MINDANAO STATE UNIVERSITY

Torts and Damages

1. US vs. Juanillo G.R. No. L-7255 October 3, 1912

( An appeal from Teodoro Juanillo from a sentence imposed to him for the crime of negligent homicide)

Facts: Ponciano Leal was struck by the car driven by Juanillo on the public highway. According to the witnesses
presented by the prosecution, they were walking abreast along the said road,, they heard a noise behind them, and
on turning around saw an automobile approaching. One of them called out immediately and when he turned around
to look for Leal, who already lying on the ground. On the other hand, the defense alleged that at that time the
chauffeur put on his brakes, used his exhaust, and blew his horn.

Issue: Whether or not Juanillo is negligent

Held: Yes, Juanillo is negligent.

Negligence is want of care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute term, and its
application depends upon the situation of the parties, and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances
reasonably impose. Where the danger is great a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a
want of ordinary care under the circumstances.

In this case, the negligence of the defendant consisted in his failure to recognize the great injury that would accrue to
the deceased from the collision. In failing to so check the speed of his machine when he saw the deceased in front of
him to give him sufficient control to avert the injury or to stop it entirely, when he knew that if he continued at the
same speed at which he was going he would collide with the deceased, not only shows negligence but reckless
negligence in a marked degree.

-Article 568 of the Penal Code provides that any person who by reckless imprudence shall commit any act.

-In the instant case, Juanillo being in charge of the powerful machine, capable of doing great damage if not skillfully
manipulated, was bound to use a high degree of care to avoid injuring these native farmers, who had a common right
to the highway.
2. Ylarde vs. Aquino G.R. No. L33722 July 29, 1988

Facts: Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School in Pangasinan while Edgardo Aquino was
a teacher therein. The school had several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop destroyed in
World War II. Aquino decided to help clear the area. So after the classes, he gathered 18 of his male pupils, aged 10-
11, and ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in making a hole where the stone can be buried. The
following day he called 4 of the 18 students, including Novelito Ylarde to complete the excavation. When the depth
was right enough to accommodate the concrete block, Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole. Aquino left the
children to level the loose soil while he went to see another teacher for the key to the school workroom where he can
get some rope. Before leaving, he told the children “not to touch the stone”. After he left, 3 of the children playfully
jumped into the pit. Then, without any warning at all, the remaining one jumped on top of the concrete block causing it
to slide down towards the opening. Unfortunately, Novelito Ylarde was pinned to the wall which led to his death 3
days after. The parents of Ylarde filed a suit for damages against both Aquino and Soriano.

Issue:Can Aquino and Soriano be held liable for damages?

Held:

Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be
answerable for torts committed by their students while in a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the school
who can be held liable. It was held in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals that:

Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the
student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general
rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as
an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students
except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable.
Following the canon of reddendo singula sinquilis 'teachers' should apply to the words "pupils and students' and
'heads of establishments of arts and trades to the word "apprentices."

In this case, Soriano, as principal, cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads is an academic
school and not a school of arts and trades. Besides, as clearly admitted by private respondent Aquino, private
respondent Soriano did not give any instruction regarding the digging. Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure
to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons. His negligent act in leaving his pupils in
such a dangerous site has a direct causal connection to the death of the child Ylarde. Left by themselves, it was but
natural for the children to play around. Everything that occurred was the natural and probable effect of the negligent
acts of private respondent Aquino. Needless to say, the child Ylarde would not have died were it not for the unsafe
situation created by private respondent Aquino which exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to real danger.
3. Abiad vs. Ablayda G.R. No. 172200 July 06, 2010

ALbayda was on his way to work when all of a sudden he was bumped and side swiped by a taxi. He suffered
serious physical injures.

On August 27, 1997, Respondent Albayda was on his way to the office to report for duty as Master Sergeant
of the Philippine Air Force, riding a bicycle along the streets. The taxi driver Completo, the petitioner,
bumped and side swiped him, causing respondent Albayda suffered from serious physical injuries. Albayda
was brought to the hospital and was confined twice therein from August 27, 1997 to February 11, 1998 and
February 23, 1998 until March 22, 1998, respectively, due to fracture in his left knee which necessitated his
stay in the hospital for several months. Then after, he underwent medical physiotherapy for more than a year.
A barangay conciliation was effected between the parties, but failed. Thus, this prompted Albayda to file a
complaint for physical injuries through reckless imprudence against Completo. On the other hand,
Completo filed a counter-charge of damage to property through reckless imprudence against Albayda.
Albayda manifested his reservation to file a separate civil action for damages against petitioners Completo
and taxi owner/operator Abiad in the MTC. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Albayda and against the
driver and taxi owner/operator. They are ordered to pay actual damages, moral damages and Attorney’s fee.
Completo and Abiad filed an appeal, however, CA affirmed the MTC’s decision with modification on the
award of damages.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not petitioner driver Completo liable for negligence against Albayda.

whether Abiad failed to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of the family;

Ruling:

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict.

As to the liability of taxi owner/operator Abiad, the court declared that when an when an injury is caused by
the negligence of an employee, a legal presumption instantly arises that the employer was negligent.

It was proven by a preponderance of evidence that Completo failed to exercise reasonable diligence in
driving the taxicab because he was over-speeding at the time he hit the bicycle ridden by Albayda . Such
negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the serious physical injuries sustained by Albayda.
Completo did not slow down even when he approached the intersection of 8th and 11th Streets of VAB. It was
also proven that Albayda had the right of way, considering that he reached the intersection ahead of
Completo. Further, considering the fact that usually more diligence will be required of a motorist than a
bicyclist in discharging his duty of care to the other because of the physical advantages the automobile has
over the bicycle.

As to the liability of taxi owner/operator Abiad, the court declared that when an when an injury is caused by
the negligence of an employee, a legal presumption instantly arises that the employer was negligent. This
presumption may be rebutted only by a clear showing on the part of the employer that he exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. However, in this case,
the protestation of Abiad to escape liability is short of the diligence required under the law. Abiad’s evidence
consisted entirely of testimonial evidence, and the unsubstantiated and self-serving testimony of Abiad was
insufficient to overcome the legal presumption that he was negligent in the selection and supervision of his
driver. He failed to prove the due diligence required by law as employer, thus he is also primarily and directly
liable with the driver Completo against the respondent.
The CA deleted the award for actual damages because respondent Albayda failed to present documentary
evidence to establish with certainty the amount he incurred during his hospitalization and treatment. The
court finds temperate damages reasonable to award since pecuniary loss is apparently suffered however the
amount cannot be ascertained. Attorney’s fee is hereby deleted for failure to prove that petitioner acted in
bad faith in refusing to satisfy respondent’s just and valid claim.

4. Pangonorom vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 143380 April 11, 2005

Facts:

On July 10, 1989, Carlos R. Berba was driving a car belonging to his mother.

They were cruising along EDSA when their car was bumped from behind by MMTC Passenger Bus
driven by herein accused Olimpio Pangonorom thereby causing damages to their car which was
estimated at P42,600.00 . The accused left his bus but they came to know his name is Olimpio
Pangonorom. Their car was a total wreck as shown in its photographs.

-The MMTC bus driven by the accused was running very fast, kept on switching lane until it finally
occupied the second lane and bumped his car. Accused Olimpio Pangonorom testified that he was a
driver since 1976, having worked as a truck driver in Mindanao. The trial held the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple slight physical injuries and
damage to property.

Issue:

Whether or not MMTC, bus company, is estopped and therefore subsidiary liable to the incident.

Ruling:

No. T here is as yet no occasion to speak of enforcing the employer’s subsidiary civil liability unless it appears that the
accused-employee’s primary liability cannot in the first instance be satisfied because of insolvency. This fact cannot
be known until some time after the verdict of conviction shall have become final. And even if it appears prima facie
that execution against the employee cannot be satisfied, execution against the employer will not issue as a matter of
course. The procedure for the enforcement of a judgment will have to be followed. Once the judgment of

conviction against Olimpio becomes final and executory, and after the writ of execution issued against him is
returned unsatisfied because of his insolvency, only then can a subsidiary writ of execution be issued against the
MMTC after a hearing set for that precise purpose. It is still too early to hold the MMTC subsidiarily liable with its
accused-employee considering that there is no proof yet of Olimpio’s insolvency.
ISSUE:
Can a subsidiary writ of execution be issued against the MMTC?

HELD:
No.

The subsidiary liability of the employer arises only after conviction of the
employee in the criminal action.

In the present case, there exists an employer-employee relationship

between petitioners, the MMTC is engaged in the transportation industry, and
Olimpio has been adjudged guilty of a wrongful act and found to have committed
the offense in the discharge of his duties. However, there is no proof here of
Olimpio’s insolvency. The judgment of conviction against Olimpio has not attained
finality. This being so, no writ of execution can issue against him to satisfy his civil
liability. Only after proof of the accused-employee’s insolvency may the subsidiary
liability of his employer be enforced.
5. Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Services Inc. vs. Phoenix Assurance G.R. No. 162467 May 08,
2009
Guys, please see link kay lisod sya icopy paste dri. Thank
you.-https://lawstudentdigest.blogspot.com/p/mindanao-terminal-andbrokerageservice.html

Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Services Inc. vs. Phoenix Assurance G.R. No. 162467 May 08, 2009

Del Monte Philippines, Inc. contracted petitioner a stevedoring company, to load and stow a
shipment of 146,288 cartons of fresh green Philippine bananas and 15,202 cartons of fresh
pineapples belonging to Del Monte Fresh Produce International, Inc. into the cargo hold of the
vessel M/V Mistrau. The vessel was docked at the port of Davao City and the goods were to be
transported by it to the port of Inchon, Korea Del Monte Produce insured the shipment under an
“open cargo policy” with private respondent Phoenix A, a non-life insurance company, and
private respondent McGee , the underwriting manager/agent of Phoenix. It was then discovered
upon discharge that some of the cargo was in bad condition.

Del Monte filed a claim under the open cargo policy for the damages to its shipment.
McGee’s Marine Claims Insurance Adjuster evaluated the claim and recommended that
payment in the amount of $210,266.43 be made. A check for the recommended amount was
sent to Del Monte Produce; the latter then issued a subrogation receipt to Phoenix and McGee.
Phoenix and McGee instituted an action for damages against Mindanao Terminal in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) which held that the only participation of Mindanao Terminal was to
load the cargoes on board the M/V Mistrau under the direction and supervision of the ship’s
officers, who would not have accepted the cargoes on board the vessel and signed the
foreman’s report unless they were properly arranged and tightly secured to withstand voyage
across the open seas. Accordingly, Mindanao Terminal cannot be held liable for whatever
happened to the cargoes after it had loaded and stowed them. Moreover, citing the survey
report, it was found by the RTC that the cargoes were damaged on account of a typhoon which
M/V Mistrau had encountered during the voyage. It was further held that Phoenix and McGee
had no cause of action against Mindanao Terminal because the latter, whose services were
contracted by Del Monte, a distinct corporation from Del Monte Produce, had no contract with
the assured Del Monte Produce. The RTC dismissed the complaint and awarded the
counterclaim of Mindanao Terminal in the amount of P83,945.80 as actual damages and
P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees. The actual damages were awarded as reimbursement for the
expenses incurred by Mindanao Terminal’s lawyer in attending the hearings in the case wherein
he had to travel all the way from Metro Manila to Davao City.
Phoenix and McGee appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed and
set aside the decision of the RTC and ordered Mindanao Terminal to pay Phoenix and McGee
“the total amount of $210,265.45 plus legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid
and attorney’s fees of 20% of the claim.” It sustained Phoenix’s and McGee’s argument that the
damage in the cargoes was the result of improper stowage by Mindanao Terminal. It imposed
on Mindanao Terminal, as the stevedore of the cargo, the duty to exercise extraordinary
diligence in loading and stowing the cargoes. It further held that even with the absence of a
contractual relationship between Mindanao Terminal and Del Monte Produce, the cause of
action of Phoenix and McGee could be based on quasidelict under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. Mindanao Terminal filed a motion for reconsideration before Court of Appeals which was
denied . Hence, the present petition for review.

ISSUE/S:
1) Was Mindanao Terminal careless and negligent in the loading and stowage of the cargoes
onboard M/V Mistrau making it liable for damages?
2) Was the awarding of attorney’s fees valid?

HELD:

1) Yes.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the complaint filed by Phoenix and McGee
against Mindanao Terminal, from which the present case has arisen, states a cause of action.
The present action is based on quasi-delict, arising from the negligent and careless loading and
stowing of the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce. Even assuming that both Phoenix and
McGee have only been subrogated in the rights of Del Monte Produce, who is not a party to the
contract of service between Mindanao Terminal and Del Monte, still the insurance carriers may
have a cause of action in light of the Court’s consistent ruling that the act that breaks the
contract may be also a tort.

In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which
breaches the contract.

In the present case, Phoenix and McGee are not suing for damages for injuries arising
from the breach of the contract of service but from the alleged negligent manner by which
Mindanao Terminal handled the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce. Despite the absence
of contractual relationship between Del Monte Produce and Mindanao Terminal, the allegation
of negligence on the part of the defendant should be sufficient to establish a cause of action
arising from quasidelict.

2) No, the Court finds no basis for the award of attorney’s fees in favor of petitioner.

The present case is clearly not an unfounded civil action against the plaintiff as there is
no showing that it was instituted for the mere purpose of vexation or injury. It is not sound public
policy to set a premium to the right to litigate where such right is exercised in good faith, even if
erroneously. Likewise, the RTC erred in awarding P83,945.80 actual damages to Mindanao
Terminal. Although actual expenses were incurred by Mindanao Terminal in relation to the trial
of this case in Davao City, the lawyer of Mindanao Terminal incurred expenses for plane fare,
hotel accommodations and food, as well as other miscellaneous expenses, as he attended the
trials coming all the way from Manila. But there is no showing that Phoenix and McGee made a
false claim against Mindanao Terminal resulting in the protracted trial of the case necessitating
the incurrence of expenditures.
6. PLDT vs. CA G.R. No. L-57097 September 29, 1989

Facts:

A jeep driven by private respondent Esteban fell into an open trench, the excavation was due to the
installation of an underground conduit system by PLDT, the said open trench was without cover and
any warning signs.

As a result the private respondent and his wife sustained injuries, and their vehicle was also
damaged.

PLDT in its defense, imputes the injuries to the private respondents own negligence. Also, it alleges
independent contractor, should be responsible for the excavation was performed by them.

As for Barte, they alleged that they have complied with the due standards in performing their
work, and that it was not aware of the accident involving the Estebans.

Court of Appeals held that respondent Esteban spouses were negligent and consequently absolved
petitioner PLDT from the claim for damages.
Upon respondent’s second motion to reconsideration, CA reversed its decision, following he decision
of Trial Court and held PLDT liable for damages.

Issue:
Whether or not PLDT is liable

Held:

NO
It is basic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to
exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof

We find no error in the findings of the respondent court in its original decision that the accident
which befell private respondents was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban
and was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT.

The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only
purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the
site. The private respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations.

It was not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to
fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane
towards the accident mound. As opined in some quarters, the omission to perform a duty, such
as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only
when the doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the injury. I. It is both a societal
norm and necessity that one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own
protection. Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to
avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident
of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence
and
location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger,
hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.

A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such
fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established
by competent evidence. Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause of action has the burden in the first
instance of proving the existence of the same if contested, otherwise his action must fail.

7. Kapalaran Bus Line vs. Angel Coronado et. al G.R. No. 85331 August 25, 1989

FACTS:

A jeepney driven by Grajera reachING the intersection where there is a traffic sign “yield”, it
stopped cautiously treated the intersection as a thru stop.

-a street on which a vehicle must stop just before entering a through street

The Kapalaran Bus Line was on its way to the interesection, on its way towards Manila. As the KBL
neared the intersection, Llamoso inquired from his conductor if they could still accommodate passengers
and learning that they were already full, he decided to bypass Pila and instead, to proceed along the
national highway. Virgilio admitted that there was another vehicle ahead of him.

The general rule is that the vehicle on the national highway has the right of way as against a feeder road.
Another general rule is that a vehicle coming from the right has the right of way voer the vehicle coming
from the left. The general rule on right of way may be invoked only if both the vehicles approach the
intersection at almost the same time. In the case at bar, both roads are national roads. Also, the KBL Bus
was still far from the intersection when the jeepney reached the same. As testified by Atty. Conrado
Manicad, he stopped at the intersection to give way to the jeepney driven by Grajera. However, there was
a collision between the jeepney and the bus. The KBL bus ignored the stopped vehicles and the other
vehicles behind Atty. Manicad and overtook both vehicles at the intersection therefore causing the
accident.

Kapalaran filed a suit against the owner of the jeepney and its driver. However, it lost the case.
Furthermore, the Court did not hold as liable the driver of the bus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not KBL is accountable, considering the driver of the bus was not held liable by the Courts.

HELD:

Yes, Kapalaran is liable.

The driver violated certain general rules, and provisions in the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
Hence, he can be presumed negligent. The patent and gross negligence on the part of Kapalaran’s driver
raised the legal presumption that Kapalaran as employer was guilty of negligence either in the selection
or supervision of its bus drivers. Where the employer is held liable for damages, it has of course a right of
recourse against its own negligent employee. If petitioner Kapalaran was interested in maintaining its right
of recourse against or reimbursement from its own driver, it should have appealed from that portion of the
trial court’s decision which had failed to hold the bus driver accountable for damages. The liability of an
employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior
recourse against the negligent on its own part.

The law requires Kapalaran as common carrier to exercise extraordinary diligence in carrying and
transporting their passengers safely “as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.” In requiring the highest
possible degree of diligence from common carriers and creating a presumption of negligence against
them, the law compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers. The law seeks to stop and prevent
the slaughter and maiming of people (whether passengers or not) and the destruction of property
(whether freight or not) on our highways by buses, the very size and power of which seem often to
inflame the minds of their drivers.

8. Guillang vs. Bedania G. R. No. 162987 May 21, 2009

FACTS:

Guillang, with three companions was driving his brand new car to Manila. On the other hand, Bedania was driving a ten-wheeler
cargo truck towards Tagaytay. Along the highway and the road leading to the Orchard Golf Course, Bedania negotiated a U-turn.
When the truck entered the opposite lane of the highway, Guillang's car hit the gas tank at the truck’s right middle portion. The truck
dragged Genaros car some five meters to the right of the road.

As a consequence, all the passengers of the car were rushed to the hospital for treatment. Because of severe injuries, one of the
passengers was later transferred to another hospital. Consequently, he died due to the injuries he sustained from the collision. The
car was a total wreck while the truck sustained minor damage.

ISSUE:

Whether Bedania was grossly negligent for recklessly maneuvering the truck by making a sudden U-turn in the highway without
due regard to traffic rules and the safety of other motorists.

RULING :

Yes.

Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the
time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. In this case, the report showed that the truck, while making the U-turn,
failed to signal a violation of traffic rules. The police records also stated that, after the collision, Bedania escaped and abandoned the
petitioners and his truck. This is another violation of a traffic regulation. Therefore, the presumption arises that Bedania
was negligent at the time of the mishap. The point of impact was on the lane where the car was cruising. Therefore, the car had
every right to be on that road and the car had the right of way over the truck that was making a U-turn. Clearly, the truck encroached
upon the cars lane when it suddenly made the U-turn.

It is not normal for a truck to make a U-turn on a highway. If Bedania wanted to change direction, he should seek an intersection
where it is safer to maneuver the truck. Bedania should have also turned on his signal lights and made sure that the highway was
clear of vehicles from the opposite direction before executing the U-turn.
9. Aonuevo vs. CA G.R No. 130003 October 20, 2004

Facts: Villagracia was traveling along Boni Ave. on his bicycle, while Añonuevo,traversing the opposite lane was
driving a Lancer car owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of Añonuevo’s brother. Añonuevo was in the
course of making a leftturn towards Libertad Street when the collision occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuries
and had to undergo four operations. Villagracia instituted an action for damages against P&G Phils., Inc. and
Añonuevo before the RTC. He had also filed a criminal complaint against Añonuevobefore the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Mandaluyong, but the latter was subsequently acquitted of the criminal charge. Añonuevo claims that
Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed to register his bicycle or install safety gadgets. He posits that
Article 2185 of the Civil Code applies by analogy. Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed
that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating any traffic
regulation.

Issues:

A. Whether or not Art. 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply to non-motorized vehicles, making Villagracia
presumptively negligent.

B. Whether or not Villagracia was negligent for failure to comply with traffic regulations.

C. Whether or not Villagracia is guilty of contributory negligence

Held: No to all.

A. Application of Article 2185 Aonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed to register his
bicycle or install safety gadgets thereon. He posits that Article 2185 of the New Civil Code applies by analogy. The
provision reads: Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating any traffic regulation. Aonuevo hypothesizes
that Article 2185 should apply by analogy to all types of vehicles [23]. He points out that modern-day travel is more
complex now than when the Code was enacted, the number and types of vehicles now in use far more numerous
than as of then. He even suggests that at the time of the enactment of the Code, the legislators must have seen that
only motor vehicles were of such public concern that they had to be specifically mentioned, yet today, the interaction
of vehicles of all types and nature has inescapably become matter of public concern so as to expand the application
of the law to be more responsive to the times. [24] At the time Article 2185 was formulated, there existed a whole
array of non-motorized vehicles ranging from humanpowered contraptions on wheels such as bicycles, scooters, and
animal-drawn carts such as calesas and carromata. These modes of transport were even more prevalent on the
roads of the 1940s and 1950s than they are today, yet the framers of the New Civil Code chose then to exclude these
alternative modes from the scope of Article 2185 with the use of the term motorized vehicles. If Aonuevo seriously
contends that the application of Article 2185 be expanded due to the greater interaction today of all types of vehicles,
such argument contradicts historical experience. The ratio of motorized vehicles as to non-motorized vehicles, as it
stood in 1950, was significantly lower than as it stands today. This will be certainly affirmed by statistical data,
assuming such has been compiled, much less confirmed by persons over sixty. Aonuevos characterization of a
vibrant intra-road dynamic between motorized and non-motorized vehicles is more apropos to the past than to the
present. There is pertinent basis for segregating between motorized and non-motorized vehicles. A motorized
vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion. Is capable of greater speeds and acceleration than non-
motorized vehicles. At the sam etime, motorized vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury or damage in
the event of an accident or collision. This is due to a combination of factors peculiar to themotor vehicle, such as the
greater speed, its relative greater bulk of mass, and greater combustibility due to the use of fuel.

B. Negligience on the part of Villagracia The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by the
personal judgment of the actor in a given situation, but rather, it is the law which determines what would be reckless
or negligent. Añonuevo asserts that Villagracia was negligent as the latter had transgressed traffic regulations.
However, Añonuevo was speeding as hemade the left turn, and by his own admission, he had seen Villagracia at a
good distance of ten (10) meters. Had he been decelerating, as he should, as he made the turn, Aonuevo would have
had ample opportunity to avoid hitting Villagracia, such negligent act was the proximate cause of the accident. Even
assuming that Añonuevo had failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle was not equipped with headlights, such
lapse on the cyclist’s part would not have acquitted the driver of his duty to slow down as he proceeded to make the
left turn.

C. Contributory Negligience To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he
performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health
and body.[60] To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate,
between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when
it contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its occurrence.[61] As between Añonuevo and
Villagracia, the lower courts adjudged Añonuevo assolely responsible for the accident. The petition does not
demonstrate why this finding should be reversed. It is hard to imagine that the same result would not have occurred
even if Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped with safety equipment.

10. Layugan vs. IAC G.R. No. 73998 November 14, 1988

Facts: Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo Isidro, alleging that while at Baretbet,
Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was parked
along the right side of the National Highway; that defendant's truck, driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the
plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured and hospitalized where he incurred and will incur more expenses as he
recuperates from said injuries; Plaintiff's right leg was amputated and that because of said injuries he would be
deprived of a lifetime income.
To free themselves from liability, defendants Isidro [owner] and Serrano [driver] averred that he knows his
responsibilities as a driver and further contends that it was the negligence of plaintiff that was the proximate cause of
the accident. They alleged that plaintiff parked his truck in a manner which occupied a part of the highway and he did
not even put a warning sign.

Subsequently, a third-party complaint was filed by the defendant against his insurer, the Travellers Multi Indemnity
Corporation; that the third-party plaintiff [Isidro], without admitting his liability to the plaintiff, claimed that the third-
party defendant [Travellers] is liable to the former for contribution, indemnity and subrogation by virtue of their
insurance contract which covers the insurer's liability for damages arising from death, bodily injuries and damage to
property. The Insurance company argued that it is only liable for the amount agreed in the policy and the complaint
was premature since no claim was made to it.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Petitioners. The CA reversed the decision, stating that it is the petitioners who were
negligent since they did not exercise caution by putting warning signs that their truck is park on the shoulder of the
highway.

Issue:
Whether or not Isidro is liable as employer of Serrano.

Held: Yes.
The SC held that the CA erroneously appreciated the evidence. It was proven that the petitioner placed a warning
sign within 3 to 4 meters from their truck in the form of a lighted kerosene lamp. The existence of this warning sings
was corroborated by Serrano, respondent's driver, and further stated that when he saw a parked truck, he kept on
stepping on the brake pedal but it did not function. Thus despite this warning signs, the truck recklessly driven by
Serrano and owned by Respondent Isidro bumped the truck of petitioner.

The private respondent is sued under Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code. In the latter,
when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that
there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after selection, or both. Such presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure and
consequently, may be rebutted. If follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in
the selection and in the supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. In disclaiming liability for the incident, the private
respondent stresses that the negligence of his employee has already been adequately overcome by his driver's
statement that he knew his responsibilities as a driver and that the truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in
driving.

We do not agree with the private respondent in his submission. In the first place, it is clear that the driver did not know
his responsibilities because he apparently did not check his vehicle before he took it on the road. If he did he could
have discovered earlier that the brake fluid pipe on the right was cut, and could have repaired it and thus the accident
could have been avoided. Moveover, to our mind, the fact that the private respondent used to intruct his driver to be
careful in his driving, that the driver was licensed, and the fact that he had no record of any accident, as found by the
respondent court, are not sufficient to destroy the finding of negligence of the Regional Trial Court given the facts
established at the trial. The private respondent or his mechanic, who must be competent, should have conducted a
thorough inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to drive it.

In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case, we hold that Isidro failed to prove that the diligence of a good
father of a family in the supervision of his employees which would exculpate him from solidary liability with his driver
to the petitioner. But even if we concede that the diligence of a good father of a family was observed by Isidro in the
supervision of his driver, there is not an iota of evidence on record of the observance by Isidro of the same quantum
of diligence in the supervision of his mechanic, if any, who would be directly in charge in maintaining the road
worthiness of his (Isidro's) truck. But that is not all. There is paucity of proof that Isidro exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection of his driver, Daniel Serrano, as well as in the selection of his mechanic, if any,
in order to insure the safe operation of his truck and thus prevent damage to others. Accordingly, the responsibility of
Isidro as employer treated in Article 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code has not ceased.

11. Professional Services Inc. vs. Agana G.R. No. 126297 January 31, 2007

Facts: On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General Hospital because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody
anal discharge. After a series of medical examinations, Dr. Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from Cancer of the sigmoid. On April 11,
1984, Dr. Ampil assisted by the medical staff of the Medical City Hospital performed an Anterior resection surgery on Natividad. He found that
the malignancy on her sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained
the consent of Natividad’s husband, Enrique Agana, to permit Dr. Juan Fuentes to perform hysterectomy on her. After Dr. Fuentes had
completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the operation and closed the incision after searching for the missing 2 gauzes as
indicated by the assisting nurses but failed to locate it. After a couple of days, Natividad complained of excruciating pains in her anal region but
Dr. Ampil said it is a natural consequence of the operation/surgery and recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the cancerous
nodes which were not removed during the operation. Natividad and her husband went to the US to seek further treatment and she was declared
free from cancer. A piece of gauze portruding from Natividad’s vagina was found by her daughter which was then removed by hand by Dr. Ampil
and assured that the pains will vanished. However, it didn’t. The pains intensified prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the Polymedic
General Hospital. While confined there, Dr. Ramon Guttierez detected the presence of another foreign object in her vagina – a foul smelling gauze
measuring 1.5 inches in width which badly infected her vagina. A recto-vaginal fistula had forced stool to excrete through her vagina. Another
surgical operation was needed to remedy the damage.

Issue: Whether or not Dr. Ampil and Fuentes are liable for medical malpractice and the PSI for damages due to the negligence of the said
doctors.

Held: Yes. No. Yes. An operation requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is not complete until the sponges are properly removed
and it is settled that the leaving of sponges or other foreign substances in the wound after the incision has been closed is at least prima facie
negligence by the operating surgeon. To put it simply, such act is considered so inconsistent with due care as to raise inference of
negligence. There are even legions of authorities to the effect that such act is negligence per se.

This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more appropriately, medical negligence. To successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient must
only prove that a health care provider either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he
did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient. Simply puts the
elements are duty, breach, injury, and proximate causation. Dr. Ampil, as the lead surgeon, had the duty to remove all foreign objects, such as
gauzes, from Natividad’s body before closure of the incision. When he failed to do so, it was his duty to inform Natividad about it. Dr. Ampil
breached both duties. Such breach caused injury to Natividad, necessitating her further examination by American doctors and another surgery.
That Dr. Ampil’s negligence is the proximate cause of Natividad’s injury could be traced from his act of closing the incision despite the
information given by the attending nurses that 2 pieces of gauze were still missing. That they were later on extracted from Natividad’s vagina
established the causal link between Dr. Ampil’s negligence and the injury. And what further aggravated such injury was his deliberate
concealment of this missing gauzes from the knowledge of Natividad and her family.

The requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor are:

1. Occurrence of an injury;
2. The thing which caused the injury was under the control and management of the defendant;
3. The occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things would not have happened if those who had control or management
used proper care, and;
4. The absence of explanation by the defendant

Of the foregoing, the most instrumental is the “Control and management of the thing which caused the injury.”

Under the “Captain of the ship” rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel
connected with the operation.

The knowledge of any of the staff of Medical City constitutes knowledge of PSI.

The doctrine of corporate responsibility, has the duty to see that it meets the standards of responsibilities for the care of patients. Such duty
includes the proper supervision of the members of its medical staff. The hospital accordingly has the duty to make a reasonable effort to monitor
and over see the treatment prescribed and administered by the physician practicing in its premises.
12. Singapore Airlines vs. CA G.R. No. 107356 March 31, 1995

FACTS: Sancho Rayos was an overseas contract worker who had a renewed contract with the Arabian American Oil
Company (Aramco) for the period covering April 16, 1980, to April 15, 1981. Part of Aramco's policy to its employees
returning to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia from Manila are allowed to claim reimbursement for amounts paid for excess
baggage of up to 50 kilograms, as long as it is properly supported by receipt.

April 1980 - Rayos took a Singapore Airlines (SIA) flight to report for his new assignment, with a 50-kilogram excess
baggage for which he paid P4,147.50. Aramco reimbursed said. amount upon presentation of the excess baggage
ticket.

December 1980 - Rayos learned that he was one of several employees being investigated by Aramco for fraudulent
claim and asked his wife Beatriz in Manila to seek a written confirmation from SIA that he indeed paid for an excess
baggage of 50 kilograms.

In SIA’s records- mager Johnny Koo notified Beatriz who was assisted by a lawyer and threatened them of filing a
lawsuit, that SIA is unable to issue certification requested by the spouses citing that only 3 kilograms were entered as
excess and not 50 kilograms

April 1981 - Aramco gave Rayos his travel documents without a return visa. His employment contract was not
renewed.

August 1981 - spouses Rayos, sued SIA for damages stating his non renewal was caused by SIA.

SIA claimed that it was not liable to the Rayoses because the tampering was committed by its handling agent,
Philippine Airlines (PAL) and filed a Third party complaint against PAL.

PAL - countered that its personnel did not collect any charges for excess baggage; that it had no participation in the
tampering of any excess baggage ticket; and that if any tampering was made, it was done by Singapore Airline’s
personnel.

RTC – rendered Judgement in favor of plaintiff Rayoses and held Singapore airlines liable for damages

On 3rd party complaint, PAL was also liable to the Rayoses

All parties appealed to the CA

SIA’s appeal – dismissed for non payment of docket fees

Rayos – withdrew appeal when SIA satisfied judgment of RTC and paid P802, 435.00

On the appeal of PAL - claimed that the spouses Rayos had no valid claim against SIA because it was the inefficiency
of Rayos which led to the nonrenewal of his contract with Aramco, and not the alleged tampering of his excess
bagged ticket.

Petitioner SIA argued that the only issue in the said appeal is whether or not it was entitled to reimbursement from
PAL, ( citing the case of Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines v. Tempongko). SIA set up the
defense that the excess baggage ticket was indeed tampered with but it was committed by PAL's personnel.

Appellate court granted PAL's appeal and absolved it from any liability to SIA.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT

RULING: YES

There is no question that a third-party defendant is allowed to set up in his answer the defenses which the third-party
plaintiff (original defendant) has or may have to the plaintiff's claim. There are, however, special circumstances
present in this case which preclude third-party defendant PAL from benefiting from the said principle.

However, while the third-party defendant; would benefit from a victory by the third-party plaintiff against the plaintiff,
this is true only when the third-party plaintiff and third-party defendant have non-contradictory defenses. Here, the
defendant and third-party defendant had no common defense against the plaintiffs' (Rayos) complaint, and they were
even blaming each other for the fiasco.

One of the defenses available to SIA was that the plaintiffs had no cause of action, that is, it had no valid claim
against SIA. SIA investigated the matter and discovered that tampering was, indeed, committed, not by its personnel
but by PAL's. This became its defense as well as its main cause of action in the third-party complaint it filed against
PAL.

13. Far East Shipping vs. CA G.R. No. 130068 October 01, 1998

FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

FACTS:

· M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of
Manila and was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its berthing space. Gavino, who was
assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association to conduct the docking maneuvers for the safe
berthing, boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the
master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him.

· After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted
anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm
and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers.

· When the vessel reached the landmark, one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped.
When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped.

· Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with two (2) shackles,
were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not
slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members.

· After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who
was then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast.

· Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code.
Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into
the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier as well as the vessel.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether the pilot of a commercial vessel, under compulsory pilotage, is liable for the damage caused by
the vessel to the pier for his negligence?

(2) Whether the owner of the vessel be liable if the damage is caused by the concurrent negligence of the
master of the vessel and the pilot under a compulsory pilotage?

HELD: GAVINO AND KAVANKOV ARE BOTH NEGLIGENT.

(1) YES. Generally speaking, the pilot supersedes the master for the time being in the command and
navigation of the ship, and his orders must be obeyed in all matters connected with her navigation. He
becomes the master pro hac vice and should give all directions as to speed, course, stopping and reversing
anchoring, towing and the like. And when a licensed pilot is employed in a place where pilotage is
compulsory, it is his duty to insist on having effective control of the vessel, or to decline to act as pilot.
Under certain systems of foreign law, the pilot does not take entire charge of the vessel, but is deemed
merely the adviser of the master, who retains command and control of the navigation even in localities where
pilotage is compulsory. It is quite common for states and localities to provide for compulsory pilotage, and
safety laws have been enacted requiring vessels approaching their ports, with certain exceptions, to take on
board pilots duly licensed under local law. The purpose of these laws is to create a body of seamen
thoroughly acquainted with the harbor, to pilot vessels seeking to enter or depart, and thus protect life and
property from the dangers of navigation.

Pursuant to an ADMIN ORDER requiring compulsory pilotage, Capt. GAVINO was assigned to pilot MV
Pavlodar into the port. Upon assuming such office as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the
universally accepted high standards of care and diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have
skill and knowledge in respect to navigation in the particular waters over which his license extends superior
to and more to be trusted than that of the master. He is not held to the highest possible degree of skill and
care, but must have and exercise the ordinary skill and care demanded by the circumstances, and usually
shown by an expert in his profession. Under extraordinary circumstances, a pilot must exercise
extraordinary care. In this case, Capt. Gavino failed to measure up to such strict standard of care and
diligence required of pilots in the performance of their duties. As pilot, he should have made sure that his
directions were promptly and strictly followed . In this case, the Court found that GAVINO was negligent
because he was late in ordering the dropping of the anchor. Moroever, when he realized that the anchor did
not attach properly, Gavino ordered merely "half-astern". It took Gavino another minute to order a "full-
astern". By then, it was too late. The vessel's momentum could no longer be slowed and, barely a minute
thereafter, the bow of the vessel hit the apron of the pier.

(2) YES. The master is still in command of the vessel notwithstanding the presence of a pilot. A perusal of
Capt. Kabankov's testimony makes it apparent that he was remiss in the discharge of his duties as master of
the ship, leaving the entire docking procedure up to the pilot, instead of maintaining watchful vigilance over
this risky maneuver. The owners of a vessel are not personally liable for the negligent acts of a compulsory
pilot, but by admiralty law, the fault or negligence of a compulsory pilot is imputable to the vessel and it may
be held liable therefor in rem. Where, however, by the provisions of the statute the pilot is compulsory only in
the sense that his fee must be paid, and is not in compulsory charge of the vessel, there is no exemption
from liability. Even though the pilot is compulsory, if his negligence was not the sole cause of the injury, but
the negligence of the master or crew contributed thereto, the owners are liable. But the liability of the ship in
rem does not release the pilot from the consequences of his own negligence. The master is not entirely
absolved of responsibility with respect to navigation when a compulsory pilot is in charge. Except insofar as
their liability is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or her owners are liable for all damages caused by
the negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those in charge of the vessel. As a general rule, the owners
or those in possession and control of a vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate
damages caused to persons or property by reason of her negligent management or navigation.

14. Valenzuela vs. CA G.R. No. 115024 February 7, 1996

Facts:

At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue
Mitsubishi lancer from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home. While travelling along Aurora Blvd.,
she noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify
whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear right
tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that car’s condition, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1½
feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk.

She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when
she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of
defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of
the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under defendant’s
car. Plaintiff’s left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest
of the body. She was brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was found to have a “traumatic
amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee).” She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and
was eventually fitted with an artificial leg.

Issues:

1.) Whether or not Li was negligent.

2.) Whether or not Valenzuela was contributory negligent.

3.) Whether or not Alexander Commercial, Inc. Li’s employer is liable.

Held:

1.) Yes. A witness testified that Li’s car was being driven at a “very fast” speed, racing towards the general direction
of Araneta Avenue. He also saw the car hit Valenzuela, hurtling her against the windshield of the defendant’s
Mitsubishi Lancer, from where she eventually fell under the defendant’s car. Moreover the witness declared that he
observed Valenzuela’s car parked parallel and very near the sidewalk, contrary to Li’s allegation that Valenzuela’s car
was close to the center of the right lane.

2.) No. The Court held that Valenzuela was not negligent applying the emergency rule.

Under the “emergency rule,” an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act
without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless
the emergency was brought by his own negligence.
Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be considered to have
contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower extremities.
The emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making, and it
was evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions. Obviously, the only negligence ascribable was the
negligence of Li on the night of the accident.

3.) Yes. Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to the Court’s satisfaction, that it exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or
not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom
it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it
should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus
pater familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuela during the accident.

Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial, Inc. He admitted that his functions as Assistant Manager did
not require him to scrupulously keep normal office hours as he was required quite often to perform work outside the
office, visiting prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with company clients. These meetings, clearly, were not
strictly confined to routine hours because, as a managerial employee tasked with the job of representing his company
with its clients, meetings with clients were both social as well as work-related functions. The service car assigned to Li
by Alexander Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled both Li – as well as the corporation – to put up the front of a highly
successful entity, increasing the latter’s goodwill before its clientele. It also facilitated meeting between Li and its
clients by providing the former with a convenient mode of travel.

15. Tamargo vs. CA G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992

Facts: Adelberto Bundoc, 10 years old, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. A civil complaint
for damages was filed by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo,
Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the
time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, homicide through reckless imprudence was filed against Adelberto Bundoc.
Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he had acted without discernment.

Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc which was grunted on
after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.

Respondent, spouses Bundoc, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting
parents, namely the spouses Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents
from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed. Petitioners contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living
with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.

Issue: Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make the
adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when actual
custody was yet lodged with the biological parents.

Ruling: Parental authority is not properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. It is not to be considered that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of
adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody
over the adopted child. Retroactive effect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit
the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been
retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and
which they could not have prevented since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto
would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the
doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura
spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed. Thus, herein
respondent, spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, were indispensable parties to the suit for damage

16. Libi vs. IAC G.R. No. 70890 September 18,1992

FACTS:
Wendell Libi shot his lover Julie Ann Giotong, both minors, before he turned the firearm on himself. As a result, the parents of Julie Ann
filed against Wendell's parents to recover damages. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence. CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the parents of Wendell Libi liable for vicarious liability.

RULING:
Yes. The subsidiary liability of parents for damages cause by their minor children is imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which
covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The parents' liability as being primary and not subsidiary and
liability shall ceased if the parents can prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father to prevent damage.

In this case, the parents had not exercised due diligence in supervising the activities of their son. It was only at the time of Wendell's death
that they allegedly discovered that he was drug informant of CANU and that the gun used in the shooting incident was missing from the
safety deposit box. Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell from having access to said gun, the Libis are subsidiary liable for
the natur

17. Ilusorio vs. CA G.R. No. 139130 November 27, 2002

Facts: Ramon Ilusorio entrusted his credit cards and checkbooks and blank checks to his secretary. Apparently, his
secretary was able to encash and deposit to her personal account 17 checks drawn against his account. Ilusorio
requested to restore to his account the value of the checks that were wrongfully encashed but the bank refused,
hence the case.

In court, the bank testified that they make sure that the sign on the check is verified. When asked by the NBI to
submit standard signs to compare, Ilusorio failed to comply. The lower held held in favor of defendant.

Issue: Whether the bank was negligent in receiving the checks.

Held:

The SC affirmed the lower court's decision. Ilusorio failed to prove that the bank was negligent on their part as he has
the burden of proof. The bank's employees did not know the secretary's modus operandi as she was always
transacting in behalf of Ilusorio. The SC even held that it was Ilusorio who was negligent as he trusted his secretary
of unusual degree.

Ilusorio also cites Sec. 23 of the NIL that a forged check is inoperative and that he bank has no authority to pay.
While true, the case at bar falls under the exception stated in the section. The SC held that Ilusorio is precluded from
setting up the forgery, assuming there is forgery, due to his own negligence in entrusting his secretary.
18. Fe Cayao Lasam vs. Ramolete G.R. No. 159132 December 18, 2008

Facts: On July 28, 1994, respondent 3 months pregnant Editha Ramolete was brought to Lorma Medical Center
(LMC) in San Fernando, La Union due to vaginal bleeding upon advise of petitioner related via telephone, Editha was
admitted to the LMC on the same day. A pelvic sonogram was then conducted on Editha revealing the fetus weak
cardiac pulsation. The following day, Editha repeat pelvic sonogram showed that aside from the fetus weak cardiac
pulsation, no fetal movement was also appreciated. Due to persistent and profuse vaginal bleeding, petitioner
advised her to undergo a D&C procedure. She was discharged the following day. On September 16, 1994, Editha
was once gain brought at the LMC, as she was suffering from vomiting ans severe abdominal pains. Editha was
attended by Drs. Dela Cruz, Mayo and Komiya. Dr. Mayo allegedly informed Editha that there was a dead fetus in the
latter’s womb, after Editha went laparectomy, she was found to have massive intra abdominal hemorrhage and
ruptured uterus. Thus, she had to go hysterectomy and as a result no more chance to bear a child.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable for medical malpractice.

Held: No.

Medical malpractice is a particular form of negligence which consists in the failure of a physician or surgeon to apply
to his practice of medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by the profession generally under
similar conditions, and in like surrounding circumstances. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient
must prove that the physician or surgeon either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or
surgeon would not have done, and that the failure or action caused injury to the patient.

There are four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury, and proximate cause. A
physician-patient relationship was created when Editha employed the services of the petitioner. As Editha’s
physician, petitioner was duty-bound to use at least the same level of care that any reasonably competent doctor
would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. The breach of these professional duties of skill and
care, or their improper performance by a physician surgeon, whereby the patient’s injured in body or in health,
constitutes actionable malpractice, as to this aspect of medical malpractice, the determination of the reasonable level
of care and the breach thereof, expert testimony is essential. Further, in as much as the causes of the injuries
involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that
expert testimony is usually necessary to suspect the conclusion as to causation.

It is undisputed that Editha did not return for follow-up evaluation, in defiance of the petitioners advice. This is as
found out is the proximate cause of the injury she sustained.

19. Hidalgo Enterprises vs. Balandan G.R. No. L-3422 June 13, 1952

Facts: Hidalgo Enterprises was the owner of an ice-plant factory in San Pablo, Laguna.
In the factory, there were two tanks full of water, both 9-ft deep, for cooling purposes of its engine. There was no
fence or top cover; the edges of the tanks were barely a foot high from the surface of the ground. The factory itself
was surrounded with a fence.

However, the wide gate entrance was continually open, and anyone could easily enter the factory. There was no
guard assigned on the gate. Around noon on April 16, 1948, Mario Balandan, a boy barely 3 years old, was playing
with other boys his age when he entered the factory premises through the gate.

Mario Balandan then took a bath in one of the tanks of water and, later on, sank to the bottom of the tank. He died of
“asphyxia secondary to drowning.” The CFI and CA ruled that Hidalgo Enterprises maintained an attractive nuisance
and neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid accident to person entering its premises.

Issue: Whether or not a water tank is an attractive nuisance.

Held: No. Hidalgo Enterprises Inc.’s water tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance. Other issues such as
whether it exercised reasonable precautions, and if the parents were guilty of contributory negligence are immaterial.
Appealed decision reversed. Hidalgo Enterprises is absolved from liability.

Ratio:

One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children
in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable
to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. This is
the doctrine of attractive nuisance. The principal reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question
although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of tender years as to induce them
to approach, get on or use it, and this' attractiveness is an implied invitation to such children.

The majority of American jurisprudence posits that the doctrine of attractive nuisance is generally not applicable to
bodies of water, whether artificial or natural. The exception to this is if there is some unusual condition or artificial
feature other than mere water and its location. Furthermore, in Anderson v. Reith-Riley Const. Co., the Indiana
Appellate Court explained why bodies of water are not considered as attractive nuisance. It ruled that children have
been instructed early on to exercise caution around bodies of water and are presumed to know the danger.

Dissent of J. Pablo: Children are naturally curious and do not have perfect knowledge of things. They are amazed by
the natural attraction of the waters and shall explore where their curiosity leads them unless there is something that
prevents them. As such, petitioners should have placed fences around the ponds as an ordinary precaution.

20. Menchavez vs. Teves G.R. No. 153201 January 26, 2005

FACTS

On February 28, 1986, a "Contract of Lease" was executed by the plaintiffs as lessors and Florentino Teves Jr. as
lessee for a parcel of land intended to be used as fishpond

On June 2, 1988, Cebu RTC Sheriffs demolished the fishpond dikes constructed by Teves and delivered possession
of the subject property to other parties. As a result, he filed a Complaint for damages with application for preliminary
attachment against petitioners. In his Complaint, he alleged that the lessors had violated their Contract of Lease,
specifically the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the property for the entire duration of the

Contract.
The RTC ruled that the respondent and petitioners are in pari-delicto and that the contract of lease is null and void
ab-initio.

ISSUE

Whether or not the subject property (fishponds) can be leased by the petitioners

HELD

No. The Constitution, (Sec. 2 & 3, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution) states:

Sec. 2 - All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests, or timber, wild life, flora and fauna and other natural resources are owned by the state.

Sec. 3 - Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks.
Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be
devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands x x x.

As a consequence of these provisions, and the declared public policy of the State under the Regalian Doctrine, the
lease contract between Florentino Teves, Jr. and Juan Menchavez Sr. and his family is a patent nullity. Being a patent
nullity, petitioners could not give any rights to Florentino Teves, Jr. under the principle: 'NEMO DAT QUOD NON
HABET' - meaning ONE CANNOT GIVE WHAT HE DOES NOT HAVE, considering that this property in litigation
belongs to the State and not to petitioners. Therefore, the first issue is resolved in the negative, as the court declares
the contract of lease as invalid and void ab-initio

A void contract is deemed legally nonexistent.

A void contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect. It does not create, modify or extinguish a juridical
relation. Parties to a void agreement cannot expect the aid of the law; the courts leave them as they are, because
they are deemed in pari delicto or "in equal fault.

No damages may be recovered from a void contract.

21. Nikko Hotel Manila Garden vs. Reyes G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005

FACTS:

One evening in October 1994, an exclusive party was being held at the Nikko Hotel Manila Garden. The party was
being held for a prominent Japanese national. The person in charge at the party was Ruby Lim who was also the
executive secretary of the hotel. Later during the party, she noticed Robert Reyes popularly known as Amay Bisaya.
Reyes was not on the list of exclusive guests. Lim first tried to find out who invited Reyes to the party. When she
ascertained that the host celebrant did not invite Reyes, Lim approached Reyes and told the latter, in a discreet voice,
to finish his food and leave the party. Reyes however made a scene and began shouting at Lim. Later, a policeman
was called to escort Reyes out of the party.
Reyes then sued Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden for damages. According to him, he said that he was invited by
another party guest, Dr. Violeta Filart. He said that while he was on the line to get his food, Lim approached him and
ordered him in a loud voice to leave the party immediately. He told Lim he was invited by Dr. Filart however when he
was calling for Dr. Filart the latter ignored him. Later, he was escorted out of the party like a common criminal.

The trial court ruled in favor of Lim and Nikko Hotel. However, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Reyes as it ruled
that Lim abused her right and that Reyes deserved to be treated humanely and fairly. It is true that Lim had the right
to ask Reyes to leave the party but she should have done it respectfully.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lim acted with abuse of rights.

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court found the version of Lim more credible. She has been employed by the hotel for more than
20 years at that time. Her job requires her to be polite at all times. It is very unlikely for her to make a scene in the
party she was managing. That would only make her look bad.

Reyes based his complaint on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Art. 19 which provides:

Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

was not violated by Lim as it appears that even Reyes testified in court that when Lim told him to leave, Lim did so
very close to him – so close that they could almost kiss. This only proves that Lim intended that only Reyes shall hear
whatever is it that she’s going to tell Reyes and exclude other guests from hearing.

Article 21 on the other hand is commonly known as contra bonus mores:

Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

This article is likewise not violated. Lim, as proven by evidence on record, did not demean Reyes. They do not know
each other personally. She has no reason to treat him wrongfully especially so that Reyes himself is a prominent
person.
On the other hand, Reyes brought whatever damage he incurred upon himself. Under the doctrine of volenti non fit
injuria*, by coming to the party uninvited, Reyes opens himself to the risk of being turned away, and thus being
embarrassed. The injury he incurred is thus self-inflicted. Evidence even shows that Dr. Filart herself denied inviting
Reyes into the party and that Reyes simply gate-crashed. Reyes did not even present any supporting evidence to
support any of his claims. Since he brought injury upon himself, neither Lim nor Nikko Hotel can be held liable for
damages.

22. Fernando vs. CA G.R. No. 92087 May 8, 1992

Facts:
• Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property of
the City Treasurer's Office for the re- emptying of the septic tank in Agdao.
• An invitation to bid was issued to Aurelio Bertulano, Lito Catarsa, Feliciano Bascon, Federico Bolo and Antonio
Suñer, Jr. Bascon won the bid.

• Bascon was notified and he signed the purchase order.

• However, bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto
Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the septic tank.

• The bodies were removed by a fireman.

• The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned that the five victims entered the septic tank without
clearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market master.

• In fact, the septic tank was found to be almost empty and the victims were presumed to be the ones who did the
re-emptying.

• Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office autopsied the bodies and in his reports, put the cause of death of all five
victims as "asphyxia" caused by the diminution of oxygen supply in the body working below normal conditions.

• The lungs of the five victims burst, swelled in hemmorrhagic areas and this was due to their intake of toxic gas,
which, in this case, was sulfide gas produced from the waste matter inside the septic tank.

Issues:

1. Whether respondent Davao City is guilty of negligence in the case at bar.

2. If so, whether such negligence the immediate and proximate cause of deaths of the victims.

HELD: NO to both.

• The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows:

Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.

• The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet
pater familias of the Roman law.
• The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor
in the situation before him.
• The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence and determines liability by that.
• The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be
always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.
• Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued?
• If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm.
• Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this provision, is always
necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
• Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this:
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect
harmful to another was sufficiently probable warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences.
(emphasis supplied)
• To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of another, a claimant must establish the
relation between the omission and the

damage. He must prove under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code that the defendant's negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury.
• Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
• Proof of such relation of cause and effect is not an arduous one if the claimant did not in any way contribute to
the negligence of the defendant.
• However, where the resulting injury was the product of the negligence of both parties, there exists a difficulty to
discern which acts shall be considered the proximate cause of the accident.
• In Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. (16 Phil. 8, 29-30), this Court set a guideline for a judicious
assessment of the situation:

Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be considered immediate causes of
the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury, between the event itself,
without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but
contributing to his own proper hurt.

• Petitioners fault the city government of Davao for failing to clean a septic tank for the period of 19 years resulting
in an accumulation of hydrogen sulfide gas which killed the laborers.
• They contend that such failure was compounded by the fact that there was no warning sign of the existing
danger and no efforts exerted by the public respondent to neutralize or render harmless the effects of the toxic gas.
• They submit that the public respondent's gross negligence was the proximate cause of the fatal incident.
• We do not subscribe to this view.
• While it may be true that the public respondent has been remiss in its duty to re-empty the septic tank annually,
such negligence was not a continuing one.
• Upon learning from the report of the market master about the need to clean the septic tank of the public toilet in
Agdao Public Market, the public respondent immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such service.
• Thereafter, it awarded the bid to the lowest bidder, Mr. Feliciano Bascon.
• The public respondent, therefore, lost no time in taking up remedial measures to meet the situation.

• It is likewise an undisputed fact that despite the public respondent's failure to re-empty the septic tank since
1956, people in the market have been using the public toilet for their personal necessities but have remained unscathed.
• In view of this factual milieu, it would appear that an accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is
unlikely to happen unless one removes its covers.
• The accident in the case at bar occurred because the victims on their own and without authority from the public
respondent opened the septic tank.
• Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which has not been cleaned for years,
an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks.
• The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to
know the hazards of the job.
• His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate
cause of the accident.
• In Culion Ice, Fish and Elect. Co., v. Phil. Motors Corporation (55 Phil. 129, 133), We held that when a person
holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he
fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do (emphasis
Ours).
• The fatal accident in this case would not have happened but for the victims' negligence.
23. Ilocano Norte Electric Coop vs. CA G.R. No. L-53401 November 6, 1989

Facts:

In the evening of June 28 until the early morning of June 29, 1967, a strong typhoon by the code name "Gening" hit the province of
Ilocos Norte. The typhoon brought flood and heavy rains. At around 5:30 to 6AM of June 29, Nana Belen (Isabel Lao Juan) went to
her business (5 sisters emporium) establishment to look after the merchandise that might have been damaged by the typhoon. Aida
and Linda, both employees of the deceased, were walking 5 to 6 meters behind Nana Belen when they heard the latter screamed
“AY!”. The deceased quickly sank into the water. The girls attempted to help but saw an electric wire moving in the water. Upon
shouting for help, Ernesto immediately came out of the house but turned back shouting the water was grounded. Nana Belen was
declared dead due to circulatory shock electrocution. The heirs of the deceased filed an action for damages in the CFI of Ilocos Norte.

In their defense, petitioner argued that the deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by electrocution due to negligence
attributable only to herself and not to petitioner. After due trial, the CFI found the facts in favor of the petitioner and dismissed the
complaint but awarded the latter P25,000 in moral damages and attorney's fees of P45,000. CA reversed the decision.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner may be held liable for the deceased's death.

Held:

Yes.

CA was correct in disposing the argument that petitioner be exonerated from liability since typhoons and floods are fortuitous
events. While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may be held responsible, it was not
said eventuality which directly caused the victim's death. It was through the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took
place.

Petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the general public"... considering that electricity is an agency, subtle
and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty
of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be". The negligence of
petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death was solely due to a
fortuitous event. "When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant
is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission"

The deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to petitioner's
consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering
damages as a result of the death caused by petitioner's negligence.

24. Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District G.R. No. L-7664 August 29, 1958

Facts:

The minor Dominador Ong drowned while in one of Metropolitan Water District’s swimming pools. The parents sought to hold
Metropolitan Water liable for its negligence. The Lower Court found no negligence. On appeal, the Ongs invoke the “last clear
chance” doctrine in an attempt to hold Metropolitan Water District liable. The SC found that the doctrine of “last clear chance”
cannot be applied in this case because the minor Ong went to the big swimming pool without any companion (in violation of the
rules and regulations of the Metropolitan Water District) as regards the use of pools, and it appearing that the lifeguard responded
to the call for help instantaneously, applying all efforts into play in order to bring minor Ong back to life.

Issue: W/N plaintiffs have clearly established the fault/negligence of the defendants so as to make it liable for the damages sought.

Held:

The person/s claiming damages has/have the burden of proving that the damages is caused by the fault/negligence of the person
from whom the damages is claimed.
Plaintiffs failed to overcome the burden. Defendant employed 6 well-trained lifeguards, male nurse, sanitary inspector and security
guards to avoid danger to the lives of their patrons. The swimming pools are provided with a ring buoy, tag roof and towing line.
Also, conspicuously displayed in the pool area the rules and regulations for pool use.

In that, it appears that the defendant has taken all the necessary precautions to avoid/prevent danger/accidents which may cause
injury to or even death of its patrons.

25. Mckee vs. IAC G.R. No. L-68102 July 16, 1992

FACTS:

Between 9 and 10 o'clock in the morning of January 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway,
between Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place between an International cargo
truck, Loadstar, owned by Tayag and Manalo, driven by Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh, resulting
in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee,
Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort

Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with 200 cavans of rice weighing about 10,000
kilos, was traveling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford
Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando

When the Ford Escort was about 10 meters away from the southern approach of the bridge, 2 boys suddenly darted
from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the
way to the other side or turn back

Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the
headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. But before he could do so, his
car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said
bridge

As a result of the accident, 2 civil cases were filed for damages for the death and physical injuries sustained by the
victims boarding the Ford Escort; as well as a criminal case against Galang

During the trial, evidence were presented showing that the driver of the Truck was speeding resulting in the skid
marks it caused in the scene of the accident

The lower court found Galang guilty in the criminal case, but the civil cases were dismissed

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of Galang, and reversed the decision in the civil cases, ordering the
payment of damages for the death and physical injuries of the McKee family

On MR, the CA reversed its previous decision and ruled in favor of the owners of the truck

ISSUES: W/N the owner and driver of the Truck were responsible for the collision

HOLDING:

THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE COLLISION WAS THE OVER SPEEDING OF THE TRUCK SHOWING ITS
NEGLIGENCE
The test of negligence and the facts obtaining in this case, it is manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose
Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the
car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril
would be the natural course to take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away
and could very well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming car. Moreover, under what
is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without
time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he
fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence"

Considering the sudden intrusion of the 2 boys into the lane of the car, the Court finds that Jose Koh adopted the
best means possible in the given situation to avoid hitting them. Applying the above test, therefore, it is clear that he
was not guilty of negligence

In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be said that his negligence was the proximate
cause of the collision. Galang's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his truck was running at 30
miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30
kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the
time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation

Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds application here. Last clear chance is a
doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim
for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided
the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to
avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof

Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert
ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As employers of the truck
driver, Tayag and Manalo are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting
damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. That presumption,
however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent the damage, which they failed to do

Petition GRANTED. Resolution SET ASIDE and previous DECISION REINSTATED.

26. LBC vs. CA G.R. No. 101683 February 23, 1995

Facts:

At about 11:30 am of 15 Nov 1987, Rogelio Monterola was traveling on board his Suzuki motorcycle towards
Mangaggoy on the right lane along a dusty road in Bislig, Surigao del Sur. At about the same time, a cargo van of
LBC, driven by petitioner herein, Tano, Jr., was coming from the opposite direction on its way to Bislig Airport. When
Tano was approaching the airport entrance on his left, he saw two vehicles racing against each other from the
opposite direction. Tano stopped the van and waited for the 2 vehicles to pass by. The dust made the visibility
extremely bad. Instead of waiting Tano started to make a sharp left turn and when he was about to reach the center
of the right lane, the motorcycle driven by Monterola suddenly emerged from the dust and smashed head-on against
the LBC van. Monterola died.

Issue:WON the negligence of Monterola is the proximate cause of the accident.

Held: The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of petitioner Tano, who, despite poor visibility, hastily
executed a left turn w/o waiting for the dust to settle.

Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "last clear chance." In the instant case, the victim was travelling along the
lane where he was rightl supposd to be. The incident occured in an instant. No apreciable time had elapsed that
could have afforded the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the collision. However, the deceased was contributorily
negligent in evidently speeding.

The SC agrees w the CA that there was contributory negligence on the victim's part that warrants a mitigation of
petitioner's liability for damages.