Automatica, Vol.27, No. 4. pp. 691-697, 1991
00
Printedin Great Britain.
Large Scale Systems with Multiple Objectives:
An Interactive Negotiation Procedure*
FERNANDO ANTONIO GOMIDE,t JOS]~ ROBERTO CARDARELLI~
and KYOSTI TARVAINEN§
Key Words--Large scale systems; multiobjective optimization; interactive methods; power
management; electric power systems.
Abslraet--An interactive negotiation procedure for large
scale systems with multiple objectives is proposed. It is
assumed that there are multiple decision-makers, who have
their own multiple objectives and who are dependent on
each other via common resources or physical connections.
The negotiation procedure includes two repeated main steps:
the decision-makers' independent multicriteria optimization
of their subsystems, and a convenient step for tradeoff
between the decision makers. Assumptions guaranteeing the
convergence of the negotiation scheme are established;
among these one assumption, concerning independence of
subsystems, is essential. The negotiation procedure is applied
in the operation planning of two coupled hydroelectrical
power systems of the southeast region of Brazil, and
simulation results are included to show its usefulness in
solving real world problems. The same operation planning
problem is also solved by the SEMOPS method. A
comparison is made from the viewpoint of methodology,
practice and computational effort. The results obtained from
the comparisons show that the proposed scheme is very
effective in solving complex, multiobjective problems.
Finally, conclusions and further work are addressed.
1. Introduction
REAL WORLDproblems, in greater number, are complex and
difficult to model and to solve. Most of the time the classical,
single objective optimization theory is not enough to present
more realistic solutions. The problems can involve more than
one decision-maker, who needs to agree with one preferred
solution. In addition, usually we have a multiplicity of
solutions that arise due to the several objective functions
inserted in the model to search the best compromise
solution.
Considering that the reality does not have an ordinary and
well known behaviour, new theories, methods and tools have
been developed to aid in looking for better solutions. An
example is the multiobjective optimization theory (Chankong
and Haimes, 1983) which enables an analyst to take into
* Received 6 January 1990; revised 1 September 1990;
received in final form 31 December 1990. The original
version of this paper was presented at the l l t h IFAC World
Congress on Automatic Control at the Service of Mankind
which was held in Tallinn, Estonia, USSR during August,
1990. The published proceedings of this IFAC Meeting may
be ordered from: Pergamon Press plc, Headington Hill Hall,
Oxford OX3 0BW, U.K. This paper was recommended for
publication in revised form by Associate Editor Y. Haimes
under the direction of Editor A. P. Sage.
t Unicamp/FEE/DCA, Caixa Postal 6101, 13.081 Cam-
pinas SP, Brazil. Author to whom all correspondence should
be addressed.
~:Villares Indtistrias de Base S.A., Av. do Estado, 01516
S~o Paulo SP, Brazil.
§ Helsinki University of Technology, Otakaari 1, 02150
Espoo, Finland.
691
0005-1098/91 $3.00+ 0.
PergamonPressplc
t~) 1991InternationalFederationof AutomaticControl
Brief Paper
consideration more than one objective, including the
relationships among them (tradeoffs). Decision-making
theory (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976), with a group utility
function that possibly leads the decision-maker to use criteria
explicitly from the model, and the decomposition theory
(Tarvainen, 1980; Gomide, 1982) which helps an analyst to
transform complex problems into a set of simpler problems
with special characteristics are further examples of these
developments intended to help analysts and decision-makers
to search for the best compromise or preferred solution in
complex, large scale systems.
This paper proposes an interactive negotiation
procedure--INP for large scale systems with multiple
objectives as a method to obtain preferred solutions for a
class of problems characterized by systems that have
common resources or physical interconnections. It is based
on the exchange of (tradeoff) information between an analyst
and the decision-makers aiming at a best compromise
solution for a problem.
The INP assumes that there is a natural or induced
decomposition structure in the problem, where a set of
coupled (through resources) subproblems are selected. Thus,
problems involving multiple decision-makers who have their
own multiple objectives, and that depend on each other via
common resources, and where it is possible to decompose
the overall problem into a set of subproblems, are members
of the class of problems addressed by the negotiation
procedure proposed.
The subproblems can be treated as a set of independent
subproblems if one essential assumption is satisfied. This
assumption guarantees the autonomy of the decision-makers,
when the coupling resources are fixed. It is assumed that the
decision-makers are not interested in each others preference
structure p e r se, that is, when the couplings are fixed, the
decision-makers are free to tradeoff their respective
objectives in their subproblems.
The INP proposed in this paper is based on tradeoff
information, and there are no display difficulties. The
decision-makers have information on their interdependence
in the form of tradeoffs.
Many others methods have been developed within the
framework of multiobjective decision-making problems
(Chankong et al., 1985).
Regarding the class of interactive methods, Zionts and
Wallenius (1976, 1980) have proposed a procedure based on
the tradeoff concept and a surrogate problem. Their method
is similar to the weighting method, with a basic difference in
the type of information exchanged between the decision-
maker and the analyst to achieve a compromise solution. The
formulation assumes linear constraint set, linear or convex
objective functions, and linearly additive or concave
surrogate function.
Another well known method is the Interactive Surrogate
Worth Tradeoff procedure (Haimes and Chankong, 1983).
Here, a sequence of single objective optimization problems
are solved, each parameterized by the direction of the
decision-maker's preferences as expressed by the tradeoffs.
692 Brief Paper
As opposed to the previous one, this method may be applied
to nonconvex problems.
Theory and methodology for a general class of hierarchical
multiobjective systems are developed by Tarvainen (1980)
and Gomide (1982). In Tarvainen's work, the central
decision-maker's preferences expressed in terms of tradeoffs
and there are assumed to be available two basic
schemes--the feasible and the nonfeasible--which are based
on a necessary condition for preferred solution. These two
schemes are basically similar to those used in the single
objective case. Gomide's work, on the other hand, considers
multistage systems with multiple objectives, where the
concept of stage tradeoff is introduced, and calculated
instead of assumed to be known. Several hierarchical
methods for noninferior solutions generation are also
derived.
The SEMOPS method (Hwang and Masud, 1979) is an
interactive procedure based on the aspiration level concept.
It will be briefly discussed later in the paper.
For a more systematic review of the literature associated
with the modeling and optimization of large scale systems
within the multiobjective framework, see Haimes and Li
(1988).
The procedure herein proposed includes basically two
repeated steps: the decision-makers' independent multiob-
jective optimization of their subproblems (subsystems), and a
convenient step of tradeoff between the decision-makers.
As opposed to some approaches for large scale
muitiobjective optimization, it does not necessarily have a
hierarchical structure, it considers multiple decision-makers,
and no a priori information about their preference is needed.
The system's own or induced decomposition structure (such
as hierarchical decomposition) is easily and naturally
handled. Furthermore, the INP is a method where, at an
intermediate compromise solution, the decision-makers
agree on a better, close intermediate compromise solution,
based on the local information on alternatives provided by
the analyst, and so oil, until a final compromise solution is
reached. This type of negotiation scheme is studied very
little. The Stackelberg scheme (Stackelberg, 1952) is of this
type, but it is not a true negotiation process. Local analysis
of preferences and domination structures that take
behavioral and psychological issues into account is
considered by Yu (1985).
The organization of the paper is as follows. The next
section presents the mathematical problem formulation. The
steps of INP are then detailed. Following, the method
(procedure) analysis and its convergence properties are
established. An application of INP in operation planning of a
hydroelectrical power system in southeast region of Brazil is
addressed. Next, the SEMOPS (Sequential Multiobjective
Problem Solving Method) procedure is used to solve the
same problem. Comparisons of the two methods, from the
viewpoint of methodology, practice and computational effort
are presented. Finally, the conclusions and further works are
described.
2. Mathematical problem formulation
Consider a system composed of a set of n coupled
subsystems where, associated with subsystem i, i = 1 , . . . , n,
we define x~--the input, u~--the decision, and z~--the output,
as variables belonging to spaces of appropriate dimensions.
Associated with each ith subsystem there is a set of n i
objective functions, and a decision-maker responsible for
decision-making.
More precisely, we define the ith subproblem as:
F fil(Xi, ui, zi)-1
DM,: min ] f~(x".u''z') (1)
subject to
Lf'.,(xi. u,, z,)d
Z i = Hi(xi, ui), (2)
gi(xi, ul, zi) <=O, (3)
x i = ~ Cozj. (4)
j-1
where n i is the number of objectives of subproblem
i , i = 1 , . . . ,n. The constraints model the subsystem
behaviour (2), the feasible region of the subproblem (3), and
the couplings between subsystems (4), respectively. Cq are
matrices consisting of zero and unity elements, where unity
indicates a connection.
Note that originally we may have had a common resource
constraint of the form
~ = qi(xi, ui, zi) <- b.
i=1
This constraint can however be included in the above
formulation by defining the following new (mathematical)
coupling variables, systems equations, and constraints:
x[+ ~ = y; = x; + qi(xi, Ui, Zi)
where
x~ =0
x', + qn(xn, u,, z,,) <- b
i=l,... ,n-1.
As a special case we may have couplings in only one
direction, that is, we may have the n subsystems connected in
series, or one system evolving over n discrete time points
(DM~ interested in the system at time i). Figure 1 depicts the
structure of the problem.
The mathematical model above defines the characteristics
of the problems to which the INP is addressed.
From now on, we use the words system and subsystem to
refer to the problem and subproblems, respectively. The xis
are, obviously, the coupling variables.
3. The steps o f l N P
REPEAT (UNTIL NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE
OCCURS)
Step l ~ T h e analyst fixes the coupling variables at feasible
values;
Step 2--The decision-makers optimize their own
subsystems;
Step 3--The analyst calculates the tradeoff among the
subsystems. This is done, for example, by
calculating the tradeoffs between the first
objectives of the subsystems;
Step 4--From the tradeoff information, the decision-
makers agree on the direction and amount of
change of those objective functions for which the
trade-off information was calculated in Step 3;
Step 5---The analyst calculates new values for the coupling
variables;
CONTINUE.
In the first step, the analyst starts the procedure by fixing
the coupling variables at feasible values.
The optimization of the subsystems by the decision
makers, in the second step, can be done by any appropriate
technique, once the coupling varibles are respected.
The concept of tradeoff (tradeoffs are calculated in the
third step) is to find the best, overall compromise solution
(the fourth step). It is important information for negotiation.
In the last step, the analyst, from the objective function
values and from the decision variable values provided by
decision-makers, fixes coupling variables at new values.
From the steps above, one sees how the proposed
fit t fhl
SUBSYSTEM
i ~Z~
i
lu~ i
FIG. 1. General system structure.
 Brief Paper
procedure breaks down a complicated decision-making
problem into subproblems of lower dimensions.
4. Analysis of the method and its convergence
The INP is a method addressed for problems with multiple
decision-makers who have their own multiple objectives. The
decision for a subsystem is normally taken by only one
decision-maker. However, this method can be easily
extended to solve subproblems that have more than one
decision-maker. Other techniques of negotiation can also be
used without affecting the INP.
We say that INP converges to some limits when the
interactive process is continued by consistent decision-
makers, and if the limit values of the objective functions
correspond to the best compromise decisions, among all
feasible decisions available to the decision-makers. Now, we
use the concept of utility function, that is, a function that
models the preference of the decision-makers. [For group
utility functions see Sage (1977)]. Thus, we say that INP
converges if the utility function converges to a limit value.
Hence, the following two assumptions are needed:
Assumption 1. A best compromise solution exists;
Assumption 2. An additive, differentiable group utility
function, not necessarily known, exists.
The existence of an additive utility function is an important
assumption to guarantee that, among the solutions found by
decision-makers when they optimize their subsystems, the
one provided by INP is the best compromise solution for the
system.
During the negotiation steps, that is, when the
decision-makers are to choose one among all noninferior
solutions, the decision-makers use tradeoffs as provided by
the analyst. With the tradeoffs, the decision-makers can
analyse the rate of change among objectives. Hence, tradeoff
information is needed in the INP. Optimization of the
subsystems can be done by any method, that need not
necessarily use the tradeoff concept. A strong condition,
however, is the existence of tradeoffs among the subsystems.
This means that the tradeoffs among the chosen objectives,
representative of the subsystems, need necessarily to exist.
The tradeoffs guarantee decision makers negotiation.
The third assumption is as follows:
Assumption 3. All tradeoffs between the objectives exist,
and all tradeoffs in subsystems optimization exist (Step 2).
As stated before, the most important point of this
assumption is the existence of the tradeoffs between the
objectives chosen as representative of the subsystems. If we
suppose that the negotiation will not be done through the
tradeoffs, this assumption can be discarded.
Consider a group utility function, additive and
differentiable. The indifferent tradeoff is that one repre-
senting the opinion of the decision-makers about one
noninferior point where the partial objective tradeoff is equal
to the indifferent subjective tradeoff. In other words, we can
state a fourth assumption as:
Assumption 4. The best compromise solution is the only
point where the tradeoffs are equal to the indifferent
tradeoffs of the group utility function (which ensures a local
maximum to be a global one).
Now, at the limit values of the objective functions, we
know that the objective, partial tradeoffs between repre-
sentative functions of subsystems are equal to the indifferent
tradeoff of the group utility function, and that the tradeoffs
in subsystem multiobjective optimization is also equal to the
corresponding indifferent tradeoffs. But note that, in
subsystem optimizations, the couplings were kept constant.
That is, tradeoffs in the subsystem optimizations are not
necessarily the tradeoffs for the whole system. One simple
assumption guaranteeing that tradeoffs associated with the
subsystems optimization are also tradeoffs for the whole
system, is the following:
Assumption 5. When determining any tradeoff between
693
objectives of the same subsystem, the fixed objectives fix the
coupling variable associated with the particular subsystem.
If assumption 5 holds, then the tradeoffs in the subsystem
optimization (Step 2) are also tradeoffs for the whole system.
Thus, based on assumption 4 the method converges.
To see an interpretation of the most crucial assumption, 5,
let us put in a weaker form:
Assumption 5'. Fixing the levels of objectives of n - 1
subsystems, fixes the coupling variables of the remaining
subsystem.
Assumption 5' is an independence condition for the
subsystems, meaning that when the levels of objectives of
n - 1 subsystems are fixed, the decision variables of n - 1
subsystem do not affect the tradeoffs of the remaining
subsystem via changing the coupling variables of that
particular subsystem.
One general class of systems where assumption 5' usually
holds consists of those cases where couplings among
subsystems are due to only common resources. In these
cases, fixing objective functions levels for n - 1 subsystems
usually fixes the amount of resources these n - 1 subsystems
require. Thus, the amount of resources for the remaining
subsystem is fixed.
Above, we have suggested a simple interactive negotiation
procedue, and considered its convergence requirements. It is
clear that the assumption 5 (or 5') is the most crucial one. In
fact, one can relax assumption 3: it is not necessary to have
tradeoffs between all objectives.
From the assumptions made, it directly follows that if the
procedure converges, a best compromise solution has been
reached. That is, a point has been obtained at which
tradeoffs are equal to the indifferent tradeoffs of the group
utility function. On the other hand, it is evident that the
procedure converges, except for some pathological cases. In
every interaction, the group utility function will increase.
Hence, based on the experience with single objective
optimization, one expects an unending interaction towards a
nonoptimal solution only in some exceptional cases, with a
special constraint structure.
It should be noted that the suggested INP can be used also
by a single decision-maker.
In order to outline a practical way to work with the
procedure just presented, a complementary remark is
necessary. There are many techniques to solve multiobjective
problems. Each of them have their own characteristics.
Among the general techniques we have the e-constraint
method (Haimes and Chankong, 1983). With this method it
is possible to transform the multiobjective case into a
sequence of single objective problems. This is done by
limiting the objective functions at values and including them
in the restriction set, except one taken as a primary
objective. If we use the E-constraint, it is possible to obtain
directly the tradeoff between objectives (Gomide et al. 1984;
Gomide, 1981; Haimes and Chankong, 1983). Hence, the
analysts have a way to obtain tradeoffs, and use them with
the negotiation procedure.
5. Application of lNP in operation planning of power systems
This section addresses an application of INP in an
operation planning of hydropower generation problem.
Figure 2 shows the main reservoirs of the hydroelectrical
power plants in the southeast region of Brazil. The reservoirs
r MARIMBONDO
SAO SIM,~O I
~ R ' ~ ' M E LHA
SOLTEIRA L~
I I,
SUBSYSTEM 2 SUBSYSTEM 1
FIG. 2. Southeast power system and subsystems.
694 Brief Paper

are arranged in two subsystems, representing two power

NEGOTIATION

//
companies that manage and operate them. The first
subsystem comprises Marimbondo and Agua Vermelha SIMULATION
reservoirs, and the second S~o Simfio and Ilha Solteira. COUPLING . COUPLING
We will denote by i the ith subsystem, and by j the ]th ~ RESERVOIR
reservoir of the ith subsystem. Let's define the following: OUTFLO7 TFLOW
xj(k): State variable. It is the reservoir level at the period
k.
u}(k): Decision variable. The amount of turninated water OPTIMIZATION OTHE IOPTIMIZATION]
at the period k. SUBSYS 1 RESERVOIR
y}(k): Natural inflows at the period k. OUTFLOWS [ SUBSYS2 J
The generation power (objective) functions are given by: FIG. 4. Negotiation simulation scheme.
T--I
fj(x~., u~, k) = k~x~(T) + ~'~ :r~. p. u}(k) .g. h~(x~(k)) (5) The scheme of negotiation, as used in simulation, is shown in
k=O
Fig. 4.
where From Fig. 2, it is easily seen that the coupling variable is
the decision variable u~(k), which is the physical connection
~r~: the efficiency in transforming potential falls into between both subsystems. It is clear that assumption 5 holds
hydroelectrieal power;
in this case. Thus, the tradeoffs of the subsystems are also
p: the specific weight of the water; the tradeoffs of the overall system.
u~(k): the turbined water quantity in the period k; From the utility function previously defined, we can now
g: the acceleration of the gravity; define the following subproblems:
h~(x~(k)): the difference between the water level, and the
escape channel of the reservoirs, debited from Subproblem 1
the hydric energy lost;
i,j: 1,2. max Ul[f~(x~, u~, k), f~(x l, u~, k)]

The constraints are defined by mass equilibrium equations

s.t. u12(k)=a(k); k = 0 . . . . . T - 1
and upper and lower bounds on state and decision variables x](k + 1) = x ] ( k ) +y](k) - u](k) + ~ u~(k)
as follows:
x_]<x](k)<$], k = O . . . . . T
x~(k + 1) = x~(k) + y~(k) - u~(k) + ~ u~(k) (6)
(I,m)~ i u~<-u}(k)<-C~}, k = 0 . . . . . T - 1
_x~<-xj(x)<-2~, k =0 ..... T (7) j=1,2.
_u)<--u~(k) -< fi), k = 0. . . . . T - 1 (8) Subproblem
where _x~, _u~, 2~, .~ denote lower and upper bounds max u2lf~(xL uL k), f~(x~, uL k)]
respectively, and f~ denotes the index set indicating the s.t. xE(k + 1)=xE(k)+y2(k)-u2(k)+ ~ u~(k)
reservoirs of the ith subsystem connected with the jth (I,m)~ 7
reservoir. _x~-<x~U,)_<,z~, k =0 ..... r
The generation power function (differentiable, but 2<:: 2 -2
nonlinear and nonconvex) make the problem difficult to _u/-ui(k)<-u/, k=0 ..... T-I
solve. In addition, the dimension of the problem normally /=1,2.
increases computational difficulties.
The INP method is appropriate to this problem since it Subproblem 3
allows negotiations among the decision-makers of the two
power companies aiming a better use of hydric resources.
max U[fl(x~, u~, k ), f ~(x~, u~, k ),
The negotiation scheme, as applied to this problem, is shown f 2,(x,,2 u,,2 k ), fZz(x2, u~, k)]
in Fig. 3. s.t.f~ = b, f2=c
To simulate the negotiation among decision-makers, the
following utility function has been defined for testing and x~(k + 1) =x~(k) +y}(k) - u~(k) + Z u~(k)
further comparison purposes: (t,rn)~Q i
x_)<-x;:(k)<-$}, k = 0 . . . . . T
1 2 = 0.2fI + 0.2f~+O.4f~+O.Ef2.
U(I1,1 fl,2 f2,/2) _u~<-u}(k)<~), k=O . . . . . T - I
j=1,2.

TRADE-OFFS
/ FIX
COUPLING [ TRADE-OFFS
In the subproblems above, a(k), b and c are fixed at
appropriate values during the interactive process.
Subproblem 1 models the optimization problem faced by
the decision makers of subsystem 1, with the coupling
variable fixed at a value set by the analyst. Subproblem 2 is
similar, but for decision maker of subsystem 2.
Subproblem 3 models the negotiation where all decision
makers are involved. To proceed with negotiations, objective
CALCULAT ON l CALCULATION 1 functions are selected to represent the subsystems, one for
each subsystem. Objective functions f~ and f2 have been
x~___/ANALYST selected to represent subsystem 1 and 2 respectively. Due to
its form, the objective functions values may be the same for
several points. For instance, keeping the quantity for
OPTIMIZATION OPTIMIZATION~ turbinated water constant instead of the objective function
SUBSYS 1 SUBSYS 2 ] value, we are, in fact, selecting one among all possible points
that corresponds to that objective function value. However,
DECISION the important is that any of those trajectories will correspond
MAKERS to the same value of the utility function, reflecting the same
FIO. 3. Negotiation scheme for the power system. preference of the decision maker. In this case, all tradeoffs
 Brief Paper 695

TABLE 1. COMPUTATIONAL PERFORMANCE OF I N P Masud, 1979):

Period Iteration Utility CPU time max {fl(xl, u~, k), f:~(x21, u21, k),
(months) number function (s) f 2,(xl,2 2
UD 2 2
k),f2(x2, U 2, k)}

6 3 7.95 15.56 s.t. x~(k + 1) = x ] ( k ) + y~(k) - u](k)

7 3 9.13 29.86 x~(k + 1) = x12(k) + y~(k) - u~(k) + u~(k)
8 3 10.14 43.10 x2(k + 1) = x2(k ) + y~(k ) - u2(k )
9 3 11.14 65.31
10 3 12.04 119.11 x2(k + 1) = x2(k) + y2(k) - u2(k) + u~(k) + u2(k)
11 3 12.92 118.24
12 3 13.95 162.24
x_~<-x~(k)<-~, k=0 ..... r
_u~<-u~(k)~f~, k=0 ..... T-1
i , ] = 1, 2.

are partial tradeoffs, since the levels of the objective, others As goals and aspirations levels for the objectives functions,
than those used to represent each subsystem, are kept fixed the values corresponding to the preferred solution obtained
during an interaction. by INP are taken. This is because our aim now is to compare
Table 1 presents the computational results obtained from the methods, in achieving the same preferred solution.
the procedure simulation for several time horizons. The SEMOPS method is also interactive. After goals and
The problems dependence of the initial points, the time aspirations levels are established, it defines surrogate
periods, the penalty factor and the precision requested are functions, corresponding to decision-makers' aspirations.
the reason of the variations in the CPU time values. The As goals for the generation power functions and
INP, in all cases, has converged in a few interactions. aspirations levels we have:
To solve the subproblems, an augmented Lagrangian
method has been used and implemented in a V A X 780 f ] > 9 . 7 f ~ > 9 . 0 f ~ > 1 4 . 8 f22>21.2
computer. A L l = 9 . 7 A L ~ = 9 . 0 AL 2=14.8 AL~=21.2
Figures 5 and 6 depict the trajectories obtained for
reservoirs' capacities and turbinated water, respectively, for which are the same values attained by the objective functions
a 12 month period. The natural inflow is also included in of the last section.
those figures as additional information. Figure 7 shows the The objective functions limits as well as the corresponding
evolution of the utility function value during the interactive dimensionless
procedure. f](x~, u], k)->AL]; d] =AL]/f~(x], u], k)
1 1 1
6. Application of the SEMOPS method f2(x2, u2, k)->AL21; d21 -_ AI..~/f
1 2(x2,
1 1 u2,
1 k)
We now consider the same multiobjective problem as fI(xl,
2 ul,
2 k)>_AL2;
presented in the previous section, rewritten in an
2
dt2_- A L 12/ f 2l(xl,2 ul,2 k)
appropriated form for the SEMOPS method (Hwang and f2(x2,
2 2 u2,
2 k)->AL2;
d 22 _- AL2/f2(x2,
2 2 2 u 22, k).

Subsystem 1 -- Reservoir 1 S u b s y s t e m 1 -- R e s e r v o i r 2
16~ 10
14i
12
10
8
6q
4~
2
l I I I l
' 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ~} 9 1'0 1'1 ,

Subsystem 2 -- Reservoir 1 Subsystem 2 -- Reservoir 2

14 25:
12
10'

~+~+~+~ + ~--..~__+ _ _ + ~ + ~ +/+,-"+ ,o//5

[ I I l I I I I I I I Oo --t--~'--? ~ , ~ ? ~ t--l-- ,+~'r---t----,
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Month
• - - T u rbinated water --+-- Natural i n f l o w
FIG. 5. Turbinated water trajectories.
696 Brief Paper

Subsystem 1 - - Reservoir 1 Subsystem 1 - - Reservoir 2

14 12
12 /\
\_./\/\,,.\,.
10
10
8
8~

t+~
6
6
4
"-...~
4 -~+\+"'+\+/+-- +--+ ~+--+--..+
2 2
0
0 ,
i
i a
i i
4 6
i L t
9 ;011,'2
i
ol 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 1~2

Subsystem 2 - - Reservoir 1 Subsystem 2 - - Reservoir 2

20 25
/ ........ . ........ _\ . _ III_ • ~II

15

10 \
20

15 \
10
5. +-.-~.+ ,-..-+ ÷.....,+ + + +..~+ ~ +
5

Oq r
;) ~} zl 5 6 -/ 8 ~) 1'0 111 112 00 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Month
- - - - - Reservoir level --+-- Natural inflow
FIG. 6. Reservoir's level trajectories.

Utility function value problems are solved. The decision-makers, according to

16 some criteria, choose one of the objective functions to be
14 deleted in S definition, and include it in a constraint set for
the next iteration.
12' Principal and auxiliary problem formulations for this
10 application is detailed in Cardarelli (1987). For the SEMOPS
method, see Monarchi (1980).
8 SEMOPS method application in operation planning
problem has considered the problem structure. For instance,
6
from the overall system topology, we see that reservoir 1 of
4 subsystem 1 is more independent than the others. For this
reason, the corresponding objective function has been
2 incorporated in the set of constraints, keeping as a goal the
o; same values of the aspiration levels previously defined. From
the results of the second iteration, and also due to the
Iteration topology, f~ has been included in the set of constraints,
keeping the same aspiration level obtained until the third
FIG. 7. Evolution of the utility function.
iteration. In the fourth iteration, the objective function f2
has been fixed in the value obtained. The results of the last
The SEMOPS method is based on a sequence of iteration are given by Table 2.
optimization problems with the following surrogate objective
functions: 7. Comparatioe analysis between the methods
The following results can be drawn after comparing the
S=~,d~ main characteristics of the methods.
(i,j)eT' The INP preserves the form and properties of the
where (i, j) determine the objective functions that enter in multiobjective optimization problem, while the SEMOPS
function S definition. does not. For instance, SEMOPS transforms a linear
In each iteration, a principal and several auxiliary optimization problem into a nonlinear one. Moreover, INP

TABLE 2. SEMOPS RESULTS--LASTITERATION

Utility CPU time

f, f21 f2 f2 dll d] dl2 d2 di function (sec)

9.7 8.5 14.8 21.2 1.0 1.06 1.0 1.0 1.06 13.8 655.08
9.7 9.0 14.8 21.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 13.9 852.24
 Brief Paper
does not require any additional information other than
tradeoffs to be used. To establish goals and aspiration levels
is a basic premise for the SEMOPS method.
Furthermore, the INP naturally exploits a decomposition
structure, while SEMOPS does not. This is a simplification
factor. For instance, in the power system example each INP
subproblem has 48 variables and 72 constraints. In SEMOPS,
each principal or secondary subproblem has 86 variables and
144 constraints. In addition, we have an increasing constraint
set due to objective functions inclusions in each iteration.
It should be noted that information provided by the INP
procedure has been used in SEMOPS implementation, to set
the aspirations levels. This usually is not the case. Hence, the
computational performance of SEMOPS has been favoured.
From the point of view of computational performance INP
requires much less programming and CPU time than
SEMOPS. For instance, to generate a compromise solution
for a 12 month planning horizon, the INP took 162.24
seconds, SEMOPS 10,186.11 seconds.
8. Conclusions
There are some important INP characteristics that we
should mention:
• It is a natural method, since it does not require any
complementary information to be used;
• It is an interactive method, giving freedom to the
decision-maker on how to proceed with his subsystem;
• It exploits decomposition structures to transform a
complex problem into a set of smaller and simpler
problems;
• It converges rapidly;
• It does not introduce any additional complexity into the
original problem.
Concerning INP application in the power system planning
example, it has been shown that it is more efficient than a
previously developed method, at least for this class of
problem.
Further work shall consider the extension of INP to handle
a broader class of problems, including those involving
uncertainties and stochastic behaviour, as well as its
combination with knowledge-based systems to elicit pre-
ferences and to speed up the obtaining of compromise
solutions (Zimmermann et al., 1984). The integration of
technical concepts and basic mechanisms of human
behaviour and decision-making in larger scope than just
mathematical optimization is also to be addressed in the near
future. See Yu (1985) for an interesting discussion on this
point.
Acknowledgements--This work was supported in part by
CNPq, the Brazilian National Research Council, under grant
no. 300.729/86-3. The help of Prof. Jaime Szajner is
acknowledged. The authors are also in debt to the
anonymous referees for their fruitful comments.
697
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