CASE NO. 7 (CD NO.

4):

A. DOCTRINE:

A solidary or joint and several obligation is one in which each debtor

is liable for the entire obligation, and each creditor is entitled to demand the
whole obligation. In a joint obligation each obligor answers only for a part
9

of the whole liability and to each obligee belongs only a part of the correla-
tive rights.

B. CASE TITLE:

G.R. No. 101723 May 11, 2000

INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORP.

(INIMACO), petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, (Fourth Division) Cebu
City, and ENRIQUE SULIT, SOCORRO MAHINAY, ESMERALDO PE-
GARIDO, TITA BACUSMO, GINO NIERE, VIRGINIA BACUS, ROBERTO
NEMENZO, DARIO GO, and ROBERTO ALEGARBES, respondents.

C. FACTS:

Private respondents filed a complaint with the Department of Labor

and Employment against Filipinas Carbon Mining Corporation, Gerardo
Sicat, Antonio Gonzales, Chin Chin Gin, Lo Kuan Chin, and petitioner In-
dustrial Management Development Corporation (INIMACO), for payment of
separation pay and unpaid wages.

The decision of the Labor Arbiter held that respondents Filipinas Car-
bon and Mining Corp., Gerardo Sicat, Antonio Gonzales/INIMACO, Chiu
Chin Gin and Lo Kuan Chin to pay complainants Enrique Sulit, Esmeraldo
Pegarido, Roberto Nemenzo and Dario Go to be deposited with the Com-
missionwithin 10 days from receipt of the Decision. All other claims were
dismissed.
 Since no appeal was filed within the reglementary period, the Deci-
sion of the Labor Arbiter became final and executor. The Labor Arbiter then
issued a writ of execution but was returned unsatisfied. The Labor Arbiter
then issued an Alias Writ of Execution commanding the complainants to
proceed to the premises of respondents to collect and turn over the ordered
amount. Should a failure to collect the said amount in cash be encountered,
they were authorized to cause the satisfaction of the same on the movable
or immovable property(s) of respondent not exempt from execution.

Petitioner then filed a Motion to Quash Alias Writ of Execution and set
aside the Decision alleging that the alias writ of execution altered and
changed the decision by changing the liability of therein respondents from
joint to solidary. The motion was denied by the lAbor Arbiter.

The petitioner then filed and appeal and the NLRC dismissed the ap-
peal holding that the Writ of Execution be given due course in all respects.

A Motion to Compel Sheriff to Accept Payment representing one sixth

pro rate share of petitioner as full and final satisfaction of judgment. The
private respondents opposed the motion and the Labor Arbiter denied the
motion ruling that the amount offered by INIMACO is to be accepted by the
Sheriff as partial satisfaction of the judgment and to proceed with the en-
forcement of the Alias Writ of Execution.

An appeal was again filed to the NLRC which was consequently de-
nied ruling that INIMACO would reopen the issue which was already re-
solved against it thus, not keeping with the established rules of practice and
procedure to allow the attempt of INIMACO to delay final disposition of the
case.

D. ISSUE:
 Whether or not petitioner’s liability is solidary or not.

E. HELD:

The court held, NO. INIMACO’s liability is not solidary but merely joint
and that the respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in up-
holding the Alias Writ of Execution.

A solidary or joint and several obligation is one in which each debtor

is liable for the entire obligation, and each creditor is entitled to demand the
whole obligation. In a joint obligation each obligor answers only for a part of
the whole liability and to each obligee belongs only a part of the correlative
rights.

Well-entrenched is the rule that solidary obligation cannot lightly be

inferred. There is a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so
states, when the law so provides or when the nature of the obligation so re -
quires.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolution

dated September 4, 1991 of the respondent National Labor Relations is
hereby declared NULL and VOID. The liability of the respondents in RAB-
VII-0711-84 pursuant to the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated March 10,
1987 should be, as it is hereby, considered joint and petitioner's payment
which has been accepted considered as full satisfaction of its liability, with-
out prejudice to the enforcement of the award, against the other five (5) re-
spondents in the said case.

SO ORDERED.

CASE NO. 2:
A. DOCTRINE:

Novation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability under the penal

laws of the country. Only the. State may validly waive the criminal action
against an accused. Novation is relevant only to determine if the parties
have meanwhile altered the nature of the obligation prior to the commence-
ment of the criminal prosecution in order to prevent the incipient criminal li-
ability of the accused.

B. CASE TITLE:

G.R. No. 162826               October 14, 2013

NARCISO DEGAÑOS, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

BERSAMIN, J.

C. FACTS:

On February 10, 1994, Miguel V. Campos filed with the Securities, Investi-
gation and Clearing Department (SICD) of the Securities Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) a petition against Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. (MKSE) and
its directors for nullification of the Resolution of the MKSE Board of Direc-
tors which allegedly deprived him of his right to participate equally in the al-
location of Initial Public Offerings of corporations registered with MKSE and
sought the delivery of the IPO shares he was allegedly deprived
of, for which he would pay IPO prices.

On August 14, 1995, the SEC en banc ordered the dismissal of Campos’
petition before the SICD. Campos filed a Petition for Certiorari with the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and ruled that
rendered the SEC order null and void. MKSE filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court.

D. ISSUE:

Whether or not the grant of the IPO allocations in favor of Campos a mere
accommodation given to him by the Board of MKSE?

E. HELD:

Yes. The petition before the SEC asserts the alleged right of Campos to
subscribe to the IPOs of corporations listed in the stock market at their of-
fering prices; and stipulates the correlative obligation of petitioners to re-
spect respondents right, specifically, by continuing to allow respondent to
subscribe to the IPOs of corporations listed in the stock market at their of-
fering prices.

A right is a claim or title to an interest in anything whatsoever that is en -

forceable by law. An obligation is defined in the Civil Code as a juridical ne-
cessity to give, to do or not to do. For every right enjoyed by any person,
there is a corresponding obligation on the part of another person to respect
such right. Article 1157 of the Civil Code provides that obligations arise
from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delict, or quasi-delict.

The Petition in the SEC utterly failed to lay down the source or basis of the
respondent’s right and/or the petitioner’s obligation. Respondent merely
quoted in his Petition the MKSE Board Resolution, passed sometime in
1989, granting him the position of Chairman Emeritus of MKSE for life.
However, there is nothing in the said Petition from which the Court can de-
duce that respondent, by virtue of his position as Chairman Emeritus of
MKSE, was granted by law, contract, or any other legal source, the right to
subscribe to the IPOs of corporations listed in the stock market at their of-
fering prices. Campos has failed to establish the basis or authority for his
alleged right to participate equally in the IPO allocations of the Exchange.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Ap-

peals dated 11 February 1997 and its Resolution dated 18 May 1999 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 38455 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders
dated 31 May 1995 and 14 August 1995 of the Securities and Exchange
Commission en banc in SEC-EB Case No. 393 and No. 403, respectively,
are hereby reinstated. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.