34  The Hackitt Review

The three gateways

The regulatory oversight of the duty holders’ activities should be
strengthened by the creation of a clear set of “Gateway Points” at key
stages in a building’s life cycle. The gateway intervention points a llow
the JCA to ensure that the duty holders are complying with the regu-
lations at each key stage. The first gateway point is to satisfy the JCA
that a proposed building is accessible by the fire service before the local
planning authority will provide a determination on any planning appli-
cation. The second gateway point is that prior to the commencement of
any building works, the duty holder must satisfy the JCA that in addi-
tion to the plans meeting all the building regulation requirements, the
Full Plans demonstrate that the key building safety risks are understood
and will be managed. At the third gateway, the relevant duty-holder
must satisfy the JCA that the signed off design has been followed during
the construction phase and that any changes have been verified as ac-
ceptable. All key documentation must be handed over, with the resi-
dents’ engagement strategy in place before occupation of the building
can be commence.
These gateway points should combine to focus construction profes-
sionals on producing high-quality designs with associated high-quality
delivery. The creation of a system in which duty- holders must meet
the necessary requirements at each of these three stages before they
can obtain permission for land use, commence building work or oc-
cupy the finished building should drive what Hackitt terms “the right
behaviours”.19

Greater powers of enforcement

The overarching objective of the Hackitt recommendations was to cre-
ate a proportionate and effective enforcement system with a wider and
more flexible range of powers that will result in the creation of reliably
safe buildings from the outset. There are to be serious penalties for actors
who choose to “game the system” and place the residents at risk. The
stronger enforcement powers should be aligned with the Health and
Safety at Work Act and the JCA and the LABS should be given addi-
tional powers to issue improvement and prohibition notices. Time limits
for bringing prosecutions against duty holders should be increased to
five or six years for “major deficiencies” in building requirements which
are identified at a later date.20
The report also acknowledged the problems that have been cre-
ated by the privatisation of building-control and it was proposed that
 The Hackitt Review  35
though approved inspectors can still be used any regulatory oversight
they provide must be independent of developers and contractors. This
is to prevent a perpetuation of the existing situation which has been
described as “builders choosing their own regulators”.21

Higher competence levels

The report identifies poor consistency in the processes for assuring the
knowledge skills and behaviours of actors working on HRRBs as a ma-
jor flaw in the current regulatory system. This is largely due to a frag-
mented approach to teaching and learning, with different competence
frameworks even within a single discipline. There may be a lack of
professional qualifications for operatives and even where qualifications
do exist, there is no coherent way to evidence them so that they are
clearly understood and recognised by those operating in the system.22
The construction sector will have to demonstrate much more effective
leadership to ensure building safety competence amongst the core roles.
This leadership must include the formation of an overarching body to
provide scrutiny of the competence requirements. The far-reaching aim
is to move the industry towards developing a system wherein the owner-
ship of technical guidance rests with the industry itself as the intelligent
lead in delivering building safety. This system should be agile enough to
ensure that the provision of technical guidance keeps pace with changing
practices.

Improving product testing and information

The report states that products used throughout the life-cycle of a
building have a critical bearing on the safety of the building. Clearly
products used in all buildings should be tested but it is crucial that this
is accurately undertaken and reported for products used in HRRBs. It
was not for the report to redesign the entire testing system but a more
transparent, effective specification and testing regime must be devel-
oped. It must specifically target products that are put together for use as
part of a system. Clear statements should be provided on what systems
can and cannot be used for. The scope of the testing regime and the re-
sulting implications must be clearly communicated to actors within the
industry using plain, consistent and relatively non-technical language
to ensure that the right products are being used in the right combina-
tion situation and context. This will support those who are responsible
for delivering safe buildings in the discharge of their duties. Additional
testing stations should be established and certified and testing methods