Cognition & Emotion

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Running from William James' Bear: A Review of

Preattentive Mechanisms and their Contributions
to Emotional Experience

Michael D. Robinson

To cite this article: Michael D. Robinson (1998) Running from William James' Bear: A Review of
Preattentive Mechanisms and their Contributions to Emotional Experience, Cognition & Emotion,
12:5, 667-696, DOI: 10.1080/026999398379493

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 CO G N IT IO N AN D EMO TION, 1998, 12 (5), 667± 696

Running from William James’ Bear: A Review of

Preattentive M echanisms and their Contributions to
Emotional Experience
M ichael D. Robinson
University of Illinois, Champaign , USA

There is a growing consensus w ithin the appraisal community that there are
multiple levels of processing that contribute to emotional experience, and a
number of multiprocess appraisal models have been developed. This paper
examines the considerations that led to such models, examines the models in
depth, and argues for a new multiprocess model. In particular, the distinction
between schem atic and conceptual processing, a centrepiece of many pre-
vious m odels, is extremely dif® cult to examine methodologically. Instead, this
paper examines the role of preattentive mechanisms in the genesis of emo-
tional reactions. It is claimed that fear and anxiety, but no other emotions,
can be generated solely by unconscious processing, and that two distinct
preattentive modules account for this dissociation. A good deal of research
suggests that judgements of valence can be m ade preattentively, and this
paper argues that the urgency of the stimulus is coded as well. When an
urgency module signals that the situation is threatening, fear and anxiety are
generated unconsciously. This allows for rapid behavioural reactions in
situations in which such immediate responding is adaptive.

INTRODUCTION
The fundam ental premise of appraisal theory is that emotions result from
the interpretation of ongo ing events in term s of their personal signi® can ce.
Appraisal theories thus give a central role to cognition in the production of
emotions. This position has been quite controversial, however. Zajonc
(1980), for exam ple, has argued that em otions can be produced without
any prior cognitive processing, a position echoed by m ore recent critics of
appraisal theory (e.g. Berkowitz, 1993 ), as well as presaged by the seminal
writings of W illiam James (1884, 1890).
Partly in response to Zajonc’s claims, a major task for appraisal theorists
has been to clarify the nature of appraisals. Particularly helpful in this regard

Request s for reprints should be sent to Dr M ichael D. Robinson , Departm ent of Psychol-
ogy, U niversit y of Illinois, 603 E. Daniel St., Cham pa ign, IL 61820, USA.
Em ail: m ichael@ s.psych.u inc.edu

q 1998 Psychology Press Ltd

668 ROBINSON

is the distinction between autom atic processing, which is generally uncon-

scious, and controlled processing, which is generally conscious (Slom an, 1996).
Arnold (1960), often credited as the forerunner of appraisal theories of
emotion, suggested that appraisals are not generally conscious or deliberate.
Recently, appraisal theorists have even more strongly emphasised the impor-
tance of automatic appraising in the production of emotions (Clore, 1994 b;
Lazarus, 1995; Leventhal & Scherer, 1987). M any of the cognitions that lead
to a particular emotion may occur without aw areness, so it is not surprising
that we are sometim es puzzled and surprised by our emotions (Clore, 1994c).
Because these issues are im portant to our understanding of appraisal
an d em otion, this paper attempts to do three things. First, cogn itive work
on autom atic and controlled processing is reviewed. Second, existing
multiprocess m odels of em otion are exam ined in som e depth. And third,
a new multiprocess model is developed. This m odel assigns a lim ited, but
im portant, role to unconscious processing, proposing that preattentive
m echanism s are capable of classifying the va lence an d urgency of the
situation. Furthermore, the m odel assum es that fear and anxiety can be
generated solely by unconscious processing, but that other em otions
require some conscious analysis of the situation.

COGNITIVE APPROACHES TO AUTOMATIC AND

CONTROLLED PROCESSING
The clear differentiation of au tom atic and controlled processing is often
credited to a handful of researchers working in the 1970s (e.g. Posner &
Snyder, 1975; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977 ). Posner an d Snyder de® ne au to-
m atic processing as processing that occurs without intention, without
leading to conscious attention, and without interfering with other mental
activities (p. 56 ). Schneider, Dumais, and Shiffrin (1984) de® ne autom atic
processing as fast, parallel, fairly effortless processing. They also note that
au tom atic processing is not lim ited by short-term m em ory capacity, is not
under a person’s control, and is clearly seen in the perform an ce of well-
skilled behav iours (p. 1).
Basing his theory entirely on these well-skilled behaviours (what Jam es,
18 90, referred to as ``hab its’ ’ ), L ogan (1988) argues that, as a process
becom es m ore autom atic through practice, it becom es faster and less
variable. W hen people perform a skill repeatedly, according to L ogan,
processing is based on direct retrieval from long-term m emory, bypassing
short-term m em ory altogether. Controlled processing, by contrast, requires
attentional resources, is relatively slow, and is im paired under conditions of
cognitive load (Schneider et al., 1984).
The classic m odel of inform ation processing (A tkinson & Shiffrin,
19 68), which includes three for ms of m em ory (sensory, short-term, and
 PREATTENTIVE MECHANISMS 669
long-term ), as well as the processes of attention, encoding, an d retrieval,
does not assign a control role to au tomatic processing (K ihlstrom , 1987).
This is because only stimulus inform ation that is attended to and m an ipu-
lated in short-term m em ory is believed to in¯ uence conscious experience,
though t, an d action. A m ore recent model of information processing is
parallel distributed processing (M cClelland, Ru melhart, & the PD P
Research Group, 1986; Ru melhart, M cC lelland, & the PD P Research
G roup, 1986). This model assigns a larger role to autom atic processing
because it assum es that an object or situation is concurrently an alysed by
multiple m echanism s. Automatic processes can occur in parallel because
they do not require attentional resources. B y contrast, because controlled
processes require such resources, which are viewed as quite limited (Posner
& Snyder, 19 75), controlled processes are thought to be largely sequential
in nature.

Automaticity and the Affective System

A grow ing body of evidence, much of it based on sublim inal priming,
suggests that certain types of affective phenom ena m ay occur in the
ab sence of controlled processing. For exam ple, Kunst-W ilson and Zajonc
(1980) dem onstrated increased liking for stimuli that had previously been
presented subliminally. M ore recently, M urphy and Zajonc (1993; M urphy,
M onah an, & Zajonc, 1995) found that sublim inally presented happy or
angry faces in¯ uenced subsequent likeability judgem ents, and G reenwald,
K linger, and L iu (1989) found that positive or negative word prim es
affected the latency of subsequent eva luations.
These subliminal priming studies suggest that valenced reactions to
objects an d situations can be in¯ uenced by factors unavailable to aw are-
ness. They do not, however, establish that such prim ing factors are non-
cognitive, as Zajonc (1980) claimed. Rather, they seem to suggest that
valenced reactions to objects and situations m ay often be governed by
autom atic processing. Such considerations led C lore and Ketelaar (1997)
to propose that valenced reactions to objects (i.e. liking or disliking) are
am ong the m ost autom atic of all affective phenomena.
In support of this re¯ exive account of evaluation, Fazio, Sanbonm atsu,
Powell, an d Kardes (1986) discovered that the presentation of certain
attitude objects can facilitate or interfere with the speed of subsequent
evaluations. If participan ts had strong, negative attitudes towards a given
object, they were faster at classifying subsequent words as negative than as
positive. Bargh, C haiken, G ovender, and Pratto (1992) extended this
``autom atic attitude’ ’ prim ing effect, show ing that it is true for weak, as
well as strong, attitudes and that it does not depend on explicit instructions
to attend to the primes.
670 ROBINSON

Other research suggests that positive or negative inform ation captures

attention in a way that neutral inform ation does not. One useful paradigm
for establishing this principle has been the dichotic listening task, in wh ich
participants attend to inform ation presented to one chan nel (i.e. one ear),
while different inform ation is presented to the other channel. In an early
study, M oray (1959) presented a person’s own nam e on the unattended
channel and found that this personally signi® cant information was m ore
likely to enter aw areness than other inform ation wa s. In more recent
research, N ielson an d Sarason (1981) found that sexually explicit wo rds
presented to the unattended chan nel caused m ore repetition errors to the
attended channel. These studies converge on the generalisation that em o-
tionally signi® cant inform ation au tom atically draw s controlled attention in
a way that other inform ation does not.
Sim ilar conclusions have been reached by other investigators. In one
study, Erdelyi and Appelbaum (1973) asked Jewish participan ts to encode
an array of nine sym bols for a later m em ory test. For some participants, a
positive sym bol (Star of D av id) was placed in the m iddle of the array.
O ther participants were presented with a negative (swastika) or neutral (a
window ) sym bol. Those given either a positive or negative symbol dem on-
strated poorer m emory for the other ® gures than those given the neutral
sym bol did. Sim ilar effects have been found in the realm of eyew itness
m em ory: Em otionally aroused eyewitnesses tend to have better m em ory for
central (i.e. va lenced) inform ation, but poorer m em ory for peripheral (i.e.
nonvalenced) information (C hristianson, 1992).
In sum , not only does valenced inform ation capture attention, but it also
in¯ uences the perception and interpretation of other stimuli. O nce prim ed,
valenced inform ation may even in¯ uence our behaviour in re¯ exive ways:
Positive inform ation m ay induce automatic approach behaviour and nega-
tive information m ay induce au tom atic avoidan ce behaviour (G ray, 1990).
In an interesting study supporting this hypothesis, Solarz (1960 ) asked
participants to pull a lever towards them selves or push it away from
them selves as fast as possible. Im m ediately before they did so, a positive
(e.g. ``pleasant’ ’ ) or negative (e.g. ``painful’ ’ ) adjective was placed in the
centre of the apparatus. Participan ts were quicker to initiate pulling m ove-
m ents wh en the adjective was positive, but were quicker to initiate pushing
m ovem ents when the ad jective wa s negative.
Thus, it appears that valenced inform ation can in¯ uence m otor beha-
viour as well as perception. Such effects appear to occur very quickly
an d, in the case of subliminal priming, require no subjective aw areness
(M erikle, 1992). These considerations lead me to propose, along with
others (C lore & Ketelaar, 1997; Scherer, 1984 a), that the processes
responsible for perceiving and assigning valence are autom atic. I would
next like to argue that this autom atic processing norm ally triggers con-
 PREATTENTIVE MECHANISMS 671
trolled processing, an d that controlled processing is usually necessary for
the production of an em otion.

The Controlled Processing of Valenced Information

Although valenced inform ation appears to be processed au tom atically, the
perception of valenced inform ation tends to recruit controlled attention.
For instance, in the dichotic listening parad igm , one’s own nam e (M oray,
1959) or taboo sexual words (N ielson & Sarason, 1981 ) drew attention in a
way that neutral inform ation did not. Participan ts in the N ielson an d
Sarason study, in fact, experienced this effect as ``intrusive’ ’ . The work of
Erdelyi an d Appelbaum (1973) and Christianson (1992), discussed earlier,
likew ise suggests that va lenced inform ation has an attention-grabbing
quality.
Kitayam a (1990 ) has likened this effect to the operation of a searchlight.
Before the valenced information is perceived, there is a diffuse light that
weakly illuminates as much as possible. A fter the valenced inform ation is
perceived, a searchlight (i.e. focal attention) is narrowly focused on this
particular information. As a consequence, this affectively signi® cant infor-
m ation is processed as com pletely as possible, whereas affectively neutral
inform ation receives com parably fewer attentional resources.
Several recent theoretical pieces have argued that the function of sub-
jectively experienced affect is to recruit controlled processing (e.g. Clore &
Parrott, 19 91; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987 ; Sm ith, G riner, Kirby, &
Scott, 1996). Fo r example, Clore and Parrott, building on earlier wo rk
by Schwarz and C lore (1988), argued that feelings serve to inform con-
sciousness about the relevant situation. Similarly, Smith et al. presented a
process model of appraising in which the function of subjective affect is to
insure that conscious attention is directed to the potentially signi® cant
inform ation. Such ``con¯ ict’ ’ m odels of em otion (M andler, 1984 ) may
account for the subjective experience of em otions as disruptive. First,
because emotions are initiated by preattentive processing, they seem to
come ``out of the blue’ ’ (Clore, 1994c). Second, because em otions serve to
capture conscious attention, they often seem to dominate subjective experi-
ence (Parrott, 1995 ).
Autom atic processing has som e clear advantages. These processes
occur quickly, can operate in parallel, an d require little to no atten-
tional resources (Schneider et al., 1984 ). They also seem capable of
scanning a great deal of inform ation (Kitayam a, 1990). H owever, auto-
m atic processing also has som e clear disadvantages. Chief among these is
a lack of ¯ exibility (Logan, 1988). O nce particular stimulus-response
connections becom e au tom atic, they can be extrem ely dif® cult to over-
come (Schneider et al., 1984). In the social realm, Fazio et al. (1986) has
672 ROBINSON

argued that well-learned attitudes are inescapable, and D evine (1989) gave
a sim ilar account of social stereotypes. According to Bargh (1984), these
diverse effects (both social an d cognitive) can be accounted for by a uni® ed
conception of automatic prim ing: In language similar to Skinner’s (1971),
au tom atic behaviour is stimulus-response behaviour that occurs without
intention.
Controlled processing, by contrast, allows for ¯ exible responding
(L ogan, 1988; Schneider et al., 1984 ). In one study, Lom bardi, H iggins,
an d Bargh (1987) prim ed participan ts with trait wo rds (e.g. ``stubborn’ ’ )
an d later had them characterise a social target after a brief behavioural
description. Fo llowing this, participan ts were asked to recall words from
the prim ing man ipulation. Those wh o had no explicit m em ory for the
primes tended to show an assim ilation effect (i.e. they autom atically used
the prim ed trait term s on the social perception task). B y contrast, those
who explicitly rem embered the prim es som etimes showed an assimilation
effect, but som etim es showed a contrast effect. Aw are participants, it
appears, had ¯ exibility in responding to the priming m anipulation.
Jacoby’s work on process dissociation (D ebner & Jacoby, 1994) makes a
sim ilar point. W hen participan ts are prim ed, but cannot consciously recall
the prim e, they are unable to prevent them selves from using it on a
subsequent wo rd-stem completion task. Finally, in work on social stereo-
types, D evine (1989) has argued that nonprejudiced people are those who
becom e aw are of the autom atic nature of their stereotypes and then choose
not to use them . Conversely, those who are not aw are of the autom atic
nature of their stereotypes cannot avoid using them .

Controlled Processing and Emotional Behaviour

Several appraisal theorists have explicitly discussed the im portance of
¯ exibility in em otional responding. In a provocative statem ent on the
function of em otions, Scherer (1984b) has m aintained that emotions serve
to decouple stim ulus and response. W hereas the behaviour of phylogeneti-
cally lower anim als is often governed by a fairly rigid connection between
feature recognition an d behavioural response (H inde, 1974), hum an beings
have a larger behavioural repertoire an d m ore va riable social environm ents.
Fo r exam ple, although anger an d aggression are often linked (Berkowitz,
19 93), people rarely aggress when an gry (Averill, 1983). Controlled proces-
sing helps ensure that the behaviour chosen will be ad aptive in the speci® c
situation (Sm ith et al., 1996).
By stating that controlled processing is involved in em otional behaviour,
I do not wish to im ply that a person can never act rapidly. In som e
situations, autom atic detection of dan ger can lead to im m ediate action
after apparently m inim al processing. To give a concrete exam ple, imagine
 PREATTENTIVE MECHANISMS 673
that you are driving on a winding road when you suddenly see a deer
directly in yo ur path. If you have ever been in this situation (or a similar
one), you know that you can take rapid action by jerking the car aw ay
from the deer. Scherer’s (1984b) an alysis also allows for such im mediate
responding in dangerous situations. A ccording to his account, the
urgency of the situation is re¯ ected in the intensity of the feeling. If
the feeling is very intense, the person acts more rapidly, having engaged
in less controlled processing than is typical in other em otion-inducing
situations.
For hum an beings, however, the large m ajority of em otion-inducing
situations involve social relationships an d are not life-and-death. In these
m ore com mon situations, behavioural ¯ exibility is extremely im portant. To
see why this is the case, imagine how m aladaptive it wo uld be if yo u
aggressed every tim e you becam e angry. In our society, successful people
are those wh o are able to guide their actions rather than react autom ati-
cally in motivationally relevant situations (M ischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez,
1989; N ewm an, Patterson, & Kosson, 1987).

MULTILEVEL MODELS OF THE APPRAISAL

PROCESS
There are now a number of m ultistage m odels of appraising, originating
from separate traditions such as m em ory (Johnson, 1994 ; Johnson &
M ulthau p, 1992), information processing (Barnard & Teasdale, 1991;
Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987), clinical psychology (OÈ hman , 1994 ;
OÈ m an , E steves, F lykt, & Soares, 1993; Teasdale, 1993), and em otion
theory (Clore & O rtony, in press; Leventhal, 1980 , 1984 , 1994 , Leventhal
& Scherer, 1987 ; Sm ith et al., 1996 ). Although the models differ in m any
respects, there is also a large degree of overlap. F ive m ajor points of overlap
(between at least two of the theories) are sum m arised and critiqued in the
following section:

Point 1: Preattentive processes are responsible for detecting em otion-rele-

vant stimuli, wh ich, when detected, autom atically recruit focal attention
(O atley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; OÈ hm an , 1994; OÈ hman et al., 1993; Sm ith
et al., 1996).

Sm ith et al. (1996), in particular, provided a rationale for why both types
of attentionÐ preattentive and focalÐ are required. Preattentive m echan-
ism s are initially relied on becau se they are both faster an d larger in
capacity than focal attention is. A lthough focal attention is slower an d
m ore lim ited in capacity, it is recruited because it is m ore ¯ exible an d
creative, thus allowing the person to act in accord with the particulars of
the situation.
674 ROBINSON

Research reviewed earlier, as well as other research, provides support for

this characterisation of preattentive an d focal attention mechanisms. B oth
the speed and capacity of preattentive m echanism s were dem onstrated in
an interesting study by Sperling (1960 ). For a fraction of a second, he
presented participants with an array of letters consisting of multiple rows,
an d then, shortly after the array was rem oved, signalled them to recall a
speci® c row. N o m atter which row was cued, participants displayed good
m em ory for that row, indicating that they had a brief, preattentive record
of the entire display. This research also suggests another reason why focal
attention is so va luable: This type of preattentive memory lasts for only a
fraction of a second (Loftus, Duncan, & Gehrig, 1992).
Point 2: There are multiple modes of processing, each of which can initiate
an em otional reaction (Clore & Ortony, in press; Johnson, 1994; Johnson &
M ulthaup, 1992 ; Leventhal & Scherer, 1987).

Both Clore and O rtony (in press), an d Leventhal an d Scherer (1987),

emphasise the distinction between schem atic processing, which is nonver-
bal and relatively autom atic, an d conceptual processing, wh ich is verbal
an d relatively controlled. Em otion can be triggered by either type of
processing alone. Fo r exam ple, com pare the an xiety that is likely to arise
(1) when driving over an unseen object on the road versus (2) when m aking
a m ental list of m ajor projects that must be accom plished within a rela-
tively short period of tim e. In each case, one’s ab ility to cope becom es an
issue (Leventhal and Scherer), but the cognitive activity that gave rise to
this appraisal is different. In the ® rst case, the sensation of being jostled
while travelling at a high speed seem s to trigger an im age of body vu lner-
ability, wh ereas in the second case, the experience of anxiety seem s to
depend on the intentional representation of one’s plans in relation to the
im pending deadline.
Leventhal and Scherer (1987 ) also propose that a third type of proces-
sing, sensorimotor processing, can initiate em otional experience. Unlike
schem atic processing, which relies on learned know ledge structures, sen-
sorim otor processing is based solely on re¯ exive stimulus-response connec-
tions. Fo r exam ple, a sudden intense noise will evoke a startle response
am ong new borns. According to Leventhal and Scherer, this response is
governed by an innate program m e, presum ably involving autonomic and
central nervous system hardware.
In practice, sensorim otor processing is inferred from the nonverbal
reactions of infants that seem to indicate distress, interest, or startle
(Izard, 1978). Leventhal and Scherer’s (1987) contentionÐ that sensorim o-
tor processing alone can initiate an em otional experienceÐ can be critiqued
on two grounds. First, some developmental researchers believe that it is
hazardous to infer subjective experience from infant expressions (e.g.
 PREATTENTIVE MECHANISMS 675
Cam ras, 1992). For example, neonates frequently display surprise an d
enjoym ent expressions during R EM sleep, a time during which the corre-
sponding emotions are unlikely to be experienced.
Second, and more important, there is new evidence that schematic
processes em erge extrem ely early in development. In one study, for exam -
ple, mothers repeatedly read particular stories to their developing fetuses.
Three days after birth, infants ``chose’ ’ the familiar stories over the unfa-
m iliar ones, as indicated by their sucking rates in response to the old an d
new stories (DeCasper & Spence, 1986). Even before birth, then, the
prenatal fetus apparently for ms expectations about the environm ent, an d
these expectations guide in the processing of new inform ation. Indeed, the
experience of surprise (or startle) would seem to require a comparison of
incom ing inform ation to some type of know ledge structure that provides
expectations about the wo rld. Similarly, the distress that infants often
exhibit on birth can be seen as a representation of the change from a
1
relatively warm and dim environment to a relatively cold and bright one.
Point 3: Although there are multiple interacting levels of processing,
emotions tend to be elicited at the schem atic level (Barnard & Teasdale,
1991; Levanthal, 1980, 1984; Sm ith et al., 1996; Teasdale, 1993).

This position must be contrasted with the view that neither schematic
nor conceptual processing is prim ary (Clore & Ortony, in press; Johnson,
1994; Johnson & M ulthau p, 1992; Leventhal & Scherer, 19 87). In the
author’s view, Teasdale (1993) develops the schem atic prim acy position
m ost cogently, arguing ® rst that there are at least two forms of proces-
sing, one that is propositional (i.e. verbal) in nature and one that is
im plicational (i.e. nonverbal) in nature. According to his account, it is
the intuitive, nonverbal, holistic meaning of environmental stim ulation,
not conceptual an alysis, that produces em otional reactions.
Teasdale’s (1993) an alysis centres on clinical depression. D epression is
m aintained, he contends, because a depressogenic schem a guides in the
processing of new inform ation. This schem a can be characterised as a view
of the self as ``helpless’ and ``incapable’ ’ , but additionally, a belief that self-
worth is contingent on the success of one’s actions an d on others’ view of
oneself. In Teasdale, Taylor, Cooper, Hayhurst, an d Paykel (1995),
depressed and nondepressed people were asked to provide a word to
complete twelve sentences designed to m easure contingent self-worth
(e.g. ``If I were always right, people wo uld m e’ ’ ). N ot only were

1
These conside ration s are admittedly speculative, but so is the evidence in suppor t of
emotion at the sensorim otor level. W ithou t an experimental paradig m for disentangling
sensori m otor and schema tic processing, conclusions m ust rem ain tentative. Sim ilar issue s
arise when we try to disting uish schema tic and conceptual processing (see later).
676 ROBINSON

depressed patients m ore likely to ® ll in the sentences with positive wo rds

(e.g. ``like’ ’ , ``adm ire’ ’ , ``respect’ ’ ), but this tendency diminished to the
extent that their condition im proved over tim e.
Teasdale et al. (1995) concluded that depressed feelings are the result of
tem porary or chronic schemas centred on helplessness an d contingent self-
wo rth. A lthough Teasdale (1993 ) tries to distingu ish his view from Beck’s
view of depression (Beck, Epstein, & H arrison, 1983), the distinction is not
entirely clear. Beck believes that depression is caused by au tom atically
triggered negative beliefs ab out the self (e.g. ``If I am not loved by
others, I am not a worthwh ile person’ ’ ; Beck et al., 19 83, p. 2)Ð that would
seem to overlap considerably w ith the beliefs that comprise Teasdale’s
depressogenic schem a.
Additionally, both authors contend that these beliefs are im plicit, guid-
ing processing, but rem aining largely unexpressed. And it appears that,
although there is an em phasis on schem atic processing, the depressogenic
beliefs can be expressed in propositional term s, som ewhat obscuring the
distinction between schem atic and conceptual processes. Finally, the causal
claim s of each of the models, from depressogenic beliefs to depression, have
not been conclusively demonstrated. Arguing for an alternative m odel in
which depressogenic beliefs are a consequence rather than a cau se of
depression, treatment by an tidepressant drugs leads to improvem ents in
depression as well as to less depressive thinking (Sim ons, G ar® eld, &
M urphy, 1984).
D espite these reservations, there is som ething com pelling about the
idea that em otion depends on intuitive and holistic though t (Teasdale,
19 93). This analysis would seem to share much in comm on with
Lazarus’ (1991) notion that emotions depend on core relational
them es. Fo r exam ple, anger can be represented holistically as ``a
dem eaning offence against m e and m ine’ ’ . A lso relevant is research
an d theory on the self-concept, which is arguably central to em otional
experience (Solom on, 1989). M arkus (1977; M arkus & Kitayam a, 1991),
for example, has long viewed the self-concept as a highly accessible
schem a that guides in the processing of self-releva nt inform ation. Sim i-
larly, Epstein (1973) argues that the self-concept is a global, intuitive
theory ab out the self-in-the-world that helps organise experience, m ain-
tain self-esteem , an d prepare a person for effective coping. It is reason-
able to propose that such a self-theory would be highly involved in the
generation of em otions.
D espite the heuristic value of a schematic account of em otion, there are
m ethodological problems that m ay never be overcom e. The problem is how
to empirically disentangle schematic and conceptual processing, particu-
larly as they tend to be so highly interacting (Leventhal, 19 80). W hereas
there are paradigm s to dissociate unconscious and conscious processing
 PREATTENTIVE MECHANISMS 677
(M erikle, 1992), au tom atic and controlled processing (Posner & Schneider,
1975; Schneider et al., 19 84), an d im plicit an d explicit m emory (Jacoby,
1991), there are no com parable paradigm s to dissociate schem atic an d
conceptual processing. Recognising this lim itation, Leventhal (1994)
argued that his m odel (and others like it) should be evaluated on the basis
of its ability to generate an d organise research rather than on a testability
criterion.

Point 4: Sensory stim ulation is a m ajor source of input to schematic

processing (Barnard & Teasdale, 1991; L eventhal, 1980, 19 84; Teasdale,
1993 ).
Especially according to Leventhal (1980, 1984), this connection between
sensation and schem atic processing is unmediated by conceptual proces-
sing. T hus, negative sensations such as pain and hunger are likely to cause
some form of negative affect, just as positive sensations such as genital
stimulation and feelings of satiety are likely to cause som e form of positive
affect. Similarly, tem perature, hum idity, noise level, and am bient odours,
which presumably exert their effects through sensation, can in¯ uence m ood
states (Watson & Clark, 1994).
W hat m ediates these sensation effects is not entirely clear. A lthough it is
generally believed that conceptual processing is not a m ajor contributor
(Clore, 1994b), it also seem s unlikely that holistic notions of the self-in-the-
world (Teasdale et al., 19 95) m ediate these effects, at least in the au thor’s
view. One clue to this sensation/emotion connection is that certain task
instructions can affect feelings of distress in response to an aversive
stimulus. In Lazarus an d Alfert (1964), for exam ple, Am erican partici-
pan ts watched a ® lm depicting a genital mutilation practice am ong a
foreign people. Those asked to view the procedure as a cultural ritual
experienced less stress than those in a control group. W hat is not clear is
whether the m anipulation worked because it provided participants with a
different schem a for the sam e events (Leventhal, 1980) or because it altered
conceptual processing of these events (Lazarus and A lfert). If schematic
and conceptual processing are indeed highly interactive (Leventhal), it may
be dif® cult to disentangle the two possibilities.
If there is a direct connection between sensory and schematic processes,
and if schematic processes are the key to emotion, then it m ay be possible
to develop psychotherapeutic interventions that are sensory in nature. Fo r
example, Teasdale (1993 ) suggests that the effective treatm ent of pan ic
disorder depends on replacing a pathogenic schem a (e.g. ``M y heart rate
is accelerating at an alarm ing rate. I must be dying’ ’ ) w ith a nonpathogenic
schem a (e.g. ``M y heart rate is accelerating. I must be getting an xious’ ’ ).
Even with this treatm ent, however, it is easy to argue that perceptions of
coping potential, an important appraisal in anxiety situations (Scherer,
678 ROBINSON

19 84a), are the key to therapeutic success. Thus, the therapist’s task is to
give the client the coping potential to deal with anxiety once it arises.

Point 5: W ith increasing experience in a given situation, schematic pro-

cesses becom e m ore differentiated, an d the emotion-generation process
becom es m ore autom ated (C lore & O rtony, in press; Leventhal, 1980,
19 84; Sm ith et al., 1996 ).

N o doubt this contention is based on research on well-learned beha-

viours (Logan, 1988 ; Schneider et al., 1984). In one study, for exam ple,
Logan asked participants to judge, as quickly as possible, whether parti-
cular letter strings were wo rds or nonwords. O ver trials, there was a marked
reduction in reaction tim e for letter strings that had previously been
presented relative to novel letter strings. Sim ilarly, it appears that expertise
in a given area of knowledge (e.g. chess) relies on the developm ent of a
number of differentiated schem as, as well as on the ab ility to m atch the
appropriate schem a to the situation at hand (C hi, G laser, & Farr, 1988).
Because of a num ber of differences between emotional situations versus
situations involving well-learned behav iours, however, it may be som ewhat
m isleading to view em otions as the sole product of such au tom ated pro-
cesses. As Sm ith et al. (1996) note, autom atic processing is relatively
in¯ exible. Fo r exam ple, Logan (1988) found that practice effects in a
lexical decision task were largely con® ned to the particular letter strings
that had been previously seen. That is, the ability to identify the string
``TRA P’ ’ as a word becam e considerably quicker with practice, but this
speci® c skill did not generally increase the speed w ith which a new word
could be identi® ed. To the extent that em otion-releva nt situations are quite
variable (Kagan, 1996), it m ay be a m istake to believe that a prim ary
reliance on schem atic processes would be adaptive in em otional situations.
There are at least three other problem s with a fundamentally au tom ated
view of emotional cognition. First, the param eters of em otional situations
are much less speci® ed than the param eters of situations involving well-
learned behaviours. The param eters of chess, for exam ple, are highly
explicit: Each piece is allowed to move in a speci® ed m anner, the players
take turns, and the go al is to take the other player’s king. The parameters
of em otion-relevant situations, by contrast, are highly variable and largely
unspeci® ed. A ccordingly, it is likely to take much more meaning an alysis to
classify the emotion-inducing situation than to classify a particular con-
® guration of chess pieces.
A second im portant difference between the two types of situations
concerns their disruptiveness. Skilled behaviours, which can be viewed as
habits (James, 1890; Logan, 1988), are well-learned routines that em erge
when a person interacts with a relatively invariant environm ent over time.
So, for exam ple, the ab ility to drive while contemplating upcoming events
 PREATTENTIVE MECHANISMS 679
is possible because of repeated experience with this highly structured
environm ent. Em otional behav iours, by contrast, em erge in situations
that are anything but routine. Indeed, many prom inent theories of em o-
tion (e.g. M andler, 19 84; O atley & Johnson-L aird, 1987) contend that
emotions are particularly likely to arise in situations in which a significant
disruption has occurred. These are precisely the situations in which auto-
m ated behav iours are least likely to be adaptive.
Third, these two types of situations clearly differ in hedonic releva nce
(Lazarus, 19 91; Solom on, 1989). Indeed, one wo uld expect that em otion-
relevant situations are the one type of situation that should clearly m oti-
vate focal attention (Clore, 1994a). Consistent with this point, research
(reviewed earlier) does indeed suggest that hedonically releva nt inform a-
tion recruits focal attention in a way that other types of inform ation do
not. Preattentive and automatic processing m ay m ake im portant contribu-
tions to emotional experience, but these contributions should not be over-
estim ated.

SUMMARY
A comparison of a number of multiprocess theories of em otion found the
following points of consensus between at least two of the theories:

1. Preattentive m echanism s are responsible for detecting em otion-rele-

vant stimuli, at which point focal attention is drawn.
2. Em otions can be elicited by either schem atic or conceptual proces-
sing.
3. Em otions are m ost closely linked to the schem atic level of processing.
4. There is a direct connection from sensory stimulation to schematic
processing.
5. W ith experience in a given situation, schemas become more differ-
entiated, and emotion elicitation becom es more autom ated.

Although there are heuristic reasons for each of these propositions,

available data unequivocally provide support only for the ® rst. In particu-
lar, it was noted that it may be extrem ely dif® cult, if not im possible, to
dissociate schem atic and conceptual processing. A dditionally, it is not clear
how sensory input leads to em otional experience, although the idea that
schem atic processes are involved seems plausible. Finally, serious doubts
were raised about the notion that em otional responses becom e more an d
m ore autom ated over tim e. Because there are key differences between the
situations associated with em otions versus those associated w ith well-
learned behaviours, it may be hazardous to develop multiprocess m odels
of emotion on the basis of this other research.
680 ROBINSON

Instead, the basic distinction between preattentive (i.e. unconscious) and

attentive (i.e. conscious) contributions to em otional experience needs to be
developed further. I hope to convince the read er that: (1) there is indirect
evidence for a particular multiprocess m odel; an d (2) the proposed model is
empirically tractable.

What Can Preattentive Processes Do?

Recall the proposed bene® ts of unconscious processing: U nconscious
processing is quicker and larger in capacity than conscious processing
(OÈ hm an , 1994 ; OÈ hm an et al., 1993; Sm ith et al., 1996). A ccording to
OÈ hm an, this allows a person to prepare to react before the stimulus is
consciously recognised. A ssum ing that this is true, an d given that we are
probably talking ab out less than a second difference in object identi® cation
(L eD oux, 19 90), it is useful to ask what type of situation wo uld require
such rapid energy mobilisation. Clearly, there is only one type of situation
that springs to m ind: W hen there is an im pending threat to the body, a
split-second response tim e m ight indeed be adaptive. Accordingly, preat-
tentive m echanism s are likely attuned to such threatening information
(Scherer, 19 84b).
To respond to threat as rapidly as possible, there must be a preattentive
m echanism that can appraise the urgency of the situation (preattentive
urgency detection). Becau se this m echanism would be speci® cally tuned
to threatening inform ation, there must be another m echan ism responsible
for detecting other types of hedonically relevant information (preattentive
valence detection). This valence detection m echan ism would play a pri-
m ary role in recruiting focal attention to a wide variety of potentially
consequential inform ation. As I will argue in the next section, research
employing a variety of paradigm s provides support for this account, as well
as for the proposed valence an d urgency detection m echanism s.

The Subliminal Priming of Affective Information

Research by M urphy and Zajonc (M urphy, 1990; M urphy & Zajonc, 1993;
M urphy et al., 19 95), as well as others (Greenwald et al., 1989 ; N iedenthal,
19 90), indicates that preattentive processing is capable of detecting
valenced inform ation. For example, M urphy and Zajonc (1993) found
that sublim inally presented positive or negative facial expressions influ-
enced participants’ liking for subsequently presented Chinese ideographs.
A lthough an apparently replicable ® nding, M urphy (1990) notes that this
``affective prim ing’ ’ is limited to the valence of the priming inform ation.
She prim ed participants with facial expressions of happiness (+), surprise
(0), an ger ( 2 ), fear ( 2 ), disgust ( 2 ), or sadness ( 2 ), an d then had them
 PREATTENTIVE MECHANISMS 681
rate the affective qualities of C hinese ideographs. Only effects speci® c to
the valence of the expressions were observed: W hereas positive expressions
increased, and negative expressions decreased, liking ratings, there were no
differential effects for the speci® c negative prim es.
In conjunction with other research discussed earlier in this paper (e.g.
Bargh et al., 1992; Erdelyi & Appelbaum , 1973), these sublim inal prim ing
studies suggest two things ab out preattentive valence detection. First, these
valence effects appear to be general and robust: B oth wo rds (G reenwald et
al., 1989) an d pictures (M urphy & Zajonc, 1993) serve as prim es, and both
latency of evaluation (G reenwald et al., 1989) and evaluative judgem ents
(N iedenthal, 1990) can be in¯ uenced. Second, however, these valence
effects tend to be nonspeci® c (M urphy, 1990). K nowing only that some-
thing is good or bad cannot prepare an individual for action (but see
Solarz, 1960), nor is it suf® cient to create an em otional experience (W in-
kielm an, Zajonc, & Schwarz, 1997). Instead, one additional appraisal, one
that is intim ately linked to rapid action, is required. In addition to the
valence of the stimulus, it is likely that the urgency of the situation can also
be coded preattentively.
Clinical research, em ploying the ``emotional Stroop’ ’ paradigm , offers
evidence for urgency detection. People with anxiety disorders take longer to
nam e the colour of wo rds when those wo rds are threatening in nature than
when they are not, an d this effect survives when the words are presented
sublim inally (W illiam s, M athew s, & M acLeod, 1996 ). Furthermore, these
effects display a speci® city that valence detection does not (M athews &
M acLeod, 1994). Fo r exam ple, threat wo rds that are physical in nature (e.g.
cancer, disease) interfere w ith colour nam ing for physical worriers, but not
for socially an xious participants (M athews & M acLeod, 1985).
Additional evidence for preattentive threat detection com es from a
series of studies by OÈ hm an. In one study, participants who were free of
psychopathology were classically conditioned to expect a shock every tim e
an angry face or a happy face was presented (OÈ hman, Dimberg, & E steves,
1989). Subsequently, the conditioned stimulus (angry or happy face) was
presented either sublim inally or supralim inally. Supraliminal presentations
of either stimulus evoked a skin conductance response (an indicator of
sym pathetic activation), whereas only the an gry face provoked a skin
conductan ce response (SC R) in the subliminal condition. Similar results
were reported in OÈ hm an and Soares (1993). In this case, threatening stimuli
(snakes an d spiders) produced a conditioned SCR response at both sub-
lim inal and supralim inal thresholds, whereas nonthreatening stimuli
(¯ owers and mushroom s) produced an SC R response only at the supra-
lim inal threshold. It therefore appears that, even for participants without
an an xiety disorder, unconscious m echan isms are particularly sensitive to
threatening inform ation (OÈ hman et al., 1993 ).
682 ROBINSON

A ® nal study by OÈ hm an (OÈ hm an & Soares, 1994) suggests that the

unconscious perception of fear-relevant stimuli is suf® cient to produce a
conscious em otional experience. In this study, no conditioning procedure
was used. Instead, spider phobics, snake phobics, and norm als, were sim ply
presented with threatening (snakes and spiders) and nonthreatening (flow-
ers and m ushroom s) slides under both sublim inal and supralim inal condi-
tions. W hether the slides were m asked or unmasked, snake phobics
displayed the largest SCR to snakes, whereas spider phobics displayed
the largest SCR to spiders (i.e. there was threat speci® city). Furtherm ore,
self-report data followed a sim ilar pattern. Phobic subjects reported feeling
m ore aroused, more negative, and in less control of the situation when the
speci® c object of their phobias had been presented, whether this phobic
object had been presented sublim inally or supralim inally. It therefore
appears that fear and an xiety can be produced solely on the basis of
unconscious processing.
Further evidence in support of this idea was provided by Robles, Sm ith,
Carver, and Wellens (1987), who inserted positive (cartoon characters),
neutral (featureless im ages), or negative (blood and gore, devils, m on-
sters) fram es w ithin a two-minute dem onstration ® lm of a particular video
ga me. Fo llowing the ® lm , norm al undergraduate students rated their state
an xiety on two well-established anxiety inventories. A s predicted, the
negative priming group reported more an xiety than either of the other
two prim ing conditions.
W hereas the affective priming procedures of M urphy an d Zajonc (1993;
M urphy et al., 1995) do not appear to in¯ uence conscious em otional
experience (C lore & Katelaar, 1997; W inkielm an et al., 19 97), both
OÈ hm an and Soares (1994) and Robles et al. (1987) provide evidence that
sublim inal images can in¯ uence subjective experience. Consistent w ith the
account outlined here, both of these effects involved fear and an xiety. It is
likely the case, then, that fear and anxiety, the emotions relevant to urgent
an d problematic situations, are particularly ``autom atic’ ’ in com parison to
other types of em otions (e.g. pride, sadness, love, etc.).
In this connection, it is notable that two of the m ost prominent
accounts of autom atic emotion (LeD oux, 1996; OÈ hm an, 1994 ) involve
these particular em otions. From an evolutionary perspective, it is reason-
able to propose that preattentive processing would be especially attuned
to situations that m ight call for rapid behavioural coping. In other
situations, which are presum ably less urgent (Scherer, 19 84b), adaptive
behaviour is more dependent on a conceptual analysis of the situation. In
agreem ent w ith others (G reenwald, 1992; M urphy & Zajonc, 1993), I
view preattentive processing as extrem ely ad aptive, but relatively crude.
We can probably expect this type of processing to wa rn us ab out an
im pending threat, but we should not expect it to provide us with a
 PREATTENTIVE MECHANISMS 683
complete an alysis of the situation. The fact that emotion-relevan t infor-
m ation captures focal attention in a way that m ore neutral information
does not (E rdelyi & Appelbaum , 19 73; N ielson & Sarason, 1981; Smith et
al., 1996) suggests that a conscious analysis of the situation is functional
in em otional situations.

A PROPOSED MODEL OF THE EMOTION

GENERATION PROCESS
The research reviewed in this paper sugg ests a particular multiprocess
m odel of em otion. This m odel is graphically presented in Fig. 1, an d
discussed in detail in the rest of this paper.
To identify threatening inform ation, preattentive processing must be
capable of detecting both the valence and urgency of the stimulus. Fo r
the following reasons, it is proposed that there are two distinct modules
capable of performing these functions: (1) because the prim ary function of
preattentive processing is to identify key param eters of the stim ulus
quickly, parallel modules wo uld function most ef® ciently (M cClelland et
al., 1986 ; Rum elhart et al., 1986); (2) empirical ® ndings suggest that
valenced reactions are a nearly ubiquitous feature of unconscious proces-
sing (B argh et al., 1992; M urphy & Zajonc, 1993 ), whereas responses based
on urgency are con® ned to particular stimuli (OÈ hman et al., 1989; OÈ hm an
& Soares, 19 93); (3) the detection of valence is not suf® cient to produce an
emotion (W inkielman et al., 1997), wh ereas the detection of urgency m ight
be (OÈ hm an & Soares, 19 94); (4) preattentive valenced reactions do not
appear to be particularly sensitive to the intensity of the stimulus (Bargh et
al., 1992 ), whereas this is precisely a parameter of interest for urgency
detection (Scherer, 1984b); (5) urgency, but not va lence, appears to be
linked to sym pathetic activation (OÈ hm an & Soares, 1994); and (6) urgency
detection appears to be m ore in¯ uenced by idiographic issues (e.g. parti-
cular psychopathological concerns, W illiam s et al., 1996; classically con-
ditioned aversion, OÈ hman & Soares, 1993) than va lence detection is.
The last point (6) deserves system atic study. In support of this principle,
M athews and M acLeod (1985) found that the emotional Stroop effect was
sensitive to the particular concerns of patients. A nd, traum atic events,
those capable of generating post-traum atic stress disorder, are associated
with the largest em otional Stroop effect (W illiam s et al., 1996). Thus,
although we may be biologically prepared to detect certain types of
threatening inform ation (OÈ hman , 1994; OÈ hman & Soares, 1994 ), aversive
experiences with a particular class of stimuli seem to create an idiographic
sensitivity (OÈ hm an et al., 1989 ; OÈ hm an & Soares, 1993 ). It m ay also be that
this threat-detecting module is m ore sensitive in certain contexts, among
those high in trait anxiety, or when a low level of anxiety has already been
684 ROBINSON

FIG. 1. The autom aticity of fear and anxiety: A multiprocess appraisal model.
Notes

1. For sim plicity of presentation, nonurgen t and nonvalen ced paths have been excluded.
2. U nconscious valence and urgenc y detection operate in parallel. They are noninte racting
initially, although both contribute to subsequ ent outcom es.
3. Preattentive processing is categorical (e.g. urgent versus. not urgent) , wherea s conscio us
appraisal allows for m ore differen tiated judgem ents.
4. When urgenc y is detected unconsc iously, fear and/or anxiety are inevitable outcome s.
H owever, these emotions do tend to recrui t conscious appraisa l, which will suppress ,
enhance, and/or contextualise the autom atic em otiona l reaction .
5. When urgenc y is not detected, but valence is, focal attention is recruited. In these situatio ns,
conscio us appraisa l is require d before an em otion is experienced. Fear and anxiety are still
possibl e outcom es, but will depend on conscio us appraisal.
6. Appraisals of valence and urgenc y are the only appraisals m ade preattentively. When focal
attention is drawn, valence and urgency are still com puted , but so are a numbe r of other
appraisals (e.g. responsi bility, controllability, anticipated effort, etc.).
7. The mode l allows for emotions to be generated solely on a conscious basis, without the
participation of the preatten tive m odule s (see text and ® gure).
8. Appraisal, whethe r it is unconsc ious or conscio us, is causal in the generation of em otiona l
states, including phenom enological, physiolog ical, and behaviou ral reactions.

generated. If so, the urgency m odule displays a context sensitivity that the
valence m odule does not.
H ow do we characterise the processing of these preattentive m echanism s?
Available evidence sugg ests dichotomous classi® cation by both m odules. As
already noted, preattentive evaluation appears to be largely insensitive to
intensity considerations (Bargh et al., 1992 ; Clore & Ketelaar, 1997 ). I
 PREATTENTIVE MECHANISMS 685
suspect that the urgency m odule operates sim ilarly. It m ay convey a speed
adva ntage to make such simple dichotom ous decisions.
Can we characterise the m odules as schem a-based or conceptual?
D espite widespread agreem ent that conceptual processing is slower than
schem atic processing, the best evidence sugg ests some form of automatic
conceptual processing. T his is the case because participants appear to be
able to detect the valence (Bargh et al., 1992) an d urgency (W illiam s et al.,
1996) of wo rds w ithout directing focal attention. And, B argh’s substantial
body of work on cognitive priming is based primarily on priming by words
(Bargh, 19 97). Of course, pictures (e.g. happy or angry faces, snakes or
spiders) have been used in studies on au tomatic affect (M urphy & Zajonc,
1993 ; OÈ hm an & Soares, 1994 ), and it seems plausible that pictures are
classi® ed on a schem atic basis. It is possible that the preattentive modules
can operate either schematically or conceptually, or that words serve as
prim es only because they are part of a schematic network. H owever,
2
neither of these alternatives has been ad equately demonstrated.

Valence and Urgency as Preattentive Appraisals

In ad dition to process-based differences between the proposed m odel and
alternative accounts, there are also im portant differences between valence
and urgency detection versus the appraisals offered by other theorists.
Although the m odel could be contrasted with a num ber of other appraisal
accounts, I will concentrate on differences between the current m odel and
the model offered by Sm ith an d Lazarus (1990 ).
Sm ith and Lazarus (1990) argue that people are constantly monitoring
events in term s of their im plications for personal well-being. This ``primary

2
Positively and negatively valenced word s have served as prim es in many importa nt studie s
on autom atic affective reactions (e.g. Bargh et al., 1992; Fazio et al., 19 86; W illiam s et al.,
19 96). A claim of the curren t paper is that valenced words can prim e affective reactions only to
the extent that they prim e aspects of the correspo ndin g concept. For exam ple, the word
``snake ’ ’ can in¯ uence subsequ ent processing only to the extent that certain aspects of the
concept of a snake are compre hende d as well, even if this comprehension occurs noncon -
sciously. It is on the basis of these considerations that I use the phrase ``automatic conceptual
processing’ ’ to describ e the relevant results.
By contrast to the characterisatio n offered in this manuscr ipt, howeve r, it has been custo m -
ary to think of conceptual processing as conscio us, and to think of schematic processing as
unconsc ious. An astute reviewer noted this discrepa ncy, and argued that readers may ® nd m y
characterisatio n confusi ng. If so, this confusion may have som e utility, particu larly to the
extent that it stim ulates furthe r thinkin g on the schem atic/conceptual distinction. As argued
earlier, it m ay be dif® cult to disenta ngle these two m odes of processing (Leventhal, 1994). To
these previou s points, I add the curren t contention that the schematic/conceptual distinct ion
should not sim ply be equated with the unconscious/conscio us distinction: C onceptual proces-
sing can be unconsc ious, just as schem atic processing can be conscious.
686 ROBINSON

appraisal’ ’ consists in determ ining both: (1) whether an event is relevant to

well-being (``m otivational relevance’ ’ ); and, if so, (2) whether the event
appears to facilitate or threaten one’s goals (``m otivational congruence or
incongruence’ ’ ). A lso, ``secondary appraisal’ ’ consists of judgements con-
cerning one’s ab ility to cope with the particular situation.
N either valence nor urgency detection ® t neatly into the Sm ith and
Lazarus (1990) m odel. First, the current model offers a very broad defini-
tion of valence, one that is far broad er than any of the appraisals in the
Smith and Lazarus m odel. Speci® cally, the current m odel assum es that
m any events an d objects are classi® ed as go od or bad at the preattentive
level. Furtherm ore, a stimulus need not invoke any considerations of
personal well-being to be classi® ed as good or bad. A t the preattentive
level, instead, valence is central to the m eaning attached to the stimulus
(M urphy et al., 1995 ), much as valence is the largest factor to em erge from
(supraliminal) studies on preferences and attitudes (O sgood, Suci, &
3
Ta nnenbaum , 1957).
View ing preattentive valence detection in this way helps explain why
even low intensity words can facilitate or interfere with subsequent eva-
luative judgem ents (B argh et al., 1992), why a sense of fam iliarity can
increase liking for relatively neutral objects (Kunst-W ilson & Zajonc,
19 80), an d why facial feedback can in¯ uence em otional experience
(Strack, M artin, & Stepper, 1988). Such effects as these rely on uncon-
scious valence detection, and on the transference of valence from the
eliciting conditions to the target stimulus.
Although m any events and objects will be appraised as good or bad at
the preattentive level, many other stimuli w ill not. Preattentive va lence
detection serves the function of deciding, at least on an initial basis,
whether a stimulus should receive focal attention or not. In general, it is
only when focal attention is draw n that primary an d secondary appraisal
(Sm ith & Lazarus, 19 90) enter the picture. T hus, valence detection is
responsible for appraisals of the potential signi® can ce of a stimulus,
whereas primary and secondary appraisal are responsible for m ore elabo-
rate, m ore de® nitive judgements concerning the situation. Valence detec-
tion therefore precedes an d triggers prim ary and secondary appraisal.
W ithin the proposed model, valence detection serves a fairly crude, but
im portant, functionÐ to recruit focal attention to potentially signi® cant
events. In this regard, it is worth noting that other investigators have
reached sim ilar conclusions concerning the crudeness of preattentive

3
This conception of valence detection is sim ilar to Scherer ’s (1984a) intrinsic pleasan tness
check, although the current mode l hold s that preatten tive judgem ents of valence are catego-
rical (i.e. good versus. bad) rather than dim ensiona l. Preattentive urgenc y detection, by
contras t, is not well-captured by the Scherer m odel.
 PREATTENTIVE MECHANISMS 687
evaluation (Bargh et al., 1992; Greenwald, 1992; M urphy, 1990). The
m odel assum es that, as Sm ith an d Lazarus (1990 ) contend, the personal
signi® cance of the stimulus must be judged before an emotion is experi-
enced. One route depends on conscious appraisal activity. It is at this
conscious level that prim ary and secondary appraisal tend to operate.
There is, however, a second route to em otional experience, one that is
not dependent on conscious appraisal. Given a particular set of eliciting
conditions, the urgency m odule can signal that a stimulus is personally
threatening, an d this w ill au tom atically trigger fear and/or anxiety.
U rgency detection thus incorporates multiple com ponents of the Sm ith
and Lazarus (1990) m odel. At the preattentive level, the urgency m odule
can: (1) determine that the event is personally signi® cant (``m otivational
relevance’ ’ ); (2) determ ine that the event is counter to one’s go als
(``m otivational incongruence’ ’ ); an d (3) determine that one’s ability to
cope is an issue (``secondary appraisal’ ’ ).
Although the urgency m odule can be described in terms of the Sm ith
and Lazarus (1990) appraisal com ponents, its essence is better captured by
biological and clinical psychologists. Fo r exam ple, C annon (1929) dem on-
strated that im minent threat m obilises the sym pathetic nervous system to
prepare for an ``em ergency response’ ’ . OÈ hman an d Soares (1993 ) showed
that the skin conductance response, part of the orienting re¯ ex (OÈ hman et
al., 1993), displays a particular sensitivity to threatening information.
Finally, Lang, Bradley, and Cuthbert (1990) dem onstrated that the inten-
sity of eye blinks is am pli® ed when negative/high arousal stimuli are
presented. They term ed this intensi® cation the ``startle response’ ’ .
The physiological evidence, in sum , indicates that organism s are parti-
cularly responsive to potential threats. Indeed, urgency detection is primi-
tive enough that it can be studied in lower an im als as well as hum ans (e.g.
LeDoux, 1996). The particular autom aticity of urgency detection has also
been discussed at length by clinical psychologists. In a recent literature
review, for exam ple, M athew s an d M acLeod (1994) proposed that threat
appraisals are the very ® rst judgem ents m ade about a stim ulus. In his
studies of anxiety disorders, Barlow (1988) m akes a similar point. In these
disorders, the body an d m ind react to the perceived threat before con-
sciousness has the opportunity to operate. T he re¯ exive nature of this
process makes such disorders particularly dif® cult to treat (Barlow).
To summ arise, preattentive urgency detection serves two speci® c pur-
poses: (1) to quickly identify potential threats; an d (2) to prepare the
body an d mind to respond rapidly. There is an intimate link between
urgency detection an d m otor preparedness. B y contrast, preattentive
valence detection serves the broad purpose of directing attention to
potentially signi® cant inform ation. To serve their distinct functions, the
two m odules operate in parallel. Because threatening stimuli are relatively
688 ROBINSON

rare in com parison to valenced stim uli, attention an d consciousness are

normally governed by the valence module. Preattentively, however, the
urgency m odule is constantly m onitoring the environment for threats.
W hen a threat is detected, attention and consciousness are inevitably
focused on issues of protection and safety.

Unconsciousness and Emotion: Statements of the

Model
The m odel is centrally concerned w ith the causes of the subjective experi-
ence of em otion. To delineate the roles played by unconscious processes, it
is necessary to distingu ish the causes of em otional experience from the
emotional experience itself. Concerning the experience itself, the model
does not assign a role to unconsciousness. This is sim ply a de® nitional
issue: A conscious subjective experience is seen as a necessary com po-
nentÐ perhaps the only necessary com ponentÐ of an emotion (Clore,
4
19 94c ).
W hereas the experience itself is alway s conscious, the m odel does allow
for the unconscious generation of an emotion: W hen the urgency module
determ ines that rapid action must be taken, the experience, sym pathetic
activation, and emotional behaviour associated with fear and/or an xiety
can occur without the pa rticipation of conscious input. In such a situation, a
person would be conscious of feeling the em otion (fear and/or anxiety), but
lack any aw areness of the m ental activity that gave rise to this feeling.
Only urgent situations, however, are capable of generating emotion
unconsciously. At the same time, the preattentive processes set in m otion
a controlled an alysis of the situation. This an alysis, although secondary to
the fear and anxiety that has already been generated, allows further
discrim inations of the situation, and the results of this conscious m eaning
an alysis may suppress or enhan ce (M urphy et al., 19 95), or contextualise
(Jacobs & Nad el, 1985 ), the feelings that have already been created.
The case of unconsciously generated fear can be contrasted w ith cases in
which other em otions are generated. In these other cases, the preattentive
valence mechan ism registers the valence of the stimulus, but the preatten-
tive urgency m echanism registers that the situation is not urgent. Becau se
valence alone is not suf® cient to produce an emotion (C lore & Ketelaar,
19 97; W inkielm an et al., 1997), the generation of an em otion w ill depend
on a m ore extended analysis of the consciously perceived situation
(Scherer, 19 84a).

4
This formulation does not preclud e the possibil ity that a perso n might be unaware of other
features of an emotion , including physiolo gical and behavioural response s.
 PREATTENTIVE MECHANISMS 689
Finally, the m odel also allow s for fear and an xiety to be generated only
after focal attention has been recruited. Thus, even without preattentive
urgency detection, a person can think about an upcom ing deadline an d
experience anxiety. Or, stimuli initially classi® ed as nonurgent can becom e
urgent as a result of conscious analysis. As an exam ple of this latter case,
im agine that you come hom e to ® nd an empty house. It is only when you
realise that yo ur dog should be there that you begin to feel an xious (i.e. D id
she get out in traf® c? W ill I be able to ® nd her?).

The Causal Power of Appraisal: Statements of the

Model and Supporting Evidence
One ® nal feature of the m odel centres on the causal power of appraisals.
W hether these appraisals are preattentive, as in the case of initial valence
and urgency detection, or require focal attention, the model proposes that
the meaning attached to the stimulus is cau sal to the subjective experience,
the physiological reaction, and the em otional behaviour. Thus, we can say
that these com ponents of the emotional episode are m eaningful an d
organised, an d that they can be viewed as responses to the perceived
situation. I include reactions to sublim inally presented faces (M urphy &
Zajonc, 19 93) and snakes an d spiders (OÈ hm an & Soares, 19 94) as exam ples
of cognition leading to emotion. In fact, results reported in these studies,
despite the fact that they are based on unconscious processing, cannot be
understood w ithout understanding the priming stimuli an d their associated
m ean ings.
Som e have claim ed that affect can occur without any conscious regis-
tration of a stim ulus (LeD oux, 1996; Zajonc, 1980). The proposed model
agrees with this claim , but also notes that affective reactions are based on
some type of meaning analysis, whether this an alysis is unconscious or
conscious. A s Leventhal an d Scherer (1987) note, whether cognition is seen
as necessary for emotion becom es a less im portant issue when one allow s
for multiple levels of processing. In the present context, one would have to
decide whether preattentive va lence and urgency detection qualify as
examples of cognition.
Support for the appraisal/subjective experience link has been based
largely on retrospective or hypothetical self-report studies. As Parkinson
and M an stead (1992) note, this raises some concern about the validity of
these reports. In particular, such reports m ay tell us m ore ab out people’s
conceptions of the cognitions associated with em otion than about actual
appraisal/em otion links. To deal with this potential problem , appraisal
researchers have recently begun to man ipulate situational factors hypothe-
sised to in¯ uence appraisal and subjective experience (K aiser & Wehrle,
1996; Reisenzein, M eyer, & SchuÈ tzwohl, 1996), and self-report has been
690 ROBINSON

supplem ented by other m easures such as facial expressions an d physiolo-

gical indicators (Kirby & Sm ith, 1996; Smith, 1989, 1994). Early results are
prom ising, although there is still a long way to go.
Appraisal researchers are also beginning to provide solid evidence for
the appraisal/physiology link. Smith (1989) found that situations asso-
ciated with perceived obstacles led to m ore brow tension, and Smith
(1994) found that the perceived dif® culty of m ath problems wa s related,
on a within-subject basis, w ith rises in ® nger tem perature slope (presum-
ably a m easure of task engagement in this context). In other research,
Tomaka, Blascovich, Kelsey, an d Leitten (1993) have shown that apprai-
sals of threat versus challenge cause different cardiovascular patterns
during an involving cognitive task. To rule out a physiology-causes-
appraisal sequence, Blascovich an d colleagues man ipulated these physiol-
ogy patterns by use of a cold pressor or m oderate exercise, and found that
appraisals of challenge or threat were unaffected (Blascovich, 1994).
Although we should not view these recent studies as conclusive evidence
for the causal power of appraisals, they certainly point in that direction. As
appraisal researchers continue to study emotions in the laboratory, an d as
they continue to supplem ent self-report with other m easures, our under-
standing of appraisal an d emotion will be substantially im proved.

CONCLUSIONS
This paper began with a review of cogn itive research on au tom atic and
controlled processing, particularly as they m ight relate to emotions. Fo l-
lowing this, a close exam ination of various multiprocess m odels of em otion
suggested some points of com m onality between the accounts. D espite this
agreem ent, there do seem to be problem s inherent in testing a m odel of
emotion that em phasises the im portance of schematic processing
(L eventhal, 19 94), particularly because schematic and conceptual proces-
sing are highly interactive (Leventhal, 19 80).
The one point of agreem ent that appears to be quite sound is the notion
that preattentive processes can detect em otion-relevant stimuli. Building
on this platform, I develop a model in which it is proposed that preatten-
tive processes can catego rise the valence an d urgency of the situation.
Va lenced inform ation w ithout a sense of urgency will trigger conceptual
an alysis, whereas valenced inform ation with a sense of urgency will prepare
the body for rapid action. Subjectively experienced fear and anxiety can be
purely au tomatic in the sense that preattentive processing is suf® cient to
produce these em otions, but the subjective experience of other em otions
will depend on a controlled analysis of the situation.
Over a hundred years ago, W illiam James (1884) gave us his theory of
au tom atic emotion. It is worth recalling that the most fam ous exam ple he
 PREATTENTIVE MECHANISMS 691
considered involved a loom ing bear in the wo ods. A t the sam e time, he
noted that there were more complex social emotions that m ight not be
explained by his theory. A com parative examination of fear an d anxiety
versus other types of em otions is likely to reveal the particular au tom aticity
of these emotions, as well as the special talents and lim itations of the
preattentive affective m odules.

M anuscrip t received 14 M arch 1997

Revised m anuscrip t received 26 Februar y 1998

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