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Overview of

Behavioral Economics
&
Behavioral Nudges

AE 6307
Behavioral Economics

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 1


Introduction
 Economics:
Given:
Opportunities &
Constraints (scare
resources) Choices
maximize Well-Being
(goods to
consume or (utility)
actions to
take.

Homo Oeconomicus
(rational, consistent, Our mind is easily
and selfish man). tricked, leading us to
CONTRADICT make mistake and bias
judgment in a systematic
 Psychology: and predictable way

Given:
psychological Choices
limitations (goods to
consume or
e.g. perception, actions to
cognition, take.
attention,
emotion
mental functions and behaviors (C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 2
Introduction

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 3


Introduction

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 4


Introduction

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 5


Economics + Psychology = Behavioral Economics
scientific study on
the nervous system and
how the brain function

Neuroscience

Neuroeconomics mental functions


and behaviors

Economics Psychology

Behavioral Economics
How psychological limitations affect
economic decision makings
(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 6
Key Figures

Daniel Kahneman Amos Tversky Richard Thaler


(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 7
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS

 It studies how psychological limitations affect


economic decision makings.
 Economics  assumes that individuals have stable
and coherent preferences  preferences are
represented by utility function  they maximize the
expected value of this utility function  leading to
rational choice.
 Behavioral economics attempts to provide more
realistic foundations and to explain why people might
make seemingly irrational choice.
 Behavioral economics aims to increase the
explanatory power of economics.
(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 8
Three Broad Topics to be Discussed:

 Bounded Rationality:
People make choices that are seemingly irrational
(from the viewpoint of standard economics models)  due
to cognitive limitations, inability to process complex
information, and the use of simple heuristics, etc.

 Bounded Self-Control:
Economics model of inter-temporal decision people
maximize the present discounted sum of the
instantaneous utilities obtained from their decision
taken at every time period (e.g. how much to consume now
and in the future)  time consistent preferences  in
reality is NOT  that is why we procrastinate (doing it later
than now), unable to commit, and get into addiction.

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 9


Three Broad Topics to be Discussed in AE 6307:

 Bounded Self-Interests:
Standard economic model assumes people maximize utility
derived from own material wealth. In reality, people may not
only care about own material interests  may also care for
others  social preferences.

Behavioral Economics Methodologies:


1. Theory  mathematical modeling of individual decision
making individual maximizes an objective function (e.g.
utility) that incorporate behavioral aspects  subject to
constraints  get theoretical predictions.
2. Empirics  estimate regressions, run simulations and (or)
calibration using empirical data (on individual behavior).
3. Experiment  design and run experimental treatments in the
lab or in the field  e.g. subjects are students.
(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 10
Choice and Framing

 People face risky decisions all the time  how do


people evaluate risky prospects?
 Economic Theory: people evaluate risky prospects on
the basis of the overall (net) wealth, the probability
of occurance and the expected ‘utility’ derived from
this net wealth.
 In reality  not true  people don’t look at the
overall wealth, but instead at gains and losses and
respond to them differently.

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 11


Choice and Framing
 Kahneman and Tversky (1984).

Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of


an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600
people. Two alternative programs to combat the
disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact
scientific estimates of the consequences of the
programs are as follows:

If program A is adopted 200 people will be 72%


saved.

If program B is adopted, there is a 1/3


probability that 600 people will be saved and a 28%
2/3 probability that no people will be saved.

framed as gain
(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 12
Choice and Framing
 Kahneman and Tversky (1984).

Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of


an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600
people. Two alternative programs to combat the
disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact
scientific estimates of the consequences of the
programs are as follows:

If program A is adopted 400 people will die. 22%

If program B is adopted, there is a 1/3


probability that nobody will die and a 2/3 78%
probability that 600 people will die.

framed as loss
(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 13
Choice and Framing

 Kahneman and Tversky (1979).


 Suppose you are asked to choose between the
followings:

 In addition to whatever you own, you have been


given 1000. You are now asked to choose between:
A: (1000, prob.=0.5) and B: (500)
N=70 [16] [84]
 In addition to whatever you own, you have been
given 2000. You are now asked to choose between:
C: (-1000, prob.=0.5)and D: (-500)
N=68 [69] [31]

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 14


Choice and Framing

 People treat gains differently from losses.


Standard economic theory says that the
choice has to be consistent as they are
identical problems (framed differently).

 People are risk-averse in gains and risk-


seeking in losses.

 Loss aversion: the disutility of losing is larger


than the utility of gaining  people want to
overturn losses  this explains why people
are risk seeking in losses  more willing to
gamble.
(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 15
Loss Aversion
• Putler (1992):
• Conducted a study on egg sales in California.

• He wanted to know how people react to price


changes. Do people behave differently towards
price increase and price decrease?
• Result: People cut back egg consumption sharply
when the price increases, and increase
consumption by only a bit when the price
decreases.

• Thus, there is asymmetric response  a price


increase is registered as a loss and a price
decrease is registered as a gain  a loss has
stronger impact than a gain  loss aversion.

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 16


Loss Aversion
• Babcock, Loewenstein and Thaler (1997):

• Conducted a study on cab drivers in NY city.

• Cabdrivers rent the cab from taxi companies.

• The rent is paid in advance (for 12 hours).

• Drivers can keep the fares they collect and quit for the day
before the 12 hours are up.

• Passengers typically hail cruising cabs.

• Rains, Snow, Holidays, and Convention days are good days.

• Weekends and when few business people are around are


bad days.

• How does the amount of hours a driver works vary with the
day’s average hourly earnings?  How does the supply look
like?
(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 17
Loss Aversion
• The law of supply: people should supply more
when the price is high.
W
S

• BUT what they found:


W
Contrary to the law of supply
How is it possible?

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 18


Loss Aversion
• It turns out that:

• Cab drivers use “daily income targeting”


strategy  they decide how long to work by
setting themselves an income target every day.

• Drivers have loss aversion  they dislike losing money


a lot more than they like winning money (with the same
amount).

• As a result: drivers do not want to quit before they


reach their daily target, but when they do reach the
target, they are not so enthusiastic to go higher even in
good days.

• Chou (2002) found similar results using data of


Singapore cab drivers.

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 19


Loss Aversion and Bounded Rationality
• Bazerman (1983).

• Lab experiment based on the Dollar


Auction Game (Shubik, 1971).

• $50 bill for auction, bidding starts at $1


and goes up in $1 increments.

• The winner pay his (her) bid and gets $50.

• 2nd highest bidder also has to pay his (her) bid, but gets
nothing in return.

• Participants open the bidding  but very soon bidders


exit the auction until there are only 2 bidders.

• 2nd highest bidder not willing to lose decides to outbid


the highest bidder  to avoid losing the highest bidder
will increase the bid further  escalate futher…

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 20


Loss Aversion and Bounded Rationality
• Loss aversion induce them to outbid each other  if both
players are stubborn, bids could go much higher than $50.

• They should have quitted much earlier  sunk cost fallacy


prevented them from doing so.

• But, more importantly, bidders failed to see this eventuality


when deciding whether or not to participate  bounded
rationality.

• By the way, this auction format is used in a real online


auction site (http://www.swoopo.com)

• Swoopo  a legitimate auction format or a scam?

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 21


Loss Aversion and Bounded Rationality
• Each bid point costs $1. You place bid points to bid for the
item and all items have a time limit. But an extra 15
seconds are added if there is someone outbid the highest
bidder.
 The losers spend bid
points and did not get
the item.
 Swoopo went bankrupt,
but thereafter the
domain name was
acquired by DealDash.

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 22


Loss Aversion and Bounded Rationality

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 23


More on Bounded Rationality

• A baseball and bat together cost $11.

• The bat costs $10 more than the ball.

• How much does the ball cost?

• Write down your answer.

• Answer:

50 cents: $10.50-$.50 = $10.00.


People tend to use “intuitive thinking”
or rules of thumb, and arrive at $1 as
the answer.

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 24


Loss Aversion  Sunk Cost Fallacy
• Loss aversion leads to sunk cost (already been
incurred and cannot be recovered) fallacy (“throwing
good money after bad”).
• What will you do in this occasion?

 You recently bought a new pair of non-returnable


running shoes for $75. They were comfortable
when you tried on in the store, but after a long
run, you discover a painful defect in the arch
support. Do you ever run in the shoes again?

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 25


Loss Aversion  Sunk Cost Fallacy

• What will you do?


 You have purchased a non-refundable and non-
transferable movie ticket in advance. When the night
of the show comes, you notice that you don't
actually feel like going out anymore, and would
actually enjoy yourself more at home. Do you go to
the movie anyway?

 You have already purchased a movie ticket in


advance. It costs you $7. You attached a value of $9
from watching that movie. On the way to the
theatre, you notice that you have lost your ticket. A
new ticket will cost you $7 at the ticket booth. Will
you buy a new ticket?

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 26


Loss Aversion  Endowment Effect
• Endowment effect  reluctant to part with the thing you
own  WTA > WTP.
• Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1984):
• A lab (class) experiment.
• Half of the class is randomly given mugs.
• Those who received the mugs are asked to value
them.
• Those who did not receive the mugs are asked to bid
for them.
• Then, allow them to trade.
• If no loss aversion (endowment effect)  half of the
mugs should be traded.
• Few mugs changed hands (10%)  the median WTP
is $2.50 and the median WTA is $5.25.
(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 27
Loss Aversion  Endowment Effect

We are willing to pay (WTP) less for something


(an item) we don’t own than we are willing to
accept (WTA) payment for an identical item we
own.

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 28


“Money” Illusion  Failure to Understand the
Difference between Real Value and Nominal Value
• Difficulty level of an exam  is a useful tool to
‘distinguish’ students’ ability (stars; average, below
average) when ability follows normal distribution.

• Suppose that the exam is difficult!

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 29


“Money” Illusion  Failure to Understand the
Difference between Real Value and Nominal Value
• The highest score is only 72 (72%) out of 100 
what do you think students’ reaction?

• But they forget that they are graded on curve!


Difficulty level does not matter!!  they confuse
the distinction between real with nominal value.
• Solutions?  Raise the maximum score from 100
to, for example, 137  you make the average close
to 100!  not easy to convert it to % in their head.
(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 30
Loss Aversion  Status Quo Bias
• People have a strong tendency to remain at the
status quo (default option)  reluctant to change.
• Even when the decision is important and the
stakes are large.
• Example: ORGAN DONATION
• Countries differ in their method of soliciting
organ donation.
• OPT-OUT: By default, people are donating their organs 
must check box to opt-out of donating.
• OPT-IN: By default, people are not donating their organs 
must check box to opt-in of donating.

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 31


The Power of Default
• ORGAN DONATION

Please, check the box below if you want to


participate in the organ donation program.

Please, check the box below if you do not want to


participate in the organ donation program.

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 32


The Power of Default

Singapore  HOTA (Human Organ Transplant Act) 


the law that covers the removal of any organ from the
body of a dead person into the body a living person.

When does the act kick in?  when a person


has died in hospital. Death may mean cardiac
death (heart stops beating), or brain death
(heart is still beating, but brain does not
function)

Singapore: OPT-OUT system.

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 33


The Power of Default

Organ donation rate in different countries:

Johnson and Goldstein (2003)

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 34


The Power of Default

• ORGAN DONATION

Please, check the box below if you want to


participate in the organ donation program.

do not check, and do not join!

Please, check the box below if you do not want to


participate in the organ donation program.

do not check, and join!

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 35


The Power of Default
• Madrian and Shea (2001)  401K Plan in the US
• What is 401K Plan?  saving for retirement  in
Singapore it is equivalent to SRS scheme
(tax-incentive saving for retirement).

• Contributions taken out of each paycheck,


and some firms match employee contributions.
• Contributions invested in mutual funds.
• Penalties for early withdrawal.

• Employees have a hard time carrying out the actions they say
they want to take.

• From a survey, out of 100 employees, 68 report saving too


little, and 24 out of 68 plan to raise 401K contribution rate
in the next 2 months  but only 3 actually do so in the
next 4 months.
(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 36
The Power of Default
• Standard enrollment  most companies require
employees to initiate 401K enrollment themselves
(opt-in).
• In contrast  automatic enrollment (opt-out).
• Automatic enrollment dramatically increases participation

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 37


The Power of Default

• Employees enrolled under the automatic enrollment cluster at


the default contribution rate.

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 38


Anchoring Effect
• People often make estimates by starting from an initial
value that is adjusted to draw the final answer.
• Kahneman and Tversky (1974):
• Conducted a study  participants were asked an arbitrary
question  “what percentage of African Nations part of the
UN?

• Then, before they gave their answer, they were given a


random anchor number (x)  from a spinning wheel
with numbers from 0-100.

• They were then asked whether the number was higher or


lower then the value of the percentage they have in mind.

• They were then asked to re-estimate the value of the quantity


upward of downward from the given number.

• Those who got a larger number gave a higher estimate.


(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 39
Anchoring Effect  Influencing WTP

• Ariely, Loewenstein and Prelec (2003).

• 55 MIT students, shown 6 products.

• They were asked for their last 2 digits of their social


security number (IC).

• Then, they were asked whether they would pay for the
products for the dollar equivalent amount of the last 2
digits SSN  e.g. 45 = $45.

• After giving yes/ no answer, they were asked the max.


amount WTP for each of the products.

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 40


Anchoring Effect

• Students with large 2 digits number are willing to pay more


 WTP is sensitive to the anchor.

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 41


Mental Accounting & The Power of Comparison

• Thaler (1985) :
• Imagine you are shopping for a calculator and a
jacket, and you find them both at the same
department store.
• The calculator costs $25, and the jacket costs
$120.
• You are told that a store across town has both
items, but the calculator is $15 cheaper at that
store.
• Do you buy the items at that store or do you go
across town?

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 42


Mental Accounting & The Power of Comparison
• Thaler (1985):
• Imagine you are shopping for a calculator and a
jacket, and you find them both at the same
department store.
• The calculator costs $25, and the jacket costs
$120.
• You are told that a store across town has both
items, but the jacket is $15 cheaper at that store.
• Do you buy the items at that store or do you go
across town?
• In theory  whether the $15 will be saved from $25
or $120 should be irrelevant  $15 is $15 no matter
what. (C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 43
Mental Accounting & The Power of Comparison

• What will you do?

 You have already purchased a movie ticket in


advance. It cost you $7. On the way to the cinema,
you lost your ticket. You can of course buy another
ticket that will cost you $7 at the ticket booth. Will
you do this?

 You plan to watch a movie. A movie ticket will cost


you $7. On the way to the cinema, you lost your
money $7 that you will use to buy the ticket. You
can of course buy another ticket that will cost you
$7 at the ticket booth. Will you do this?

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 44


The Power of Comparison
• Ariely (2008)
• 100 students at MIT’s Sloan School of Management.

68

32

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 45


The Power of Comparison
• Ariely (2008)
• 100 students at MIT’s Sloan School of Management.

16
0

84

• Option 2 (print subscription)  inferior option compared to


option 3  used as a ‘decoy’  preference reversal.
(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 46
The Power of Comparison
• Ayres, Raseman, and Shih (2009)

• How to encourage people to


reduce electricity and gas
usage (conserve energy)?

• Field experiments (with 85000 households  random


assignments) conducted by utility companies in
Sacramento California.

• The idea: can we induce customers to conserve energy


by providing feedback to customers on their home
electricity and natural gas usage to allow for peer
comparisons.
• Samples of the feedback.
(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 47
The Power of Comparison

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 48


The Power of Comparison

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 49


The Power of Comparison
• Ayres, Raseman, and Shih (2009)

• Significant impact on energy


usage reductions in energy consumption with the
decrease sustained over time.

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 50


The Power of Comparison
• Singapore  old PUB Bill  there is comparison, but could
be made more salient to better facilitate comparison.

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 51


The Power of Comparison
• Singapore  new PUB Bill  better!

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 52


The Power of Comparison
• Shampanier, Mazar and Ariely (2007).
• They ran field experiments selling 2 brands of
chocolates (Lindt ‘Truffle’ and Hershey ‘Kiss’).
Lindt Truffle is known as an exquisite quality chocolate,
while Hershey Kiss is known as a rather ordinary
chocolate. They set the following prices:
Lindt Truffle 15 cents 73%
Hershey Kiss 1 cents 27%

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 53


The Power of Comparison
• Shampanier, Mazar and Ariely (2007).
• They ran field experiments selling 2 brands of
chocolates (Lindt ‘Truffle’ and Hershey ‘Kiss’).
Lindt Truffle is known as an exquisite quality chocolate,
while Hershey Kiss is known as a rather ordinary
chocolate. They set the following prices:
Lindt Truffle 14 cents 31%
Hershey Kiss 0 cents 64%

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 54


Paradox of Choice
• Too many choices can be demotivating (Iyengar and Lepper
(2000)
Choice of Marmalades No. of Shoppers No. of Buyers
Visiting

40% of shoppers 30% of shoppers


Stand 1 2 flavors sampled on (e.g. 12)
average
(e.g. 40)

60% of shoppers
2 flavors sampled on 3.33% of shoppers
Stand 2 average (e.g. 2)
(e.g. 60)

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 55


The Intertemporal Choice
 We often have to make a choice between
doing something now or later at some
future time.
What We Often Say:

 Intertemporal choice  decision involving trade-offs


between costs and benefits occurring in different time
periods.
(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 56
The Intertemporal Choice: Resisting Temptation

 Immediate (now) benefits and delayed (future) costs


 can we fight temptation to pursue immediate
gratification?
 E.g. consuming addictive substances (cigarettes
and alcohol), gambling
 Immediate (now) costs and delayed (future) benefits
 can we force ourselves to do it now?
 E.g. exercising (going to gym), doing your
homework.
 Walter Mischel’s delayed gratification
experiment with kids.
[Play Video Clip]
(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 57
The Intertemporal Choice: Resisting Temptation
The Marshmallow Test
Walter Mischel’s Study 
The 4-year-olds who
waited for two
marshmallows  less
likely to abuse drugs,
had higher self-esteem,
had better relationships,
were better at handling
stress, obtained higher
degrees and earned more
money.

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 58


The Intertemporal Choice

 Read and Van Leeuwen (1998).


 Food choice experiment (when hungry).

Choosing Today For Next Week

If you were deciding today,


would you choose
fruit or chocolate for 74%
next week.

“healthy”

26%

“unhealthy”

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 59


The Intertemporal Choice

Choosing and Eating Today

If you were deciding today,


would you choose
fruit or chocolate for
today.

30%

“healthy”

70%

“unhealthy”
(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 60
The Intertemporal Choice

 Results:

 People are ‘patient’ (choosing healthy food


that has long term benefit) when making
decision for the future, but,

 People are ‘impatient’ (choosing unhealthy


food that has instant benefit) when making
decision for today.

 Time inconsistent preference.

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 61


Time Inconsistent Preferences
• Implications:
• People are not internally consistent decision makers 
dynamic inconsistency.

• This explain why people keep making promises and finding


hard times to deliver them  think of new year resolutions:

• I’ll quit smoking next week…


• I’ll stop procrastinating on my term paper and do it early, so I
won’t need to work in a rush approaching the deadline…

• I’ll go to sleep now, but will get up early to prepare for


tomorrow exam….

• I’ll exercise this weekend…


• I’ll start studying for my finals at the beginning of reading
period….…

• Solution: COMMITMENT (C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 62


How Do You Commit – http://www.stickk.com

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 63


How Do You Commit – http://www.stickk.com

(C) Yohanes Eko Riyanto 64


How Do You Commit – http://www.stickk.com

(C) Yohanes Eko Riyanto 65


How Do You Commit – http://www.stickk.com

(C) Yohanes Eko Riyanto 66


Bounded Self-Interest

• Gneezy and Rustichini (2000).


• Study on the effect of imposing monetary fine on parents
who arrived late to pick up their children in a day care
centre in Israel.
• Before the fine was imposed:
• A social unspoken contract (social norms) between
parents and teachers  so when parents were late
they would feel guilty.
• Late pick-ups were rare.
• Subsequently, after the fine was imposed:
• Late pick-ups became common.

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 67


Bounded Self-Interest

• The reason: paying fine for being late effectively replaces


social norms with market norms.

• Market norms  the fine is a price to pay  parents can


decide whether to pick up their kids late or not.

• Few weeks later the day care centre removed the fine 
the centre was back with social norms.

• Parents did not change their behavior  late pick ups


were still common  the guilt feeling disappeared.
• Social norms can be eroded by market norms.
• Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) and Gneezy and
Rustichini (2003) provide other evidence of this
motivation crowding-out.

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 68


Bounded Self-Interest
• Suppose I give you S$100, and I ask you to divide with
another person of your choice (e.g. a friend, a
girlfriend/boyfriend, a family member etc. ). You can
decide whatever division you want.
• The rule: The other person must either accept the offer or
reject, no negotiation is allowed. If he or she rejects it,
both of you walk away with nothing.
• What would you offer? and why?
S$100 S$(100-x) ; S$x
accept
S$ x
A B

you receives S$100 recipient reject


from me, and, S$0 ; S$0
S$0
makes offer S$x>0
out of S$100 to B
(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 69
Bounded Self-Interest

• By backward induction (game-theory): In this ultimatum


game: B should accept S$x, because S$x>0  knowing
this A should indeed offer S$x  since A’s payoff is
decreasing in S$x, A should offer as low x as possible (i.e.
x≈0).
• If you run this experiment: people are always making
‘generous’ offer.

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 70


What have We Learned?

• People exhibit various systematic behavioral biases and


limitations  leading to seemingly irrational choices.
• Understanding these behavioral biases and limitations
could enrich economic theories and offer some
perspectives on the limitation of economic theories.
• These behavioral biases and limitations have profound
impacts on people’s economics decision makings.
• The decisions and choices made will influence the success
of public policies.
• Public policies need to consider the choice architecture
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2008)  the context in which
people make decisions  allow us to nudge people into
the direction we want them to go.
(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 71
Behavioral Economics and Public Policies

• How do we change people’s behavior (e.g. healthy habits,


quit smoking, adherence to speed limit…) for the better
with policies?

Prohibition and Fines Don’t regulate (free


(Paternalism) Choice)
(Libertarian)
Indirectly by nudging
them to the direction
we want them to go

Must understand the psychological aspects and contexts in which


people make decisions (economic decisions or non economic decisions
that have significant economic implications).

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 72


Behavioral Nudges

(C) Yohanes Eko Riyanto 73


Behavioral Nudges

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 74


Behavioral Nudges

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 75


Behavioral Nudges

Nomophobia: the phobia (intense,


irrational fear) of being out of mobile
phone contact.

(C) Yohanes Eko Riyanto 76


Behavioral Nudges
Singapore Digital Marketing Statistic 2015

5.2 3.5 3.4 2.9 2


HOURS HOURS HOURS HOURS HOURS

(C) Yohanes Eko Riyanto 77


Behavioral Nudges – IKEA Phoneless Table

(C) Yohanes Eko Riyanto 78


Behavioral Nudges – Hope Soap (South Africa)

 WHO ranked South Africa as one of the most


unhygienic places in the world

 Thousands die from diseases which regular hand


washing could reduce by 70% and the majority of them
are children

 Hand washing with soap is one of the most effective


and cheapest ways to practice hygiene and prevent the
spread of deadly disease.

 In collaboration with SafetyLab South Africa and


Blikkiesdorp 4 Hope, Young and Rubicam Group (Y&R)
aims to encourage children to wash their hands
thoroughly with soap

(C) Yohanes Eko Riyanto 79


(C) Yohanes Eko Riyanto 80
Behavioral Nudges – Hope Soap (South Africa)

• Toys: Hello Kitty for girls to Car figurines for boys


• Child-friendly with curved edges and colorful
appearances
• A simple sticker is also pasted at the back of the soap
which provide instructions and spread the importance of
hand washing

(C) Yohanes Eko Riyanto 81


Behavioral Nudges – Hope Soap (South Africa)

(C) Yohanes Eko Riyanto 82


Behavioral Nudges – The Social Swipe – Making
Donation Easy

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 83


Behavioral Nudges

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 84


Behavioral Nudges

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 85


Behavioral Nudges

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 86


Behavioral Nudges

(C) Yohanes E. Riyanto 87


Behavioral Nudges

(C) Yohanes Eko Riyanto 88


Behavioral Nudges

WHAT IS A GOOD NUDGE?

1. EASY TO OPT OUT 2. TRANSPARENT 3. IMPROVES WELFARE

(C) Yohanes Eko Riyanto 89


Behavioral Nudges

WHAT IS A BAD NUDGE?

1. POORLY DESIGNED 2. BAD INTENTIONS

(C) Yohanes Eko Riyanto 90


Behavioral Nudges – Fighting Diabetes – Less Sugar
Diet

(C) Yohanes Eko Riyanto 91


Behavioral Nudges – Fighting Diabetes – Less
Sugar Diet

(C) Geraldine Soh, Goh Wanling, Josiah Lim, Lin


Yifeng, Tan He Jiang 92
Behavioral Nudges – Fighting Diabetes – Less
Sugar Diet

(C) Yohanes Eko Riyanto 93


Behavioral Nudges – Fighting Diabetes
– Less Sugar Diet
Sugar Taxes

The idea is being mooted for implementation in Singapore


(public consultation).
In April 2018, UK implemented it.

(C) Yohanes Eko Riyanto 94


Behavioral Nudges – Fighting Diabetes
– Less Sugar Diet
What about Behavioral Economics based Policy to complement?

Consider the following group project submitted by


students in my Behavioral Economics class (HE4004) at
NTU.

• Visual nudge (to increase social awareness)


• Shaping preferences
• Allowing people to identify themselves with the
health conscious group.
• Building social norm  creating bandwagon effect

Special thanks to: Geraldine Soh Zixin, Goh Wanling,


Josiah Lim Guan Qun, Lin Yifeng, Tan He Jiang
(C) Yohanes Eko Riyanto 95
Fighting Diabetes – Less Sugar Diet

(C) Geraldine Soh, Goh Wanling, Josiah Lim, Lin


Yifeng, Tan He Jiang 96
Fighting Diabetes – Less Sugar Diet

(C) Geraldine Soh, Goh Wanling, Josiah Lim, Lin


Yifeng, Tan He Jiang 97
Fighting Diabetes – Less Sugar Diet

(C) Geraldine Soh, Goh Wanling, Josiah Lim, Lin


Yifeng, Tan He Jiang 98
Fighting Diabetes – Less Sugar Diet

(C) Geraldine Soh, Goh Wanling, Josiah Lim, Lin


Yifeng, Tan He Jiang 99
Fighting Diabetes – Less Sugar Diet

(C) Geraldine Soh, Goh Wanling, Josiah Lim, Lin


Yifeng, Tan He Jiang 100
Fighting Diabetes – Less Sugar Diet

(C) Geraldine Soh, Goh Wanling, Josiah Lim, Lin


Yifeng, Tan He Jiang 101

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