East Asia Forum

Economics, Politics and Public Policy in East Asia

and the Pacific
https://www.eastasiaforum.org

The Philippines–US Visiting Forces Agreement and small

power foreign policy
9th April, 2020

Author: Mico Galang, National Defense College of the Philippines

On 11 February 2020, the Duterte administration announced [1] that it had issued a notice of
termination for the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement [2] (VFA) — a key military pact in the
Philippines–US alliance [3]. The notice of termination triggered a 180-day waiting period after
which the VFA formally ceases to exist.

The implications [4] of Manila’s move to downscale [5] its alliance with Washington are significant.
The VFA is a major agreement between a great power and a small state. Small states [6] facing
strategic constraints in pursuing their national security interests are not downsized versions of
larger states. For this reason, it is important to frame the issues surrounding the VFA in terms of
the nuances of ‘small power foreign policy’ in the Philippines.

Mitigating geopolitical vulnerability is a strategic imperative for small states. Unlike great
powers, small states cannot primarily rely on their capabilities to ensure their security. Forging
security relationships with other countries is, in many ways, more important for small states. For
the Philippines, the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty [7] (MDT) with the United States has been a
key pillar of Manila’s security arrangement for decades.

The presence of US armed forces in the Philippines has been crucial to the successful
implementation of the MDT, for without it, the United States would find it more difficult to fulfil its
treaty obligations [8]. The VFA operationalises the MDT in this regard by providing a legal

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framework for the presence of US forces in the Philippines.

Defence modernisation must also be pursued by small states. But building up military
capabilities and maintaining robust security relations with other countries are not mutually
exclusive [9] objectives. By providing a legal basis for military training and exercises, the VFA
complements Manila’s efforts [10] to boost the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP).

According to the Philippines’ National Security Strategy [11], rivalry between major powers
spawned by the rise of China is an integral long-term strategic concern in the Asia Pacific.
China’s increasing role in international affairs should not come as a surprise. Rising powers
have often sought to match their economic wealth with geopolitical influence. Emerging powers
may be more assertive in pursuing certain interests that may be different to the interests of other
countries.

Strategic adjustments, decided to a large degree by major powers, need to reflect new
geopolitical realities. Small powers generally support [12] the international order, a status-quo
arrangement from which they benefit. In this international context, small powers must pursue
two strategic objectives which may not be compatible with each other: adapting to the changing
geo-strategic environment and protecting core interests.

The strategic environment engendered by major power competition amplifies a small power’s
sense of vulnerability. Other observers have argued [13] that US presence in the Philippines
exposes the latter to major power competition since Beijing’s actions are driven by
Washington’s desire to encircle China. But even if the Philippines wishes to be insulated from
strategic rivalry, geography [14] dictates that the archipelagic nation will inevitably be influenced
by big power competition.

In 1995, China — exploiting the power vacuum [15] left by the Philippine Senate’s 1991 decision
[16]
not to extend the presence of US bases — seized [17] Mischief Reef from the Philippines.
Without a balancing force, it seems that China’s quest for pre-eminence in the region could go
on unrestrained to the detriment of small powers.

There are also criticisms [18] of Washington’s actions in the region, particularly in the South
China Sea. China has seized Scarborough Shoal [19] and created artificial islands [20]. Beijing
was arguably not deterred by the US military presence in the Philippines when making this
move. With China having military outposts in the South China Sea, the interests of the United
States and its allies converge in constraining Chinese behaviour in the maritime domain.
Washington, through efforts under the auspices of the VFA [21], has thus far been able to deter
China’s plan to create an artificial island [22] in Scarborough Shoal — the last piece in Beijing’s
‘strategic triangle [23]’ designed to dominate the South China Sea [24].

The United States has the economic and military wherewithal to balance against an increasingly
assertive China. Continued US military presence in the Philippines — which the VFA provides —
and in East Asia is critical in maintaining a regional power equilibrium. While the alliance is far
from perfect [25], this situation is arguably better for the Philippines in mitigating its geopolitical

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vulnerability.

While unfavourable for some [26], small powers have very limited geopolitical options. Prudence
and pragmatism — not lofty idealism [27] divorced from geopolitical realities [28] — must guide
small power foreign policy. An alternative is the complete elimination of the US military footprint
in the Philippines which, as the early 1990s suggests, would unshackle the remaining restraints
on China’s expansionist maritime agenda.

Small states view the establishment of security relations with other countries as a major platform
for the pursuit of their own interests, especially in the context of shared security challenges. The
VFA facilitates this goal in expanding Manila’s space for security cooperation. For example, the
annual Philippines–US Balikatan exercises have evolved from a bilateral to a multilateral activity
[29]
, to include participation from other components of the Washington-led system of alliances
and partnerships [30] including Australia, Japan and Vietnam. Without the VFA, the future of this
important platform for security cooperation is uncertain.

While the structure of the international system [31] is largely defined by the balance of power
between or among major powers, small states are not devoid of agency [32]. The pursuit of
survival and autonomy dictates the nature of engagement with all powers, including those
whose interests may be incompatible. Many small states in Southeast Asia have pursued
hedging approaches [33] in a geo-strategic environment where Cold War-type alignment is
increasingly difficult. The danger for small states is believing that false binary options [34]
represent the overall strategic backdrop of all major foreign policy decision [35]s.

Mico A Galang is a researcher at the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP). The
views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the
NDCP.

Article from the East Asia Forum: https://www.eastasiaforum.org

URL to article: https://www.eastasiaforum.org/?p=245137

[1] announced:
https://globalnation.inquirer.net/185186/fwd-breaking-philippines-officially-terminates-vfa
-with-us

[2] Visiting Forces Agreement:

https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1998/02/10/agreement-between-the-government-of-the-
republic-of-the-philippines-and-the-government-of-the-united-states-of-america-regardin
g-the-treatment-of-united-states-armed-forces-visiting-the-philippines-f/

[3] Philippines–US alliance:

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-philippines-defense-alliance

[4] implications:
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/pushing-philippines-us-alliance-over-cliff

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[5] downscale:
https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/251527-what-happens-philippine-military-vfa-termi
nated

[6] Small states: https://manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk/9780719082733/

[7] Mutual Defense Treaty: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/phil001.asp

[8] treaty obligations:

https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/07/02/the-us-philippine-alliance-is-moving-beyond-ir
onclad/

[9] not mutually exclusive:

https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/2/11/PH-should-rely-on-its-own-after-VFA-terminati
on.html

[10] Manila’s
efforts:
https://amti.csis.org/the-next-phase-of-philippine-military-modernization-looking-to-exter
nal-defense/

[11] National Security Strategy: http://www.nsc.gov.ph/images/NSS_NSP/NSS_2018.pdf

[12] generally support: https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783319388144

[13] argued:
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/10/18/can-the-us-philippine-alliance-surviv
e-duterte/duterte-is-right-to-end-the-us-philippine-military-exercises?smid=fb-share&fbcli
d=IwAR2px4eDflHF-VPqZRDCLgWJNDlSwH6lwzRzmG6lpK0fklwHVyK5zYTS52c

[14] geography: https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/philippines-geographic-challenge

[15] power vacuum:

https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/rebuilding-the-us-philippine-alliance

[16] decision:
https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/146410-look-back-senate-no-us-base-renewal-199
1

[17] seized:
https://www.nytimes.com/1995/02/19/world/manila-sees-china-threat-on-coral-reef.html

[18] criticisms:
https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/02/12/20/termination-of-vfa-with-us-to-pave-way-for-bette
r-military-deal-analyst

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[19] seized Scarborough Shoal: https://amti.csis.org/counter-co-scarborough-standoff/

[20] artificial islands: https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/china/

[21] auspices of the VFA:

https://opinion.inquirer.net/127491/first-casualty-of-vfa-abrogation-scarborough

[22] artificial island:

https://globalnation.inquirer.net/153202/lorenzana-us-stopped-china-from-building-in-sca
rborough-shoal

[23] strategic triangle:

https://www.nbr.org/publication/japans-perceptions-of-and-interests-in-the-south-china-s
ea/

[24] dominate the South China Sea:

https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/02/27/turbulence-on-the-horizon-in-the-south-china-
sea/

[25] far from perfect:

https://globalnation.inquirer.net/112663/laude-slay-also-issue-of-special-treatment-under-
vfa-up-prof

[26] some:
https://www.manilatimes.net/2020/03/01/opinion/columnists/vfa-termination-is-pro-filipino
/698474/

[27] lofty idealism: https://globalnation.inquirer.net/150961/ph-us-needs

[28] geopolitical realities: https://carnegieendowment.org/files/SA_20_Tellis.pdf

[29] multilateral activity:

https://globalnation.inquirer.net/174000/philippines-us-open-2019-balikatan-exercises

[30] alliances and partnerships:

https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/791213/remarks-on-asia-pa
cifics-principled-security-network-at-2016-iiss-shangri-la-di/

[31] structure of the international system: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24357222

[32] agency:
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/lee-hsien-loong-small-states-forum-u
n-11943622

[33] hedging approaches:

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10670564.2015.1132714?journalCode=cjcc2

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[34] false binary options:

https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/02/26/20/duterte-we-can-be-a-us-territory-or-a-chinese-pr
ovince

[35] all major foreign policy decision:

https://www.businessinsider.com/philippine-vfa-exit-raises-stakes-in-pacific-competition-
with-china-2020-2

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