History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis

23 (2020) 423–446
brill.com/hpla

Forma Dat Esse

Tracking the Rise and Fall of Formal Causality

Sylvain Roudaut
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Stockholm University,
Stockholm, Sweden
sylvain.roudaut@hotmail.com

Abstract

This paper offers an overview of the history of the axiom forma dat esse, which was
commonly quoted during the Middle Ages to describe formal causality. The first part
of the paper studies the origin of this principle, and recalls how the ambiguity of
Boethius’s first formulation of it in the De Trinitate was variously interpreted by the
members of the School of Chartres. Then, the paper examines the various declensions
of the axiom that existed in the late Middle Ages, and shows how its evolution sig-
nificantly follows the progressive decline of the Aristotelian model of formal causality.

Keywords

forma dat esse – form – essence – hylomorphism – matter – plurality of forms

1 Forma dat esse rei. Introduction

What do Aristotle’s theory of formal causation and the Roman law have in
common? It is rarely pointed out that the formula ‘Forma dat esse rei’—one of
the most common principles of scholastic metaphysics—was also an impor-
tant maxim of the Roman law. In this legal context, the complete principle—
In solemnibus forma dat esse rei—meant that solemn acts are valid only if
they follow formal procedures (contracts have to be written, for instance).
This principle, which obviously had in philosophical matters a quite differ-
ent sense, was widely quoted in the Middle Ages to describe formal causality
from an Aristotelian point of view. The principle forma dat esse bridges two

© mentis Verlag, 2020 | doi:10.30965/26664275-02302007 Downloaded from Brill.com10/14/2022 02:12:06PM

via communal account
424 Roudaut

fundamental notions of medieval ontology, namely form and being. Although

major studies on the first Boethian version of this axiom have already high-
lighted its importance for the evolution of medieval thought (Hadot 1970, 143–
156; Fabro 1961a; Fabro 1961b, 407–436; Dewan 2006; Porcell 2013, 335–359), the
exact origin of its most common version ( forma dat esse) has not been stud-
ied in detail. Similarly, the many declensions of this principle have not been
analyzed despite its great importance for the history of formal causation. As
a matter of fact, the multiple variations of the adage forma dat esse—quoted
most of the time with a noun in the dative case ( forma dat esse rei / materiae /
subjecto / individuo / aggregato / composito, etc.)—are highly significant for
the history of formal causality and its relation to the concept of esse. Indeed,
the ambiguity of the formula made possible quite different uses of it, depend-
ing on the way the term ‘esse’ was interpreted.
The aim of this paper is to fill this gap in the history of formal causation,
by explaining the historical emergence of the principle forma dat esse, and by
studying its most significant variations in the late Middle Ages. After recalling
the origin of the principle in Boethius’s works, it will be shown how the formula
‘forma dat esse’ became a philosophical axiom in the 12th century (section 2).
Then, we will see how the various declensions of this principle followed the
evolution of medieval hylomorphism, depending on how the relation of form
to matter and the physical composition of substance were understood (sec-
tion 3), and how essential properties, powers and actions were interpreted in
the late Middle Ages (section 4).

2 Forma dat esse materiae. The Sources of an ‘Aristotelian’ Axiom

2.1 Omne esse ex forma est. Boethius’s Original Principle

Form is arguably one of the most central concept of Aristotle’s ontology, bind-
ing together his fundamental views on the structure of concrete substances
and the nature of causality. Together with matter, form provides the concep-
tual basis of hylomorphism—the view according to which concrete substanc-
es are compounds of matter and form. Presented in the Middle Ages as an
axiom of the Aristotelian theory of formal causality, the expression ‘forma dat
esse’ has no precise equivalent in the Stagirite’s original works. Nevertheless,
it cannot be denied that this expression corresponds to the role Aristotle at-
tributed to form, when he identified in book Zeta of his Metaphysics the form
of a thing with its essence, or what it is (to ti en einai). The idea of a causal
relation between form and being appears in the Metaphysics when Aristotle
describes the ousia, identified with the eidos, as the “cause of being” (aition tou

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (2020) 423–446

Downloaded from Brill.com10/14/2022 02:12:06PM
via communal account
Forma Dat Esse 425

einai).1 However, the semantic indeterminacy of the Latin term ‘esse’ has no
real equivalent in Aristotle’s texts. Whereas this term can be used in quantified
expressions (‘omne esse …’), ‘esse’ can ambiguously refer to the act of existence
or the essence of a thing. It was Boethius who in his De Trinitate formulated
the original axiom relating form and ‘esse’, stating that all being is from form,
or comes from form: omne esse ex forma est. To clarify the meaning of this
proposition, Boethius gave the example of a bronze statue: “Omne namque
esse ex forma est. Statua enim non secundum aes quod est materia sed se-
cundum formam qua in eo insignita est effigies animalis dicitur, ipsumque
aes non secundum terram quod est eius materia sed dicitur secundum aeris
figuram” (Boethius 1891, 1250).The analogy between a statue and the metal it
is made of, on the one hand, and form and matter, on the other hand, is quite
clear. Nonetheless, Boethius’s text contains a certain ambiguity: it remains un-
certain whether the role of form is simply to structure and organize a preex-
isting matter in a specific way, or to give existence to matter and thereby to
the compound substance.2 In other words, it is not entirely clear that form,
in Boethius’s axiom, assumes a role of existential actualization in top of its
essential determination.3 If the term ‘esse’ does not make it possible to dif-
ferentiate what will be called later “essence” and “existence”, Boethius draws a
sharp distinction in the De Hebdomadibus between esse, provided by form, and
id quod est, namely the concrete subject informed by it (Boethius 1891, 1311; on
this distinction, see Marenbon 2003, 88–90). The intimate link between form
and its ontological function is further evidenced by the phrase ‘forma essendi’,
that Boethius sometimes employs, and which will receive a radical interpreta-
tion in the School of Chartres.

2.2 Forma essendi. The Medieval Reception of Boethius’s Formula

Members of this school have a decisive role in the philosophical transmission
of Boethius’s axiom. Commenting on Boethius’s Opuscula sacra, the members
of the School of Chartres tend to identify the notion of form with God defined
as the forma essendi. Given that the axiom omne esse ex forma est found in
the De Trinitate seems to attribute to form the power to give individual exis-
tence, authors such Clarembald of Arras and Thierry of Chartres will consider

1 Aristotle Metaphysics H 2, 1043a2; H 3, 1043b11–14.

2 Hadot saw in this indeterminate meaning the transposition into Latin of Porphyry’s einai,
understood as the first hypostasis in his Neoplatonist doctrine; see Hadot 1970, 151–152.
3 For the view that Boethius fails to properly distinguish between essence and existence, see
Brosch 1933, 7–73, 95–120; on the idea that Boethius favors an essentialist understanding of
‘esse’, see De Rijk 1988, 1–29.

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (2020) 423–446

Downloaded from Brill.com10/14/2022 02:12:06PM
via communal account
426 Roudaut

it as a description of God’s creation.4 It need hardly be said that within a hylo-

morphic conception of the sensible universe, the description of God as forma
essendi presented a risk of misinterpretation, for it could mean that God is
immanently present in every substance. Such a confusion between form and
God as the true cause of being (Deus dat esse) led Amaury of Bene in the 12th
century to his doctrine of formal pantheism according to which God is the
“principium formale omnium rerum”, i.e. the form of every being (Capelle 1932,
42). To avoid this confusion, Thierry of Chartres clearly distinguishes God con-
ceived as the first form or forma essendi and the created forms inhering in ma-
terial compounds. Because the sensible forms present in material compounds
are derived from the first form as imitations of its perfection, God can be called
the form of forms ( forma formarum).5

2.3 Forma dat esse hyle. Avicenna and Efficient Causation

Simultaneously, the reflections on the relation between form and being were
led in a quite different way in the Arabic tradition. An important milestone
for the history of formal causality is Avicenna’s philosophical system, which
relies on the introduction a new type of cause. Indeed, the way Avicenna
(† 1037) defines efficient causation significantly departs from the usual pre-
sentation of the four Aristotelian causes.6 In his Metaphysics of the Šifā, effi-
cient cause, which first applies to the divine mode of creation, is defined as
that which gives being to something distinct from itself. In contrast, a mov-
ing cause only brings motion in a preexisting subject, whereas a formal cause
transmits an ontological determination not entirely distinct from itself, in-
sofar as form communicates itself and thus explains resemblance in natural
processes. Avicenna’s motivations for introducing this distinction lie in his
Neoplatonic influences. Although Avicenna is willing to respect Aristotle’s

4 Thierry of Chartres, Tractatus de sex dierum operibus in Thierry of Chartres 1971, 568, l. 96;
574, l. 56; see also 573, l. 36 for the phrase “forma omnium rerum”; Abbreviatio monacensis De
Hebdomadibus, II, see esp. 22–38, in Thierry of Chartres 1971, 409–412; Clarembald of Arras,
Expositio super librum Boetii De hebdomadibus, 18–19, in Clarembald of Arras 1965, 200–201;
see also Tractatus super librum Boetii De Trinitate, 23, in Clarembald of Arras 1965, 116. On the
relation of these phrases with Boethius’s doctrine, see Häring 1956; Galonnier 2007, 337–345;
Erismann 2009.
5 Thierry of Chartres, Abbreviatio monacensis De Hebdomadibus, II, 26 (Thierry of Chartres
1971, 409–410, ll. 59–61); on this point, see Garin 1958, 57sq. See also Gilbert of Poitiers 1966,
89, ll. 5–6.
6 See Richardson 2013; Marmura 1984. The phrase ‘causa agens’ appears more frequently in
the Avicenna latinus than the term ‘efficiens’, which will soon replace the former in the Latin
philosophical vocabulary; see for instance Thomas of Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, II,
c. 6, nn. 2–3.

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (2020) 423–446

Downloaded from Brill.com10/14/2022 02:12:06PM
via communal account
Forma Dat Esse 427

thesis of the eternity of the world, he also subscribes to the Neoplatonic idea
that the world ontologically derives from a first cause. The resulting compro-
mise is the idea of an eternal world, of which God is not only the unmoved
prime mover, but also the principle of existence (wuǧūd). With Avicenna’s fa-
mous doctrine of a Dator formarum, form itself is given by a higher cause from
which it receives existence. Even if the term ‘efficiens’ also appears in the first
Latin translations of Aristotle,7 it is hard to overestimate the importance of
Avicenna’s definition of this new kind of cause for the history of causality in
the Western thought. Indeed, the term ‘efficient cause’ will progressively be-
come the new paradigm of causality in the late Middle Ages and the Modern
Era (Gilson 1962). Avicenna’s doctrine resulted in a redefinition of the role of
form in nature. According to Avicenna, the fact that some individual belongs
to a given species comes from its form, which generates a concrete substance
when it informs matter. But even though form retains this function it already
had in Aristotle’s theory of causality, its own existence and consequently the
existence of the hylomorphic compound are necessarily produced by a higher
cause. Because of its new definition, efficient causation comes to designate in
the first place the divine process of creation, which Avicenna conceptualized
owing to the Neoplatonic concept of ‘flow’ (fayḍ, translated into Latin as flux-
us; see Hasnawi 1990). Within this vertical interpretation of efficient causality,
the hylomorphic scheme remains central for the explanation of natural phe-
nomena, but it now appears as a derived mode of causality. On the horizontal
level of natural processes, generation and corruption directly depend on the
information of matter by forms. However, the existence of forms depends itself
on a chain of causes which first principle—God—is the only absolutely neces-
sary being (Marmura 1981, 65–83). In this perspective, the act of “giving being”
is ultimately due to efficient causation: form does not give being in the most
fundamental sense; the existence of a being can only be the effect of the first
efficient cause (Richardson 2012, 251–274).
With Avicenna’s reception in the Latin world, and given that the notion of
causa efficiens became the proper model of divine action, the esse given by
form necessarily came to acquire a new meaning. Interestingly, while the no-
tion of efficient causation imposed itself from the 12th century onwards, the
concept of existence (existentia) simultaneously emerged as a new term to
refer to the being of created individuals (Bardout 2014). Whereas the notions
of existence and efficient causation appear strongly connected (medieval au-
thors often read the verb ‘ex-sistere’ as ‘to stand from/outside (ex) its cause’),

7 William of Moerbeke translated the term ‘to poioun’ (for instance in Metaphysics Δ 2, 1013b24)
by efficiens.

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (2020) 423–446

Downloaded from Brill.com10/14/2022 02:12:06PM
via communal account
428 Roudaut

the esse given by form became gradually understood as an essential determina-

tion, and form itself as a physical principle explaining the properties essential
to a given species.8 From a historical point of view, the description of God’s
act of giving being as efficere represented a decisive factor in the progressive
transformation of formal causality, but not the only one. After the translatio
studiorum bringing the Aristoteles latinus in Western Europe, Christian theo-
logians will try in their own way to reconcile Aristotle’s hylomorphism with
the Christian doctrine of creation. It must be noted, above all, that Christian
theologians could find in the Avicenna latinus a version of the axiom relating
the being of matter to form—the famous adage that will later frequently be
quoted without any indirect object: “forma […] dat esse hyle”.9

2.4 Proprietates formae, […] scilicet dare esse. Ibn Gabirol and
Gundissalinus
Gundissalinus († ca. 1190) is directly involved in the great diffusion of the
axiom forma dat esse that accompanied the reception of Aristotle’s core philo-
sophical texts and the works of his Arabic commentators, and not only be-
cause he is supposed to have translated Avicenna’s Metaphysica. It is known
that Gundissalinus was familiar with the works from the school of Chartres,
in particular those by Thierry of Chartres, which conveyed a strong Boethian
influence (Polloni 2015). The beginning of his De unitate, an early work heavily
influenced by Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae, explains Boethius’s principle according
to which every being comes from form (Gundissalinus 1891, 3). Gundissalinus
demonstrates in this short treatise that matter receives its being from form and
that form is the principle of unity in every being.
In the middle of the 12th century, Gundissalinus led the team in Toledo
that translated into Latin the Fons Vitae of Ibn Gabirol († 1070), which repre-
sents the most extensive treatise on matter and form of this period. Written in
Arabic in the 11th century, the Fons vitae exposed in a systematic manner the
thesis of the plurality of forms in compound substances. The concept of form
is introduced in the first paragraphs of the Fons Vitae together with its three
main properties (Ibn Gabirol 1995, 16, ll. 9–11):

8 It is known that the Latin reception the Metaphysics of the Šifā emphasized this essentialist
interpretation of Avicenna; see Porro 2002, 9–51.
9 Avicenna, Metaphysica II, 4 (Avicenna 1977, 102). The pseudo-Avicennian treatise Liber de
causis primis et secundis, which was widely disseminated in the Latin world towards the end
of the 12th century, literaly quotes this passage (De Vaux 1934, 107).

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (2020) 423–446

Downloaded from Brill.com10/14/2022 02:12:06PM
via communal account
Forma Dat Esse 429

(1) form subsists in something else (in alio);

(2) form perfects the essence of its subject;
(3) form gives being to its subject
The Latin phrase ‘dare esse’ appears several times in the Fons vitae (Ibn Gabirol
1995, 16, ll. 9–11; 234; l. 13; 235; ll. 19–20; see also 271, ll. 9–10 for related expres-
sions). Therefore, it is no surprise that Gundissalinus, deeply influenced by this
text, took up this expression.10 The dative form of the axiom appears in his
De anima when, after recalling Boethius’s formula, Gundissalinus defines the
soul as the form of the body and asserts that the soul gives actual being to its
subject (Gundissalinus 1940, 41; see also 55, 61–62). These two influent works
explain that the scholastic principle linking form and being, as well as the close
adage esse fluit a forma, were associated with Gundissalinus, whose identity
was commonly confused with Boethius.11

3 Forma dat esse specificum. Between Essence and Existence

From the 13th century onwards, the axiom forma dat esse became so common-
place that it would require a special survey to detail the entire list of authors
using it, often with references to the books Z and H of Aristotle’s Metaphysics.
The Auctoritates Aristotelis, a famous compilation of quotations from the new
translations of Aristotle’s works, but also including many sentences wrongly at-
tributed to him, contained the adage forma dat esse rei.12 If the task of listing all
the authors using it could be of great interest, the lexical variations of the prin-
ciple, in any case, are highly indicative of the evolution of formal causation in
the late Middle Ages. Since every philosopher or theologian of this period was
reluctant to attribute the act of giving existence to something else than God,
the phrase ‘forma dat esse’ had to be adjusted in one way or another. Therefore,
the evolution of the axiom shows how formal causation was progressively har-
monized with another model of causation—efficient causality—but also with
a series of new philosophical problems. This new situation affecting the causal
role of forms is particularly salient when looking at two problems that became
central in the 13th century: the problem of matter, on the one hand; the prob-
lem of the plurality of forms, on the other hand.

10 About the influence of Ibn Gabirol on Gundissalinus, see Fidora 2003, esp. 30, 196; Polloni
2017, 2018.
11 See for instance Peter John Olivi, Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum, q. 16
(Olivi 1922, vol. 1, 330); Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet X, q. 7 (Henry of Ghent 1981, 198).
12 Auctoritates Aristotelis 130; see also 131, 133.

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (2020) 423–446

Downloaded from Brill.com10/14/2022 02:12:06PM
via communal account
430 Roudaut

3.1 Forma facit esse in actu. The Status of Matter and the Causality
of Form
In a Christian perspective, the idea that form gives being in natural generations
had to be somehow restricted, given that everything ultimately owes its very
being to God. But once creation was distinguished from generation, the role of
form in the latter process could be interpreted in different ways depending on
the ontological status attributed to the other principles of nature. The idea that
form gives being could be taken as a quite literal truth for those who thought
that matter could not exist without it. According to Thomas Aquinas († 1274)
and Giles of Rome († 1316), matter cannot exist independently of form, thus
justifying the principle that forma dat esse materiae. However, since the first
act of giving being comes from the First cause, form gives being only in virtue
of God’s action (Dewan 2006, 2007). Therefore, even from a Thomist perspec-
tive, form always gives being insofar as it conveys the divine donation of being
(John Quidort 1961, 23).
The primacy of formal causation was sometimes challenged with the idea
that form also depends on matter in a way. In this sense, Bonaventure († 1274)
states that “existere dat materia formae, sed essendi actum dat forma materiae”.13
The meaning of Bonaventure’s sentence is clear: in the case of material forms
(other than immaterial souls, like angels, intellective forms or desincarnate
souls), form depends on matter regarding its own existence, although form
gives an essential act of being to matter. Here, the difference between exis-
tence and esse is crucial, for Bonaventure’s sentence clearly implies that the
actum essendi should not be understood in an existential sense: form is that
by which an individual hylomorphic compound possesses a given essence.
In the final third of the 13th century, this distinction between existence and
esse (in its essentialist’ interpretation) becomes even more evident from the
fact that several authors like Roger Bacon, Richard of Middleton or John Duns
Scotus, among others, attributed an actual being to matter independently of
form. The separation between matter and its form (that is to say the soul in the
case of animate beings) became even greater for those who accepted the view
that several substantial forms compose individual substances. Henry of Ghent
(† 1293), like several theologians belonging to the Franciscan order, conceived
human beings as composed of several substantial forms, while admitting at
the same time that matter could exist separately from form owing to the power
of God. This implies that the substantial form of a material compound does
not cause its fundamental act of existence, but mostly determines its essential

13 Bonaventure of Bagnoregio, Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum, II, d. 3, p. 1, a. 2,
q. 3, concl. (Bonaventure 1885, vol. 2, 110).

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (2020) 423–446

Downloaded from Brill.com10/14/2022 02:12:06PM
via communal account
Forma Dat Esse 431

properties. This distinction between the cause of existence and the specific
sense of ‘esse’ became explicit in the frequent modifications of the axiom
precising that form only gives “specific being” to its subject: forma dat esse
specificum.14 From the 13th century onwards, the view that matter possesses
an intrinsic being entailed that form also tended to be considered as a physi-
cal entity rather than a metaphysical principle responsible for its actual exis-
tence.15 Bonaventure’s idea that the existence of form also depends on matter
was shared by several authors who tried to establish the ontological priority
of matter over form. Suarez († 1617), disagreeing with the principle that form
gives being, will rather define it as an “incomplete substance” (Shields 2012,
49). Eustachius of Saint-Paul († 1640), who still endorsed a hylomorphic ontol-
ogy at the beginning of the 17th century, will offer a clear example of this inver-
sion regarding the ontological priority of form. Whereas many theologians of
the 13th century categorically refused to admit that matter could exist without
form, Eustachius will claim that form cannot exist without matter, while mat-
ter could exist without form (Eustachius of Saint-Paul 1609, vol. 2, 33–34).

3.2 Formae dantes esse in tali gradu. The Controversy over the Plurality
of Forms
From the 13th century onwards, the idea that form gives specific being also
took place in the important controversy over the unity or plurality of substan-
tial forms, that is to say the problem to determine whether compound sub-
stances like human beings or other living creatures are made up from one or
more substantial forms (Callus 1961, De Boer 2013, 36–43; Pasnau 2011, 574–605;
Zavalloni 1951). The unicists like Thomas Aquinas or Giles of Rome, claimed
that compound substances possess a unique substantial form that gives them
actual, substantial and specific being at the same time. According to the uni-
cists, the distinct attributes of a substance (for example life, sensitivity and
intellectuality in the case of human beings) cannot be attributed to distinct
forms, although no absolute consensus existed among unicists about the way
those faculties and properties relate to form.
For some of them, like Thomas Aquinas, they are really distinct powers,
although grounded in one and the same form.16 Others, like John Buridan,
endorsed the opinion usually ascribed to Augustine that the powers of the

14 See for instance Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet X, q. 5 (Henry of Ghent 1981, 82); Quodlibet IV,
q. 13 (Henry of Ghent 2001, 126).
15 See Pasnau 2004.
16 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 77; Quaestiones disputatae de anima, a. 11–13.

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (2020) 423–446

Downloaded from Brill.com10/14/2022 02:12:06PM
via communal account
432 Roudaut

soul are distinct relations to different objects.17 In any case, according to most
unicists, the same form gives actual being to matter (“forma dat esse actuale
materiae”18) and causes the proper and essential properties of a substance. In
contrast, the pluralists regarded the material substance as composed of several
forms corresponding to its essential properties: in the most common version of
this theory, a human being has a form of corporeity, a form corresponding to its
vital activities, another to its sensitive operations, and a last one correspond-
ing to its intellectual faculties. Only this last form determines which species
the individual substance belongs to: ultima forma dat esse specificum, although
other forms can be said to give being in a less strict sense, or in according to a
certain degree (Matthew of Aquasparta 1957, 167).
Despite their divergent conceptions of the material composite, the unicists
and the pluralists equally tried to adjust the axiom forma dat esse to their point
of view. On the one hand, the unicists often relied on the transcendental equiv-
alence of being and unity to deduce that only one substantial form could be
present in a material substance. Since forma dat esse, and since unum esse ab
una forma, the material substance cannot include more than one substantial
form. On the other hand, the pluralists also tried to adjust the same principle
to their own position. From their point of view, the idea that form gives specific
being was a way to justify the validity of the Aristotelian axiom. Relying on
the principle that a denomination predicable of a subject depends on its form
(denominatio a forma est), the pluralists could also argue that the multiple
properties attributed to a substance were logical counterparts of the various
forms really composing it. To ground this correspondence theory, since every
essential predicate implies the presence of a form in the material substance,
the axiom forma dat esse was often extended to take into account this seman-
tical aspect. Following this line of thought, Henry of Harclay († 1317)—who
sided with the pluralists—claimed that “ultima forma dat nomen et speciem”.19

17 John Buridan, In Metaphysicen Aristotelis quaestiones argutissimae, VII, q. 14: forms can
be divided into a plurality of quantitative parts (Buridan 1518, f. 49va) but not into several
forms corresponding to different faculties or essential attributes (ff. 49vb–50ra). For a re-
cent study and the relevant bibliography, see De Boer 2013, 227–251.
18 See for instance Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 29, a. 2, ad. 5m.
19 Henry of Harclay, Quaestiones ordinariae, q. 8, n. 81 (Henry of Harclay 2008, 384). One of
the pluralist theories relying most explicitly on the correspondence between predicates
and forms is defended by John of Jandun; see esp. Quaestiones in duodecim libros meta-
physicae, II, q. 10 (John of Jandun 1525, ff. 30vb–34vb); Quaestiones in libros physicorum
Aristotelis, VI, q. 8 (John of Jandun 1488, ff. 115va–121ra).

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (2020) 423–446

Downloaded from Brill.com10/14/2022 02:12:06PM
via communal account
Forma Dat Esse 433

3.3 Forma dat aliud esse ossi et aliud esse carni. Essential and
Accidental Composition
Like other philosophers and theologians of his time, Henry of Harclay sub-
scribed to an extreme version of the pluralist view according to which every
material part of a corporeal substance possesses its own substantial form (the
limbs, the flesh, the bones, etc.). According to this position, which John Duns
Scotus († 1308) had previously defended, those different substantial forms
corresponding to bodily parts were called “partial forms” ( formae partiales).20
According to Henry, despite the transcendental equivalence of being and
unity, this plurality of forms does not imply a plurality of beings within the
same substance. Even though one being can be divided into several partial be-
ings, those partial forms compose a unique being because each one provides a
partial being contributing to the total being of the individual substance.
Around 1350, Nicole Oresme († 1382) defended a similar version of the plu-
rality of forms according to which the soul is composed of multiple partial
forms corresponding to the different bodily organs. Except in the case of in-
tellectual souls, which are simple and unextended, souls are extended forms
composed of distinct partial forms, each of which gives a particular being to its
corresponding organ. Oresme calls the soul a “heterogeneous form” and modi-
fies the principle accordingly: “Anima bruti est forma heterogenea, […] dat aliud
esse ossi et aliud esse carni”.21 The thesis that one form can be composed of mul-
tiple formal parts will culminate two centuries later with Zabarella († 1589).
The Italian philosopher will claim that a hundred substantial forms can co-
exist in the same body without compromising the unity of a being: whereas
different “general beings” (being a body, being an animal, being a man) can
perfectly coexist and be colocated, only one “special being” (being a man, and
not a horse) can exist in one individual.22 The argument that the distinction of
bodily organs entails the plurality forms was rejected by those who considered
the forms of organs as accidental forms, and not substantial ones. Indeed, the
controversy over the plurality of forms only involved substantial ones, since no
one denied that several accidental forms (belonging to different genera) could
inform the same subject. The thesis that only substantial forms ground the es-
sential attributes of a substance was usually specified in a twofold declension

20 Henry of Harclay, Quaestiones ordinariae, q. 8, op. cit.; John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones
super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis VII, q. 20 (Duns Scotus 1997).
21 Nicole Oresme, Quaestiones de anima II, 5 (Oresme 1995, 151).
22 Jacopo Zabarella, De communi rerum generatione et interitu, De rebus naturalibus
(Zabarella 2016, 502, ll. 8–28).

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (2020) 423–446

Downloaded from Brill.com10/14/2022 02:12:06PM
via communal account
434 Roudaut

of the axiom: forma substantialis dat esse simpliciter, whereas forma accidenta-
lis dat esse secundum quid.23
For similar reasons, following Aristotle’s conception of artifacts, artificial
forms were not supposed to give being in the sense of a substantial determina-
tion: the form of a house, for instance, does not give substantial existence to
its parts, for it only consists in the spatial of already existing substantial parts.
On the contrary, the soul gives being simpliciter because the bodily parts can-
not subsist without it.24 In any case, the idea that only a substantial form gives
being simpliciter, i.e. provides the first actualization of a substance, did not
by itself constitute a definitive argument for or against the plurality of forms,
since both sides respected it. Even though the axiom forma dat esse was shown
to be compatible with extreme versions of the plurality of forms, this evolu-
tion of medieval hylomorphism entailed new challenges for the explanation
of the unity of material substances. Despite becoming increasingly dominant,
the plurality of forms never led to an absolute consensus among late scholastic
authors. As a matter of fact, the pluralist position blurred the distinction be-
tween essential composition (defining the relation between form and matter)
and integral composition (characterizing the relation between the material
parts of a substance).

4 Forma dat esse rei, distingui et operari. Forms, Properties and

Actions

4.1 Pars formalis non dat esse, sed forma per ipsam. Forms and
Intermediary Distinctions
In the Aristotelian tradition, form is not only the principle accounting for the
unity of a material individual. It is also the unifying principle of the various
properties characterizing a substance of a given species. As such, form explains
how different properties—essential properties belonging to a given species
and the necessary accidents following from it (such as specific faculties)—
stem from a unique principle. In a hylomorphic framework, form ensures that
the essential properties belonging to some entity are not a mere collection of
random properties but constitute a coherent unity. Thus, the concept of formal
causation aims to justify a causal dependence between the essential properties
of a given being and its form.

23 An alternative formulation is that “forma accidentalis dat esse tale”. See for instance
Walter Burley 1970, 10; Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 76, a. 4, resp.
24 See again Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de anima, a. 10, ad 16m.

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (2020) 423–446

Downloaded from Brill.com10/14/2022 02:12:06PM
via communal account
Forma Dat Esse 435

Because of the non-material character of form, medieval philosophers did

not identify this causal relation with a type of physical causality, but rather
with a metaphysical dependence that was often captured in the phrase that
essential attributes ‘flow ( fluere) from form’.25 However, the task of precising
the nature of this type of causality encountered serious difficulties. On the one
hand, form could hardly be identified with the various properties depending
on it. Indeed, form conceived as a mere sum of properties would lose its onto-
logical simplicity (contrasting with the composition of material entities) and
its unifying function (regarding the multiplicity of essential properties).
On the other hand, considering form as a cause entirely distinct from its
effects also raised strong objections: while formal causation was supposed to
explain the resemblance of distinct individuals belonging to the same species,
it was also supposed to ground the very nature of their properties. Towards
the end of the 13th century, a new trend appeared in the debates about the
relations between form and the various properties depending from it. Trying
to make sense of the intimate connection between forms, essential properties
and necessary accidents, several philosophers made use of a special type of
distinction in between the distinction of reason and the real distinction.
A great variety of attempts were made to justify such an intermediary
distinction (distinctio media) weaker than a distinction between forms. The
Franciscan philosopher Peter John Olivi († 1298) designed for instance the
concept of formal part (pars formalis). A formal part, according to Olivi, is a
component of a form that does not have an independent existence from the
total form it is part of. Olivi employed this notion to explain the relations be-
tween the forms of the organs in the body and between the distinct faculties in
the soul (Olivi 1924, vol. 2, qq. 50–54). Olivi described this new concept by pre-
cising the ontological function of a formal part compared to the role of forms
strictly speaking: “pars formalis non dat esse, sed forma per ipsam”.26 What is
true of Olivi also goes for similar innovations developed around the concept
of form.
Like Olivi, John Duns Scotus accepted the principle that form gives being,27
and that an individual substance can be composed of a plurality of partial
forms. Since every form gives being, Scotus conceded that a single individual
is composed of a plurality of esse making up the total being of the substance,

25 For a recent study on the use of this phrase in the 13th century, see Erhet 2017.
26 Peter John Olivi 1924, vol. 2, 36; on this aspect of Olivi’s anthropology, see Schneider 1973,
230.
27 On the difference between Scotus’s reading of Forma dat esse and former interpretations
of it, like Aquinas’s, see Gilson 2018, 561.

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (2020) 423–446

Downloaded from Brill.com10/14/2022 02:12:06PM
via communal account
436 Roudaut

speaking of partial beings (esse partialia) to describe the internal structure of

complex substances. Only the total form gives being in the sense that it defines
the species of an individual substance, but this total form includes several par-
tial forms, each causing a part of the total being: “Et isto modo concedo quod
‘esse’ istud totale est completive ab una forma, quae dat toti illud quod est, sed ex
hoc non sequitur quod in toto includatur praecise una forma vel quin in toto in-
cludantur plures formae non tanquam specifice constituentes illud compositum,
sed tanquam quaedam inclusa in potentiali illius compositi” (John Duns Scotus
2010, 255; on this point, see Ward 2014, esp. chpt. V).
On top of his views on the plurality of forms, and like his predecessors Peter
John of Olivi and Henry of Ghent, Scotus also invented new concepts for enti-
ties he did not want to consider as forms. His famous concepts of formalitas
and formal distinction refer to properties predicable of a substance but not
reducible to forms strictly speaking.28 Scotus and his followers had to show
how the axiom forma dat esse should be understood in relation of these new
entities that Scotus employed on several topics. On the problem of individu-
ation, for instance, the followers of Scotus could explain how form gives spe-
cific being to its subject, whereas only a particular formalitas or realitas gives
individual being to it.29 In the same way, Scotus could explain how one and
the same soul can perform distinct operations without having to postulate any
internal composition of forms in it.30
From the 14th century onwards, following the ideas of John Duns Scotus,
several authors used the concept of formalitas to refer to a property thought
of as real but inferior to the ontological status of forms. One of the main rep-
resentatives of the Scotist school in the 14th century, the Franciscan theolo-
gian Peter Thomae, offered in a short treatise entitled De formis one of the
most detailed analysis of the principle according to which form gives being.
The second question of his treatise is dedicated to understand if every form
gives being simpliciter.31 In order to answer this question Peter Thomae distin-
guishes the various modalities according to which forms can give being (esse
simpliciter, esse perfectum, esse specificum, esse imperfectum, esse rationale).
Although Peter indicates that the plurality of formalities does not always entail

28 John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3.

29 John Duns Scotus 1997, vol. 2, 187–242. Referring to Scotus’s theory of individuation, which
involves the notion of formalitas or realitas, Franciscus Antonius Casmirius explains that:
“Sicut forma dat esse specificum ita ultima realitas formae dat esse individuale” (Casmirius
1607, 331); see also Philippus Faber 1616, 610B.
30 On the many uses of the formal distinction in Duns Scotus, see Wolter 1965; Grajewski
1944; Cross 2013; Blander 2014, esp. 6–84.
31 Peter Thomae, Quaestiones de formis, Ms. Vat. Lat. 2190, ff. 146r–146v.

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (2020) 423–446

Downloaded from Brill.com10/14/2022 02:12:06PM
via communal account
Forma Dat Esse 437

a plurality of forms, the main arguments against the claim that every form
gives being simpliciter stem from the hypothesis that several substantial forms
coexist in the same substance. Indeed, what informs something already exist-
ing is accidental to it and only informs it secundum quid.
Having distinguished various meanings of the expression ‘secundum quid’
and the opposite adverb ‘simpliciter’, Peter deduces a series of conclusions re-
garding the axiom forma dat esse. In the first sense of being simpliciter, i.e.
to exist independently of anything else, no created form (be it substantial or
accidental) gives being simpliciter, for only God does.32 But created forms can
give being simpliciter according to other meanings of the term. For instance,
every form gives being insofar as it does not only exist in the active potency
of a subject, or in the passive potency of matter, but also in effectu. Every form
predicable of the whole subject gives being simpliciter in the sense that it does
not denominate it like an accident or a simple part of it. More generally, every
form giving specific or perfect being (esse perfectum seu specificum) gives being
simpliciter. From that, it can also be inferred that not every form gives being
in the sense of giving subsistence.33 Only the ultimate substantial form gives
being in the sense that it completes the potentiality of matter and brings about
the unity of a substance. Nonetheless, the difference between substantial and
accidental forms can be maintained even if the plurality of forms is conceded,
without violating the principle that something added to an actual being must
be an accident.
The great complexity of Peter Thomae’s distinctions to clarify the meaning
of the axiom forma dat esse shows how the problem of the plurality of forms
could be seen as a threat for the unity of the hylomorphic compound. It also
shows how the development of Scotism in the 14th century, with the new con-
cepts of formalitas and realitas, generated a new approach to hylomorphism
leading to the need to spell out the exact status of formal causation.

4.2 Forma dat solum operari. Hylomorphism and the Separability of

the Soul
It has been suggested that the use of intermediary distinctions to explain the
relations of properties within complex substances progressively led to a new
definition of forms, conceived as causal autonomous agents, and not only
as principles of action (Cross 2014, 138–149; Cross 2008). For authors such as

32 Peter Thomae, Quaestiones de formis, f. 146v: “Prima conclusio, nulla forma seu substantia-
lis seu accidentalis dat [esse] simpliciter primo modo”.
33 Peter Thomae, Quaestiones de formis, f. 146v: “Quartum [correlarium] quod quaelibet
forma substantialis dat esse subsistentie est falsum”.

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (2020) 423–446

Downloaded from Brill.com10/14/2022 02:12:06PM
via communal account
438 Roudaut

Thomas Aquinas, forms were most of all principles of action insofar as a form
such as hotness does not act by itself but only through a hot body.34 According
to Thomas Aquinas, forms are not the subjects of action, in the sense that ac-
tions cannot be directly attributed to them, even if a substance acts owing
to powers that depend from its specific form. For Aquinas, the fact that form
does not operate directly is due to its ontological status: form may be an indi-
vidual principle—the metaphysical principle accounting for specific powers
and faculties—but not a material entity interacting directly with the physical
world. Thus, according to Thomas Aquinas, the form of a substance only desig-
nates the principle (principium) of action, that by which something acts.35 In
contrast, actions are attributed to forms themselves by Henry of Ghent and
John Duns Scotus, leading to a new interpretation of the idea that actions come
from form (“operatio est ab forma” or “illud quo primo aliquid operatur est forma
operantis”).36 The idea of an intermediary distinction between properties (the
intentional distinction in the case of Henry of Ghent; the formal distinction
in Scotus) allows one to attribute different properties to the same form as if
it were their subject of inherence. In this sense, the theories of intermediary
distinctions from the end of the 13th century onwards might have contributed
to reinforce the ontological robustness of forms, thus favouring strong dualist
positions regarding the soul-body relationship. But the same theories might
also have accelerated—in the opposite direction—the physicalist interpreta-
tion of forms typical of the late Middle Ages.
Indeed, the description of form as a causal agent could not but further re-
duce the particular role of formal causation in the framework of natural phi-
losophy. In fact, the attribution of immediate action to forms brought their
causal activity closer to efficient causation. Together with the thesis that mat-
ter possesses an actuality of its own, this reinterpretation of formal cause in
terms of agency contributed to the more general reshaping of forms as physi-
cal entities. As such, by the very evolution of medieval hylomorphism, formal
cause as a sui generis type of metaphysical causality became more and more
superfluous, as it was stripped of its specificity and divided between the two
standpoints it originally aimed to avoid—dualism and materialism.
Philosophers such as William of Ockham († 1347) and John Buridan († 1363)
were famously hostile to Duns Scotus’s theory of properties formally distinct

34 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 75, a. 2, resp.

35 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 76, a. 1, resp.; a. 4, resp.; a. 6, resp.; Quodlibet I,
q. 4, a. 1, resp., ad 2m.
36 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, II, c. 47, n. 4. On the use of this principle in
late medieval scholastics, see De Libera 2008, 421–426.

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (2020) 423–446

Downloaded from Brill.com10/14/2022 02:12:06PM
via communal account
Forma Dat Esse 439

in one substance, and chose to define the powers of the soul either as forms
or as different relations of the same spiritual substance to distinct operations.37
Their reductionist views, however, went along with the ongoing tendency to
regard forms as agents, and not only as the principles of action of the subject.
According to the nominalist via moderna, the concept of form also refers to an
autonomous entity to which actions can be properly attributed.
The semantical problem of attributing agent-causal predicates to forms
or only to subjects is far from being a marginal issue in the history of formal
causation in the Middle Ages. Here again, the declensions of the axiom forma
dat esse are indicative of the evolution of hylomorphism, and in particular of
the relations between forms and the concept of action. Since the perfections
characterizing a being are in any case attributed to it owing to its form, the
association of being and operation in the adage was common in natural phi-
losophy, metaphysics and theology: forma dat esse et operari.38 Owing to the
Aristotelian distinction between first and secondary acts, even those reluctant
to consider forms as autonomous causal agents could explain this identifica-
tion of being and operation regarding the causality of form: whereas form is
the immediate and proximate principle of being, it is the mediate and remote
principle of action (agere sequitur esse).39
Since the end of the 13th century, several philosophers inspired by Averroes
denied that human intellects could be defined as forms inhering in their sub-
ject. According to Thomas Wylton (2010), the human intellect is an assisting
form, i.e. a form that does not strictly inform its subject but only enables it to
perform a specific operation: forma dans solum operari.40 The human soul is
neither an informing form nor a totally separate motor, but a separate, non-
informing form responsible for the essential properties of human beings only
through (intellectual) operations.
At the end of the Middle Ages, the term forma assistens understood as a
form dans solum operari will become common, and systematically opposed
to forma inhaerens, which refers to a material form immediately joined to its

37 Ockham’s position on the problem has been studied in detail in McCord Adams 1976.
38 As such, the principle was still employed by modern theologians since the perfection of
a form—depending on its capacity to give being or operation alone—could be used to
explain the relations between the divine persons within God’s essence. See for instance
Franz Henno 1719, vol. 1, 80A; Charles René Billuart 1778, 240B.
39 Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, III, c. 69, n. 20; Scriptum super Sententiis, III,
d. 3, q. 2, a 1, resp. The term ‘operari’ will often replace the verb ‘agere’ in later formula-
tions: “operari sequitur esse” or “operatio sequitur ad esse eique proportionatur”.
40 The same idea can be found in John of Jandun’s Quaestiones de anima II, 1 (John of Jandun
1587, 69–70).

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (2020) 423–446

Downloaded from Brill.com10/14/2022 02:12:06PM
via communal account
440 Roudaut

subject (Brenet 2013, 76–104; De Libera 2014). However, the notion of forma as-
sistens will be heavily criticized since theological authorities demanded to de-
fine the human soul as an ‘inhering’ or ‘informing’ form. Nonetheless, several
Averroist defenders of this idea tried to show that a non-inhering or separate
form could be conceived in a consistent manner as a forma non dans esse.41 In
the early modern period, authors like Zabarella will still refer to this opposi-
tion between informing form and assisting form, as well as Pietro Pomponazzi,
who might have been directly targeted by the Fifth Council of the Lateran
(1512–1517) against the conception of the human soul as an assisting form.42 By
rejecting the idea that souls could act or give operation without inhering in
the body, late medieval philosophers did not eliminate the ambiguity proper
to the scholastic concept of substantial form. On the contrary, while insisting
on the substantiality of the human soul together with its metaphysical simplic-
ity, they were committed to define it as an inhering principle immanently and
somehow wholly present in the body.

5 Concluding Remarks

From these elements, several conclusions can be drawn. First, the precise ori-
gin of the principle forma dat esse, in this literal version, cannot be properly
attributed to Aristotle, Boethius or their commentators. The principle pro-
gressively appeared in the 12th century from a complex combination of these
sources that includes the Neoplatonic influences of Avicenna and Ibn Gabirol.
Its compatibility both with the core philosophical works of Aristotle and the
Christian doctrine of Boethius explains its fast and wide dissemination in me-
dieval philosophical works.
Second, this principle paradoxically imposed itself when no one was will-
ing to accept seriously the idea that form really gives existence. The use of the

41 The members of the Bologna Averroist school of the first half of the 14th century admit
the equivalence of giving being and inhering, while defending the idea that a form can
give operation only. See for instance James of Piacenza: “dare esse formae et inhaerere
formae idem sunt, ergo falsum est, quod dat esse et non inhaeret” (James of Piacenza 1967,
184); see also Matthew of Gubbio 1981, 200.
42 Zabarella 2016, 1075–1076; Pietro Pomponazzi, Expositio super De anima, Ms. Napoli,
Biblioteca Nazionale, VIII D 81, f. 88r: “[…] notandum quod secundum eaos qui tenent uni-
tatem intellecus, et quod si immaterialis et abstractus, ponunt [sic] duas formas in homine:
formam scilicet assistentem, et est intellectus, et formam dantem esse, et talis et est cogita-
tiva” (quoted in Bakker 2007, 163–164).

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (2020) 423–446

Downloaded from Brill.com10/14/2022 02:12:06PM
via communal account
Forma Dat Esse 441

principle rather coincides with the emergence of efficient causation as a new

model of causal explanation.
Third, the emergence of efficient causation as well as theological debates
over the status of matter led to a chain reaction that impacted the status of
forms: since matter can exist without form, form is no longer identified with
an abstract metaphysical principle giving existence to it, and progressively
becomes a physical entity possessing an intrinsic partibility. The main de-
clensions of the adage forma dat esse correspond to these redefinitions of
hylomorphism according to its main applications (natural philosophy, meta-
physics and theology).
Fourth, the variations of the adage suggest how medieval hylomorphism,
through various innovations, became eventually exposed to the violent criti-
cisms against it—those from Descartes in particular—that will characterize
the beginnings of modern philosophy. On the one hand, the distinction be-
tween hylomorphic composition and integral composition became fuzzy due
to the idea that forms are divisible and spatially extended entities. On the other
hand, the reluctance towards alternative approaches to hylomorphism—like
the thesis of assisting forms—forced philosophers and theologians to define
every soul as really present in the body despite its ontological simplicity, just
like God was supposed to be present to the world, and not only secundum op-
erationem. This conception reinforced the conceptual tension affecting the
‘monstrous’ notion of substantial form: while souls understood as forms in the
Aristotelian sense (as the function of the body) were increasingly conceived
as physical extended entities, the human soul was still defined as a substance
in the Augustinian sense, i.e. as an autonomous and immaterial entity wholly
present in the body in which it inheres.
The scholastic principle forma dat esse was obviously too loose to define
precise doctrinal contents about formal causation, and did not entail specific
positions on the many points of detail of the hylomorphic doctrine. But its
vagueness is precisely the reason why it is so interesting for the history of for-
mal causation to track its various declensions. Every modification of the theory
of formal causation had to respect the letter of this principle and to remain
somehow compatible with it to be considered as an orthodox and valid doc-
trine. The intellectual and institutional context of medieval thought was such
that philosophers always had to check their innovations regarding the list of
authorities they considered as beyond dispute. In this respect, the evolution
of the Aristotelian theory of form conformed to what was explicitly demand-
ed by the Roman law for the validity of procedures: in solemnibus, forma dat
esse rei.

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (2020) 423–446

Downloaded from Brill.com10/14/2022 02:12:06PM
via communal account
442 Roudaut

Acknowledgement

The author wishes to thank two anonymous referees for their comments on a
previous version of this paper.

Bibliography

Primary Texts
[Anonymous.] Liber de causis primis et secundis. De Vaux, R. (ed.), 1934. L’Avicennisme
latin aux confins des XIIe–XIIIe siècles. Paris: Vrin.
[Anonymous.] Auctoritates Aristotelis. Hamesse, J. (ed.), 1974. Les Auctoritates Aristotelis.
Un florilège médiéval. Etude historique et edition critique (Philosophes Medievaux).
Paris: Louvain Publications Universitaires.
[Avicenna.] Metaphysica. In: Van Riet, S. (ed.). Avicenna latinus, Liber de philosophia
prima sive de scientia divina. 1977. Leiden: Brill.
[Boethius.] De Hebdomadibus. In: Migne, J.-P. (ed.), 1891. Patrologia Latina 64. Paris:
Garnier.
[Boethius.] De Trinitate. In: Migne, J.-P. (ed.), 1891. Patrologia Latina 64. Paris: Garnier.
[Bonaventure of Bagnoregio.] Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum. In: 1882–
1889. Opera omnia. Vols. 1–4. Quaracchi: Collegium Sancti Bonaventurae.
[Clarembald of Arras.] Expositio super librum Boetii De hebdomadibus. Häring, N. M.
(ed.), 1965. The Life and Works of Clarembald of Arras: A Twelfth Century Master of
the School of Chartres. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.
[Dominicus Gundissalinus.] De unitate. In: Correns, P. (ed.), 1891. Die dem Boethius
fälschlich zugeschriebene Abhandlung des Dominicus Gundisalvi De unitate.
Münster: Aschendorff.
[Dominicus Gundissalinus.] De anima. In: Muckle, J. T. (ed.), 1940. The treatise De
anima of Dominicus Gundissalinus, Mediaeval Studies 2, 23–103.
[Eustachius of Saint-Paul.] 1609. Summa Philosophiae Quadripartita. 2 vols., vol. 2,
Paris: Carolum Chastellain.
[Franciscus Antonius Casmirius.] 1607. Scotus dilucidatus in secundo sententiarum.
Naples: Iacobum Carlinum.
[Franz Henno.] 1719. Theologia dogmatica, moralis et scholastica. 2 vols., vol. 1, Venice:
Antonium Bortoli.
[Gilbert of Poitiers.] The Commentaries of Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers. Häring, N. M.
(ed.), 1966. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.
[Henry of Ghent.] Quodlibet IV. In: Etzkorn, G. J. & Wilson, G. (eds.), 2001. Henrici de
Gandavo Opera omnia 8. Leuven: Leuven University Press.

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (2020) 423–446

Downloaded from Brill.com10/14/2022 02:12:06PM
via communal account
Forma Dat Esse 443

[Henry of Ghent.] Quodlibet X. In: Macken, R. (ed.), 1981. Henrici de Gandavo Opera

omnia 14. Leuven: Leuven University Press – Leiden: Brill.
[Henry of Harclay.] Quaestiones ordinariae. Henninger, M. G. (ed.), 2008. Auctores
Britannici Medii Aevi XVII. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[Jacopo Zabarella.] De rebus naturalibus libri XXX. 2 vols. In: Valverde, J. M. G. (ed.),
2016. Leiden: Brill.
[James of Piacenza.] Lectura cum quaestionibus super tertium de anima. Kuksewicz, Z.
(ed.), 1967. Wroclaw: Ossolineum.
[John Duns Scotus.] Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis. Etzkorn, G. J.
& Wolter, A. B. (eds.), 1997. St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute Publications.
[John Duns Scotus.] Ordinatio. In: Vatican Scotistic Commission (eds.), 2010. Opera
omnia XII. Vatican City: Typis Vaticanis.
[John of Jandun.] 1525. Quaestiones in duodecim libros metaphysicae. Venice: Octaviani
Scoti.
[John of Jandun.] 1488. Quaestiones in libros physicorum Aristotelis. Venice: Joannes
Lucilius Santritter and Hieronymus de Sanctis.
[John of Jandun.] 1587. Quaestiones de anima. Venice: Girolamo Scoto.
[John Quidort.] Commentaire sur les Sentences. Reportatio I–II. Muller, J.-P. (ed.), 1961.
Rome: Pontificum Institutum S. Anselmi.
[Matthew of Aquasparta.] Quaestiones de incarnatione. PP. Collegium S. Bonaventurae
(eds.), 1957. Quaracchi: Collegium Sancti Bonaventurae.
[Matthew of Gubbio.] Quaestiones de anima. Gishalberti, A. (ed.), 1981. Le “Quaestiones
de anima” atribuite a Matteo da Gubbio. Milan: Vita e Pensiero.
[Nicole Oresme.] Expositio Et Quaestiones in Aristoteles de Anima. Patar, B. (ed.), 1995.
Leuven: Peeters.
[Peter John Olivi.] Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum. 3 vols. Jansen, B.
(ed.), 1922–1926. Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae.
[Philippus Faber.] 1616. Philosophia naturalis Duns Scoti. Venice: Baptistam Bertonum.
[Solomon Ibn Gabirol.] Fons vitae. Baeumker, C. (ed.), 1995. Münster: Aschendorff.
[Thierry of Chartres.] Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and His School.
Häring, N. M. (ed.), 1971. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.
[Thomas Aquinas.] Summa theologiae. Commissio Leonina (ed.), Corpus Thomisticum.
Opera Omnia. URL: <https://www.corpusthomisticum.org>. Accessed: October 16,
2020.
[Thomas Aquinas.] Summa contra Gentiles. Commissio Leonina (ed.), Corpus Thomis-
ticum. Opera Omnia. URL: <https://www.corpusthomisticum.org/>. Accessed:
October 16, 2020.
[Thomas Aquinas.] Quaestiones disputatae de anima. Commissio Leonina (ed.),
Corpus Thomisticum. Opera Omnia. URL: <https://www.corpusthomisticum.org>.
Accessed: October 16, 2020.

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (2020) 423–446

Downloaded from Brill.com10/14/2022 02:12:06PM
via communal account
444 Roudaut

[Thomas Wylton.] Quaestio de anima intellectiva. In: Nielsen, L. O., Trifogli, C. (eds.) &
Trimble, G. (tr.), 2010. On the Intellectual Soul. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[Walter Burley.] Tractatus de formis. Down Scott, F. J. (ed.), 1970. München: Verlag der
Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

Secondary Literature
Bakker, P. J. J. M. 2007. Natural Philosophy, Metaphysics, or Something in Between?
Agostino Nifo, Pietro Pomponazzi, and Marcantonio Genua on the Nature and
Place of the Science of the Soul. In: Bakker, P. J. J. M. & Thijssen, J. (eds.), Mind,
Cognition and Representation: The Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle’s De
anima. Aldershot: Ashgate, 151–177.
Bardout, J.-C. 2014. Penser l’existence. L’existence exposée. Époque médiévale. Paris: Vrin.
Billuart, C. H., 1778. Summa S. Thomae hodiernis academiarum moribus accommodata
sive Cursus theologiae. Venice.
Blander, J. 2014. Dependence, Separability, and Theories of Identity and Distinction in
Late Medieval Philosophy: Case Studies from Scotus and Ockham (Unpublished Ph.D
Dissertation). The University of California: Los Angeles.
Brenet, J.-B. 2013. Les Possibilités de jonction, Averroès—Thomas Wylton. Berlin: De
Gruyter.
Brosch, H. J. 1933. Der Seinsbegriff bei Boethius. Mit Berücksichtigung der Beziehung von
Sosein und Dasein. Innsbruck: F. Rauch.
Callus, D. A. 1961. The Origins of the Problem of the Plurality of Form. The Thomist 24,
257–285.
Capelle, G. C. 1932. Amaury de Bène. Etudes sur son panthéisme formel. Paris: Vrin.
Cross, R. 2008. Accidents, Substantial Forms, and Causal Powers in the Late Thirteenth
Century: Some Reflections on the Axiom “actiones sunt suppositorum”. In:
Erismann, C. & Schniewind, A. (eds.), Compléments de substance, Études offertes sur
les propriétés accidentelles à Alain de Libera (Problemes Et Controverses). Paris: Vrin,
133–146.
Cross, R. 2013. Duns Scotus on Essence and Existence. Oxford Studies in Medieval
Philosophy 1, 172–203.
Cross, R. 2014. Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
De Boer, S. W. 2013. The Commentary Tradition on Aristotle’s De Anima, c. 1260–c. 1360.
Leuven: Leuven University Press.
De Libera, A. 2008. Archéologie du sujet: La Quête de l’identité (Vol. 2). Paris: Vrin.
De Libera, A. 2014. Formes assistantes et formes inhérentes. Sur l’union de l’âme et du
corps, du Moyen Age à l’Âge classique. Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du
Moyen Âge Tome 81, 197–248.
De Rijk, L. M. 1988. On Boethius’ Notion of Being—A Chapter on Boethian Semantics.
In: Kretzmann, N. (ed.), Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy. Amsterdam:
Kluwer, 1–29.

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (2020) 423–446

Downloaded from Brill.com10/14/2022 02:12:06PM
via communal account
Forma Dat Esse 445

Dewan, L. 2006. Form and Being, Studies in Thomistic Metaphysics. Washington:

Catholic University of America Press.
Dewan, L. 2007. Saint Thomas and Form as Something Divine in Things. Milwaukee:
Marquette University Press.
Erhet, C. 2017. The Flow of Powers: Emanation in the Psychologies of Avicenna, Albert
the Great and Aquinas. Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy 5, 87–121.
Erismann, C. 2009. The Medieval Fortunes of the Opuscula sacra. In: Marenbon, J.
(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Boethius. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 155–178.
Fabro, C. 1961a. Participation et causalité selon Thomas d’Aquin. Paris: Éditions B.
Nauwelaerts.
Fabro, C. 1961b. The Problem of Being and the Destiny of Man. International
Philosophical Quaterly 1(3), 407–436.
Fidora, A. 2003. Des Wissenschaftstheorie des Dominicus Gundissalinus. Voraussetzungen
und Konsequenzen des zweiten Anfangs der aristotelischen Philosophie im 12.
Jahrundert. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
Galonnier, A. 2007. Introduction. In: Galonnier, A. (ed.), Boèce Opuscula sacra, Volume
1: Capita dogmatica. Leuven: Peeters, 336–348.
Garin, E. 1958. Studi Sul Platonismo Medievale. Firenze: Felice le Monnier.
Gilson, E. 2018. John Duns Scotus: Introduction to His Fundamental Positions. London:
T&T Clark.
Gilson, E. 1962. Notes pour l’histoire de la cause efficiente. Archives d’histoire doctrinale
et littéraire du Moyen Âge 29, 7–31.
Grajewski, M. J. 1944. The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus: A Study in Metaphysics.
Washington: The Catholic University of America Press.
Hadot, P. 1970. Forma essendi. Interprétation philologique et interprétation philos-
ophique d’une formule de Boèce. Les études classiques 38, 143–156.
Häring, N. M. 1956. The Creation and Creator of the World according to Thierry of
Chartres and Clarembald of Arras. Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du
Moyen Âge 22, 137–216.
Hasnawi, A. 1990. Fayḍ. In: Jacob, A. (ed.), Encyclopédie Philosophique Universelle. II.
Les Notions philosophiques. Vol. 1. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 966–972.
John Buridan. 1518. In Metaphysicen Aristotelis quaestiones argutissimae. Paris.
Marenbon, J. 2003. Boethius. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Marmura, M. 1984. The Metaphysics of Efficient Causality in Avicenna. In: Marmura, M.
(ed.), Islamic Theology and Philosophy. Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press, 160–171.
Marmura, M. E. 1981. Avicenna on Causal Priority. In: Morewedge, P. (ed.), Islamic
Philosophy and Mysticism. Delmar, NY: Caravan Books, 65–83.
McCord Adams, M. 1976. Ockham on Identity and Distinction. Franciscan Studies 36,
5–74.

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (2020) 423–446

Downloaded from Brill.com10/14/2022 02:12:06PM
via communal account
446 Roudaut

Pasnau, R. 2004. Form, Substance and Mechanism. Philosophical Review 113(1), 31–88.
Pasnau, R. 2011. Metaphysical Themes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Porcell, J. M. 2013. Forma dat esse come principio fondamentale dell’ontologia della
persona di Tommaso d᾽Aquino. Espíritu 62(146), 335–359.
Polloni, N. 2015. Thierry of Chartres and Gundissalinus on Spiritual Substances: the
Problem of Hylomorphic Composition. Bulletin de Philosophie médiévale 57, 35–57.
Polloni, N. 2017. Toledan Ontologies: Gundissalinus, Ibn Daud, and the Problem
of Gabirolian Hylomorphism. In: Fidora, A. & Polloni, N. (eds.), Appropriation,
Interpretation and Criticism: Philosophical and Theological Exchanges Between the
Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Intellectual Traditions. Turnhout: Brepols, 19–49.
Polloni, N., 2018. Nature, Souls and Numbers: Remarks on a Medieval Gloss on
Gundissalinus’s De Processione Mundi. In: Soto-Bruna, M. J. (ed.), Causality and
Resemblance. Medieval Approaches to the Explanation of Nature. Hildesheim: OLMS,
75–87.
Porro, P., 2002. Universaux et ‘esse essentiae’: Avicenne, Henri de Gand et le ‘troisième
Reich’. Le réalisme des universaux. Philosophie analytique et philosophie médiévale,
Cahiers de philosophie de l’Université de Caen 38–39, 9–51.
Richardson, K. 2012. Avicenna and Aquinas on Form and Generation. In: Hasse, D. N.
& Bertolacci, A. (eds.), The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna’s
Metaphysics. Berlin: De Gruyter, 251–274.
Richardson, K. 2013. Avicenna’s Conception of the Efficient Cause. British Journal for
the History of Philosophy 21(2), 220–239.
Schneider, T. 1973. Die Einheit des Menschen: Die anthropologische Formel “anima forma
corporis” im sogenannten Korrektorienstreit und bei Petrus Johannis Olivi, Ein Beitrag
zur Vorgeschichte des Konzils von Vienne. Münster: Aschendorff.
Shields, C. 2012. The Reality of Substantial Form: Metaphysical Disputations XV. In:
Schwartz, D. (ed.), Interpreting Suárez: Critical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 39–61.
Ward, T. 2014. John Duns Scotus on Parts, Wholes and Hylomorphism. Leiden / Boston:
Brill.
Wolter, A. B. 1965. The Formal Distinction. In: Ryan, J. K. & Bonansea, B. M. (eds.), John
Duns Scotus, 1265–1965. Washington DC: The Catholic University of America Press,
45–60.
Zavalloni, R. 1951. Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des formes.
Louvain: Editions de l’Institut supérieur de Philosophie.

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (2020) 423–446

Downloaded from Brill.com10/14/2022 02:12:06PM
via communal account