General Principles of Remedial Law On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice,
he Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should be
Difference between Substantive Law and Procedural Law
G.R. No. 140500 : January 21, 2002
ERNESTINA BERNABE, Petitioner, v. 0CAROLINA ALEJO as guardian ad litem for the minor ADRIAN
BERNABE, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate children who were still
minors at the time the Family Code took effect cannot be impaired or taken away. The minors have up to four
years from attaining majority age within which to file an action for recognition.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition  for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying for
(1) the nullification of the July 7, 1999 Court of Appeals (CA) Decisio  in CA-GR CV No. 51919 and the
October 14, 1999 CA Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, as well as (2) the
reinstatement of the two Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City (Branch 109)
concerning the same case. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the lower court dismissing Civil Case No. 94-
0562 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of this case be remanded to the lower court for trial on
the merits
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of twenty-three (23)
years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18, 1981 and was named
Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife Rosalina died on December 3 of the
same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian
be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he (Adrian) be given his share in
Fiscal Bernabes estate, which is now being held by Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that under the provisions
of the Family Code as well as the case of Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, the complaint is now barred
Orders of the Trial Court
In an Order dated July 26, 1995, the trial court granted Ernestina Bernabes Motion for
Reconsideration of the trial courts Decision and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for recognition. Citing
Article 175 of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death of the putative father had barred the action.
In its Order dated October 6, 1995, the trial court added that since the putative father had not
acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing, the action for recognition should have been filed
during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him the opportunity to either affirm or deny the childs filiation.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy was born in 1981, his
rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an action for recognition to be filed within
four years after the child has attained the age of majority. The subsequent enactment of the Family Code did
not take away that right.
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
I
Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner, the legitimate daughter of the
putative father, for recognition and partition with accounting after the putative fathers death in the absence of
any written acknowledgment of paternity by the latter.
II
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents had four years from the
attainment of minority to file an action for recognition as provided in Art. 285 of the Civil Code, in complete
disregard of its repeal by the [express] provisions of the Family Code and the applicable jurisprudence as held
by the Honorable Court of Appeals.
III
Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner is fatally defective for failure to implead the
Court of Appeals as one of the respondents.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First and Second Issues: Period to File Action for Recognition
Because the first and the second issues are interrelated, we shall discuss them jointly.
Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from filing an action for recognition, because Article
285 of the Civil Code has been supplanted by the provisions of the Family Code. She argues that the latter
Code should be given retroactive effect, since no vested right would be impaired. We do not agree.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides the period for filing an action for recognition as follows:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the
lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action
before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard
and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document.
The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have however been omitted by Articles 172, 173
and 175 of the Family Code, which we quote:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and
shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the
heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both
of the parties.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action
is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of
the alleged parent.
Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the
lifetime of the alleged parent. The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor
when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a chance to dispute the claim,
considering that illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate
family being aware of their existence. x x x The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm
or deny the childs filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead.
Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already vested prior to its
enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired as follows:
ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is whether Adrians right to an action for recognition,
which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code, had already vested prior to the enactment of the Family
Code. Our answer is affirmative.
A vested right is defined as one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the exercise of
which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency.
Respondent however contends that the filing of an action for recognition is procedural in nature and that as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to [or] arise from procedural laws
Bustos v. Lucero  distinguished substantive from procedural law in these words:
x x x. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be
said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys
under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that part of the
law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give
rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed
to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for
their invasion.  (Citations omitted)
Recently, in Fabian v. Desierto,  the Court laid down the test for determining whether a rule is
procedural or substantive:
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of
the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law  and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes
away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule
deals merely with procedure.
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive
law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within four years from attaining majority
age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrians right to file an action for recognition, because
that right had already vested prior to its enactment.
Uyguangco  v. Court of Appeals   is not applicable to the case at bar, because the plaintiff therein sought
recognition as an illegitimate child when he was no longer a minor. On the other hand, in Aruego  Jr. v. Court
of Appeals18 the Court ruled that an action for recognition filed while the Civil Code was in effect should not
be affected by the subsequent enactment of the Family Code, because the right had already vested.
Not Limited to Natural Children
To be sure, Article 285 of the Civil Code refers to the action for recognition of natural children.
Thus, petitioner contends that the provision cannot be availed of by respondent, because at the time of his
conception, his parents were impeded from marrying each other. In other words, he is not a natural  child.
A natural child is one whose parents, at the time of conception, were not disqualified by any legal
impediment from marrying each other. Thus, in De Santos v. Angeles,19  the Court explained:
A childs parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the time of conception for
him to qualify as a natural child.
A strict and literal interpretation of Article 285 has already been frowned upon by this Court in the
aforesaid case of Aruego, which allowed minors to file a case for recognition even if their parents were
disqualified from marrying each other. There, the Complaint averred that the late Jose Aruego Sr., a married
man, had an extramarital liason with Luz Fabian. Out of this relationship were born two illegitimate children
who in 1983 filed an action for recognition. The two children were born in 1962 and 1963, while the alleged
putative father died in 1982. In short, at the time of their conception, the two childrens parents were legally
disqualified from marrying each other. The Court allowed the Complaint to prosper, even though it had been
filed almost a year after the death of the presumed father. At the time of his death, both children were still
minors.
Moreover, in the earlier case Divinagracia  v. Rovira,  the Court said that the rules on voluntary and
compulsory acknowledgment of natural children, as well as the prescriptive period for filing such action, may
likewise be applied to spurious children. Pertinent portions of the case are quoted hereunder:
The so-called spurious children, or illegitimate children other than natural children, commonly
known as bastards, include those adulterous children or those born out of wedlock to a married woman
cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a married man cohabiting with a woman other than his
wife. They are entitled to support and successional rights. But their filiation must be duly proven.
How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the investigation of the
paternity or maternity or spurious children under the circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284 of the
Civil Code. The implication is that the rules on compulsory recognition of natural children are applicable to
spurious children.
Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children. The rules on proof of
filiation of natural children or the rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment for natural children
may be applied to spurious children.
That does not mean that spurious children should be acknowledged, as that term is used with respect
to natural children. What is simply meant is that the grounds or instances for the acknowledgment of natural
children are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious children.
A spurious child may prove his filiation by means of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing. These are the modes of voluntary recognition of natural children.
In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the spurious child, then his filiation may
be established by means of the circumstances or grounds for compulsory recognition prescribed in the
aforementioned articles 283 and 284.
The prescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory recognition in the case of natural
children, as provided for in article 285 of the Civil Code, applies to spurious children. (Citations omitted,
italics supplied)
Thus, under the Civil Code, natural children have superior successional rights over spurious
ones. However, Rovira treats them as equals with respect to other rights, including the right to recognition
granted by Article 285.
To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect
and whose putative parent died during their minority are thus given the right to seek recognition (under Article
285 of the Civil Code) for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not
impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.
Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of minors who could not have
filed suit, on their own, during the lifetime of their putative parents. As respondent aptly points out in his
Memorandum,24 the State as parens patriae should protect a minors right. Born in 1981, Adrian was only
seven years old when the Family Code took effect and only twelve when his alleged father died in 1993. The
minor must be given his day in court.
Third Issue: Failure to Implead the CA
Under Section 4(a) of Rule 45 of the current Rules of Court, it is no longer required to implead the
lower courts or judges x x x either as petitioners or respondents. Under Section 3, however, the lower tribunal
should still be furnished a copy of the petition. Hence, the failure of petitioner to implead the Court of Appeals
as a party is not a reversible error; it is in fact the correct procedure.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED.  Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
April 25, 2017 G.R. No. 202189
RODANTE F. GUYAMIN, LUCINIA F. GUY AMIN, and EILEEN G. GATARIN, Petitioners vs.
JACINTO G. FLORES and MAXIMO G. FLORES, represented by RAMON G. FLORES, Respondents
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to set aside the May 23, 2012 Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No. 92924 which affirmed the October 21, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Trece Martires City, Branch 23 in Civil Case No. TMCV-0040-06.
Factual Antecedents
In 2006, respondents Jacinto G. Flores and Maximo G. Flores, represented by their brother and
attorney-in-fact Ramon G. Flores, filed a Complaint4 for Recovery of Possession against petitioners Rodante F.
Guyamin (Rodante), Lucinia F. Guyamin (Lucinia), and Eileen G. Gatarin (Eileen). The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. TMCV-0040-06 and assigned to Branch 23 of the RTC of Trece Martires City.
Respondents alleged in their Complaint that they are the registered owners of a 984-square meter lot
in Baranga_v Santiago, General Trias, Cavite covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-308589 (the
subject property) that petitioners are their relatives who for many years have been occupying the subject
property by mere tolerance of respondents' predecessors and parents, the original owners of the same; that
petitioners have been "reminded x x x to vacate the premises" because respondents have decided to sell the
property; that petitioners failed to vacate; that respondents made several attempts to settle the matter through
conciliation before the Punong Barangay  but the same proved futile; that the Punong Barangay  was
constrained to issue a Certification To File Action;  that respondents were thus compelled to file the Complaint
and incur legal expenses, for which they pray that petitioners be ordered to vacate the subject property and pay
₱20,000.00 attorney's fees, ₱5,000.00 litigation expenses, and costs.
On September 25, 2006, summons and a copy of the Complaint were served upon petitioners
through Eileen, who nonetheless refused to sign and acknowledge receipt thereof. This fact was noted in the
court process server's Return of Summons dated September 26, 2006
On January 9, 2007, respondents filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default, arguing that
despite service of summons on September 25, 2006, petitioners failed to file their answer.
On May 28, 2007, petitioners filed their Answer with Motion to Dismiss.
On June 5, 2007, respondents filed their Reply to Answer, arguing that petitioners' Answer was
belatedly filed, which is why they filed a motion to declare petitioners in default; and for this reason, they
prayed that the Answer be stricken off the record.
On December 26, 2007, the RTC issued an Order decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, for failure to file their responsive answer within the reglementary period of fifteen
(15) days, defendants are hereby declared in default. The pleadings filed by the defendant on May 30, 2007 is
[sic] hereby denied.
Petitioners moved to reconsider, but the trial court was unmoved. It proceeded to receive
respondents' evidence ex parte.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On October 21, 2008, the RTC issued a Decision declaring as follows:
 The plaintiffs as represented by their attorney-in-fact, Ramon G. Flores when presented in Court
reiterated the allegations in the complaint and presented in evidence the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
308589 in the names of Jacinto Flores and Maximo Flores (Exhibit "B"); the tax declaration (Exhibit "C") of
the property; and the Certification (Exhibit "F") issued by Brgy. Justice Lito R. Sarte of Barangay Santiago,
Bayan ng Heneral Trias, Cavite.
In the case at bar, by a preponderance of evidence, plaintiffs have proven their case.
On September 26, 2006 the Return of Summons by the process server of this Court, Rozanno L.
Morabe, as certified, stated, to wit:
This is to certify that on September 25, 2006 the undersigned cause [sic] the service of Summons
together with a copy of the complaint upon defendants x x x thru EILEEN GATARIN, one of the defendants,
who received a copy of the Summons for all the defendants who refused to sign and acknowledge receipt of
said summons.
This served as a proof of receipt by the defendants of the copy of the complaint upon them.
However defendants filed their answer with motion to dismiss way beyond the reglementary period on May
28, 2007 which prompted this Court to deny their motion. Defendants, if indeed having a good defense, could
have been vigilant in this case instead of resorting to delays in the prosecution thereof.
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs as against the defendants herein and
hereby orders, to wit:
1) Ordering the defendants and their respective families and or any other persons claiming rights
under them, to vacate subject parcel of land and deliver the same peacefully to the possession of the
plaintiffs;
2) Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of ₱10,000.00 as reasonable attorney's
fees, ₱5,000.00 as litigation expenses, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners filed an appeal before the CA which was docketed as CAG. R. CV. No. 92924. On May 23, 2012,
the CA rendered the assailed Decision containing the following pronouncement:
Aggrieved, the Guyamins filed this instant appeal raising the following assignment of errors:
1. The trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action or
prematurity;
2. The trial court erred in declaring the defendants in default and proceeding to receive plaintiffs'
evidence ex-parte; and
3. The trial court erred and abused its discretion when it rendered its Decision favorable to the
plaintiffs prior or without the filing of the plaintiffs' Formal Offer of Evidence.
xxxx
The Guyamins argue that the case should have been dismissed for failure of the Floreses to give
notice or demand to vacate and to observe conciliation process in the barangay. They further argued that based
on the averments in the complaint the Floreses merely reminded them to vacate but no actual demand to vacate
has been given.
In this jurisdiction, there are three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of real property
and one is accion publiciana or the plenary action for the recovery of the real right of possession, which
should be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one
year.
After a review of the averments of the complaint, we find that the court-a-quo did not err in
assuming jurisdiction over the case. From the allegations of the complaint it appears that the land subject of
the case was originally owned by the Floreses' grandmother, Damasa Vda. De Guzman and was later acquired
by their mother, Julia Guyan1in who in turn transferred the ownership of the property to them. Based on the
attached Transfer Certificate of Title, the property was transferred to the Floreses on May 10, 1991. The
Floreses averred in the complaint that since the time the ownership of the property was transferred to them,
they have been reminding the Guyamins to vacate the premises because they wanted to sell the property.
While it is true that the complaint uses the word "reminding" instead of the word "demanding", it
still does not mean that no demand to vacate was made by the Floreses. It is clear on the records that the
Floreses filed a complaint for the Guyamins to vacate the premises before Office of the Barangay Chairman of
Barangay Santiago, General Trias, Cavite. On the subject line of the complaint the following words are clearly
written: "Ukol sa: Pagpapaalis sa bahay na nakatirik sa lupa na hindi naman kanila" which is clearly a demand
to vacate.
On March 11, 2006 the Office of the Barangay Chairman issued a certificate to file action because
the parties were unable to settle their dispute. Contrary to the argument of' the Guyamins, the records also
show that there was an attempt to settle the issues between the parties before the Office of the Barangay
Chairman.
Anent the second ground raised by the Guyamins, records will also show that Return of Summons
was filed by the Process Server, Rozanno L. Morabe on September 25, 2006 certifying that a copy of the
summons was received on September 26, 2006 by one of the defendants Eileen Gatarin, who received a copy
for all the defendants.  It was only on May 28, 2007 that the Guyamins filed an Answer with a Motion to
Dismiss, or more than 8 months after receiving the summons, hence the court-a-quo did not commit any error
in declaring the Guyamins in default.
As to the last error raised, it is settled that for evidence to be considered, the same must be formally
offered. However, in People v. Napat-a, the Supreme Court relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence
not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following requirements are
present, viz: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same
must have been incorporated in the records of the case.
In the instant case, we find that the requirements have been satisfied. The exhibits were presented
and marked during the ex-parte hearing of August 7, 2008. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that exhibits
"A" to "F" were not formally offered prior to the rendition of the Decision in Civil Case No. TMCV-0040-06
by the court-a-quo,  the trial court judge committed no error when he admitted and considered them in the
resolution of the case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated October 21, 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court of Trece Martires City in Civil Case No. TMCV-0040-06 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED (Citations omitted)
Hence, the present petition
In an April 23, 2014 Resolution, this Court resolved to give due course to the Petition, which
contains the following assignment of errors:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON
THE GROUND OF LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION OR PREMATURITY.
 2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
WAS CORRECT IN DECLARING THE PETITIONERS IN DEFAULT AND PROCEEDING TO
RECEIVE RESPONDENTS' EVIDENCE EXP ARTE.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT VALIDLY RENDERED ITS DECISION FAVORABLE TO THE RESPONDENTS
WITHOUT THE FILING OF THE FORMAL OFFER OF EVIDENCE.  To be sure, while petitioners attached every other pleading filed and order issued below to the
Petitioners' Arguments
In their Petition and Reply,  petitioners insist that there is no demand to vacate the subject property,
and the lack of such demand renders the action against them premature; that the filing of a conciliation case
before the barangay captain (or barangay  chairman) and the issuance of a certificate to file action in court
cannot take the place of the required notice to vacate; that only Rodante was made respondent in
the barangay conciliation process when Lucinia and Eileen should have been impleaded as well; that the
Return of Summons dated September 26, 2006 is a sham; that summons was improperly served upon Rodante
and Lucinia through Eileen or by substituted service; that it was impossible for Eileen to have received the
summons and complaint at her residence on September 25, 2006, as she was then teaching in school; that when
summons was served, Lucinia was then abroad, and so summons should have been made through publication;
and that the filing of their Answer prior to respondents' motion to declare them in default, and the latter's filing
of a reply to their answer, cured the defective answer.
Petitioners add that it was error for the lower courts to have ruled in favor of respondents in spite of
the fact that the latter made no formal offer of their evidence; that respondents' evidence cannot therefore be
considered, since it is a settled maxim that "courts will only consider as evidence that which has been formally
offered";  that the purposes of a formal offer are to 1) enable the trial court to know the purpose or purposes
for which the proponent is presenting the evidence, 2) allow opposing parties to examine the evidence and
object to its admissibility, and 3) facilitate review as the appellate court will not be required to review
documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court; and that the evidence presented ex parte  is insufficient
to prove respondents' case, as it failed to show how the latter came into ownership of the subject property and
it failed to prove the identity of the property.
Petitioners thus pray that the CA Decision be reversed and set aside and that a new judgment be
rendered ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. TMCV-0040-06.
Respondents' Argument
Respondents simply point out in their single-page Comment that the arguments raised in the instant
Petition have been adequately passed upon by the lower courts; thus, there is no cogent reason to reverse their
decisions.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
The Court notes that petitioners raise purely procedural questions and nothing more. In other words,
petitioners aim to win their case not on the merit, but on pure technicality.  But in order for this Court to even
consider their arguments, petitioners should have at least shown that they have a substantial defense to
respondents' claim. There must be a semblance of validity in their resistance to respondents' Complaint.
However, there appears to be none at all. The fact remains that respondents are the registered
owners of the subject property, per Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-308589 and the tax declaration in their
names;  that petitioners are respondents' relatives who have been occupying the property by mere tolerance
and liberality of the latter; that several times in the past, they have been "reminded" to vacate the property; and
that they have failed and refused to do so, even after the conduct of conciliation proceedings before
the Barangay  Chairman.
As owners, respondents' substantive rights must be protected in the first instance; they cannot be
defeated by a resort to procedural hairsplitting that gets the parties and this Court nowhere. The Court will not
pretend to engage in a useless discussion of the virtues of adhering strictly to procedure, when to do so would
promote a clear injustice and violation of respondents' substantive rights. More so when the result would be the
same, that is, petitioners would eventually and ultimately lose their case.
instant Petition, they did not attach a copy of their Answer to the Complaint if only to demonstrate to this
Court that they have a plausible and substantial defense against the respondents' Complaint. To repeat, this
Court will not waste its precious time and energy in a futile exercise where the result would be for naught;
petitioners will not be indulged when it appears that they have no valid claim in the first place. Quite the
contrary, the Court must give respondents the justice they deserve. As owners of the subject property who
have been deprived of the use thereof for so many years owing to petitioners' continued occupation, and after
all these years of giving unconditionally to the petitioners who are their relatives, respondents must now enjoy
the fruits of their ownership. Respondents have been more than cordial in dealing with petitioners; they have
shown only respect and reverence to the latter, even to the extent of using less offensive language in their
complaint for fear of generating more enmity than is required. Thus, instead of using "demand", respondents
chose "remind". The parties being relatives and the context and circumstances being the way they are, the
choice of words is understandable. The Court will treat respondents' act as a polite demand; indeed, the law
never required a harsh or impolite demand but only a categorical one.
With the clear realization that they are settling on land that they do not own, occupants of registered
private lands by mere tolerance of the owners should always expect that one day, they would have to vacate
the same. Their time is merely borrowed; they have no right to the property whatsoever, and their presence is
merely tolerated and under the good graces of the owners. As it were, they 1ive under constant threat of being
evicted; they cannot pretend that this threat of eviction does not exist. It is never too much to ask them to give
a little leeway to the property owners; after all, they have benefited from their tolerated use of the lands, while
the owners have clearly lost by their inability to use the same.
Thus, this Court need only reiterate the CA's pronouncement that there could be no more categorical
demand by respondents than the filing of a case against petitioners before the Barangay Chairman to cause the
latter's eviction from the property. The fact that only Rodante was made respondent in the conciliation process
is of no moment; given the context, relation, circumstances, lack of a visible defense, and the above
pronouncement, this claim of the petitioners must be treated as undue hairsplitting. This Court's "duty is to
dispel any vestige of doubt rather than indulge in subtle distinctions. "
Regarding the claim of improper service of summons, the record reveals that the contrary is true.
The court process server's Return of Summons dated September 26, 2006 exists, and must be presumed
regular. The mere fact that the RTC, and even the respondents, requested at different stages in the proceedings
that summons be served once more upon petitioners does not prove that the service thereof made on
September 25, 2006 was invalid; it only means that the court and parties desire the service of summons anew
which was clearly unnecessary. The claim that Lucinia was then abroad is of no moment either; there is no
evidence to support this self-serving claim.
The filing of petitioners' answer prior to respondents' motion to declare them in default, and the
latter's filing of a reply, do not erase the fact that petitioners' answer is late. Respondents' reply filed thereafter
is, like the belated answer, .a mere scrap of paper, as it proceeds from the said answer.
Finally, the Court supports the CA's pronouncement that since respondents' exhibits were presented
and marked during the ex parte hearing of August 7, 2008, the trial court judge committed no error when he
admitted and considered them in the resolution of the case notwithstanding that no formal offer of evidence
was made. The pieces of evidence were identified during the ex parte hearing and marked as Exhibits "A" to
"F" for respondents and were incorporated into the records of the case. As a matter of fact, the RTC Judge
referred to them in his October 21, 2008 Decision. If they were not included in the record, the RTC Judge
could not have referred to them in arriving at judgment.
 While it is true that the rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate the ends of
justice, and the swift unclogging of court docket is a laudable objective, it nevertheless must not be met at the
expense of substantial justice. This Court has time and again reiterated the doctrine that the rules of
procedure are mere tools aimed at facilitating the attainment of justice, rather than its frustration. A
strict and rigid application of the rules must always be eschewed when it would subvert the primary
objective of the rules, that is, to enhance fair tria.ls and expedite justice. Technicalities should never be
used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party. Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.
Considering that there was substantial compliance, a liberal interpretation of procedural rules in this x x x
case is more in keeping with the constitutional mandate to secure social justice. (Emphasis supplied)
By not attaching a copy of their Answer to their Petition, petitioners are shielding themselves from a
perusal of their defense; in a sense, this is quite revealing of the merits of their claim, and in another, it is an
ingenious scheme that this Court censures. Indeed, they failed to realize that this Court is not composed of
machines that will mindlessly and mechanically solve a problem at the touch of a button; it will not be forced
into motion on petitioners' turn of a key. They must be reminded that-
The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation
of justice, but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves
to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts, in rendering
justice, have always been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and not the other way around. As applied to the instant
case, in the language of then Chief Justice Querube Makalintal, technicalities 'should give way to the
realities of the situation' (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May 23, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV. No. 92924 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199107, August 30, 2017
ALFONSO SINGSON CORTAL, JUANITO SINGSON CORTAL, NENITA CODILLA, GENEROSO
PEPITO LONGAKIT, PONCIANA BATOON, AND GREGORIA SABROSO, Petitioners, v. INAKI A.
LARRAZABAL ENTERPRISES, REPRESENTED BY INAKI P. LARRAZABAL, JR., THE
HONORABLE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VIII, TACLOBAN CITY AND
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, QUEZON CITY IN
HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB), Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Procedural rules must be faithfully followed and dutifully enforced. Still, their application should
not amount to "placing the administration of  justice in a straight jacket. “An inordinate fixation on
technicalities cannot defeat the need for a full, just, and equitable litigation of claims.
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari  under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, praying that the assailed September 30, 2010 and September 7, 2011 Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04659 be reversed and set aside, and that the Court of Appeals be directed to give
due course to the dismissed appeal of Alfonso Singson Cortal, Juanito Singson Cortal, Nenita Codilla,
Generoso Pepito Longakit, Ponciana Batoon, and Gregoria Sabroso (petitioners).
The assailed Court of Appeals September 30, 2010 Resolution dismissed petitioners' appeal under
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on account of several technical defects. First was an
inconsistency between the listing of petitioners' names in their prior Motion for Extension of Time and
subsequent Petition for Review, in which the accompanying verification and certification of non-forum
shopping were laden with this same inconsistency and other defects. Second was the non-inclusion of the
original Complaint filed by the adverse party, now private respondent Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises, before
the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform. And last was petitioners'
counsel's failure to indicate the place of issue of the official receipt of his payment of annual membership dues
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
The assailed Court of Appeals September 7, 2011 Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration.Private respondent Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises (Larrazabal Enterprises) owned three (3)
parcels of land in Sitio Coob, Barangay Libertad, Ormoc City: Lot No. 5383-G, with an area of 7.6950
hectares and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 10530; Lot No. 5383-N, with an area of
5.7719 hectares and covered by TCT No. 10530; and Lot No. 5383-F, with an area of 8.7466 hectares and
covered by TCT No. 16178.
In 1988, these three (3) parcels were placed under the Compulsory Acquisition Scheme of
Presidential Decree No. 27, as amended by Executive Order No. 228. Pursuant to the Scheme, Emancipation
Patents and new transfer certificates of title were issued to farmer-beneficiaries, petitioners included.
In 1999, Larrazabal Enterprises filed its Action for Recovery of these parcels against the
Department of Agrarian Reform and the petitioners before the Office of the Regional Adjudicator, Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).It assailed the cancellation of its transfer certificates of title
and the subsequent issuance of new titles to petitioners. It alleged that no price had been fixed, much less paid,
for the expropriation of its properties, in violation of the just compensation requirement under Presidential
Decree No. 27, as amended. Thus, it prayed for the recovery of these lots and the cancellation of petitioners'
transfer certificates of title.
In their Answer, petitioners denied non-payment of just compensation. They presented certifications
issued by the Land Bank of the Philippines (Landbank) that the amounts of P80,359.37 and P95,691.49 had
been deposited as payments in the name of Larrazabal Enterprises. They added that since they had paid, the
cancellation of Larrazabal Enterprises' transfer certificates of title, the subdivision of the parcels, and the
issuance of emancipation patents in their favor were all properly made.
In his October 15, 1999 Decision, Regional Adjudicator Felixberto M. Diloy (Regional Adjudicator
Diloy) noted that there was nothing in the records to show that just compensation was fixed or paid for the
parcels. Hence, he ruled in favor of Larrazabal Enterprises and ordered that it be restored to ownership of the
lots.
Petitioners appealed to the DARAB. In its September 16, 2008 Decision the DARAB reversed the
Decision of Regional Adjudicator Diloy. It ruled that Larrazabal Enterprises' action, which was filed in 1999,
was already barred by prescription and laches, as the assailed Emancipation Patents were issued in 1988. It
likewise gave credence to the certificates issued by Landbank, which confirmed the payment of just
compensation.
Larrazabal Enterprises filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In its September 30, 2009 Resolution, the
DARAB reversed its own decision and granted Larrazabal Enterprises' Motion for Reconsideration. It justified
its ruling by saying that Larrazabal Enterprises had been denied due process when the parcels were taken from
it without having been given just compensation.
Petitioners then filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals. In its assailed September
30, 2010 Resolution the Court of Appeals dismissed their Petition for the following formal errors:
a. the name of Raymundo Claros Codilla was indicated in the Motion for Extension of Time to File
Petition for Review as one of the petitioners, but in the Petition for Review and in the Verification
and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, his name was no longer indicated[;]
b. the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping failed to show any competent evidence
of identity of the petitioners, Alfonso Singson Cortal, Juanito Singson Cortal, Nenita Codilla, Cenon
Baseles, Felimon Almacin Batoon, Rodrigo Panilag Cabonillas, Generoso Pepito Longakit, Exopiro
Limgas Cabonillas, Jose Panilag Cabonillas, Avelino Panilag Cabonillas, Ricardo Estrera German
and Victoria Rosales, at least one current identification document issued by an official agency
bearing the photographs and signatures of petitioners, in violation of Sec. 2.(2) Rule IV of the Rules
of Notarial Practice[;]
c. petitioners failed to attach the copy of the Complaint filed by respondent Inaki A. Larrazabal
Enterprises before the Office of the Regional Adjudicator, Tacloban City, docketed as DARAB
Case No. E.O. No. 288 (sic); and
d. counsel for the petitioners, Atty. Norjue I. Juego did not indicate the place of issue of his [Integrated
Bar of the Philippines] number.
Following the dismissal of their Petition for Review, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
In its assailed September 7, 2011 Resolution,25 the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration.
Thus, this Petition was filed.
For resolution of this Court is the sole issue of whether or not the dismissal of petitioners' appeal
was justified by the errors noted by the Court of Appeals. It was not.
I a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not
Appeal is the remedy available to a litigant seeking to reverse or modify a judgment on the merits of
a case.26 The right to appeal is not constitutional or natural, and is not part of due process 27 but is a mere
statutory privilege.28 Thus, it must be availed in keeping with the manner set by law and is lost by a litigant
who does not comply with the rules.
Nevertheless, appeal has been recognized as an important part of our judicial system and courts
have been advised by the Supreme Court to cautiously proceed to avoid inordinately denying litigants this
right.
II
Procedural rules "are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases so courts and litigants alike are thus
enjoined to abide strictly by the rules.They provide a system for forestalling arbitrariness, caprice, despotism,
or whimsicality in dispute settlement. Thus, they are not to be ignored to suit the interests of a party. Their
disregard cannot be justified by a sweeping reliance on a "policy of liberal construction."
Still, this Court has stressed that every party litigant must be afforded the fullest opportunity to
properly ventilate and argue his or her case, "free from the constraints of technicalities. Rule 1, Section 6 of
the Rules of Court expressly stipulates their liberal construction to the extent that justice is better served:
Section 6. Construction. - These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
Procedural rules may be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons so as to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed.35 This Court has noted that a strict application of the rules should not amount to straight-jacketing
the administration of justice36 and that the principles of justice and equity must not be sacrificed for a stern
application of the rules of procedure.37 In Obut v. Court of Appeals:
We cannot look with favor on a course of action which would place the administration of justice in a
straightjacket for then the result would be a poor kind of justice if there would be justice at all. Verily, judicial
orders, such as the one subject of this petition, are issued to be obeyed. nonetheless a non-compliance is to be
dealt with as the circumstances attending the case may warrant. What should guide judicial action is the
principle that a party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or
defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Nevertheless, alluding to the "interest of substantial justice" should not automatically compel the
suspension of procedural rules. While they may have occasionally been suspended, it remains basic policy that
the Rules of Court are to be faithfully observed. A bare invocation of substantial justice cannot override the
standard strict implementation of procedural rules. In Spouses Bergonia v. Court of Appeals:
The petitioners ought to be reminded that the bare invocation of "the interest of substantial justice"
is not a magic wand that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules.
are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non observance may have resulted in prejudice to a
party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of
reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. (Emphasis supplied)
In Barnes v. Padilla, this Court relaxed the 15-day period to perfect an appeal to serve substantial
justice; and identified situations justifying a liberal application of procedural rules:
[T]his Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty,
honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a
cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e)
be unjustly prejudiced thereby.45
A petition for review filed out of time was entertained by this Court in Yong Chan Kim v. People as
it considered the strict application of the rules as unjustly depriving the accused of his liberty. It appeared that
no party stood to suffer substantial injury if the accused were to be extended an opportunity to be heard
Telan v. Court of Appeals gave due course to a belatedly filed petition. Finding that the petitioners
were assisted by someone who misrepresented himself to be a lawyer, it held that denying an opportunity for
relief to petitioners, despite the misrepresentation, was tantamount to depriving them of their right to
counsel. It underscored that in criminal cases, the right to counsel is immutable as its denial could amount to a
peremptory deprivation of a person's life, liberty, or property. It stated that the right to counsel was just as
important in civil cases:
There is no reason why the rule in criminal cases has to be different from that in civil cases. The
preeminent right to due process of law applies not only to life and liberty but also to property. There can be no
fair hearing unless a party, who is in danger of losing his house in which he and his family live and in which
he has established a modest means of livelihood, is given the right to be heard by himself and counsel.
III
Judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are appealed to the Court of Appeals through
petitions for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 43 was adopted in order to
provide uniform rules on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies.
Rule 43 appeals shall be taken through the filing of a verified petition for review with the Court of
Appeals,within 15 days from notice of the appealed action.
Rule 43, Section 6 specifies the required contents of Rule 43 petitions:
Section 6. Contents of the Petition. - The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the
case, without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise
statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a
clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution
appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein and
other supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last
paragraph of Section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the specific material dates showing that it was filed
within the period fixed herein.
Rule 43, Section 7 stipulates that failure to comply with these requisites may be sufficient ground
for dismissing the appeal:
Section 7. Effect of Failure to Comply with Requirements. The failure of the petitioner to comply
with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit
for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the
petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
IV
In its assailed September 30, 2010 Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners' appeal for purely
formal defects and without discussing the merits of the case:
After a cursory examination of the instant Petition for Review filed by petitioner under Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules in Civil Procedure, the same reveals the following defects:
a. the name of Raymundo Claros Codilla was indicated in the Motion for Extension of Time
to File Petition for Review as one of the petitioners, but in the Petition for Review and in
the Verification and Certification of Non Forum Shopping, his name was no longer
indicated[;]
b. the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping failed to show any competent
evidence of identity of the petitioners, Alfonso Singson Cortal, Juanito Singson Cortal,
Nenita Codilla, Cenon Baseles, Felimon Almacin Batoon, Rodrigo Panilag Cabonillas,
Generoso Pepito Longakit, Exopiro Limgas Cabonillas, Jose Panilag Cabonillas, Avelino
Panilag Cabonillas. Ricardo Estrera German and Victoria Rosales, at least one current
identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photographs and
signatures of petitioners, in violation of Sec. 2.(2) Rule IV of the Rules of Notarial
Practice[;]
c. petitioners failed to attach the copy of the Complaint filed by respondent Inaki A.
Larrazabal Enterprises before the Office of the Regional Adjudicator, Tacloban City,
docketed as DARAB Case No. E.O. No. 288 (sic); and
d. counsel for the petitioners, Atty. Norjue I. Juego did not indicate the place of issue of his
[Integrated Bar of the Philippines] number.
Contrary to the Court of Appeals' conclusion, this Court does not consider these defects to have been so fatal
as to peremptorily deny petitioners the opportunity to fully ventilate their case on appeal.
IV.A
Rule 7, Sections 4 and 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure articulate the basic rules
concerning the verification of pleadings and their accompaniment by a certification of non-forum
shopping:
Section 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need
not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations
therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief,"
or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned
pleading.
Section 5. Certification Against Forum Shopping. - The plaintiff or principal party shall certify
under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification
annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or
filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim,
a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar
action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court
wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless
otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance
with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute
willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and
shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
An affiant verifies a pleading to indicate that he or she has read it and that to his or her knowledge
and belief, its allegations are true and correct and that it has been prepared in good faith and not out of mere
speculation. Jurisprudence has considered the lack of verification as a mere formal, rather than a jurisdictional,
defect that is not fatal. Thus, courts may order the correction of a pleading or act on an unverified pleading, if
the circumstances would warrant the dispensing of the procedural requirement to serve the ends of justice.
 Altres v. Empleo, outlined the differences "between non-compliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective verification, and noncompliance with the requirement on or submission of defective
certification against forum shopping":
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective
verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against
forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading
fatally defective, The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of
justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the
truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the
petition nave been made in good faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in
verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need
to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or
compelling reasons".
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case;
otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a
common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum
shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel.
If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special
Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.61 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted.
Thus, in Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation,62 this Court gave due course to
a petition even if the verification and certification against forum shopping were not signed by all of the
parties.63 Though there were 25 petitioners in Torres, this Court held that the signatures of just two (2) of them
in the verification were suitable, substantial compliance considering that they were "unquestionably real
parties in interest, who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the Petition." On the lacking signatures in the certificate of non-forum shopping, this Court
noted that the petitioners have shown that "there was reasonable cause for the failure of some of them to sign
the certification against forum shopping, and that the outright dismissal of the Petition would defeat the
administration of justice."
In Cavile v. Heirs of Clarita Cavile this Court held that the signing by only one (1) of the 22
petitioners on the certificate of non-forum shopping was substantial compliance as the petitioners had a
common interest in the property involved, they being relatives and co-owners of that property.
Cavile was echoed in Heirs of Agapito Olarte v. Office of the President, where the certification of
non-forum shopping, signed by only two (2) of four (4) petitioners, was condoned considering that the
petitioners shared a common interest over the lot subject of that case.
In the same vein, the inclusion of Raymundo Claros Codilla (Codilla) in the Motion for Extension
of Time to File Petition for Review but not in the Petition for Review and in the verification and certificate of
non-forum shoppin should not have been fatal to petitioners' appeal. The defective verification amounted to a
mere formal defect that was neither jurisdictional nor fatal and for which a simple correction could have been
ordered by the Court of Appeals.Petitioners here, too, are acting out of a common interest. Even assuming that
a strict application of the rules must be maintained, the Court of Appeals could just as easily have merely
dropped Codilla as a party instead of peremptorily and indiscriminately foreclosing any further chance at relief
to those who had affixed their signatures.75
IV.B
Equally not fatal to petitioners' appeal was their supposed failure to show competent evidence of
identities in their petition's verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
Rule IV, Section 2(b)(2) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practic stipulates that a notary public is not
to perform a notarial act if the signatory to the document subject to notarization is not personally known to the
notary or otherwise identified through a competent evidence of identity:
SECTION 2. Prohibitions. - . . .
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document
-
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
Competent evidence of identity enables the notary to "verify the genuineness of the signature of the
acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act and deed."Rule II, Section 12 of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice elaborates on what is "competent evidence of identity":
Section 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. - The phrase "competent evidence of identity" refers to the
identification of an individual based on:
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and
signature of the individual, such as but not limited to, passport, driver's license, Professional
Regulations Commission ID, National Bureau of Investigation clearance, police clearance, postal ID,
voter's ID, Barangay certification, Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) ecard, Social
Security System (SSS) card, Philhealth card, senior citizen card, Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID, seaman's book, alien certificate of registration/immigrant
certificate of registration, government office ID, certification from the National Council for the
Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP), Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
certification; or
(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or transaction
who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two
credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each
personally knows the individual and shows to the notary public documentary identification.
As is evident from Rule IV, Section 2(b)(2) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, the need for a
competent evidence of identity is not an absolute requirement. It is imperative only when the signatory is not
personally known to the notary. When the signatory is personally known to the notary, the presentation of
competent evidence of identity is a superfluity.
Heirs of Amada Zaulda v. Zaulda,which concerned the Court of Appeals' prior determination that a
senior citizen card is not among the competent evidence of identity recognized in the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice, referred to the more basic consideration that a defect in a pleading's verification is merely formal, and
not jurisdictional or otherwise fatal:
Even assuming that a photocopy of competent evidence of identity was indeed required, non-
attachment thereof would not render the petition fatally defective. It has been consistently held that
verification is merely a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement, affecting merely the form of the pleading such
that non-compliance therewith does not render the pleading fatally defective. It is simply intended to provide
an assurance that the allegations are true and correct and not a product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may in fact order the correction of the
pleading verification is lacking or it may act on the pleading although it may not have been verified, where it
is made evident that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed so that the ends of justice may be
served.81 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
In Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. Dela Cruz, the petitioner bewailed the notary public's
failure to "indicate that the affiants were personally known to the notary public, [or to] identify the affiants
through competent evidence of identity other than their community tax certificate."
The petitioner's objection, while correctly pointing out a deficiency, failed to convince this Court
that a fatal defect existed:
[T]he defect is a technical and minor one; the respondents did file the required verification and
certification of non-forum shopping with all the respondents properly participating, marred only by a glitch in
the evidence of their identity. In the interest of justice, this minor defect should not defeat their petition and is
one that we can overlook in the interest of substantial justice.
In this case, the Court of Appeals' bare reference to petitioners' inadequate proof of identity does not
justify the outright denial of their appeal. The Court of Appeals failed to absolutely discount the possibility
that petitioners may have been personally known to the notary public, especially considering that, by that
advanced stage in litigating their claims, they must have already verified several pleadings, likely before the
same notary public.
It is true that the notary public failed to categorically indicate that petitioners were personally
known to him.Coca-Cola demonstrates, however, that even if this were the case, the notary public's lapse is
not fatal. While the circumstances were concededly less than ideal, Coca-Cola did not obsess on how only
community tax certificates were indicated in the verification and certification of non forum shopping.
This Court elects to be liberal here, as it was in Coca-Cola. Even conceding the lapses noted by the
Court of Appeals, petitioners had not gotten themselves into an irremediable predicament. This Court repeats
that, ultimately, a defective verification is merely a formal and not a fatal, jurisdictional defect, which could
have very easily been ordered corrected.87 As to the defective certification of non-forum shopping, the greater
cause of justice should have impelled the Court of Appeals, as this Court implored in Altres v. Empleo, to have
at least enabled petitioners to rectify their lapse, rather than completely deny them a chance at exhaustive
litigation by a mere stroke of its pen.
IV.C
Rule 43, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that a verified petition for review
must "be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment,
final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the
record referred to therein and other supporting papers."
In Quintano v. National Labor Relations Commission,this Court faulted the Court of Appeals for
dismissing a Rule 65 petition on account of failure to include in the petition a copy of the Complaint initially
brought before the Labor Arbiter. Referencing Rule 65's own requirement that the petition shall be
"accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non forum shopping," this
Court explained that appending a copy of an original complaint is not even required:
The Rules do not specify the precise documents, pleadings or parts of the records that should be appended to
the petition other than the judgment, final order, or resolution being assailed. The Rules only state that such
documents, pleadings or records should be relevant or pertinent to the assailed resolution, judgment or orders;
as such, the initial determination of which pleading, document or parts of the records are relevant to the
assailed order, resolution, or judgment, falls upon the petitioner.
Given this Rule's generic reference to "copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, this Court explained that:
The [Court of Appeals] will ultimately determine if the supporting documents are sufficient to even
make out a prima facie case. If the [Court of Appeals] was of the view that the petitioner should have
submitted other pleadings, documents or portions of the records to enable it to determine whether the petition
was sufficient in substance, it should have accorded the petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice, a
chance to submit the same instead of dismissing the petition outright. Clearly, this is the better policy.
Quintano was echoed in Panaga v. Court of Appeals. There, a petition for certiorari was dismissed
by the Court of Appeals for failure to include an affidavit of proof of service and after appending only the
decisions of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission. This Court explained that the
petition's annexes sufficed as the Labor Arbiter's decision already recounted the material allegations in the
pleadings of the parties and wo4ld have been enough for the Court of Appeals to determine whether there was
a prima facie case.
Quintano was further echoed in Valenzuela v. Caltex Philippines, Inc.,where this Court stated that
"the failure to submit certain documents, assuming there was such a failure on respondent's part, does not
automatically warrant outright dismissal of its petition."
Quintano equally holds true here, Though Quintano was concerned with a Rule 65 petition and this
case with a Rule 43 petition, the crucial procedural rule here is substantially the same as that in
which Quintano hinged. As with Rule 65's generic reference to "copies of all pleadings and documents
relevant and pertinent thereto," Rule 43 also only references "material portions of the record referred to . . . and
other supporting papers."
To be sure, the determination of what is sufficiently pertinent to require inclusion in a pleading is
not a whimsical exercise. Air Philippines Corporation v. Zamora laid down guideposts for determining the
necessity of the pleadings or parts of the records. It also clarified that even if a pertinent document was
missing, its subsequent submission was no less fatal
First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the petition, Only
those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether the document in
question will support the material allegations in the petition, whether said document will make out a prima
facie  case of grave abuse of discretion as to convince the court to give due course to the petition.
Second, even if a docurnent is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended if it is
shown that the contents thereof can also [be] found in another document already attached to the petition.
Thus, if the material allegations in a position paper are summarized in a questioned judgment, it will suffice
that only a certified true copy of the judgment is attached.
Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given due
course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required,
or that it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits.102 (Citations omitted,
emphasis supplied.
Here, petitioners' failure to attach a copy of the complaint originally filed by Larrazabal Enterprises
before the DARAB should not have been fatal to their Rule 43 petition. Its inclusion was not absolutely
required, as it was certainly not the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from.If, in the Court of
Appeals' judgment, it was a material document, the more prudent course of action would have been to afford
petitioners time to adduce it, not to make a justit1cation out of it for dispossessing petitioners of relief.
IV.D
Through Bar Matter No. 287, this court required the inclusion of the number and date of [lawyers']
official receipt indicating payment of their annual membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
the current year; in lieu of this, a lawyer may indicate his or her lifetime membership number:1
 Effective August 1, 1985, all lawyers shall indiqate in all pleadings, motions and papers signed and
filed by them in any Court in the Philippines, the number and date of their official receipt indicating payment
of their annual membership dves to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the current year; provided,
however, that such official receipt number and date for any year may be availed of and indicated in all such
pleadings, motions and papers filed by them in court up to the end of the month of February of the next
succeeding year.  APPEALS (4th DIVISION) and AMADO BRAVO, JR., Respondents.
Indicating the place of issue of the official receipt is not even a requirement. While its inclusion may
certainly have been desirable and would have allowed for a more consummate disclosure of information, its
non inclusion ws certainly not fatal. As with the other procedural lapses considered by the Court of Appeals,
its non-inclusion could have very easily been remedied by the Court of Appeals' prudent allowance of time and
opportunity to petitioners and their counsel.
V
This Court entertains no doubt that petitioners' Petition for Review, which the Court of Appeals
discarded, falls within the exceptions to the customary strict application of procedural rules. This Court has
previously overlooked more compelling procedural lapse, such as the period for filing pleadings and appeals.
The Court of Appeals was harsh in denying petitioners the opportunity to exhaustively ventilate and argue
their case.
Rather than dwelling on procedural minutiae, the Court of Appeals should have been impelled by
the greater interest of justice. It should have enabled a better consideration of the intricate issues of the
application of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, social justice, expropriation, and just compensation.
The reversals of rulings at the level of the DARAB could have been taken as an indication that the matters at
stake were far from being so plain that they should be ignored on mere technicalities. The better part of its
discretion dictated a solicitous stance towards petitioners.
The present Petition must be gnmt d. The Court of Appeals must give due course to petitioners'
appeal to enable a better appreciation of the myriad substantive issues which have otherwise not been pleaded
and litigated before this Court by the parties.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed September 30,
2010 and September 7, 2011 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04659
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Court of Appeals is ordered to give due course to the petition subject
of CA-G.R. SP No. 04659.
SO ORDERED
Objective of Procedural laws
G.R. No. 189151               January 25, 2012
SPOUSES DAVID BERGONIA and LUZVIMINDA CASTILLO, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by the spouses David
Bergonia and Luzviminda Castillo (petitioners) assailing the Resolutions issued by the Court of Appeals (CA)
on May 18, 2009  and June 29, 20092 in CA-G.R. CV No. 91665.
The petitioners were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Br. 23-749-03 entitled "Spouses David
Bergonia and Luzviminda Castillo v. Amado Bravo, Jr." in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Roxas,
Isabela. On January 21, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision adverse to the petitioners. The petitioners
consequently sought a reconsideration of the said decision but the same was denied by the RTC in an Order
dated April 25, 2008 which was received on May 6, 2008. On May 7, 2008, the petitioners filed a Notice of
Appeal.
In January 2009, the Law Firm of Lapeña & Associates filed with the CA its formal entry of
appearance as counsel for the petitioners, in view of the withdrawal of the former counsel, Atty. Panfilo
Soriano. The substitution of lawyers was noted in the Resolution dated January 20, 2009. In the same
resolution, the CA further directed the appellants therein to remit the deficient amount of ₱20.00 within 5 days
from notice. Thereafter, the CA issued a Resolution on January 30, 2009 requiring the filing of the Appellant’s
Brief within 45 days from receipt.
On April 8, 2009, respondent Amado Bravo, Jr. (the defendant-appellee therein), filed a Motion to
Dismiss Appeal dated April 2, 2009 stating that the petitioners failed to file their Appellant’s Brief within the
45-day period granted to them by the CA in the Resolution dated January 30, 2009. Citing Section 1 (e), Rule
50 of the Rules of Court, respondent prayed for the dismissal of the petitioners’ appeal.
In an Opposition/Comment promptly filed on April 8, 2009,the petitioners alleged that the Motion
to Dismiss filed by the respondent had no basis considering that they or their counsel did not receive any
resolution from the CA requiring them to file their Appellants’ Brief within 45 days.
On May 18, 2009, the CA issued the assailed resolution which reads:
For failure of the plaintiffs-appellants to file the required appellant’s brief within the reglementary
period which expired on 22 March 2009, as per Judicial Records Division Report dated 05 May 2009, the
appeal is hereby considered ABANDONED and is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to Section 1 (e), Rule 50,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED. (citation omitted)
On May 25, 2009, the CA issued a Resolution  which stated, among others, that the January 30, 2009
notice to file brief addressed to petitioners’ counsel was received by a certain Ruel de Tomas on February 5,
2009.
 On June 5, 2009, the petitioners filed a Compliance and Motion for Reconsideration praying that the
dismissal of their appeal be set aside in the interest of justice and equity. The petitioners claimed that their
failure to file their brief was due to the fact that they were never furnished a copy of the said January 30, 2009
Resolution of the CA directing them to file their brief.
Subsequently, in a Manifestation filed on June 16, 2009, the petitioners asserted that their counsel – the Law
Firm of Lapeña and Associates – has no employee in the name of Ruel de Tomas. However, they explained
that Atty. Torenio C. Cabacungan, Jr., an associate of the law firm personally knows a person named "Ruel"
who sometimes visits their office and who may have accidentally received the said January 30, 2009
Resolution of the CA. In such a case, the same should not be considered officially served upon them as the
latter was not connected with nor authorized to perform any act for and in behalf of counsel. On June 29, 2009,
the CA denied the motion for reconsideration.
Undaunted, the petitioners instituted the instant petition for certiorari before this Court asserting the
following arguments: (1) their failure to file their appellants’ brief was merely due to the fact that they were
never properly served with a copy of the January 30, 2009 Resolution of the CA; (2) Ruel de Tomas, the
person who apparently received the copy of the January 30, 2009 Resolution of the CA, was not their
employee; and (3) the CA, in the interest of justice and equity, should have decided their appeal on the merits
instead of dismissing the same purely on technical grounds.
The sole issue for resolution is the propriety of the dismissal of the petitioners’ appeal for their
failure to file the appellants’ brief within the reglementary period.
The petition is denied.
At the outset, this Court notes that the petitioners’ resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court is not the proper remedy to assail the May 18, 2009 and June 29, 2009 Resolutions issued
by the CA. In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available, a party aggrieved by a court order,
resolution or decision must first correctly identify the nature of the order, resolution or decision he intends to
assail.
It bears stressing that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari can be availed of only if there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.14 On the other hand,
Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court states that an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case or a particular matter therein.
Concomitant to the foregoing, the remedy of a party against an adverse disposition of the CA would
depend on whether the same is a final order or merely an interlocutory order. If the Order or Resolution issued
by the CA is in the nature of a final order, the remedy of the aggrieved party would be to file a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Otherwise, the appropriate remedy would be to file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), this Court laid down the following rules to
determine whether a court’s disposition is already a final order or merely an interlocutory order and the
respective remedies that may be availed in each case, thus:
Case law has conveniently demarcated the line between a final judgment or order and an
interlocutory one on the basis of the disposition made. A judgment or order is considered final if the order
disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of the same action; in such
case, the remedy available to an aggrieved party is appeal. If the order or resolution, however, merely resolves
incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of the case, the order is
interlocutory and the aggrieved party’s remedy is a petition for certiorari  under Rule 65. Jurisprudence
pointedly holds that:
As distinguished from a final order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates
a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined by the court, an interlocutory order does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something
more to be adjudicated upon. The term "final" judgment or order signifies a judgment or an order which
disposes of the case as to all the parties, reserving no further questions or directions for future determination.
On the other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory in character if it leaves substantial
proceedings yet to be had in connection with the controversy. It does not end the task of the court in
adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as against each other. In this
sense, it is basically provisional in its application. (citations omitted)
Here, the assailed May 18, 2009 and June 29, 2009 Resolutions issued by the CA had considered
the petitioners’ appeal below as having been abandoned and, accordingly, dismissed. Thus, the assailed
Resolutions are in the nature of a final order as the same completely disposed of the petitioners’ appeal with
the CA. Thus, the remedy available to the petitioners is to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
with this court and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Even if we are to assume arguendo that the petitioners’ resort to the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari is proper, the instant petition would still be denied. A petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave
abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist. 16 The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility. Here, there was no hint of whimsicality or gross and patent abuse of discretion on the part
of the CA when it dismissed the appeal of the petitioners for the failure of the latter to file their appellants’
brief.
Section 1 (e), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court succinctly provides that:
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. – An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own
motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within
the time provided by these Rules; x x x
In a long line of cases, this Court has held that the CA’s authority to dismiss an appeal for failure to file the
appellant’s brief is a matter of judicial discretion. Thus, a dismissal based on this ground is neither mandatory
nor ministerial; the fundamentals of justice and fairness must be observed, bearing in mind the background and
web of circumstances surrounding the case.
Having in mind the peculiar circumstances of the instant case, we find that the petitioners’ excuse for their
failure to file their brief was flimsy and discreditable and, thus, the propriety of the dismissal of their appeal.
Indeed, as aptly ruled by the CA, the records of the case clearly showed that the petitioners, through their
counsel, received the January 30, 2009 Resolution which required them to file their appellants’ brief. Thus:
The records of this case are clear that the Resolution of 30 January 2009 requiring the [petitioners] to file the
required brief was received by a certain Ruel de Tomas for [petitioners’] counsel on 05 February 2009. Hence,
mere denial by [petitioners’] counsel of the receipt of his copy of the Resolution cannot be given weight in the
absence of any proof that the said person is neither an employee at his law office nor someone unknown to
him. Likewise, it is highly implausible that any person in the building where [petitioners’] counsel holds office is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an
would simply receive a correspondence delivered by a postman orderly and speedy administration of justice. The instant case is no exception to this rule.

Verily, the petitioners were only able to offer their bare assertion that they and their counsel did not actually
receive a copy of the January 30, 2009 Resolution and that the person who apparently received the same was
not in any way connected with their counsel. There was no other credible evidence adduced by the petitioners
which would persuade us to exculpate them from the effects of their failure to file their brief.
The Court notes that, in concluding that the petitioners indeed received a copy of the January 30, 2009
Resolution, the CA was guided by the Report of the Judicial Records Division of the CA and by the
certification issued by the Postmaster of Quezon City. Indubitably, the petitioners’ bare assertions could not
overcome the presumption of regularity in the preparation of the records of the Post Office and that of the CA.
Nonetheless, the petitioners cite a cacophony of cases decided by this Court which, in essence, declared that
dismissal of an appeal on purely technical ground is frowned upon and that, as much as possible, appeals ought
to be decided on the merits in the interest of justice and equity.
The petitioners' plea for the application of the principles of substantial justice in their favor deserves scant
consideration. The petitioners should be reminded that technical rules may be relaxed only for the furtherance
of justice and to benefit the deserving. While the petitioners adverted to several jurisprudential rulings of this
Court which set aside procedural rules, it is noted that there were underlying considerations in those cases
which warranted a disregard of procedural technicalities to favor substantial justice. Here, there exists no such
consideration.
In the present case, we find no cogent reason to exempt the petitioner from the effects of its failure to comply
with the Rules of Court.
The right to appeal is a statutory right and the party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the
requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost. More so, as in this case, where petitioner
not only neglected to file its brief within the stipulated time but also failed to seek an extension of time for a
cogent ground before the expiration of the time sought to be extended.
In not a few instances, the Court relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure to afford the parties the
opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. This is in line with the time-honored principle that cases
should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and
procedural imperfection should, thus, not serve as basis of decisions. In that way, the ends of justice would be
better served. For, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the
rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the
administration of justice. In this case, however, such liberality in the application of rules of procedure may not
be invoked if it will result in the wanton disregard of the rules or cause needless delay in the administration of
justice. It is equally settled that, save for the most persuasive of reasons, strict compliance is enjoined to
facilitate the orderly administration of justice.24 (citations omitted)
Reiterating the foregoing in Dimarucot v. People of the Philippines, this Court stated that:

The petitioners ought to be reminded that the bare invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" is not a
magic wand that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules are not to
be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's
substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of
reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and
may be exercised only in accordance with the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with
the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.
Strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the orderly and speedy disposition of justice.
The Rules must be followed, otherwise, they will become meaningless and useless. (citations omitted)

In Asian Spirit Airlines v. Spouses Bautista, this Court clarified that procedural rules are required to be
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed
followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an Resolutions dated May 18, 2009 and June 29, 2009 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 91665
injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
dismissing the petitioners’ appeal are AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.
prescribed:

We agree with the petitioner’s contention that the rules of procedure may be relaxed for the most persuasive
reasons. But as this Court held in Galang v. Court of Appeals:

Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in
prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the
most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate
with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.

In an avuncular case, we emphasized that:

Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are, thus,
enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the
application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the
rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases
and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it

Application of procedural laws
G.R. No. 168313               October 6, 2010
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO BARZA, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Br. 61, FIRST UNION GROUP ENTERPRISES and LINDA WU
HU, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Through the present petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)
seeks the reversal of: (1) the Court of Appeals (CA) decision of November 2, 2004,in "Bank of the Philippine
Islands v. Hon. Romeo Barza, et al." docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 75350 and (2) the CA resolution of May 25,
20053 denying BPI’s Motion for Reconsideration. The assailed CA ruling affirmed the Order of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 61 dated August 26, 2002 granting First Union Group Enterprises
(First Union) and Linda Wu Hu’s (Linda) Motion to Dismiss dated March 26, 2002. A subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
First Union borrowed from BPI the sums of Five Million Pesos (PhP5,000,000.00) and One
Hundred Twenty Thousand U.S. Dollars and 32 cents (USD123,218.32), evidenced by separate promissory
notes.
As partial security for the loan obligations of First Union, defendant Linda and her spouse (Eddy
Tien) executed a Real Estate Mortgage Agreement dated August 29, 1997, covering two (2) condominium
units. Linda executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement dated April 14, 1997 where she agreed to be
solidarily liable with First Union for its obligations to BPI.
Despite repeated demands to satisfy the loan obligations upon maturity, First Union failed to pay
BPI the amounts due.
On October 16, 2000, BPI initiated with the Office of the Sheriff of the RTC of Pasig extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings against the two (2) mortgaged condominium units to satisfy First Union and Linda’s
solidary obligations.
After due notice and publication, the properties were sold at public auction on June 29, 2001.
BPI was the highest bidder, having submitted a bid of Five Million Seven Hundred Ninety Eight
Thousand Four Hundred Pesos (PhP5,798,400.00). The proceeds of the auction sale were applied to the costs
and expenses of foreclosure, and thereafter, to First Union’s obligation of Five Million Peso
(PhP5,000,000.00). After so applying the proceeds, First Union still owed BPI a balance of Four Million
Seven Hundred Forty Two Thousand Nine Hundred Forty Nine & 32/100 Pesos (PhP4,742,949.32), inclusive
of interests and penalty charges, as of December 21, 2001.
 Additionally, First Union’s foreign currency loan obligation remained unpaid and, as of December
21, 2001, amounted to One Hundred Seventy Five Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four Thousand & 35/100
US Dollars (USD175,324.35), inclusive of interest and penalty charges.
The Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money
First Union’s and Linda’s continued failure to settle their outstanding obligations prompted BPI to
file, on January 3, 2002, a complaint for collection of sum of money with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 61.
The complaint’s verification and certificate of non-forum shopping were signed by Ma. Cristina F. Asis (Asis)
and Kristine L. Ong (Ong). However, no Secretary’s Certificate or Board Resolution was attached to evidence
Asis’ and Ong’s authority to file the complaint.
On April 1, 2002, First Union and Linda filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that BPI violated
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules); BPI failed to attach to the complaint the necessary
board resolution authorizing Asis and Ong to institute the collection action against First Union and Linda.
On August 7, 2002, BPI filed an "Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss," arguing that the
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping sufficiently established Asis’ and Ong’s authority to file the
complaint and proof of their authority could be presented during the trial. Further, BPI alleged that a complaint
"can only be dismissed under Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure if there was no
certification against forum shopping." The provision, according to BPI, "does not even require that the person
certifying should show proof of his authority to do so."
Instead of submitting a board resolution, BPI attached a "Special Power of Attorney" (SPA) dated
December 20, 2001 executed by Zosimo A. Kabigting (Zosimo), Vice-President of BPI.
 The SPA authorized Asis and Ong or any lawyer from the Benedicto Versoza Gealogo and Burkley
Law Offices to initiate any legal action against First Union and Linda.
In their Comment to BPI’s Opposition, First Union and Linda challenged BPI’s reading of the law,
charging that it lacked jurisprudential support.18 First Union and Linda argued, invoking Public Estates
Authority v. Elpidio Uy, that "an initiatory pleading which does not contain a board resolution authorizing the
person to show proof of his authority is equally guilty (sic) of not satisfying the requirements in the
Certification against Non-Forum Shopping. It is as if though (sic) no certification has been filed." Thus,
according to First Union and Linda, BPI’s failure to attach a board resolution "shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for dismissal of the case without
prejudice x x x." First Union and Linda likewise questioned the belated submission of the SPA, which in any
case, "is not the board resolution envisioned by the rules since the plaintiff herein is a juridical person." BPI’s
Reply to the Comment argued that the cited Public Estates Authority case is not authoritative since "what is
proscribed is the absence of authority from the board of directors, not the failure to attach the board resolution
to the initiatory pleading." BPI contended that the "primary consideration is whether Asis and Ong were
authorized by BPI, not the failure to attach the proof of authority to the complaint." BPI also begged the "kind
indulgence of the Honorable Court as it inadvertently failed to submit with the Special Power of Attorney the
Corporate Secretary’s Certificate which authorized Mr. Zosimo Kabigting to appoint his substitutes."
On August 22, 2002, the RTC issued its assailed Order granting First Union’s and Linda’s Motion to
Dismiss. The trial court denied BPI’s Motion for Reconsideration on November 13, 2002.
Proceedings before the CA
BPI, on February 5, 2003, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before
the CA. It alleged that that lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint despite the submission of the SPA and the Corporate Secretary’s
Certificate.
In their Comment to the petition,First Union and Linda submitted that the petition is an improper
remedy since an order granting a motion to dismiss is not interlocutory. They contended that the dismissal is
final in nature; hence, an appeal, not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, is the proper recourse.
The CA disagreed with First Union and Linda’s contention. The assailed order, according to the CA,
categorically stated that the dismissal of the complaint was without prejudice. As a dismissal without
prejudice, the order is interlocutory in nature and is not a final order.
 The CA, however, found that BPI failed to comply with the procedural requirements on non-forum
shopping. Citing Sec. 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the CA ruled that the requirement that a petition should
sign the certificate of non-forum shopping applies even to corporations since the Rules of Court do not
distinguish between natural and civil persons. Digital Microwave Corp. v. Court of Appeals, et al. holds that
"where a petitioner is corporation, the certification against forum shopping should be signed by its duly
authorized director or representative."
While the CA did not question the authority of Asis and Ong as bank representatives, the Bank
however failed to show - through an appropriate board resolution – proof of their authority as representatives.
To the CA, this failure warranted the dismissal of the complaint.
The CA lastly refused to accord merit to BPI’s argument that it substantially complied with the
requirements of verification and certification; BPI only submitted the SPA and the Board Resolution after it
had filed the complaint.
THE PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS
BPI maintains in the present petition that it attached a verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping to its complaint. Contesting the CA’s interpretation of Shipside v. Court of Appeals, it argues that the
Supreme Court actually excused Shipside’s belated submission of its Secretary’s Certificate and held that it
substantially complied with the rule requiring the submission of a verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping as it did, in fact, make a submission. From this starting point, it now asks the Court to excuse its
belated submission.
BPI likewise contends that it is in a better position than the petitioner in Shipside because the latter
only submitted a secretary’s certificate while it submitted a special power attorney signed by Zosimo. On this
same point, BPI also cites General Milling Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission where the
Court held that General Milling’s belated submission of a document to prove the authority of the signatories to
the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping was substantial compliance with Rules of Court.
BPI finally urges the Court to reverse and set aside the Decision of the CA and to remand the case to
the RTC of Makati City for further proceedings under the principle that "technicality should not defeat
substantial justice."
THE RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
In their Memorandum dated September 25, 2009,First Union and Linda allege that BPI’s "position
on the submission of the Board Resolution has been one of defiance." BPI’s failure to submit the required
board resolution is not an inadvertence but a wilful disregard of the Rules and a blatant refusal to heed the
order of the RTC. First Union and Linda point to BPI’s opposition to the Motion to Dismiss as proof of BPI’s
wilful disregard. BPI argued in this opposition that (1) the Rules do not require the presentation of a board
resolution, and (2) proof of such authority need not be attached to the initiatory pleading but can be presented
during trial.
Further, instead of submitting a board resolution, BPI submitted a special power of attorney.It was
only after First Union and Linda pointed out that the submitted special power of attorney cannot bind a
juridical entity did BPI change its position. Only then did BPI claim that it merely inadvertently failed to
submit the required secretary’s certificate.
This belated change of position, according to First Union and Linda, does not entitle BPI to the
jurisprudential exception established by the Court in Shipside where the Court held that the relaxation of the
rule requiring verification and certification of non-forum shopping is only for "special circumstances or
compelling reasons."
THE COURT’S RULING
We rule in the respondents’ favor.
This Court has repeatedly emphasized the need to abide by the Rules of Court and the procedural
requirements it imposes. The verification of a complaint and the attachment of a certificate of non-forum
shopping are requirements that – as pointed out by the Court, time and again – are basic, necessary and
mandatory for procedural orderliness.
Thus, we cannot simply and in a general way apply – given the factual circumstances of this case –
the liberal jurisprudential exception in Shipside and its line of cases to excuse BPI’s failure to submit a board
resolution. While we may have excused strict compliance in the past, we did so only on sufficient and
justifiable grounds that compelled a liberal approach while avoiding the effective negation of the intent of the
rule on non-forum shopping. In other words, the rule for the submission of a certificate of non-forum
shopping, proper in form and substance, remains to be a strict and mandatory rule; any liberal application has
to be justified by ample and sufficient reasons that maintain the integrity of, and do not detract from, the
mandatory character of the rule.
The rule, its relaxation and their rationale were discussed by the Court at length in Tible & Tible
Company, Inc. v. Royal Savings and Loan Association where we said:
Much reliance is placed on the rule that "Courts are not slaves or robots of technical rules, shorn of
judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided
by the norm that on balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way
around." This rule must always be used in the right context, lest injustice, rather than justice would be its end
result. It must never be forgotten that, generally, the application of the rules must be upheld, and the
suspension or even mere relaxation of its application, is the exception. This Court previously explained:
The Court is not impervious to the frustration that litigants and lawyers alike would at times
encounter in procedural bureaucracy but imperative justice requires correct observance of indispensable
technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper dispensation. It has long been recognized that strict
compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly
and expeditious dispatch of judicial business.
Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit
the convenience of a party. Adjective law is important in ensuring the effective enforcement of substantive
rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. These rules are not intended to hamper litigants
or complicate litigation but, indeed to provide for a system under which a suitor may be heard in the correct
form and manner and at the prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they
acknowledge.
It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the
orderly administration of justice. Justice has to be  administered according to the Rules in order to obviate
arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality. We have been cautioned and reminded in Limpot v. Court of Appeals,
et al.,  that:
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the protection of
substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to propose that substantive law and
adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as often suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules
should never be permitted if it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants. This is not
exactly true; the concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give both
kinds of law, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties.
Observance of both substantive rights is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of such rights,
be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
x x x (T)hey are required to be followed except only when for the most persuasive of reasons them
may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in
not complying with the procedure prescribed. x x x While it is true that a litigation is not a game of
technicalities, this does not mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice
of the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and their just resolution. Justice eschews anarchy.
 In particular, on the matter of the certificate of non-forum shopping that was similarly at issue,
Tible pointedly said:
x x x the requirement under Administrative Circular No. 04-94 for a certificate of non-forum
shopping is mandatory. The subsequent compliance with said requirement does not excuse a party's
failure to comply therewith in the first instance. In those cases where this Court excused the non-
compliance with the requirement of the submission of a certificate of non-forum shopping, it found special
circumstances or compelling reasons which made the strict application of said Circular clearly unjustified or
inequitable. x x x [Emphasis supplied.]
This same rule was echoed in Mediserv v. Court of Appeals 53 where we said in the course
of allowing a liberal justification:
It is settled that liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations where there may be some
excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the
proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the rules. After all, rules of
procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; they are used only to help secure substantial
justice. [Emphasis supplied.]
To be sure, BPI’s cited Shipside case also involved the absence of proof – attached to the petition –
that the filing officer was authorized to sign the verification and non-forum shopping certification. In the
Motion for Reconsideration that followed the dismissal of the case, the movant attached a certificate issued by
its board secretary stating that ten (10) days prior to the filing of the petition, the filing officer had been
authorized by petitioner’s board of directors to file said petition. Thus, proper authority existed but was simply
not attached to the petition. On this submission, the petitioner sought and the Court positively granted relief.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the
case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing.
We thus hold that the dismissal of the case is the appropriate ruling from this Court, without
prejudice to its refiling as the Rules allow.1avvphi1
We end this Decision by quoting our parting words in Melo v. Court of Appeals:
We are not unmindful of the adverse consequence to private respondent of a dismissal of her
complaint, nor of the time, effort, and money spent litigating up to this Court solely on a so-called technical
ground. Nonetheless, we hold that compliance with the certification requirement on non-forum shopping
should not be made subject to a party’s afterthought, lest the policy of the law be undermined.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitioner’s petition for review on certiorari, and AFFIRM the
decision dated November 2, 2004 of the Court of Appeals, in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Hon. Romeo
Barza, et al. (CA-G.R. SP No. 75350), and the subsequent resolution dated May 25, 2005 denying BPI’s
Motion for Reconsideration. The complaint filed against the respondents is DISMISSED without prejudice.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

In the present case, we do not see a situation comparable to the cited Shipside. BPI did not submit
any proof of authority in the first instance because it did not believe that a board resolution evidencing such
authority was necessary. We note that instead of immediately submitting an appropriate board resolution –
after the First Union and Linda filed their motion to dismiss – BPI argued that it was not required to submit
one and even argued that:

The Complaint can only be dismissed under Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
if there was no certification against forum shopping. The Complaint has. The provision cited does not even
require that the person certifying show proof of his authority to do so x x x.

In fact, BPI merely attached to its opposition a special power of attorney issued by Mr. Kabigting, a
bank vice-president, granting Asis and Ong the authority to file the complaint. Thus, no direct authority to file
a complaint was initially ever given by BPI – the corporate entity in whose name and behalf the complaint was
filed. Only in its Reply to the Comment to plaintiff’s Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss did BPI "beg the
kind indulgence of the Honorable Court as it inadvertently failed to submit with the Special Power of Attorney
the Corporate Secretary’s Certificate which authorized Mr. Zosimo Kabigting to appoint his substitutes." Even
this submission, however, was a roundabout way of authorizing the filing officers to file the complaint.

BPI, interestingly, never elaborated nor explained its belatedly claimed inadvertence in failing to
submit a corporate secretary’s certificate directly authorizing its representatives to file the complaint; it
particularly failed to specify the circumstances that led to the claimed inadvertence. Under the given facts, we
cannot but conclude that, rather than an inadvertence, there was an initial unwavering stance that the
submission of a specific authority from the board was not necessary. In blunter terms, the omission of the
required board resolution in the complaint was neither an excusable deficiency nor an omission that occurred
through inadvertence. In the usual course in the handling of a case, the failure was a mistake of counsel that
BPI never cared to admit but which nevertheless bound it as a client. From this perspective, BPI’s case is
different from Shipside so that the ruling in this cited case cannot apply.

Under the circumstances, what applies to the present case is the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule
7 of the Rules of Court which states:
 G.R. No. 170488               December 10, 2012
CMTC INTERNATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
BHAGIS INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Resolutions dated August 19, 2005 and November 15, 2005 of the Former Special Twelfth Division of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84742.
The facts of the case follow.
Petitioner instituted a Complaint for Unfair Competition and/or Copyright Infringement and Claim for
Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction against respondent
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati (trial court).
On February 14, 2005, the trial court rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner.
The fallo of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Complaint for Unfair Competition and/or Copyright Infringement
and Claim for Damages is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
After receiving a copy of the trial court’s Decision, petitioner seasonably filed a Notice of Appeal before the
Court of Appeals (appellate court) on March 4, 2005.
Thereafter, the appellate court issued a Notice to File the Appellant’s Brief on May 20, 2005, which was
received by the law office representing petitioner on May 30, 2005, stating as follows:
Pursuant to Rule 44, Sec. 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure you are hereby required to file with this Court
within forty-five (45) days from receipt of this notice, SEVEN (7) legibly typewritten, mimeographed or
printed copies of the Appellant’s Brief with legible copies of the assailed decision of the Trial Court and proof
of service of two copies upon the appellee/s.
However, despite said notice, petitioner failed to file its appellant’s brief timely. Hence, on August 19, 2005,
the appellate court issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal filed by petitioner. The full text of said
Resolution reads:
Considering the report of the Judicial Records Division dated 17 August 2005 stating that no appellant’s brief
has been filed as per docket book entry, the Court RESOLVES to consider the appeal as having been
ABANDONED and consequently DISMISS the same pursuant to Sec. 1(e), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.
Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit
Appellant’s Brief, which was filed forty-two (42) days late from the date of its expiration on July 15, 2005.
On November 15, 2005, the appellate court denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to
Admit Appellant’s Brief. It ruled that one of the grounds by which the Court of Appeals may, on its own
motion or that of the appellee, dismiss the appeal is the failure on the part of the appellant to serve and file the
required number of copies of his brief within the time prescribed by the Rules of Court, viz.:
For this Court to admit the appellant’s brief after such wanton disregard of the Rules would put a strain on the
orderly administration of justice.
As held in the case of St. Louis University vs. Cordero, 434 SCRA 575, 587, citing Don Lino Gutierres &
Sons, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 61 SCRA 87:
"It is necessary to impress upon litigants and their lawyers the necessity of strict compliance with the periods
for performing certain acts incident to the appeal and the transgressions thereof, as a rule, would not be
tolerated; otherwise, those periods could be evaded by subterfuges and manufactured excuses and would
ultimately become inutile.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit
Appellant’s Brief is perforce DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Accordingly, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court questioning the August 19,
2005 and November 15, 2005 Resolutions of the appellate court. Thus, petitioner presents the following
grounds to support its petition:
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
SACRIFICED SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN FAVOR OF PROCEDURAL TECHNICALITIES WITH ITS
DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER’S APPEAL FOR FAILURE TO FILE THE APPELLANT’S BRIEF ON
TIME WITHOUT CONSIDERING AT ALL WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER’S APPEAL DESERVED
FULL CONSIDERATION ON THE MERITS.
B.
IN THE INTEREST OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE, PETITIONER’S APPEAL SHOULD BE REINSTATED
CONSIDERING THAT THE ERRORS OF THE TRIAL COURT IN RENDERING ITS APPEALED
DECISION ARE EVIDENT ON THE FACE OF THE SAID DECISION AND MORE SO AFTER AN
EXAMINATION OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
1. The trial court’s ruling that petitioner should have established actual confusion in the minds of
buyers is contrary to jurisprudence.
2. The trial court did not state the facts upon which it based its conclusion that petitioner’s
trademark is strikingly different and distinct from that of defendant’s.
3. Respondent labeled its products in a manner confusingly similar to that of petitioner’s.
4. The trial court erred in finding that respondent did not pass off its products as that of
petitioner’s.11
Simply, the issue to be resolved is the propriety of the dismissal of petitioner’s appeal for its failure to file the rather than promote justice, this Court is not without power to exercise its judicial discretion in relaxing the
appellant’s brief within the reglementary period. rules of procedure.

Petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred in dismissing its appeal, since dismissal of appeals on purely
technical grounds is frowned upon and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very technical sense,
for they are adopted to help secure substantial justice.
For its part, respondent maintains that the appellate court did not err in dismissing petitioner’s appeal for its
failure to file the required appellant’s brief within the reglementary period. It stresses that in the absence of
persuasive reason to deviate therefrom, rules of procedure must be faithfully followed for the prevention of
needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial business.
Also, it must be stressed that petitioner had no participatory negligence in the dismissal of its appeal. Hence,
the ensuing dismissal of its appeal was completely attributable to the gross negligence of its counsel. For said
reason, the Court is not averse to suspending its own rules in the pursuit of justice. Where reckless or gross
negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when the interests of justice so require,
relief is accorded to the client who suffered by reason of the lawyer’s gross or palpable mistake or negligence.
All told, petitioner should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his
cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.

We find merit in the instant petition.
Time and again, this Court has emphasized that procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due
regard, since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay
in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. From time to time, however, we have
recognized exceptions to the Rules, but only for the most compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to the
Rules would defeat rather than serve the ends of justice.
Nevertheless, considering that this Court is not a trier of facts, the appropriate action to take is to remand the
case to the appellate court for further proceedings, for it to thoroughly examine the factual and legal issues that
still need to be threshed out.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED, insofar as this case
is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings, subject to the payment of the corresponding
docket fees within fifteen (15) days from notice of this Decision.

In Obut v. Court of Appeals,13 this Court reiterated that it "cannot look with favor on a course of action which Let the records and the CA rollo of this case be transmitted accordingly.
would place the administration of justice in a straightjacket, for then the result would be a poor kind of justice
if there would be justice at all. Verily, judicial orders are issued to be obeyed, nonetheless a non-compliance is
SO ORDERED.
to be dealt with as the circumstances attending the case may warrant. What should guide judicial action is the
principle that a party-litigant if to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint of
defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities."

The same principle was highlighted in Philippine National Bank and Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Philippine Milling Company, Incorporated, et al. where the Court ruled that even if an appellant failed to file a
motion for extension of time to file his brief on or before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court
of Appeals does not necessarily lose jurisdiction to hear and decide the appealed case, and that the Court of
Appeals has discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss appellant’s appeal, which discretion must be a sound one to
be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play having in mind the circumstances obtaining
in each case.

Ergo, where strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the petition, the strict application of
the rules of procedure may be relaxed, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction. Thus, a rigid application of the
rules of procedure will not be entertained if it will obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice in
the light of the prevailing circumstances in the case under consideration.

In the instant case, it is apparent that there is a strong desire to file an appellant’s brief on petitioner’s part.

When petitioner filed its motion attaching therewith its appellant’s brief, there was a clear intention on the part
of petitioner not to abandon his appeal. As a matter of fact, were it not for its counsel’s act of inadvertently
misplacing the Notice to File Brief in another file, petitioner could have seasonably filed its appellant’s brief as
its counsel had already prepared the same even way before the receipt of the Notice to File Brief.

It bears stressing at this point then that the rule, which states that the mistakes of counsel binds the client, may
not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or
property, or where the interest of justice so requires. In rendering justice, procedural infirmities take a backseat
against substantive rights of litigants. Corollarily, if the strict application of the rules would tend to frustrate