[ G.R. Nos.

237888 & 237904, July 28, 2020 ]

WENCESLAO A. SOMBERO, JR., PETITIONER, VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
AND NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS: On December 16, 2016, Sombero filed before the OMB a Complaint-Affidavit8 for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 against Bureau of Immigration Deputy
Commissioners Al C. Argosino and Michael B. Robles On December 22, 2016, a Second
Complaint9 was filed by the then BI Acting Intelligence Chief Charles T. Calima, Jr. before the
OMB also charging Argosino and Robles with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and
R.A. No. 7080.

Lastly, on January 26, 2017, NBI Director Dante A. Gierran filed the Third Complaint, this time
charging Argosino, Robles, Calima, Sombero, and Jack Lam with direct bribery,
receiving/soliciting gifts, violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, and PD 46.

On November 24, 2016, pursuant to BI Mission Order (MO) No. JHM-2016-06511 issued by

Commissioner Jaime H. Morente, the Fugitive Search Unit of the BI conducted a law
enforcement operation at the Fontana Leisure Park and Casino in Clark Freeport Zone, Angeles,
Pampanga, resulting in the apprehension of 1,316 undocumented Chinese nationals who were
running an illegal online casino. Fontana was reportedly owned by Lam and managed by Ng
Khoen Hon also lcnown as Norman Ng.

Amidst the crisis in Fontana, Sombero allegedly reached out to Ng, introduced himself as the
President of the Asian Gaming Service Providers Association, Inc. (AGSPA), and arranged for
the latter to meet with DOJ Secretary Vitaliano N. Aguirre II and Argosino.

On November 26, 2016, at the VIP room of High Street Cafe situated inside Shangri-La Hotel in
Bonifacio Global City, Sombero introduced Lam, Ng, and a certain Alex Yu to Secretary
Aguirre and Argosino Sombero then told Secretary Aguirre about the plight of the businessmen
and even uttered the words: "Secretary, matagalna walang nag-aalaga Icay Jack Lam. So pwede
ho ba ang Secretary of Justice ang mang ninong sa kanya?" However, Secretary Aguirre ignored
this and left the room within minutes. Thus, it was Sombero and Argosino who allegedly agreed
on the amount of PI 00 Million and P50 Million of which must be given immediately. That same
day, before midnight, Argosino and Robles showed up in the City of Dreams in Pasay City and
waited at a restaurant. At around 2:00 a.m. on November 27, 2016, Sombero, carrying two paper
bags each containing P10 Million, met with Argosino and Robles at the restaurant. After a few
conversations, Sombero left the restaurant, leaving the two bags with Argosino and Robles. By
5:45 a.m., Sombero was back with three more paper bags filled with P10 Million each. They then
proceeded to the parking lot and loaded three paper bags in Argosino's car and the other two
paper bags in Robles' car. Sombero also took P2 Million from the P50 Million.

On November 30, 2016, Argosino, Robles, Sombero, Ng, and Yu met at a suite at the Crown
Hotel and discussed bail matters. After that, Argosino kept on demanding the other P50 Million
even though none of the Chinese workers had been released. Thus, Sombero went to Calima and
divulged the transaction. Consequently, Calima visited Argosino and Robles on separate
occasions and informed them that he knew about the P50 Million exchange on November 27,
2016 at COD.

On December 8, 2016, Argosino and Robles approached Commissioner Morente and claimed
that Calima was harassing them. Calima was thus summoned to the Commissioner's
office. There, Calima showed Commissioner Morente the evidence pertaining to Argosino and
Robles' transaction with Sombero.It was then that the two Deputy Commissioners admitted that
they were in possession of the P50 Million. Thereafter, Calima and Argosino met after office
hours to discuss damage control during which, Calima's share was fixed at P18 Million. On
December 9, 2016, at around 2:00 p.m., Argosino delivered two paper bags containing a total of
P18 Million to Calima. Thereafter, Calima was fired by Secretary Aguirre while Robles and
Argosino resigned.

Pursuant to the Order dated March 10, 2017 of the OMB directing the respondents in OMB-C-C-
17-0089 to submit their counter-affidavits, Sombero, in particular, submitted his Counter-
Affidavit on April 10, 2017, claiming that he only assisted the detained Chinese nationals in his
capacity as President of AGSPA. Moreover, he asserted that it was Argosino who asked for
P100Million and insisted that half of the said amount be given at once as a show of goodwill. He
also contended that he received P2 Million from Argosino for the puipose of forming a legal
team to assist in the processing of the release of the Chinese individuals

ISSUE:
A. THE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT FOUND PROBABLE CAUSE TO CHARGE [HIM]
WITH PLUNDER.

B. THE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING

TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT VIOLATED [HIS] RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS

HELD: There is probable cause to indict Sombero, et al.

After a judicious review, the Court holds that, in the present case, the OMB's finding of probable
cause for violation of R.A. No. 7080 against Sombero, et al. is supported by substantial evidence.
The crime of Plunder, as culled from the law itself has the following elements:

(a) that the offender is a public officer, who acts by himself or in connivance with members of
his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons;

(b) that he amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts described in Section 1 (d); and

(c) that the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated, or
acquired is at least P50 Million Pesos.

Here, as the correctly found by the OMB, the presence of the first element is undisputed
for Argosino and Robles were serving as BI Deputy Commissioners at the time relevant to the
case. Next, based on the documentary evidence adduced, Argosino and Robles, in connivance
with Sombero, came into possession of ill-gotten wealth through a series of overt acts committed
on a single day - in the wee hours of November 27, 2016, they received or collected a sum of
money on two instances in consideration for their supposed intercession or assistance in the
release of the detained Chinese nationals. Lastly, on the strength of Ng and Yu's affidavits and of
Robles' own admission in his Counter-Affidavit, the total aggregate amount involved is P50
Million.

Anent the requirement of a main plunderer, the Office of the Solicitor General in its
Consolidated Comment properly pointed out that what is at issue here are the Consolidated
Resolution and Consolidated Order issued by the OMB after finding probable cause to indict
Sombero et al. for Plunder. The disquisition then regarding the lack of a main plunderer — who
was supposed to be identified in the Information - is at this stage, premature. In Macapagal-
Arroyo v. People we held that because Plunder is a crime that only a public official can commit
by amassing, accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the total value of at least P50
Million, the identification in the Information of such public official as the main plunderer among
the several individuals thus charged, is logically necessary under the law itself. It is, thus, clear
that the main plunderer must be identified in the Information and not necessarily in the
questioned OMB Consolidated Resolution and Consolidated Order.

Sombero's constitutional right to due process was not violated.

Sombero maintains that his right to due process was violated. According to him, the initial
complaint against him and his co-respondents a quo was for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019. Yet, the OMB, after preliminaiy investigation, filed an Information against him and
several others for violation of R.A. No. 7080 instead.

Surely, Sombero's argument is untenable. Enrile v. Salazar tells us that there is nothing

inherently irregular or contrary to law in filing against an accused an indictment for an offense
different from what is charged in the initiatoiy complaint, if warranted by the evidence
developed during the preliminary investigation. Corollarily, the OMB is given ample room and a
wide-ranging margin of discretion in determining not only what will constitute sufficient
evidence that will establish "probable cause" for the filing of an information against a supposed
offender, but the proper offense to be charged as well against said offender depending again on
the evidence submitted by the parties during the preliminary investigation. "In fact, the
Ombudsman may investigate and prosecute on its own, without need for a complaint-affidavit,
for as long as the case falls within its jurisdiction." In fine, the Court finds the foregoing facts
sufficient to engender a reasonable belief that the overt acts of Sombero satisfy all of the
elements of the law allegedly violated. In turn, these facts rule out any arbitrariness in the OMB's
determination of probable cause. Stated otherwise, Sombero failed to show that the OMB
capriciously and whimsically exercised its judgment in determining the existence of probable
cause to warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari and nullify its findings on the ground that
these were made in excess of jurisdiction.
All told, the presence or absence of the elements of the crime charged and the validity of a
party's defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and other documentary
proof, are matters best passed upon during a full-blown trial on the merits. Hence, Sombero's
assertions anchored on the absence of some elements of the crime charged are better ventilated
during trial and not during preliminary investigation.

[ G.R. No. 233308, August 18, 2020 ]

DELILAH J. ABLONG, CAROLINA M. SANTOS, ROGELIO B. OLIVA, JOCELYN D. JUANON,

ETHELRAIDA V. TUMACOLE, ERLINA V. FLORES, JOSE RENE A. CEPE, DANTE A.
CAPISTRANO, MARIANO R. FLORES, JR., GEORGE N. VALENCIA, BERNADETTE Y.
ARAULA, FELISA P. TRAYVILLA, GILBERT NICANOR ATILLO,* ESTRELLA M. GARCIA,
PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, RESPONDENT.

FACTS: In calendar year 2008, the Board of Regents of the Negros Oriental State University,
Dumaguete City, passed Board Resolution No. 28, Series of 2008, granting Economic Relief Allowance
(ERA) in the amount of P25,000.00 each to all regular, casual, temporary, or part-time, personnel and
officials of NORSU. ERA in the amount of P30,000.00 each was also given in the two succeeding years:
2009 and 2010.

Petitioners, all teachers of NORSU, received ERA in calendar years 2008 to 2010.

On January 27, 2011, the COA Audit Team issued Notice of Disallowance on the payments of
ERA on the grounds that the expenditure did not carry the approval of the President of the
Philippines and that the same was illegally debited from tuition fees and other school charges.
The NDs and the letter-transmittal therefor were delivered to and received by NORSU Acting
Chief Accountant Liwayway G. Alba on February 16, 2011.

No appeal was made on the NDs. Thus, on August 31, 2011, a Notice of Finality of Decision
(NFD) on ND) was issued. On November 23, 2011, COA Order of Execution was issued to
enforce the said ND.

On January 18, 2012, petitioner Delilah J. Ablong as a member of the Faculty and Academic
Staff Association/All NORSU Faculty Union, wrote a letter7 to COA Regional Director Delfin
P. Aguilar requesting that the COE be reconsidered. She maintained that she and her colleagues
were not informed that the grant of ERA by the NORSU Board of Regents was disallowed and
learned of the disallowance and the NFD subsequently issued only in November or December
2011 when they were given copies of the NFD by the Office of the Dean of the College of Arts
and Sciences of NORSU. She, thus, prayed that she and her colleagues be provided with avenues
to remedy the situation instead of being required to refund the amounts received by them.

In a Letter, dated February 7, 2012, Aguilar denied Ablong's request stating in essence, that the
enforcement of the COE can no longer be deferred because NFDs had already been issued and
any appeal from the NDs can no longer be entertained since doing so will violate COA Circular
No. 2009-006 on the Rules and Regulations on Settlement of Accounts.

Unyielding, the petitioners filed a Petition for Review before the COA Proper appealing the
denial by COA Regional Director Aguilar of their letter-request. They contended that COA rules
of procedure on reglementary period should not have been strictly applied since they were not
notified of the NDs and that they should not be required to refund the amounts disallowed as
their receipt of ERA was in good faith.

The COA Proper Disposition

On July 28, 2016, the COA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition for review
upon a finding that the six-month period to appeal an ND under Section 48, P.D. No. 144510 and
Section 33, Chapter 5(B)(1) of Administrative Code of 1987 has already expired. The petitioners
having failed to appeal the NDs, necessarily, NFDs were issued which, in turn, led to the
ministerial duty of the Regional Director of issuing COE. Further, it ruled that the petitioners'
filing of a petition for review is improper ratiocinating that the proper subject of an appeal before
the same is a decision rendered by the Director on the ND itself before it becomes final and
executory, and not a letter-reply from a Regional Director enforcing COEs.

ISSUE: The commission proper committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, when it upheld the notices of finality of decision (nfds) and the coa orders
of execution (coes) despite:

(1) Lack of actual service of the notice of disallowances to petitioners; and

(2) Good faith on the part of the petitioners in receiving the economic relief allowance

HELD: We find merit in the petition

 The Court generally observes the policy of sustaining the decisions of the COA on
the basis both of the doctrine of separation of powers and of the COA's presumed
expertise in the laws entrusted to it to enforce. The Court will not review any errors
allegedly committed by the COA in its decisions, unless tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. The Constitution itself, as well as the Rules of Court, provide the remedy of a
petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 in order to restrict the scope
of inquiry to errors of jurisdiction or to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction committed by the COA. Indeed, it is the Court that determines
whether or not there was an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law, on the part of the COA, as when
the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence, but on caprice, whim and
despotism.

Here, there is no dispute that petitioners were not informed that NDs had been
issued on the ERA they received from 2008 to 2010. Petitioners learned of the
disallowance of the ERA only in November to December 2011 when they were given
copies of the NFD by the Office of the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences of
NORSU. Petitioner Ablong, as a member of the Faculty Union, on January 18, 2012,
then wrote a letter to COA Regional Director Aguilar requesting that the COE be
reconsidered, maintaining that they were not informed of the disallowance of the
subject benefits. COA Regional Director Aguilar, however, denied Ablong's request
stating that the enforcement of the COE can no longer be deferred because NFDs had
already been issued and any appeal from the NDs can no longer be entertained, invoking
COA Circular No. 2009-006 on the Rules and Regulations on Settlement of Accounts.

Petitioners thereafter filed a petition for review with the COA Proper appealing
the denial of their letter-request. This was dismissed by the COA on July 28, 2016,
finding that the six-month period to appeal an ND under Section 38, P.D. No. 1445 and
Section 33, Chapter 5(B)(1) of Administrative Code of 1987 has already expired. The
COA further ruled that petitioners' petition for review was improper as the proper
subject of an appeal is a decision on the ND, before it becomes final and executory, and
not a letter-reply from a Regional Director enforcing COEs. Clearly, COA failed to heed
Section 10.2 of COA Circular No. 2009-006 which categorically requires service of the
ND to all the persons liable, viz.:

10.2 The ND shall be addressed to the agency head and the

accountant; served on the persons liable; and shall indicate the transactions and
amount disallowed, reasons for the disallowance, the laws/rules/regulations violated,
and persons liable. It shall be signed by both the Audit Team Leader and the Supervising
Auditor.

COA's argument that, because there were several payees, it was duty-bound to serve
notice only to the accountant since service to the latter constitutes service to all payees
under Section 12.1 of COA Circular No. 2009-006, fails to sway. It is true that said
provision holds that in case there are several payees, service to the accountant who shall
be responsible for informing all payees concerned, shall constitute constructive notice to
all payees in the payroll. It bears emphasizing however that while the accountant had
the corresponding duty to inform the payees, this did not materialize in this case for. to
reiterate, the petitioners were not informed by the Acting Chief Accountant of NORSU
of the NDs of their ERAs.

Given the petitioners' allegation that the Supervising Auditor even refused the
request of NORSU's former president that copies of the NDs be furnished to the
individuals determined to be liable, it is easy to conclude that COA not only did not
observe Section 10.2 of COA Circular No. 2009-006, but also the mandate of the due
process clause. Such lack of notice to the petitioners amounted to a violation of their
fundamental right to due process as the same is considered satisfied only if a party is
properly notified of the allegations against him or her and is given an opportunity to
defend himself or herself.

Due process of law, as guaranteed in Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, is a

safeguard against any arbitrariness on the part of the Government, and serves as a
protection essential to every inhabitant of the country. Any government act that
militates against the ordinary norms of justice or fair play is considered an infraction of
the great guaranty of due process; and this is true whether the denial involves violation
merely of the procedure prescribed by the law or affects the very validity of the law itself.

We have held that due process is satisfied if the party who is properly notified of
allegations against him or her is given an opportunity to defend himself or herself
against those allegations, and such defense was considered by the tribunal in arriving at
its own independent conclusions. What is offensive to due process is the denial of the
opportunity to be heard.

Here, petitioners were not given any opportunity to be heard and their defenses
were not considered in the denial of their petition.

It is true that a Notice of Finality of Decision and an Order of Execution had

already been rendered in this case. However, considering the non-observance of
petitioners' right to due process, the same should be set aside. It is settled that violation
of due process rights is a jurisdictional defect" and that "a. decision or judgment is
fatally defective if rendered in violation of a party-litigant's right to due process.
Accordingly, the case should be remanded to the COA in order to resolve petitioners'
appeal from the NDs on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision No. 2016-160 dated

July 28, 2016 and the Resolution dated April 26, 2017 of the Commission on Audit
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the COA in
order to resolve petitioners' appeal from the subject notices of disallowance on the
merits.

[ G.R. No. 247471, July 07, 2020 ]

JOINT SHIP MANNING GROUP, INC., et.al, VS. SSS COMMISSION, REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT AND VICE CHAIRMAN, RESPECTIVELY, AURORA C. IGNACIO, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

R.A. No. 1161, or the Social Security Act of 1954, established the Social Security System (SSS).
Its declared policy was to develop a social security service to protect Filipino workers. At that
time, Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) were not covered by the said law. Subsequently, in
1987, the 74th Geneva Maritime Session of the International Labour Organization (ILO) ruled
that seafarers have the right to social security protection, an internationally accepted principle.
Eighteen (18) countries, including the Philippines, signed the Session's act.

On July 14, 1988, the SSS and the DOLE entered into a MOA stating that one of the conditions
of the Standard Employment Contract (SEC) of seafarers would be that sea based OFWs shall be
covered by the SSS.

In 1995, the Court promulgated Sta. Rita v. Court of Appeals which stated that R.A. No. 1161
does not exempt seafarers from coverage of the SSS law. It was underscored therein that the SEC
entered into by the seafarer and the manning agencies, which imposes SSS coverage, is valid and
binding.

In 1997, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8282 or the 1997 SSS Law. However, the said law still did
not consider the mandatory coverage of OFWs under the SSS. In 2006, the ILO adopted the
Maritime Labour Convention to establish the minimum working living standards for all
seafarers. It provides for the labor rights of a seafarer, including social protection, and the
implementation and enforcement of these rights.

In 2010, the Philippines Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) amended the SEC,
declaring that the seafarer's SSS coverage is a duty of the principal, the employer, the master, or
the company.

On February 7, 2019, Congress enacted R.A. No. 11199, which mandated compulsory SSS
coverage for OFWs. The purpose of the law is to provide OFWs with SSS benefits, especially
upon retirement. It also increased the rates of SSS contributions to provide relief for the
dwindling resources of the SSS. Sec. 9-B of R.A. No. 11199 covers the compulsory coverage of
OFWs

Issues:

WHETHER SEC. 9-B OF R.A. NO. 11199 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT VIOLATES

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF RIGHTS.

Ruling:

When a law is questioned before the Court, the presumption is in favor of its constitutionality. To
justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unmistakable breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and argumentative one.Moreover, the reason courts will, as much as possible, avoid the
decision of a constitutional question can be traced to the doctrine of separation of powers which
enjoins on each department a proper respect for the acts of the other departments. In line with
this policy, courts indulge the presumption of constitutionality and go by the maxim that "to
doubt is to sustain." The theory is that, as the joint act of the legislative and executive authorities,
a law is supposed to have been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it
was finally enacted.

R.A. No. 11199 was enacted, among others, to extend social security protection to
Filipino workers, local or overseas, and their beneficiaries. Sec. 9-B(a) states that OFWs shall
have compulsory coverage by the SSS. Sec. 9-B(b) states that manning agencies are agents of
their principals and are considered as employers of sea-based OFWs which make them jointly
and severally or solidarily liable with their principals with respect to the civil liabilities therein.
On the other hand, the recruitment agencies of land-based OFWs are not considered as agents of
their principals, and thus, are not jointly and solidarily liable for the SSS contributions.

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right
which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the
laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to
provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause.
But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper
weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.It, however, does not require the universal
application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the
test of reasonableness.

The Court finds that Sec. 9-B of R.A. No. 11199 does not violate the equal protection of laws
because there is a substantial distinction between sea-based OFWs and land-based OFWs.

As properly argued by respondents, seafarers constitute a unique classification of OFWs. Their

essential difference against land-based OFWs is that all seafarers have only one (1) standard
contract, which provides the rights and obligations of the foreign ship owner, the seafarer and the
manning agencies

As petitioners failed to prove that Sec. 9-B of R.A. No. 11199, to the extent that sea-based OFWs
are concerned, violates the Constitution, then this statutory provision must be upheld in favor of
the obligatory SSS coverage of the seafarers.

EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-15-2438 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3681-RTJ], September 02,
2020

SHARON FLORES-CONCEPCION, COMPLAINANT, V. JUDGE LIBERTY O.

CASTANEDA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 67, PANIQUI, TARLAC,
RESPONDENT.

[ G.R. No. 245438, November 03, 2020 ]

FRABELLE PROPERTIES CORP., PETITIONER, VS. AC ENTERPRISES, INC., RESPONDENT.

FACTS: Frabelle Properties Corporation, a domestic corporation, is the

developer and manager of Frabella I Condominium, a 29-storey building
composed of residential and commercial units and located at 109 Rada Street,
Legaspi Village, Makati City. Petitioner owns some of the units in Frabella I
Condominium, and leases them out to tenants.

Respondent, a domestic corporation, is the owner of Feliza Building, a 10-

storey building composed of commercial and office units, and located along
V.A. Rufino Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City. Frabella I Condominium was
constructed around 1995, about five years later than Feliza Building. Both
buildings are located in Legaspi Village, which at that time was already a
bustling business and commercial area with numerous establishments and
busy streets. Rada and V.A. Rufino streets lie parallel to each other, with
Rodriguez Street, a two-lane road approximately 12 meters wide situated in
between. Feliza Building is located at the back of Frabella I Condominium,
such that the exhaust of the blowers from the air-conditioning units at Feliza
Building faces the direction of the rear of Frabella I Condominium.

From the first to ninth floor of Feliza Building, there are air-conditioning
units served by 36 blowers, with four blowers for each floor located outside the
building's windows facing Frabella I Condominium. Only a portion of the rear
side of Feliza Building faces Frabella I Condominium, while the remaining
portion of Feliza Building faces the Thailand Embassy, a building adjacent to
Frabella I Condominium. Petitioner contends that respondent's blowers
generate excessive noise and irritating hot air blown towards the direction of
Frabella I Condominium. The noise and hot air are claimed to be a nuisance to
petitioner and the tenants of Frabella I Condominium.

According to petitioner, it had complained to respondent about the blowers in

at least three letters dated April 11, 1995, June 6, 1995 and August 14, 2000,
all of which were ignored. It had also attempted to settle its complaint with
respondent through other actions filed prior to the civil case. On March 10,
2001, petitioner filed a complaint with the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB)
for the abatement of noise and/or pollution and damages, with a plea of
injunctive relief. In a letter dated March 7, 2002, petitioner filed a complaint
with then Makati City Mayor Jejomar C. Binay with prayer to cancel the
Mayor's License and Business Permits of the Feliza Building.

In response to petitioner's complaints, respondent introduced some

improvements in 2000 and 2006, including the installation of soundproofing
materials on all air-conditioning units and replacement of blowers and air-
condensers.However, petitioner continued to insist that respondent cease
operation of its blowers.

ISSUE:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS AN ACTIONABLE NUISANCE

 II. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE PAYMENT OF
TEMPERATE AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, AND ATTORNEY'S FEES

HELD:

I. First Issue: Actionable Nuisance

Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance:

A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of

property, or anything else which:

(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or

(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or

(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or

(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or
street, or any body of water; or

(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.

The Civil Code classifies nuisances as public or private. A private

nuisance has been defined as one which violates only private rights and
produces damages to but one or a few persons. A nuisance is public when it
interferes with the exercise of public right by directly encroaching on public
property or by causing a common injury.

Noise nuisance

The noise complained of by petitioner has already been recognized by this

Court in AC Enterprises not to be a nuisance per se. Noise can be considered a
nuisance only if it affects injuriously the health or comfort of ordinary people in
the vicinity to an unreasonable extent.

In AC Enterprises, the Court held:

The test is whether rights of property, of health or of comfort are so injuriously
affected by the noise in question that the sufferer is subjected to a loss which
goes beyond the reasonable limit imposed upon him by the condition of living,
or of holding property, in a particular locality in fact devoted to uses which
involve the emission of noise although ordinary care is taken to confine it
within reasonable bounds; or in the vicinity of property of another owner who,
though creating a noise, is acting with reasonable regard for the rights of those
affected by it.

The court ruled that there was no nuisance because no one on the subject
premises had suffered materially from the noise in comfort or health, and the
operation of the factory did not unreasonably interfere with the comfort, health
or property of the plaintiff. In the absence of proof of material suffering in
comfort or health, we are constrained to rule that there is no actionable
nuisance.

Therefore, in light of the foregoing discussion and after a careful consideration

of the facts and applicable law, We rule in favor of respondent and affirm the
findings of the CA that there was no actionable nuisance caused by
respondent's operation of its blowers.

Thus, in the absence of proof of material suffering in comfort or health, we do

not find the sound of the blowers to be a nuisance.

II. Award of Damages and Attorney's Fees

The CA correctly deleted the award of damages, there being no injury caused
by respondent to petitioner in the absence of nuisance. Respondent cannot be
made to suffer for the lawful enjoyment of its property, petitioner having failed
to prove nuisance. Petitioner failed to prove injury suffered due to respondent.
As we held in Sps. Custodio v. CA ,damage without wrong does not constitute a
cause of action, to wit:
To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a
legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff
therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not
constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy
allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.

Even assuming petitioner suffered some loss, as it had failed to prove

nuisance, there is no injury caused by respondent to petitioner to entitle the
latter to an award of damages. In situations of damnum absque injuria or
damage without injury, wherein the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of legal duty, there is no basis for an award of damages. There must
first be a breach of duty and imposition of liability before damages may be
awarded. In Tortorella, the court did not award damages to the petitioner that
had similarly claimed loss of rental value because there was no nuisance found
in the case. In the case at bar, there being no actionable nuisance, respondent
was not in breach of duty but in the lawful exercise of its ownership rights, and
therefore, there is no basis to sustain an award of damages in favor of
petitioner.

Petitioner is not entitled to the temperate and exemplary damages and attorney's fees it claims.

Temperate damages are only awarded by virtue of the wrongful act of a

party when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be provided with
certainty. Exemplary damages are awarded when the act of the offender is
attended by bad faith or done in wanton, fraudulent, or malevolent manner. As
discussed, petitioner failed to prove nuisance, thus there is no wrongful act to
serve as basis for an award of temperate or exemplary damages in its favor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED

ASIGA MINING CORPORATION, Petitioner, -versus- MANILA MINING

CORPORATION and BASIANA MINING EXPLORATION CORPORATION,
Respondents. G.R. No. 199081, SECOND DIVISION, January 24, 2018, REYES, JR., J.
FACTS: Petitioner Asiga Mining Corporation was the holder of mining claims over hectares of
land located in Santiago, Agusan del Norte. These claims, known as MIRADOR and CICAFE,
were granted unto Asiga by virtue of the Mining Act of 1936. Subsequently, when the law was
amended by the Mineral Resources Decree of 1974, the petitioner had to follow registration
procedures so that its earlier mining claims, MIRADOR and CICAFE, could be recognized
under the new law. Following their successful application, their mining claims over the subject
area were upheld. Two decades later, the Mineral Resources Decree of 1974 was amended and
superseded by the Mining Act of 1995. Like before, Asiga was again required by the
supervening law to undergo registration procedures so that its mining claims could be recognized
anew. Hence, on March 31, 1997, Asiga applied with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau to
convert its mining claims into a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement as required by the
Mining Act of 1995 and its implementing rules and regulations. As fate would have it, it was
during this application process when Asiga discovered that its mining claims overlapped with
that of respondent Manila Mining Corporation, by about 1,661 hectares, and of respondent
Basiana Mining Exploration Corporationby 214 hectares. Upon knowledge of the foregoing, and
to protect its interest over the subject area, Asiga filed before the MGB-CARAGA Regional
Office an Adverse Claim with Petition for Preliminary Injunction against the respondents MMC
and BMEC, and prayed for the exclusion of the area applied for by the respondents from the
bounds of its mining claims. It asserted that: (1) it has vested right to the approved and existing
mining claims that were awarded to it since 1975; (2) it has preferential right to enter into any
mode of mineral agreement with the government for the period up to 14 September 1997; and (3)
the respondents' MPSA applications are null and void because the areas applied for encroached
on Asiga's mining claims and thus, were closed to application.

The respondents MMC and BMEC, on the other hand, separately filed a Motion to
Dismiss on grounds of prescription and abandonment of mining claims. Collectively, they
averred that: (1) Asiga's adverse claim is rendered void by prescription as it was only filed more
than thirty (30) days from the date of the first publication of respondents' Notice of Application
for MPSA; (2) Asiga did not substantiate the alleged encroachment since it failed to submit
documents that would prove such claim; (3) Asiga already abandoned its mining claims because
it failed to file an Affidavit of Annual Work Obligation showing its work performance over the
subject mining areas for more than two (2) consecutive years. On December 24, 1998, the Panel
of Arbitrators organized by the MGB-CARAGA Regional Office rendered a Decision in favor of
Asiga. The respondents appealed to the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB) reiterating their
arguments of prescription and abandonment, to which the MAB agreed. Aggrieved, Asiga filed a
Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the CA. On May 12, 2011, the
CA promulgated the assailed decision. It ruled that Asiga cannot be considered a holder of valid
and existing mining claims. After the dismissal of Asiga 's motion for reconsideration, Asiga
filed this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Asiga could be considered to have abandoned its mining claim over the
hectares of land located in Santiago, Agusan del Norte on the basis of (a) non-submission of the
affidavit of annual work obligations, and (b) non-payment of fees. (NO)

2. Whether Asiga's adverse claim is rendered void by prescription as it was only filed
more than thirty (30) days from the date of the first publication of respondents' Notice of
Application for MPSA. (NO)

RULING: 1. The Court has already established that there is no rule of automatic abandonment
with respect to mining claims for failure to file the affidavit of annual work obligations. Based
on the facts as borne by the records of this case, the Court is of the considered opinion that Asiga
did not abandon its mining claims over the subject area.

To rule that it did on the basis merely of the non-submission of the affidavit and the non-
payment of fees, without considering the relevant implementing rules and regulations of the law
as well as settled jurisprudence on the matter, would cause undue injury to a right granted—and
thus protected by law—unto the petitioner. The notion of "automatic abandonment" being
invoked by the respondents is provided for in Section 27 of the Mineral Resources Development
Decree of 1974. As originally worded, Section 27 of the Mineral Resources Development Decree
of 1974 provided that the failure of a claim owner to submit a sworn statement of its compliance
with its annual work obligations for two (2) consecutive years shall "cause the forfeiture of all
rights to his claim."

In 1978, Section 15 of P.D. No. 1385 amended this specific provision. Instead of merely
causing the forfeiture of the mining rights upon failure to comply with the required submissions,
the section then provided for an "automatic abandonment" of the mining claims, which provides
that failure of the claimowner to comply therewith for two (2) consecutive years shall constitute
automatic abandonment of the mining claims In 1980, this provision was once again amended.
Section 5 of P.D. No. 1677 retained the "automatic abandonment" provision and further included
that, should a verification be conducted and it was discovered that no work was actually
accomplished despite the submission of an affidavit to that effect, the owner/lessee shall likewise
automatically lose all the rights appurtenant to his/her mining claims. Finally, Section 27, as it
now stands, was modified by Section 2 of P.D. No. 1902 which provides that failure of the
claimowner to comply therewith for two (2) consecutive years shall constitute automatic
abandonment of the mining claim: Provided, further, That, if it is found upon field verification
that no such work was actually done on the mining claim, the claimowner/lessee shall likewise
automatically lose all his rights thereto notwithstanding submission of the aforesaid documents.

What is being asked of this Court by the respondents is a re-interpretation of this most
recent iteration of the Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974. As how it was in
Santiago, to arrive at an answer, the subject matter of the provision must first be clarified. Is it
the non-submission of the proof of the compliance—the affidavit of annual work obligation—for
two consecutive years, or is it the actual non-compliance of the annual work obligation for two
consecutive years that would become the basis for the declaration of abandonment of mining
claims? The Court opines that it is the latter. The latest version indicates that there is focus on the
annual work obligations imposed upon claim owners or lessees, and not merely on the
submission of proof to this requirement. Indeed, as ruled in Santiago, the essence of this
provision is to exact compliance of the obligations imposed upon claim owners or lessees who
are granted the privilege of exploring and/or exploiting the Philippines' natural resources.

Thus, when Section 27 included the phrase "failure of the claimowner to comply
therewith," the phrase was referring to the actual work obligations required of the claim owners,
and not merely the submission of the proof of the actual work obligations. This is the proper
interpretation of this section. As explained by Justice Paras in Santiago: Under the Consolidated
Mines Administrative Order (CMAO), implementing PD 463, as amended, the rule that has been
consistently applied is that it is the failure to perform the required assessment work, not the
failure to file the AAWO that gives rise to abandonment. Interpreted within the context of PD
1902, the last amending decree of PD 463, it is intended, among others, to accelerate the
development of our natural resources and to accelerate mineral productions, abandonment under
the aforequoted Sec. 27 refers to the failure to perform work obligations which in turn is one of
the grounds for the cancellation of the lease contract (Sec. 43(a), Consolidated Mines
Administrative Order, implementing PD 463) Even DENR, was of the opinion that it is the
failure to perform actual work obligations that would give rise to abandonment. It further
interpreted the provision as one which is more of convenience than substance, and that the claim
owners or lessees are not precluded from proving their actual compliance through other means.
Further, in declaring claim owners or lessees to have abandoned their mining claims, due process
must primarily be observed.

There were no notices sent to Asiga, which either notified it of its non-compliance to
Section 27 or notified it of the cancellation of its mining claims. Thus, on the basis of the
foregoing, it could not be said that the petitioner has abandoned its mining claims over the
disputed parcels of land. 2. The CA failed to consider Section 8 of the same administrative order
which, in cases when the holder of the mining claim is involved in a mining dispute/case,
allowed the submission of the actual mineral agreement application thirty (30) days from the
final resolution of the dispute/case. In cases where a claim owner or lessee is involved in a
mining dispute, it shall just submit a "Letter of Intent to file the necessary Mineral Agreement
application."

The actual mineral agreement application, however, should only be filed within thirty
(30) days from the final resolution of the dispute of the case. Necessarily, therefore, and contrary
to the CA ruling, the 30-day period within which to pay the occupational fees would only
commence to run from the filing of the actual mineral agreement application, and not before.
Considering that the present case is the very mining dispute referred to in Section 8 of DENR
DAO No. 97-07, then, contrary to the MAS and CA decisions, Asiga is correct in asserting that it
has thirty (30) days from the finality of this decision to pay in full the occupational fees as
required by Section 9 thereof

G.R. No. 237428

REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C.
CALIDA, Petitioner
 vs.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO, Respondent
(see land mark case file page 34)

G.R. No. 121777       January 24, 2001

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA, accused-appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS:

On the afternoon of January 30, 1994, Maria Lourdes Modesto and Nancy Araneta
together with her friends Jennelyn Baez, and Sandra Aquino went to the house of Jasmine
Alejandro, after having learned that a woman is there to recruit job applicants for Singapore.
Carol dela Piedra was already briefing some people when they arrived. Jasmine, on the other
hand, welcomed and asked them to sit down. They listened to the “recruiter” who was then
talking about the breakdown of the fees involved: P30,000 for the visa and the round trip ticket,
and P5,000 as placement fee and for the processing of the papers. The initial payment was
P2,000, while P30,000 will be by salary deduction.

The recruiter said that she was “recruiting” nurses for Singapore. Araneta, her friends
and Lourdes then filled up bio-data forms and were required to submit pictures and a transcript
of records. After the interview, Lourdes gave the initial payment of P2,000 to Jasmine, who
assured her that she was authorized to receive the money. Meanwhile, in the morning of the
said date, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA),
received a telephone call from an unidentified woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the
recruitment conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Ramos, whose duties include the
surveillance of suspected illegal recruiters, immediately contacted a friend, a certain Mayeth
Bellotindos, so they could both go the place where the recruitment was reportedly being
undertaken. Upon arriving at the reported area at around 4:00 p.m., Bellotindos entered the
house and pretended to be an applicant. Ramos remained outside and stood on the pavement,
from where he was able to see around six (6) persons in the sala. Ramos even heard a woman,
identified as Carol Figueroa, talk about the possible employment she has to provide in
Singapore and the documents that the applicants have to comply with. Fifteen (15) minutes
later, Bellotindos came out with a bio-data form in hand.
 Thereafter, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the Criminal Investigation
Service (CIS) to organize the arrest of the alleged illegal recruiter. A surveillance team was then
organized to confirm the report. After which, a raid was executed. Consequently, Carol was
charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal recruitment.

Upon appeal, accused questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and
assails, as well, the constitutionality of the law defining and penalizing said crime. First, accused
submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining “recruitment and placement” is void for
vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause. The provision in question reads: ART.
13.

Definitions

(b)“Recruitment and placement” refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,

transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided,
That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two
or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not sec. 13 (b) of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the illegal
recruitment law is unconstitutional as it violates the due process clause.

(2) Whether or not accused was denied equal protection and therefore should be
exculpated

HELD:

(1) For the First issue, dela Piedra submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining
“recruitment and placement” is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause.
Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform
those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties. In
support of her submission, dela Piedra invokes People vs. Panis, where the Supreme Court
“criticized” the definition of “recruitment and placement.”
The Court ruled, however, that her reliance on the said case was misplaced. The issue in Panis
was whether, under the proviso of Article 13 (b), the crime of illegal recruitment could be
committed only “whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any
employment for a fee.” In this case, the Court merely bemoaned the lack of records that would
help shed light on the meaning of the proviso.

The absence of such records notwithstanding, the Court was able to arrive at a
reasonable interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in criminal law and drawing from
the language and intent of the law itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is not a “perfectly vague act”
whose obscurity is evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched in
imprecise language that was salvaged by proper construction. It is not void for vagueness.

Dela Piedra further argues that the acts that constitute “recruitment and placement”
suffer from overbreadth since by merely “referring” a person for employment, a person may be
convicted of illegal recruitment. That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently
considers as customary and harmless acts such as “labor or employment referral” (“referring” an
applicant, according to appellant, for employment to a prospective employer) does not render
the law overbroad. Evidently, Dela Piedra misapprehends concept of overbreadth. A statute
may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms
affirmatively guaranteed By the Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion.

A generally worded statute, when construed to punish conduct which cannot be

constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to give
constitutionally adequate warning permissible and of the the boundary constitutionally between
the impermissible applications of the statute.

(2) Anent the second issue, protection clause in her defense. Dela Piedra invokes the
equal She points out that although the evidence purportedly shows that Jasmine Alejandro
handed out application forms and even received Lourdes Modesto’s payment, appellant was the
only one criminally charged. Alejandro, on the other hand, remained scot-free. From this, she
concludes that the prosecution discriminated against her on grounds of regional origins.
Appellant is a Cebuana while Alejandro is a Zamboangueña, and the alleged crime took place in
Zamboanga City. The Supreme Court held that the argument has no merit. The prosecution of
one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, is not, by itself, a denial of the
equal protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on its face,
resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of
equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful
discrimination. But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of “clear
and intentional discrimination.” In the case at bar, Dela Piedra has failed to show that, in
charging her, there was a “clear and intentional discrimination” on the part of the prosecuting
officials.

Furthermore, the presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularly performed their duties,
and this presumption can be overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation.

As said earlier, accused has not presented any evidence to overcome this presumption. The
mere allegation that dela Piedra, a Cebuana, was charged with the commission of a crime,
while a Zamboangueña, the guilty party in appellant’s eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a
conclusion that the prosecution officers denied appellant equal protection of the laws.

[ G.R. No. 194461, January 07, 2020 ]

ZOMER DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER, VS. SPECIAL TWENTIETH DIVISION

OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, CEBU CITY AND UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.

FACTS: Zomer, a domestic corporation, owned three (3) parcels of land in Cebu City, which were
mortgaged to International Exchange Bank as security for its loan. When Zomer Development failed to
pay its indebtedness, IEB foreclosed on the properties. Auction was conducted, IEB emerged as the
highest bidder. Sheriff issued to it Certificates of Sale on November 19, 2001, and provided for a period
of redemption of twelve months from registration, "or sooner and/or later, as provided for under
applicable laws." Zomer filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Notice of Sale, Certificate of Sale &
TCTs and Declaration as Unconstitutional Sec. 47, RA 8791.

It argued that Section 47 of RA 8791 (General Banking Law of 2002), violates its right to equal
protection since the law provides a shorter period for redemption of three (3) months or earlier to
juridical entities compared to the one (1) year redemption period given to natural persons. This
discrimination, it argued, gives "undue advantage to lenders who are non-banks." RTC dismissed the
Complaint and refused to rule on the constitutionality of RA 8791, Section 47. According to the trial
court, to rule on the issue will deprive the Republic of its right to due process since it was not heard on
the issue and was not impleaded as party defendant in the case.
 Zomer appealed to the CA, arguing that the Republic was not required to be impleaded when
questions regarding the constitutionality of a statute are raised. CA dismissed the appeal "without
prejudice to appellant's filing of the appropriate case before the SC. " CA categorized Zomer's Complaint
as one for declaratory relief and refused to "make a definitive ruling" on the constitutionality issue,
citing Rule 63, Section 5 of the Rules of Court on the discretion of courts to entertain petitions for
declaratory relief. Zomer filed a Petition for Mandamus before the SC praying that the CA be compelled
to resolve the issue on the constitutionality of RA 8791, Section 47.

ISSUES:

1. Is the trial court correct in dismissing the Complaint on the ground that the Office of the
Solicitor General was not impleaded as a party? - NO

2. Can the CA be compelled by writ of mandamus to pass upon the constitutionality of a statute?
NO

RULINGS:

1. The trial court erred in dismissing the Complaint on the ground that the Republic, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General, was not impleaded in this case. The Complaint, while denominated as a
Declaration of Nullity of Notice of Sale, Certificate of Sale & TCTs and Declaration as Unconstitutional
Sec. 47, RA No. 8791, was, in reality, an action for declaratory relief. Petitioner, in seeking the
nullification of the foreclosure sale, questioned the validity of RA 8791, Section 47 insofar as the law
limits the redemption period for juridical persons to only three (3) months. Petitioner was a juridical
person affected by the shorter redemption period. Under Rule 63, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, any
person whose rights are affected by a statute may bring an action before the trial court to determine its
validity.

In dismissing the action, the trial court cited Rule 63, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, in that the
Solicitor General was required to be impleaded in all actions where the validity of a statute was in
question. The Rules, however, only require that notice be given to the Solicitor General. They do not
state that if the Solicitor General fails to participate in the action, the action would be dismissed. The
trial court dismissed the action on the ground that the Solicitor General may be deprived of due process.
Due process, however, has already been accorded to the Solicitor General when he/she was furnished
with a copy of the Complaint. The Solicitor General's failure to comment on the Complaint should have
the effect of waiving his or her right to participate in the case. To hold otherwise would be to give the
Solicitor General more power than what the law grants. The Solicitor General does not have and should
not have unbridled control over cases that were originally filed between private parties.

2. The grant of declaratory relief is discretionary on the courts. Courts may refuse to declare rights or to
construe instruments if it will not terminate the controversy or if it is unnecessary and improper under
the circumstances. A discretionary act cannot be the subject of a petition for mandamus. Although the
RTCs have exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for declaratory relief, the CA exercises appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments of the trial court. Thus, the CA may, in appeals of actions for
declaratory relief, apply Rule 63 of the Rules of Court in resolving the appeal. The CA, in deferring the
question of the validity of RA 8791, Section 47 to the CA, cited Rule 63, Section 5of the Rules of Court,
and held that to resolve the Petition "would be an empty discourse and will not terminate the
controversy. "

This was an exercise of the CA’s discretion. Mandamus may issue only to compel the
performance of a ministerial duty. It cannot be issued to compel the performance of a discretionary act.
In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay: Generally, the writ of
mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. A ministerial duty is one that "requires
neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment." It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the
discretion of the person executing it. It is a "simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or
proved to exist and imposed by law." Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on
matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the
other.

Petitioner cannot file a petition for mandamus to compel what is essentially a discretionary act
on the CA. What Petitioner should have done was to file a petition for certiorari to question the exercise
of the CA’s discretion. Unfortunately, Petitioner filed the wrong remedy. As such, the Petition must be
denied.

G.R. No. 228087, January 24, 2018

H. VILLARICA PAWNSHOP, INC., HL VILLARICA PAWNSHOP, INC., HRV

VILLARICA PAWNSHOP, INC. AND VILLARICA PAWNSHOP,
INC., Petitioners, v. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, SOCIAL SECURITY
SYSTEM, AMADOR M. MONTEIRO, SANTIAGO DIONISIO R. AGDEPPA, MA. LUZ
N. BARROS-MAGSINO, MILAGROS N. CASUGA AND JOCELYN Q. GARCIA
Articles: Art.9 Civil Code, RA no. 8282 Social Security Law 1997, RA no. 9903 Social Security
Condonation Law 2009. Art. 2154 to 2163 civil code Doctrine: Condonation Statutes, non-
delegation of powers from the separation of the branches of government.

FACTS: Petitioners are private corporations engaged in the pawnshop business and are
compulsorily registered with the SSS under R.A. No. 8282 the Social Security Law of 1997.
Petitioners paid their delinquent contributions and accrued penalties with the different branches
of the SSS through installment. On January 7, 2010, Congress enacted R.A. No. 9903 Social
Security Condonation Law of 2009, which took effect on February 1, 2010. The said law offered
delinquent employers the opportunity to settle, without penalty, their accountabilities or overdue
contributions within six (6) months from the date of its effectivity. Petitioners claimed that the
benefits of the condonation program extend to all employers who have settled their arrears or
unpaid contributions even prior to the effectivity of the law.

SSS - San Francisco Del Monte Branch DENIED HRV Villarica Pawnshop, Inc. DENIED
Villarica Pawnshop, Inc. DENIED HL Villarica Pawnshop, DENIED. For their application for the
refund of the accrued penalty.

ISSUE: NO- whether the petitioners is liable to the RA 9903

RELEVANT ISSUE- WON- whether the RA 9003 is not a subject of ambiguity and the meaning
of “accured” is clearly define in the law.

HELD: In its Resolution SSC denied all the petitions for lack of merit It ruled that petitioners
were not entitled to the benefits of the condonation program under R.A. No. 9903 in view of the
full payment of their unpaid obligations prior to the effectivity of the law on February 1, 2010.

The CA Ruling: affirmed the ruling of the SSC highlighted that lawmakers did not include within
the sphere of R.A. No. 9903 those employers whose penalties have already been paid prior to
its effectivity. Instant petition is hereby DISMISSED Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it
was DENIED by the CA. The court of appeals erred in ruling that ra no. 9903 does not Include
petitioners in its coverage, considering that:

1. Section 4 of RA no. 9903 expressly includes employers, such as petitioners, who settled
(their) arrears in contributions before the effectivity of the law and thus, are entitled to a waiver
of their accrued penalties.
2. Prior to ra no. 9903, employers are required to settle their arrears in contributions
simultaneously with payment of the penalty, thus rendering it impossible for petitioners to pay
their arrears without paying the penalty. Erred in ruling that respondent ssc correctly interpreted
the term ‘accrued’ under the SSS condonation law of 2009 to mean unpaid. The petition is
bereft of merit. The petition is DENIED. Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED in toto.

G.R. No. 202408, June 27, 2018

FAROUK B. ABUBAKAR, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 202409
ULAMA S. BARAGUIR Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 202412
DATUKAN M. GUIANI Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

FACTS:

Acting upon then President Ramos' instruction, the Commission on Audit created a
special audit team headed by Heidi L. Mendoza to look into the implementation of four (4) road
concreting projects, namely: (1) the Cotabato-Lanao Road, Sections 1-13; (2) the Awang-Nuro
Road; (3) the Highway Linek-Kusiong Road; and (4) the Highway Simuay Seashore Road.12
Physical inspections were conducted on October 15, 1992 to validate the existence of the
projects and the extent of their development.

The audit team made the following findings:

First, an overpayment amounting to P17,684,000.00 was incurred on nine (9) road

sections. The audit team discovered the existence of bloated accomplishment reports that
allowed contractors to prematurely claim on their progress billings.

Second, advance payments totaling P14,400,000.00 were given to nine (9) contractors
for the procurement of aggregate sub-base course in violation of Section 88(l) of Presidential
Decree No. 1445.

Third, public bidding for the Cotabato-Lanao Road Project was done without a detailed
engineering survey.The bidding was reportedly conducted on January 14, 1992. However, the
engineering survey was only completed sometime in August 1992. The audit team also
observed bidding irregularities in the Awang-Nuro Road Project and in six (6) road sections of
the Cotabato-Lanao Road Project. Public bidding for the two (2) projects was reportedly
conducted on January 14, 1992 but records disclose that the contractors already mobilized their
equipment as early as January 4 to 7, 1992.

Lastly, the engineering survey for the centerline relocation and profiling of the Cotabato-
Lanao Road, which cost P200,000.00, appeared to be unnecessary due to the existence of a
previous engineering survey. Furthermore, advance payment was given to the contractor in
excess of the limit provided under the implementing rules and regulations of Presidential Decree
No. 1594.19

For the Court's resolution are three (3) consolidated Petitions for Review on certiorari
concerning alleged anomalies in the implementation of infrastructure projects within the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The Petitions, separately docketed as G.R.
Nos. 202408, 202409, and 202412, question the Sandiganbayan's December 8, 2011 decision
and June 19, 2012 Resolution in Criminal Case Nos. 24963-24983. The assailed judgments
declared Farouk B. Abubakar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 10 counts of violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, and Ulama S. Baraguir and Datukan M. Guiani guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of 17 counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019

HELD: Yes, petitioners violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Section 3(e) of Republic
Act No. 3019 punishes a public officer who causes "any undue injury to any party, including the
Government" or gives "any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence".

The Court finds that petitioners Baraguir and Guiani gave unwarranted benefits and
advantage to several contractors by allowing them to deploy their equipment ahead of the
scheduled public bidding. As a matter of policy, public contracts are awarded through
competitive public bidding. The acts of identifying certain contractors ahead of the scheduled
public bidding and of allowing the advanced deployment of their equipment through the
issuance of certificates of mobilization are glaring irregularities in the bidding procedure that
engender suspicion of favoritism and partiality towards the seven (7) contractors. These
irregularities create a reasonable, if not conclusive, presumption that the concerned public
officials had no intention of complying with the rules on public bidding and that the results were
already predetermined.
 G.R. No. 192935               December 7, 2010
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, Respondent.

FACTS: For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases both of which essentially
assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled
"Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010." In, G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo assails
Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1,
Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a
public office and to appropriate funds therefor. The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special
civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano
Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. as incumbent members of the House of
Representatives. The Philippine Truth Commission is a mere ad hoc body formed under the
Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption
committed by third-level public officers and employees, their coprincipals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been
described as an "independent collegial body," it is essentially an entity within the Office of the
President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad
hoc body is one. To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative
body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however,
a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in
disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft
and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power
to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or
administrative penalties or sanctions.

ISSUES: Whether or not EO No. 1 is Unconstitutional

HELD: Yes. Petitions Granted

Legal Standing as an essential requisite for judicial review The Court disagrees with the OSG in
questioning the legal standing of the petitioners-legislators to assail Executive Order No. 1.
Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to
which they belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for
Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the usurpation of their power and
rights as members of the legislature before the Court. As held in Philippine Constitution
Association v. Enriquez: To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of
each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers
of that institution.

An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but
nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a
case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts. Indeed, legislators have a legal
standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in
their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action
which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

Power of the President to create the Truth Commission

The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall within
the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative
Code? Section 31 contemplates "reorganization" as limited by the following functional and
structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper
by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to
another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of the
President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to
reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body or an office is already existent
but a modification or alteration thereof has to be effected.

The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision.
Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative. To say that the PTC is borne out of a
restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in
the plainest meaning attributable to the term "restructure" an "alteration of an existing structure."
Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the
enactment of Executive Order No. 1. In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by
the Presidents power of control. Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or
set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely different
from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter
finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully
execute the laws. The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress,
empowering the President to create a public office? According to the OSG, the power to create
a truth commission pursuant to the above provision finds statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as
amended by P.D. No. 1772.

The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the
President to create a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable.
P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the national government including the power to create offices and
transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last
"Whereas" clause: WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of government will
necessitate flexibility in the organization of the national government. Clearly, as it was only for
the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as
amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio upon the convening of the First Congress, as
expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate Invoking this
authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and
corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial
powers have been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come
before it. Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the
DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will
complement those of the two offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of the commission to
conduct a fact-finding investigation.

The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of
the charges against them, is certainly not a function given to the commission. The phrase,
"when in the course of its investigation," under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and gives
credence to a contrary interpretation from that of the petitioners. The function of determining
probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with
the DOJ and the Ombudsman. At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under R.A.
No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies.
The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title
III, Book IV in the Revised Administrative Code is by no means exclusive and, thus, can be
shared with a body likewise tasked to investigate the commission of crimes.

Equal protection clause although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the
investigative power of the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause.
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature.
Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through
whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. It, however, does not require the universal
application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the
test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class."

Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification." Applying these precepts to
this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the
truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration
only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention
of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. In this regard, it
must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a
class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations
similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction.
Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution.

Power of the Supreme Court of Judicial Review The Philippine Supreme Court, according to
Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power that "includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave of abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the
power of judicial review which is the power to declare a treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
unconstitutional.

This power also includes the duty to rule on the constitutionality of the application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations. These provisions, however, have been fertile grounds of conflict between the
Supreme Court, on one hand, and the two co-equal bodies of government, on the other. Many
times the Court has been accused of asserting superiority over the other departments. Thus, the
Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own will upon a co-equal
body but rather simply making sure that any act of government is done in consonance with the
authorities and rights allocated to it by the Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds
no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions
under review.

Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void and unconstitutional.
GRANTED.

CASE NO: G.R. No. L-45987 May 5, 1939

PLAINTTHE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
RESPONDENT: CAYAT
FACTS: Prosecuted for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3), the accused, Cayat, a native
of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, was sentenced by the justice of the peace court of
Baguio to pay a fine of P50 or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency

That on or about the 25th day of January, 1937, in the City of Baguio, Commonwealth of the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the above-named accused, Cayat, being a
member of the non-Christian tribes, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and illegally receive,
acquire, and have in his possession and under his control or custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an
intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such
tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639.
Accused interposed a demurrer which was overruled. At the trial, he admitted all the facts
alleged in the information, but pleaded not guilty to the charge for the reasons adduced in his
demurrer and submitted the case on the pleadings. The trial court found him guilty of the crime
charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of fifty pesos or supper subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.

Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 read:

SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-
Christian tribe within the meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to
buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating
liquors of any kind, other than the so called native wines and liquors which the members of such
tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act, except as
provided in section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly
authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial, municipal or township government to seize and
forthwith destroy any such liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-
Christian tribe.

SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon
conviction thereof, be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos
or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, in the discretion of the court. The
accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds:

(1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;

(2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution: and.

(3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of the state

Counsel for the appellant holds out his brief as the "brief for the non-Christian tribes." It is said
that as these less civilized elements of the Filipino population are "jealous of their rights in a
democracy," any attempt to treat them with discrimination or "mark them as inferior or less
capable rate or less entitled" will meet with their instant challenge.

As the constitutionality of the Act here involved is questioned for purposes thus mentioned, it
becomes imperative to examine and resolve the issues raised in the light of the policy of the
government towards the non-Christian tribes adopted and consistently followed from the
Spanish times to the present, more often with sacrifice and tribulation but always with
conscience and humanity.
As early as 1551, the Spanish Government had assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude
toward these inhabitants, and in the different laws of the Indies, their concentration in so-called
"reducciones" (communities) have been persistently attempted with the end in view of according
them the "spiritual and temporal benefits" of civilized life. Throughout the Spanish regime, it had
been regarded by the Spanish Government as a sacred "duty to conscience and humanity" to
civilize these less fortunate people living "in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the
"the moral and material advantages" of community life and the "protection and vigilance
afforded them by the same laws." (Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippines, Jan. 14,
1887.)

This policy had not been deflected from during the American period. President McKinley in his
instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900, said: In dealing with the uncivilized
tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course followed by Congress in
permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and
government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in peace and contentment,
surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform.

Such tribal government should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without
undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous
practices and introduce civilized customs. Since then and up to the present, the government has
been constantly vexed with the problem of determining "those practicable means of bringing
about their advancement in civilization and material prosperity." Placed in an alternative of either
letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization," the present government "has
chosen to adopt the latter measure as one more in accord with humanity and with the national
conscience." (Memorandum of Secretary of the Interior, quoted in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of
Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660, 714.) To this end, their homes and firesides have been brought in
contact with civilized communities through a network of highways and communications; the
benefits of public education have to them been extended; and more lately, even the right of
suffrage.

And to complement this policy of attraction and assimilation, the Legislature has passed Act No.
1639 undoubtedly to secure for them the blessings of peace and harmony; to facilitate, and not
to mar, their rapid and steady march to civilization and culture. It is, therefore, in this light that
the Act must be understood and applied. It is an established principle of constitutional law that
the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated
by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable,
(1) Must rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) Must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) Must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) Must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not
merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage,"
as counsel to the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term
'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and,
more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in
tribal relationship apart from settled communities." (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro,
supra.) This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the
peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes.

The exceptional cases of certain members thereof who at present have reached a position of
cultural equality with their Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of the
classification thus established. That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted.
The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer,
wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which
the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of
this Act.," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian
tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court
disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often
resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise
their standard of life and civilization. The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing
at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist.
The Act was not predicated, as counsel for appellant asserts, upon the assumption that the non-
Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing influence." On the contrary, the Legislature
understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must
go measures of protection and security

Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof.
That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason of their
degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application
ISSUE: WON provision of the law empowering any police officer or other duly authorized agent
of the government to seize and forthwith destroy any prohibited liquors found unlawfully in the
possession of any member of the non-Christian tribes is violative of the due process of law
provided in the Constitution.

HELD: But this provision is not involved in the case at bar.

Besides, to constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are not always necessary. This
rule is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials in
applying a law to particular cases. Due process of law means simply:

(1) That there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative
department of the government;

(2) That it shall be reasonable in its operation;

(3) That it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and

(4) That it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of the class.

Thus, a person's property may be seized by the government in payment of taxes without judicial
hearing; or property used in violation of law may be confiscated or when the property constitutes
corpus delicti, as in the instant case (Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil., 439, 442). Neither is the Act
an improper exercise of the police power of the state. It has been said that the police power is
the most insistent and least limitable of all powers of the government. It has been aptly
described as a power coextensive with self-protection and constitutes the law of overruling
necessity.

Any measure intended to promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the
people or to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and
prosperity (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U.S., 27), is a legitimate exercise of the police power,
unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual,
the same must be upheld. Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and
order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual
growth and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian
brothers.

Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater
Philippines. The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less
capable race." On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public
policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of
those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers.

Their active participation in the multifarious welfare activities of community life or in the delicate
duties of government is certainly a source of pride and gratification to people of the Philippines.
But whether conditions have so changed as to warrant a partial or complete abrogation of the
law, is a matter which rests exclusively within the prerogative of the National Assembly to
determine. In the constitutional scheme of our government, this court can go no farther than to
inquire whether the Legislature had the power to enact the law. If the power exists, and we hold
it does exist, the wisdom of the policy adopted, and the adequacy under existing conditions of
the measures enacted to forward it, are matters which this court has no authority to pass upon.

And, if in the application of the law, the educated non-Christians shall incidentally suffer, the
justification still exists in the all-comprehending principle of salus populi suprema est lex. When
the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by certain
class of persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its
discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer.
The private interests of such members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation.

G.R. No. 179267               June 25, 2013

JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41,
Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children.

FACTS:

Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining
Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical,
emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of
her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner.

Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former was
eleven years her senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old,
who is the natural child of petitioner but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J.
Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.

Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would take
her children from her and deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had previously warned her
that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo.

Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells. He is
the President of three corporations – 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation,
and J-Bros Trading Corporation – of which he and private respondent are both stockholders. In
contrast to the absolute control of petitioner over said corporations, private respondent merely
draws a monthly salary of ₱20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill
Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less than ₱200,000.00 a month are paid for
by private respondent through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same
corporation together with the bills for utilities.

On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of ₱60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill
Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of thousands
of pesos from the corporations. After private respondent confronted him about the affair,
petitioner forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses of
the corporations are conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full information about said
businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent an
accounting of the businesses the value of which she had helped raise to millions of pesos

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by
the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte.
The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment
on why the TPO should not be modified.  After the given time allowance to answer, the
petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.”

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on,
questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal
protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an
invalid law.”

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for
failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition
for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on
said law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.

ISSUES:

a. WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes
a collateral attack on the validity of the law.
b. WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is
discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.
c. WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the
due process clause of the Constitution
d. WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to
protect the family as a basic social institution
e. WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional
because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.

Decision:        

1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle
the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider
the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not
raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’
Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable,
which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing
conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on
a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women over
men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due
process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the
right to due process.

4.  The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention that by not
allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it
ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because
violence is not a subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials.  Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the
Government while executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws.  The
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function. 
The same holds true with the issuance of BPO.  Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law
enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit

G.R. No. 204819               April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor
children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT
CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports
and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents

FACTS: FACTS: 1. After the enactment of R.A. No. 10354, also known as the RH Law, on
December 1, 2012, the Court faces fourteen petitions and two petitions-in-intervention assailing
the law’s constitutionality:

a. Petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Attys. James and Lovely Ann Imbong

b. Petition for prohibition filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc. (ALFI)
c. Petition for certiorari filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc. and Valeriano
Avila

d. Petition for certiorari and prohibition, filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Rosevale
Foundation

e. Petition filed by Expedito Bulgarin, Jr.

f. Petition for certiorari and prohibition, filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc., etc.
g. Petition filed by Dr. Reynaldo Echavez

h. Petition for certiorari and prohibition, filed by Francisco and Maria Tatad, Atty. Alan Paguia

i. Petition for certiorari and prohibition, filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, etc.

j. Petition for certiorari and prohibition, filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc., Attys. Ramon
Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Causing k. Petition for certiorari
and prohibition, filed by John Juat l. Petition for certiorari and prohibition, filed by Couples for
Christ Foundation m. Petition for prohibition, filed by Almarim Tillah and Abdulhussein Kashim n.
Petition-in-intervention, filed by Atty. Samson Alcantara o. Petition-in-intervention, filed by
Buhay Hayaang Humabong (BUHAY)

2. Various parties, including the OSG, also filed comments-in-intervention defending the RH
Law’s constitutionality 3. On March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR (Implementing Rules and
Regulations) took effect 4. On March 19, the Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO)
delaying the said law’s implementation 5. On July 16, the SQAO was extended 6. Note: Prior to
the RH Law, the following legislation concerned reproductive health and contraception: a) R.A.
No. 4729; b) R.A. No. 5921; c) R.A. No. 6365; d) P.D. No. 79; e) R.A. No. 9710 (Magna Carta of
Women)

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the case on the following
grounds:

a. Power of judicial review

b. Actual case/controversy

c. Facial challenge

d. Locus standi
 e. Declaratory relief

f. One subject/one title rule

2. Whether the RH Law is unconstitutional on account of the following:

a. Right to life

b. Right to health

c. Freedom of religion and right to free speech

d. Right to privacy

e. Academic freedom

f. Due process

g. Equal protection

h. Involuntary servitude

i. Delegation of authority to FDA

j. Autonomy of local governments and ARMM k. Natural law

HELD:

1. Procedural Issues a. YES. The OSG holds that the Court’s authority to review the RH Law is
“weak”, and that the petitioners’ prayers are inappropriate. However, the Court contends that the
RH Law’s contravention of the Constitution justifies a review. Moreover, certiorari and
prohibition are proper remedies for constitutional issues.

b. YES. For a controversy to be justiciable, it must be definite and concrete, and the petitioner
must prove the existence of immediate or threatened injury to himself. In the instant case, the
RH Law and RH-IRR have already taken effect, and the petitioners point out that medical
practitioners are in danger of prosecution under it. c. YES. The OSG contends that a facial
challenge only applies in free speech cases. However, in US constitutional law, a facial
challenge, also known as a First Amendment challenge, covers statutes concerning religious
freedom. Furthermore, the petitioners allege that the RH Law violates fundamental rights, such
as life, speech, and religion. d. YES. Since the RH Law drastically affects constitutional
provisions on rights such as life and freedom of religion, the petitioners can invoke
transcendental importance regarding their locus standi.

e. NO. The Court finds that most of the petitions pray for injunctive reliefs. f. YES. The
petitioners assert that the RH Law violates Sec. 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution since it is a
population control measure in disguise. However, the Court finds that “reproductive health” and
“responsible parenthood”, being interrelated and germane to population control, fall under the
said rule. 2.

Substantive Issues a. YES. The framers of the 1987 Constitution made it clear that conception
refers to the moment of fertilization, not implantation. Thus, despite the RH Law’s apparent ban
on abortifacients, the qualifier “primarily” in Sec. 3.01 (a) and (G) of the RH-IRR should be
declared void as it may allow contraceptives with abortifacient fail-safe mechanisms. b. NO. The
sale and distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices, as safeguarded by R.A. Nos. 5921 and
4729, are continued by Sec. 10 of the RH Law.

In addition, petitioners’ concerns over the health effects of such drugs are premature as
no contraceptive has been submitted to the FDA. c. YES. Secs. 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law
violate religious freedom as their force conscientous objectors to refer patients seeking health
care against the former’s beliefs. Furthermore, the exemptions outlined in Sec. 5.24 of the
RHIRR violate equal protection with regards to public health officers’ religious beliefs. d. YES.
Sec. 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states that in case of spousal disagreement regarding
reproductive health procedures, the decision of the one undergoing them shall prevail. In
addition, Sec. 7 provides that, if a minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, she is
allowed access to family planning methods without parental consent.

These two sections clearly violate marital privacy and parental consent, which are
protected by Article XV of the Constitution. e. NO. Petitioners’ concern that Sec. 14 of the RH
Law violates academic freedom is premature, as the DECS has yet to formulate a reproductive
health education curriculum. In addition, Sec. 14 and Sec. 4(t), along with Rule 10, Sec. 11.01
of the RH-IRR, supplement the mandate of Sec. 12, Art. II of the Constitution. f. NO.

Petitioners contend that the RH Law is vague due to its failure to define “private health care
service provider” and “incorrect information”, as well as being unclear on the exemptions in Sec.
7. However, such terms are clearly defined, and the law makes it clear that regarding Sec. 7,
religious hospitals have the right to be exempt. g. NO. According to the petitioners, the RH Law
violates equal protection because it discriminates against the poor and exempts private
educational institutions. However, Sec. 7 actually prioritizes poor families with fertility issues,
pursuant to Sec. 11, Art. XIII of the Constitution.

The latter argument is grounded on the academic freedom enjoyed by such institutions.
h. NO. The RH Law does not force private health care service providers to provide services, but
only encourages them. In addition, they shall have the discretion as to the manner and time of
rendering such services. i. NO. The Court finds nothing wrong with Congress’s delegation of
authority to the FDA, as it is clear that the former intended for the public to be given safe, legal,
and non-abortifacient medicines. j. NO. Petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the
powers of LGUs under Sec. 17 of the Local Government Code. However, the said section
exempts nationally-funded projects, including the RH Law. Regarding the ARMM, R.A. No. 9054
does not abdicate legislation for general welfare. k. NO. The Court does not recognize natural
law as a legal basis, unless it has been transformed into a written law.

G.R. No. 148208             December 15, 2004

CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,

INC., petitioner,
vs.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondents.

FACTS:On 3 July 1993, RA 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old
Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP. On 8 June 2001, almost 8 years after
the effectivity of RA 7653, the Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a
petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to
restrain the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Executive Secretary from further implementing
the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of RA 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.

Article II, Section 15(c) of RA 7653 (Exercise of Authority) provides that: "In the exercise of its
authority, the Monetary Board shall ... (c) establish a human resource management system
which shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all
personnel. Such system shall aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the
Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of management.
 A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and
subject to the Board’s approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko
Sentral’s human resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall
make its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under
Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act]. Provided, however, That compensation and
wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in
accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758."

The Association alleges that the proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of
employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the
Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-andfile (Salary Grade [SG]
19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is
contended that this classification is “a classic case of class legislation,” allegedly not based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP
personnel’s position.

In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious,
and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner also stresses: (a) that
R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause, which will allow the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of the proviso in question without affecting the other provisions; and (b) the
urgency and propriety of the petition, as some 2,994 BSP rank-and-file employees have been
prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1) since
the inequitable proviso has no force and effect of law, respondents' implementation of such
amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course except through this petition for prohibition, which this
Court should take cognizance of, considering the transcendental importance of the legal issue
involved.

ISSUES: Whether or not the rank-and-file employees of the BSP are unduly discriminated upon
by exempting BSP officers (SG 20 and above) from the Salary Standardization Law thus
violates the equal protection of law clause.

HELD: No. It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent
the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules
shall operate - so long as the classification is not unreasonable. Congress is allowed a wide
leeway in providing for a valid classification. The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class. If the groupings
are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be
treated and regulated differently from another.

The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all
those belonging to the same class. The exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL
was intended to address the BSP’s lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent
officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file. If the end-
result did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between the officers and the rank-and-file in
terms of salaries and benefits, the discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not
palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense.

However, while RA 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislature’s power, the
enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of other Government
Financial Institutions (GFIs) leeched all validity out of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II
of RA 7653.

The concept of relative constitutionality- The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every

instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the
Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and
invalid in its application to another. A statute valid at one time may become void at another time
because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary
or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and
investigation in the light of changed conditions.

After the new BSP charter was enacted in 1993, Congress also undertook the amendment of
the charters of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP, with RA 7907 [1995]), Social Security
System (SSS, with RA 8282 [1997]), Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation
(SBGFC, with RA 8289 [1997]), Government Service Insurance System (GSIS, with RA 8291
[1997]), Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP, with RA 8523 , Home Guaranty
Corporation (HGC, with RA 8763 , and Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC, with RA
9302 [2004]). Thus, 11 years after the amendment of the BSP charter, the rank-and-file of 7
other GFIs were granted the exemption that was specifically denied to the rank-and-file of the
BSP. Even the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was granted the same blanket
exemption from the SSL in 2000. The prior view on the constitutionality of RA 7653 was
confined to an evaluation of its classification between the rank-and-file and the officers of the
BSP, found reasonable because there were substantial distinctions that made real differences
between the two classes.

The subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstance that

considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last proviso of Section
15(c), Article II of RA 7653, thereby exposing the proviso to more serious scrutiny. This time, the
scrutiny relates to the constitutionality of the classification - albeit made indirectly as a
consequence of the passage of eight other laws - between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the
seven other GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but must also apply equally to
all members of the class.

The proviso may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly
discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make unjust distinctions between persons
who are without differences. The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-andfile and the rank-
and-file of the other seven GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable badge of invidious
discrimination - no one can, with candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the
subsequent blanket and total exemption of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was
withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikes without any rational basis.

The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is
that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if
not identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall
within a class should be treated in the same fashion; whatever restrictions cast on some in the
group is equally binding on the rest.

In light of the lack of real and substantial distinctions that would justify the unequal treatment
between the rank-and-file of BSP from the seven other GFIs, it is clear that the enactment of the
seven subsequent charters has rendered the continued application of the challenged proviso
anathema to the equal protection of the law, and the same should be declared as an outlaw.
The two-tier analysis made in the case, and its conclusion of unconstitutionality by subsequent
operation, are in cadence and in consonance with the progressive trend of other jurisdictions
and in international law. There should be no hesitation in using the equal protection clause as a
major cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable irrational discrimination in our society. Indeed,
the social justice imperatives in the Constitution, coupled with the special status and protection
afforded to labor, compel this approach.

The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national
laws. The BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from the Supreme Court. They
represent the more impotent rank-and-file government employees who, unlike employees in the
private sector, have no specific right to organize as a collective bargaining unit and negotiate for
better terms and conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor
practices. Not only are they impotent as a labor unit, but their efficacy to lobby in Congress is
almost nil as RA 7653 effectively isolated them from the other GFI rank-and-file in
compensation. These BSP rank-and-file employees represent the politically powerless and they
should not be compelled to seek a political solution to their unequal and iniquitous treatment.
Indeed, they have waited for many years for the legislature to act. They cannot be asked to wait
some more for discrimination cannot be given any waiting time. Unless the equal protection
clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Court’s duty to save them from reasonless
discrimination.

Thus, the continued operation and implementation of the last proviso of Section 15(c),
Article II of Republic Act 7653 was declared unconstitutional.

SEARCH AND SEIZURES

A. PROBABLE CAUSE:

January 27, 2020 G.R. No. 210488

JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, PETITIONER, V. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN FIFTH DIVISION

AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

The OMB issued an Order designating a Panel of Investigators composed of the Ombudsman
personnel. They were mandated to investigate anomalies in the purchase of Light Operational Police
Helicopters by the Philippine National Police in 2009. In a Complaint, the Office of the Ombudsman charged
Arroyo, his brother Ignacio "Iggy" Arroyo (Iggy), Hilario De Vera (De Vera), and other officials of the
Philippine National Police with violation of several administrative and penal laws. The Ombudsman created a
Special Investigating Panel to conduct a preliminary investigation. Subsequently, the Special Investigating
Panel issued a Joint Resolution recommending the filing of criminal and administrative cases against Arroyo
and his coaccused. Arroyo and others were alleged to have conspired with several Philippine National Police
officers and personnel and other private persons in violating Section 3 of RA 3019. Arroyo filed for a Motion
for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause but was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause
against petitioner.

HELD: NO. At the preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman determines probable cause which merely
involves weighing of facts and circumstances and relying on common sense, without resorting to technical
rules of evidence.91 A preliminary investigation is simply an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not
there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held
responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, a finding of probable cause does not require an
inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.

A preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is only conducted to aid the prosecutor in
preparing the information. It is preparatory to a trial. An accused's right to a preliminary investigation is purely
statutory; it is not a right guaranteed by the Constitution. Even if there are alleged irregularities in an
investigation's conduct, this neither renders the information void nor impairs its validity. In this case, the
conduct of preliminary investigation is geared only to determine whether or not probable cause exists to hold
petitioner for trial. Considering the lower quantum of evidence required in preliminary investigations, this
Court does not find grave abuse of discretion in the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman.
Probable cause simply implies probability of guilt. It is based merely on opinion and reasonable belief.

The preliminary investigation is not the proper venue to rule on petitioner's guilt or innocence.
Probable cause is determined in a summary manner. Precisely, there is a trial to allow a full assessment of
petitioner's case. In this case, petitioner's arguments are matters of evidence which are better subjected to the
scrutiny of this Court after an extensive trial on the merits. Failing to demonstrate that the Sandiganbayan and
the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with their findings of
probable cause. Contrary to petitioner's claim, a review of the records of the case shows that the findings of the
Ombudsman, as affirmed by the Sandiganbayan, are neither tainted with malice nor are they mere speculations
and surmises. Conversely, the findings are sustained by evidence. Mere disagreement with the appreciation of
the evidence by the Ombudsman does not translate to jurisdictional error.