Additional Notes on Mill

Justice and Utilitarianism

Starting from the popular conception of justice, Mill theorizes about what links a
diverse set of ideas about justice.

Mill attempts to show that justice is actually grounded on utility. He argues that
the sentiment of justice itself is rooted in the human desire of retribution.
However, the reason why we feel that this sentiment of retribution is a moral one,
is that it occurs when not only an individual is wronged, but when society in
general is wronged. Thus, justice is still grounded in utility concerns. It does not
have separate origins, but can rather be measured on the same scale of utility.

Meaning of Justice
Mill says that throughout history, one of the biggest barriers to the acceptance of utility has
been that it does not allow for a theory of justice. Mill begins by trying to pin down the meaning
of justice, by coming up with a list of those things that are commonly classified as just or unjust.

First, it is considered unjust to deprive someone of his legal rights. However, this concept has
exceptions. Law cannot be the ultimate standard of justice.

A second form of injustice comes from depriving someone of something he has a moral right
to possess.

Third, it is considered just that a person receives what he "deserves," and unjust that he
obtain something he doesn't deserve.

A fourth form of injustice is to violate an agreement with someone or disappoint expectations

that one knowingly nurtured.

Fifth, it is considered unjust to show favoritism and preference in inappropriate circumstances.

However, it is not generally necessary to be impartial; for example, one doesn't have to be
impartial in the selection of friends. The claim is rather that a person should only be influenced
by those considerations that should apply in a given circumstance.

Finally, the idea of equality is seen by many to be a component of justice;

Given so many different applications of the concept of justice, it is hard to find what links them
all together, and on what concept the sentiment of justice is based. Nevertheless, people do see
justice as a unified concept, and do feel a sentiment of justice regardless of whether they
understand its foundation.

Mill says that some help may come from looking at the history of the word. In most languages,
the word's origin came from either positive law or authoritative custom.

Whether the sentiment of justice comes from a special, unique tendency of nature, or whether it
can be linked to the concerns of utility. Mill argues for the latter.

Mill contends that there are two components to justice. The first is the desire to punish a
person who has done harm. This desire comes from the impulse of self-defense, and the feeling
of sympathy. All animals have instincts of self- defense. However, unlike animals, humans are
capable of sympathizing not only with their offspring, but with all human beings. Furthermore,
humans are more intelligent, and thus have a wider range of sentiments and are able to feel
that they are a part of a broader community of interests. Justice then, reflects the natural
feeling of retaliation, expanded by sympathy and intellect to apply to things that harm
society at large.

In themselves, these feelings are not moral sentiments. Justice's moral component can be seen
rather in the quality of the outrage people feel at an injustice: people can be upset by an
injustice not only if it affects them individually, but if it goes against the interests of society at
large; this demonstrates a moral concern.

The other component of justice is that there is an identifiable victim who suffers if justice is
infringed upon. Mill argues that the idea of a right is not a concept separate from justice, but
is rather a manifestation of the other aspects of justice, namely the desire for punishment and
the fact that there is an assignable person who has been harmed. A right means that a person
has a valid claim on society to protect him in the possession of that right. However, if one
wants to know why society should defend this right, Mill argues that the only reason is one of
general utility.

The sentiment of justice derives its intensity from its link to the animalistic need for retaliation. It
gets its moral force from the "impressive" kind of utility that is involved in rights violations--
namely the interest of security. People cannot do without security, and require before they can
enjoy anything else.

Mill then observes that if justice exists independent of utility, if it is a standard in its own right
that can be understood through introspection, then it is difficult to understand why questions
of justice are often so debatable. In fact, there is as fierce a discussion about what is just as
there is about what is useful to society, and it is guided by many conflicting ideas. For example,
there is a conflict over which acts should be punished, and over the proper apportionment of
punishments. In fact, the only way to navigate among conflicting claims of justice is to look to
the source of its authority, namely, social utility.

Mill argues that the moral rules that forbid people to harm each other are more important
than any rules of policy, rules about how societal affairs should be managed. Furthermore,
the preservation of justice preserves peace among human beings. Thus, there is a very strong
utility interest in preserving and enforcing justice's dictates.

Mill argues that most of the applications of justice we observe today are simply ways of
maintaining the notion of moral rights. Impartiality is one rule that is partly based in these, but
also comes from the very meaning of utility. The greatest happiness principle doesn't have
meaning unless each person's happiness, supposed equal in degree, is valued exactly as much as
somebody else's. Social inequalities that are not required by expediency are thus seen to be
unjust.

Mill closes by observing that justice is a name for some moral requirements, which are higher
on the scale of utility, and thus more important, than any others. However, there can be cases
in which some other social duty is so important that it overrules one of the general rules of
justice. Thus, it could be acceptable to steal in order to save a life.