HERBERT SPENCER AND THE RELATION BETWEEN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LIBERTY

Author(s): Gary Doherty and Tim Gray

Source: History of Political Thought , Autumn 1993, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Autumn 1993), pp.
475-490
Published by: Imprint Academic Ltd.

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/26214409

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to History of Political
Thought

This content downloaded from

188.83.115.249 on Mon, 27 Sep 2021 19:46:54 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 HERBERT SPENCER AND THE RELATION BETWEEN
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LIBERTY

Gary Doherty and Tim Gray*

Introduction

Herbert Spencer's view of the relation between economic and political liberty
changes as he loses his early enthusiasm for universal suffrage, and seeks to
protect economic freedoms from majoritarianism. During his lifetime he was
much criticized for this volte-face over the vote, but two recent writers have
rightly shown that the change is not inconsistent with the main body of his
thought. Miller points out that Spencer does not abandon his commitment to
individual freedom, but only changes his mind on whether universal suffrage
promotes that end. 'He simply becomes convinced that extending the electorate
... will enlarge, not prevent growth of, the government control. '1 Wiltshire adds
a relativistic dimension to this explanation, stating that Spencer's later suffrage
restrictions 'stemmed from the two main sources of Spencerian theory; an
evolutionary imperative of the appropriateness of political institutions to na
tional character, and the individualist imperative which made reform condi
tional on the continued passivity of the state'.2
In our analysis of Spencer's about-turn on the suffrage, we wish to elaborate
and supplement the accounts presented by Miller and Wiltshire, by showing
how Spencer's later views reflect not only his individualism and his relativism,
but also his conceptualizations of politics and liberty, and his dynamic theory
of history. It should be noted that our article is not a historical explanation of
why Spencer changed his mind, but an analytical study of the relationship
between economic and political freedom in Spencer's writings.
Liberals such as Spencer generally endorse economic liberty, but they are
divided on the issue of political liberty (by which we mean possession of the
franchise). Until the nineteenth century, the question of political liberty does
not figure much on the agenda of most liberals, but with the coming of electoral
reform it becomes a central preoccupation for them. They have to face the

The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful comments they received from Mark Bevir
and Shaun Breslin on an earlier draft of this article.

W.L. Miller, 'Herbert Spencer's Drift to Conservatism', History of Political Thought, III
(1982), p. 497.

2 D. Wiltshire, The Social and Political Thought of Herbert Spencer (Oxford, 1978),
p. 111.

HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT. Vol. XIV. No. 3. Autumn 1993

This content downloaded from

188.83.115.249 on Mon, 27 Sep 2021 19:46:54 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
476 G. DOHERTY AND T. GRAY

difficulty that political liberty might come into con

since, for example, newly enfranchised electors m
are opposed to a free economy.
Several liberal responses could be made to dea
conceptual response could simply deny the poss
economic and political liberty, on grounds that lib
economic and political liberty presuppose each
voters cannot use their political liberty to exting
without undermining democracy itself, since by d
respect for economic rights.
A moral response could accept the possibility of
and political liberty, but to make clear which of th
either generally or in particular cases — and ther
other if and when they collide.
A historical response could introduce a dynamic e
by arguing that economic and political liberty only
are prematurely juxtaposed. When, however, one of
can lay down the groundwork for the other to fol
can co-exist harmoniously side by side.
In Spencer's theory, we can find each of these thr
that economic and political liberty are simulta
principle of equal freedom, so they cannot conflict
conflict between them, political liberty is to be sa
since political liberty is essentially a means to the
liberties; third, that economic liberty historically p
for political liberty.
In examining these three Spencerian responses, w
partially retracts the first response as the concep
economic and political liberty become clear to him
response is the second one, in which he argues that
prior to political liberty and has to be protected fro
third response, in which he argues that economic
prior to political liberty and is a necessary trainin
participation.
Let us begin our account of Spencer's views with
his responses.

(1) Political Liberty as Conceptually Coincident

This response to the question of the relation betw

liberty entails that freedom cannot be disaggregat
but is all of a piece. On this view, economic and p
supportive; indeed, they depend upon each other.

This content downloaded from

188.83.115.249 on Mon, 27 Sep 2021 19:46:54 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 SPENCER AND ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 477

view, which he enunciates mainly in Social Statics, the two forms of liberty a
held to coincide because each of them is a separate deduction from 'the law o
equal freedom'. Spencer's law of equal freedom is the touchstone of justice;
lays down that 'every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculti
compatible with the possession of like liberty by every other man'.3 The bas
of this law is a matter of some controversy, but its centrality to Spencer's theor
is not in doubt; every moral issue in politics is decided by reference to the la
of equal freedom. Hence Spencer derives the rights of life and personal libert
from the law, together with the right to the use of the earth, the right of property
and the right of exchange.4 In exercising any of these rights, no one is assumin
more freedom than they leave to others. Clearly, then, Spencer sees economi
liberty as entailed by the law of equal freedom.
What of political liberty? In Social Statics Spencer is equally emphatic abou
the derivation of universal suffrage from the law of equal freedom. Voting, like
anv other activitv. is an exercise of the faculties, and as such it must be
guaranteed to everyone on equal terms. Of the several conclusions deducible
from the law of equal freedom there are few more manifest or more generally
agreed to than this, that all members of a community have like claims to
political power.'5 No one has an innate right to command other people, 'for
whoso commands, manifestly claims more freedom than whoso is com
manded'.6 The highest form of government is that which confers 'equal privi
leges'7 and in which 'all men are represented'.8 Moreover, 'men' is a generic
term which includes both sexes. 'Equity knows no difference of sex . . . The
law of equal freedom manifestly applies to the whole race — female as well as
male ... the rights of women are equal with those of men ... the political
privileges exercised by men must thereby be ceded to women also.'9
Since both economic and political liberty are derivatives from the basic
principle of justice, they must be consistent with one another. Indeed, so
emphatic is Spencer's claim that democracy is consistent with other liberties,
that he defines it in terms of the law of equal freedom. Ά democracy, properly
so called, is a political organisation modelled in accordance with the law of
equal freedom.'10 The distinctive characteristic of democracy is that of all

3 H. Spencer, Social Statics (London, 1851), p. 78.

4 Ibid., pp. 112-47.

5 Ibid., p. 217.

6 Ibid., p. 164.

7 Ibid., p. 217.

8 Ibid., p. 248.

9 Ibid., pp. 155, 156, 169.

10 Ibid., p. 237.

This content downloaded from

188.83.115.249 on Mon, 27 Sep 2021 19:46:54 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 478 G. DOHERTY AND T. GRAY

forms of government, it interferes least. 'The p

contrasted with the monarchical, is professedly
upon the individual. In speaking of it we use such t
liberty, self-government, all implying this.'11 Pr
tions, says Spencer, entails 'less government. Co
Political freedom means this. Democracy means t
is one who cherishes freedom for its intrinsic
democratic feeling loves liberty as a miser loves
irrespective of its advantages.'13 So by definitio
approve laws which diminish economic freedom
ment can be deemed democratic; democracy is de
(elections by universal suffrage), but also by its
law of equal freedom).
In Social Statics, Spencer supplements these
behavioural claim denvine that, if enfranchised, the working class would
trample on the economic freedoms of the upper class. He claims that the
working class is too scattered and heterogeneous to vote in concert, 'for half a
dozen millions of working men, distributed over a vast area, engaged in various
occupations, belonging to different religious sects, and divided into two totally
distinct bodies [urban and rural]. .. for these to act with unanimity is scarcely
possible'.14 Moreover, even if class legislation is inevitable, a greater amount
of freedom will be secured under working-class legislation than under upper
class legislation. Indeed, says Spencer, 'the merit of the democratic form of
government consists solely in this, that it trespasses against the smallest
number'.15
The fact is, Spencer argues, representative government is the best for enfor
cing the law of equal freedom. 'Abundant evidence shows that the maintenance
of equitable relations among its subjects, which forms the essential business of
a ruling power, is surest when the ruling power is of popular origin . . . For
discharging the true function of a government, representative government is
shown to be the best, alike by its origin, its theory, and its results.'16 In its
origin, representative government arose to check the power of royal despotism;
in its theory, it is the best guarantor of the general welfare; and in its results, the
'proofs are undeniable' that it has served to bring about 'more equitable

11 Ibid., pp. 240-1.

12 Ibid., p. 13.

13 Ibid., p. 242.

14 Ibid., pp. 221-2.

15 Ibid., p. 210.

16 H. Spencer, Essays: Scientific, Political and Speculative, III (London, 1901), p. 317.

This content downloaded from

188.83.115.249 on Mon, 27 Sep 2021 19:46:54 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 SPENCER AND ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 479

arrangements'. Hence, says Spencer, 'It is clear, both a priori and a posteriori,
that representative government is especially adapted for the establishment and
maintenance of just laws.'17
Spencer claims that the evidence also shows that economic and politica
««freedom are always to be found together: 'there has been a constant ratio kep
between the stringency of mercantile restraints and the stringency of other
restraints'.18 For example, Spencer refers to the situation in France, where
'intolerable restraints once borne by the manufacturing classes of France wer
cotemporary [sic] with intense despotism at court'.19 This is true of countrie
throughout Europe, where 'the oppressiveness of a nation's mercantile laws
varies as the oppressiveness of its general arrangements and government'.20
Spencer also claims that the ending of economic and political unfreedom
always takes place simultaneously: 'coerciveness of regulation declines politi
cally, ecclesiastically, and industrially at the same time'.21
So Spencer's first response is an unequivocal endorsement of the view that
cluiiuuiu. duu μυηιιι^αι iiLicny aie 5υ îiicAuicauiy miKcu lugeuier uiaL wnerever
the one exists, the other must always accompany it. Indeed, they are virtually
synonymous.
Subsequently, however, Spencer rejects universal suffrage as he becomes
much less sanguine about the practical compatibility of economic and political
liberty and much more aware of the need to protect the former from the latter.
Nevertheless, it can be argued that he retains his conceptual link between
economic and political liberty, in that a premature increase in the franchise,
leading to over-legislation (loss of economic liberty), can be interpreted as also
a move away from democracy, properly so-called — i.e. democracy defined in
functional terms as embodying respect for individual rights. Moreover, insofar
as Spencer substantively changes his mind, we will argue that this change is not
a renunciation, but a reflection, of deep-seated values in his philosophy,
compounded by insights yielded by his unfolding theory of history.

(2) Political Liberty as Morally Subordinate to Economic Liberty

Spencer's second response expresses his growing anxiety about the vulnerabil
ity of economic liberty. He rejects his earlier view that political liberty is a right,
like that of economic liberty, directly deduced from the law of equal freedom,
and although he still defines democracy in functional terms of 'less govern

17 Ibid., p. 320.

18 Spencer, Statics, p. 298.

19 Ibid., p. 299.
20 Ibid.

21· H. Spencer, Principles of Sociology, III (London, 1896), p. 525.

This content downloaded from

188.83.115.249 on Mon, 27 Sep 2021 19:46:54 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
480 G. DOHERTY AND T. GRAY

ment' as well as in structural terms of universal fra

his earlier days he had been naive about the way d
practice.22 He now argues that political liberty is onl
upon the use to which it is put, and that if the fra
other liberties (principally economic liberties), then
it is used by voters to violate other liberties, it is il
are morally prior to political claims. Moreover, sin
loves liberty 'as a miser loves gold', people who vote
economic rights are not genuine democrats.
Strictly speaking, political 'liberty' is not liberty
argues that the act of voting is not a fundamental e
in the way that genuine liberties are.

The giving of a vote, considered in itself, in no w

life, as does the exercise of those various liberties w
All we can say is that the possession of the franchi
the citizens in general powers of checking trespa
powers which they may or may not use to good p

Hence in assessing someone's level of freedom, no a

their political liberty in itself·, the liberty which
measured, not by the nature of the governmental
whether representative or not, but by the relative
imposes on him'.24 Accordingly, a people who freely
thereby resign their freedom. 'If men use their lib
surrender their liberty, are they thereafter any th
plebiscite elect a man despot over them, do they
despotism was of their own making?'25
The fundamental objective is freedom from govern
a secondary issue:

to me the limitation of the functions of the S

questions, in comparison with which all other
trivial ... to me electoral changes and other c
government are of interest mainly as they p
freer ... by the removal of... injustices.26

22 D. Duncan, The Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer (Lo

23 H. Spencer, Principles of Ethics, II (London, 1900), p. 17

24 H. Spencer, Social Statics, Abridged and Revised; togeth

State (London, 1892), p. 293.

25 Ibid., p. 291.
26 Duncan, The Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer, p. 139

This content downloaded from

188.83.115.249 on Mon, 27 Sep 2021 19:46:54 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 SPENCER AND ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 481

So political 'liberty' is of purely instrumental value; it has no intrinsic mora

worth:

the acquirement of so-called political rights is by no means equivalent to

the acquirement of rights properly so called. The one is but an instrumen
tality for the obtainment and maintenance of the other; and it may or may
not be used to achieve those ends.27

Political liberty is thus parasitic on other liberties for its justification. The
crucial issue is the practical one of whether the vote promotes or retards th
exercise of other (real) liberties.28

The greatest attainable amount of individual liberty being the true end;
and the diffusion of political power being regarded mainly as a means to
this end; the real question when considering further extensions of the
franchise, is... whether men will be severally freer than before to pursue
the objects of life in their own way?29

inese statements retiect Spencer's deep aversion to the idea of unlimited

authority. No amount of democratic participation can legitimate it:

these multitudinous restraining acts are not defensible on the ground that
they proceed from a popularly-chosen body; for . . . the authority of a
popularly-chosen body is no more to be regarded as an unlimited authority
than the authority of a monarch.30

Spencer denounces majoritarianism — the idea that the majority has unlimit
authority to determine what are the rights of the individual — as simply a ne
kind of despotism. 'It merely modifies "divine right of kings" into divine righ
of governments. It is despotism democratised.'31 Belief in the divinity
parliament has become the 'great political superstition of the present'.32 Th
truth is, says Spencer, that 'there is a law to which the popular voice must
defer ... the law of pure equity — the law of equal freedom.'33 The people
cannot use their political power to authorize a breach of rights, since 'rights a

27 Ethics, p. 180.
90
Spencer, Statics, Abridged, p. 290.

29 Spencer, Essays, p. 382.

30 Spencer, Statics, Abridged, p. 292.

31 Spencer, Statics, p. 200.

32 Spencer, Statics, Abridged, p. 369.

33 Spencer, Statics, p. 210.

This content downloaded from

188.83.115.249 on Mon, 27 Sep 2021 19:46:54 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 482 G. DOHERTY AND T. GRAY

the be-all and end-all of government; and rank

means'.34
Spencer's critique of political liberty takes on a more behavioural form in his
1857 article 'Representative Government — What is it Good For?', where he
questions the basis of some of the electoral assumptions of advocates of
representative government — including himself in Social Statics. The principle
of representative government is that, since the people have an interest in good
government, if they are given the vote they will choose 'the wisest and best men
for governors'.35 But in practice, many electors have neither the will nor the
ability to cast a valuable vote. Some of them pride themselves on keeping out
of politics, not meddling in things that they say do not concern them; others
vote in accordance with the wishes of their patrons; yet others succumb to
bribery. Hence:

Those who adequately recognise the importance of honestly exercising

tious votes, form but a minority; and the election usually hangs less upon
their wills than upon the illegitimate influences which sway the rest. Here,
therefore, the theory fails.36

Moreover, there is little evidence of intelligence amongst the electors. 'Even

among the higher order of electors', Spencer says, there is 'gross political
ignorance', while 'in the lower and larger class' there is 'almost hopeless
stupidity'.37
Spencer further argues that there is a direct link between the incompetence
of the electorate and over-legislation — i.e. the enactment of legislation which
violates the law of equal freedom. Elected politicians are perpetually exposed
to the pressures of re-election, and this leads them all too readily to solicit
popular support by promises of further governmental expenditure. This is
especially visible at the level of local government.38 It is also evident at the
national level. 'Every candidate for Parliament is prompted to propose or
support some new piece of ad captandum legislation ... Each seeks popularity
by promising more than his opponent has promised.'39
Spencer adds another behavioural argument against the extension of the
franchise — the authoritarian economic mentality of the working classes. He

34 Ibid., p. 205.
35
Spencer, Essays, p. 292.

36 Ibid., p. 293.
37 Ibid.

38 Ibid., pp. 290-1.

39 Spencer, Statics, Abridged, p. 312.

This content downloaded from

188.83.115.249 on Mon, 27 Sep 2021 19:46:54 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 SPENCER AND ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 483

concedes that increased working-class participation in politics could be

ficial in some respects; e.g. it could help to get rid of inequitabl
legislation and discriminatory religious laws. But these gains would be
than outweighed by the expected losses of liberty resulting from the lu
economic prejudices that are built deep into the psyche of the average w
man.

There is among them a prevailing enmity towards capitalists. The f

that machinery acts to their damage, is still widespread... And they
a wish, not only to dictate how long per day men shall work, but to re
all the relations between employers and employed.40

It is this element of economic authoritarianism that is particularly distu

Spencer, and he explains it in terms of tyrannical trade union practi
the workers.

Mpn u/lin rpnrlpr nn tliPir nritrofp liKartioc tn tVia mlarr

unions, seem scarcely independent enough rightly to exerc

liberties. Those who so ill understand the nature of freedom,
that any man or body of men has a right to prevent employer a
from making any contract they please, would almost appea
pacitated for the guardianship of their own freedom and th
fellow-citizens .. . when their sense of justice is so obtuse th
ready to bully, to deprive of work, to starve, and even to kill,
their own class who... assert their rights to sell their labour a
and to such persons as they think fit... we may well pause be
them the franchise.41

Even more tellingly, Spencer points out that trade unions the
democratic structure, yet this has not prevented them engaging
economic practices:

if there needs a demonstration that representative equality

ficient safeguard for freedom, we have it in the trades'-unio
referred to; which, purely democratic as are their organisa
exercise over their members a tyranny almost Neapolitan in its
unscrunulousness 42

Clearly, then, in his second response Spencer rejects his earl

view of the automatic compatibility of economic and polit
downgrades political liberty from the level of a basic right to

40 Spencer, Essays,
JOZ. p.
41 Ibid., pp. 365-6.

42 Ibid., p. 382.

This content downloaded from

188.83.115.249 on Mon, 27 Sep 2021 19:46:54 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
484 G. DOHERTY AND T. GRAY

conditional claim which is devoid of intrinsic w

justification upon the use to which it is put in p
increasingly fears the damaging effects that ma
the economy, and insists that the sole function o
individual rights — must be strenuously defende
voters for 'over- legislation'. Economic liberty is
worth to political liberty, but morally superior to
However, this second response only represen
change of principle, on Spencer's part. Indeed, it
in Spencer's theory — his understanding of pol
of liberty. The first root — Spencer's understan
his view that politics is an activity that is essent
unlike Aristotle, politics is not an integral comp
contrary, he thinks that in an ideal world, the g
without government, and therefore without poli
a necessary evil, politics, which is the handmaide
mode of conducting affairs. Moreover, politics f
in which the best means of enforcing the law of
There is no need for deep debates about fundam
not negotiable: onlv the means are to be discussed. In short, nolitics is little

more than administration — how to manage the creation and maintenance of

the industrial type of society (i.e. the society which is based on the law of equal
freedom). Hence Spencer's priority of economic over political liberty reflects
the low esteem in which he holds the activity of politics. Ideally, we can do
without politics, but not without economics.
This brings us to the second root of the second response — Spencer's
fundamental understanding of the concept of freedom as absence of restraint,
not self-determination. A free society is one where governmental power is
limited; not where it is in the hands of the people. Spencer does not have a
theory of human autonomy which states that people are free only if they
determine their own destiny. The nearest he approaches such a view is in Social
Statics, where he writes that 'the democratic theory... is, that the people ought
not to ho snhieet to the. will of one hut should fulfil their own wills' 43 Rut this

statement contains no reference to liberty. In Spencer's view, provided people

are let alone, they are free. Hence for him, citizens are freer under an élitist
political system that does not interfere with the free market, than under a
democratic political system that does interfere with the free market. Spencer's
position is typically that of a classical liberal; by contrast to that of a social or
new liberal such as Hobhouse, who adopts a conception of freedom which
embraces self-determination, arguing that unless people have the vote, they are
denied human dignity. Spencer never enunciates this self-determination con

43 Spencer, Statics, p. 428.

This content downloaded from

188.83.115.249 on Mon, 27 Sep 2021 19:46:54 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 SPENCER AND ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 485

ception of freedom; even when he justifies democracy, it is a justification

invariably rests upon an assumed link between popular representation an
limitation of governmental powers. In other words, Spencer always adhe
the view of freedom as absence of restraint.
Hence Spencer's retraction of his earlier endorsement of political liber
reconcilable with his fundamental conceptions of politics and freedom
earlier position assumes that economic and political liberty are simultan
compatible, and that there is no need to prioritize them. Later he sees tha
are not necessarily compatible, and that he is forced to choose between
His prioritizing of economic over political liberty is consistent with his
standing of both politics and freedom, in that it reflects his low valuation
activity of politics, and his preference for the conception of freedom as
of restraint, rather than self-determination.
We come to a similar conclusion in the next section, where we show
Spencer's rejection of his earlier idea of the simultaneous attainment o
nomic and political liberty is not an abandonment of principle, but a recogn
of historical necessity.

(3) Political Liberty as a Consequence of Economic Liberty

In his third response, Spencer relinquishes the simplistic view expressed

first response that economic and political liberty are achieved simultane
He now states that political liberty, if and when it does arrive, is something
can only be consequential upon the prior attainment of economic liberty
argument is that we will not be able to have political liberty until the g
work has been laid by long experience of economic liberty. In other word
direction that progress takes is necessarily from economic to political lib
Spencer enunciates this argument in his Principles of Sociology, whe
traces the origin of representative bodies to the development of commerc
is partly for the physical reason that commerce brings people togethe
precondition of politics: 'here we are brought back to the truth which can
too much insisted upon, that growth of popular power is in all ways ass
with trading activities. For only by trading activities can many people
brought to live in close contact.'44 It is also because the experience of tr
generates a conception of justice, and this is another precondition of pol
'the form of cooperation distinctive of the industrial state thus arising, f
the feelings and thoughts appropriate to political power. In daily usage th
a balancing of claims; and the idea of equity is, generation after gener
made more definite.'45

44
H. Spencer, Principles of Sociology, II (London, 1882), p. 421.
45 Ibid., p. 422.

This content downloaded from

188.83.115.249 on Mon, 27 Sep 2021 19:46:54 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 486 G. DOHERTY AND T. GRAY

In other words, there is a process of political so

the operation of the free market; the moral sen
their economic transactions, since they develop
independence, personal responsibility, financial
merit. By contrast, the command economy encou
a lack of personal responsibility, deference tow
status — none of which equips people for politi
So economic development, which entails the ex
precedes and brings about political development

dissolving in various ways the old relation of st

new relation of contract . . . progressing indu
masses of people who by their circumstances
discipline prompted, to modify the political org
has bequeathed.46

Accordingly, Spencer rejects the conventional

arises out of power struggles between élites who
each other. Where such situations arise, says Sp
underlying economic causes:
it is an error to reeard occurrences of these kinds as causes of nonular

power. They are to be regarded rather as the conditions under which the
causes take effect. These incidental weakenings of pre-existing institu
tions, do but furnish opportunities for the action of the pent-up force
which is ready to work political changes.47

For instance, contrary to received opinion, Spencer claims that Athenian demo
cracy did not originate in dissension among political factions; 'it was the
growing industrial power which then produced, and thereafter preserved, the
democratic organisation'.48 Similarly with the origin of popular power in
England; the summoning of Parliament in 1265 was no doubt a significant
move in the power struggle between king and barons, but Parliament would not
have flourished unless the groundwork had already been laid by the 'aug
mented mass, and hence augmented influence, of the free industrial communi
ties'.49
This account of the economic basis of political change is confirmed, says
Spencer, by the fact that popular power is not sustained unless industrial
development continues.

46 Ibid., p. 423. 48 Ibid., pp. 424-5.

47 Ibid. 49 Ibid., p. 426.

This content downloaded from

188.83.115.249 on Mon, 27 Sep 2021 19:46:54 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 SPENCER AND ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 487

Confirmation is supplied by cases showing that power gained by the

people during times when the regal and aristocratic powers are diminishe
by dissension, is lost again if, while the old organisation recovers its
stability and activity, industrial growth does not make proportionate
progress.50

Hence, if there is a relapse towards militancy — e.g. because of war-mongering

abroad or feuds at home — the extension of popular power is suspended. The
absence of such a relapse in England is the reason why the representative
principle has flourished here.51
In short, the modem democratic state owes its existence essentially to
economic growth:

the increase of a free industrial population was its fundamental cause...

it is the increasing mass of those who carry on life by voluntary coopera
tion instead of compulsory cooperation — partly the rural class of small
freeholders and still more the urban class of traders — which initiates
popular representation.52

This Spencerian historical analysis unexpectedly resembles that of Marx, in

explaining the way that the bourgeoisie gradually wrests control of the political
system from the hands of the feudal aristocracy.

Thus at first of little account, and growing in power only because the free
portion of the community occupied in production and distribution grew
in mass and importance, so that its petitions, treated with increasing
respect and more frequently yielded to, began to originate legislation, the
representative body came to be that part of the governing agency which
more and more expresses the sentiments and ideas of industrialism. While
the monarch and the upper house are the products of that ancient regime
of compulsory cooperation the spirit of which they still manifest, though
in decreasing degrees, the lower house is the product of that modern
regime of voluntary cooperation which is replacing it; and in an increasing
degree, this lower house carries out the wishes of people habituated to a
daily life regulated by contract instead of by status.53

In this third response to the issue of the relation between economic and
political liberty, therefore, Spencer argues that the two forms of liberty do not
arise simultaneously, but sequentially. Economic liberty is the pathbreaker
which, once securely attained, provides the necessary conditions for the
achievement of sustainable democracy. Without economic liberty, democracy
can neither arise nor survive. The free market is a precondition of political

50 Ibid. 52 Ibid., pp. 436-7.

51 Ibid., p. 429. 53 Ibid., p. 439.

This content downloaded from

188.83.115.249 on Mon, 27 Sep 2021 19:46:54 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 η muPDTV δκγγ» τ γ,ώ λ ν

freedom; economic liberty is necessary to develo

moral infrastructure that democratic institutions d
One implication of this response is that unless
experience of economic liberty in a society, its
oping democratic institutions are slight. Prematu
is not only futile, but also risky, since it will almos
economic liberty already exists, thereby killing t
eggs. The greater the extent of experience of econ
better its chances of developing democratic inst
will have internalized the norms of equitable treat
democratic polity.
However, this raises the question of how mu
liberty is necessary before political liberty beco
answer to this question is that it depends upon th
as a whole are engaged in free economic activity.
economic freedom does not have to be at its maxim
be extended. Indeed, he points out that political
stances lead to increased economic liberty —
Reform Act: 'has not that extension of our own
the Reform-Bill, brought about more equitable ar
repeal of the Corn-Laws'.54 But he insists that t
through the prior experience of economic lib
develop the necessary spirit of equity unless the
to market forces. This is why Spencer at one poin
be restricted to those people who pay taxes —
political life of the discipline of the market place
the consequences of their own actions. He argues
ought to be made more direct as fast as popular
criticizes Lord John Russell's proposal to abolish
as a retrograde step, since it would diminish 'the
of the costs of public administration'.55
luck. οι economic experience is aiso uie main ieason ueninu opened s
subsequent exclusion of women from the franchise. In Principles of Et
recants the doctrine of sexual equality enunciated in Social Statics, argu
women should not be given the vote, because as a result of their role
family rather than in the economy, their judgments are determined m
men's by considerations of need — 'love of the helpless' — rather
considerations of entitlement — 'the principle that each shall receive t
and evil results of his own conduct'.56 (Spencer also argues, incongruou

54 Spencer, Essays, p. 320.

55 Ibid., p. 385. 56 Spencer, Ethics, p. 196.

This content downloaded from

188.83.115.249 on Mon, 27 Sep 2021 19:46:54 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 SPENCER AND ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 489

since women do not serve in the armed forces, they are not entitled to the same
political rights as men 'until there is reached a state of permanent peace'57 —
implying that military service does not, after all, produce political incom
petents.)
However, these arguments do pose a difficulty for Spencer. They imply that
a prerequisite for democracy is extensive exposure to the rigours of market
forces on the part of the majority of the population. Democracy will only be
'safe' when most people have developed the sense of justice that contractual
dealings alone can establish in their minds. But many groups in society may
never be exposed to such enlightening influences unless the government steps
in to assist them. For instance, until there is adequate educational provision for
all, it is unlikely that severely disadvantaged groups in society will ever enter
into meaningful contractual relationships. Similarly with the position of
women; unless the structure of family life in society is radically changed, it is
unlikely that the majority of women would experience the beneficial effect of
the discipline of the market. But neither the extension of educational provision
to all, nor the restructuring of family life are likely to come about through the
operation of the free market itself. It may be necessary, therefore, for Spencer
to contemplate political intervention in the economic system in order to provide
the conditions necessary for everyone to experience its salutary training in
equity. Popular capitalism may demand active encouragement, not passive
neutrality, on the part of government. Unless such governmental intervention
in the economy takes place, democracy may remain beyond reach.
Moreover, the market may be directly inimical to democracy by discouraging
institutions such as trade unions, cooperative societies, professional associa
tions and local authorities, thereby depriving people of the experience of
collective endeavours which could prepare them for political participation. It
may prove necessary for the state to grant such institutions special immunities
from prosecution for market impediments, in order to harness the repre
sentative experience which thev nurture.
Since, however, Spencer forbids governmental interference with education
and the family, and pours scorn on trade unionism and local government for
their production of false political principles, the implication is that his market
system could continue indefinitely without leading to democracy. Although
Spencer's goal always remains that of a society in which there is both economic
and political liberty, there is nothing in his theory that makes the process of
reaching democracy certain. Indeed, élitist governments might be permanently
required in order to protect the free market from majoritarian hijacking, and a
condition of economic liberty without political liberty could theoretically last
for ever. Although Spencer claims that economic development has in the past
led to political development, he does not show how this process is inevitable.

57 Ibid., p. 166.

This content downloaded from

188.83.115.249 on Mon, 27 Sep 2021 19:46:54 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
490 G. DOHERTY AND T. GRAY

What he shows is that when political liberty ap

experience of economic liberty — not that when
political liberty will inevitably follow. Whether i
extent to which the free market generates more
the minds of its participants. In Spencer's theor
necessary condition of political liberty, but it i
Unlike Marx's historical materialism, Spencer's th
causal thrust.

Conclusion

Our conclusion is that Spencer's change of mind over the franchise is not a
renunciation of principle, but a reflection of his twin beliefs in the parasitic
nature of politics, and the conception of freedom as absence of restraint,
together with his increasing preoccupation with the forces of historical deter
minism. Moreover, although his explanation of the way in which the market
economy provides the conditions under which democracy can become practi
cable leaves some questions unanswered, it does provide us with an answer to
a difficult question. It accounts for the contemporary failure of the free market
to deliver true democracy, since the free market has evidently become cor
rupted, and thereby unable to generate more equity than authoritarianism,
because of the premature extension of the suffrage. Had the franchise been
withheld long enough for the population as a whole to become socialized by
the market, then, Spencer seems to be saying, democracy (in both its senses,
structural and functional) would have been achieved.
Is there any enduring significance in Spencer's change of mind? We believe
there is one useful lesson which can be drawn from Spencer's reflections —
that the granting of political liberty in advance of a process of socialization may
well prove disastrous for both economic and political liberty. Whether or not
the market in itself can provide the necessary socialization is, however, another
question.

Gary Doherty and Tim Gray UNIVERSITY OF

NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE

This content downloaded from

188.83.115.249 on Mon, 27 Sep 2021 19:46:54 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms