TORTS AND DAMAGES BATCH 1 CASES

US vs. Juanillo G.R. No. L-7255 October 3, 1912

FACTS:
Ponciano Leal was struck by the car driven by Juanillo on the public highway. According
to the four witnesses presented by the prosecution, they were walking abreast along the
said road, while they were going along, they heard a noise behind them, and on turning
around saw an automobile approaching. One of them called out immediately and when
he turned around to look for Leal, who already lying on the ground. On the other hand,
the defense alleged that at that time, the chauffeur put on his brakes, used his exhaust,
and blew his horn.
Issue: whether or not Juanillo is negligent
Held:
Yes, Juanillo is negligent. Negligent is want of care required by the circumstances. It is
a relative or comparative, not an absolute term, and its application depends upon the
situation of the parties, and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances
reasonably impose. Where the danger is great a high degree of care is necessary, and
the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances. Here, the
negligence of the defendant consisted in his failure to recognize the great injury that
would accrue to the deceased from the collision. In failing to so check the speed of his
machine when he saw the deceased in front of him to give him sufficient control to avert
the injury or to stop it entirely, when he knew that if he continued at the same speed at
which he was going he would collide with the deceased, not only shows negligence but
reckless negligence in a marked degree.
Facts:
Ponciano Leal was killed on the public highway while going from the town of Pavia to
Santa Barbara, Iloilo by being struck by an automobile, of which the Juanillo was the
chauffeur. The prosecution contends that the death of the deceased was due to the
reckless driving of the Juanillo while the defense insists that the unfortunate occurrence
was purely an accident.
The prosecution presented 4 witnesses and the defense 6, including the Juanillo.
According to the witnesses for theprosecution (Labrila, Latoja, Agraviado, and son of
Leal), Labrila, Leal, and Latoja were walking along the road towardSanta Barbara that
afternoon. Latoja was in the middle of Labrila (left) and Leal (right). While they were
walking andhaving a conversation, Latoja heard a noise behind them and turning
around he saw an automobile approaching. He calledout immediately that an
automobile was coming and jumped to the left, colliding with Labrila and knocking him
into theditch. Leal on the other hand, was seen lying on the ground, having been
knocked down by the automobile.
The defense introduced the testimony of the members of the party riding in the
automobile, (Becker, Dean, Rimmer,Hardwood, and Miller) and that of the chauffeur. All
the witnesses for the defense testified that the middle of the road wasclear at that place
and time and that the deceased, as well as all others, were in perfectly safe places and
that the deceasedwould not have been killed if he had not at tempted to cross from the
right to the left side of the road.

According to Juanillo, he noticed up ahead about 80 or 100 brazas some men walking
in the road and that when he got upto within about 40 or 50 brazas of them he closed off
his gasoline and kept blowing his horn. He also placed his foot onthe exhaust so he
could make a noise. They were then going about 10 MPH. When they were within about
2 or 3 brazas ofthe men, the man on the right side started to run across the road. He put
on his brakes but could not stop right on the spot.Some part of the automobile hit him.
At the time they hit the man they were going about 6 or 8 MPH. They ran about 3 or4
brazas more when the automobile stopped.
Q. If you could stop going at 8 miles an hour within 2 brazas, why did you run 3 or 4?
A. I don't know, sir; I was going about 8 miles an hour, I should say.

Issue: Whether Juanillo is liable for reckless imprudence.

Held:
YES. According to the witnesses for the defense, when they were about 25 feet away
from the natives, the brakeswere applied with such force that he and his companions
were all thrown forward, yet the machine still continued running,hitting the deceased
under its own momentum for about 150 or 200 yards.

In view of all the admitted facts and circumstances, and the unreasonableness of the
stories told by the defendantappellant and his witnesses we are fully satisfied that the
trial court was justified in accepting the testimony of Latoja,Labrila, and Agraviado as to
how the collision took place. Neither Latoja nor Labrila heard the blowing of the horn
orany other warning until the machine was so close that Latoja and Labrila barely had
time to make their escape, whilethe deceased, being on the left, did not have sufficient
time.

It has been held, that courts will take judicial notice that an automobile makes an
unusual noise; that it can be driven at agreat velocity—at a speed many times greater
than that of ordinary vehicles drawn by animals, and that it is highlydangerous when
used on country roads. Its use as a vehicle for traveling is comparatively recent. It
makes an unusualnoise. It can be and usually is made to go on common roads at great
velocity — at a speed many times greater than that ofordinary vehicles hauled by
animals; and beyond doubt it is highly dangerous when used on country roads, putting
togreat hazard the safety and lives of the mass of the people who travel on such roads.

It is ty held that the rights and duties of pedestrians and vehicles are equal. Each may
use the highway, andeach must exercise such care and prudence as the circumstances
demand. Owners of automobiles have the same rightsin the streets and highways that
pedestrians and drivers of horses have. Automobile drivers or the drivers of animalsare
not to use the means of locomotion without regard to the rights of others having
occasion to travel on the highway.

While an automobile is a lawful means of conveyance and has equal rights upon the
roads with pedestrians, horses, andcarriages, its use cannot be lawfully countenanced
unless accompanied with that degree of prudence in managementand consideration for
the rights of others which is consistent with safety. Negligence is the failure to observe
for theprotection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justlydemand, whereby such other person suffers
injury. Negligence is want of care required by the circumstances. It is arelative or
comparative, not an absolute term, and its application depends upon the situation of the
parties, and the degreeof care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably
impose. Where the danger is great a high degree of care isnecessary, and the failure to
observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances.

The operator of an automobile is bound to exercise care in proportion to the varying

danger and risks of thehighway and commensurate with the dangers naturally incident
to the use of such vehicle. He is obliged to takenotice of the conditions before him, and
if it is apparent that by any particular method of proceeding he is liable to workan injury,
it is his duty to adopt some other or safer method if within reasonable care and
prudence he can do so. Indetermining the degree of care an operator of an automobile
should use, when on the highway, it is proper to take into consideration the place,
presence or absence of other travelers, the speed of the automobile, its
size,appearance, manner of movement, and the amount of noise it makes, and anything
that indicates unusual orpeculiar danger.

The quantum of care required is to be estimated by the exigencies of the particular

situation; that is, by the place, presence or absence of other vehicles and travelers;
Also, the degree of care required to be exercised varies with thecapacity of the person
endangered to care for himself. Thus, it has been held not to be negligence per se in a
boy of 6to play on the highway, where an auto mobile came up on him under
circumstances which produced fright and terror, andthus caused an error of judgment
by which the boy ran in front of the automobile.

The testimony of all the parties in the case at bar as to the surrounding conditions of this
occurrence was to the effect thatthe road on which they were traveling was dotted with
simple rural folk. In his brief, counsel for the Juanillo says:―Two native farmers who all
their lives have seen nothing that moves faster than a bull cart, except on the two or
three occasions on which they testify they have visited Iloilo, cannot be expected to give
an intelligent idea of speed of an automobile, train, or even a fast horse.‖

Under such conditions Juanillo being in charge of the powerful machine, capable of
doing great damage if not skillfully manipulated, was bound to use a high degree of care
to avoid injuring these native farmers, who had a common right to the highway. A driver
of an automobile, under such circumstances, is required to use a greater degree of care
than drivers of animals, for the reason that the machine is capable of greater
destruction, and furthermore, it is absolutely under the power and control of the driver;
whereas, a horse or other animal can and does to some extent aid in averting an
accident. It is not pleasant to be obliged to slow down automobiles to accommodate
persons riding, driving, or walking.

It is probably more agreeable to send the machine along and let the horse or person get
out of the way in the best mannerpossible; but it is well to understand, if this course is
adopted and an accident occurs, that the automobile driver will becalled upon to
account for his acts. An automobile driver must at all times use all the care and caution
which acareful and prudent driver would have exercised under the circumstances.
Juanillo was aware of and is chargeablewith the knowledge that the deceased and his
companions were simple country people and were lacking in thecapacity to appreciate
and to guard against the dangers of an automobile driven at a high rate of speed, and
he wasbound to enlarge to a commensurate extent the degree of vigilance and care
necessary to avoid injuries which theuse of his machine made more imminent.

The negligence of Juanillo in the case at bar consisted in his failure to recognize the
great injury that would accrue to thedeceased from the collision. He had no right, it
seems to us, after he saw the deceased and his companions walking in theroad ahead
of him to continue at so great a speed, at the eminent hazard of colliding with the
deceased. Great care wasdue from him by reason of the deadliness of the machine he
was propelling along the highway. When one comesthrough the highways with a
machine of such power as an automobile, it is incumbent upon the driver to use great
care notto drive against or over pedestrians. An automobile is much more dangerous
than a street car or even a railway car. Theseare propelled along fixed rails and all the
traveling public has to do to be safe is to keep off the track. But the automobilecan be
turned as easily as an individual, and for this reason is far more dangerous to the
traveling public than either thestreet car or the railway train.

Ylarde vs. Aquino G.R. No. L33722 July 29, 1988

Facts:

Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School in Pangasinan while
Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. The school had several concrete blocks which
were remnants of the old school shop destroyed in World War II. Aquino decided to help
clear the area. So after the classes, he gathered 18 of his male pupils, aged 10-11, and
ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in making a hole where the stone
can be buried. The following day he called 4 of the 18 students, including Novelito
Ylarde to complete the excavation. When the depth was right enough to accommodate
the concrete block, Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole. Aquino left the
children to level the loose soil while he went to see another teacher for the key to the
school workroom where he can get some rope. Before leaving, he told the children “not
to touch the stone”. After he left, 3 of the children playfully jumped into the pit. Then,
without any warning at all, the remaining one jumped on top of the concrete block
causing it to slide down towards the opening. Unfortunately, Novelito Ylarde was pinned
to the wall which led to his death 3 days after. The parents of Ylarde filed a suit for
damages against both Aquino and Soriano.

Issues:

Can Aquino and Soriano be held liable for damages?

Held:

Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of an
academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students while
in a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the school who can be held liable. It
was held in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals that:

Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature,

responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of
such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case
of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be
held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall
be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in
which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon
of reddendo singula sinquilis 'teachers' should apply to the words "pupils and students'
and 'heads of establishments of arts and trades to the word "apprentices."

Hence, applying the said doctrine to this case, we rule that private respondent Soriano,
as principal, cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads is an
academic school and not a school of arts and trades. Besides, as clearly admitted by
private respondent Aquino, private respondent Soriano did not give any instruction
regarding the digging.

From the foregoing, it can be easily seen that private respondent Aquino can be held
liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for
being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary
precautions to prevent any injury on their persons.

it is very clear that private respondent Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence
when he: (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead
utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete
stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task; (2) required the children to remain
inside the pit even after they had finished digging, knowing that the huge block was
lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance
may go to the perilous area; (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation
when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling; (4) went to a
place where he would not be able to check on the children's safety; and (5) left the
children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance.

The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving his pupils in such a dangerous
site has a direct causal connection to the death of the child Ylarde. Left by themselves,
it was but natural for the children to play around. Everything that occurred was the
natural and probable effect of the negligent acts of private respondent Aquino. Needless
to say, the child Ylarde would not have died were it not for the unsafe situation created
by private respondent Aquino which exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to real
danger. (Ancheta vs. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004)

Abad vs. Ablayda G.R. No. 172200 July 06, 2010

Heirs of Completo v. Albayda, Jr.

Heirs of Redentor Completo, and Elpidio Abiad v. Sgt. Amando Albayda, Jr.
2010 / Nachura [Negilgence > Standard of conduct > Special circumstance]
Facts
Albayda is a Master Sergeant of the PH Air Force, and Completo was the taxi driver of a
Toyota Corolla which was owned by Abiad. Albayda was riding a bike on his way to the
office, when Completo's taxi bumped and sideswept him, causing serious physical
injuries. He [Albayda] was brought to the PH Air Force General Hospital, but he was
transferred to the AFP Medical Center because he sustained a fracture and there was
no orthopedic doctor available in the first hospital. He was confined from 27 Aug 1997 to
11 Feb 1998, and again in 23 Feb to 22 Mar 1998 [approx. 7 months].
Conciliation before the barangay failed, so Albayda filed a complaint for physical
injuries through reckless imprudence against Completo before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasay. Completo filed a counter-charge of damage to property through
reckless imprudence against Albayda. The Office of the City Prosecutor recommended
the filing of an information for Albayda's complaint, and Completo's complaint [against
Albayda] was dismissed. Albayda manifested his reservation to file a separate civil
action for damages against Completo and Abiad.
Albayda alleged that Completo's negligence is the proximate cause of the incident.
He demanded the following damages and their respective amounts: Actual damages -
276,550; Moral damages - 600,000; Exemplary damages - 200,000; Attorney's fees -
25,000 + 1,000 per court appearance.
On the other hand, Completo alleged that he was carefully driving the taxicab when
he heard a strange sound from the taxicab's rear right side. He found Albayda lying on
the road, holding his left leg, so he brought Albayda to PH Air Force General Hospital.
Completo asserted that he was an experienced driver, and that he already reduced his
speed to 20km even before reaching the intersection. In contrast, Albayda rode his
bicycle at high speed, causing him to lose control of the bicycle. Completo said that
Albayda had no cause of action.
Several people testified for each side, but here are some notes on the testimony of
the owner of the taxi driver, Abiad. Abiad said that aside from being a soldier, he also
held franchises of taxicabs and passenger jeepneys, and being a taxicab operator, he
would wake up early to personally check the taxicabs. When Completo applied as a
taxicab driver, Abiad required him to show his bio-data, NBI clearance, and driver's
license. Completo never figured in a vehicular accident since he was employed, and
according to Abiad, he [Completo] was a good driver and good man.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Albayda, and the defendants are ordered to pay
actual [46k] and moral [400k] damages, and attorney's fees [25k]. Upon appeal at the
CA, the court affirmed RTC's decision with modifications [no more actual damages;
awarded temperate damages [40k]; moral damages only 200k; Completo and Abiad are
solidarily liable to pay Albayda; added legal interest].
Issues and Holding
WON CA erred in finding that Completo was the one who caused the collision. NO
WON Abiad failed to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of the family.
YES
WON the award of moral and temperate damages and attorney's fees for Albayda had
no basis. NO / NO / YES
Ratio
On Negligence
It is a rule in negligence suits that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of evidence the motorist's breach in his duty of care owed to the plaintiff,
that the motorist was negligent in failing to exercise the diligence required to avoid injury
to the plaintiff, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury suffered.
NCC 2176 quoted, and said that the question of the motorist's negligence is a question
of fact. Usually, more will be required of a motorist [25mi/hr = 37ft/sec] than a bicyclist
[10mi/hr = 15ft/sec] in discharging the duty of care because of the physical advantages
the former has over the latter.

It was proven by a preponderance of evidence that Completo failed to exercise

reasonable diligence.
He was overspeeding at the time he hit Albayda's bicycle; he did not slow down even
when he approached the intersection
Such negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the injuries sustained by Albayda
It was proven that Albayda had the right of way since he reached the intersection ahead
of Completo
NCC 2180 cited - obligation imposed by NCC 2176 is demandable also for those
persons for whom one is responsible. Employers are liable for damage caused by
employees, but the responsibility ceases upon proof that employers observed the
diligence of the good father of the family in the selection and supervision of
employees. The burden of proof is on the employer. The responsibility of two or more
persons who are liable for QD is solidary. The employer's civil liability for his employee's
negligent acts is also primary and direct, owing to his own negligence in selecting and
supervising them, and this liability attaches even if the employer is not in the vehicle at
the time of collision.
In the selection of employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience, and service records. With respect to supervision, employers
should formulate SOPs and monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary
measures for breaches. To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of
vicarious [secondary] liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including
documentary evidence.

ABIAD'S EVIDENCE CONSISTED ENTIRELY OF TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE, AND

THIS IS INSUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION THAT HE WAS
NEGLIGENT IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF COMPLETO.

On Damages
CA rightfully deleted the award of actual damages because Albayda failed to present
documentary evidence to establish the amount incurred. Temperate damages may be
recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot be proved with certainty. Moral damages are awarded in QDs causing
physical injuries, so the award is proper. The award of attorney's fees is deleted for
failure to prove that petitioners acted in bad faith in refusing to satisfy respondent's just
and valid claim.

Pangonorom vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 143380 April 11, 2005

Pangonorom v. People, GR No. 143380, April 11, 2005

Facts:
On July 10, 1989, Carlos R. Berba was driving a car belonging to his morther. With him
inside the car were his mother Mary Berba, who was seated in front beside him, and his
auntie Amelia Berba, who was at the back seat. They were cruising along EDSA when
their car was bumped from behind by MMTC Passenger Bus driven by herein accused
Olimpio Pangonorom thereby causing damages to their car which was estimated
at P42,600.00. The accused left his bus but they came to know his name is Olimpio
Pangonorom. Their car was a total wreck as shown in its photographs. The MMTC bus
driven by the accused was running very fast, kept on switching lane until it finally
occupied the second lane and bumped his car. Accused Olimpio Pangonorom testified
that he was a driver since 1976, having worked as a truck driver in Mindanao. The trial
held the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple slight physical injuries and damage to property.

Issue:
Whether or not MMTC, bus company, is estopped and therefore subsidiary liable to the
incident.

Ruling:
No. There is as yet no occasion to speak of enforcing the employer’s subsidiary civil
liability unless it appears that the accused-employee’s primary liability cannot in the first
instance be satisfied because of insolvency. This fact cannot be known until some time
after the verdict of conviction shall have become final. And even if it appears prima
facie that execution against the employee cannot be satisfied, execution against the
employer will not issue as a matter of course. The procedure for the enforcement of a
judgment will have to be followed. Once the judgment of conviction against Olimpio
becomes final and executory, and after the writ of execution issued against him is
returned unsatisfied because of his insolvency, only then can a subsidiary writ of
execution be issued against the MMTC after a hearing set for that precise purpose. It is
still too early to hold the MMTC subsidiarily liable with its accused-employee
considering that there is no proof yet of Olimpio’s insolvency.

Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Services Inc. vs. Phoenix Assurance G.R. No.
162467 May 08, 2009
FACTS:
The stevedoring company Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage
Service, Inc is contracted by Del Monte Philippines, Inc., to load and stow a shipment of
of fresh green Philippine bananas and fresh pineapples belonging to Del
Monte Fresh Produce International, Inc. into the cargo hold of the vessel M/V Mistrau.
The
vessel was docked at the port of Davao City and the goods were to be transported by it
to
the port of Inchon, Korea in favor of consignee Taegu Industries, Inc. The vessel set sail
from the port of Davao City and arrived at the port of Inchon, Korea. It was then
discovered
upon discharge that some of the cargo was in bad condition. The Marine Cargo
Damage
Surveyor of Incok Loss and Average Adjuster of Korea, through its representative
Byeong
Yong Ahn (Byeong),surveyed the extent of the damage of the shipment. In a survey
report, it
was stated that16,069 cartons of the banana shipment and2,185 cartons of the
pineapple
shipment were so damaged that they no longer had commercial value. Phoenix and
McGee instituted an action for damages against Mindanao Terminal After
trial, the RTC held that the only participation of Mindanao Terminal was to loathe
cargoes on
board theM/V Mistrauunderthe direction and supervision of the ship’s officers, who
would not
have accepted the cargoes on board the vessel and signed theforeman’s report unless
they
were properly arranged and tightly secured to withstand voyage across the open seas.
Accordingly, Mindanao Terminal cannot be held liable for whatever happened to the
cargoes
after it had loaded and stowed them. Moreover, citing the survey report, it was found by
the
RTC that the cargoes were damaged on account of a typhoon whichM/V Mistrauhad
encountered during the voyage. It was further held that Phoenix and McGee had no
cause of
action against Mindanao Terminal because the latter,whose services were contracted
by Del
Monte, a distinct corporation from Del Monte Produce, had no contract with the assured
Del
Monte Produce. The RTC dismissed the complaint and awarded the counterclaim of
Mindanao Terminal in the amount of P83,945.80 as actual damages and P100,000.00
as
attorney’s fees.

ISSUE: Whether Mindanao Terminal is liable for not having exercised extraordinary
diligence in the transport
and storage of the cargo.
RULING:
No, in the present case, Mindanao Terminal, as a stevedore, was only charged with
the loading and stowing of the cargoes from the pier to the ship’s cargo hold; it
was never the custodian of the shipment of Del Monte Produce. A stevedore is
not a common carrier for it does not transport goods or passengers; it is not akin to a
warehouseman for it does not store goods for profit. **Phoenix and McGee appealed to
the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed and set aside the decision The same
court
ordered Mindanao Terminal to pay Phoenix and McGee “the total amount of
$210,265.45
plus legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid and attorney’s fees of
20%
of the claim." It sustained Phoenix’s and McGee’s argument that the damage in the
cargoes
was the result of improper stowage by Mindanao Terminal.** Mindanao Terminal filed a
motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in its 26 February 2004
resolution. Hence, the present petition for review.

PLDT vs. CA G.R. No. L-57097 September 29, 1989

FACTS
Sps. Esteban were riding their jeep along the inside lane of Lacson Street where they
resided [at 25km/hr as Antonio Esteban claimed; CA said jeep ran fast; if the jeep
braked at that speed, the spouses would not have been thrown against the windshield].
The jeep abruptly swerved from the inside lane, then it ran over a mound of earth and
fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation
of its underground conduit system. Antonio failed to notice the open trench which was
left uncovered because of the darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. The
spouses were thrown against the windshield. Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries
on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while Antonio
suffered cut lips. The jeep’s windshield was also shattered.
 PLDT denies liability, contending that the injuries sustained by the spouses were
due to their own negligence, and that it should be the independent contractor L.R. Barte
and Co. [Barte] who should be held liable. PLDT filed a third-party complaint against
Barte, alleging that under the terms of their agreement, PLDT should not be answerable
for any accident or injuries arising from the negligence of Barte or its employees. Barte
claimed that it was not aware, nor was it notified of the accident, and that it complied
with its contract with PLDT by installing the necessary and appropriate signs.
RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. CA reversed RTC and dismissed the spouses’
complaint, saying that the spouses were negligent. Later, it set aside its earlier decision
and affirmed in totoRTC’s decision. (SC declared this later decision null and void. The
first decision already became final and executory because no appeal was taken
seasonably.)

ISSUE AND HOLDING

WON PLDT is liable for the injuries sustained by Sps. Esteban. NO

RATIO
The accident which befell the spouses was due to the lack of diligence of Antonio, and
was not imputable to the negligent omission on the part of PLDT. If the accident did not
happen because thejeep was running quite fast on the inside lane and for some reason
or other it had to swerve suddenly to the right and had to climb over the accident
mound, then Antonio had not exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the accident. With the drizzle, he should not have run on dim lights, but should
have put on his regular lights which should have made him see the accident mound in
time. The mound was relatively big and visible, being 2-3 ft high and 1-1/2 ft wide.
Also, he knew of the existence and location of the mound, having seen it many previous
times.
The negligence of Antonio was not only contributory to his and his wife’s injuries
but goes to thevery cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining
factors, and therebyprecludes their right to recover damages. The perils of the road
were known to the spouses. By exercising reasonable care and prudence, Antonio
could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even
assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the part of PLDT.
The omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site
of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said
omitted act would have prevented the injury. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed
on that street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location of the
excavations there; hence, the presence of warning signs could not have completely
prevented the accident. Furthermore, Antonio had the last clear chance to avoid the
accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to PLDT.
A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of
proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof, otherwise, his action
must fail. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established
by competent evidence. In this case, there was insufficient evidence to prove any
negligence on the part of PLDT. What was presented was just the self-serving
testimony of Antonio and the unverified photograph of a portion of the scene of the
accident. The absence of a police report and the non-submission of a medical report
from the hospital where the spouses were allegedly treated have not even been
explained.

Kapalaran Bus Line vs. Angel Coronado et. al G.R. No. 85331 August 25, 1989
Kapalaran Bus Line vs. Coronado [G.R. No. 85331. August 25, 1989]
Note: See RTC, CA & SC ruling on exemplary damages – doon ung discussion ata
nung safety of passengers na topic – izzy
1. Grajera, jeepney driver, came from Pila Laguna & was on its way towards Sta. Cruz
traversing the highway. The jeep reached the intersection and stopped.
2. The bus was from Sta Cruz going to Manila. The regular itinerary of the bus was to
pass thru the town proper of Pila Laguna but in case the bus is already full, it would
pass thru the highway. The bus driver asked its conductor if they could still
accommodate passengers but the conductor said the bus was already full.

• Here, boath roads are national roads. The bus was still far from the intersection when
the jeepney first reacher there. Atty. Manicad driving his Mustang, & was 2 vehicles
ahead of the bus testified that he & the other 2 vehicle behind him stopped at the
intersection to GIVE WAY to the jeepney. But the bus ignored the stopped vehicles &
overtook both vehicles.

• The 1st vehicle to arrive at the intersection was the jeepney. The jeepney driver upon
seeing that the road was clear, began to move forward to which the lawyer stopped his
car to give way to the jeepney. • While the bus was approaching the intersection, the
driver was busy asking his conductor if the bus was full or not. And when he turned his
attention to the road & saw the stopped vehicles & the jeepney crossing the
intersection, there was no more room to stop without slamming into the stopped
vehicles. The bus driver chose to gamble on proceeding & even had to overtake the
stopped vehicles but collided w/ the jeepney, which was at the right of way and was
crossing at the intersection. RTC: In favor of jeepney & the injured passenger Shinyo;
Bus company liable for damages a. 40 k - pay the owner of the wrecked jeepney + 5k -
atty’s fees & litigation expenses b. 35K - the medical expenses of the injured passenger
c. 30k - 2nd operation of the injured passenger to remove nail from his femur d. 50k -
moral damages for pain & suffering inflicted upon defendant
e. 10k - exemplary damages; to serve as a deterrent to others who, like the bus
company, may be minded to induce accident victims to perjure themselves in a sworn
statement f. 15k - atty’s fees & litigation expenses to the injured passenger CA: Affirmed
but set aside the grant of exemplary damages & the atty’s fees & litigation expenses to
the injured passenger Bus company: It was the fault of the jeepney driver. The jeepney
should have stopped since there is a possibility that another vehicle behind the cars
might not actually stop & might swerve to the left.

ISSUE: Was it right to hold the bus company liable? YES.

HELD:
Kapalaran’s driver had become aware that some vehicles ahead of the bus and
travelling in the same direction had already stopped at the intersection obviously to give
way either to pedestrians or to another vehicle about to enter the intersection. The bus
was driving at a high speed on the highway to hight to slow down & stop & chose to
swerve to the left land & overtake the stopped vehicles ahead of it & directly smashed
into the jeepney. Immediately before the collision, the bus driver was actually violating
traffic rules. 1

“Sec. 35. Restriction as to speed.—(a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway
shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor less than is
reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the width of the highway, and
or any other condition then and there existing; and no person shall drive any motor
vehicle upon a highway at such a speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of
any person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop
within the assured clear distance ahead.xxx xxx xxx Sec. 41. Restrictions on overtaking
and passing.—(a) The driver of a vehicle shall not drive to the left side of the center line
of a highway in overtaking or passing another vehicle, proceeding in the same direction,
unless such left side is clearly visible, and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient
distance ahead to permit such overtaking or passing to be made in safety. xxx xxx xxx
(c) The driver of a vehicle shall not overtake or pass any other vehicle proceeding in the
same direction, at any railway grade crossing, or at any intersection of highways, unless
such intersection or crossing is controlled by traffic signal, or unless permitted to do so
by a watchman or a peace officer, except on a highway having two or more lanes for
movement of traffic in one direction where the driver of a vehicle may overtake or pass
another vehicle on the right. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a
driver overtaking or passing, upon the right, another vehicle which is making or about to
make a left turn.

The presumption arose that the bus driver was negligent which it failed to overthrow
such. The bus driver tried to shift the blame upon the jeepney driver for the latter’s
failure to stop. But the jeepney driver, seeing the cars closest to the intersection on the
opposite side of the highway come to a stop to give way to him, had the right to assume
that other vehicles further away and behind the stopped cars would similarly come to a
stop. The bus driver has the responsibility to see to it that before overtaking, the left
lane of the road within the intersection & beyond it was clear. Here, the point of impact
was on the left side of the intersection, which was precisely the lane, or side on which
the jeepney had a right to be.

As to the moral damages: • The owners (employer) of the bus assails the moral
damages since it was the bus driver who was negligent & not them. SC: The patent and
gross negligence on the part of petitioner Kapalaran’s driver raised the legal
presumption that Kapalaran as employer was guilty of negligence either in the selection
or in the supervision of its bus drivers. • Where the employer is held liable for damages,
it has of course a right of recourse against its own negligent employee. • The
employer’s liability for the for the acts and negligence of its bus driver is not “merely
subsidiary,” and is not limited to cases where the employee “cannot pay his liability,” nor
are private respondents compelled first to proceed against the bus driver. • The
liability of the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is direct and immediate; it is
not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing
of the insolvency of such employee. • The injured passenger died during the pendency
of the this petition, which was hastened due to the serious nature of his injuries due to
the collision. As to the exemplary damages deleted by the CA: • CA said there was no
basis for the award since it was not such a reprehensible act to try to gather witnesses
for one’s cause and that there was no evidence of use of pressure or influence to
induce the accident victims to perjure themselves.

SC: The lower courts overlooked the fact that the bus driver was grossly & criminally
negligent in his reckless disregard of the rights of other vehicles and their passengers
and of pedestrians as well. SC is entitled to take judicial notice of the gross negligence
and the appalling disregard of the physical safety and property of others so commonly
exhibited today by the drivers of passenger buses and similar vehicles on our highways.
The law requires petitioner as common carrier to exercise extraordinary diligence in
carrying and transporting their passengers safely “as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all
the circumstances.” • In requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from common
carriers and creating a presumption of negligence against them, the law compels them
to curb the recklessness of their drivers. • While the immediate beneficiaries of the
standard of extraordinary diligence are, of course, the passengers and owners of cargo
carried by a common carrier, they are not the only persons that the law seeks to benefit.
• For if common carriers carefully observed the statutory standard of extraordinary
diligence in respect of their own passengers, they cannot help but simultaneously
benefit pedestrians and the owners and passengers of other vehicles who are equally
entitled to the safe and convenient use of our roads and highways. • The law seeks to
stop and prevent the slaughter and maiming of people (whether passengers or not) and
the destruction of property (whether freight or not) on our highways by buses, the very
size and power of which seem often to inflame the minds of their drivers. • Article 2231
of the Civil Code explicitly authorizes the imposition of exemplary damages in cases of
quasidelicts “if the defendant acted with gross negligence.” Here, it is not only the
demands of social justice but also the compelling considerations of public policy noted
above which impelled the SC to restore the award of exemplary damages. CA decision
affirmed but award of damages modified:

a. Examplary damages to Shinyo restored & increased from 10k to 25k b. 15k of atty’s
fees to Shinyo restored

GUILLANG VS BEDANIA
FACTS: Guillang, with three companions was driving his brand new car to Manila. On
the other hand, Bedania was driving a ten-wheeler cargo truck towards Tagaytay. Along
the highway and the road leading to the Orchard Golf Course, Bedania negotiated a
Uturn. When the truck entered the opposite lane of the highway, Guillang's car hit the
gas tank at the truck’s right middle portion. The truck dragged Genaros car some five
meters to the right of the road. As a consequence, all the passengers of the car were
rushed to the hospital for treatment. Because of severe injuries, one of the passengers
was later transferred to another hospital. Consequently, he died due to the injuries he
sustained from the collision. The car was a total wreck while the truck sustained minor
damage.
ISSUE: Whether Bedania was grossly negligent for recklessly maneuvering the truck by
making a sudden U-turn in the highway without due regard to traffic rules and the safety
of other motorists.
RULING: Yes. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the
contrary, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap,
he was violating any traffic regulation. In this case, the report showed that the truck,
while making the U-turn, failed to signal, a violation of traffic rules. The police records
also stated that, after the collision, Bedania escaped and abandoned the petitioners and
his truck. This is another violation of a traffic regulation. Therefore, the presumption
arises that Bedania was negligent at the time of the mishap. The point of impact was on
the lane where the car was cruising. Therefore, the car had every right to be on that
road and the car had the right of way over the truck that was making a U-turn. Clearly,
the truck encroached upon the cars lane when it suddenly made the U-turn. It is not
normal for a truck to make a U-turn on a highway. If Bedania wanted to change
direction, he should seek an intersection where it is safer to maneuver the truck.
Bedania should have also turned on his signal lights and made sure that the highway
was clear of vehicles from the opposite direction before executing the U-turn.
AONUEVO VS. CA, GR. NO. 130003, OCTOBER 20, 2004
Facts: The accident in question occurred on 8 February 1989, at around nine in the
evening, at the intersection of Boni Avenue and Barangka Drive in Mandaluyong (now a
city). Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue on his... bicycle, while Añonuevo,
traversing the opposite lane was driving his Lancer car with plate number PJJ 359. The
car was owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of Añonuevo's brother,
Jonathan. Añonuevo was in the course of making a left turn towards Libertad Street
when... the collision occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result, which
necessitated his hospitalization several times in 1989, and forced him to undergo four
(4) operations.
Villagracia instituted an action for damages against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and
Añonuevo before the RTC.
Trial on the civil action ensued, and in a Decision dated 9 March 1990, the RTC
rendered judgment against Procter and Gamble and Añonuevo, ordering them to pay
Villagracia the amounts... of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150, 000.00). for
actual damages, Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for moral damages, and Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for attorney's fees, as well as legal costs.the Court of
Appeals Fourth Division affirmed the RTC Decision in toto
Issues:
whether Article 2185 of the New Civil Code, which presumes the driver of a motor
vehicle negligent if he was violating a traffic... regulation at the time of the mishap,
should apply by analogy to non-motorized vehicles.

Should the doctrine of negligence per se apply to Villagracia, resulting from his violation
of an ordinance? It cannot be denied that the statutory purpose for requiring bicycles to
be equipped with headlights or horns is to promote road safety and to minimize the
occurrence of... road accidents involving bicycles.

Ruling:
Añonuevo points out that Villagracia's bicycle had no safety gadgets such as a horn or
bell, or headlights, as invoked by a 1948 municipal ordinance.

Nor was it duly registered... with the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, as required by
the same ordinance.
Villagracia does not dispute these allegations, which he admitted during the... trial, but
directs our attention instead to the findings of Añonuevo's own negligence.
Villagracia also contends that, assuming there was contributory negligence on his part,
such would not exonerate Añonuevo from payment of damages.
What Añonuevo seeks is for the Court to amend the explicit command of the legislature,
as embodied in Article 2185, a task beyond the pale of judicial power. The Court
interprets, and not creates, the law. However, since the Court is being asked to consider
the matter, it might... as well examine whether Article 2185 could be interpreted to
include non-motorized vehicles.
If Añonuevo seriously contends that... the application of Article 2185 be expanded due
to the greater interaction today of all types of vehicles, such argument contradicts
historical experience.
The more pertinent basis for the segregate... classification is the difference in type of
these vehicles.
A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by... the limitations in physical exertion. is capable of
greater speeds and acceleration than non-motorized vehicles.
At the same time, motorized vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury or
damage in the event of an accident or collision.
Art. 2185 was not formulated to compel or ensure obeisance by all to traffic rules and
regulations.
While the legal argument as formulated by Añonuevo is erroneous, his core contention
that Villagracia was negligent for... failure to comply with traffic regulations warrants
serious consideration, especially since the imputed negligent acts were admitted by
Villagracia himself.
The generally accepted view is that the violation of a statutory duty constitutes
negligence, negligence as a matter of law, or negligence per se.
At face value, Villagracia's mishap was precisely the danger sought to be guarded
against by the ordinance he violated. Añonuevo argues that Villagracia's violation
should bar the latter's recovery of damages, and a simplistic interpretation of...
negligence per se might vindicate such an argument.
There is the fact which we consider as proven, that Añonuevo was speeding as he
made the left turn, and such negligent act was the proximate cause of the accident. This
reckless behavior would have imperiled anyone unlucky enough within the... path of
Añonuevo's car as it turned into the intersection, whether they are fellow motorists,
pedestrians, or cyclists.
Even assuming that Añonuevo had failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle was not
equipped with headlights, such lapse on the cyclist's part would not have acquitted the
driver of his duty... to slow down as he proceeded to make the left turn.
The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the logical
consequences of the facts leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for
that matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to...
impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor to perform up to a standard
established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to
deny relief when in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and
the injury... sustained. Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not intractable so as
to forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. After all, tort law is remunerative in spirit, aiming to
provide compensation for the harm suffered by those whose interests have been
invaded owing to the conduct of... others.

Principles:
Thus, we cannot sustain the contention that Art. 2185 should apply to non-motorized
vehicles, even if by analogy. There is factual and legal basis that necessitates the
distinction under Art. 2185
The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an inference that such
violation was the proximate cause of the injury complained. However, if the very injury
has happened which was intended to be prevented by the statute, it has been held
that... violation of the statute will be deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury
Sanitary Steam[42] is controlling in this case. The bare fact that Villagracia was violating
a municipal ordinance at the time of the accident may have sufficiently established
some degree of negligence on his part, but such negligence is without... legal
consequence unless it is shown that it was a contributing cause of the injury.
The failure of the bicycle owner to comply with accepted safety practices, whether or not
imposed by ordinance or statute, is not sufficient to negate or mitigate recovery unless a
causal connection is established between such failure... and the injury sustained. The
principle likewise finds affirmation in Sanitary Steam, wherein we declared that the
violation of a traffic statute must be shown as the proximate cause of the injury, or that it
substantially contributed thereto.

10. Layugan vs. IAC; Torts- vicarious liability of owner of a truck

Facts:
Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo Isidro, alleging that
while at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff and a companion were
repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was parked along the right side of the
National Highway; that defendant's truck, driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped
the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured and hospitalized where he incurred and
will incur more expenses as he recuperates from said injuries; Plaintiff's right leg was
amputated and that because of said injuries he would be deprived of a lifetime income.
To free themselves from liability, defendants Isidro [owner] and Serrano [driver] averred
that he knows his responsibilities as a driver and further contends that it was the
negligence of plaintiff that was the proximate cause of the accident. They alleged that
plaintiff parked his truck in a manner which occupied a part of the highway and he did
not even put a warning sign.
Subsequently, a third-party complaint was filed by the defendant against his insurer, the
Travellers Multi Indemnity Corporation; that the third-party plaintiff [Isidro], without
admitting his liability to the plaintiff, claimed that the third-party defendant [Travellers] is
liable to the former for contribution, indemnity and subrogation by virtue of their
insurance contract which covers the insurer's liability for damages arising from death,
bodily injuries and damage to property. The Insurance company argued that it is only
liable for the amount agreed in the policy and the complaint was premature since no
claim was made to it.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Petitioners. The CA reversed the decision, stating that it
is the petitioners who were negligent since they did not exercise caution by putting
warning signs that their truck is park on the shoulder of the highway.

Issue:
Whether or not Isidro is liable as employer of Serrano.

Ruling:
Yes!

The SC held that the CA erroneously appreciated the evidence. It was proven that the
petitioner placed a warning sign within 3 to 4 meters from their truck in the form of a
lighted kerosene lamp. The existence of this warning sings was corroborated by
Serrano, respondent's driver, and further stated that when he saw a parked truck, he
kept on stepping on the brake pedal but it did not function. Thus despite this warning
signs, the truck recklessly driven by Serrano and owned by Respondent Isidro bumped
the truck of petitioner.

The private respondent is sued under Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180, paragraph 5, of
the Civil Code. In the latter, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or
employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the
part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after selection, or both. Such presumption is juris tantum and not
juris et de jure and consequently, may be rebutted. If follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and in the
supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. In disclaiming liability for the
incident, the private respondent stresses that the negligence of his employee has
already been adequately overcome by his driver's statement that he knew his
responsibilities as a driver and that the truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in
driving.

We do not agree with the private respondent in his submission. In the first place, it is
clear that the driver did not know his responsibilities because he apparently did not
check his vehicle before he took it on the road. If he did he could have discovered
earlier that the brake fluid pipe on the right was cut, and could have repaired it and thus
the accident could have been avoided. Moveover, to our mind, the fact that the private
respondent used to intruct his driver to be careful in his driving, that the driver was
licensed, and the fact that he had no record of any accident, as found by the respondent
court, are not sufficient to destroy the finding of negligence of the Regional Trial Court
given the facts established at the trial. The private respondent or his mechanic, who
must be competent, should have conducted a thorough inspection of his vehicle before
allowing his driver to drive it.
In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case, we hold that Isidro failed to prove
that the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of his employees which
would exculpate him from solidary liability with his driver to the petitioner. But even if we
concede that the diligence of a good father of a family was observed by Isidro in the
supervision of his driver, there is not an iota of evidence on record of the observance by
Isidro of the same quantum of diligence in the supervision of his mechanic, if any, who
would be directly in charge in maintaining the road worthiness of his (Isidro's) truck. But
that is not all. There is paucity of proof that Isidro exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection of his driver, Daniel Serrano, as well as in the selection
of his mechanic, if any, in order to insure the safe operation of his truck and thus
prevent damage to others. Accordingly, the responsibility of Isidro as employer treated
in Article 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code has not ceased.

Professional Services Inc. vs. Agana G.R. No. 126297 January 31, 2007
Facts:

Enrique Agana told his wife Natividad Agana to look for their neighbour, Dr. Ampil, a
surgeon staff member of Medical City General Hospital, a prominent and known
hospital, owned and operated by Professional Services Incorporated (PSI). Natividad
Agana underwent medical surgery in said Hospital. The attendant doctors were Dr.
Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. Natividad suffered from injury due to two (2) gauzes left inside
her body during the operation. Despite the report of the (2) two missing gauzes, PSI did
not initiate an investigation.

This case consolidated three (3) other cases previously decided and became final and
executory. Hence, this case is limited only to the second motion for reconsideration filed
by the PSI in an attempt absolve itself from liability.

Issue:

Whether or not PSI is liable for tort?

Ruling:

Yes. PSI is liable. Firstly, under the principle of Ostensible Agency, according to the
Court, ample evidence that the hospital held out to the patient that the doctor was its
agent. Present are the two factors that determine apparent authority: first, the hospital's
implied manifestation to the patient which led the latter to conclude that the doctor was
the hospital's agent; and second, the patient’s reliance upon the conduct of the hospital
and the doctor, consistent with ordinary care and prudence the decision made by
Enrique for [his wife] Natividad to consult Dr. Ampil was significantly influenced by the
impression that Dr. Ampil was a staff member of Medical City General Hospital, and that
said hospital was well known and prominent. Enrique looked upon Dr. Ampil not as
independent of but as integrally related to Medical City. The Supreme Court also held
that the hospital’s “consent for hospital care” - required to be signed prior to the surgery
- affirmed that the surgeon was of the hospital.

Secondly, under the principle of Corporate Negligence, which was self-imposed liability
because of the statements made by the PSI which constituted judicial admission in its
Motion for Reconsideration. Its statements revealed that it had the power to review or
cause the review of what may have irregularly transpired within its walls strictly for the
purpose of determining whether some form of negligence may have attended any
procedure done inside its premises, with the ultimate end of protecting its patients.

The Court also noted the hospital admitted “the standards of its corporate conduct
under the circumstances of this case, specifically: (a) that it had a corporate duty to
Natividad even after her operation to ensure her safety as a patient; (b) that its
corporate duty was not limited to having its nursing staff note or record the two missing
gauzes and (c) that its corporate duty extended to determining Dr. Ampil's role in it,
bringing the matter to his attention, and correcting his negligence. The Court held that
the case is “not intended to set a precedent and should not serve as a basis to hold
hospitals liable for every form of negligence of their doctors-consultants under any and
all circumstances.”

Singapore Airlines vs. CA G.R. No. 107356 March 31, 1995 312 Phil. 1081
ROMERO, J.:
Sancho Rayos was an overseas contract worker who had a renewed contract with the
Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) for the period covering April 16, 1980, to April
15, 1981. As part of Aramco's policy, its employees returning to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
from Manila are allowed to claim reimbursement for amounts paid for excess baggage
of up to 50 kilograms, as long as it is properly supported by receipt. On April 13, 1980,
Rayos took a Singapore Airlines (SIA) flight to report for his new assignment, with a 50-
kilogram excess baggage for which he paid P4,147.50. Aramco reimbursed said
amount upon presentation of the excess baggage ticket.

In December 1980, Rayos learned that he was one of several employees being
investigated by Aramco for fraudulent claims. He immediately asked his wife Beatriz in
Manila to seek a written confirmation from SIA that he indeed paid for an excess
baggage of 50 kilograms. On December 10, 1980, SIA's manager, Johnny Khoo,
notified Beatriz of their inability to issue the certification requested because their records
showed that only three kilograms were entered as excess and accordingly charged. SIA
issued the certification requested by the spouses Rayos only on April 8, 1981, after its
investigation of the anomaly and after Beatriz, assisted by a lawyer, threatened it with a
lawsuit. On April 14, 1981, Aramco gave Rayos his travel documents without a return
visa. His employment contract was not renewed.

On August 5, 1981, the spouses Rayos, convinced that SIA was responsible for the
non-renewal of Rayos' employment contract with Aramco, sued it for damages. SIA
claimed that it was not liable to the Rayoses because the tampering was committed by
its handling agent, Philippine Airlines (PAL). It then filed a third-party complaint against
PAL. PAL, in turn, countered that its personnel did not collect any charges for excess
baggage; that it had no participation in the tampering of any excess baggage ticket; and
that if any tampering was made, it was done by SIA's personnel.
Judge Jesus O. Ibay of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 30, rendered
judgment on September 9, 1988, in favor of the plaintiffs, the dispositive portion of
which reads thus:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant Singapore Airlines Limited, sentencing the latter to pay the former the
following:

1. The sum of Four Hundred Thirty Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos and Eighty
Centavos (P430,900.80) as actual damages, with interest at the legal rate from the date
of the filing of the complaint until fully paid.

2. The sum of Four Thousand One Hundred Forty-Seven Pesos and Fifty Centavos
(P4,147.50) as reimbursement for the amount deducted from Mr. Rayos' salary, also
with legal rate of interest from the filing of the complaint until paid in full;

3. The sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages;

4. The sum equivalent to ten Per Cent (10%) of the total amount due as and for
attorney's fees; and

5. The cost of suit.

The defendant's counterclaim is hereby dismissed.

ON THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT, the third-party defendant PAL is ordered to pay
defendant and third-party plaintiff SIA whatever the latter has paid the plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED."
In so ruling, the court a quo concluded that the excess baggage ticket of Rayos was
tampered with by the employees of PAL and that the fraud was the direct and proximate
cause of the non-renewal of Rayos' contract with Aramco.

All parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. SIA's appeal was dismissed for non-
payment of docket fees, which dismissal was eventually sustained by this Court. The
Rayos spouses withdrew their appeal when SIA satisfied the judgment totalling
P802,435.34.

In its appeal, PAL claimed that the spouses Rayos had no valid claim against SIA
because it was the inefficiency of Rayos which led to the non-renewal of his contract
with Aramco, and not the alleged tampering of his excess baggage ticket. On the other
hand, SIA argued that the only issue in the said appeal is whether or not it was entitled
to reimbursement from PAL, citing the case of Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of
the Philippines v. Tempongko.[1]

The appellate court disagreed with SIA's contention that PAL could no longer raise the
issue of SIA's liability to the Rayoses and opined "that SIA's answer to the complaint
should inure to the benefit of PAL, and the latter may challenge the lower court's
findings against SIA in favor of plaintiffs-appellees (the Rayos spouses) for the purpose
of defeating SIA's claim against it, and not for the purpose of altering in any way the
executed judgment against SIA." In its answer to the main complaint, SIA set up the
defense that the excess baggage ticket was indeed tampered with but it was committed
by PAL's personnel. On September 21, 1992, the appellate court granted PAL's appeal
and absolved it from any liability to SIA.

In this petition for review, SIA argues that PAL cannot validly assail for the first time on
appeal the trial court's decision sustaining the validity of plaintiff's complaint against SIA
if PAL did not raise this issue in the lower court. It added that the appellate court should
have restricted its ruling on the right of SIA to seek reimbursement from PAL, as this
was the only issue raised by SIA in its third-party complaint against PAL.
The instant appeal is impressed with merit.
The petitioner correctly pointed out that the case of Firestone squarely applies to the
case at bench. In said case, the Court expounded on the nature of a third-party
complaint and the effect of a judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant and
in favor of such defendant as third-party plaintiff against, ultimately, the third-party
defendant. Speaking through then Justice and later Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee,
the Court stated:
"The third-party complaint is, therefore, a procedural device whereby a "third party" who
is neither a party nor privy to the act or deed complained of by the plaintiff, may be
brought into the case with leave of court, by the defendant, who acts as third-party
plaintiff to enforce against such third-party defendant a right for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief, in respect of the plaintiff's claim. The third-party
complaint is actually independent of and separate and distinct from the plaintiff's
complaint. x x x When leave to file the third-party complaint is properly granted, the
Court renders in effect two judgments in the same case, one on the plaintiff's complaint
and the other on the third-party complaint. When he finds favorably on both complaints,
as in this case, he renders judgment on the principal complaint in favor of plaintiff
against defendant and renders another judgment on the third-party complaint in favor of
defendant as third-party plaintiff, ordering the third-party defendant to reimburse the
defendant whatever amount said defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff in the case.
Failure of any of said parties in such a case to appeal the judgment as against him
makes such judgment final and executory. By the same token, an appeal by one party
from such judgment does not inure to the benefit of the other party who has not
appealed nor can it be deemed to be an appeal of such other party from the judgment
against him."

It must be noted that in the proceedings below, PAL disclaimed any liability to the
Rayoses and imputed the alleged tampering to SIA's personnel. On appeal, however,
PAL changed its theory and averred that the spouses Rayos had no valid claim against
SIA on the ground that the non-renewal of Sancho's contract with Aramco was his
unsatisfactory performance rather than the alleged tampering of his excess baggage
ticket. In response to PAL's appeal, SIA argued that it was improper for PAL to question
SIA's liability to the plaintiff, since this was no longer an issue on account of the finality
and, in fact, satisfaction of the judgment.

Surprisingly, the appellate court ignored the Court's pronouncements in Firestone and
declared:

"[T]here is nothing in the citation which would suggest that the appellant cannot avail of
the defenses which would have been available to the non-appealing party against the
prevailing party which would be beneficial to the appellant. After all, PAL's liability here
is premised on the liability of SIA to plaintiffs-appellees. In its own defense, it should
have the right to avail of defenses of SIA against plaintiffs-appellees which would
redound to its benefit. This is especially true here where SIA lost the capability to
defend itself on the technicality of failure to pay docket fee, rather than on the merits of
its appeal. To hold otherwise would be to open the door to a possible collusion between
the plaintiff and defendant which would leave the third-party defendant holding the bag."
There is no question that a third-party defendant is allowed to set up in his answer the
defenses which the third-party plaintiff (original defendant) has or may have to the
plaintiff's claim. There are, however, special circumstances present in this case which
preclude third-party defendant PAL from benefitting from the said principle.

One of the defenses available to SIA was that the plaintiffs had no cause of action, that
is, it had no valid claim against SIA. SIA investigated the matter and discovered that
tampering was, indeed, committed, not by its personnel but by PAL's. This became its
defense as well as its main cause of action in the third-party complaint it filed against
PAL. For its part, PAL could have used the defense that the plaintiffs had no valid claim
against it or against SIA. This could be done indirectly by adopting such a defense in its
answer to the third-party complaint if only SIA had raised the same in its answer to the
main complaint, or directly by so stating in unequivocal terms in its answer to SIA's
complaint that SIA and PAL were both blameless. Yet, PAL opted to deny any liability
which it imputed to SIA's personnel. It was only on appeal - in a complete turnaround of
theory - that PAL raised the issue of no valid claim by the plaintiff against SIA. This
simply cannot be allowed.

While the third-party defendant would benefit from a victory by the third-party plaintiff
against the plaintiff, this is true only when the third-party plaintiff and third-party
defendant have non-contradictory defenses. Here, the defendant and third-party
defendant had no common defense against the plaintiffs' complaint, and they were even
blaming each other for the fiasco.

Fear of collusion between the third-party plaintiff and the plaintiffs aired by the appellate
court is misplaced if not totally unfounded. The stand of SIA as against the plaintiffs'
claim was transparent from the beginning. PAL was aware of SIA's defense, and if it
was convinced that SIA should have raised the defense of no valid claim by the
plaintiffs, it should have so stated in its answer as one of its defenses, instead of waiting
for an adverse judgment and raising it for the first time on appeal.

The judgment, therefore, as far as the Rayoses and SIA are concerned, has already
gained finality. What remains to be resolved, as correctly pointed out by petitioner, is
whether it is entitled to reimbursement from PAL, considering that PAL appealed that
part of the decision to the appellate court. This is where the rule laid down in Firestone
becomes applicable.

The trial court's decision, although adverse to SIA as defendant, made PAL ultimately
answerable for the judgment by ordering the latter to reimburse the former for the entire
monetary award. On appeal, PAL tried to exonerate itself by arguing that the Rayoses
had no valid claim against SIA. From PAL's viewpoint, this seemed to be the only way to
extricate itself from a mess which the court a quo ascribed to it. This cannot, however,
be allowed because it was neither raised by SIA in its answer to the main complaint nor
by PAL in its answer to the third-party complaint. The prudent thing that PAL should
have done was to state in its answer to the third-party complaint filed by SIA against it
everything that it may conceivably interpose by way of its defense, including specific
denials of allegations in the main complaint which implicated it along with SIA.

The appellate court was in error when it opined that SIA's answer inured to the benefit
of PAL for the simple reason that the complaint and the third-party complaint are
actually two separate cases involving the same set of facts which is allowed by the court
to be resolved in a single proceeding only to avoid a multiplicity of actions. Such a
proceeding obviates the need of trying two cases, receiving the same or similar
evidence for both, and enforcing separate judgments therefor. This situation is not, as
claimed by the appellate court, analogous to a case where there are several defendants
against whom a complaint is filed stating a common cause of action, where the answer
of some of the defendants inures to the benefit of those who did not file an answer.
While such a complaint speaks of a single suit, a third-party complaint involves an
action separate and distinct from, although related to, the main complaint. A third-party
defendant who feels aggrieved by some allegations in the main complaint should, aside
from answering the third-party complaint, also answer the main complaint.

We do not, however, agree with the petitioner that PAL is solely liable for the
satisfaction of the judgment. While the trial court found, and this has not been
adequately rebutted by PAL, that the proximate cause of the non-renewal of Rayos'
employment contract with Aramco was the tampering of his excess baggage ticket by
PAL's personnel, it failed to consider that the immediate cause of such non-renewal was
SIA's delayed transmittal of the certification needed by Rayos to prove his innocence to
his employer.

SIA was informed of the anomaly in December 1980 but only issued the certification
four months later or, more specifically, on April 8, 1981, a few days before the expiration
of Rayos' contract. Surely, the investigation conducted by SIA could not have lasted for
four months as the information needed by the Rayoses could easily be verified by
comparing the duplicate excess baggage tickets which they and their handling agent,
PAL, kept for record purposes. The fact that the Rayos spouses had to be assisted by
counsel who threatened to file a damage suit against SIA if the certification they
urgently needed was not immediately issued only strengthens the suspicion that SIA
was not dealing with them in utmost good faith. The effect of SIA's mishandling of
Beatriz Rayos' request became instantly apparent when her husband's contract was not
renewed in spite of his performance which was constantly "highly regarded" by the
manager of Aramco's equipment services department.

Former Chief Justice and noted remedial law expert Manuel V. Moran opined that "in an
action upon a tort, the defendant may file a third-party complaint against a joint tort-
feasor for contribution."[2]

The non-renewal of Rayos' employment contract was the natural and probable
consequence of the separate tortious acts of SIA and PAL. Under mandate of Article
2176 of the Civil Code, Rayos is entitled to be compensated for such damages.
Inasmuch as the responsibility of two or more persons, or tort-feasors, liable for a quasi-
delict is joint and several,[3] and the sharing as between such solidary debtors is pro-
rata,[4] it is but logical, fair, and equitable to require PAL to contribute to the amount
awarded to the Rayos spouses and already paid by SIA, instead of totally indemnifying
the latter.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.

20488 dated September 21, 1992, is hereby REVERSED and a new one is entered
ordering private respondent Philippine Airlines to pay, by way of contribution, petitioner
Singapore Airlines one-half (1/2) of the amount it actually paid to Sancho and Beatriz
Rayos in satisfaction of the judgment in Civil Case No. 142252, dated September 9,
1988.
Far East Shipping vs. CA G.R. No. 130068 October 01, 1998
FACTS: Sometime in 1980, M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern
Shipping Company, arrived at the Port of Manila. When the vessel reached the
landmark, Gavino ordered the engine stopped and anchor dropped which was relayed
by Kavankov to the crew. However, the anchor did not take hold and the bow of the
vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier and
the vessel. The PPA, through the OSG, filed a complaint for a sum of money against the
FESC, Capt. Senen C. Gavino and the Manila Pilots Association, praying that the
defendants therein be held jointly and severally liable to pay for damages plus costs of
suit., which the trial court and the CA decided in the affirmative. Neither of the
defendants was happy with the decision and both of them elevated their respective
plaints to the SC via separate petitions for review on certiorari. However, on matters of
compliance with procedural requirements, the conduct of the respective counsel for
FESC, PPA and OSG leaves much to be desired, to the displeasure and
disappointment of the Court. The records showed that the counsels of FESC filed
several motion for extension of time to file petition totaling to 210 days, and 180 days for
the OSG before the comment was filed to the court and copies where not furnished to
the parties involved; the certification against forum shopping is also defective. ISSUE: 1.
Whether or not the counsel violated the CPR. 2. Whether or not the canons under the
CPR applies to lawyers in government service. Ruling: 1. Yes. As between the lawyer
and the courts, a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. He is an
officer of the court exercising a privilege which is indispensable in the administration of
justice. Candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the expeditious
administration of justice. A lawyer is obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not
to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. A lawyer should not only help attain these
objectives but should likewise avoid any unethical or improper practices that impede,
obstruct or prevent their realization, charged as he is with the primary task of assisting
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Sad to say, the members of said
law firm sorely failed to observe their duties as responsible members of the Bar.

2. Yes. the Court find a lackadaisical attitude and complacency on the part of the OSG
in the handling of its cases and an almost reflexive propensity to move for countless
extensions, as if to test the patience of the Court, before favoring it with the timely
submission of required pleadings. The OSG is reminded that just like other members of
the Bar, the canons under the Code of Professional Responsibility apply with equal
force on lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks. These
ethical duties are rendered even more exacting as to them because, as government
counsel, they have the added duty to abide by the policy of the State to promote a high
standard of ethics in public service. Wherefore, counsel for FESC, the law firm of Del
Rosario and Del Rosario, specifically its associate, Atty. Herbert A. Tria, is
REPRIMANDED and WARNED. The original members of the legal team of the OSG are
ADMONISHED and WARNED

Valenzuela vs. CA G.R. No. 115024 February 7, 1996

Lessons Applicable:
Calculation of Risk (Torts and Damages)
Factors in Determining Amount (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
June 24, 1990 2 am: While driving from her restaurant at Araneta avenue towards the
direction of Manila, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela noticed that she had a flat tire so she
parked along the sidewalk about 1 1/2 feet away, place her emergency lights and
seeked help
She was with her companion Cecilia Ramon
While she was pointing her tools to the man who will help her fixed the tires, she was
suddenly hit by another Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Richard Li who was intoxicated and
she slammed accross his windshield and fell to the ground
She was sent to UERM where she stayed for 20 days and her leg was amputated and
was replaced with an artificial one.
Her expenses totalled 147, 000 [120,000 php (confinement) + 27, 000 (aritificial leg)]
RTC: Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code. Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li’s employer, jointly and severally liable for
damages pursuant to Article 2180 P41,840 actual damages, P37,500 unrealized profits
because of the stoppage of plaintiffs Bistro La Conga restaurant 3 weeks after the
accident on June 24, 1990, P20,000 a month as unrealized profits of Bistro La Conga
restaurant, from August, 1990 until the date of this judgment, P30,000.00, a month, for
unrealized profits in 2 Beauty salons, P1,000,000 in moral damages, P50,000, as
exemplary damages, P60,000, as reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.
CA: there was ample evidence that the car was parked at the side but absolved Li's
employer
Li: 55 kph - self serving and uncorraborated
Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an establishment located just across the
scene of the accident: Valenzuela’s car parked parallel and very near the sidewalk and
Li was driving on a very fast speed and there was only a drizzle (NOT heavy rain)
ISSUE:
1. W/N Li was driving at 55 kph - NO
2. W/N Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence - NO
3. W/N Alexander Commercial, Inc. as Li's employer should be held liable - YES
4. W/N the awarding of damages is proper. - YES.

HELD: CA modified with reinstating the RTC decision

1. NO
If Li was running at only about 55 kph then despite the wet and slippery road, he could
have avoided hitting the Valenzuela by the mere expedient or applying his brakes at the
proper time and distance
it was not even necessary for him to swerve a little to the right in order to safely avoid a
collision with the on-coming car since there is plenty of space for both cars, since
Valenzuela car was running at the right lane going towards Manila and the on-coming
car was also on its right lane going to Cubao
2. NO.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a
legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is
required to conform for his own protection
emergency rule
an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act
without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently
and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was
brought by his own negligence
She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a
dark Street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her
She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat
tire and to solicit help if needed
she parked along the sidewalk, about 1½ feet away, behind a Toyota Corona Car
3. YES.
Not the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for acts of the
servant (must be in the course of business), but that of pater familias, in which the
liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a
good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his employees
Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent supervision
of its employee during the performance of the latter‘s assigned tasks would be enough
to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the
Civil Code.
situation is of a different character, involving a practice utilized by large companies with
either their employees of managerial rank or their representatives.
Moreover, Li’s claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of the accident
because he was coming from a social visit with an officemate in Parañaque was a bare
allegation which was never corroborated in the court below. It was obviously self-
serving. Assuming he really came from his officemate’s place, the same could give rise
to speculation that he and his officemate had just been from a work-related function, or
they were together to discuss sales and other work related strategies.
Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li
4. YES.
As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Court’s discretion, we are of the
opinion that the amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in greater accord
with the extent and nature of the injury -. physical and psychological - suffered by
Valenzuela as a result of Li’s grossly negligent driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the
early morning hours of the accident.
the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be
permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes which her body would
normally undergo through the years. The replacements, changes, and adjustments will
require corresponding adjustive physical and occupational therapy. All of these
adjustments, it has been documented, are painful.

Tamargo vs. CA G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992

Facts:
On October 20, 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer
Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil
complaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court by petitioner Macario
Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia
Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara
Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic
incident.
Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to
adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc before the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur.
This petition for adoption was granted after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. In
their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the
result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the
adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable
parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the
moment the successful petition for adoption was filed. Petitioners in their Reply
contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents,
parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting
of a petition for adoption. The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that
respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the
action.
Issue:
Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned may
be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties
in a damage case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter,
when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents?
Ruling:
No. The Court does not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of
adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when
adopting parents had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child. Retroactive
effect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is
essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted
child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively
lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that
they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were
at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto)
would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent
with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a
little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting
parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact
subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.

Libi vs. IAC G.R. No. 70890 September 18,1992

Facts:

Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi, both minors, are sweethearts for more than two
years until Julie (for brevity) broke up her relationship with Wendell after she found him
to be sadistic and irresponsible. Wendell wanted reconciliation but Julie persisted in her
refusal. This prompted the former to resort to threats against her. One day Julie Ann
and Wendell died from a single gunshot wound each comingfrom the same
Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, Wendell’s
father.

As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case against the parents of
Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter’s vicarious liability under Article
2180 of the Civil Code. After trial, the court rendered judgment dismissing plaintiffs’
complaint for insufficiency of the evidence. CA set aside the decision of the lower court.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Wendell’s parents should be held liable for damages.

Ruling:

The civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, is contemplated in
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not
subsidiary, as the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that" (t)he responsibility
treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages." In other
words, the parents' liability as being primary and not subsidiary and liability shall ceased
if the parents can prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father to prevent
damage.

However, defendants-appellees utterly failed to exercise all the diligence of a good

father of the family in preventing their minor son from committing this crime by means of
the gun which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi for they have not regularly checked
whether said gun was still under lock, but learned that it was missing from the safety
deposit box only after the crime had been committed. Wendell could have not gotten
hold of the gun if the key was not left negligently lying around.

Ilusorio vs. CA G.R. No. 139130 November 27, 2002

FACTS:

Ramon Ilusorio entrusted his credit cards and checkbooks and blank checks to his
secretary. Apparently, his secretary was able to encash and deposit to her personal
account 17 checks drawn against his account.

Ilusorio requested to restore to his account the value of the checks that were wrongfully
encashed but the bank refused, hence the case.

In court, the bank testified that they make sure that the sign on the check is verified.
When asked by the NBI to submit standard signs to compare, Ilusorio failed to comply.
The lower held held in favor of defendant.

ISSUE: Whether the bank was negligent in receiving the checks.

RULING:

The SC affirmed the lower court's decision. Ilusorio failed to prove that the bank was
negligent on their part as he has the burden of proof. The bank's employees did not
know the secretary's modus operandi as she was always transacting in behalf of
Ilusorio.

The SC even held that it was Ilusorio who was negligent as he trusted his secretary of
unusual degree.

Ilusorio also cites Sec. 23 of the NIL that a forged check is inoperative and that he bank
has no authority to pay. While true, the case at bar falls under the exception stated in
the section. The SC held that Ilusorio is precluded from setting up the forgery, assuming
there is forgery, due to his own negligence in entrusting his secretary.

Fe Cayao Lasam vs. Ramolete G.R. No. 159132 December 18, 2008
Facts:

On July 28, 1994, respondent Editha Ramolete, who was 3 months pregnant, was
brought to Lorma Medical Center (LMC) in San Fernando, La Union due to vaginal
bleeding. Upon advise of petitioner related via telephone, Editha was admitted to the
LMC on the same day.

A pelvic sonogram was then conducted on Editha revealing the fetus’ weak cardiac
pulsation. The following day, the pelvic sonogram showed that aside from the fetus’
weak cardiac pulsation, no fetal movement was also appreciated. Due to persistent and
profuse vaginal bleeding, petitioner advised her to undergo a D&C procedure. She was
discharged the following day.
On September 16, 1994, Editha was once gain brought at the LMC, as she was
suffering from vomiting and severe abdominal pains. Editha was attended by Drs. Dela
Cruz, Mayo and Komiya. Dr. Mayo allegedly informed Editha that there was a dead
fetus in the latter’s womb, after Editha went laparectomy, she was found to have
massive intra abdominal hemorrhage and ruptured uterus. Thus, she had to go
hysterectomy and as a result no more chance to bear a child.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is liable for medical malpractice.

Ruling:

No. Medical malpractice is a particular form of negligence which consists in the failure of
a physician or a surgeon to apply in his practice of medicine that degree of care and
skill which is ordinarily employed by the profession generally under similar conditions
and in like surrounding circumstances. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a
patient must either prove that the physician or surgeon failed to do something which a
reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would have done, or that the physician or
surgeon performed something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would
not have done, and that such failure or action caused injury to the patient.

There are four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury, and
proximate cause.

The breach of the professional duties of skill and care, or their improper performance by
a physician surgeon, whereby the patient is injured in body or in health, constitutes
actionable malpractice. Further, in as much as the causes of the injuries involved in
malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has
been recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to suspect the conclusion
as to causation.

However, in this case, it was undisputedly established that Editha did not return for
follow-up evaluation, in defiance of the petitioner’s advice. This is, as found out, is the
proximate cause of the injury she sustained.
Hidalgo Enterprises vs. Balandan G.R. No. L-3422 June 13, 1952
Topic: Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance
Facts: Hidalgo Enterprises was the owner of an ice-plant factory in San Pablo, Laguna.
In the factory, there were two tanks full of water, both 9-ft deep, for cooling purposes of
its engine. There was no fence or top cover; the edges of the tanks were barely a foot
high from the surface of the ground. The factory itself was surrounded with a fence.
However, the wide gate entrance was continually open, and anyone could easily enter
the factory. There was no guard assigned on the gate. Around noon on April 16, 1948,
Mario Balandan, a boy barely 3 years old, was playing with other boys his age when he
entered the factory premises through the gate. Mario Balandan then took a bath in one
of the tanks of water and, later on, sank to the bottom of the tank. He died of “asphyxia
secondary to drowning.” The CFI and CA ruled that Hidalgo Enterprises maintained an
attractive nuisance and neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid accident
to person entering its premises.

Issue: Whether or not a water tank is an attractive nuisance.

Held: No. Hidalgo Enterprises Inc.’s water tanks are not classified as attractive
nuisance. Other issues such as whether it exercised reasonable precautions, and if the
parents were guilty of contributory negligence are immaterial. Appealed decision
reversed. Hidalgo Enterprises is absolved from liability. Ratio: One who maintains on his
premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract
children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing
therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby,
even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. This is the doctrine of
attractive nuisance. The principal reason for the doctrine is that the condition or
appliance in question although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or
alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to approach, get on or use it, and
this' attractiveness is an implied invitation to such children. The majority of American
jurisprudence posits that the doctrine of attractive nuisance is generally not applicable to
bodies of water, whether artificial or natural. The exception to this is if there is some
unusual condition or artificial feature other than mere water and its location.
Furthermore, in Anderson v. Reith-Riley Const. Co., the Indiana Appellate Court
explained why bodies of water are not considered as attractive nuisance. It ruled that
children have been instructed early on to exercise caution around bodies of water and
are presumed to know the danger. Dissent of J. Pablo: Children are naturally curious
and do not have perfect knowledge of things. They are amazed by the natural attraction
of the waters and shall explore where their curiosity leads them unless there is
something that prevents them. As such, petitioners should have placed fences around
the ponds as an ordinary precaution.
Menchavez vs. Teves G.R. No. 153201 January 26, 2005
This is a case to recover damages from a lease contract between the parties.
Facts  February 28, 1986: Menchavez (lessors) and Florentino Teves Jr. (lessee)
executed a contract of lease.
 June 2, 1988: Cebu RTC Sheriffs demolished the fishpond dikes constructed by the
the respondent and delivered the possession of the subject roperty to the plaintiffs. 
Respondent filed a complaint for damages and alleged that the lessors have violated
their contract, specifically the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the property for the
entire duration of the contract  RTC declared the contract of lease between the parties
as void ab initio as it is owned by the state based on the Regalian Doctrine. RTC ruled
in favor of the Petitioners.  Respondent elevated the case to CA.  CA disagreed with
RTC’s finding that petitioners and respondent were in pari delicto. It contended that
while there was negligence on the part of the respondent for failing to verify the
ownership of the property, there was no evidence that he had knowledge of petitiones’
lack of ownership  Hence, this petition.

Issue Whether or not the subject property (fishponds) can be leased by the petitioners.

Held: No. It was the state who owned the fishpond. The 1987 Constitution specifically
declares that all lands of the public domain, waters, fisheries and other natural
resources belong to the State. Included here are fishponds, which may not be alienated
but only leased. Possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership.
Being merely applicants for the lease of the fishponds, petitioners had no transferable
right over them. And even if the State were to grant their application, the law expressly
disallowed sublease of the fishponds to respondent. The contract of lease is void ab
initio. No damages may be recovered from a void contract. WHEREFORE, the Petition
is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution SET ASIDE. The Decision of
the trial court is hereby REINSTATED
Nikko Hotel Manila Garden vs. Reyes G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005
FACTS:
Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name “Amay Bisaya,” alleged that while he
was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, Mrs. Filart, his friend of several years,
approached him and invited him to join her in a party at the hotel’s penthouse for the
birthday of the hotel’s manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for
him for which she replied: “of course.” Mr. Reyes then went up with Dr. Filart carrying
the basket of fruits which was the latter’s present for the celebrant.
After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the
buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by
petitioner Ruby Lim, Executive Secretary of Hotel Nikko. In a loud voice and within the
presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet table,
Ruby Lim told him to leave the party (“huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado,
bumaba ka na lang”).
Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart. Dr. Filart, who was within
hearing distance, however, completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and
humiliation. Not long after, while he was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a
Makati policeman approached and asked him to step out of the hotel.
Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One
Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
attorney’s fees.
Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not
under the ignominious circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she
was the Hotel’s Executive Secretary for the past twenty (20) years. For Mr. Tsuruoka’s
party, Ms. Lim generated an exclusive guest list limited to Mr. Tsuruoka’s closest friends
and some hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited.
Dr. Filart gave her version of the story to the effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to
the party. According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket of
fruits intended for the celebrant as he was likewise going to take the elevator. When
they reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he was not
properly dressed and was not invited.
Then there was a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes shouting. She ignored Mr. Reyes.
She was embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to think that she invited him.
The court a quo dismissed the complaint, giving more credence to the testimony of Ms.
Lim. The trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being
thrown out of the party as he was uninvited:
On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the trial court.
Thus, the instant petition for review.
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit
injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk
of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he
was a “gate-crasher.”
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (“to which a person assents is not esteemed in law
as injury” ) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the
recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to
danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so. As formulated by petitioners, however,
this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent
Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19
and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to
expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. “Amay
Bisaya,” to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby
becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby
Lim were so liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily liable with
her.
RULING:
Indeed, the general rule is that we are not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to
reviewing and revising errors of law. One of the exceptions to this general rule,
however, obtains herein as the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of
the trial court.
From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower court’s
findings of fact.
We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel, for-invitation-only, thrown
for the hotel’s former Manager, a Japanese national. Then came a person who was
clearly uninvited (by the celebrant) and who could not just disappear into the crowd as
his face is known by many, being an actor. While he was already spotted by the
organizer of the party, Ms. Lim, the very person who generated the guest list, it did not
yet appear that the celebrant was aware of his presence.
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and
expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from
a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years
wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes
that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the
lower court was correct in observing that –
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to
leave the party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was
meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no intention on her part to
cause embarrassment to him.
Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take
him out.

Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyes’s version of the story is that it is
unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes,
however, had not presented any witness to back his story up.
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he
was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of
the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its
liability springs from that of its employee.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances.
Article 19 states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Elsewhere, we explained that when “a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible.”
The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed
not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties.
These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith.6 Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or
intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which
is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. When
Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil
Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law which does not
obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article
21, on the other hand, states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
Article 21refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is
an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or
public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.

A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained of
must be intentional.
As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms.
Lim was driven by animosity against him. These two people did not know each other
personally before the evening of 13 October 1994.
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr.
Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done within
the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone.
Fernando vs. CA G.R. No. 92087 May 8, 1992

SUMMARY Public Respondent City of Davao put out a bid to re-empty the septic tank in
Agdao. On Nov 1975, one of the losing bidders, together with 4 others, were found dead
inside the almost-empty tank. It was presumed that they opened the tank and cleaned it,
without knowledge or authority of the public respondent. The cause of death is
inhalation of toxic gas. The heirs of the victims, the petitioners in this case, sought to
recover from the respondent, alleging negligence on the latter’s part which they claim is
the proximate death of the 5 victims. Court ruled in favor of respondent, holding that the
latter was compliant to the safety requirements for sanitation. Gas could not have
leaked from the tank because it was air-tight, unless somebody opens it. The act of the
victims of opening the tank and attempting to re-empty it is the proximate cause of their
death. To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of another,
a claimant must establish the relation between the omission and the damage. He must
prove that the defendant’s negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury. But, where the victim contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its
determining factors, he cannot recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he
contributes only to his own injury, he may recover less a sum deemed a suitable
equivalent for his own imprudence.

FACTS  Market master Bibiano Morta filed a requisition request to re-empty the septic
tank in Agdao. Because of this, an invitation to bid was issued, which Feliciano Bascon
won. o On Nov 22, 1975, bidder Aurelio Bertulano was found dead inside the tank with
4 others (Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando, and Jose Fajardo, Jr.). o
Cause of death: asphyxia caused by diminution of oxygen supply in the body. Their
lungs burst due to their intake of toxic gas produced from the waste matter inside the
tank. o Since the tank was found almost empty, it was presumed that the victims
entered the tank to reempty it, without knowledge and consent of the market master. 
Petitioners (heirs of the 5 deceased) sued the Respondent (City of Davao) for the
deaths, faulting the government for failing to clean the tank for 19 years, resulting in an
accumulation of hydrogen sulfide gas which killed the 5 laborers. They also alleged that
the fault is compounded by the absence of warning signs indicating the existence of
danger and because Respondent exerted no efforts to neutralize the harm. o Petitioners
aver that it was Respondent’s gross negligence which was the proximate cause of the
fatal incident that led to the deaths.  RTC ruled in favor Respondents, dismissing the
complaint. CA initially ruled in favor of Petitioners, ordering Respondents to pay
Petitioners. But on motion for reconsideration, the CA reversed itself and ruled in favor
of Respondents, holding them not liable to the Petitioners.

ISSUE: WON Respondent City of Davao is guilty of negligence, such that will make
them liable to the Petitioners? – NO [Jump to issue #2 for the topical issue] 1) WON
there was negligence? – NO  Negligence: failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.  Test: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which
an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence.  What would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given
situation must always be determined in the light of human experience and in view of the
facts involved in the particular case.

 If a prudent man can foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued, it is his
duty to take precautions to guard against that harm.  Conduct is said to be negligent
when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect
harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or
guarding against its consequences.

2) WON the alleged acts/omissions of Respondents is the proximate cause of the

deaths of the victims? – NO  To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the
negligence of another, a claimant must establish the relation between the omission and
the damage. He must prove that the defendant’s negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury.  Proximate cause: that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred.  Test: Where the victim
contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot
recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own
injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should
pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence. 
Public respondent had been remiss in its duty to re-empty the tank annually, but such
negligence is not a continuing one. In fact, upon learning that the tank needs to be
cleaned, they immediately took steps to remedy it.  It is an undisputed fact that people
have been using the toilet but have remained unscathed. They pass over it, but since
it’s well-covered they are unharmed. The absence of any accident was u to the public
respondent’s compliance with the sanitary and plumbing specifications in constructing
the toilet and tank.  The toxic gas from the waste matter could not have leaked out
because the tank was air-tight. The only indication that it was full was when water came
out of it. Yet even when it was full there was no report of any casualty of gas poisoning
despite the people’s continued use of it.  Engineer Demetrio Alindada of the city
government testified as to the safety of the tank and the toilet. An accident such as toxic
gas leakage is unlikely to happen unless the cover is removed.  The accident which
caused the victims’ deaths happened because the victims, on their own and without
authority from the public respondent, opened the tank.  Victim Bertulano is an old
hand in the service and is presumed to know the hazards of the job (of cleaning septic
tanks). Their failure to take precautions is the proximate cause of the accident. Other
issues: 3) As to the lack of ventilation pipe in the toilet, which Petitioners allege
emphasize the negligence of the public respondent, the court held that theirs is not an
expert witness. On the other hand, Engr Alindada testified that the sanitary plan would
not have been approved unless it is in conformance with sanitary requirements
(ventilation pipe need not be constructed separately/outside the building, but could also
be embodied in the hollow blocks). 4) As to the lack of warning signs, toilets and septic
tanks are not nuisance per se which the Civil Code necessitates warning signs for. 5)
Court also held that there was no contractual relationship whatsoever between the
victims and the public respondent. DISPOSITION: ACCORDINGLY, the amended
decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 11, 1990 is AFFIRMED. No costs.

Ilocano Norte Electric Coop vs. CA G.R. No. L-53401 November 6, 1989

When an act of God combines with defendant’s negligence to produce an injury,

defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent
conduct.

FACTS  Typhoon “Gening” buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains
and consequent flooding in its wake.  After the typhoon had abated and when the
floodwaters were beginning to recede, the deceased, Isabel Lao Juan, ventured out,
and proceeded to the Five Sisters Emporium, of which she was the owner and
proprietress, to look after the merchandise that might have been damaged.  Wading in
waist-deep flood, Isabel was followed by 2 of her employees. Suddenly, the deceased
screamed “Ay” and quickly sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help, but
failed. There was an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion
in the water.  Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of
Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but at four meters away from her
he turned back shouting that the water was grounded.  When Antonio Yabes was
informed by Ernesto that his mother-in- law had been electrocuted, they requested the
police to ask the people of INELCO to cut off the electric current.  The body of the
deceased was recovered about two meters from an electric post. Upon the request of
the relatives of the deceased, Dr. Castro examined the body. The skin was grayish or,
in medical parlance, cyanotic, which indicated death by electrocution. On the left palm,
the doctor found an “electrically charged wound” or a first degree burn. About the base
of the thumb on the left hand was a burned wound. The certificate of death prepared by
Dr. Castro stated the cause of death as “circulatory shock electrocution”  In defense
and exculpation, defendant presented the testimonies of its officers and employees, and
sought to prove that on and even before the day of Isabel Lao Juan’s death, the electric
service system of the INELCO in the whole franchise area, did not suffer from any
defect that might constitute a hazard to life and property. The service lines, devices and
other INELCO equipment had been newly-installed prior to the date in question. As a
public service operator and in line with its business of supplying electric current to the
public, defendant had installed safety devices to prevent and avoid injuries to persons
and damage to property in case of natural calamities such as floods, typhoons, fire and
others.  An action for damages in the aggregate amount of P250000 was instituted by
the heirs of the deceased with the CFI.  INELCO, however, theorizes that the
deceased could have died simply by either drowning or by electrocution due to
negligence attributable only to herself. it was pointed out that the deceased, without
petitioner’s knowledge, caused the installation of a burglar deterrent by connecting a
wire from the main house to the iron gate and fence of steel matting, thus, charging the
latter with electric current whenever the switch is on. This might have caused the
electrocution.  The CFI ruled in favor of INELCO and dismissed the complaint but
awarded P25000 in moral damages and attorney’s fees of P45000.  The CA set aside
the CFI decision and ordered INELCO to pay actual damages of P30229.45,
compensatory damages of P50000, exemplary damages of P10000, attorney’s fees of
P3000, plus the cost of the suit.

ISSUE W/N INELCO is liable for damages since typhoons and floods are fortuitous
events – NO RATIO  While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of
God for which no person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which
directly caused the victim’s death. It was through the intervention of petitioner’s
negligence that death took place.  Engr. Juan from the NAPOCOR stated that when
he set out that morning for an inspection, there was no INELCO line man attending to
the grounded and disconnected electric lines. The INELCO Office was likewise closed
around the time of the electrocution.  At the INELCO, irregularities in the flow of
electric current were noted because “amperes of the switch volts were moving”. And
yet, despite these danger signals, INELCO had to wait for Engr. Juan to request that
defendant’s switch be cut off— but the harm was done. Asked why the delay, Loreto
Abijero, one of INELCO’s linemen answered that he “was not the machine tender of the
electric plant to switch off the current.”  In times of calamities, extraordinary diligence
requires a supplier of electricity to be in constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable
incident that might imperil life or limb. The evidence does not show that defendant did
that. On the contrary, evidence discloses that there were no men (linemen or otherwise)
policing the area, nor even manning its office.  The negligence of petitioner having
been shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim’s death
was solely due to a fortuitous event.  “When an act of God combines or concurs with
the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury
would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission”  A person is
excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger
he must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or
property of another is in peril or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property.
Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased’s property, a source of her
livelihood, was faced with an impending loss. RULING CA Decision affirmed with
modification, increasing actual damages to P48229.

Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District G.R. No. L-7664 August 29, 1958
spouses ONG vs. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT
FACTS: Defendant owns and operates three recreational swimming pools at its Balara
filters, Diliman, Quezon City, to which people are invited and for which a nominal fee is
charged . 14 year old Dominador Ong drowned while swimming in one of those pools.

Defendant admits the fact that plaintiffs’ son was drowned in one of its swimming pools
but avers that his death was caused by his own negligence or by unavoidable accident.
Defendant also avers that it had exercised due diligence in the selection of, and
supervision over, its employees and that it had observed the diligence required by law
under the circumstances.

After trial, the lower court found that the action of plaintiffs is untenable and dismissed
the complaint without pronouncement as to costs. Plaintiffs took the case on appeal
directly to this Court because the amount involved exceeds the sum of P50,000.

ISSUE:

1. WON the death of minor Dominador Ong can be attributed to the negligence of
defendant and/or its employees so as to entitle plaintiffs to recover damages.

2. WON the doctrine of last clear chance could be used against the respondent

HELD: decision is affirmed

The present action is governed by Article 2176 in relation to Article 2080 of the new Civil
Code. The first article provides that “whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damages done.” Such
fault or negligence is called quasi-delict. Under the second article, this obligation is
demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.

Since the present action is one for damages founded on culpable negligence, the
principle to be observed is that the person claiming damages has the burden of proving
that the damage is caused by the fault or negligence of the person from whom the
damage is claimed, or of one of his employees.

NO

There is sufficient evidence to show that appellee has taken all necessary precautions
to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident which may cause their
death. Thus, it has been shown that the swimming pools of appellee are provided with a
ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. The
bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so as to insure clear visibility. There is
on display in a conspicuous place within the area certain rules and regulations
governing the use of the pools. Appellee employs six lifeguards who are all trained as
they had taken a course for that purpose and were issued certificates of proficiency.
…There is a male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen
resuscitator. And there are security guards who are available always in case of
emergency.

The record also shows that when the body of minor Ong was retrieved from the bottom
of the pool, the employees of appellee did everything possible to bring him back to life,
from manual resuscitation to calling for a doctor. All of the foregoing shows that
appellee has done what is humanly possible under the circumstances to restore life to
minor Ong and for that reason it is unfair to hold it liable for his death.

2. We do not see how this doctrine may apply considering that the record does not
show how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool. The only thing the record
discloses is that minor Ong informed his elder brothers that he was going to the locker
room to drink a bottle of coke but that from that time on nobody knew what happened to
him until his lifeless body was retrieved. The doctrine of last clear chance simply means
that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of
defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence,
might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence.
Or, “As the doctrine usually is stated, a person who has the last clear chance or
opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent
or the negligence of a third person which is imputed to his opponent, is considered in
law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.”

Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it being
apparent that he went there without any companion in violation of one of the regulations
of appellee as regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that the lifeguard
responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it and immediately
after retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal of appellee had been put into play in
order to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the
doctrine now invoked by appellants to impute liability to appellee..

The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to
act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means
at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any
previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the
injury.

Before closing, we wish to quote the following observation of the trial court, which we
find supported by the evidence: “There is (also) a strong suggestion coming from the
expert evidence presented by both parties that Dominador Ong might have dived where
the water was only 5.5 feet deep, and in so doing he might have hit or bumped his
forehead against the bottom of the pool, as a consequence of which he was stunned,
and which to his drowning.

NOTES:

Cited jurisprudence:

“The rule is well settled that the owners of resorts to which people generally are
expressly or by implication invited are legally bound to exercise ordinary care and
prudence in the management and maintenance of such resorts, to the end of making
them reasonably safe for visitors” (Larkin vs. Saltair Beach Co., 30 Utah 86, 83 Pac.
686).

“Although the proprietor of a natatorium is liable for injuries to a patron, resulting from
lack of ordinary care in providing for his safety, without the fault of the patron, he is not,
however, in any sense deemed to be the insurer of the safety of patrons. And the death
of a patron within his premises does not cast upon him the burden of excusing himself
from any presumption of negligence” (Bertalot vs. Kinnare.)

Mckee vs. IAC G.R. No. L-68102 July 16, 1992

FACTS
Between 9 and 10 o'clock in the morning of January 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along
MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga, a head-on-
collision took place between an International cargo truck, Loadstar, owned by Tayag
and Manalo, driven by Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh, resulting in
the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to
George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of
the Ford Escort Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded
with 200 cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling southward from
Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort,
on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando When the
Ford Escort was about 10 meters away from the southern approach of the bridge, 2
boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car moving
back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back
Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the
truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter
attempted to return to his lane. But before he could do so, his car collided with the truck.
The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said
bridge As a result of the accident, 2 civil cases were filed for damages for the death
and physical injuries sustained by the victims boarding the Ford Escort; as well as a
criminal case against Galang During the trial, evidence were presented showing that
the driver of the Truck was speeding resulting in the skid marks it caused in the scene
of the accident The lower court found Galang guilty in the criminal case, but the civil
cases were dismissed On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of Galang, and
reversed the decision in the civil cases, ordering the payment of damages for the death
and physical injuries of the McKee family On MR, the CA reversed its previous
decision and ruled in favor of the owners of the truck

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the owner and driver of the Truck were responsible
for the collision

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE COLLISION WAS
THE OVER SPEEDING OF THE TRUCK SHOWING ITS NEGLIGENCE The test of
negligence and the facts obtaining in this case, it is manifest that no negligence could
be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to
avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if
this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the
natural course to take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be
several meters away and could very well slow down, move to the side of the road and
give way to the oncoming car. Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule,
"one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time
to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not
guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may
appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is
brought about by his own negligence" 
Considering the sudden intrusion of the 2 boys into the lane of the car, the Court finds
that Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the given situation to avoid hitting
them. Applying the above test, therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty of negligence

In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be said that his
negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. Galang's negligence is apparent in
the records. He himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per
hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30
kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is
presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation
Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds
application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the
contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is
shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have
avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the
person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences thereof Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not
difficult to rule that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to
avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As employers
of the truck driver, Tayag and Manalo are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly
and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent
flows from the negligence of their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris
tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage, which they failed to do
Petition GRANTED. Resolution SET ASIDE and previous DECISION REINSTATED.
LBC vs. CA G.R. No. 101683 February 23, 1995
311 Phil. 715

VITUG, J.:

In this petition for review, the application of the doctrines of "proximate cause" and "last
clear chance" is, once again, being put to test. The petition questions the decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated 18 July 1991, which has reversed that of the trial court.

The case arose from a vehicular collision which occurred at about 11:30 in the morning
of 15 November 1987. Rogelio Monterola, a licensed driver, was traveling on board his
Suzuki motorcycle towards Mangagoy on the right lane along a dusty national road in
Bislig, Surigao del Sur. At about the same time, a cargo van of the LBC Air Cargo
Incorporated, driven by defendant Jaime Tano, Jr., was coming from the opposite
direction on its way to the Bislig Airport. On board were passengers Fernando Yu,
Manager of LBC Air Cargo, and his son who was seated beside Tano. When Tano was
approaching the vicinity of the airport road entrance on his left, he saw two vehicles
racing against each other from the opposite direction. Tano stopped his vehicle and
waited for the two racing vehicles to pass by. The stirred cloud of dust made visibility
extremely bad. Instead of waiting for the dust to settle, Tano started to make a sharp left
turn towards the airport road. When he was about to reach the center of the right lane,
the motorcycle driven by Monterola suddenly emerged from the dust and smashed
head-on against the right side of the LBC van. Monterola died from the severe injuries
he sustained.

A criminal case for "homicide thru reckless imprudence" was filed against Tano. A civil
suit was likewise instituted by the heirs of deceased Monterola against Tano, along with
Fernando Yu and LBC Air Cargo Incorporated, for the recovery of damages. The two
cases were tried jointly by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, of Surigao del Sur.

On 29 July 1990, the trial court dismissed both cases on the ground that the proximate
cause of the "accident" was the negligence of deceased Rogelio Monterola.

Private respondent appealed the dismissal of the civil case to the Court of Appeals. On
18 July 1991, the appellate court reversed the court a quo. It held:

"WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED, and another one is hereby
rendered ordering the defendants Jaime Tano and LBC Air Cargo, Inc. to jointly and
severally pay the plaintiff Patrocinia Monterola the following amounts:

"To SHERWIN MONTEROLA:

"1. Indemnity for the death of Rogelio Monterola ------------ P50,000.00

"2. For Moral damages ------------------------------------------ 20,000.00

"TO PATROCINIA GRONDIANO Y MONTEROLA:

"3. Actual damages ----------------------------------------------- P 7,361.00

"4. Hospitals & Burial Expenses -------------------------------- 15,000.00

"5. Attorneys Fees and expenses of Litigation ---------------- 10,000.00

"Plus the costs.

"Actual payment of the aforementioned amounts should, however, be reduced by twenty

(20%) per cent." [1]

In the instant petition for review, petitioners contend that -

"1.
The Court of Appeals erred in finding that Jaime Tano Jr. was negligent in the driving of
his vehicle and in failing to give a signal to approaching vehicles of his intention to make
a left turn.
"2.
The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the proximate cause of the accident was
the victim's negligence in the driving of his motorcycle in a very fast speed and thus
hitting the petitioner's cargo van." [2]

The issues raised are thus essentially factual. The intrinsic merit of, as well as cogency
in, the detailed analyses made by the Court of Appeals in arriving at its findings is at
once apparent. Said the appellate court:

"That visibility was poor when Jaime Tano made a left turn was admitted by the latter.

"Q
When these two vehicles passed by your parked vehicle, as you said, there were clouds
of dust, did I get you right?
"A
Yes sir, the road was dusty.
"Q
So much so that you could no longer see the vehicles from the opposite direction
following these vehicles?
"A
It is not clear, sir, so I even turned on my left signal and the headlight.
"Q
What do you mean by it was not clear, you could not see the incoming vehicles?
"A
I could not see because of the cloud of dust.
"Q
And it was at this juncture, when you were to follow your theory, when you started your
LBC van again and swerved to the left leading to the Bislig airport?
"A
I did not enter immediately the airport, I waited the dust to clear a little before I drove.
"x x x x x x x x x
"Q
In other words when you said that it was slightly clear, you would like to tell the
Honorable Court that you could only clearly see big vehicles x x x but not small vehicles
like a motorcycle?
"A
I could see clearly big vehicles but not small vehicles like a motorcycle.
"Q
Like the motorcycle of Rogelio Monterola?
"A
Yes, sir. I could not se clearly. (Tano, tsn, April 18, 1989, pp. 26--30) (p. 15, Appellant's
brief).
"Tano should not have made a left turn under the conditions admitted by him. Under the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the driver of any vehicle upon a highway, before
starting, stopping or turning from a direct line, is called upon to first see that such
movement can be made in safety, and whenever the operation of any other vehicle
approaching may be affected by such movement, shall give a signal plainly visible to the
driver of such other vehicles of the intention to make such movement (Sec. 44, R.A.
4136, as amended). This means that before a driver turns from a direct line, in this case
to the left, the driver must first see to it that there are no approaching vehicles and, if
there are, to make the turn only if it can be made in safety, or at the very least give a
signal that is plainly visible to the driver of such other vehicle. Tano did neither in this
case, for he recklessly made a left turn even as visibility was still 'very poor, and thus
failed to see the approaching motorcycle and warn the latter of his intention to make a
left turn. This is plain and simple negligence.

"In thus making the left turn, he placed his vehicle directly at the path of the motorcycle
which, unaware of Tano's intention to make a left turn, smashed at Tano's vehicle. It
was Tano's negligence that created the risk or the condition of danger that set into
operation the event that led to the smashedup and untimely death of Rogelio Monterola.

"Rogelio Monterola's motorcycle would not have hit the cargo van had Tano, in
operating it, not recklessly turned left when visibility was still poor, and instead observed
the directive of the Land Transportation Code that before doing so, he should first see to
it that such movement can be made in safety, and that whenever any other vehicle
approaching may be affected by such movement, should give a signal plainly visible to
the driver of such other vehicle of the intention to make such movement.

"That Rogelio Monterola was running fast despite poor visibility as evidenced by the
magnitude of the damage to the vehicles is no defense. His negligence would at most
be contributory (Article 2179, N.C.C.). Having negligently created the condition of
danger, defendants may not avoid liability by pointing to the negligence of the former.

"x x x xxx xxx.

"Tano's proven negligence created a presumption of negligence on the part of his

employer, the LBC Air Cargo Corporation, in supervising its employees properly and
adequately (Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra), which
may only be destroyed by proof of due diligence in the selection and supervision of his
employees to prevent the damage (Article 2180, N.C.C.). No such defense was
interposed by defendants in their answer.

"We, however, fail to see Fernando Yu's liability as Manager of LBC-Mangagoy Branch
Office, there being no employer-employee relationship between him and Jaime Tano
who is a driver of the LBC Air Cargo Inc. It was held in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc.,
et al. vs. Phil. American Forwarders, Inc., 63 SCRA 231, that the term 'Manager' in
Article 2180 is used in the sense of 'employer.' Hence, no tortuous or quasi-delictual
liability can be fastened on Fernando Yu as branch manager of LBC Air Cargo Inc.

"Now for the amount of damages. Aside from the indemnity for death which has been
pegged at P50,000.00 (Resolution En Banc, August 30, 1990, cited in People vs.
Sazon, 189 SCRA 700), the evidence disclose that as a result of the accident, Rogelio
Monterola's motorcycle was damaged, the repair cost of which amounted to P7,361.00
(Exh. E-1), for the hospitalization, wake and burial expenses, plaintiff spent P15,000.00.
There is likewise no question that by reason of Rogelio Monterola's untimely death, his
only child 14 years old Sherwin Monterola, suffered mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock that entitles him to moral damages which
we hereby fix at P20,000.00. Because of defendants' refusal to indemnify the plaintiff for
his father's death, the latter was compelled to litigate and engage the services of
counsel. He is therefore entitled to an additional amount of P10,000.00 for attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation.

"Considering, however, the contributory negligence of Rogelio Monterola in driving at a

fast clip despite the fact that the road was dusty, we reduce the aggregate amount of
damages to which the plaintiff is entitled by twenty per cent (Phoenix Construction Inc.
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, Supra)." [3]

From every indication, the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Tano
who, despite extremely poor visibility, hastily executed a left turn (towards the Bislig
airport road entrance) without first waiting for the dust to settle. It was this negligent act
of Tano, which had placed his vehicle (LBC van) directly on the path of the motorcycle
coming from the opposite direction, that almost instantaneously caused the collision to
occur. Simple prudence required him not to attempt to cross the other lane until after it
would have been safe from and clear of any oncoming vehicle.

Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to, at times,
as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"). The doctrine, in essence, is to the
effect that where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably
later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the
consequences thereof (see Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil. 809). Stated differently, the rule
would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the
recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against
liability sought by, another if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided
the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence (Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs.
Baesa, 179 SCRA 384; Glan People's Lumber and Hardware vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 173 SCRA 464).

In the case at bench, the victim was traveling along the lane where he was rightly
supposed to be. The incident occurred in an instant. No appreciable time had elapsed,
from the moment Tano swerved to his left to the actual impact, that could have afforded
the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the collision.

It is true however, that the deceased was not all that free from negligence in evidently
speeding too closely behind the vehicle he was following. We, therefore, agree with the
appellate court that there indeed was contributory negligence on the victim's part that
could warrant a mitigation of petitioners' liability for damages.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

PACALNA SANGGACALA ET. AL VS. NAPOCOR , GR no. 209438, July 27, 2021
ORIENT FREIGHT INTERNATIONAL INC. VS. KEIHIN-EVERETT FORWARDING
COMPANY INC., G.R. No. 191937, August 9, 2017

FACTS:
On October 16, 2001, Keihin-Everett entered into a Trucking Service Agreement with
Matsushita. Under the Trucking Service Agreement, Keihin-Everett would provide
services for Matsushita's trucking requirements. These services were subcontracted by
Keihin-Everett to Orient Freight, through their own Trucking Service Agreement
executed on the same day.
When the Trucking Service Agreement between Keihin-Everett and Matsushita expired
on December 31, 2001, Keihin-Everett executed an In-House Brokerage Service
Agreement for Matsushita's Philippine Economic Zone Authority export operations.
Keihin-Everett continued to retain the services of Orient Freight, which sub-contracted
its work to Schmitz Transport and Brokerage Corporation.
In April 2002, Matsushita called Keihin-Everett about a column in the issue of the tabloid
newspaper Tempo. This news narrated the April 17, 2002 interception by Caloocan City
police of a stolen truck filled with shipment of video monitors and CCTV systems owned
by Matsushita
When contacted by Keihin-Everett about this news, Orient Freight stated that the tabloid
report had blown the incident out of proportion. They claimed that the incident simply
involved the breakdown and towing of tKeihin-Everett independently investigated the
incident. During its investigation, it obtained a police report from the Caloocan City
Police Station. The report stated, among others, that at around 2:00 p.m. on April 17,
2002, somewhere in Plaza Dilao, Paco Street, Manila, Cudas told Aquino to report
engine trouble to Orient Freight. After Aquino made the phone call, he informed Orient
Freight that the truck had gone missing. When the truck was intercepted by the police
along C3 Road near the corner of Dagat-Dagatan Avenue in Caloocan City, Cudas
escaped and became the subject of a manhunt. The truck was promptly released and
did not miss the closing time of the vessel intended for the shipment.
Matsushita terminated its In-House Brokerage Service Agreement with Keihin-Everett,
effective July 1, 2002. Matsushita cited loss of confidence for terminating the contract,
stating that Keihin-Everett's way of handling the April 17, 2002 incident and its
nondisclosure of this incident's relevant facts "amounted to fraud and signified an utter
disregard of the rule of law. Keihin-Everett sent a letter to Orient Freight, demanding
P2,500,000.00 as indemnity for lost income. It argued that Orient Freight's mishandling
of the situation caused the termination of Keihin-Everett's contract with Matsushita.
When Orient Freight refused to pay, Keihin-Everett filed a complaint dated October 24,
2002 for damages. In its complaint, Keihin-Everett alleged that Orient Freight's
"misrepresentation, malice, negligence and fraud" caused the termination of its In-
House Brokerage Service Agreement with Matsushita. Keihin-Everett prayed for
compensation for lost income, with legal interest, exemplary damages, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses, and the costs of the suit. The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of
Keihin-Everett. It found that Orient Freight was "negligent in failing to investigate
properly the incident and make a factual report to Keihin [-Everett] and Matsushita.
Orient Freight appealed the said Decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
issued its Decision affirming the trial court's decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 2176 is applicable in this case

RULING:
Negligence may either result in culpa aquiliana or culpa contractual. Culpa aquiliana is
the "the wrongful or negligent act or omission which creates a vinculum juris and gives
rise to an obligation between two persons not formally bound by any other
obligation," and is governed by Article 2176 of the Civil Code:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Actions based on contractual negligence
and actions based on quasi-delicts differ in terms of conditions, defenses, and proof.
They generally cannot co-exist.Once a breach of contract is proved, the defendant is
presumed negligent and must prove not being at fault. In a quasi-delict, however, the
complaining party has the burden of proving the other party's negligence. However,
there are instances when Article 2176 may apply even when there is a pre-existing
contractual relation. A party may still commit a tort or quasi-delict against another,
despite the existence of a contract between them.
Here, petitioner denies that it was obliged to disclose the facts regarding the hijacking
incident since this was not among the provisions of its Trucking Service Agreement with
respondent. There being no contractual obligation, respondent had no cause of action
against petitioner.

The obligation to report what happened during the hijacking incident, admittedly, does
not appear on the plain text of the Trucking Service Agreement. Petitioner argues that it
is nowhere in the agreement. Respondent does not dispute this claim. Neither the
Regional Trial Court nor the Court of Appeals relied on the provisions of the Trucking
Service Agreement to arrive at their respective conclusions. Breach of the Trucking
Service Agreement was neither alleged nor proved.
While petitioner and respondent were contractually bound under the Trucking Service
Agreement and the events at the crux of this controversy occurred during the
performance of this contract, it is apparent that the duty to investigate and report arose
subsequent to the Trucking Service Agreement. When respondent discovered the news
report on the hijacking incident, it contacted petitioner, requesting information on the
incident.Respondent then requested petitioner to investigate and report on the veracity
of the news report. Pursuant to respondent's request, petitioner met with respondent
and Matsushita on April 20, 2002 and issued a letter dated April 22, 2002, addressed to
Matsushita.Respondent's claim was based on petitioner's negligent conduct when it was
required to investigate and report on the incident.
Both the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals erred in finding petitioner's
negligence of its obligation to report to be an action based on a quasi-delict Petitioner's
negligence did not create the vinculum juris or legal relationship with the respondent,
which would have otherwise given rise to a quasi-delict. Petitioner's duty to respondent
existed prior to its negligent act. When respondent contacted petitioner regarding the
news report and asked it to investigate the incident, petitioner's obligation was created.
Thereafter, petitioner was alleged to have performed its obligation negligently, causing
damage to respondent.
The doctrine "the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort," on which the lower
courts relied, is inapplicable here. Petitioner's negligence, arising as it does from its
performance of its obligation to respondent, is dependent on this obligation. Neither do
the facts show that Article 21 of the Civil Code applies, there being no finding that
petitioner's act was a conscious one to cause harm, or be of such a degree as to
approximate fraud or bad faith.

Consequently, Articles 1170, 1172, and 1173 of the Civil Code on negligence in the
performance of an obligation should apply. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
January 21, 2010 Decision and April 21, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 91889 are AFFIRMED.
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are
liable for damages. (1101)
Art. 1171. Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations. Any waiver
of an action for future fraud is void. (1102a)
Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of
obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts,
according to the circumstances. (1103)
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad
faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.
(1104a)
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of
risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or
which, though foreseen, were inevitable. (1105a)
Casupanan vs. Laroya, G.R. No. 145391, August 26, 2002
VICENTE HENSON JR. VS. UCPB

Facts:
o Petitioner Henson owns a two-storey building, and on its ground floor, Copylandia. On
May 2006, a water leak occurred in the building, which lead to the copiers and various
equipments to be damaged.

o This prompted Copylandia to file a claim for the proceeds of the insurance they had
over the equipment under Respondent UCPB, ultimately leading to the subrogation of
the latter to the rights to claim of the former to Henson.

o On Oct 2011, UCPB went after NASCL, the original lease holder, but they would
eventually impleaded CHI, the company of Henson. However, on April 2014,
respondent then filed a petition to amend the complaint to implead Henson himself. CHI
then opposed the motion, stating that the respondent’s cause of action has already
prescribed as it is based on quasi-delict. Thus, it must be brought within four (4) years
from its accrual on May 9, 2006.

o The RTC and the CA ruled in favor of Henson, stating that the 4-year prescription for
a quasi-delict is not applicable as the respondent was merely enforcing its right of
subrogation, the prescriptive period is ten (10) years based on an obligation created by
law reckoned from the date of Copylandia's indemnification, or on November 2, 2006.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 10-year period should apply to Henson

HELD: YES. However, the SC discussed the problem with the previous ruling that takes
precedence of this case.
SUBROGATION DISCUSSION:
In ruling that respondent's claim against petitioner has yet to prescribe, the courts a quo
cited Vector Shipping Corporation v. American Home Assurance Company (Vector).
In this case, the Court held that the insured's (i.e., American Home's) claim against the
debtor(i.e., Vector) was premised on the right of subrogation pursuant to Article 2207 of
the Civil Code and hence, an obligation created by law.
However, the Court failed to discern that no new obligation was created between
American Home and Vector for the reason that a subrogee only steps into the shoes of
the subrogor; hence, the subrogee-insurer only assumes the rights of the subrogor-
insured based on the latter's original obligation with the
The Courts have clearly explained that because of the nature of subrogation as a mode
of "creditor-substitution," the rights of a subrogee cannot be superior to the rights
possessed by a subrogor. A subrogee in effect steps into the shoes of the insured and
can recover only if the insured likewise could have recovered."
Based on the above-discussed considerations, the Court must heretofore abandon the
ruling in Vector that an insurer may file an action against the tortfeasor within ten (10)
years from the time the insurer indemnifies the insured.
CONCLUSION: Be that as it may, it should, however, be clarified that this Court's
abandonment ofthe Vector doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason
that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until
reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.
BACK TO THE MAIN CASE:
o In this case, it is undisputed that the water leak damage incident, which gave rise to
Copylandia's cause of action against any possible defendants, including NASCL and
petitioner, happened on May 9, 2006. As this incident gave rise to an obligation
classified as a quasi-delict, Copylandia would have only had four (4) years, or until May
9, 2010, within which to file a suit to recover damages.

o When Copylandia's rights were transferred to respondent by virtue of the latter's

payment of the former's insurance claim on November 2, 2006, as evidenced by the
Loss and Subrogation Receipt,respondent was likewise bound by the same prescriptive
period.

o Since it was only on:

o May 20, 2010 when respondent made an extrajudicial demand to NASCL, and
thereafter, filed its complaint;
o October 6, 2011 when respondent amended its complaint to implead CHI as party-
defendant; and
o April 21, 2014 when respondent moved to further amend the complaint in order to
implead petitioner as party-defendant in lieu of CHI, prescription - if adjudged under the
present parameters of legal subrogation under this Decision - should have already set
in.

o However, it must be recognized that the prevailing rule applicable to the pertinent
events of this case is Vector. Pursuant to the guidelines stated above, specifically under
guideline 1 (a), the Vector doctrine - which was even relied upon by the courts a quo -
would then apply.

PETITION IS AFFIRMED
GUIDELINES: With these in mind, the Court therefore sets the following guidelines
relative to the application of Vector and this Decision vis-a-vis the prescriptive period in
cases where the insurer is subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer
based on a quasi-delict:
1. For actions of such nature that have already been filed and are currently pending
before the courts at the time of the finality of this Decision, the rules on prescription
prevailing at the time the action is filed would apply. Particularly:
A. For cases that were filed by the subrogee-insurer during the applicability ofthe Vector
ruling (i.e., from Vector's finality on August 15, 201360 up until the finality of this
Decision), the prescriptive period is ten (10) years from the time of payment by the
insurer to the insured, which gave rise to an obligation created by law.
a. Rationale: Since the Vector doctrine was the prevailing rule at this time, issues of
prescription must be resolved under Vector's parameters.
B. (b) For cases that were filed by the subrogee-insurer prior to the applicability of the
Vector ruling (i.e., before August 15, 2013), the prescriptive period is four (4) years from
the time the tort is committed against the insured by the wrongdoer.

a. Rationale: The Vector doctrine, which espoused unique rules on legal subrogation
and prescription as afore described, was not yet a binding precedent at this time; hence,
issues of prescription must be resolved under the rules prevailing before Vector, which,
incidentally, are the basic principles of legal subrogation vis-a-vis prescription of actions
based on quasi-delicts.

2. For actions of such nature that have not yet been filed at the time ofthe finality ofthis
Decision:
A. For cases where the tort was committed and the consequent loss/injury against the
insured occurred prior to the finality of this Decision, the subrogee-insurer is given a
period not exceeding four (4) years from the time of the finality of this Decision to file the
action against the wrongdoer; provided, that in all instances, the total period to file such
case shall not exceed ten (10) years from the time the insurer is subrogated to the rights
ofthe insured.

a. Rationale: The erroneous reckoning and running of the period of prescription

pursuant to the Vector doctrine should not be taken against any and all persons relying
thereon because the same were based on the then- prevailing interpretation and
construction of the Court. Hence, subrogees- insurers, who are, effectively, only now
notified of the abandonment of Vector, must be given the benefit of the present doctrine
on subrogation as ruled in this Decision.
b. However, the benefit of the additional period (i.e., not exceeding four [4] years) under
this Decision must not result in the insured being given a total of more than ten (10)
years from the time the insurer is subrogated to the rights of the insured (i.e., the old
prescriptive period in Vector); otherwise, the insurer would be able to unduly propagate
its right to file the case beyond the ten (10)-year period accorded by Vector to the
prejudice of the wrongdoer.

B. For cases where the tort was committed and the consequent loss/injury against the
insured occurred only upon or after the finality of this Decision, the Vector doctrine
would hold no application. The prescriptive period is four (4) years from the time the tort
is committed against the insured by the wrongdoer.
a. Rationale: Since the cause of action for quasi-delict and the consequent subrogation
of the insurer would arise after due notice of Vector's abandonment, all persons would
now be bound by the present doctrine on subrogation as ruled in this Decision.