Is Spencer's Theory an Evolutionary Theory?

Author(s): Valerie A. Haines

Reviewed work(s):
Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 93, No. 5 (Mar., 1988), pp. 1200-1223
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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Is Spencer's Theory an Evolutionary
Theory?'
ValerieA. Haines
UniversityofCalgary

The explanatoryformof Spencer'stheoryof social evolutionhas

been persistentlymisunderstood in the sociologicalliterature.This
paper challengesthe conventionalinterpretation thatSpencerpro-
posed a theoryofimmanentchangeto establishthathis is an evolu-
tionarytheoryin the modernbiologicalsense. Proponentsof the
immanenceinterpretation havefailedtograsptherolethatLamarck-
ian and von Baerian modelsof changeplay in Spencer'stheoriesof
organicand superorganic evolution.Theircase againstSpencerand
evolutionarytheorymore generallyattacks a model of change
Spencerhad alreadyrejected.Instead of providingsupportforthe
standardsociologicaldefinitionof evolutionand its corollary,the
argumentfor deconstruction,Spencer's theoryof social change
pointsto the need fora fundamentalrethinking of thetermsof the
debate over evolutionarytheoryin sociology.

HerbertSpencerwas themostimportant19th-century socialevolutionist.

His influenceon the developmentof sociologyis widelyacknowledged,
yethe remainsrelativelyunstudied.In lightoftherevivalofevolutionary
theoryin sociology,this neglectmade furtherexegesisof Spencerseem
naturaland necessary.New interpretations flourished,witheach claim-
ingto set therecordstraight.In thispaper,I pose two questions:Has the
recordbeen set straight?and, Does it matter?
Both questionscan be best approachedthrougha criticalanalysisand
reinterpretationof Spencer'stheoryofsocial evolution.If, as theconven-
tionalsociologicalview suggests,Spencerproposeda theoryofimmanent
change,thenhis theoryis indeedirremediably flawed,and itsimportance
as a theoryof social change ends with its value for the historianof
sociology.But ifSpencer'sis an evolutionarytheoryin themodernbiolog-

I I wouldliketo thankCraigCalhoun,Anthony Giddens,and PeterV. Marsdenfor

comments on an earlierversionofthispaper.The researchwas supportedbya Social
Sciencesand HumanitiesResearchCouncilof Canada postdoctoral and a
fellowship
universityfellowshipfromtheUniversity ofCalgary.Requestsforreprintsshouldbe
sentto ValerieA. Haines,Department of Sociology,University
ofCalgary,Alberta,
Canada T2N 1N4.
? 1988by The University
of Chicago.All rightsreserved.
0002-9602/88/9305-0007$01.50

1200 AJS Volume 93 Number5 (March 1988): 1200-1223

 Spencer

ical sense of the term"evolution,"then,insteadof supportingthe case

againstevolutionary theoryin sociology,itbecomesan important pointof
departurefor rethinkingthis approach to the studyof social change.
Whetherthe recordhas been set straightand whetherit matters,then,
bothdepend on the explanatoryformof Spencer'stheory.
In contemporary biology,theimmanence(development)/evolution con-
trastidentifies
twocontradictory modelsofchange.The development model
describesa processof immanentchange.Biologicaldevelopment is an un-
foldingof preexistingpotentialsinherentin an individualorganismat
the time it begins life. In this model of change, environmental factors
can onlyaccelerate,retard,or preventtheunfoldingofpreexisting poten-
tials. They cannotcreatenew potentials.
Biologicalevolution,in contrast,is a creativeprocess.New potentials
are created eitherthroughthe inheritanceof environmentally induced
modifications (Lamarckism)or throughthe environmental selectionof
randomvariation(naturalselection).Environmental contingency, histor-
ical specificity,and probabilismare hallmarksoftheevolutionary model.
In sociology,the immanence/evolution contrastis blurred.Spencer's
theoryofsocial evolutionmustbe rejected,theargumentgoes,becauseit
is a theoryof immanentchange. Because an "immanent-evolutionary"
theoryis a contradiction in terms,eitherSpencer'stheoryis notan evolu-
tionarytheoryor his criticshave misconstrued itsexplanatoryform.Pre-
sentedwithmyuse oftheconceptsofimmanentchangeand evolutionary
change,proponentsof theconventionalview ofSpencerwould adopt the
firstalternative.For them,Spencerianevolutionismis a theoryofimma-
nentchange.
There are two variations on the immanenceinterpretation in the
sociologicalliterature:a biologicaland a nonbiologicalvariation.Propo-
nents of the biological variation argue that the explanatoryformof
Spencer's theoryof social change followslogicallyfromits biological
foundation.For them,Spencer'ssourceanalogyis eitherthevon Baerian
modelofdevelopment(see Nisbet 1969)or theLamarckianassumptionof
an inherentdrivetowardperfection (see Hirst 1976).
Proponentsof the nonbiologicalvariationrejectthisargumentforthe
structuringrole of Spencer's biology. They argue that the core of
Spencer'ssystemof syntheticphilosophyis his firstprinciplesand their
deduction,the generallaw of evolution.What distinguishes theirinter-
pretationsfromone anotheris whetherSpencer'sfirstprinciplesare held
to be derivedfrommetaphysics or fromphysics.The mostwidelycitedof
theseinterpretations belongsto thefirstgroup.This is Peel's (1969, 1971)
argumentthat Spencer's is a theoryof immanentchange because its
mechanismis a metaphysicalprinciple:thepersistence offorce.The most
recentvariationon theimmanenceinterpretation, Turner's(1985)dialect-

1201
AmericanJournalof Sociology

ical interpretation
of Spencer'stheoryof social change, belongsto the
second group.
In thediscussionthatfollows,I builda case againstbothvariationson
theimmanenceinterpretation, first,by developingan evolutionaryinter-
pretationofSpencer'stheoryofsocial changeand, then,by showingwhy
proponentsof the immanenceinterpretation misconstrueits explanatory
form.I conclude by investigatingthe implicationsof the evolutionary
forthe case againstevolutionarytheoryin sociology.
interpretation

ULTIMATE-CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS: THE GENERAL LAW OF

EVOLUTION
As a systemphilosopher,Spencerwished "to framea coherent,logical,
necessarysystemof generalideas in termsof whicheveryelementof our
experiencecan be interpreted" (Whitehead,quoted in Medawar 1967,p.
39). These generalideas are Spencer'sfirstprinciplesand theirdeduction,
the generallaw of evolution.
The most importantfirstprincipleis the persistenceof force.This
"truthby derivationfrom which all other truthsare to be proved"
(Spencer[1862] 1911,p. 433)2restatedthelaw ofconservationofenergy.
Spencer(1911, p. 149) preferred "persistence"to "conservation"because
theword"conservation"incorrectly implies(1) "a conserverand an act of
conserving";(2) "withoutsome act of conservation,forcewould disap-
pear"; and (3) forcedoes notexist"beforetheparticularmanifestation of
it which is contemplated.""Force" was preferableto "energy"because
forceis "the ultimateof ultimates"(Spencer 1911, p. 132). In Spencer's
philosophy,the indestructibility of matterand the continuity of motion
are derivativefacts.They are logical implicationsof the ultimatetruth
that"forceis unchangeablein quantity"(Spencer 1911, p. 433).
Spencer'sphilosophyconforms to theexplanatoryparadigmthatdomi-
natedscienceafterthe 17th-century rejectionoftheAristotelian concepts
of purpose,value, teleology,and finalcause. With theirrejection,the
goal of sciencewas to explain all phenomenain physicochemical terms
(i.e., in termsof the primaryqualities of matter,motion,and force)
(Young 1971). In Spencer'suse, theseexplanationsdo notentaila reduc-
tionto physicochemical elements.His fundamental and derivativepropo-
sitionsand the deductionsdrawn fromthem are "not highlygeneral

2 The 1862citationdateforFirstPrinciplesand thecitations in thetextforSpencer's

pre-"system"worksare originalpublicationdates. The actual editionsused in this
studyare First Principles(1900), Social Statics (1891), "The DevelopmentHy-
Its Law and Cause" (1891),"Transcendental
pothesis"(1891),"Progress: Physiology"
(1891),and "The Social Organism"(1891).

1202
 Spencer

truths[science];theyare universaltruths[philosophy]"(Spencer 1911,

p. 217). The highlygeneraltruthsof science(e.g., principlesof biology,
principlesofsociology)generateproximate-causal explanations.Explana-
tions in termsof firstprinciplesdo not belong to the domain of any
science.They are ultimate-causalexplanations.
In FirstPrinciples,Spencerclaimedthathe deducedthegenerallaw of
evolutionfromhisfirstprinciples.His subsequentworkspresenthistheo-
riesoforganicevolutionand superorganicevolutionas twoexpressions of
thegenerallaw ofevolution.3If thisview oftherelationship ofSpencer's
firstprinciplesto his principlesofbiologyand hisprinciplesofsociologyis
correct,thenhis theoriesof organicand social evolutionare bothshaped
by his generallaw of evolution.
I arguethatthisview is incorrect.FollowingMedawar (1967), I reject
Spencer'sclaimon thegroundsthat,bythetimehe wroteFirstPrinciples
in 1862, he already had a well-developedconceptionof evolution.
Medawar (1967, p. 42) suggeststhat this conception"grew inductively
out of the contemplationof its several instances."I argue for a more
restrictedsource: Spencer'sgenerallaw of evolutionis a generalization
and respecification,in ultimateterms,of his theoryoforganicevolution.
As the core of his systemof syntheticphilosophy,the theoryof organic
evolutiondeterminesthe explanatoryformof Spencer'stheoryof social
evolution.

PROXIMATE-CAUSALEXPLANATIONS:THE THEORIES OF
ORGANICAND SUPERORGANICEVOLUTION
To understandSpencer'stheoryof organicevolutionand, therefore, his
theoryof social evolution,it is necessaryto know somethingabout the
two biologicalmodelstheycombine.For thisreason,I beginmyexegesis
of these theorieswith a discussionof von Baerian epigenesisand La-
marckism.4

3 As Spencerunderstood
them,superorganic
and organicevolutionhave congruent
coursesand mechanisms but differentunitsof analysis.Superorganicevolutionin-
cludes"all thoseprocessesand productswhichimplytheco-ordinated actionsofmany
individuals"(Spencer1896,p. 4). In organicevolution,
theactionsare thoseofsingle
or relatedindividuals.WhileSpencerrecognizedthatsuperorganic evolutionis not
uniquetoHomosapiens,he arguedthatthemagnitude ofthedifferencesbetweenthe
humanand othersocialspeciesjustified restricting
hisanalysisofsuperorganic evolu-
tionto theformthat"humansocietiesexhibitin theirgrowths, structures,
functions,
products"(Spencer1896, p. 7), i.e., to what contemporary sociologistscall social
evolution.
4 In preparingthesediscussions,I have drawnheavilyon authoritative secondary
sources:for von Baer, Ospovat (1976), Gould (1977), and Mayr (1982), and for
Lamarck,Burkhardt (1977)and Mayr(1982).

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AmericanJournalof Sociology

Von Baerian Epigenesis

Epigenesisis a theoryof development.Its von Baerian formulation de-
scribestheembryological developmentof a singleindividualas a process
of successivedifferentiations leadingto increasedstructuralcomplexity:
"There is graduallytakingplace a transitionfromsomethinghomoge-
neous and generalto somethingheterogeneousand special" (von Baer
[1828],quoted in Mayr 1982, p. 473).
Viewed in thisway, development,or "evolution"as it was thencalled,
is bothdivergentand progressive.It entailsdivergencefroma common
archetype,withdevelopmentproceedingfromthegeneral(embryo)to the
special (adult), or fromundifferentiated homogeneityto differentiated
heterogeneity. Progressis definedin structuralterms:higher,moreper-
fectformsare moredifferentiated, morecomplex,and moreheterogene-
ous than lower,less perfectforms.
Von Baer developedhis law of individualdevelopmentas an embry-
ologicaltheory.But he did notrestrict itsapplicationto thedevelopment
of individualorganisms.Like otherGermanembryologists (e.g., Wolff),
he believedthatthe laws of natureapply to all objectsand all processes
(Gould 1977). For von Baer, the law of individualdevelopmentwas the
law of all change.
To grasp the role of this biologicalmodel in Spencer'stheoriesof or-
ganic and superorganicevolution,it is essentialto recognizethat von
Baer's law of individualdevelopmentdescribesthecourseof embryolog-
ical development.It does not specifythemechanismof change(Ospovat
1976; Gould 1977; Mayr 1982). This is also trueof the paleontological
extensionsof von Baer's law proposed by Chambers,Carpenter,and
Owen, whom Spenceralso read. Developed as "laws" thatdescribeob-
servedphenomena,theydo not explainthechangefromhomogeneity to
heterogeneity. Spencerwas free,therefore, to introducethemechanismof
his choice. This was Lamarckism.

Lamarckism
Lamarck proposedthefirstevolutionarytheoryin themodernbiological
sense of the term"evolution."Spencer,in developinghis theoryof or-
ganic evolution,incorporatedtwo ideas thatLamarck ([1809] 1984) had
presentedas laws in Zoological Philosophy.These are (1) thedifferential
use and disuse of organsin responseto environmental contingencies and
(2) theinheritance ofacquiredcharacters.Accordingto thefirstlaw, high
levels of use strengthenand develop organs,whilelow levelsof use lead
to theirdeteriorationand eventualdisappearance.The secondlaw states

1204
 Spencer

thatthesefunctionally producedmodifications are "preservedby repro-

duction"(Lamarck 1984, p. 113).
At the time Lamarck developed his theory,these laws were part of
conventionalwisdomin biology.Lamarckdid notdefendhis use ofthem
or suggestthathe had discoveredthem.He claimedonlyto have discov-
ered theirgenerality:together,theycould accountforthe diversityand
orderingof life.
In the plant seriesand in the simplestanimals,arguedLamarck, the
environment has a directeffecton thehereditary material.In morecom-
plex animals(i.e., animalswithnervoussystems),however,habitsdefine
a key interveningvariable between environmentalcircumstancesand
organicchange. Here, environmentalchanges create new needs, new
needsrequirenew habits,which,in turn,exerciseorgansdifferentially to
producechangesin organicstructures thatcan be inherited.
For Lamarck, the primarycause of organicevolutionis the need to
adapt to a constantly changingenvironment. Variationsarisethroughthe
developmentand maintenanceofhabits.Two corollariesfollowfromthis
conceptionof variation:(1) habitsdetermineformand notvice versa, as
most 18th-century biologistsbelieved,and (2) speciesare mutable.If, as
Lamarcksuggested,organismsmustremainin harmonywiththeirenvi-
ronmentsand if theirenvironments are constantlychanging,thenthey
must also change. This change is necessary to retain organism/
environment harmony.
When relatedto Lamarck'stwo laws, behavioraladjustmentsto envi-
ronmentalchangesexplainorganicchange:"All theacquisitionsor losses
wroughtby natureon individuals,throughthe influenceof the environ-
mentin which theirrace has long been placed, and hence throughthe
influenceof the predominantuse or permanentdisuse of any organ;all
theseare preservedby reproduction to the new individualswhicharise,
providedthattheacquiredmodifications are commonto bothsexes,or at
least to the individuals which produce the young" (Lamarck 1984,
p. 113). Because this is the mechanismof Spencer'stheoriesof organic
and superorganicevolution,bothare evolutionarytheories.

CombiningLamarckismand von Baerian Epigenesis

An evolutionarytheorymustspecifyboththemechanismand thecourse
of change. My case against the immanenceinterpretation and forthe
evolutionaryinterpretation centerson theargumentthatSpencer'suse of
themechanism/course distinctionallowed himto combinetwo biological
modelsthatentailcontradictory explanationsof change.In his theoryof
organicevolution,Lamarckismspecifiesthe mechanismof change;von
Baerian epigenesis,its course.

1205
AmericanJournalof Sociology

To develop thisargument,I discusstheLamarckianand von Baerian

modelsin theorderin whichSpencerintroducedthemintohis evolution-
arysynthesis.Spencer'sfirstmajor work,Social Statics,providesstrong
supportforthe argumentthat he proposeda teleologicalconceptionof
progress.The significance of thissupportdependsupon the relationship
of Social Statics to Spencer'sbiologicaland sociologicalworks.If these
worksmerelyelaboratethe theoryit presents,as Peel (1971) concludes,
thenSocial Statics does pose a major problemforan evolutionary inter-
pretationof Spencerianevolutionism.My analysisofthedevelopmentof
Spencer'stheoryoforganicevolutionmakesit clear,however,thatthisis
not the case.
When Spencer wrote Social Statics, in 1850, he was familiarwith
Lamarck'sevolutionary theory.He had read Lyell'sPrinciplesofGeology
(1830-33) in 1840afterhis workas a civilrailwayengineerstimulatedhis
interestin geology.In Principlesof Geology,Lyell developeda seriesof
argumentsforuniformitarianism and againstLamarckism.Spencerac-
ceptedLyell's conclusionthat causes operatingin the presentwere also
operativein the past but did not accept his case againstLamarckism.
Social Statics developeda Lamarckianinterpretation oftheutilitarian
conceptof progress.This conceptof progressis teleological.The telosis
humanhappiness;changesthatdirectlyor indirectly maximizehappiness
constituteprogress.Social Statics specifiedthe natureof thesechanges
formodernman. This specification was explicitlyLamarckian.
Spencer'slaw of adaptationrestatedthe Lamarckianpremisesof use
and disuse of organs and of the inheritanceof acquired characters.Its
corollary,"the evanescenceof evil," incorporatedthe Lamarckian as-
sumptionthat organismsmust remainin harmonywith theirenviron-
ments.Functionallyproducedadaptationsincreasean organism'sfitness
forits surroundingconditions.At the species level, then,adaptationis
inevitable. Nonadaptation, or "evil," must disappear given sufficient
timeand sufficient numbersof individuals.5
Extendingthis argumentto the questionof morality,Spencer([1850]
1966a,pp. 30-31) continuedwithwhathas becomethemostwidelycited
part of his work:
Man neededone moralconstitution to fithimforhisoriginalstate;he
needsanothertofithimforhispresent state;andhe hasbeen,is,andwill
longcontinueto be, in processof adaptation.And thebeliefin human
perfectibility
merely amountsto thebeliefthat,in virtueofthisprocess,
manwilleventuallybecomecompletely suitedto hismodeoflife.
Progress,
therefore,is notan accident,
buta necessity.
Insteadofciviliza-

5In latereditionsofSocial Statics,Spencermodified

thispositionto arguethatprog-
resswas dependenton favorableenvironmental
conditions.

1206
 Spencer

tionbeingartificial
itis a partofnature;
all ofa piecewiththedevelopment
ofan embryo or theunfolding ofa flower.

In the superorganic,as in the organic,realm, evil resultsfromthe

nonadaptationofconstitution to conditions.In thehumansituation,how-
ever,the conditionsare fixed.Human beingsnow live and will continue
to live in thesocial state:"The social stateis a necessity"(Spencer1966a,
p. 34). As the inevitableconsequenceof the increasedsize of the human
population,it has become and will continueto be the characteristic hu-
man environment.Complete adaptation can occur, then, only by the
modification oftheorganism,and progresswillpresupposethosechanges
in moral nature that will reestablishharmonywith the environment.
Again, to quote Spencer(1966a, p. 32), "We findthisstateestablished;
are henceforth to continuein it; and musttherefore set it down as one of
thosenecessitieswhichour rulesfortheachievementofthegreatesthap-
pinessmustrecognizeand conformto."
Three moral rules are necessaryforattainingthe greatesthappiness.
They are justice, negativebeneficence,and positivebeneficence.These
moralrules,Spencerargued,are theonlyway in whichtheutilityprinci-
ple can be satisfiedin thesocial state.It is forthisreason,and notbecause
theyare potentialsinherentin humansociety,thattheyare "necessities."
This argumentforthe inevitability of progressis used to supportthe
immanenceinterpretation. Spencer'simagerysuggestsimmanence,but
his explanationis evolutionary.Progressis explainedby the inheritance
of environmentally inducedmodifications. Spencer'sconceptof progress
is teleologicalnotbecause itsbiologicalfoundationentailstheassumption
of immanencebut ratherbecause it incorporatesthe utilitariantelos of
humanhappiness.
Spencer'suse of evolutionand developmentas synonyms in "The De-
velopmentHypothesis"([1852] 1966b)invitesthesame misunderstanding
thathis evolutionismis a theoryof immanentchange. Because thiscon-
ceptofdevelopmentinforms hisgenerallaw ofevolution,his principlesof
biology,and his principlesof sociology,it is importantto graspits bases
in biology.The failureto do so has helpedto perpetuatetheimmanence
interpretation.
"The DevelopmentHypothesis"was not about development.It de-
fendedevolutionagainst the competinghypothesisof special creation
and, in substance,did not differfromotherpre-Darwiniandefensesof
evolution.Thus, Spencer(1966b,p. 3) argued,whereasspecialcreationis
noteven definitely conceivable,evolutionists can showthat"anyexisting
species-animal or vegetable-when placed under conditionsdifferent
fromits previousones, immediatelybeginsto undergocertainchanges
fittingitfor the new conditions."

1207
AmericanJournalof Sociology

As thisquotationmakes clear, Spencer'sunderstanding of themecha-

nismof organicevolutionis Lamarckian.The introduction of von Baer-
ian epigenesisin "Progress:Its Law and Cause" ([1857] 1966c) leftthe
Lamarckianfoundationofhistheoryunchanged.Von Baer's specification
ofthecourseoforganicchangedid, however,lead to a fundamental shift
in Spencer'sthinking.
Spencerfirstdiscoveredvon Baer's law of individualdevelopmentin
1851,whenhe read Carpenter'sPrinciplesofPhysiology.The importance
of this discoveryforhis systemof syntheticphilosophyis not at issue.
Whyitwas important remainscontroversial,however,and becomesclear
only when the theorydeveloped in "Progress:Its Law and Cause" is
interpreted againstthe backdropof Social Statics.
In Social Statics, Spencer'sLamarckismforcedhim to abandon two
premisesof utilitarianism: the uniformityof human natureand the "is/
ought"distinction.His introduction ofvon Baerian epigenesisto charac-
terize the course of organic change led him to reject the more basic
utilitarianassumptionthatprogressis teleological.If, as Spencer(1966c,
pp. 8-9) believed,the natureof progress"in itself'had been discovered
bytheGermanembryologists, thenthe"currentconception"thatcontem-
plated phenomena"solelyas bearingon humanhappiness"mustbe dis-
carded because "it is in greatmeasureerroneous."
Spencer replaced this teleologicalconceptionof progress(which in-
formsSocial Statics) witha moreexplicitlybiologicalone. In his view,
Wolffand von Baer had "settledbeyonddispute"(Spencer1966c,p. 10)
thatorganicprogresswas an advance fromhomogeneity to heterogeneity
of structurethrougha process of successivedifferentiations. Spencer's
aim was to show that this law of organicprocess was the law of all
progress,includingsocial progress.
Spencer did not call this universallaw "progress"because it covers
inorganicas well as organicand superorganicchange and because the
processit describesis nonteleological.The courseofevolutionis progres-
sive in the von Baerian, not the utilitarian,sense. It is a process of
structuralchangeleadingto increasedorganizationalcomplexity.
Six months later, in "TranscendentalPhysiology"([1857] 1966d),
Spencer introducedan importantcorrectionto this conceptionof the
course of evolution.Differentiation is necessarybut not sufficient for
evolution. Evolution also presupposesintegration,by which Spencer
meantthe coalescenceof partsperforming similarfunctions.
Spencer's generallaw of evolutionreframesthis specificationof the
courseof organicchangein ultimateterms.The generallaw ofevolution
maybe deduciblefromfirstprinciples,as Spencerclaimedin FirstPrin-
ciples,but it was not arrivedat by deductionfromthesefirstprinciples.
Its sourceis Spencer'stheoryof organicevolution.

1208
 Spencer

"TranscendentalPhysiology" also clarifiedand extendedthearguments

about themechanismof organicchangedevelopedin "The Development
Hypothesis."Its subject,however,was developmentand not evolution.
AlthoughSpencer used the same factorsto explain both processesof
change,he did notgroundhistheoryofevolutionin themodelofdevelop-
ment,as the immanenceinterpretation suggests.Nowherein his biolog-
ical worksdid he view developmentas a processofimmanentchange.In
all theseworks,von Baer's law of individualdevelopmentcharacterized
the course of developmentalchange and not the mechanism.Spencer's
explanationof development(and evolution)was always Lamarckian.
In his pre-Darwinianworks,Spencerused Lamarckismand evolution
as synonyms. His post-Darwinian(i.e., post-1859)worksdefendnotonly
evolutionbut also Lamarckism.Lamarckismand Darwinismare both
evolutionarytheories.Where theydifferis in theirexplanationsof the
originsofvariation.Lamarck arguedthattheenvironment caused varia-
tion,but forDarwin "randomvariationwas presentfirst,and theorder-
ing activityof the environment ('naturalselection')followedafterwards"
(Mayr 1982, p. 354).
In thepost-Darwinianformulations of his theoryof organicevolution,
Spencerdid notdenytherealityofnaturalselection.But he did reject(1)
Darwin's conclusionsthatvariationsare randomand thatnaturalselec-
tionis theprimarycause oforganicevolutionand (2) Weismann'scase for
naturalselectionas the sole cause of organicevolution.6In Spencerian
evolutionism, the naturalselectionof environmentally inducedmodifica-
tionsis moreimportantthan the naturalselectionof spontaneouslypro-
duced modifications. Natural selectionis theprincipalcause ofevolution
for
only inferior plantsand animalsand fortheearlyevolutionary stages
of superiorplants and animals. In higherlife forms,includingHomo
sapiens,Lamarckismis the primarymechanismof evolutionary change.
Here, naturalselectionmaintainsenvironmentally inducedadaptations
by eliminatingunfitorganisms.

From Organicto SuperorganicEvolution

Spencer'ssociology,likehis biology,is Lamarckian.For him,sociologyis
the studyof social evolution. Establishingthe structuringrole of his
combinationof Lamarckism and von Baerian epigenesisis rendered
problematicby his failureto providea systematic,orderlystatementof
his theoryof social evolution. His use of Lamarckismto specifythe

6 Weismann's cytological
evidenceshowedthatthegermcellsandthesomaticcellsare
functionallyindependent.This means that the transferof information
fromthe
somaticcellsto thegermcellsthatLamarckismentailscannotoccur.

1209
 AmericanJournalof Sociology

mechanismof social evolutionand von Baerian epigenesisto specifyits

course must be abstractedfromdiscussionsof methodologicalsupposi-
tionsand principlesof sociologyand fromthe way bothare used in the
comparativeanalysisofsocial institutions thatconstitutes thebulkofThe
PrinciplesofSociology.
This processof abstractionis complicatedby the way Spencerrelates
these proximate-causalexplanationsof social change to ultimate-causal
explanations.ThroughoutThe PrinciplesofSociology,Spencerwas con-
cernedwith demonstrating the congruenceof social evolutionwith the
generallaw of evolution.This concernties his principlesof sociologyto
his firstprinciplesand, therefore,onlyindirectly to his principlesof biol-
ogy.This meansthatSpencer'sconceptionsofthemechanismand course
of evolutionare not identifiedas beingspecifically Lamarckianand von
Baerian. TheirLamarckianand von Baerian foundations are nonetheless
clearonce therelationship ofSpencer'sbiologyand hissociologyis under-
stood.
The key to understanding this relationshipis Spencer'sLamarckism.
As a Lamarckian,Spencerdid notmake themoderndistinction between
organicevolution(information transmitted throughgeneticmechanisms)
and cultural evolution (informationtransmittedthroughnongenetic
mechanisms,such as learning).As he understoodit, all evolutionary
change,includingitssociologicalexpression,is genetic,to use themodern
term.Since acquired charactersare transmitted throughgenes and not
throughculture,the rate of social evolutionis limitedby "the rate of
organicmodification in human beings"(Spencer[1880] 1961, p. 366).
UndertheLamarckianmodel,organicmodification occursthroughthe
inheritanceof functionally producedmodifications. The causes of social
change,then,are foundin the adaptationof the human constitution to
surroundingconditions.Understoodin this way, social change is a re-
sponse to environmentally induced changesin the physical,emotional,
and intellectualtraits of individuals. In more explicitlyLamarckian
terms,environmental changescreatenew needs,new needs requirenew
habits,which,in turn,requirechangesin the physical,emotional,and
intellectualtraitsof individuals.These changed individualsthen mold
social institutions
intocorresponding forms.Two core ideas of Spencer's
sociologyfollowfromitsLamarckianfoundation.These are methodologi-
cal individualismand social Darwinism.
Methodologicalindividualism.7-In superorganicas in organicevolu-

7 FollowingBrodbeck(1954,1958)and Agassi(1960),I definemethodological individ-

ualismbythreeideas:(1) a reciprocal
conception oftheindividual/society
relationship,
(2) a relational ofsociety,and (3) explanation
conception in termsofcollectiveproper-

1210
 Spencer

tion,differential use is a responseto environmentalcontingencies.In the

humansituation,the "surrounding conditionsare in part constitutedby
social arrangements"(Spencer 1961, p. 307). The relationshipbetween
the individual and the societyis thereforereciprocal.Institutionsand
people modifyeach otherthroughsuccessivegenerations.
This conceptionof the reciprocalindividual/society relationshipis at
thecoreof Spencer'sorganicism,whichis individualistratherthanholis-
tic. Its individualistfoundationcan be establishedby examiningthecar-
dinal difference betweenthe biological(individual)and social organisms
Spencer([1860] 1966e, pp. 276-77) identifiedin his construction of the
organismicanalogy:
Still,we haveherea tolerably decidedcontrastbetweenbodies-politic
and
individual bodies;and it is onewhichwe shouldkeepconstantly in view.
Forit reminds us thatwhile,in individual
bodies,thewelfare ofall other
partsis rightly subservient to thewelfareof thenervoussystem, whose
pleasurable or painfulactivitiesmakeup thegoodorill oflife;in bodies-
politicthesamethingdoesnothold,orholdstobuta veryslight extent....
Thecorporate lifemustherebe subservienttothelivesoftheparts,instead
ofthelivesofthepartsbeingsubservient to thecorporatelife.
Expressedin methodological terms,thisdifference
meansthat,whilein
biologicalorganisms,thepartsexistforand are determined by thewhole
(methodologicalholism), in social organisms,parts and wholes recip-
rocallydetermineeach other(methodologicalindividualism).In social
organisms,then,the referent of functionalsignificanceis the part (indi-
vidual) and not the whole (society).What is importantis the survivalof
individuals-exactly what the Lamarckianmodel assumes.
Spencer'sorganismicanalogyis not a falseanalogybecause what ren-
ders biologicaland social organismsanalogous is that,in both, mutual
dependenceis the core of organization.Since mutual dependenceis a
basic assumptionof methodologicalholismand methodologicalindivid-
ualism,Spencer's(1896, p. 460) definitionoforganizationas the"mutual
dependenceof parts"does not entaila methodologicalposition.He was

ties. Understoodin thisway, it is an alternativeto methodological holismand to

methodologicalpsychologism. For methodological holists,societiesare entitiessui
generis,characterizedby emergent properties (e.g., autonomoussystemgoals and
needs).The coreoftheirmethodology is a unidirectionalconception oftheindividual/
societyrelationship,withthe directionof influencebeingfromthe societyto the
individual.Advocatesofmethodological psychologism also arguefora unidirectional
conceptionof the individual/societyrelationship,but theyreversethe directionof
influence.
Forthem,sociology can be reducedtopsychology becausesocialphenomena
aremerely"magnified duplicates"ofindividualphenomena. The domainassumptions
of methodologicalpsychologismcannotbe used to characterize methodological
indi-
vidualism,as Mayhew(1980)suggests.

1211
AmericanJournalof Sociology

free,therefore,to conclude that the principlesof organizationare the

same in biologicaland social organisms,despitethecardinaldifference he
identified.8
Spencer's combinationof Lamarckism and methodologicalindivid-
ualism permittedhim to explain "the growth,development,structure,
and functionsof the social aggregate,as broughtabout by the mutual
actions of individualswhose naturesare partlylike those of all men,
partlylike those of kindred races, partlydistinctive"(Spencer 1961,
p. 47). It also permittedhim to explain what will happen if the
implicationsof Lamarckism for the human species are ignored.This
componentof Spencer'ssystemof syntheticphilosophyhas come to be
knownas social Darwinism.
Social Danwinism.-Introducedas earlyas Social Statics, social Dar-
winismformsthecoreof Spencer'scase againstgovernment intervention
that interferes with the law of adaptation. Where no such legislation
exists,the weak die beforetheyreproduce,and thosewith"fitter struc-
tures"producethe nextgeneration.Legislationthatartificially preserves
the feeblestmembersof a societylowers the physical,emotional,and
intellectualquality of its members.Because theseindividualsnow sur-
vive to reproduce,the processis cumulative:"From diminisheduse of
self-conserving facultiesalreadydeficient,theremustresult,in posterity,
stillsmalleramountsof self-conserving faculties"(Spencer1961,p. 313).
To interfere with the survivalof the fittestis to exacerbateratherthan
eliminatemisery.
Spencer'scase against"law-enforced plans ofrelief"is one substantive
illustrationof his social Darwinism. AlthoughSpencer accepted the
utilitarianargumentthatmoralpassionsare importantcauses of human
action,he also acceptedtheLamarckianpositionthatmoralpassionsare
environmentally induced. Adding the Lamarckian caveat means that
only those moral characteristicsthat spring from motives that are
routinelybroughtinto play will spread throughthe population.Law-
enforcedplans of reliefare maladaptive,then,because as an "opiate to
the yearningsof sympathy"(Spencer 1966a, p. 144) they"diminishthe
demands made upon it, limitits exercise,check its development,and
therefore retardthe processof adaptation"(p. 146).
Spencer'ssocial Darwinismprovidesa clear demonstration of the ex-
planatoryrole of the Lamarckianmodel. This role in his sociologymore
generallyalso becomes clear once its relationshipsto its von Baerian

conception
8 Thisrelational ofsocietyalso signalsa rejection position
ofthenominalist
that"theunitsof a societyalone exist,whiletheexistenceof societyis but verbal"
(Spencer1896,p. 447). For Spencer,relationsamongparts,and notattributesofparts
or attributesof wholes,definesocieties.His so-calledorganismicand nominalist
ofsociety(Stark1961)are bothindividualist.
definitions

12 12
 Spencer

counterpartand, throughit, to his two systemsfor classifyingsocial

organismsare understood.
Spencer's comparative study of social institutionsdocumentsthat
superorganicevolutioninvolves increasesin complexityand diversity.
Whilehis analysescoverbothdimensions,theycenteron thecomplexity
dimensionand its corollary,the idea thatsocietiescan be ranked.This
conceptualfocusfollowslogicallyfromSpencer'suse ofvon Baer's law of
individual developmentas the source analogy for the general law of
evolution.To establishthatsocial evolutionconformsto the generallaw
of evolution,Spencer must show that, throughthe joint action of the
processesofdifferentiation and integration, social institutions and, there-
fore,societiesbecomemorecomplex.Spencermust,in otherwords,show
thatthe courseof social evolutionis von Baerian.
Differentiation, integration,and complexityalso formthe core of
Spencer'sclassificationof social typesby theirdegreeof integration or
composition.Underthissystem,societiesare ranked,fromlow to high,as
simple,compound,doubly compound,and treblycompound. Because
compoundingand recompounding mustbe passed throughin succession,
Spencerconcludedthat,underthisclassification, thetransition fromthe
lowestto the highestsocial typesis throughthesestages.
Spencer also classifiedsocietiesby theirpredominantsocial activity:
"In a less specificway, we may divide them into the predominantly
militantand the predominantly industrial-thosein whichtheorganiza-
tionforoffenceand defenceis mostlargelydeveloped,and thosein which
the sustainingorganizationis most largelydeveloped" (1896, p. 550).
Unlike the firstone, this classificationis groundedin the Lamarckian
model. The linkis Spencer'sargumentforthesuperorganic environment
(theinteractions betweena societyand neighboring societies)as themajor
sourceof adaptationalvariationin social evolution.Whethertheorgani-
zation for offenseand defenseor the sustainingorganizationis more
"largelydeveloped"dependson the natureof theinteractions thatoccur
betweena societyand its neighboringsocietiesin the struggleforexis-
tence.If theseinteractions are hostile,thenmilitancyevolves;ifpeaceful,
thenindustrialism is adaptive.
The militant/industrial classificationalso incorporatesthe idea that
societiescan be ranked.Here, however,Spencerqualifiedhis use of the
Lamarckian model to reflectthe cardinal difference betweenbiological
and social organismsdiscussedabove. FollowingLamarck, he classified
biologicalorganismswithundevelopednervoussystemsas relativelylow
and thosewithdevelopednervoussystemsas relativelyhigh. To reflect
the difference in the ends served(partsvs. wholes),his classification of
social organismsreversedthisranking:"Those withpredominantindus-
trialor sustainingsystemsare superiorto thosewith highly-centralized

1213
AmericanJournalof Sociology

and powerfulregulatingsystems"(Spencer 1896, p. 598). Transposed

onto the militant-industrial classification,this differencemeans that
thelowestsocial typesare militantsocieties,and thehighestsocial types,
industrialsocieties.
Spencer suggestedthat both classificationsshould "be kept in mind
when interpreting social phenomena"(1896, p. 574). But, because of its
more direct link with the Lamarckian model, the militant/industrial
classificationdominatesThe Principlesof Sociology.Thus, in his com-
parativeanalysisofceremonialinstitutions, Spencer(1897a) showedthat,
as expressionsof subordinationand deference,ceremoniesare concomi-
tantsofmilitancy.He documented(1896, pp. 687-92) theenvironmental
specificityof domesticinstitutionsby comparingpolygynyand mono-
gamy,two formsof permanentmarriage.
Polygyny evolves in hostilesuperorganicenvironments wherethehigh
deathrateofmenand surplusofwomenmeanthatrapidreplacement can
occuronlythroughthemarriageofone man to morethanone women.As
industrialactivitiesbecomemoredominant,fewermendie in war and the
sex ratiobeginsto approach 1: 1. In thissuperorganicenvironment, po-
lygynousrelationships are at firstsupplemented by,and thenreplacedby,
monogamousunions.
The political institutionsthat exist in a societyalso depend on the
natureofitssuperorganic environment. To establishthis,Spencer(1897a)
refinedthe militant/industrial classificationto identifytwo radicallydif-
ferenttypesof politicalorganization.The militanttypeofsocietyis orga-
nized on the principleof compulsorycooperation.In the hostilesuperor-
ganic environments where it is found,the societyas a whole must be
preservedif any individualis to survive.Cooperationis therefore com-
pulsory.Whereintersocietal conflict is absent,jointactionforoffenseand
defenseis unnecessarv.Here, voluntaryratherthancompulsory coopera-
tion conferssurvivaladvantages in the struggleforexistence;thus,the
industrialtypeof societyis adaptive.
Individualsin militantsocietiesdeal withfellowmembersand super-
natural beings in the same way. As a result,societieswith coercive,
centralizedcivil rule have coercive,centralizedreligiousrule. A corre-
spondingstructuralisomorphismalso characterizesindustrialsocieties.
Spencer(1897b) concluded,therefore, thatecclesiasticalinstitutionsalso
evolve in responseto pressuresfromthe superorganicenvironment.
This relationshipbetweeninstitutional structureand superorganicen-
vironmentalso holdsforthe regulatory componentsof industrialinstitu-
tions.In societieswheremilitantactivitiespredominate, industrialactivi-
tiesare controlledthroughcoerciveinstitutions likeslavery,serfdom,and
guilds. But, as the superorganicenvironment becomesmoreindustrial,

1214
 Spencer

formsof industrialregulationthatdo not entailcompulsorycooperation

(e.g., free labor, contract) become increasinglyimportant(Spencer
1897b).Here, as withothersocial institutions, it is the activitycriterion
and not the integration criterionthatunambiguouslyclassifiessocieties.
Because social institutions
are environment specific,thetransition from
low (militant)to high(industrial)typesofsocialorganizationis contingent
on favorableenvironmental conditions.The argumentforenvironmental
contingency also holdswhereprogressis definedin von Baerianterms.As
Spencer stressed,in both biological and social organisms,structural
change occurs in responseto environmental pressures.A more hetero-
geneousor "advanced" structure will develop,therefore, onlyiftheenvi-
ronmentdemandsmorecomplexhabits.Otherwise,therewillbe stasisor
retrogression:
Evolutiondoes notimplya latenttendency to improve,everywhere in
operation.Thereis no uniformascentfromlowerto higher, butonlyan
occasionalproduction
ofa formwhich,invirtueofgreater fitness
formore
complexconditions,becomescapableofa longerlifeofa morevariedkind.
Andwhilesuchhighertypebeginsto dominate overlowertypesand to
spreadat theirexpense,
thelowertypessurviveinhabitatsormodesoflife
thatarenotusurped, orarethrustintoinferior
habitatsormodesoflifein
whichtheyretrogress.
Whatthusholdswithorganic typesmustalsoholdwithtypesofsocieties.
[Spencer1897b,p. 609]
This quotationfromthe last chapterof The PrinciplesofSociologyis
importantbothbecause it pointsto thestructuringroleofSpencer'scom-
binationof Lamarckismand von Baerian epigenesisand because it con-
tainsan explicitrejectionoftheprincipleofimmanentchangein boththe
biological and sociologicalcontexts.Spencer'stheoriesof organic and
superorganicevolutionare both evolutionarytheories.How is it, then,
thattheimmanenceinterpretation remainsthestandardinterpretation of
Spencer'stheoryof social change?

REASSESSING THE IMMANENCE INTERPRETATION

I have arguedthatSpencer'stheoryofsocial evolutioncan be understood
onlyby graspingthe contentand the structuringroleof the Lamarckian
and von Baerian models it combines.I now argue thatthisis precisely
what proponentsof the immanenceinterpretation have failed to do.9

9 Thisargument also appliesto Carneiro's(1973)evolutionaryinterpretation.

His case
forthecausal relevanceof theenvironment in Spencer'stheoryis weak becausehe
doesnotfollowthrough on hisownsuggestion and beginwitha thoroughdiscussionof
Spencer'stheoryoforganicevolution.This leaveshimopento Alland's(1974)charge

1215
 AmericanJournalof Sociology

Because myconcernis theexplanatoryformof Spencerianevolutionism,

my analysisof both the biologicaland nonbiologicalvariationson the
immanenceinterpretation centerson their specificationsof Spencer's
mechanismof social evolution.'0In the discussionthat follows,I (1)
identifythesemechanisms,(2) summarizethe evidenceused to support
them,and (3) evaluate (1) and (2) in lightof the textualand analytical
evidencethatI introducedto develop the evolutionaryinterpretation.

BiologicalVariations
Biological variations on the immanenceinterpretation recognizethe
structuringrole of Spencer's biology. To their proponents,Spencer's
mechanismmustbe eithervon Baerian epigenesisor Lamarckism.Argu-
mentsforthe formermiss Spencer'sconceptualseparationof the course
and the mechanismof evolution.In these interpretations, von Baerian
epigenesisspecifiesboth. Argumentsforthe lattermisconstruethe ex-
planatoryformof Lamarckism.
The most influentialformulationof the von Baerian alternativeis
foundin Nisbet's(1969) critiqueof evolutionarytheoryin the social sci-
ences. The textualevidencehe uses to supporthis interpretation is both
sparse and misleading.Nisbet includesonly six references to Spencer's
works-two to Social Statics(one ofwhichis presentedin a discussionof
"Progress:Its Law and Cause") and four to "Progress:Its Law and
Cause." Both quotationsfromSocial Statics are from"The Evanescence
ofEvil," in whichSpencerdid indeedproposea teleologicalconceptionof
progress.But, as I have shown,even theretheexplanationofprogressis
Lamarckian.
Nisbet's interpretationmisses the Lamarckian component.It also
missesthe fundamentalshiftin Spencer'sthinkingthatfollowedhis dis-
coveryofvon Baerian epigenesis.Nisbethas pointedto theimportanceof
this discovery,but, because he fails to grasp the temporalpriorityand
explanatoryrole of the Lamarckianmodel, he misconstrues Spencerian
evolutionismas a theoryof immanentchange.
UnlikeNisbet,Hirst(1976) acceptstheview thatSpencer'smechanism
is Lamarckian. He adopts the traditionalview-that Lamarck used an
inherentdrive toward perfectionto explain organicevolution-to con-
cludethatSpencer'stheoryis teleological.AlthoughSpenceralso believed

thathispositiondependssolelyon selectivequotations,whereasmyanalysismakesit
clearthatitis Allandwhousesmisleading quotations(fromSocial Statics)to support
his variationon theimmanence interpretation.
10 The immanence can also be criticizedon methodological
interpretation grounds
becauseit incorporatestheholisticinterpretation
of Spencer's"organicism," whichI
have shownto be incorrect.

1216
 Spencer

thatLamarck'stheoryhad a teleologicalcomponent,his intellectualdebt

to Lamarckis nonethelessclear. In both"The FactorsofOrganicEvolu-
tion"([1891]1966f)and The PrinciplesofBiology([1898] 1966g),Spencer
rejectedthisteleologicalcomponentin favorof what he stressedwas the
only"vera causa" Lamarck proposed:the modification of structures
re-
sultingfromenvironmentally inducedmodificationsof functions."

NonbiologicalVariations
Hirst'sexplicationof the explanatoryformof Spencer'stheoryis limited
by his lack of understanding of Lamarckism.Freeman(1974) recognizes
thatLamarckismis an evolutionarytheoryand thatSpencer'stheoryof
social evolutionis Lamarckian.This does notlead himto an evolutionary
interpretation, however,because he accepts Spencer'sclaim thathe de-
duced his theoriesof organicand superorganicevolutionfromhis first
principles.For Freeman,thecoreofSpencer'ssystemofsynthetic philos-
ophy is not the theoryof organicevolution,as I have argued. It is the
generallaw of evolution.
Peel (1969, 1971) agreeswithFreeman.Spencer'stheoryof social evo-
lution is a theoryof immanentchange, argues Peel, not because it is
groundedin themodelofdevelopment(althoughPeel agreesthatit is) but
ratherbecause its mechanismis a metaphysicalprinciple,thepersistence
offorce.I have arguedthatSpencer'sfirstprinciples,includingthepersis-
tenceofforce,are derivedfromphysics.Peel acknowledgesthispossibil-
ity but dismisses it as unlikelyon the groundsthat, withoutsome
metaphysical or finalcause, Spencer'stheorylacks an appropriatemecha-
nism of change. The mechanismhe claims to use, "adaptationto the
demands of the environment" (Peel 1971, p. 134), will not work, con-
tinuesPeel, because it cannotguaranteetheinevitablemoveto perfection
centralto Spencer'steleologicaltheoryof social change.
Accordingto Peel, adaptation is a valid mechanismof change only

11Perrin's
(1976)multiple-theories interpretationcombinesbothbiologicalvariations.
Accordingto him,thetheory developedin Social Statics-social evolution as progress
towardan ideal socialstate-assignscausal primacyto theenvironment. Perrinsup-
portsthisinterpretationwithtextualevidencefromSpencer'spost-1857works,evi-
dencethatsupportsan evolutionary interpretationbutdoes notillustrate thetheory
developedin Social Statics.Perrinis rightin concluding thattheory1 has "no real
consistencywiththeothers,"buthe is rightforthewrongreason.His suggestion that
theothertheoriesare interdependent is also correctbut again notforthereasonhe
gives.WhatPerrinhas identified as theories2, 3, and 4 are coreideas ofthesingle
evolutionarytheorySpencerdevelopedin his post-1857works.Ontogenyenters
Spencerianevolutionism onlyas a sourceanalogyforthecourseofchange.Functional
increasingcomplexity,
differentiation, and increasing diversity are all explainedby
Lamarckism.

1217
AmericanJournalof Sociology

when (1) the unitsof adaptationare partsthatcan be referred to wholes

and (2) adaptationis to something.Because Spencer'suse of adaptation
does not satisfyeithercondition,Peel (1971, pp. 154-55) concludes,

It is reallya misnomer to call thisadaptation.For thesocialstateis

certainly notenvironment, something external
tosociety,foritseemstobe
.. . thesupposedend-product ofhistory.... To takesociety as part,as
adaptationimplies,is to make its progresscontingent on persistently
favourable conditionsinthenonsocial environment....Butadaptation to
a secularprocesswhichis immanent
thesocialstateis essentially insociety
itself,andlikeallsuchprocesses concealsteleology-thepsychologicaltelos
of a humannaturewitha potential, and thesociological
telosofan un-
realizedperfect societywhichseemstobe drawing thehumanracetowards
itselfthrough history.

This quotationsummarizestwo argumentsthatunderliePeel's case for

the immanenceinterpretation. The firstargumentis that societiesare
Spencer'sunitsof adaptation.The second argumentis that,because the
social stateis a telos,Lamarckismcannotexplainadaptationto thesocial
state. Instead of beingcontingent on the inheritanceof environmentally
inducedmodifications, as in theLamarckianmodel,progressis inevitable
and retrogression is "unnaturaland bad."
My interpretation calls bothargumentsintoquestion.Peel is correctin
arguingthatsomethingmustadapt to something.But, forSpencer,the
relevantsomethingthat is adapted to is the environment and not the
whole,and the relevantsomethingthatis adaptingis theindividualand
not the society.Where the social state constitutesthe conditionsunder
whichindividualslive and wheretheunitsofselectionare individuals,it
is nota misnomerto speak of adaptationto thesocial state.Lamarckism
is themechanismSpencerclaimsto use and does use. The substitution of
an alternativemechanism,the persistenceof force,is unnecessary.
If social change is teleological,as in Peel's interpretation of Spencer,
then,as Peel pointsout, "changemustalwaysgo forward"and retrogres-
sion is "unnaturaland bad." Underthe Lamarckianmodelof evolution,
however,retrogression is as naturalas progression."When the habitat
entailsmodesoflifethatare inferior, degradationfollows.Onlyoccasion-
allydoes thenew combinationoffactorsproducea changeconstituting a
stepin social evolution"(Spencer1896, p. 97). This stepis neither"bad"
nor"good" because,likeretrogression, progression is definedin structural
terms.
Peel's case forthe immanenceinterpretation restson the assumption
thatSpencerdeduced his principlesof sociologyfromhis firstprinciples.
Turner(1985) makes the same assumptionbut does notview the persis-
tence of force as a metaphysicalprincipleor as the mechanismof
Spencer's theoryof social change. As he understandsit, the militant/

1218
 Spencer

industrialclassificationspecifiesan inherentdialecticthat is Spencer's

principalexplanatoryvariable: "The criticalpointin Spencer'smodel is
thatcentralizedpowersetsintomotionforcesthatbringabout decentral-
ization.Conversely,decentralizedpowergeneratesconditionsthatcause
thecentralization of power. There is, then,an inherentdialecticin polit-
ical regulation.Politicallycentralizedsystemscreatepressuresfortheir
decentralization, and vice versa" (Turner1985, pp. 79-80).
If thereis an inherentdialecticin politicalregulation,thensocietieswill
oscillatebetweenmilitancyand industrialism regardlessof theirsuperor-
ganic environments. But myanalysismakesit clear thatSpencerargued
forthe superorganicenvironment as the primaryfactorin social evolu-
tion. Explained by Lamarckism,the shiftfrommilitantto industrial
organization(and vice versa) occurs onlyin responseto changesin the
superorganicenvironment: "This relation,in whichthemutualrendering
of servicesis unforcedand neitherindividualsubordinated,becomesthe
predominantrelationthroughoutsocietyin proportionas the industrial
activitiespredominate.Daily determining the thoughtsand sentiments,
daily discipliningall in assertingtheirown claimswhileforcingthemto
recognizethe correlativeclaimsof others,it producessocial unitswhose
mental structuresand habits mould social arrangementsinto corre-
spondingforms"(Spencer 1896, p. 569).
The militant/industrial classificationdominatesSpencer'sanalysesof
socialinstitutions, notbecause it explainstheirstructure and operationas
Turnerconcludes,but, rather,because it reflectsthe causal primacyof
thesuperorganicenvironment. The importanceTurnerattachesto inter-
societal conflict,selectionpressures,and survival advantages is more
consistentwithan evolutionarythana dialecticalmode of analysis.Tur-
ner,however,followsotherproponentsof the immanenceinterpretation
in arguingthatSpencer'stheoryof social evolutionpresumesan endoge-
nous motorof change.

SPENCER AND THE ANTIEVOLUTIONARY CRITIQUE

Turner'sargumentfortheimmanencepremiseis particularly instructive
because, unlikeNisbet, Hirst,Freeman,and Peel, he is concernedwith
establishingthe relevanceof Spencerforcontemporary sociology.Like
Andreski(1971) beforehim, he argues for a renewed appreciationof
Spenceron the groundsthatignoranceof Spencerhas forcedcontempo-
Spencer'ssub-
rarysociologiststo waste intellectualenergyrediscovering
stantivetheoreticalideas and empiricalgeneralizations.To document
this,Turnerpointsto, among others,Blau's model of differentiation in
organizations,Kasarda's theoryofecologicalexpansion,and Hannan and
Freeman's population-ecology approach to the studyof organizations.

1219
AmericanJournalof Sociology

Each, according to Turner, is a reformulation(and refinement) of

Spencer'sideas on the relationsamongsize, differentiation, and integra-
tion.
Understoodin thisway, theworkof Blau, Kasarda, and Hannan and
Freeman demonstratesthat these ideas are stillrelevanttoday. But, if
correct,Turner's interpretation would not establishthe contemporary
relevanceof Spencer'stheoryas a theoryof social change.As a variation
on the immanenceinterpretation, it would have the oppositeresultbe-
cause social change is not an unfoldingof preexistingpotentials.The
conventionalcritiqueof Spencermakesit clear thata theorythatdenies
the causal relevanceoftheenvironment can neverexplainsocial change.
Were this interpretation correct,thensettingthe recordstraightwould
notmatter.Spencer'stheoryofsocialevolutionwouldcontinueto provide
strongsupportforthe deconstruction theoryin sociol-
of "evolutionary"
ogyadvocated by Peel (1971) and, morerecently,by Giddens(1984).
The core of the deconstruction argumentis the assumptionthat an
evolutionary theoryis a theoryof immanentchange.For Peel, theessen-
tial elements of an evolutionarytheoryinclude progress,necessity,
timelessness,placelessness,and an inevitablepathto perfection. For Gid-
dens,evolutionary theoriesare unfoldingconceptionsofchangethatposit
endogenousmotorsof change. They treat"social changeas theprogres-
sive emergenceof traitsthata particulartypeof societyis presumedto
have withinitselffrom its inception"(Giddens 1979, p. 223).
The evolutionary interpretationof Spencer'stheoryof social evolution
developed in this paper challengesthis characterization of a theoryof
evolution.Spencerianevolutionism,theexemplarof evolutionary theory
in sociology, is not an evolutionarytheoryunder the conventional
sociologicaldefinitionof evolution.Settingthe recordstraightmatters,
then,because it pointsto the need fora fundamentalrethinking of the
termsof the debate over evolutionarytheoryin sociology.The case
againstevolutionary theoryin sociologycan no longerreston a critiqueof
the immanence(development)model of change.
The relevanceof Spencerianevolutionismto thestatusofevolutionary
theoryin contemporary sociologydoes not end here. Settingthe record
straightalso means that neoevolutionary theoristsmust take Spencer's
theoryof social evolutionseriously.This is importantbecause Spencer's
theoryoffersone alternativeto theholistictheoriesthatnow dominatethe
evolutionaryapproachto the studyof social change.
As their criticspoint out, these evolutionarytheories(e.g., human
ecology,Parsonianevolutionism,ecologicalevolutionary theory)are lim-
ited by a restrictedfocus on macro-levelchange and, therefore,by a
failureto treatactorsas importantagentsofchange.But theselimitations
are not inherentin an evolutionaryapproach to the study of social

1220
 Spencer

change,as thesecriticsalso suggest.They followlogicallyfromtheholis-

tic conceptionof the individual/society relationshipthatinformshuman
ecology, Parsonian evolutionism,and ecological evolutionarytheory
(Haines 1985, 1987).
Viewed holistically,the individual/society relationshipis unidirec-
tional,withthe directionof influencebeingfromthe societyto the indi-
vidual. Individuals are sociallyformed,and the appropriatereferent of
functionalsignificance is thesocietyand nottheindividual.For method-
ological holists,societieshave autonomousneeds, goals, and interests,
and structuralexplanationsare a distinctivetypeof explanation.
Methodologicalindividualistsdisagree.As theyunderstandit,theindi-
vidual/society relationshipis reciprocalratherthan unidirectional.Pur-
pose and goal directednessare propertiesof individualsand not of so-
cieties. Spencer's methodologicalsuppositions allow for purposive
individual behavior but not for autonomoussystemneeds and goals.
Recognizingthisis importantbecause, as Hirst(1976) pointsout,thereis
a fundamentaldifference betweenacknowledgingthatthereare teleolog-
ical elementsin social actionand constructing teleologicalexplanations.
Spencer'sLamarckismpreventedhimfromcapitalizingon thisinsight,
however. Because he misunderstoodthe relationshipbetweenorganic
evolutionand superorganicevolution,Lamarckismis morethan just a
source analogy forthe mechanismof social evolution.Individualsand
societiesdo reciprocallyinfluenceeach other,as Spencerargued,butthis
influenceis nottransmitted genetically,as he also argued.Organicevolu-
tionand superorganicevolutioncan and mustbe separated.
This separationwould severtheLamarckism-methodological individ-
ualismconnectionthatformsthecoreof Spencer'stheoryofsocial evolu-
tion.This, in turn,would permitthesociologicalexplanationoftheindi-
vidual/societyrelationshipthat Spencer's evolutionarytheorylacked.
Because this explanation would be individualistic,the result would
be an evolutionarytheoryof social changethat,in termsof explanatory
formand methodologicalsuppositions,convergeswithso-calledantievo-
lutionarytheoriesof social change like Giddens's (1984) structuration
theory.
12
This convergencesignalsa need fora reconstructionand not a decon-
structionof evolutionarytheoryin sociology.The evolutionary
interpre-
tationof Spencerianevolutionismdeveloped in this paper suggestsone

12 The mechanism ofchangein an individualist

evolutionary
theoryis universal,but,
in everyinstance,theoutcomedependson a uniqueconfigurationofhistorical
events.
Spencer'stheoryof social evolutionmakesit clearthatenvironmentalcontingency,
historicalspecificity,
and probabilismare domainassumptions of an evolutionary
theoryof change.

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AmericanJournalof Sociology

reconstruction strategy.Building a methodologicalconnectionbetween

Spencerianand neoevolutionary theorieswould contestthemethodologi-
cal plank in the deconstructionprogram,thus furtherundermining the
case againstevolutionary is practicable,
theoryin sociology.This strategy
ofcourse,onlybecause Spencer'sis an evolutionary theoryin themodern
biologicalsenseoftheterm"evolution."Settingtherecordstraighton the
explanatoryformof Spencer'stheoryof social change,then,is the first
stepin developingan argumentfora constructive roleforSpencerin the
revivalof evolutionarytheoryin sociology.

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