RULE 58: PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

TEMPLATE

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16. BPI vs. Hontanosas, G.R. No. 157163, June 25, 2014

Topic: Injunction should not issue except upon a clear showing that the applicant has a right
in esse to be protected, and that the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of such right. A
preliminary injunction should not determine the merits of a case, or decide controverted
facts, for, being a preventive remedy, it only seeks to prevent threatened wrong, further
injury, and irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties can be settled.

Facts:
● Respondents Spouses Silverio and Zosima Borbon, Spouses Xerxes and Erlinda
Facultad,and XM Facultad and Development Corporation - Civil Case No.
CEB-26468 to seek the declaration of the nullity of the promissory notes,real estate
and chattel mortgages and continuing surety agreement they had executed in favor
of the petitioner. They further sought damages and attorney’s fees, and applied for a
temporary restraining order (TRO) orwrit of preliminary injunction to prevent the
petitioner from foreclosing on the mortgages against their properties.
● The complaint alleged that the respondents had obtained a loan from the petitioner,
and had executed promissory notes binding themselves, jointly and severally, to pay
the sum borrowed; that as security for the payment of the loan, they had constituted
real estate mortgages on several parcels of land in favor of the petitioner; and that
they had been made to sign a continuing surety agreement and a chattel mortgage
on their Mitsubishi Pajero.
● It appears that the respondents obligation to the petitioner had reached
₱17,983,191.49, but they had only been able to pay ₱13 Million because they had
been adversely affected by the economic turmoil in Asia in 1997. The petitioner
required them to issue post dated checks to cover the loan under threat of
foreclosing on the mortgages. Thus, the complaint sought a TRO or a writ of
preliminary injunction to stay the threatened foreclosure.
● On June 6, 2001, the petitioner filed its answer with affirmative defenses and
counterclaim, as well as its opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction, contending that the foreclosure of the mortgages was within its legal right
to do.

RTC: Allowed the preliminary injunction.

CA: affirmed the decision

Issue: Whether or not the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioner,
its agents and representatives, was in order. (No)

Ruling:
Respondents were not entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction.

In their application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, the respondents
averred that the nullity of the loan and mortgage agreements entitled them to the relief of
enjoining the petitioner from: (a) foreclosing the real estate and chattel mortgages; (b)taking
possession, by replevin, of the Mitsubishi Pajero; and (c) depositing the postdated checks;
that respondents Spouses Facultad would suffer injustice and irreparable injury should the
petitioner foreclose the mortgages and file criminal complaints for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg.22 against them; and that such threatened acts, if done, would render
ineffectual the judgment of the trial court. They prayed that the petitioner be enjoined from
doing acts that would disturb their material possession of the mortgaged properties,
manifesting their willingness to post a bond for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction.

The petitioner submits that the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction constituted a
violation of Administrative Circular (AC) No. 07-99 dated June 25, 1999, and thus subjected
respondent Judge to administrative sanction; that injunction could not issue to enjoin the
prosecution of the criminal offenses because such prosecution was imbued with public
interest. and that the petitioner, as the mortgagee, could not be prohibited from exercising its
legal right to foreclose the mortgages because foreclosure of the mortgages was its proper
remedy under the law.Judges are thus enjoined to observe utmost caution, prudence and
judiciousness in the issuance of TRO and in the grant of writs of preliminary injunction to
avoid any suspicion that its issuance or grant was for considerations other than the strict
merits of the case.

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or
final order requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or
acts. It is the "strong arm of equity," an extraordinary peremptory remedy that must be used
with extreme caution, affecting as it does the respective rights of the parties.The
requirements for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or TRO are enumerated in
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be

granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such
relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited
period or perpetually

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts

complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to

do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of
the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and
tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

Under the circumstances averred in the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-26468, the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction upon the application of the respondents was
improper. They had admittedly constituted the real estate and chattel mortgages to secure
the performance of their loan obligation to the petitioner, and, as such, they were fully aware
of the consequences on their rights in the properties given as collateral should the loan
secured be unpaid. The foreclosure of the mortgages would be the remedy provided by law
for the mortgagee to exact payment. In fact, they did not dispute the petitioner's allegations
that they had not fully paid their obligation, and that Civil Case No. CEB-26468 was precisely
brought by them in order to stave off the impending foreclosure of the mortgages based on
their claim that they had been compelled to sign pre-printed standard bank loan forms and
mortgage agreements.
17. CITY GOVERNMENT OF BUTUAN vs. CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING SYSTEM
(CBS), INC

G.R. No. 157315; December 1, 2010

Facts:

· Mayor Plaza (Mayor Plaza) wrote to the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Butuan

City to solicit its support for her decision to deny the application for mayor’s permit of
respondent Bombo Radyo/Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), and to
eventually close down CBS’s radio station, claiming that CBS is operating its
broadcasting business within the Arujiville Subdivision, a residential area, had
violated the City’s zoning ordinance

· Mayor Plaza, in his letter, contends that In 1994, CBS was informed that they
cannot situate their business in the area as it violates the city’s zoning ordinance,
however, they have pleaded and was agreeable to operate in the area by virtue of a
Temporary Use Permit (TUP). The TUP allowed them to operate in the area but only
for a very limited period. As a matter of fact, the TUP was good only for one year,
which can be renewed every year for a maximum of five (5) years or until 1999.
Thus, right from the beginning they have been informed and forewarned that they
cannot operate in the area forever and that they have to relocate to a proper area.
Bombo Radyo renewed its TUP only in 1995 and 1996. And that his office has
received numerous complaints against Bombo Radyo for violation of private rights,
inciting people to go rise against the government, malicious imputations, insinuations
against people not of their liking, false or fabricated news, etc.

· Thereupon, the Sangguninang Panlungsod adopted Resolution-057-2002 "to

strongly support the decision of the City Mayor to deny the application of
Consolidated Broadcasting System Development Corporation (Bombo
Radyo-Butuan) for a Mayor’s Permit and thereafter close the radio station.

· the City’s licensing officer served on CBS’s station manager a final/last notice
of violation and demand to cease and desist illegal operation, with a warning that he
would recommend the closure of its business in case of non-compliance.

· CBS and its manager, Norberto Pagaspas, filed a complaint for prohibition,
mandamus, and damages against the petitioners in the Regional Trial Court in
Butuan City (RTC), with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the petitioners from closing its station, or from
disturbing and preventing its business operations.

· Judge Dabalos granted CBS’s prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction stating
among others that the City Gov’t of Butuan did not introduce any evidence in spite of
the order of the Court to show cause why no writ of preliminary injunction be issued
and the repeated directive of the court in open court for them to present evidence
which they firmly refused to do so on flimsy grounds. The Court resolved to issue a
writ of preliminary injunction as the complaint under oath alleges that CBS is a
grantee of a franchise from the Congress of the Philippines and the act threatened to
 be committed by petitioners curtail the constitutional right of freedom of speech of the
defendant which the Court finds that it should be looked into, the defendants' refusal
to controvert such allegations by evidence deprived the Court [of] the chance to be
guided by such evidence to act accordingly that it left the court no alternative but to
grant the writ prayed for.

· The petitioners further submit that Judge Dabalos improperly resolved CBS’s
application for preliminary injunction by not first requiring the applicant to adduce
evidence in support of the application.

ISSUE:

Whether the evidence of CBS should have first been required before Judge Dabalos issued
the writ of preliminary injunction

RULING:

The Court held in the negative.

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to

the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a person to refrain from
a particular a particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or
acts, in which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus, a prohibitory
injunction is one that commands a party to refrain from doing a particular act, while a
mandatory injunction commands the performance of some positive act to correct a wrong in
the past.

As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a party who
possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought to be protected. It is
proper only when the applicant appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in the
complaint, which must aver the existence of the right and the violation of the right, or whose
averments must in the minimum constitute a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief
sought. Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ are:

(a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie;

(b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and

(c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely contingent
and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action; or to
prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited by statute. Indeed, a right, to be protected by
injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter
of law.

While it is true that CBS was not required to present evidence to prove its entitlement to the
injunctive writ, the writ was nonetheless properly granted on the basis of the undisputed
facts that CBS was a grantee of a franchise from the Legislature, and that the acts
complained against (i.e., refusal of the Mayor’s permit and resulting closure of the radio
station) were imminent and, unless enjoined, would curtail or set at naught CBS’s rights
under the franchise. In this regard, worthy of mention is that even the Vice Executive Judge,
acknowledging that CBS had stood to suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury should its
radio station suffer closure, had issued ex parte the TRO.

It was error on the part of the petitioners to insist that the evidence of CBS should have first
been required before Judge Dabalos issued the writ of preliminary injunction. Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court clearly lays the burden on the shoulders of the petitioners, as the parties
against whom the TRO was issued, to show cause why the application for the writ of
preliminary injunction should not issue, thus:

Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. — No

preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or
person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by
the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant
before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for
preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to
be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person
sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said twenty-day period,
the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time and
place, why the injunction should not be granted, determine within the same period
whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the
corresponding order.

In fine, Judge Dabalos properly directed the petitioners to first present evidence why the
application for the writ of preliminary injunction should not be granted. By their refusal to
comply with the directive to show cause by presenting their evidence to that effect, the
petitioners could blame no one but themselves.

WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review on certiorari, and affirm the decision dated
October 28, 2002 promulgated by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 69729.

Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
18. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY (PPA) vs. NASIPIT INTEGRATED ARRASTRE AND
STEVEDORING SERVICES, INC. (NIASSI) G.R. No. 214864. March 22, 2017.*

TOPIC: Preliminary Injunction

MAIN ACTION: Writ of Mandamus to compel PPA to formally execute a written contract
reflecting NIASSI’s right to operate the port.

PROVISIONAL REMEDY:
Ancillary thereto, NIASSI’s petition included an application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction (WPMI),3 seeking that the cargo handling operations of
the said port be returned to it pending litigation of the main case.

FACTS

Petitioner Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) accepted bids for a ten (10)-year contract to
operate as the sole cargo holder at the port of Nasipit, Agusan del Norte.

Respondent Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc. (NIASSI) was
proclaimed as the winning bidder. The second highest bidder filed a protest against the
award to NIASSI. Despite the protest, PPA issued to NIASSI a Notice of Award, directing the
latter to signify its concurrence by signing the conforme portion. PPA received notice of
NIASSI’s conformity on January 3, 2001.

The Notice of Award requires the parties to formally execute a written contract. Instead of
executing the contract, NIASSI requested PPA to issue a Holdover Authority (HOA). PPA
issued the HOA initially for three (3) months from August 1, 2001 or until the cargo handling
contract is awarded, whichever comes first. The HOA was extended several times upon
NIASSI’s request even after the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel issued an
opinion affirming the validity of the award in NIASSI’s favor.

Barely two (2) months after the last extension of the HOA was granted, PPA sent a letter
revoking the extension. It allegedly received numerous complaints regarding the poor quality
of NIASSI’s services due to inadequately maintained equipment. Thus, PPA would take over
the cargo handling services at the port starting on December 10, 2004.

Aggrieved, NIASSI filed a petition for mandamus2 against PPA before the Regional Trial
Court of Butuan City, Branch 3 (RTC), praying that a writ of mandamus be issued compelling
PPA to formally execute a written contract reflecting its right to operate the port.

Ancillary thereto, NIASSI’s petition included an application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction (WPMI),3 seeking that the cargo handling operations of the
said port be returned to it pending litigation of the main case.
 ISSUE
Whether the CA erred when it issued the Amended Decision affirming the
September 2011 RTC Resolution and December 2011 RTC Order, and directing PPA to
execute a cargo handling contract in favor of NIASSI for a full 10-year term without
deducting the period covered by the HOA.

RULING
A preliminary injunction is in the nature of an ancillary remedy to preserve the status quo
during the pendency of the main case. As a necessary consequence, matters resolved in
injunction proceedings do not, as a general rule, conclusively determine the merits of the
main case or decide controverted facts therein.67 Generally, findings made in injunction
proceedings are subject to the outcome of the main case which is usually tried subsequent
to the injunction proceedings.

In this case, however, no further proceedings were conducted after the Decision of the
Supreme Court relative to the injunction proceedings had become final. To be sure, the RTC
directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda on the issue of whether or not the
main case had become moot and academic because of the finality of said Decision and, on
the basis of the memoranda, the RTC resolved to dismiss the Amended Petition, as it had
nothing left to determine.68 As such, no evidence to controvert the findings of the CA in
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 00214 were presented in the main case. This being the case, the factual
findings of the CA in respect of the perfected cargo handling contract in the injunction
proceedings became conclusive upon finality of this Court’s decision affirming the same.
These circumstances thus render the application of the law of the case doctrine proper.

In any case, it is worth noting that NIASSI recognized the perfection of the cargo handling
contract in its Comment to the instant Petition, thus:
x x x When NIASSI received and signed the “conforme” portion [of the Notice of Award],
there [was] already [a] meeting of minds between the parties as to the object and cause of
the cargo handling contract, including the terms and duration thereof.69

To NIASSI, the cargo handling contract was a valid and binding agreement, and it was
thus bound by the concomitant rights and obligations arising therefrom.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is

GRANTED. The Amended Decision dated September 15, 2014 of the Court of Appeals
in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 04828-MIN is SET ASIDE. Consequently, SP Civil Case No. 1242
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch 4, is hereby
DISMISSED.

Perlas-Bernabe, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:

Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Injunction; View that jurisprudence

provides that in a proceeding to determine whether to issue a writ of preliminary injunction,
the applicant must show that it has a clear legal right to be protected and that the other
party’s act against which the writ is to be directed violates that right.—Jurisprudence
provides that in a proceeding to determine whether to issue a writ of preliminary injunction,
the applicant must show that it has a clear legal right to be protected and that the other
party’s act against which the writ is to be directed violates that right. The Court, however,
clarified that although a clear right is necessary, its existence need not be conclusively
established. In fact, the evidence to be submitted need not be conclusive or complete
but need only be a sampling to convince the court to issue the preliminary injunction
pending the decision on the merits of the case. In more explicit terms, the applicant only
needs to show that it has the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in the
petition. Therefore, the issuance of a preliminary injunction does not conclusively determine
the merits of the main case or decide controverted facts therein. This is because a
preliminary injunction is merely an ancillary remedy to preserve the status quo and
prevent irreparable harm until the merits of the main case resolving the rights of the
parties are heard and decided.

Same; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Law of the Case Doctrine; View that according to
jurisprudence, the law of the case doctrine means that whatever is once irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same
case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so
long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case
before the court.—According to jurisprudence, the law of the case doctrine means that
whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision
between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case,
whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. In other words, when an
appellate court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower court for further
proceedings, the question settled therein becomes the law of the case upon subsequent
appeal.

RTC and CA PROCEEDINGS

The RTC initially granted NIASSI’s application for the issuance of a WPMI in an Order dated
March 18, 2005. However, on PPA’s motion for reconsideration, it reversed itself and
dissolved the WPMI, thus reinstating PPA’s cargo handling operations.4

The RTC’s holding on this incident (i.e., the dissolution of the WPMI) was elevated by
NIASSI to the Court of Appeals (CA) on certiorari, docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 00214. In
a Decision5 dated August 8, 2006, the CA granted the certiorari petition, finding, among
others, that NIASSI had “a clear legal right to continue its operations in the port.”
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the petition for certiorari, the same is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the assailed Order dated 11 April 2005 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET
ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction. Consequently, the Order dated 18 March 2005 granting the Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction is hereby REINSTATED.9

This Court later affirmed the CA in PPA v. NIASSI, 10 docketed as G.R. No. 174136.
 With the WPMI reinstated, the case was remanded to the RTC for proceedings on the
main. Instead of advancing to the pretrial and trial stages of the proceedings, the RTC, after
the parties’ filing of their respective memoranda, dismissed the case on the ground of
mootness.

According to the RTC, the issue of whether or not PPA should be directed to formally
execute a 10-year cargo handling contract with NIASSI had been rendered moot and
academic by the CA’s ruling in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 00214, that a contract had been perfected
between the parties. As such, there was no more need for the parties to execute the 10-year
contract.11

However, the RTC reversed itself upon reconsideration,12 and its reversal was later
upheld by the CA on appeal in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 04828-MIN. 13

The CA held that the HOA is a separate agreement between the parties pending the
issuance of the cargo handling contract. Based on the language of the HOA, the holdover
permits do not constitute partial fulfillment of the unwritten contact. Thus, finding that NIASSI
has a right to the 10-year cargo handling contract in view of the Notice of Award and its
compliance with the necessary requirements, PPA is bound to execute a formal contract.14
Notably, this ruling was an adjudication by the CA on the main case, whereby it granted the
main relief prayed for by NIASSI in its mandamus petition15 PPA now assails this CA ruling
via the present petition.
19. Nerwin Industries Corporation vs. PNOC-Energy Development Corp.
669 SCRA173, April 11, 2012
Topic: Prohibition on Injunctions under R.A. 8975

CJabagat

FACTS:

National Electrification Administration (NEA) published an invitation to pre-qualify and to

bid for a contract known as IPB No. 80 for the supply and delivery of about 60,000 pieces of
wood poles and 20,000 of cross-arms.

Nerwin was one of the bidders. The contract was awarded to him being the lowest bidder.
However, NEA’s Board of Directors passed Resolution No. 32 reducing by 50% the material
requirements for IBP No. 80 “given the time limitations for the delivery of the materials, xxx,
and with the loan closing date of October 2001 fast approaching”. In turn, it resolved to
award the four (4) schedules of IBP No. 80 at a reduced number to private respondent
[Nerwin]. Private respondent [Nerwin] protested the said 50% reduction, alleging that the
same was a ploy to accommodate a losing bidder.

On the other hand, the losing bidders Tri State and Pacific Synergy appeared to have filed
a complaint, citing alleged false or falsified documents submitted during the pre-qualification
stage which led to the award of the IBP-80 project to private respondent [Nerwin].

Finding a way to nullify the bid, NEA sought the opinion of Gov’t Corporate Counsel who
upheld the eligibility of Nerwin. NEA allegedly held negotiations with other bidders for IPB
80 contract. As a result, Nerwin filed a complaint with prayer of injunction which was granted
by RTC Manila.

In the interim, PNOC-Energy Development Corporation purporting to be under the

Department of Energy, issued a requisition or an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for
wooden poles needed for its Samar Rural Electrification Project (“O-ILAW project”).

Upon learning of the issuance of the requisition for the O-ILAW Project, Nerwin filed a civil
action in RTC alleging that it was an attempt to subject portions of IPB 80 to another
bidding. He prayed for TRO to enjoin respondents to the proposed bidding.

Respondents averred that this is in violation of a rule that government infrastructures are not
subject to TROs.

RTC granted TRO nevertheless. CA ruled in favor of respondents. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

W/N CA erred in dismissing the case pursuant to RA 8975 which prohibits issuance of TRO
except SC to gov’t projects. (NO)

HELD:

RA 8975 clearly prohibits issuance of TRO, preliminary injunctions, and preliminary

mandatory injunctions against gov’t.
Section 3 of RA 8975 states:

“No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or
any of its subdivisions, officials, or any person or entity, whether public or private,
acting under the government’s direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following
acts:

xxx

(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as

defined under Section 2 hereof;

xxx

This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a

private party, including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to
have rights through such bidders involving such contract/project. This prohibition
shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue,
such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and
irreparable injury will arise.

Section 4 of RA 8975 also states:

“Any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory

injunction issued in violation of Section 3 hereof is void and of no force and effect.”

Thus, as provided in Sec 4 of RA 8975 the subject writ of preliminary injunction issued in
violation of Section 3 is void and of no force and effect.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals; and ORDERS
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
20. Novecio Vs. Lim
GR No. 193809, 23 March 2015
Digested by: Catherine Jaboli
Topic: Grounds for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction

Facts:

Respondents Maria Carmen J. Tuazon and Manuel V. Nieto, represented by their

attorney-in-fact, Lope Durotan (the respondents), filed complaint for forcible entry with
damages against petitioners Satumino Novecio, Gavino Novecio, Anastacio Golez, et al.

The respondents alleged that on February 15, 2004, the petitioners, by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy and stealth, unlawfully squatted and took possession of several portions of
land.

The petitioners allegedly planted crops, erected makeshift shelters, and continue to plant
and /or improve the shelters as of the filing of the complaints for forcible entry, all without the
consent and/or against the will of the respondents.

The petitioners, on the other hand, contended that they have already been in possession of
the land for more than two years when the complaints were filed.1âwphi1 They maintained
that they have planted the land with com, durian, coconut, mango, jackfruit, rambutan, etc.
for their livelihood. m

The MTC ruled in favor of the petitioners.

The RTC reversed the MTC decision.

The petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the CA assailing the judgment of the RTC.

As the respondents sought the execution of the RTC judgment, the petitioners filed an
Extremely Urgent Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Immediate Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order.

CA denies the petitioners' application for preliminary injunction.

Issue:

The sole issue is whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it denied the petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction.

Ruling:

A review of the records shows that the CA ignored relevant facts that would have justified
the issuance of a preliminary injunction and denied the prayer for preliminary injunction
without giving the factual and legal bases.

Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that a preliminary injunction may be
granted when the following have been established:
i. That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consist in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of,
or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually;

ii. That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of
during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

iii. That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done some act or acts probably in violation of the rights
of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to
render the judgment ineffectual.

A preliminary injunction is proper when the plaintiff appears to be clearly entitled to the relief
sought and has substantial interest in the right sought to be defended.

In a prayer for preliminary injunction, the plaintiff is not required to submit conclusive
and complete evidence. He is only required to show that he has an ostensible right to
the final relief prayed for in his complaint.

In this case, the petitioners have adequately shown their entitlement to a preliminary
injunction. First, the relief demanded consists in restraining the execution of the RTC
decision ordering their ejectment from the disputed land. Second, their ejectment from the
land from which they derive their source of livelihood would work injustice to the petitioners.
Finally, the execution of the RTC decision is probably in violation of the rights of the
petitioners, tending to render the MTC judgment dismissing the forcible cases entry
ineffectual.

We conclude that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the prayer for
preliminary injunction without explanation and justification.

Disposition: GRANT the writ of certiorari and accordingly SET ASIDE the resolutions of the
Court of Appeals for grave abuse of discretion
21. Sps. Plaza vs Lustiva et al.

G.R. No. 172909

March 5, 2014

FACTS:

On August 28, 1997, the CA ruled that among the Plaza siblings, Barbara was the owner of
the subject agricultural land. The decision became final and executory and Barbara's
successors, respondents Guillermo Lustiva, Eleodora Vda. de Martinez and Vicky Sayson
Goloseno, have continued occupying the property.

On September 14, 1999, Vidal’s son and daughter-in-law, the petitioners, filed a Complaint
for Injunction, Damages, Attorney’s Fees with Prayer for the Issuance of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order against the respondents and the
City Government of Butuan. They prayed that the respondents be enjoined from unlawfully
and illegally threatening to take possession of the subject property. According to the
petitioners, they acquired the land from Virginia Tuazon in 1997; Tuazon was the sole bidder
and winner in a tax delinquency sale conducted by the City of Butuan on December 27,
1996.

In their answer, the respondents pointed out that they were never delinquent in paying the
land taxes and were in fact not aware that their property had been offered for public auction.
Moreover, Tuazon, being a government employee, was disqualified to bid in the public
auction, as stated in Section 89 of the Local Government Code of 1991. As Tuazon’s
participation in the sale was void, she could have not transferred ownership to the
petitioners..

The RTC denied the prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and ordered that the
possession and occupation of the land be returned to the respondents. The RTC found that
the auction sale was tainted with irregularity as the bidder was a government employee
disqualified in accordance with the Local Government Code of 1991.

Through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 65, the petitioners challenged the
RTC’s order before the CA.

The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling, found the petitioners guilty of forum shopping, dismissed
the case, and referred the case to the Court and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation and institution of the appropriate administrative action and rejected the
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court to challenge
the CA rulings.

ISSUE: WoN the Court erred in not issuing the Writ of Injunction (No)

RULING:

The Court denied the petition for lack of merit.

As the lower courts correctly found, Tuazon had no ownership to confer to the petitioners
despite the latter’s reimbursement of Tuazon’s purchase expenses. Because they were
never owners of the property, the petitioners failed to establish entitlement to the writ of
preliminary injunction. "[T]o be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the
violation against that right must be shown. A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only
upon clear showing of an actual existing right to be protected during the pendency of the
principal action. When the complainant’s right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not
have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper."

Likewise, upon the dismissal of the main case by the RTC on August 8, 2013, the question
of issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction has become moot and academic.
22. SOLID BUILDERS INC. vs. CHINA BANKING CORP.
G.R. No. 179665
April 3, 2013
MATEO

TOPIC: REQUISITES OF A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

FACTS:
1. China Bank granted several loans to Solid Builders. To secure the loans, Medina
Foods executed several surety agreements and contracts of real estate mortgage
in favor of China Bank.
2. Subsequently Solid Builders proposed to China Bank a scheme through which
the former would sell the mortgaged properties and share the proceeds with
China Bank until the whole obligation is fully paid.
3. Thereafter, Solid Builders requested a restructuring of its loans, a reduction of
interest and penalties, and the implementation of a dacion en pago of one of its
properties. China Bank replied that the loans had already been completely
restructured in the previous year upon the issuance by Solid Builders of
promissory notes in favor of China Bank.
4. Subsequently, China Bank demanded Solid Builders to settle its outstanding
balance, otherwise it shall refer the matter to their lawyers for collection.
5. Solid Builders and Medina Foods filed a complaint “To Compel Execution of
Contract and for Performance and Damages, with Prayer for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Ex-Parte Temporary Restraining Order” claiming
that the interests, penalties and chargers imposed by China Bank were iniquitous
and unconscionable and to prohibit China Bank from initiating foreclosure
proceedings. (Main case: Specific Performance; Ancillary Action: Preliminary
Injunction & Ex-Parte TRO)
6. RTC granted the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
stating that the actual or imminent danger to plaintiffs is clear considering the
number of parcels of land involved, since if these are foreclosed, plaintiff’s
properties and source of income will be diminished possibly to the point of
closure; and that the issue on the interests and penalties may only be heard
during trial on the merits, and by then the case may already be moot and
academic if the injunctive writ is not issued.
7. The CA dissolved the injunctive writ because it had no basis as there is no clear
and unmistakable right on the part of Solid Builders and Medina Foods that would
entitle them to the protection of the injunctive writ.

ISSUE:
WON foreclosure of Solid Builders and Medina Foods’ properties merit the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction (NO)

RULING:
A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be granted only in the
face of actual and existing substantial rights. The duty of the court taking cognizance of a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is to determine whether the requisites necessary for
the grant of an injunction are present in the case before it. In this connection, a writ of
preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo ante, upon the applicant’s showing
of two important requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima
facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven
that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injury.

SBI and MFII’s claim disintegrates in the face of the ten promissory notes in the total amount
of ₱218,540,648.00, exclusive of interest and penalties, issued by SBI in favor of CBC on
March 1, 1999 which until now remain unpaid despite the maturity of the said notes on
March 1, 2004 and CBC’s repeated demands for payment. Foreclosure is but a necessary
consequence of nonpayment of mortgage indebtedness.

Where the parties stipulated in their credit agreements, mortgage contracts and
promissory notes that the mortgagee is authorized to foreclose the mortgaged
properties in case of default by the mortgagors, the mortgagee has a clear right to
foreclosure in case of default, making the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
improper.

In addition, the default of SBI and MFII to pay the mortgage indebtedness disqualifies them
from availing of the equitable relief that is the injunctive writ. SBI’s default or failure to settle
its obligation is a breach of contractual obligation which tainted its hands and disqualified it
from availing of the equitable remedy of preliminary injunction.

As SBI is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, so is MFII. The
accessory follows the principal. The accessory obligation of MFII as accommodation
mortgagor and surety is tied to SBI’s principal obligation to CBC and arises only in the event
of SBI’s default. Thus, MFII’s interest in the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is
necessarily prejudiced by SBI’s wrongful conduct and breach of contract.

As no clear right that warrants the extraordinary protection of an injunctive writ has been
shown by SBI and MFII to exist in their favor, the first requirement for the grant of a
preliminary injunction has not been satisfied. In the absence of any requisite, and where
facts are shown to be wanting in bringing the matter within the conditions for its issuance,
the ancillary writ of injunction must be struck down for having been rendered in grave abuse
of discretion.

Neither has there been a showing of irreparable injury. An injury is considered irreparable if it
is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had
therefor in a court of law, or where there is no standard by which their amount can be
measured with reasonable accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical
computation. The provisional remedy of preliminary injunction may only be resorted to when
there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied
under any standard of compensation.

In the first place, any injury that SBI and MFII may suffer in case of foreclosure of the
mortgaged properties will be purely monetary and compensable by an appropriate judgment
in a proper case against CBC. Moreover, where there is a valid cause to foreclose on the
mortgages, it cannot be correctly claimed that the irreparable damage sought to be
prevented by the application for preliminary injunction is the loss of the mortgaged properties
to auction sale. The alleged entitlement of SBI and MFII to the "protection of their properties
put up as collateral for the loans" they procured from CBC is not the kind of irreparable injury
contemplated by law. Foreclosure of mortgaged property is not an irreparable damage that
will merit for the debtor-mortgagor the extraordinary provisional remedy of preliminary
injunction.

NOTES:
En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, Re: Procedure in Extrajudicial or Judicial
Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgages:

(2) No temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against the extrajudicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage shall be issued on the allegation that the interest on the
loan is unconscionable, unless the debtor pays the mortgagee at least twelve percent per
annum interest on the principal obligation as stated in the application for foreclosure sale,
which shall be updated monthly while the case is pending.
23. GARCIA vs DRILON
G.R. No. 179267
June 25, 2013

TOPIC – Prohibition on Injunctions

Digested by: Matthew Matienzo

OVERVIEW:

On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf
of her minor children, a verified petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod
City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C.
Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262 (Violence Against Women and Children). She
claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence
as a result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody
of her children and of financial support.

FACTS:

Private respondent Rosalie Jaype-Garcia married petitioner Jesus C. Garcia in 2002 when
she was 34 years old and the former was eleven years her senior. They have three (3)
children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural child of petitioner but
whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph
Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.

Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His
infidelity emotionally wounded private respondent which spawned several quarrels that left
respondent wounded. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann.

The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he
would take away their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she
pursued legal battle, she would not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him
of his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This deprived her of access to full information
about their businesses. Hence, no source of income.

Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence
against respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders
(TPO) pursuant to RA 9262 (VAWC).

The TPO was continuously renewed until September 26, 2006, by the filing of private
respondent of an application for its extension as petitioner continued to deprive them of
financial support and committed acts of harassment against her and their children.

Meanwhile, during the proceedings before the RTC, petitioner filed a petition before the
Court of Appeals, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the
due process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO
issued in the civil case for being "an unwanted product of an invalid law."
The CA dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his
pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve
the same.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner sought recourse to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Temporary Protection Order (TPO) issued against the petitioner is valid
(YES)

RULING:

As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited.
Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its
enforcement, with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time,
should not be enjoined.

The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself
entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined. In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,the Supreme Court of
the United States declared, thus:

Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with
respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of
course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the
community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts.
The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and,
hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary
powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid.

The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully
the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex
parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction
against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.

Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to
determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications. The
Court have, time and again, discharged their solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional
issues, and with more reason now, in view of private respondent's plea in her Comment to
the instant Petition that we should put the challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to
rest. And so the Court agrees.
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a
statute. Hence, the Court dares not to venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the
members of Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262
to women and children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this
proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this
judgment. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is
to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative.

By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity,
adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law. We only step in when there is a violation of
the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.

DISPOSITION:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.
24. Mega-World Properties & Holdings, Inc. vs. Magestic Finance & Investment Co.,
G.R. No. 169694, December 09, 2015
Topic: Preliminary Injunction

FACTS:
● This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision promulgated of the CA, affirming
the decision of the RTC Branch 67, directing the obligation to provide their obligation to
provide round-the-clock security for the property under development.

● Petitioner, Megaworld Properties and Holdings, Inc. developer) entered into a Joint Venture
Agreement (VA) with Majestic Finance and westment Co, Inc. (Owner) for the development of
the residential subdivision located in Brgy Alingare, General Trias, Cavite. According to the
NA, the development of the 215 hectares of land belonging to the owner (joint venture
property) would be for the sole account of the developer, and that upon completion of the
development of the subdivision, the owner would compensate the developer in the form of
saleable residential subdivision lots. The VA further provided that the developer would
advance all the costs for the relocation and resettlement of the occupants of the joint venture
property, subject to reimbursement by the owner; and that the developer would deposit the
initial amount of P10,000,000.00 to defray the expenses for the relocation and settlement, and
the costs for obtaining from the Government the exemptions and conversion permits, and the
red clearances.

● The developer and owner agreed, through the addendum to the JVA, to increase the initial
deposit for the settlement of claims and the relocation of the tenants from P10,000,000.00 to
P60,000,000.00.

● The developer, by deed of assignment, transferred, conveyed and assigned to Empire East
Land Holdings, Inc. (developer/assignee) all its rights and obligations under the JVA including
the addendum.

● The owner filed in the RTC a complaint for specific performance with damages against the
developer, the developer/assignee, and respondent Andrew Tan, who are now the petitioners
herein. The complaint was mainly based on the failure of the petitioners to comply with their
obligations under the JVA, including the obligation to maintain a strong security force to
safeguard the entire joint venture property of 215 hectares from illegal entrants and
occupants. The presentation of the owner’s evidence was suspended because of the parties’
manifestation that they would settle the case amicably.

● However, the owner filed in the RTC a manifestation and motion, praying therein that the
petitioners be directed to provide round-the-clock security for the joint venture property in
order to defend and protect it from the invasion of unauthorized persons. The petitioners
opposed the manifestation and motion, pointing out that: (1) the move to have them provide
security in the properties was premature; and (2) under the principle of reciprocal obligations,
the owner could not compel them to perform their obligations under the JVA if the owner itself
refused to honor its obligations under the JVA and the addendum.

ISSUE:

● WON the lower court gravely erred in characterizing the order for the petitioners to implement
the round-the-clock security provision of the JVA and the addendum (YES)
RULING:
● The CA further gravely erred in characterizing the order for the petitioners to implement the
round-the-clock security provision of the JVA and the addendum as an established and
undisputed interim measure that could be issued pending the resolution of the case on the
merits.

● Apart from the provisional remedies expressly recognized and made available under Rule 56
to Rule 61 of the Rules of Court, the Court has sanctioned only the issuance of the status quo
ante order but only to maintain the last, actual, peaceable and uncontested state of things that
preceded the controversy. The eminent Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority on remedial
law, has delineated the nature of the status quo ante order, and distinguished it from the
provisional remedy of temporary restraining order, as follows:

There have been instances when the Supreme Court has issued a status quo order
which, as the very term connotes, is merely intended to maintain the last, actual, peaceable
and uncontested state of things which preceded the controversy. This was resorted to when
the projected proceedings in the case made the conservation of the status quo desirable or
essential, but the affected party neither sought such relief or the allegations in his pleading did
not sufficiently make out a case for a temporary restraining order. The status quo order was
thus issued motu proprio on equitable considerations. Also, unlike a temporary restraining
order or a preliminary injunction, a status quo order is more in the nature of a cease and
desist order, since it neither directs the doing or undoing of acts as in the case of prohibitory
or mandatory injunctive relief. The further distinction is provided by the present amendment in
the sense that, unlike the amended rule on restraining orders, a status quo order does not
require the posting of a bond.

● The order of November 5, 2002, by directing the developer to provide sufficient

round-the-clock security for the protection of the joint venture property during the pendency of
the case, was not of the nature of the status quo ante order because the developer, as
averred in the complaint, had not yet provided a single security watchman to secure the entire
215 hectares of land for several years. Also, the owner stated in the comment to the petition
that the developer had dismissed all the security guards posted in the property since 1997. At
the time of the filing of the complaint for specific performance on February 29, 2000,
therefore, the last actual, peaceable and uncontested state of things preceding the
controversy was the absence of such security, not the installation of the security
personnel/measures. In fact, the failure of the developer to provide the round-the-clock
security itself became the controversy that impelled the owner to bring the action against the
petitioners.

● By preliminarily directing the developer to provide sufficient round-the- clock security for the
protection of the joint venture property during the pendency of the case, the November 5,
2002 order of the RTC did not come under the category of the status quo ante order that
would issue upon equitable consideration, or even of an injunctive relief that would issue
under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the issuance of the order constituted a blatant
jurisdictional error that needed to be excised. Verily, a jurisdictional error is one by which the
act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction. Without
jurisdiction means that the court acted with absolute want of jurisdiction. Excess of jurisdiction
means that the court has jurisdiction but has transcended the same or acted without any
statutory authority.
25. CARPIO VS CA

G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015

Digested by: Monge
Topic: Preliminary Injunction

SUMMARY: Ombudsman ordered the preventive suspension of Binay, Jr, Mayor of Makati,
pending investigation as to his involvement in the alleged corruption in the Makati Parking
Building Project. Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking nullification of
the preventive suspension order.

FACTS:
● A complaint-affidavit was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr.
and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati, accusing
them of plunder and violation of RA 3019, in connection with 5 phases of the
procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building
● The Ombudsman constituted a special panel of investigators to conduct a fact-finding
investigation, submit an investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if
warranted.
● Pursuant to this directive, a complaint was indeed filed by the panel, charging Binay,
Jr. et al with 6 administrative cases for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service, and 6 criminal cases for violation
of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents.
● As to Binay, Jr. himself, the OMB complaint alleged that he was involved in
anomalous activities attending the procurement and construction phases of the
Makati Parking Building project, committed during his previous (2010-2013) and
present terms (2013-2016) as City Mayor of Makati
■ He allegedly awarded phases of the project to Hilmarc’s Construction
Corp. and executed the corresponding contract without the required
publication and the lack of architectural design, and approved the
release of funds therefor
■ He likewise approved the release of funds for the remaining balance
of the contract with MANA Architecture
● The Ombudsman then created a 2nd Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a
preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication on the OMB Cases. Upon
recommendation of the Ombudsman, this second panel issued a preventive
suspension order, placing Binay, Jr. et al. under preventive suspension for not more
than 6 months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB cases.
● Binay, Jr. then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, seeking the nullification of
the preventive suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI
to enjoin its implementation. He argued that
■ He could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous activity
attending any of the 5 phases of the Makati Parking Building project
since phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of
Makati in 2010, and Phases III-V transpired during his first term, and
that his re-election as a City Mayor of Makati for a second term
effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor (condonation
 doctrine, as will be briefly discussed later), rendering the
administrative cases against him moot and academic.
■ Ombudsman’s preventive suspension order failed to show that the
evidence of guilt presented against him is strong, and further, that his
suspension would undeservedly deprive the electorate of the services
of the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office

ISSUE:

W/N the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO, and later the WPI, enjoining
the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the
condonation doctrine. (NO)

RULING:

● A preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a preventive measure. The
purpose is to prevent the official to be suspended from using his position and the
powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with
records which may be vital in the prosecution case against him.
■ Requisites under Sec. 24 of RA 6770:
● Evidence of guilt is strong
● either:
○ the charge involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave
misconduct of neglect in the performance of duty
○ the charge would warrant removal from the service
○ or the respondent’s continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.
● The TRO was based not on the Ombudsman’s non-compliance with these requisites
but rather the condonation doctrine.
● While the Court disagreed with the Omudsman and agreed with the CA that it was
not precluded from considering the same given that it was material to the propriety of
according provisional injunctive relief, the Court reviewed the basis for the doctrine
(tracing it back to US jurisprudence) and found that it was not uniformly applied
across all state jurisdictions. In reviewing the applicability of this doctrine to our
jurisdiction, the Court likewise considered the Constitutional provisions on public
office, that public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of
accountability to the people at all times is inconsistent with the idea that an elective
local official’s administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term
can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even
another elective post.
● SC held that election is not a mode of condoning
administrative offenses, and that there is no constitutional or
statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support this notion.
● However, by merely following settled precedents on the condonation doctrine, wthich
at that time unwittingly remained good law, it cannot be concluded that the CA
committed a grave abuse of discretionbased on its legal attribution. The WPI was
thus correctly issued.
● The ensuing course of action should have been for the CA to resolve the main
petition for certiorari on the merits. However, considering that the Ombudsman had
already found Binay, Jr. administratively liable and imposed upon him the penalty of
dismissal, which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification, the CA
petition appears to have been mooted.
● retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights.”
26. Hernandez vs. National Power Corp.,
G.R. No. 145328
March 23, 2006
NJ

TOPIC: RULE 58, Preliminary Injunction

FACTS:

Sometime in 1996, Respondent National Power Corporation began the construction of 29

steel poles in connection with its 230 kilo-volt Sucat-Araneta- Balintawak Power
Transmission Project. These poles, each of which was 53.4 meters high, were to support
overhead tension cables that would pass through Dasmariñas Village, Makati City, where
petitioners’ homes were located.

Trouble ensued when petitioners discovered some scientific studies, finding that
electromagnetic fields created by high-voltage power lines could cause a range of illnesses
from cancer to leukemia. In a privileged speech, Representative Francis Joseph G.
Escudero denounced the cavalier manner in which Napocor had ignored safety and
consultation requirements. An explanation was demanded by Representative Arnulfo
Fuentebella, chairperson of the House Committee on Energy. Respondent admitted that it
was still negotiating with petitioners, and that it had come up with four options to address the
problem: transfer the line, maintain a 12-meter distance from the village, construct an
underground line, or reroute along C-5 and South Luzon Expressway. These
negotiations resulted in an impasse.

On March 9, 2000, petitioners filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Napocor.
Judge Francisco B. Ibay issued an Order temporarily restraining it from energizing and
transmitting high-voltage electric current through the project. This Order was extended from
2 days to 18 days. Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari
with Prayer for TRO and Preliminary Injunction and sought the dismissal of the Complaint,
on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction. It cited Section 1 of Presidential Decree
No. 1818, which states:

Section 1. No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute,
or controversy involving an infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other
natural resource development project of the government, or any public utility
operated by the government, including among other public utilities for transport of the
goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or
persons, entity or government official from proceeding with or continuing the
execution or implementation of any such project, or the operation of such public utility
or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or
operation.
While the Petition was pending before the CA, the trial court ordered the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction to stop Napocor from installing high voltage cables and
from energizing and transmitting high-voltage electric current through those cables.

On May 3, 2000, the CA reversed the trial court’s Order on the ground that Section 1 of
Presidential Decree 1818 clearly proscribed injunctions against infrastructure projects. It
further cited Supreme Court Circulars 2-91 and 13-93 dated March 15, 1991, and March 5,
1993, respectively.

Petitioners filed the instant Petition, contending that the proscription in PD 1818 should not
be applied to cases of extreme urgency, such as when the right to health and safety was
hanging on the balance.

ISSUE:

WON the trial court may temporarily restrain or preliminarily enjoin Napocor from
constructing and operating the 29 steel poles or towers, notwithstanding Presidential Decree
1818

RULING:

The Court granted the Petition. It held that the prohibition contained in Presidential
Decree 1818 extended only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders
against administrative acts, in controversies involving facts or the exercise of
discretion in technical cases. It did not cover controversies involving questions of law, as
those involved in the instant case.

What Presidential Decree 1818 aimed to avert was the untimely frustration of government
infrastructure projects, particularly by provisional remedies. Otherwise, the greater good
would suffer from the disruption of the pursuit of essential government projects or the
frustration of the economic development effort of the nation. PD No. 1818, however, was not
meant to be a blanket prohibition that would disregard the fundamental right to the health,
safety and well-being of a community, guaranteed by the Constitution.

Indeed, the prohibition was not absolute. It only prohibited the courts from issuing injunctions
against administrative acts involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases.
Outside this dimension, the Supreme Court declared that courts could not be
prevented from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts in
cases involving questions of law.

The instant controversy involved questions of law. Petitioners raised the issues of whether
there was a violation of their constitutionally protected right to health, and whether
respondent had indeed violated the Local Government Code provision on prior consultation
with affected communities. These questions of law removed the case from the protective
mantle of Presidential Decree 1818.
Moreover, the issuance by the trial court of a preliminary injunction found legal support in
Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, which merely required a probable violation of the
applicant’s rights and a tendency to render the judgment ineffectual. In the case at bar, there
was adequate evidence on record to justify the conclusion that the Napocor project would
probably imperil the health and safety of petitioners.

First, petitioners presented copies of studies linking the incidence of illnesses, such as
cancer and leukemia, to exposure to electromagnetic fields.

Second, the Napocor brochure on its Quezon power project had a provision that power lines
should be located within safe distances from residences because of the danger concomitant
with high-voltage power.

Third, documents on record showed that respondent had made representations that it was
looking into the possibility of relocating the project, and that it had even undertaken a series
of negotiations and meetings with petitioners. These documents and negotiations suggested
that their health concerns were far from imaginary. If there was indeed no cause for concern,
it would not have come up with options to address their woes. Neither would Representative
Escudero have fired away strong words of censure in his privileged speech.

While it was true that the issue of whether the transmission lines were safe was essentially
evidentiary in nature and pertained to the very merits of the action below, the Court found
that the possibility of health risks from exposure to electromagnetic radiation was
within the realm of a scientific scale of probability. It held that there was sufficient
basis on record engendering a cloud of doubt over the danger posed by the project
upon the lives of petitioners. Indeed, probability was enough for injunction to issue as a
provisional remedy. In contrast, injunction as a main action was resorted to when one
needed to establish absolute certainty as basis for a final and permanent injunction. Pending
the final determination of the trial court on the main case, it was prudent to preserve the
status quo.

The Supreme Court held that its circulars on the observance of PD 1818 did not suggest an
unbridled prohibition on the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining orders. What these circulars prohibited was the indiscriminate issuance of court
injunctions. They simply enjoined judges to observe utmost caution, prudence and
judiciousness in issuing temporary restraining orders and in granting writs of preliminary
injunction, so as to avoid any suspicion that these measures were for considerations other
than the strict merits of the case. Thus, there was nothing in the circulars that would tie the
hands of the courts from issuing a writ of preliminary injunction.

This Decision did not seek to undermine the purpose of the Napocor project, which was
aimed at the common good of the people. But the Court recognized, too, that the
primordial concern should be the far-reaching irreversible effects to human safety,
rather than the economic benefits presumed by respondent. Of what use would
modernization be if it proved to be a scourge to an individual’s fundamental right, not just to
health and safety, but to the preservation of life itself in all of its desired quality
27. Union Bank vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 133366, August 5, 1999

TOPIC: PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

FACTS:
1. A real estate mortgage was executed on 17 December 1991 by Spouses
Leopoldo and Jessica Dario in favor of UNIONBANK to secure a P3 million loan,
including interest and other charges. The mortgage covered a Quezon City
property with Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 41828 in Leopoldo Dario's
name and was annotated on the title on 18 December 1991. For non-payment of
the principal obligation, UNIONBANK extrajudicially foreclosed the property
mortgaged on 12 August 1993 and sold the same at public auction, with itself
posting the highest bid.

2. On 4 October 1994, one week before the one-year redemption period expired,
private respondents filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City against the
mortgagors, UNIONBANK, the Register of Deeds and the City Sheriff of Quezon
City. The complaint was for annulment of sale and real estate mortgage
reconveyance and prayer for restraining notice of lis pendens was annotated on
the title. Without notifying private respondents, UNIONBANK consolidated its title
over the foreclosed property on 24 October 1994, TCT No. 41828 was cancelled
and TCT No. 120929 in UNIONBANK's name was issued in its stead.

3. Private respondents filed an amended complaint, alleging that they, not the
mortgagors, are the true owners of the property mortgaged and insisting on the
invalidity of both the mortgage and its subsequent extrajudicial foreclosure.
When the case was assigned to Judge Capulong, he admitted the amended
complaint and set the application for writ of preliminary injunction for hearing. The
RTC held the mortgagors and the City Sheriff of Quezon City in default and
sustained UNIONBANK's contention that the act sought to be enjoined had
been enforced, negating the need of hearing the application for preliminary
injunction. When the case reached before the CA, the latter set aside the portion
of the assailed RTC orders that declared private respondents’ prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction as moot and academic.
ISSUE:
WON THE DISMISSAL OF THE APPLICATION FOR PRELIMINARY PROHIBITORY
INJUNCTION WAS VALID. (YES)

RULING:

There is, moreover, nothing erroneous with the denial of private respondents' application for
preliminary prohibitory injunction. The acts complained of have already been consummated.
It is impossible to restrain the performance of consummated acts through the issuance of
prohibitory injunction. When the act sought to be prevented had long been
consummated, the remedy of injunction could no longer be entertained, hearing the
application for preliminary injunction would just be an exercise in futility.
In addition, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, movant must show that there exists a
right to be protected which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined.
Furthermore, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and
substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
a serious damage.The injunctive remedy prevents a threatened or continuous
irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claim can be thoroughly
investigated and advisedly adjudicated; it is resorted to only when there is a pressing
necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any
standard compensation.

In the case at bar, the consolidation of ownership over the mortgaged property in favor
of UNIONBANK and the issuance of a new title in its name during the pendency of an
action for annulment and reconveyance will not cause irreparable injury to private
respondents who are plaintiffs in the said preliminary injunction. This is because as
purchaser at a public auction, UNIONBANK is only substituted to and acquires the right, title,
interest and claim of the judgment debtors or mortgagors to the property at the time of levy.
Perforce, the judgment in the main action for reconveyance will not be rendered ineffectual
by the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of title in the name of UNIONBANK.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals of 26 June 1997 nullifying the
consolidation of ownership and ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel TCT
No. 120929 and reinstate TCT No. 41828 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The order
of the trial court dated 7 August 1999, declaring UNIONBANK's prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction moot and academic, is hereby REINSTATED. Let this case be remanded to the
Regional Trial Court for trial on the merits.
28. ARSENIO LUKANG VS PAGBILAO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
GR No: 195374
Date: March 10, 2014
Topic: Essential elements or Grounds for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction
Main Action: Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction
Ancillary Action: Ex-Parte Prayer for TRO
Digest by: JKRN

FACTS:
1. Arsenio Lukang and Mercedes Dee lived as husband and wife in Calamba, Laguna,
from 1922 to 1934 and begot 3 children, namely, Domingo, Rosalina, and Olympia.
2. In 1935, Lukang started cohabiting with Leoncia Martinez, with whom he had 10
children, namely, Elpido, Socorro, Manuel, Pedro, Teresita, Simeon, Eugenio, Hilaria,
Concepcion, and Carlos.
3. During their cohabitation in Lucena, Quezon, they acquired several real properties.
They later acquired 4 more parcels of land.
4. When Arsenio died in 1976, his 13 children and Mercedes, executed the
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, in which they agreed to adjudicate and transfer
among themselves the rights, interest, and ownership of the 4 parcels of land.
5. Many transactions transpired until respondent Pagbilao Development Corporation
(PDC) purchased from Simeon, Mercedes and Rosalina the 6 properties while
two civil cases were still pending between the heirs of Arsenio. Annotations were
carried over into PDC’s title on the said properties.
6. When Pedro and the other heirs learned of the sale of the subject properties to PDC,
they filed a motion to require Simeon and Rosalina to explain why they sold the
properties without permission from the RTC. On April 23, 2008, they also filed an
application for a writ of preliminary injunction with ex-parte prayer for temporary
restraining order (TRO). They alleged that they were in actual and physical
possession of the subject properties; and that PDC entered into the said premises,
destroyed some structures therein and started to construct improvements on the
properties without their consent.
7. RTC granted the issuance of a TRO and granted the application for a writ of
preliminary injunction by which it restrained PDC from wresting possession of the
subject properties and ordering the movant, Pedro, to file a bond which the latter did
and posted a 1-million-peso bond.
8. CA reversed RTC’s decision. The CA explained that Pedro’s right over the said
properties was not clear as it was contingent on the outcome or result of the cases
pending before the RTC; that it was not a present right but a contingent or future right
which was not covered by injunction; and that there was no paramount necessity
because there would be no great and irreparable injury. Moreover, PDC, as the
registered owner of the said properties, had the right to enjoy the same as provided
under Articles 428 and 429 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:
WON the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued the May 13, 2008 Order
granting the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. (NO, RTC was correct in granting the Writ)
HELD:
A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued upon the concurrence of the following
essential requisites, to wit:

(a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial;
(b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and
(c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

While a clear showing of the right is necessary, its existence need not be conclusively
established. Hence, to be entitled to the writ, it is sufficient that the complainant shows that
he has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint.

In the present case, the Court finds that the RTC’s grant of injunction is in order.
During the hearing, Pedro and the other heirs were able to convince the RTC that they had a
right over the properties which should be protected while being litigated. Convinced, the RTC
made a preliminary determination that their right should be protected by a writ of preliminary
injunction.

Their claimed ownership and actual possession were then being violated by PDC which had
started entering the premises and preparing the property for the construction of a power
plant for liquefied natural gas. Unless legally stopped, such an act would indeed cause
irreparable damage to the petitioner and other claimants.

As claimed co-owners, the petitioner and the other heirs have the right to remain in
possession of the subject properties pendente lite. The legal or practical remedy of PDC,
who gambled its lot in purchasing the properties despite the annotations, is to await the final
outcome of the cases or to amicably settle its problems with all the co-owners, co-heirs, or
claimants.

29. BAGONG WEST KABULUSAN NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION v LERMA

[A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1904 : February 18, 2005]
Topic: Hearing for application of TRO
Main Action: Injunction
Ancillary Action: Preliminary Injunction
Palami

FACTS:
1. CST Enterprises filed before the Muntinlupa MeTC complaints for ejectment against 39
individuals (defendants) who were occupying lots located at West Kabulusan, Muntinlupa
City. The court found in favor of CST on 17 March 2000, ordering defendants to vacate and
surrender possession. However, defendants refused to vacate so the MeTC issued a writ of
demolition directing the sheriff to demolish the houses.
2. On 11 December 2000, the Neighborhood Association filed a Complaint against MeTC
Sheriff Camacho for "Injunction with Very Urgent Petition for the Issuance of Restraining
Order to Preserve and Maintain the Status Quo" (Civil Case 00-233). The complaints alleged
that R.A. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) mandates that adequate
relocation be given before demolition or eviction can be effected. It prayed that service of the
notice to vacate and demolish be held in abeyance until compliance of R.A. 7279 and in the
meantime, a TRO be issued to preserve and maintain the status quo.
4. Meanwhile, the defendants filed a petition before the CA (CA-G.R. SP 61991), assailing
the MeTC judgment in the ejectment cases which was sought to be annulled. The appellate
court then issued a TRO on the enforcement of the writ of demolition. (However, the petition
was eventually dismissed by the CA due to procedural infirmities and for lack of merit.)
5. Civil Case 00-233 was then raffled to the sala of respondent Judge Lerma. Summons
dated 2 January 2001 was issued to Sheriff Camacho requiring his appearance and answer
to the Association's petition.
6. Sheriff Camacho was absent during the 17 January 2001 hearing for the TRO as it was
served to him the day after the hearing (or on 18 January). As he was not present, the
Association submitted the matter of the issuance of TRO for resolution.
7. On 5 February 2001, respondent denied the grant of the TRO, finding that no great or
irreparable injury would result. A Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Association was
denied.
8. On 21 February 2001, the Association filed a "Motion to Resolve the Pending Incident of
Temporary Restraining Order with Motion to Declare the Defendant in Default" which was set
for hearing on 28 February 2001. By Order of 28 February 2001, upon motion of the
Association, the "Motion to Resolve Temporary Restraining Order and to Declare Defendant
in default" was submitted for resolution.
9. During the hearing of the application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction on 9 March 2001,
respondent noted Sheriff Camacho's absence.
10. On motion of the Association, the hearing of "the main case for injunction" (Civil Case
00-233) was set for hearing on 19 April 2001 during which the defendant sheriff again failed
to show up. The hearing was moved to 22 June 2001 during which the respondent, on
motion of the Association, declared its "Motion to Declare Defendant in Default" submitted
for resolution.
11. On 14 September 2001, the Association filed a "Very Urgent Motion to Resolve
Complaint for Injunction," setting the motion for hearing on September 17, 2001. The
Association later alleged that the staff of respondent refused to set the said motion for
hearing. It further alleged that respondent Judge, "with manifest bias and partiality and with
gross ignorance of R.A. 7279 and gross neglect of duty, deliberately delayed the resolution
of Civil Case 00-233] in order for Sheriff Camacho to carry out the demolition… rendering
the case moot and academic" in a complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator.
12. The Association averred that respondent SC Administrative Circular 20-95 which
required him to act on a TRO application after all parties are heard in a summary hearing
conducted within 24 hours after records are transmitted to the court. The Judge set for
hearing the prayer for TRO only on 17 January 2001 or 33 days after the complaint was
raffled to his sala.
13. They further accused respondent of maliciously and unlawfully falsifying court records by
making it appear that he already resolved the pending TRO application by issuing the 5
February 2001 Order when in fact the Motion to Resolve the application was not yet resolved
when it was heard on 28 February 2001.
14. On the part of the Respondent, claimed that several actions were instituted by
complainant and/or the defendants to stop at all costs the enforcement and implementation
of the original decision rendered by the MeTC. (YOU MAY SKIP THIS PART) Aside from
earlier actions, he claimed that a week after the defendants filed their petition before the CA,
they also filed Civil Case 00-233. Again, five months after the CA dismissed their case,
complainant filed a motion to suspend proceedings in Civil Cases 4678-4715 before to hold
in abeyance the enforcement of the notice to vacate and demolish. Again, on 24 September
2001, the defendants filed before the RTC a complaint for illegal eviction/demolition, loss of
property and damages, injunction and temporary restraining order,
relocation/restitution/benefits with prayer for lis pendens, again praying, among other things,
to restrain Sheriff Camacho from enforcing the notice to vacate and demolish.
15. In short, respondent stressed that all these cases were filed for the purpose of
restraining the sheriff, in violation of the rule against forum-shopping as they involved the
same parties, causes of action, and reliefs.

ISSUE RELATED TO CASE: WON respondent Judge delayed in hearing the TRO
application.

RULING: NO, the circular mandates the giving of notice and opportunity for the adverse
party to be heard and interpose objections in a summary hearing, before a prayer for a TRO
is acted upon. The period to conduct a summary hearing is not 24 hours after the case has
been raffled but 24 hours after the records are transmitted to the branch. This circular is now
incorporated in the present Rules of Court as Rule 58, Section 4:

“Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or restraining order. - A preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order may be granted only when:

c) When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining

order is included in a complaint or any initiatory pleading, the case, if filed in a
multi-sala court, shall be raffled only after notice to and in the presence of the
adverse party or the person sought to be enjoined. In any event, such notice shall be
preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by service of summons, together
with a copy of the complaint or initiatory pleading and the applicant's affidavit and
bond, upon the adverse party in the Philippines.

(d) The application for a TRO shall thereafter be acted upon only after all parties are
heard in a summary hearing which shall be conducted within 24 hours after the
sheriff's return of service and/or records are received by the branch selected by raffle
and to which the records shall be transmitted immediately.

Clearly, the circular and the Rules of Court seek to minimize the ex-parte, precipitate and
improvident issuance of TROs. Granting that respondent may have erred in not taking a
more suitable course of action, given the circumstances surrounding the case, not to
mention the palpable intent of the defendants to trifle with judicial processes, any lapse on
his part can be seen as mere error of judgment, of which he may not be held administratively
liable in the absence of a showing of bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose.

As to allegations that respondent exhibited gross ignorance of the provisions of R.A. 7279
with manifest bias and partiality, such allegation remains unsubstantiated.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, for insufficiency of evidence, the administrative complaint
against respondent is hereby DISMISSED.

Note:

1. Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 20-95 provides:

1. Where an application for temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary

injunction is included in a complaint or any initiatory pleading filed with the trial court,
such complaint or initiatory pleading shall be raffled only after notice to the adverse
party and in the presence of such party or counsel.

2. The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a
summary hearing conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the records are
transmitted to the branch selected by raffle. The records shall be transmitted
immediately after raffle.

30. PURISIMO BUYCO v. NELSON BARAQUIA, Respondent. CARPIO MORALES, J.:

G.R. No. 177486

December 21, 2009

Topic: Preliminary Injunction

FACTS:

Respondent filed before the RTC of Iloilo City a complaint against the Buycos, for the
establishment of permanent right of way, injunction and damages with preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order, to enjoin the Buycos from closing off a private road within
their property which he has been using to go to and from the public highway to access his
poulty farm;

The Iloilo RTC granted respondent’s application for preliminary injunction;

However, the trial court dismissed respondent’s complaint for failure to establish the
concurrence of the essential requisites for the establishment of an easement of right of way
and accordingly lifted the writ of preliminary injunction;

During the pendency of respondent’s appeal with the CA, the same filed with the trial court a
motion to cite petitioner in contempt, alleging that they had closed off the subject road, thus
violating the writ of preliminary injunction, which the trial court granted;

Petitioner moved for reconsideration thereafter and was granted by the trial court setting
aside its earlier resolution.

ISSUE:

Whether the lifting of a writ of preliminary injunction due to the dismissal of the complaint is
immediately executory, even if the dismissal of the complaint is pending appeal. (YES)

RULING:

A writ of preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding

prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain
from a particular act or acts. It is merely a provisional remedy, adjunct to the main case
subject to the latter’s outcome. It is not a cause of action in itself. Being an ancillary or
auxiliary remedy, it is available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to
by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition,
and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case.

Indubitably, in the case at bar, the writ of preliminary injunction was granted by the lower
court upon respondent’s showing that he and his poultry business would be injured by the
closure of the subject road. After trial, however, the lower court found that respondent was
not entitled to the easement of right of way prayed for, having failed to prove the essential
requisites for such entitlement, hence, the writ was lifted.

The present case having been heard and found dismissible as it was in fact dismissed, the
writ of preliminary injunction is deemed lifted, its purpose as a provisional remedy having
been served, the appeal therefrom notwithstanding.