EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-2990. December 17, 1951.]

OSCAR ESPUELAS Y MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Carlos P. Garcia, Cosme P. Garcia and B. E. Enerio, for petitioner.

First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Jesus
A. Avanceña, for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; SEDITIOUS LIBEL. — The essence of seditious libel is

its immediate tendency to stir up general discontent to the pitch of illegal
courses or to induce people to resort to illegal methods in order to redress
the evils which press upon their minds.
2. ID.; ID.; — A published writing which calls our government one of
crooks and dishonest persons ("dirty") infested with Nazis and Fascists i.e.
dictators, and which reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a
feeling incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to the government,
is a scurrilous libel against the Government.
3. ID.; ID.; CRITICISM OF GOVERNMENT; HOW IT MAY LEGALLY BE
DONE. — Any citizen may criticise his government and government officials
and submit his criticism to the "free trade of ideas." However, such criticism
should be specific and therefore constructive specifying particular
objectionable actuations of the government; it must be reasoned or
tempered, and not a contemptuous condemnation of the entire government
set-up.

DECISION

BENGZON, J : p

Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code punishes those who shall write,
publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the
Philippines or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof or which
suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots or which tend to stir up the
people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the
community.
The appellant Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza was, after trial, convicted in
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 the Court of First Instance of Bohol of a violation of the above article. The
conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, because according to said
court,
"About the time comprised between June 9 and June 24, 1947, both
dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza
had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at
the end of a piece of rope suspended from the limb of a tree, when in truth
and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel (Exhibits A, C-I). After
securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to several
newspapers and weeklies of general circulation (Exhibits C, F, G, H, I), not
only in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and abroad,
for their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear
that it was written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to
the latter's supposed wife translation of which letter or note is hereunder
reproduced:
"Dearest wife and children, bury me five meters deep. Over my
grave don't plant a cross or put floral wreaths, for I don't need them.
"Please don't bury me in a lonely place. Bury me in the Catholic
cemetery. Although I have committed suicide, I still have the right to
be buried among Christians.
"But don't pray for me. Don't remember me, and don't feel sorry.
Wipe me out of your lives.
"My dear wife, if someone asks you why I committed suicide, tell
them I did it because I was not pleased with the administration of
Roxas. Tell the whole world about this.
"And if they ask why I did not like the administration of Roxas,
point out to them the situation in Central Luzon, the Hukbalahaps. Tell
them about Julio Guillen and the banditry of Leyte.
"Dear wife, write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them
that here in the Philippines our government is infested with many
Hitlers and Mussolinis.
"Teach our children to burn pictures of Roxas if and when they
come across one.
"I committed suicide because I am ashamed of our government
under Roxas. I cannot hold high my brows to the world with this dirty
government.
"I committed suicide because I have no power to put under Juez
de Cuchillo all the Roxas people now in power. So, I sacrificed my own
self."
The accused admitted the fact that he wrote the note or letter above
quoted and caused its publication in the Free Press, the Evening News, the
Bisaya, Lamdang and other local periodicals and that he had impersonated
one Alberto Reveniera by signing said pseudonymous name in said note or
letter and posed himself as Alberto Reveniera in a picture taken wherein he
was shown hanging by the end of a rope tied to a limb of a tree."
The letter is a scurrilous libel against the Government. 1 It calls our
government one of crooks and dishonest persons (dirty) infested with Nazis
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 and Fascists i.e. dictators.
And the communication reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction
or a feeling incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to the
government. 2
Writings which tend to overthrow or undermine the security of the
government or to weaken the confidence of the people in the government
are against the public peace, and are criminal not only because they tend to
incite to a breach of the peace but because they are conducive to the
destruction of the very government itself (See 19 Am. Law Rep. 1511).
Regarded as seditious libels they were the subject of criminal proceedings
since early times in England (V. op. cit.).
As explained by Paterson, 3 ". . . the great factors of government,
consisting of the Sovereign, the Parliament, the ministers of state, the courts
of justice, must all be recognized as holding functions founded on sound
principles and to be defended and treated with an established and well-high
unalterable respect. Each of these great institutions has peculiar virtues and
peculiar weaknesses, but whether at any one time the virtue or the
weakness predominates, there must be a certain standard of decorum
reserved for all. Each guarded remonstrance, each fiery invective, each burst
of indignation must rest on some basis of respect and deference towards the
depository, for the time being, of every great constitutional function. Hence
another limit of free speech and writing is sedition. And yet within that limit
there is ample room and verge enough for the freest use of the tongue and
pen in passing strictures on the judgment and conduct of every constituted
authority."
Naturally, when the people's share in the government was restricted,
there was a disposition to punish even mild criticisms of the ruler or the
departments of government. But as governments grew to be more
representative, the laws of sedition became less drastic and freedom of
expression grew apace. Yet malicious endeavors to stir up public strife
continue to be prohibited.
The United States punished seditious utterances in the act of July 14,
1798 containing provisions parallel to our own article 142. Analogous
prohibitions are found in the Espionage Act of June 1917 and the seditious
libel amendment thereto in May, 1918.
Of course such legislation despite its general merit is liable to become
a weapon of intolerance constraining the free expression of opinion, or mere
agitation for reform. But so long as there is a sufficient safeguard by
requiring intent on the part of the defendant to produce illegal action — such
legislation aimed at anarchy and radicalism presents largely a question of
policy. Our Legislature has spoken in article 142 and the law must be
applied.
In disposing of this appeal, careful thought had to be given to the
fundamental right to freedom of speech. Yet the freedom of speech secured
by the Constitution "does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish
without responsibility whatever one may choose." It is not "unbridled license
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 that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the
punishment of those who abuse this freedom. 4 " So statutes against sedition
have always been considered not violative of such fundamental guaranty,
although they should not be interpreted so as to unnecessarily curtail the
citizen's freedom of expression to agitate for institutional changes. 5
Not to be restrained is the privilege of any citizen to criticize his
government and government officials and to submit his criticism to the "free
trade of ideas" and to plead for its acceptance in "the competition of the
market." However, let such criticism be specific and therefore constructive,
reasoned or tempered, and not a contemptuous condemnation of the entire
government set-up. Such wholesale attack is nothing less than an invitation
to disloyalty to the government. In the article now under examination one
will find no particular objectionable actuation of the government. It is called
dirty, it is called a dictatorship, it is called shameful, but no particular
omissions or commissions are set forth. Instead the article drips with male-
violence and hate towards the constituted authorities. It tries to arouse
animosity towards all public servants headed by President Roxas whose
pictures this appellant would burn and would teach the younger generation
to destroy.
Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences the article
cannot fail to impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of
sedition and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere effort to
persuade, what with the writer's simulated suicide and false claim to
martyrdom and what with its failure to particularize. When the use of
irritating language centers not on persuading the readers but on creating
disturbance, the rationable of free speech can not apply and the speaker or
writer is removed from the protection of the constitutional guaranty.
If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire
governmental structure but only President Roxas and his men, the reply is
that article 142 punishes not only all libels against the Government but also
"libels against any of the duly constituted authorities thereof." The "Roxas
people" in the Government obviously refer at least to the President, his
Cabinet and the majority of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers
and Mussolinis were naturally directed. On this score alone the conviction
could be upheld. 6

As heretofore stated the publication suggests or incites rebellious

conspiracies or riots and tends to stir up the people against the constituted
authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition groups who may seek to
silence the writer. 7 Which is the sum and substance of the offense under
consideration.
The essence of seditious libel may be said to be its immediate
tendency to stir up general discontent to the pitch of illegal courses; that is
to say to induce people to resort to illegal methods other than those
provided by the Constitution, in order to repress the evils which press upon
their minds. 8
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 "The idea of violence pervades the whole letter" says Justice Paredes of
the Court of Appeals. "The mere fact that a person was so disgusted with his
"dirty government" to the point of taking his own life, is not merely a sign of
disillusionment; it is a clear act to arouse its readers a sense of
dissatisfaction against its duly constituted authorities. The mention made in
said letter of the situation in Central Luzon, the Hukbalahaps, Julio Guillen
and the banditry in Leyte, which are instances of flagrant and armed attacks
against the law and the duly constituted authorities, cannot but be
interpreted by the reading public as an indirect justification of the open
defiance by the Hukbalahaps against the constituted government, the
attempt against the life of President Roxas and the ruthless depredations
committed by the bandits of Leyte, thus insinuating that a state of
lawlessness, rebellion and anarchy would be very much better than the
maladministration of said President and his men.
To top it all, the appellant proclaimed to his readers that he committed
suicide because he had "no power to put under juez de cuchillo all the Roxas
people now in power." Knowing, that the expression Juez de Cuchillo means
to the ordinary layman as the Law of the Knife, a "summary and arbitrary
execution by the knife", the idea intended by the appellant to be conveyed
was no other than bloody, violent and unpeaceful methods to free the
government from the administration of Roxas and his men.
The meaning, intent and effect of the article involves maybe a question
of fact, making the findings of the court of appeals conclusive upon us. 9
Anyway, it is clear that the letter suggested the decapitation or
assassination of all Roxas officials (at least members of the Cabinet and a
majority of Legislators including the Chief Executive himself). And such
suggestion clinches the case against appellant.
In 1922 Isaac Perez of Sorsogon while discussing political matters with
several persons in a public place uttered these words: "Filipinos must use
bolos for cutting off Wood's head" — referring to the then Governor-General,
Leonard Wood. Perez was found guilty of inciting to sedition in a judgment of
this court published in Volume 45 of the Philippine Reports. That precedent
is undeniably opposite. Note that the opinion was penned by Mr. Justice
Malcolm probably the member who has been most outspoken on freedom of
speech. Adopting his own words we could say, "Here the person maligned by
the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official
position, like the President of the United States and other high offices, under
a democratic form of government, instead of affording immunity from
promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive attacks. But in this
instance, the attack on the President passes the furthest bounds of free
speech and common decency. More than a figure of speech was intended.
There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce
disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a
disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws."
The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there
being no question as to the legality of the penalty imposed on him, the
decision will be affirmed with costs.
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 Pablo, Padilla, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Jugo, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions
TUASON, J., dissenting:

Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, entitled "Inciting to

Sedition", provides:
"The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a
fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who,
without taking any direct part in the crime of sedition, should incite
others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute
sedition, by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems,
cartoons, banners, or other representations tending to the same end,
or upon any reason or persons who shall utter seditious words or
speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the
Government of the United States or the Government of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, or any of the duly constituted
authorities thereof, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful
officer in executing the functions of his office, or which tend to
instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purpose, or
which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which lead or
tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the
peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government, or
who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices."
In the case of U. S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332, this Court traced the origin
and history of the predecessor of Article 142 and expounded its meaning.
Mr. Justice Ladd, who wrote the decision, said:
"Several allied offenses or modes of committing the same
offense are defined in that section, viz: (1) The uttering of seditious
words or speeches; (2) the writing, publishing, or circulating of
scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the
Insular Government of the Philippine Islands; (3) the writing, publishing
or circulating of libels which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful
officer in executing his office; (4) or which tend to instigate others to
cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes; (5) or which suggest or
incite rebellious conspiracies or riots; (6) or which tend to stir up the
people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the
community, the safety and order of the Government; (7) knowingly
concealing such evil practices."
Referring to case (2) — scurrilous libels against the Government of the
United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands which the
Court said may stand on a somewhat different footing from the rest — the
Court went on to say:
"In the determination of this question we have encountered great
difficulty, by reason of the almost entire lack of American precedents
which might serve as a guide in the construction of the law. There are,
indeed, numerous English decisions, most of them of the eighteenth
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 century, on the subject of libelous attacks upon the 'Government, the
constitution, or the law generally,' attacks upon the Houses of
Parliament, the Cabinet, the Established Church, and other
governmental organisms, but these decisions are not now accessible to
us, and, if they were, they were made under such different conditions
from those which prevail at the present day, and are founded upon
theories of government so foreign to those which have inspired the
legislation of which the enactment in question forms a part, that they
would probably afford but little light in the present inquiry. In England,
in the latter part of the eighteenth century, any 'written censure upon
public men for their conduct as such,' as well as any written censure
'upon the laws or upon the institutions of the country,' would probably
have been regarded as a libel upon the Government. (2 Stephen,
History of the Criminal Law of England, 348.) This has ceased to be the
law in England, and it is doubtful whether it was ever the common law
of any American State. 'It is true that there are ancient dicta to the
effect that any publication tending to 'possess the people with an ill
opinion of the Government' is a seditious libel (per Holt, C. J., in R. vs.
Tuchin, 1704, 5 St. Tr., 532, and Ellengborough, C. J., in R. vs. Cobbett,
1804, 29 How. St. Tr., 49), but no one would accept that doctrine now.
Unless the words used directly tend to foment riot or rebellion or
otherwise to disturb the peace and tranquillity of the Kingdom, the
utmost lattitude is allowed in the discussion of all public affairs.' (11
Enc. of the Laws of England 450.) Judge Cooley says (Const. Lim., 901):
'The English common law rule which made libels on the constitution or
the government indictable, as it was administered by the courts,
seems to us unsuited to the condition and circumstances of the people
of America, and therefore never to have been adopted in the several
States'."
After citing the Act of Congress of July 14, 1798, commonly and
historically known as the "Sedition Act," and after noting that "the term
'government' would appear to be used here in the abstract sense of the
existing political system, as distinguished from the concrete organisms of
the Government — the Houses of Congress and the Executive — which are
also specially mentioned," the Court reached the opinion that "this is the
(abstract) sense in which the term is used in the enactment under
consideration." The Court pointed out that, "while libels upon forms of
government, unconnected with defamation of individuals, must in the nature
of things be of uncommon occurrence, the offense is by no means an
imaginary one," and cited a case (Republic vs. Dennie, 4 Yeates [Pa.], 267) in
which the defendant was indicted for bringing into contempt and hatred the
independence of the United States, the constitution of this Commonwealth
and of the United States; for exciting popular discontent and dissatisfaction
against the scheme of polity instituted; for condemning the principles of the
Revolution, and reviling the characters of the patriots and statesmen; for
endangering, subverting, and totally destroying the republican constitutions
and free governments of the said United States and the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania.

In consonance with the principles laid down, the Court held that the
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 article published by Dorr, in which he virulently attacked the policy of the
Civil Commission in appointing Filipinos to office, did not come within the
purview of the law, although it "may have had the effect of exciting among
certain classes dissatisfaction with the Commission and its measures." It
found that there was nothing in the article which could "be regarded as
having a tendency to produce anything like what may be called disaffection,
or, in other words, a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to
remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws."
The message which the accused herein caused to be published with his
picture contained no libel or criticism against the instituted system of
government as distinct from the administration. On the contrary, the gist of
the message was that the author was desperate and was going to kill himself
because many men in the government were following the practices of
absolute and despotic rulers in other parts of the world. He wanted President
Truman and Mr. Churchill, leading exponents of such democratic institutions
as are consecrated in the Philippine Constitution, to be informed that
President Roxas and others in his administration were unfaithful to the
tenets of constitutional government. He pointed to the turbulent situation in
Central Luzon, the rampant banditry in Leyte, the attempted assassination of
President Roxas by Guillen, etc., not as examples to be emulated but as the
direct outcome of what he claimed widespread graft and corruption in the
Government. He pretended to have decided to take his life because he was
impotent to remedy or suppress this deplorable state of affairs, and he was
ashamed of the way the Government was being conducted. He likened some
men in the Government, whom he did not specify, to Hitler and Mussolini,
not that he idolized those notorious characters but because, he felt, evil
forces that undermined the ideas and ideals of the Constitution were at work
in our republic. In short, far from advocating the overthrow or change of the
present scheme of polity, the article evinced intense feeling of devotion to
the welfare of the country and its institutions.
President Roxas was the only official named in the article. But the
defendant did not counsel violence in his reference to the President and the
unnamed officials. In his statement to the effect that he was going to kill
himself because he could not kill President Roxas and the men who
surrounded the Executive, it is not a necessary deduction that he wished
others to do it. Let it be remembered that the message was addressed to the
writer's "wife" and "children" who, it turned out, were imaginary.
At best, the meaning of the sentence is doubtful and the norm is that,
where the defendant's intention is ambiguous he should be given the benefit
of the doubt. The courts may not subject an act or utterance to a
microscopic examination in an endeavor to find in it germs of seditious
purpose. In prosecutions for sedition utmost caution is called for lest the
freedom of expression be impaired. Although statutes against sedition have
been held not to violate the constitutional guaranty to the freedom of
expression, the courts are warned to so construe or interpret them as not to
abridge that freedom. (33 C. J., 164, citing U. S. vs. Apurado et al., 7 Phil.,
422.) It is axiomatic that the Constitution is the paramount law and that
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 legislation has to be adjusted thereto. Accordingly in the solution of clashes,
which frequently occur, between liberty or free speech and prosecution for
sedition, the criterion, it is submitted, should be the presence or absence of
real, not imaginary, danger of the utterance materializing or inciting others
to disloyalty to the Government and its laws.
There is no inciting to sedition unless, according to Mr. Justice Holmes'
theory expressed in connection with a similar topic, "the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent." In the very law punishing inciting to sedition there is
the requirement that the words alleged to be seditious or libelous lead or
tend to the consummation of the evils sought to be prevented. Even in the
ordinary offenses of threat and defamation, words are not taken at face
value, but their import or gravity is gauged by the circumstances
surrounding each particular case.
The terms "lead" and "tend" are used in Article 142 of the Revised
Penal Code in their ordinary signification. Thus understood, lead as a verb
means "to draw or direct by influence" or "to prevail on," and tend means "to
conduce to an end." (Webster's International Dictionary.)
Judged by these tests, and granting for the present purposes that the
defendant did intend to incite others to sedition, the article was harmless as
far as the safety of the Government and its officers was concerned, and
should have been ignored, as many others more serious than this one have
been. The message, like an evil imagining from which no harm proceeds
except to the individual himself, was not conducive to the attainment of the
prisoner's aims. If words are "the keys of persuasion" and "the triggers of
action," the article under consideration was far from possessing either of
these qualities, taking into consideration the personality of the man who
wrote it and what he "did." The reaction of the readers could not have been
other than that the whole thing was comical if it were not "tragic." The
general reaction, it is fairly safe to say, was one of regret for a man of
eccentric and unbalanced mind or ridicule and curiosity for a grotesque
stunt. The witnesses for the Government themselves, some of whom were
constabulary officers stationed at Tagbilaran, stated that upon reading the
article and seeing the author's picture they just laughed it off, "thinking that
this fellow must be crazy." That was akin to our own reaction, and there is
little or no doubt that it exemplified the general effect upon the minds of
other readers of the article. It is certain that none would commit a rash act
upon a vague suggestion of a man who hanged himself and whom they had
never heard of before, while those who had known him, like the constabulary
officers above mentioned, were aware that the picture was a fake and
thought the subject was a crank.
Attacks more Serious, virulent and inflammatory than the one at bar,
by persons well known in politics and public life and having influence and
large following, have frequently appeared in the press or been launched on
the platforms. What the defendant did or said was very tame and mild by
comparison. Nevertheless, those critics have not been brought to court; and
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 it is to the everlasting credit of the administration and, in the long run, for
the good of the Government, that the parties reviled and the prosecutors
have adopted a tolerant attitude. A well-known author on criminal law
quoting classical writers on the same subject has truly said:
"Yet while such is no doubt the law, prosecutions of this class
have recently fallen, in England as well as in the United States, for
several reasons, into disuse. In the first place, it is now generally felt
that unless criticism be permitted to penetrate even to the foundations
of government, revolution rather than reform may result. Time, says
Bacon, is the greatest of destructives; and truth is to be constantly
employed in repairing the breaches which time makes. The wise
conservative, therefore, is often apparently the most destructive
radical; as he is the most prudent repairer who, when the piers of a
bridge are weakened by a storm, advices that the work of
reconstruction should begin at the foundation. To prevent the
application of revolutionary criticism to government is of all modes of
government the most revolutionary. And closely allied with this position
is another, that among countries used to freedom libels only begin to
bring the state into contempt when they are prosecuted by the state as
contemptuous. The sedition laws, for instance, were among the Chief
causes of the overthrow of the administration of John Adams; and their
repeal one of the chief causes of the popularity of that of Jefferson. If,
however, seditious libels are to be prosecuted, it is well to keep in mind
the noble words of princes from whose edicts the English common law,
imbued as it is in so many other respects with the spirit of freedom,
has much, in reference to the law of libel, to learn: 'Imppp. Theodosius,
Arcarius et Honorius, A.A.A. Rufino P. P. Si quis modestiae nescius et
pudoris ignarus improbo petulantique maledicto nomina nostra
crediderit lacessenda, ac temulentia turbulentus obtrectator temporum
nostrorum fuerit, eum poenae nolumus subiugari neque durum aliquid
nec asperum sustinere, quoniam, si ex levitate processerit,
contemnedum est, si ex insania, miseratione dignissimum, si ab injuria,
remittendum.'" (2 Wharton's Criminal Law Section 1947.)
In somewhat parallel vein is the dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes, joined in
by Mr. Justice Brandeis, in U. S. vs. Abrams, 250 U. S., 621, 629. Said Justice
Holmes:
"Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly
logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want
a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in
law and sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition by speech
seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as when a man
says that he has squared the circle, or that you do not care whole
heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your power or your
premises. But when men have realized that time has upset many
fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas — that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon
which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the
theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an
experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our
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 salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While
that experiment is part of our system I think that we should be
eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions
that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so
imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and
pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to
save the country. I regret that I cannot put into more impressive words
my belief that in their conviction upon this indictment the defendants
were deprived of their rights under the Constitution of the United
States."

Moreover, the subject of this prosecution does not reveal personal

malice or hatred. Except for the "Juez de Cuchillo" item which, like words
coming from a babe's mouth, did not have the weight or chance to sway the
listeners, the article was but a statement of grievances against official
abuses and misgovernment that already were of common knowledge and
which more influential and responsible speakers and writers had denounced
in terms and ways more dangerous and revolutionary.
Parás, C.J. and Feria, J. concur.

Footnotes

1. "Scurrilous" means low, vulgar, mean, foul (U.S. vs. Strong, 263 Fed., 789; U.S.
vs. Ault, 263 Fed., 800).
2. U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332.
3. Liberty of the Press 2nd Ed. p. 371.

4. People vs. Nabong, 57 Phil., 455.

5. U.S. vs. Apurado, 7 Phil., 422.

6. But we will not rest conviction on this, aware as we are that the prohibition
could be pushed to the point where it will silence all criticism against public
officials, and thereby infringe the constitutional freedom of speech. Too
much danger that men will be prosecuted, simply because they criticize the
powers that be.
7. Terminiello vs. Chicago 337 U. S. Rep. p. 1.

8. Paterson, Liberty of the Press, Speech and Public Worship, p. 81; note Hale and
Benson Law of the Press, p. 359.
9. People vs. Most, 64 N.E. 175, L.R.A. 509. The question whether the words had
the effect of inciting or counselling disturbance of the peace is often a
question of degree, which in the U.S. is largely for the jury. This means it is
a question of fact. (Cf. Schenk vs. U.S., 249 U.S. 47, 52.)

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