Supreme Court’s Gigi Reyes Habeas Corpus decision.

Will it be a
precedent-setting milestone?

In my interview with Christian Esguerra, we tackled the implications of

the Supreme Court’s decision to release Gigi Reyes by granting her a
habeas corpus petition.
Recall that Atty. Lucila “Gigi” Reyes, former chief-of-staff of former
senator and now presidential legal counsel Juan Ponce Enrile, was
released from detention on January 19, 2023. She has been in
detention since July 2014 after the Sandiganbayan ordered her arrest
for the crime of plunder in connection with the P172.8-million
kickbacks allegedly received from Janet Lim Napoles who was already
convicted of plunder, for the same scheme in a separate case. Her co-
accused, former senator Juan Ponce Enrile, has since been granted bail
on humanitarian grounds and is now the presidential legal counsel of
President Marcos, a testament to his political endurance and longevity.
Meantime, in detention for 9 years, Reyes went to the Supreme Court,
via a petition for habeas corpus, insisting that she had been in
detention for so long without any sign of being freed soon. In her
petition, Reyes argued that she is entitled to the privilege of writ of
habeas corpus by reason of delay and alleged violation of her
constitutional right to speedy trial. Reyes also reasoned that she has
been in detention “longer than any other accused similarly charged.”
She cited the following government officials and the days they spent
behind bars:
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (1,387 days)
Senator Bong Revilla (1,643 days)
Senator Jinggoy Estrada (1,188 days and released on bail)
Enrile, Reyes’ co-accused (413 days and released on bail).
Reyes also pointed out she had filed various petitions before the High
Court for her release on multiple grounds but none was granted. She,
therefore, invoked the writ of habeas corpus.
Ruling in favor of Atty. Reyes, the Supreme Court reasoned that Reyes’
confinement "has become oppressive, thus, infringing upon her right to
liberty." The SC said while Reyes’ detention is based on a court order,
her prolonged detention, without any progress on the case against her,
is considered “vexatious, capricious, and oppressive.”
The Reyes decision is a novel approach to habeas corpus. The ultimate
purpose of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint.
The writ exists as a speedy and effectual remedy from unlawful
restraint and as an effective defense of personal freedom. Hence, in
previous instances, habeas corpus was granted where a person was
subject to physical restraint, such as arbitrary detention, or even by
moral restraint. Thus, a prisoner may secure his release if convicted by
a court without jurisdiction; or if a person is deprived of liberty due to
mistaken identity. However, habeas corpus may no longer avail when a
person allegedly deprived of liberty is retrained under a lawful process
or order of the court. In the latter case, the remedy is to pursue the
ordinary course and exhausted the usual remedies like a motion to
quash the information or warrant of arrest based on one or more of the
grounds enumerated under Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.
The Reyes decision provides a new way of applying the writ but also
shows how temporary liberty may be secured other than bail. Notice
that Reyes, being legally detained for plunder, a non-bailable offense,
may not be eligible for the grant of habeas corpus under the normal
and ordinary sense and application. In fact, her previous bids to secure
temporary release or dismissal of the case proved futile. Previously, she
filed a Petition to challenge the resolution by the Sandiganbayan
denying her petition for bail. The Sandiganbayan resolution was
thereafter affirmed by the Court in August 2020 and Reyes remained in
detention for the last 9 years awaiting trial. In its decision, the SC noted
that the Sandiganbayan detailed across one hundred ninety-four (194)
pages the testimonies of the 19 witnesses on direct, redirect, and cross-
examination at the bail hearing. It then quoted the parts of the
discussion of this Court in Napoles v. Sandiganbayan that pertained or
referred to the petitioner. However, it also explained in full the basis of
its findings that there is strong evidence of the guilt of the petitioner.
As such, the petitioner Reyes failed to establish that the Sandiganbayan
acted with grave abuse of discretion in concluding that there is strong
evidence against the petitioner. Thus, her bid for bail on humanitarian
grounds failed.
Reyes then took on a new tack via a petition for habeas corpus, this
time invoking a violation of her right to a speedy trial. citing Section 14,
Article III of the Constitution, which entitles those facing criminal
charges to “a speedy, impartial, and public trial.” This time she
succeeded when the SC agreed with her. As earlier pointed out, the SC,
her prolonged detention, without any progress on the case against her,
is considered “vexatious, capricious, and oppressive.”
As extensively discussed by J. Leonen in his ponencia in Cagan v,
Sandiganbayan, G .R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, said the right of the
accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against
him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding
criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to
prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts
to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such
right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only
when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has
been denied such right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The
concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily
be a flexible concept.
Leonen further observed that: “the right to speedy disposition of cases
is violated only when there is inordinate delay, such that the
proceedings are "attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for
and secured, or when without cause or unjustifiable motive, a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried."
According to Leonen, inordinate delay was first introduced in Tatad v.
Sandiganbayan. In Tatad, this Court ruled that the inordinate delay in
the conclusion of preliminary investigation and subsequent filing of
information will result to the violation of the right to speedy disposition
of cases and right to due process. In so ruling, this Court considered
several circumstances such as: (1) the political motivation which
propelled the prosecution; (2) the patent violation of procedural rules;
and (3) the unjustified delay in attending the investigation. Ultimately,
Tatad held that the determination of whether or not there is a violation
of speedy disposition of cases applies on a case-to-case basis:
In a number of cases, this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called
"radical relief' and to spare the accused from undergoing the rigors and
expense of a full-blown trial where it is clear that the has been deprived
of due process of law or other constitutionally guaranteed rights. Of
course, it goes without saying that in the application of the doctrine
enunciated in those cases, particular regard must be taken of the facts
and circumstances peculiar to each case”
Thus, the concept of speedy disposition is relative. There is no hard-
and-fast mathematical rule on the reckoning of time involved and facts
peculiar to each case must be taken into account, Leonen added.
The Reyes decision is an innovation and can significantly modify the
understanding of a few things. First, it enhances the utility of habeas
corpus as a remedy. This writ is usually used to question the legality of
an arrest or detention; now it can be used to release a person whose
constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated.
Second, it allows for another avenue to secure release other than trying
to secure bail. This may not be bail in the strict sense but it is
tantamount to bail grant. As pointed out by Atty. Te and I quote,
because of the decision, a new way for temporary release became
available. The “interim” writ of habeas corpus – as Te calls it – is similar,
but not exactly like bail. The “interim” writ of habeas corpus was also
differentiated from the two other instances when interim bail is
granted. “Interim bail” means “bail pending trial where bail is
discretionary.” “Interim bail 1 (affidavits presented hearsay, as found by
the SC pre-arraignment), interim bail 2 (health condition) both involved
the same applicant,” Te said.
As I said during my interview, this is a good decision if it is applied to all
detention prisoners under the same circumstances. I cited the
examples of Leila De Lima and Myles Albasin, detained for six years and
five years now respectively. We all know what Atty. De Lima is going
through. As for Miles Albasin, she is a UP Cebu alumna, a political
activist, and now languishing in detention after being accused member
of the New Peoples Army. Both frivolous and wrongful accusations.
They too must benefit from the Reyes decision and be able to secure
their own release, if not the dismissal of their respective cases.
Apparently, there is no indication that this is a pro hac vice decision.
The right to a speedy trial is sacrosanct. As long as the actions of the
accused is not the reason for the delay, it must be unconditionally
upheld. In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, The court does not
state the length of time when a person can be properly detained before
a speedy trial can be invoked. But in my opinion, I say one year is
enough. The basic principle is that no one should be deprived of liberty
unless there has been a trial and final conviction.