General Principles of Remedial Law On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, ruling
1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that under the
A. Difference between Substantive Law and Procedural Law
Bernabe vs. Alejo, 374 SCRA 180
G.R. No. 140500 : January 21, 2002
ERNESTINA BERNABE, Petitioner, v. CAROLINA ALEJO as guardian ad litem for the
minor ADRIAN BERNABE, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate children who were still
minors at the time the Family Code took effect cannot be impaired or taken away. The minors
have up to four years from attaining majority age within which to file an action for
recognition.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying
for (1) the nullification of the July 7, 1999 Court of Appeals 2 (CA) Decision3 in CA-GR CV
No. 51919 and the October 14, 1999 CA Resolution4 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration, as well as (2) the reinstatement of the two Orders issued by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City (Branch 109) concerning the same case. The dispositive
portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the lower court dismissing Civil Case No.
94-0562 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of this case be remanded to the
lower court for trial on the merits.[5
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of twenty-three
(23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18, 1981
and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife
Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint praying that
Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he
(Adrian) be given his share in Fiscal Bernabes estate, which is now being held by Ernestina as
the sole surviving heir.
provisions of the Family Code as well as the case of Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, the
complaint is now barred x x x.[6
Orders of the Trial Court
In an Order dated July 26, 1995, the trial court granted Ernestina Bernabes Motion for
Reconsideration of the trial courts Decision and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for
recognition. Citing Article 175 of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death of the putative
father had barred the action.
In its Order dated October 6, 1995, the trial court added that since the putative father had not
acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing, the action for recognition should have
been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him the opportunity to either affirm
or deny the childs filiation.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should be
allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy was born
in 1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an action for
recognition to be filed within four years after the child has attained the age of majority. The
subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right.
Hence, this appeal.7
Issues
In her Memorandum,8 petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
I Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner, the
legitimate daughter of the putative father, for recognition and partition with accounting after
the putative fathers death in the absence of any written acknowledgment of paternity by the
latter.
II Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents had four
years from the attainment of minority to file an action for recognition as provided in Art. 285
of the Civil Code, in complete disregard of its repeal by the [express] provisions of the Family
Code and the applicable jurisprudence as held by the Honorable Court of Appeals.
III Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the petition[er] is fatally defective for
failure to implead the Court of Appeals as one of the respondents.[9
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.

First and Second Issues: Period to File Action for Recognition
Because the first and the second issues are interrelated, we shall discuss them jointly.
Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from filing an action for recognition, because
Article 285 of the Civil Code has been supplanted by the provisions of the Family Code. She
argues that the latter Code should be given retroactive effect, since no vested right would be
impaired. We do not agree.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides the period for filing an action for recognition as
follows:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the
lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may
file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing
had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the
document.
The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have however been omitted by
Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which we quote:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her
lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state
of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute
the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either
or both of the parties.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and
on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought
within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The Family Code makes no distinction on whether
the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new
Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that illegitimate children are usually begotten
and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. x x x
The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the childs filiation,
and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead.10cräläwvirtualibräry
Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already vested prior to
its enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired as follows:
ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is whether Adrians right to an action for recognition,
which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code, had already vested prior to the enactment
of the Family Code. Our answer is affirmative.
A vested right is defined as one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the exercise
of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent
upon a contingency x x x.11 Respondent however contends that the filing of an action for
recognition is procedural in nature and that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to [or]
arise from procedural laws.12cräläwvirtualibräry
Bustos v. Lucero13 distinguished substantive from procedural law in these words:
x x x. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said
to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys
under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that part
of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties
which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to
administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing
rights or obtains redress for their invasion.[14 (Citations omitted)
Recently, in Fabian v. Desierto,15  the Court laid down the test for determining whether a rule
is procedural or substantive:
[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is
whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the
rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter;
but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with
procedure.[16cräläwvirtualibräry
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a
substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within four years
from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrians right to
file an action for recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.
Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals17 is not applicable to the case at bar, because the plaintiff
therein sought recognition as an illegitimate child when he was no longer a minor. On the
other hand, in Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals18 the Court ruled that an action for recognition
filed while the Civil Code was in effect should not be affected by the subsequent enactment of
the Family Code, because the right had already vested.
Not Limited to Natural Children
To be sure, Article 285 of the Civil Code refers to the action for recognition of natural
children. Thus, petitioner contends that the provision cannot be availed of by respondent,
because at the time of his conception, his parents were impeded from marrying each other. In
other words, he is not a natural child.
A natural child is one whose parents, at the time of conception, were not disqualified by any
legal impediment from marrying each other. Thus, in De Santos v. Angeles,19  the Court
explained:
A childs parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the time of
conception for him to qualify as a natural child.[20cräläwvirtualibräry
A strict and literal interpretation of Article 285 has already been frowned upon by this Court in
the aforesaid case of Aruego, which allowed minors to file a case for recognition even if their
parents were disqualified from marrying each other. There, the Complaint averred that the late
Jose Aruego Sr., a married man, had an extramarital liason with Luz Fabian. Out of this
relationship were born two illegitimate children who in 1983 filed an action for recognition.
The two children were born in 1962 and 1963, while the alleged putative father died in 1982.
In short, at the time of their conception, the two childrens parents were legally disqualified
from marrying each other. The Court allowed the Complaint to prosper, even though it had
been filed almost a year after the death of the presumed father. At the time of his death, both
children were still minors.
Moreover, in the earlier case Divinagracia v. Rovira,21 the Court said that the rules on
voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment of natural children, as well as the prescriptive
period for filing such action, may likewise be applied to spurious children. Pertinent portions
of the case are quoted hereunder:
The so-called spurious children, or illegitimate children other than natural children, commonly
known as bastards, include those adulterous children or those born out of wedlock to a married
woman cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a married man cohabiting with a
woman other than his wife. They are entitled to support and successional rights. But their
filiation must be duly proven.
How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the investigation of
the paternity or maternity or spurious children under the circumstances specified in articles
283 and 284 of the Civil Code. The implication is that the rules on compulsory recognition of
natural children are applicable to spurious children.
Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children. The rules on proof of
filiation of natural children or the rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment for
natural children may be applied to spurious children.
That does not mean that spurious children should be acknowledged, as that term is used with
respect to natural children. What is simply meant is that the grounds or instances for the
acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious children.
A spurious child may prove his filiation by means of a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. These are the modes of voluntary
recognition of natural children.
In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the spurious child, then his
filiation may be established by means of the circumstances or grounds for compulsory
recognition prescribed in the aforementioned articles 283 and 284.
The prescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory recognition in the case of natural
children, as provided for in article 285 of the Civil Code, applies to spurious children.
[22  (Citations omitted, italics supplied)
Thus, under the Civil Code, natural children have superior successional rights over spurious
ones.23 However, Rovira treats them as equals with respect to other rights, including the right
to recognition granted by Article 285.
To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took
effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are thus given the right to seek
recognition (under Article 285 of the Civil Code) for a period of up to four years from
attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the
Family Code.
Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of minors who could not Gatarin (Eileen). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. TMCV-0040-06 and assigned to
have filed suit, on their own, during the lifetime of their putative parents. As respondent aptly Branch 23 of the RTC of Trece Martires City.
points out in his Memorandum,24 the State as parens patriae should protect a minors right.
Born in 1981, Adrian was only seven years old when the Family Code took effect and only Respondents alleged in their Complaint that they are the registered owners of a 984-square
twelve when his alleged father died in 1993. The minor must be given his day in court. meter lot in Baranga_v Santiago, General Trias, Cavite covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-308589 (the subject property);5 that petitioners are their relatives who for many
years have been occupying the subject property by mere tolerance of respondents'
predecessors and parents, the original owners of the same; that petitioners have been
"reminded x x x to vacate the premises"6 because respondents have decided to sell the
property; that petitioners failed to vacate; that respondents made several attempts to settle the
matter through conciliation before the Punong Barangay but the same proved futile; that
Third Issue: Failure to Implead the CA the Punong Barangay was constrained to issue a Certification To File Action; 7 that
respondents were thus compelled to file the Complaint and incur legal expenses, for which
Under Section 4(a) of Rule 45 of the current Rules of Court, it is nolonger required to implead they pray that petitioners be ordered to vacate the subject property and pay ₱20,000.00
the lower courts or judges x x x either as petitioners or respondents. Under Section 3, however, attorney's fees, ₱5,000.00 litigation expenses, and costs.
the lower tribunal should still be furnished a copy of the petition. Hence, the failure of
petitioner to implead the Court of Appeals as a party is not a reversible error; it is infact the On September 25, 2006, summons and a copy of the Complaint were served upon petitioners
correct procedure. through Eileen, who nonetheless refused to sign and acknowledge receipt thereof. This fact
was noted in the court process server's Return of Summons dated September 26, 2006.8
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. On January 9, 2007, respondents filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default, arguing that
despite service of summons on September 25, 2006, petitioners failed to file their answer.
SO ORDERED.
On May 28, 2007, petitioners filed their Answer with Motion to Dismiss.
Rodante Guyamin, et.al. v. Jacinto Flores, et.al., G.R. No. 202189, April 25, 2017
On June 5, 2007, respondents filed their Reply to Answer, arguing that petitioners' Answer
G.R. No. 202189 was belatedly filed, which is why they filed a motion to declare petitioners in default; and for
this reason, they prayed that the Answer be stricken off the record.
RODANTE F. GUYAMIN, LUCINIA F. GUY AMIN, and EILEEN G.
GATARIN, Petitioners On December 26, 2007, the RTC issued an Order decreeing as follows:
vs.
JACINTO G. FLORES and MAXIMO G. FLORES, represented by RAMON G. WHEREFORE, for failure to file their responsive answer within the reglementary period of
FLORES, Respondents fifteen (15) days, defendants are hereby declared in default. The pleadings filed by the
defendant on May 30, 2007
DECISION
is [sic] hereby denied.9
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Petitioners moved to reconsider, but the trial court was unmoved. It proceeded to receive
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the May 23, 2012 Decision 2 of the respondents' evidence ex parte.
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No. 92924 which affirmed the October 21, 2008
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Trece Martires City, Branch 23 in Civil Case Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
No. TMCV-0040-06.
On October 21, 2008, the RTC issued a Decision10 declaring as follows:
Factual Antecedents

In 2006, respondents Jacinto G. Flores and Maximo G. Flores, represented by their brother and
attorney-in-fact Ramon G. Flores, filed a Complaint4 for Recovery of Possession against
petitioners Rodante F. Guyamin (Rodante), Lucinia F. Guyamin (Lucinia), and Eileen G.
The plaintiffs as represented by their attorney-in-fact, Ramon G. Flores when presented in
Court reiterated the allegations in the complaint and presented in evidence the Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-308589 in the names of Jacinto Flores and Maximo Flores (Exhibit
"B"); the tax declaration (Exhibit "C") of the property; and the Certification (Exhibit "F")
issued by Brgy. Justice Lito R. Sarte of Barangay Santiago, Bayan ng Heneral Trias, Cavite.
xxxx
In the case at bar, by a preponderance of evidence, plaintiffs have proven their case.
On September 26, 2006 the Return of Summons by the process server of this Court, Rozanno
L. Morabe, as certified, stated, to wit:
This is to certify that on September 25, 2006 the undersigned cause [sic] the service of
Summons together with a copy of the complaint upon defendants x x x thru EILEEN
GATARIN, one of the defendants, who received a copy of the Summons for all the defendants
who refused to sign and acknowledge receipt of said summons.
This served as a proof of receipt by the defendants of the copy of the complaint upon them.
However defendants filed their answer with motion to dismiss way beyond the reglementary
period on May 28, 2007 which prompted this Court to deny their motion. Defendants, if
indeed having a good defense, could have been vigilant in this case instead of resorting to
delays in the prosecution thereof.
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs as against the defendants herein
and hereby orders, to wit:
1) Ordering the defendants and their respective families and or any other persons
claiming rights under them, to vacate subject parcel of land and deliver the same
peacefully to the possession of the plaintiffs;
2) Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of ₱10,000.00 as
reasonable attorney's fees, ₱5,000.00 as litigation expenses, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.11
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners filed an appeal before the CA which was docketed as CAG. R. CV. No. 92924. On
May 23, 2012, the CA rendered the assailed Decision containing the following
pronouncement:
Aggrieved, the Guyamins filed this instant appeal raising the following assignment of errors:
1. The trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of
cause of action or prematurity;
2. The trial court erred in declaring the defendants in default and proceeding to
receive plaintiffs' evidence ex-parte; and
3. The trial court erred and abused its discretion when it rendered its Decision
favorable to the plaintiffs prior or without the filing of the plaintiffs' Formal Offer of
Evidence.
xxxx
The Guyamins argue that the case should have been dismissed for failure of the Floreses to
give notice or demand to vacate and to observe conciliation process in the barangay. They
further argued that based on the averments in the complaint the Floreses merely reminded
them to vacate but no actual demand to vacate has been given.
In this jurisdiction, there are three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of real
property and one is accion publiciana or the plenary action for the recovery of the real right of
possession, which should be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court when the
dispossession has lasted for more than one year.
After a review of the averments of the complaint, we find that the court-a-quo did not err in
assuming jurisdiction over the case. From the allegations of the complaint it appears that the
land subject of the case was originally owned by the Floreses' grandmother, Damasa Vda. De
Guzman and was later acquired by their mother, Julia Guyan1in who in turn transferred the
ownership of the property to them. Based on the attached Transfer Certificate of Title, the
property was transferred to the Floreses on May 10, 1991. The Floreses averred in the
complaint that since the time the ownership of the property was transferred to them, they have
been reminding the Guyamins to vacate the premises because they wanted to sell the property.
While it is true that the complaint uses the word "reminding" instead of the word
"demanding", it still does not mean that no demand to vacate was made by the Floreses. It is
clear on the records that the Floreses filed a complaint for the Guyamins to vacate the
premises before Office of the Barangay Chairman of Barangay Santiago, General Trias,
Cavite. On the subject line of the complaint the following words are clearly written: "Ukol sa:
Pagpapaalis sa bahay na nakatirik sa lupa na hindi naman kanila" which is clearly a demand to
vacate.
On March 11, 2006 the Office of the Barangay Chairman issued a certificate to file action
because the parties were unable to settle their dispute. Contrary to the argument of' the
Guyamins, the records also show that there was an attempt to settle the issues between the
parties before the Office of the Barangay Chairman.
Anent the second ground raised by the Guyamins, records will also show that Return of
Summons was filed by the Process Server, Rozanno L. Morabe on September 25, 2006
certifying that a copy of the summons was received on September 26, 2006 by one of the
defendants Eileen Gatarin, who received a copy for all the defendants. 12 It was only on May
28, 2007 that the Guyamins filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss, or more than 8 months
after receiving the summons, hence the court-a-quo did not commit any error in declaring the
Guyamins in default.
As to the last error raised, it is settled that for evidence to be considered, the same must be
formally offered. However, in People v. Napat-a, the Supreme Court relaxed the foregoing
rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court
provided the following requirements are present, viz: first, the same must have been duly
identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in
the records of the case.
In the instant case, we find that the requirements have been satisfied. The exhibits were
presented and marked during the ex-parte hearing of August 7, 2008. Therefore,
notwithstanding the fact that exhibits "A" to "F" were not formally offered prior to the
rendition of the Decision in Civil Case No. TMCV-0040-06 by the court-a-quo, the trial court
judge committed no error when he admitted and considered them in the resolution of the case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated October 21, 2008 of the Regional
Trial Court of Trece Martires City in Civil Case No. TMCV-0040-06 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.13 (Citations omitted)
Hence, the present petition
In an April 23, 2014 Resolution, 14 this Court resolved to give due course to the Petition, which
contains the following assignment of errors:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF CAUSE OF
ACTION OR PREMATURITY.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DECLARING THE PETITIONERS IN
DEFAULT AND PROCEEDING TO RECEIVE RESPONDENTS'
EVIDENCE EXP ARTE.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT VALIDLY RENDERED ITS DECISION
FAVORABLE TO THE RESPONDENTS WITHOUT THE FILING OF THE
FORMAL OFFER OF EVIDENCE. 15
Petitioners' Arguments
In their Petition and Reply, 16 petitioners insist that there is no demand to vacate the subject
property, and the lack of such demand renders the action against them premature; that the
filing of a conciliation case before the barangay captain (or barangay chairman) and the
issuance of a certificate to file action in court cannot take the place of the required notice to
vacate; that only Rodante was made respondent in the barangay conciliation process when
Lucinia and Eileen should have been impleaded as well; that the Return of Summons dated
September 26, 2006 is a sham; that summons was improperly served upon Rodante and
Lucinia through Eileen or by substituted service; that it was impossible for Eileen to have
received the summons and complaint at her residence on September 25, 2006, as she was then
teaching in school; that when summons was served, Lucinia was then abroad, and so summons
should have been made through publication; and that the filing of their Answer prior to
respondents' motion to declare them in default, and the latter's filing of a reply to their answer,
cured the defective answer.
Petitioners add that it was error for the lower courts to have ruled in favor of respondents in
spite of the fact that the latter made no formal offer of their evidence; that respondents'
evidence cannot therefore be considered, since it is a settled maxim that "courts will only
consider as evidence that which has been formally offered"; 17 that the purposes of a formal
offer are to 1) enable the trial court to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent
is presenting the evidence, 2) allow opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its
admissibility, and 3) facilitate review as the appellate court will not be required to review
documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court; and that the evidence presented ex
parte is insufficient to prove respondents' case, as it failed to show how the latter came into
ownership of the subject property and it failed to prove the identity of the property.1âwphi1
Petitioners thus pray that the CA Decision be reversed and set aside and that a new judgment
be rendered ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. TMCV-0040-06.
Respondents' Argument
Respondents simply point out in their single-page Comment18 that the arguments raised in the
instant Petition have been adequately passed upon by the lower courts; thus, there is no cogent
reason to reverse their decisions.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
The Court notes that petitioners raise purely procedural questions and nothing more. In other
words, petitioners aim to win their case not on the merit, but on pure technicality. But in order
for this Court to even consider their arguments, petitioners should have at least shown that
they have a substantial defense to respondents' claim. There must be a semblance of validity in
their resistance to respondents' Complaint.
However, there appears to be none at all. The fact remains that respondents are the registered
owners of the subject property, per Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-308589 and the tax
declaration in their names; 19 that petitioners are respondents' relatives who have been
occupying the property by mere tolerance and liberality of the latter; that several times in the
past, they have been "reminded" to vacate the property; and that they have failed and refused
to do so, even after the conduct of conciliation proceedings before the Barangay Chairman.
As owners, respondents' substantive rights must be protected in the first instance; they cannot
be defeated by a resort to procedural hairsplitting that gets the parties and this Court nowhere.
The Court will not pretend to engage in a useless discussion of the virtues of adhering strictly
to procedure, when to do so would promote a clear injustice and violation of respondents'
substantive rights. More so when the result would be the same, that is, petitioners would
eventually and ultimately lose their case.
To be sure, while petitioners attached every other pleading filed and order issued below to the
instant Petition, they did not attach a copy of their Answer to the Complaint if only to
demonstrate to this Court that they have a plausible and substantial defense against the
respondents' Complaint. To repeat, this Court will not waste its precious time and energy in a
futile exercise where the result would be for naught; petitioners will not be indulged when it
appears that they have no valid claim in the first place. Quite the contrary, the Court must give
respondents the justice they deserve. As owners of the subject property who have been
deprived of the use thereof for so many years owing to petitioners' continued occupation, and
after all these years of giving unconditionally to the petitioners who are their relatives,
respondents must now enjoy the fruits of their ownership. Respondents have been more than
cordial in dealing with petitioners; they have shown only respect and reverence to the latter,
even to the extent of using less offensive language in their complaint for fear of generating
more enmity than is required. Thus, instead of using "demand", respondents chose "remind".
The parties being relatives and the context and circumstances being the way they are, the
choice of words is understandable. The Court will treat respondents' act as a polite demand;
indeed, the law never required a harsh or impolite demand but only a categorical one.
With the clear realization that they are settling on land that they do not own, occupants of
registered private lands by mere tolerance of the owners should always expect that one day,
they would have to vacate the same. Their time is merely borrowed; they have no right to the
property whatsoever, and their presence is merely tolerated and under the good graces of the
owners. As it were, they 1ive under constant threat of being evicted; they cannot pretend that
this threat of eviction does not exist. It is never too much to ask them to give a little leeway to
the property owners; after all, they have benefited from their tolerated use of the lands, while
the owners have clearly lost by their inability to use the same.
Thus, this Court need only reiterate the CA's pronouncement that there could be no more
categorical demand by respondents than the filing of a case against petitioners before
the Barangay Chairman to cause the latter's eviction from the property. The fact that only
Rodante was made respondent in the conciliation process is of no moment; given the context,
relation, circumstances, lack of a visible defense, and the above pronouncement, this claim of
the petitioners must be treated as undue hairsplitting. This Court's "duty is to dispel any
vestige of doubt rather than indulge in subtle distinctions. "20
Regarding the claim of improper service of summons, the record reveals that the contrary is
true. The court process server's Return of Summons dated September 26, 2006 exists, and
must be presumed regular. The mere fact that the RTC, and even the respondents, requested at
different stages in the proceedings that summons be served once more upon petitioners does
not prove that the service thereof made on September 25, 2006 was invalid; it only means that
the court and parties desire the service of summons anew which was clearly unnecessary. The
claim that Lucinia was then abroad is of no moment either; there is no evidence to support this
self-serving claim.
The filing of petitioners' answer prior to respondents' motion to declare them in default, and
the latter's filing of a reply, do not erase the fact that petitioners' answer is late. Respondents'
reply filed thereafter is, like the belated answer, .a mere scrap of paper, as it proceeds from the
said answer.
Finally, the Court supports the CA's pronouncement that since respondents' exhibits were
presented and marked during the ex parte hearing of August 7, 2008, the trial court judge
committed no error when he admitted and considered them in the resolution of the case
notwithstanding that no formal offer of evidence was made. The pieces of evidence were
identified during the ex parte hearing and marked as Exhibits "A" to "F" for respondents and
were incorporated into the records of the case. As a matter of fact, the RTC Judge referred to
them in his October 21, 2008 Decision. If they were not included in the record, the RTC Judge
could not have referred to them in arriving at judgment.
While it is true that the rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate the
ends of justice, and the swift unclogging of court docket is a laudable objective, it nevertheless
must not be met at the expense of substantial justice. This Court has time and again reiterated
the doctrine that the rules of procedure are mere tools aimed at facilitating the attainment
of justice, rather than its frustration. A strict and rigid application of the rules must
always be eschewed when it would subvert the primary objective of the rules, that is, to
enhance fair tria.ls and expedite justice. Technicalities should never be used to defeat the
substantive rights of the other party. Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Considering that there was substantial compliance, a liberal interpretation of
procedural rules in this x x x case is more in keeping with the constitutional mandate to secure
social justice.21 (Emphasis supplied)
By not attaching a copy of their Answer to their Petition, petitioners are shielding themselves
from a perusal of their defense; in a sense, this is quite revealing of the merits of their claim,
and in another, it is an ingenious scheme that this Court censures. Indeed, they failed to realize
that this Court is not composed of machines that will mindlessly and mechanically solve a
problem at the touch of a button; it will not be forced into motion on petitioners' turn of a key.
They must be reminded that-
The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the
dispensation of justice, but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for
otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial
discretion. That is precisely why courts, in rendering justice, have always been, as they in fact
ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a
backseat to substantive rights, and not the other way around. As applied to the instant
case, in the language of then Chief Justice Querube Makalintal, technicalities 'should give
way to the realities of the situation' .22 (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May 23, 2012 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 92924 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Alfonso Singson Cortal v. Inaki Larrazabal, G.R. No. 199107 August 30, 2017
[ G.R. No. 199107. August 30, 2017 ]
ALFONSO SINGSON CORTAL, JUANITO SINGSON CORTAL, NENITA CODILLA,
GENEROSO PEPITO LONGAKIT, PONCIANA BATOON, AND GREGORIA SABROSO,
PETITIONERS, VS. INAKI A. LARRAZABAL ENTERPRISES, REPRESENTED BY
INAKI P. LARRAZABAL, JR., THE HONORABLE REGIONAL DIRECTOR,
REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VIII, TACLOBAN CITY AND THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, QUEZON CITY IN HIS
CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB), RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Procedural rules must be faithfully followed and dutifully enforced. Still, their application
should not amount to "plac[ing] the administration of  justice in a straightjacket."[1] An
inordinate fixation on technicalities cannot defeat the need for a full, just, and equitable
litigation of claims.
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari [2] under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, praying that the assailed September 30, 2010[3] and September 7,
2011[4] Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04659 be reversed and set
aside, and that the Court of Appeals be directed to give due course to the dismissed appeal of
Alfonso Singson Cortal, Juanito Singson Cortal, Nenita Codilla, Generoso Pepito Longakit,
Ponciana Batoon, and Gregoria Sabroso (petitioners).
The assailed Court of Appeals September 30, 2010 Resolution dismissed petitioners' appeal
under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on account of several technical defects.
First was an inconsistency between the listing of petitioners' names in their prior Motion for
Extension of Time and subsequent Petition for Review, in which the accompanying
verification and certification of non-forum shopping were laden with this same inconsistency
and other defects. Second was the non-inclusion of the original Complaint filed by the adverse
party, now private respondent Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises, before the Regional Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform. And last was petitioners' counsel's
failure to indicate the place of issue of the official receipt of his payment of annual
membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.[5]
The assailed Court of Appeals September 7, 2011 Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration.[6]
Private respondent Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises (Larrazabal Enterprises) owned three (3)
parcels of land in Sitio Coob, Barangay Libertad, Ormoc City: Lot No. 5383-G, with an area
of 7.6950 hectares and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 10530; Lot No.
5383-N, with an area of 5.7719 hectares and covered by TCT No. 10530; and Lot No. 5383-F,
with an area of 8.7466 hectares and covered by TCT No. 16178.[7]
In 1988, these three (3) parcels were placed under the Compulsory Acquisition Scheme of
Presidential Decree No. 27, as amended by Executive Order No. 228. Pursuant to the Scheme,
Emancipation Patents and new transfer certificates of title were issued to farmer-beneficiaries,
petitioners included.[8]
In 1999, Larrazabal Enterprises filed its Action for Recovery of these parcels against the
Department of Agrarian Reform and the petitioners before the Office of the Regional
Adjudicator, Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).[9] It assailed the
cancellation of its transfer certificates of title and the subsequent issuance of new titles to
petitioners. It alleged that no price had been fixed, much less paid, for the expropriation of its
properties, in violation of the just compensation requirement under Presidential Decree No. 27,
as amended. Thus, it prayed for the recovery of these lots and the cancellation of petitioners'
transfer certificates of title.[10]
In their Answer, petitioners denied non-payment of just compensation. They presented
certifications issued by the Land Bank of the Philippines (Landbank) that the amounts of
P80,359.37 and P95,691.49 had been deposited as payments in the name of Larrazabal
Enterprises.[11] They added that since they had paid, the cancellation of Larrazabal Enterprises'
transfer certificates of title, the subdivision of the parcels, and the issuance of emancipation
patents in their favor were all properly made.[12]
In his October 15, 1999 Decision,[13] Regional Adjudicator Felixberto M. Diloy (Regional
Adjudicator Diloy) noted that there was nothing in the records to show that just compensation
was fixed or paid for the parcels.[14] Hence, he ruled in favor of Larrazabal Enterprises and
ordered that it be restored to ownership of the lots.[15]
Petitioners appealed to the DARAB. In its September 16, 2008 Decision, [16] the DARAB
reversed the Decision of Regional Adjudicator Diloy.[17] It ruled that Larrazabal Enterprises'
action, which was filed in 1999, was already barred by prescription and laches, as the assailed
Emancipation Patents were issued in 1988.[18] It likewise gave credence to the certificates
issued by Landbank, which confirmed the payment of just compensation.[19]
Larrazabal Enterprises filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In its September 30, 2009
Resolution,[20] the DARAB reversed its own decision and granted Larrazabal Enterprises'
Motion for Reconsideration.[21] It justified its ruling by saying that Larrazabal Enterprises had
been denied due process when the parcels were taken from it without having been given just
compensation.[22]
Petitioners then filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals. In its assailed
September 30, 2010 Resolution,[23] the Court of Appeals dismissed their Petition for the
following formal errors:
a. the name of Raymundo Claros Codilla was indicated in the Motion for Extension of Time
to File Petition for Review as one of the petitioners, but in the Petition for Review and in
the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, his name was no longer
indicated[;]
b. the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping failed to show any competent
evidence of identity of the petitioners, Alfonso Singson Cortal, Juanito Singson Cortal,
Nenita Codilla, Cenon Baseles, Felimon Almacin Batoon, Rodrigo Panilag Cabonillas,
Generoso Pepito Longakit, Exopiro Limgas Cabonillas, Jose Panilag Cabonillas, Avelino
Panilag Cabonillas, Ricardo Estrera German and Victoria Rosales, at least one current
identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photographs and
signatures of petitioners, in violation of Sec. 2.(2) Rule IV of the Rules of Notarial
Practice[;]
c. petitioners failed to attach the copy of the Complaint filed by respondent Inaki A.
Larrazabal Enterprises before the Office of the Regional Adjudicator, Tacloban City,
docketed as DARAB Case No. E.O. No. 288 (sic); and
d. counsel for the petitioners, Atty. Norjue I. Juego did not indicate the place of issue of his
[Integrated Bar of the Philippines] number.[24]
Following the dismissal of their Petition for Review, petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. In its assailed September 7, 2011 Resolution,[25] the Court of Appeals denied
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
Thus, this Petition was filed.
For resolution of this Court is the sole issue of whether or not the dismissal of petitioners'
appeal was justified by the errors noted by the Court of Appeals.
It was not.
I rules. Procedural rules. are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non
Appeal is the remedy available to a litigant seeking to reverse or modify a judgment on the
merits of a case.[26] The right to appeal is not constitutional or natural, and is not part of due
process[27] but is a mere statutory privilege. [28] Thus, it must be availed in keeping with the
manner set by law and is lost by a litigant who does not comply with the rules.[29]
Nevertheless, appeal has been recognized as an important part of our judicial system and
courts have been advised by the Supreme Court to cautiously proceed to avoid inordinately
denying litigants this right.[30]
II
Procedural rules "are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases [so] [c]ourts and
litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules."[31] They provide a system for
forestalling arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in dispute settlement. Thus, they
are not to be ignored to suit the interests of a party. [32] Their disregard cannot be justified by a
sweeping reliance on a "policy of liberal construction."[33]
Still, this Court has stressed that every party litigant must be afforded the fullest opportunity to
properly ventilate and argue his or her case, "free from the constraints of
technicalities."[34] Rule 1, Section 6 of the Rules of Court expressly stipulates their liberal
construction to the extent that justice is better served:
Section 6. Construction. - These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.
Procedural rules may be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons so as to relieve a litigant of
an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with
the procedure prescribed.[35] This Court has noted that a strict application of the rules should
not amount to straight-jacketing the administration of justice[36] and that the principles of
justice and equity must not be sacrificed for a stern application of the rules of procedure.
[37]
 In Obut v. Court of Appeals:[38]
We cannot look with favor on a course of action which would place the administration of
justice in a straightjacket for then the result would be a poor kind of justice if there would be
justice at all. Verily, judicial orders, such as the one subject of this petition, are issued to be
obeyed. nonetheless a non-compliance is to be dealt with as the circumstances attending the
case may warrant. What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant is to
be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than
for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities.[39] (Emphasis supplied)
Nevertheless, alluding to the "interest of substantial justice" should not automatically compel
the suspension of procedural rules.[40] While they may have occasionally been suspended, it
remains basic policy that the Rules of Court are to be faithfully observed. A bare invocation of
substantial justice cannot override the standard strict implementation of procedural rules.
[41]
 In Spouses Bergonia v. Court of Appeals:[42]
The petitioners ought to be reminded that the bare invocation of "the interest of substantial
justice" is not a magic wand that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural
observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they
are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be
relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.[43] (Emphasis supplied)
In Barnes v. Padilla,[44] this Court relaxed the 15-day period to perfect an appeal to serve
substantial justice; and identified situations justifying a liberal application of procedural rules:
[T]his Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of
life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c)
the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the
party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought
is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
[45]
A petition for review filed out of time was entertained by this Court in Yong Chan Kim v.
People[46] as it considered the strict application of the rules as unjustly depriving the accused of
his liberty. It appeared that no party stood to suffer substantial injury if the accused were to be
extended an opportunity to be heard.[47]
Telan v. Court of Appeals[48] gave due course to a belatedly filed petition. Finding that the
petitioners were assisted by someone who misrepresented himself to be a lawyer, it held that
denying an opportunity for relief to petitioners, despite the misrepresentation, was tantamount
to depriving them of their right to counsel. [49] It underscored that in criminal cases, the right to
counsel is immutable as its denial could amount to a peremptory deprivation of a person's life,
liberty, or property.[50] It stated that the right to counsel was just as important in civil cases:[51]
There is no reason why the rule in criminal cases has to be different from that in civil cases.
The preeminent right to due process of law applies not only to life and liberty but also to
property. There can be no fair hearing unless a party, who is in danger of losing his house in
which he and his family live and in which he has established a modest means of livelihood, is
given the right to be heard by himself and counsel.[52]
III
Judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are appealed to the Court of Appeals
through petitions for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 43 was
adopted in order to provide uniform rules on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies. [53]
Rule 43 appeals shall be taken through the filing of a verified petition for review with the
Court of Appeals,[54] within 15 days from notice of the appealed action.[55]
Rule 43, Section 6 specifies the required contents of Rule 43 petitions:
Section 6. Contents of the Petition. - The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of
the parties to the case, without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or
respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds
relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a
certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together
with certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein and other
supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in
the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the specific material dates
showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein.
Rule 43, Section 7 stipulates that failure to comply with these requisites may be sufficient
ground for dismissing the appeal:
Section 7. Effect of Failure to Comply with Requirements. The failure of the petitioner to
comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other
lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the
documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal
thereof.
IV
In its assailed September 30, 2010 Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners'
appeal for purely formal defects and without discussing the merits of the case:[56]
After a cursory examination of the instant Petition for Review filed by petitioner under Rule
43 of the 1997 Rules in Civil Procedure, the same reveals the following defects:
a. the name of Raymundo Claros Codilla was indicated in the Motion for Extension of Time
to File Petition for Review as one of the petitioners, but in the Petition for Review and in
the Verification and Certification of Non Forum Shopping, his name was no longer
indicated[;]
b. the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping failed to show any competent
evidence of identity of the petitioners, Alfonso Singson Cortal, Juanito Singson Cortal,
Nenita Codilla, Cenon Baseles, Felimon Almacin Batoon, Rodrigo Panilag Cabonillas,
Generoso Pepito Longakit, Exopiro Limgas Cabonillas, Jose Panilag Cabonillas, Avelino
Panilag Cabonillas. Ricardo Estrera German and Victoria Rosales, at least one current
identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photographs and
signatures of petitioners, in violation of Sec. 2.(2) Rule IV of the Rules of Notarial
Practice[;]
c. petitioners failed to attach the copy of the Complaint filed by respondent Inaki A.
Larrazabal Enterprises before the Office of the Regional Adjudicator, Tacloban City,
docketed as DARAB Case No. E.O. No. 288 (sic); and
d. counsel for the petitioners, Atty. Norjue I. Juego did not indicate the place of issue of his
[Integrated Bar of the Philippines] number.[57]
Contrary to the Court of Appeals' conclusion, this Court does not consider these defects to
have been so fatal as to peremptorily deny petitioners the opportunity to fully ventilate their
case on appeal.
IV.A
Rule 7, Sections 4 and 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure articulate the basic rules
concerning the verification of pleadings and their accompaniment by a certification of non-
forum shopping:
Section 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule,
pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and
belief," or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be
treated as an unsigned pleading.
Section 5. Certification Against Forum Shopping. - The plaintiff or principal party shall certify
under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a
sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not
theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or
similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5)
days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of
the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case
without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission
of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute
indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal
actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum
shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute
direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
An affiant verifies a pleading to indicate that he or she has read it and that to his or her
knowledge and belief, its allegations are true and correct and that it has been prepared in good
faith and not out of mere speculation.[58] Jurisprudence has considered the lack of verification
as a mere formal, rather than a jurisdictional, defect that is not fatal. Thus, courts may order
the correction of a pleading or act on an unverified pleading, if the circumstances would
warrant the dispensing of the procedural requirement to serve the ends of justice.[59]
Altres v. Empleo,[60] outlined the differences "between non-compliance with the requirement
on or submission of defective verification, and noncompliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective certification against forum shopping":
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission
of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of
defective certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render
the pleading fatally defective, The court may order its submission or correction or act on the
pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to
swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and
when matters alleged in the petition nave been made in good faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein,
unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction
thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or
presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons".
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners
in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under
reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share
a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one
of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not
by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to
sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on
his behalf.[61] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Thus, in Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation,[62] this Court gave due
course to a petition even if the verification and certification against forum shopping were not
signed by all of the parties. [63] Though there were 25 petitioners in Torres, this Court held that
the signatures of just two (2) of them in the verification were suitable, substantial compliance
considering that they were "unquestionably real parties in interest, who undoubtedly have
sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the Petition." [64] On
the lacking signatures in the certificate of non-forum shopping, this Court noted that the
petitioners have shown that "there was reasonable cause for the failure of some of them to sign
the certification against forum shopping, and that the outright dismissal of the Petition would
defeat the administration of justice."[65]
In Cavile v. Heirs of Clarita Cavile,[66] this Court held that the signing by only one (1) of the
22 petitioners on the certificate of non-forum shopping[67] was substantial compliance as the
petitioners had a common interest in the property involved, they being relatives and co-owners
of that property.[68]
Cavile[69] was echoed in Heirs of Agapito Olarte v. Office of the President,[70] where the
certification of non-forum shopping, signed by only two (2) of four (4) petitioners,[71] was
condoned considering that the petitioners shared a common interest over the lot subject of that
case.[72]
In the same vein, the inclusion of Raymundo Claros Codilla (Codilla) in the Motion for
Extension of Time to File Petition for Review but not in the Petition for Review and in the
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping[73] should not have been fatal to petitioners'
appeal. The defective verification amounted to a mere formal defect that was neither
jurisdictional nor fatal and for which a simple correction could have been ordered by the Court
of Appeals.[74] Petitioners here, too, are acting out of a common interest. Even assuming that a
strict application of the rules must be maintained, the Court of Appeals could just as easily
have merely dropped Codilla as a party instead of peremptorily and indiscriminately
foreclosing any further chance at relief to those who had affixed their signatures.[75]
IV.B
Equally not fatal to petitioners' appeal was their supposed failure to show competent evidence
of identities in their petition's verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
Rule IV, Section 2(b)(2) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice [76] stipulates that a notary
public is not to perform a notarial act if the signatory to the document subject to notarization is
not personally known to the notary or otherwise identified through a competent evidence of
identity:
SECTION 2. Prohibitions.
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document -. . . .
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
Competent evidence of identity enables the notary to "verify the genuineness of the signature
of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act and
deed."[77] Rule II, Section 12 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice elaborates on what is
"competent evidence of identity":
Section 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. - The phrase "competent evidence of identity"
refers to the identification of an individual based on:
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the
photograph and signature of the individual, such as but not limited to, passport, driver's
license, Professional Regulations Commission ID, National Bureau of Investigation
clearance, police clearance, postal ID, voter's ID, Barangay certification, Government
Service and Insurance System (GSIS) ecard, Social Security System (SSS) card,
Philhealth card, senior citizen card, Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA)
ID, OFW ID, seaman's book, alien certificate of registration/immigrant certificate of
registration, government office ID, certification from the National Council for the
Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP), Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) certification; or
(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or
transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the
individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument,
document or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the
notary public documentary identification.[78]
As is evident from Rule IV, Section 2(b)(2) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, the need
for a competent evidence of identity is not an absolute requirement. It is imperative only when
the signatory is not personally known to the notary. [79] When the signatory is personally known
to the notary, the presentation of competent evidence of identity is a superfluity.
Heirs of Amada Zaulda v. Zaulda,[80] which concerned the Court of Appeals' prior
determination that a senior citizen card is not among the competent evidence of identity
recognized in the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, referred to the more basic consideration
that a defect in a pleading's verification is merely formal, and not jurisdictional or otherwise
fatal:
Even assuming that a photocopy of competent evidence of identity was indeed required, non-
attachment thereof would not render the petition fatally defective. It has been consistently
held that verification is merely a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement, affecting merely the
form of the pleading such that non-compliance therewith does not render the pleading fatally
defective. It is simply intended to provide an assurance that the allegations are true and correct
and not a product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in
good faith. The court may in fact order the correction of the pleading verification is lacking or
it may act on the pleading although it may not have been verified, where it is made evident
that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed so that the ends of justice may be
served.[81] (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
In Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. Dela Cruz,[82] the petitioner bewailed the notary
public's failure to "indicate that the affiants were personally known to the notary public, [or to]
identify the affiants through competent evidence of identity other than their community tax
certificate."[83]
The petitioner's objection, while correctly pointing out a deficiency, failed to convince this
Court that a fatal defect existed:
[T]he defect is a technical and minor one; the respondents did file the required verification and
certification of non-forum shopping with all the respondents properly participating, marred
only by a glitch in the evidence of their identity. In the interest of justice, this minor defect
should not defeat their petition and is one that we can overlook in the interest of substantial
justice[.][84]
In this case, the Court of Appeals' bare reference to petitioners' inadequate proof of identity
does not justify the outright denial of their appeal. The Court of Appeals failed to absolutely
discount the possibility that petitioners may have been personally known to the notary public,
especially considering that, by that advanced stage in litigating their claims, they must have
already verified several pleadings, likely before the same notary public.
It is true that the notary public failed to categorically indicate that petitioners were personally
known to him.[85] Coca-Cola demonstrates, however, that even if this were the case, the notary
public's lapse is not fatal. While the circumstances were concededly less than ideal, Coca-
Cola did not obsess on how only community tax certificates were indicated in the verification
and certification of non forum shopping.[86]
This Court elects to be liberal here, as it was in Coca-Cola. Even conceding the lapses noted
by the Court of Appeals, petitioners had not gotten themselves into an irremediable
predicament. This Court repeats that, ultimately, a defective verification is merely a formal
and not a fatal, jurisdictional defect, which could have very easily been ordered corrected.
[87]
 As to the defective certification of non-forum shopping, the greater cause of justice should
have impelled the Court of Appeals, as this Court implored in Altres v. Empleo,[88] to have at
least enabled petitioners to rectify their lapse, rather than completely deny them a chance at
exhaustive litigation by a mere stroke of its pen.
IV.C
Rule 43, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that a verified petition for
review must "be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of
the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true
copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting
papers."[89]
In Quintano v. National Labor Relations Commission,[90] this Court faulted the Court of
Appeals for dismissing a Rule 65 petition on account of failure to include in the petition a
copy of the Complaint initially brought before the Labor Arbiter. Referencing Rule 65's own
requirement that the petition shall be "accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment,
order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non forum shopping,"[91] this Court explained
that appending a copy of an original complaint is not even required:
The Rules do not specify the precise documents, pleadings or parts of the records that should
be appended to the petition other than the judgment, final order, or resolution being assailed.
The Rules only state that such documents, pleadings or records should be relevant or pertinent
to the assailed resolution, judgment or orders; as such, the initial determination of which
pleading, document or parts of the records are relevant to the assailed order, resolution, or
judgment, falls upon the petitioner.[92]
Given this Rule's generic reference to "copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto,"[93] this Court explained that:
The [Court of Appeals] will ultimately determine if the supporting documents are sufficient to
even make out a prima facie case. If the [Court of Appeals] was of the view that the petitioner
should have submitted other pleadings, documents or portions of the records to enable it to
determine whether the petition was sufficient in substance, it should have accorded the
petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice, a chance to submit the same instead of
dismissing the petition outright. Clearly, this is the better policy.[94]
Quintano was echoed in Panaga v. Court of Appeals.[95] There, a petition for certiorari was
dismissed by the Court of Appeals for failure to include an affidavit of proof of service and
after appending only the decisions of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations
Commission.[96] This Court explained that the petition's annexes sufficed as the Labor Arbiter's
decision already recounted the material allegations in the pleadings of the parties and wo4ld
have been enough for the Court of Appeals to determine whether there was a prima facie case.
[97]
Quintano was further echoed in Valenzuela v. Caltex Philippines, Inc.,[98] where this Court
stated that "the failure to submit certain documents, assuming there was such a failure on
respondent's part, does not automatically warrant outright dismissal of its petition."[99]
Quintano equally holds true here, Though Quintano was concerned with a Rule 65 petition
and this case with a Rule 43 petition, the crucial procedural rule here is substantially the same
as that in which Quintano hinged. As with Rule 65's generic reference to "copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto,"[100] Rule 43 also only references
"material portions of the record referred to . . . and other supporting papers."[101]
To be sure, the determination of what is sufficiently pertinent to require inclusion in a pleading
is not a whimsical exercise. Air Philippines Corporation v. Zamora laid down guideposts for
determining the necessity of the pleadings or parts of the records. It also clarified that even if a
pertinent document was missing, its subsequent submission was no less fatal:
First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the petition,
Only those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy
is whether the document in question will support the material allegations in the petition,
whether said document will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to
convince the court to give due course to the petition.
Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended if
it is shown that the contents thereof can also [be] found in another document already attached
to the petition. Thus, if the material allegations in a position paper are summarized in a
questioned judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true copy of the judgment is attached.
Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given due
course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted the
documents required, or that it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided
on the merits.[102] (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
Here, petitioners' failure to attach a copy of the complaint originally filed by Larrazabal
Enterprises before the DARAB should not have been fatal to their Rule 43 petition. Its
inclusion was not absolutely required, as it was certainly not the award, judgment, final order
or resolution appealed from.[103] If, in the Court of Appeals' judgment, it was a material
document, the more prudent course of action would have been to afford petitioners time to
adduce it, not to make a justification out of it for dispossessing petitioners of relief.
IV.D
Through Bar Matter No. 287, this court required the inclusion of the number and date of
[lawyers'] official receipt indicating payment of their annual membership dues to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the current year; in lieu of this, a lawyer may indicate his
or her lifetime membership number:[104]
Effective August 1, 1985, all lawyers shall indiqate in all pleadings, motions and papers signed
and filed by them in any Court in the Philippines, the number and date of their official receipt
indicating payment of their annual membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for the current year; provided, however, that such official receipt number and date for any year
may be availed of and indicated in all such pleadings, motions and papers filed by them in
court up to the end of the month of February of the next succeeding year. [105]
Indicating the place of issue of the official receipt is not even a requirement. While its
inclusion may certainly have been desirable and would have allowed for a more consummate
disclosure of information, its non inclusion was certainly not fatal. As with the other
procedural lapses considered by the Court of Appeals, its non-inclusion could have very easily
been remedied by the Court of Appeals' prudent allowance of time and opportunity to
petitioners and their counsel.
V petitioners. The petitioners consequently sought a reconsideration of the said decision but the
This Court entertains no doubt that petitioners' Petition for Review, which the Court of
Appeals discarded, falls within the exceptions to the customary strict application of procedural
rules. This Court has previously overlooked more compelling procedural lapse, such as the
period for filing pleadings and appeals. The Court of Appeals was harsh in denying petitioners
the opportunity to exhaustively ventilate and argue their case.
Rather than dwelling on procedural minutiae, the Court of Appeals should have been impelled
by the greater interest of justice. It should have enabled a better consideration of the intricate
issues of the application of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, social justice,
expropriation, and just compensation. The reversals of rulings at the level of the DARAB
could have been taken as an indication that the matters at stake were far from being so plain
that they should be ignored on mere technicalities. The better part of its discretion dictated a
solicitous stance towards petitioners.
The present Petition must be granted. The Court of Appeals must give due course to
petitioners' appeal to enable a better appreciation of the myriad substantive issues which have
otherwise not been pleaded and litigated before this Court by the parties.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed September
30, 2010 and September 7, 2011 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
04659 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Court of Appeals is ordered to give due course
to the petition subject of CA-G.R. SP No. 04659.
SO ORDERED.
B. Objective of Procedural laws
Sps. Bergonia vs. CA, G.R. No. 189151, January 25, 2012
G.R. No. 189151               January 25, 2012
SPOUSES DAVID BERGONIA and LUZVIMINDA CASTILLO, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (4th DIVISION) and AMADO BRAVO, JR., Respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by the spouses David
Bergonia and Luzviminda Castillo (petitioners) assailing the Resolutions issued by the Court
of Appeals (CA) on May 18, 20091 and June 29, 20092 in CA-G.R. CV No. 91665.
The petitioners were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Br. 23-749-03 entitled "Spouses David
Bergonia and Luzviminda Castillo v. Amado Bravo, Jr." in the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 23, Roxas, Isabela. On January 21, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision adverse to the
same was denied by the RTC in an Order dated April 25, 2008 which was received on May 6,
2008. On May 7, 2008, the petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal.3
In January 2009, the Law Firm of Lapeña & Associates filed with the CA its formal entry of
appearance as counsel for the petitioners, in view of the withdrawal of the former counsel,
Atty. Panfilo Soriano. The substitution of lawyers was noted in the Resolution 4 dated January
20, 2009. In the same resolution, the CA further directed the appellants therein to remit the
deficient amount of ₱20.00 within 5 days from notice. Thereafter, the CA issued a Resolution
on January 30, 2009 requiring the filing of the Appellant’s Brief within 45 days from receipt.
On April 8, 2009, respondent Amado Bravo, Jr. (the defendant-appellee therein), filed a
Motion to Dismiss Appeal5 dated April 2, 2009 stating that the petitioners failed to file their
Appellant’s Brief within the 45-day period granted to them by the CA in the Resolution dated
January 30, 2009. Citing Section 1 (e), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, respondent prayed for
the dismissal of the petitioners’ appeal.
In an Opposition/Comment promptly filed on April 8, 2009,6 the petitioners alleged that the
Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent had no basis considering that they or their counsel
did not receive any resolution from the CA requiring them to file their Appellants’ Brief
within 45 days.7
On May 18, 2009, the CA issued the assailed resolution8 which reads:
For failure of the plaintiffs-appellants to file the required appellant’s brief within the
reglementary period which expired on 22 March 2009, as per Judicial Records Division
Report dated 05 May 2009, the appeal is hereby considered ABANDONED and is hereby
DISMISSED pursuant to Section 1 (e), Rule 50, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED. (citation omitted)
On May 25, 2009, the CA issued a Resolution 9 which stated, among others, that the January
30, 2009 notice to file brief addressed to petitioners’ counsel was received by a certain Ruel de
Tomas on February 5, 2009.
On June 5, 2009, the petitioners filed a Compliance and Motion for Reconsideration10 praying
that the dismissal of their appeal be set aside in the interest of justice and equity. The
petitioners claimed that their failure to file their brief was due to the fact that they were never
furnished a copy of the said January 30, 2009 Resolution of the CA directing them to file their
brief.
Subsequently, in a Manifestation11 filed on June 16, 2009, the petitioners asserted that their
counsel – the Law Firm of Lapeña and Associates – has no employee in the name of Ruel de
Tomas. However, they explained that Atty. Torenio C. Cabacungan, Jr., an associate of the
law firm personally knows a person named "Ruel" who sometimes visits their office and who
may have accidentally received the said January 30, 2009 Resolution of the CA. In such a
case, the same should not be considered officially served upon them as the latter was not
connected with nor authorized to perform any act for and in behalf of counsel.
On June 29, 2009, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration.12
Undaunted, the petitioners instituted the instant petition for certiorari before this Court
asserting the following arguments: (1) their failure to file their appellants’ brief was merely
due to the fact that they were never properly served with a copy of the January 30, 2009
Resolution of the CA; (2) Ruel de Tomas, the person who apparently received the copy of the
January 30, 2009 Resolution of the CA, was not their employee; and (3) the CA, in the interest
of justice and equity, should have decided their appeal on the merits instead of dismissing the
same purely on technical grounds.
The sole issue for resolution is the propriety of the dismissal of the petitioners’ appeal for their
failure to file the appellants’ brief within the reglementary period.
The petition is denied.
At the outset, this Court notes that the petitioners’ resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court is not the proper remedy to assail the May 18, 2009 and June 29,
2009 Resolutions issued by the CA. In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies
available, a party aggrieved by a court order, resolution or decision must first correctly
identify the nature of the order, resolution or decision he intends to assail.13
It bears stressing that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari can be availed of only if there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 14 On
the other hand, Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court states that an appeal may be taken
from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case or a particular matter
therein.
Concomitant to the foregoing, the remedy of a party against an adverse disposition of the CA
would depend on whether the same is a final order or merely an interlocutory order. If the
Order or Resolution issued by the CA is in the nature of a final order, the remedy of the
aggrieved party would be to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. Otherwise, the appropriate remedy would be to file a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), 15 this Court laid down the following rules to
determine whether a court’s disposition is already a final order or merely an interlocutory
order and the respective remedies that may be availed in each case, thus:
Case law has conveniently demarcated the line between a final judgment or order and an
interlocutory one on the basis of the disposition made. A judgment or order is considered final
if the order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of
the same action; in such case, the remedy available to an aggrieved party is appeal. If the order
or resolution, however, merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be
done to resolve the merits of the case, the order is interlocutory and the aggrieved party’s
remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Jurisprudence pointedly holds that:
As distinguished from a final order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined by the court, an interlocutory order does not dispose of a
case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon. The term "final"
judgment or order signifies a judgment or an order which disposes of the case as to all the
parties, reserving no further questions or directions for future determination.
On the other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory in character if it leaves substantial
proceedings yet to be had in connection with the controversy. It does not end the task of the
court in adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as
against each other. In this sense, it is basically provisional in its application. (citations
omitted)
Here, the assailed May 18, 2009 and June 29, 2009 Resolutions issued by the CA had
considered the petitioners’ appeal below as having been abandoned and, accordingly,
dismissed. Thus, the assailed Resolutions are in the nature of a final order as the same
completely disposed of the petitioners’ appeal with the CA. Thus, the remedy available to the
petitioners is to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with this court and not a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Even if we are to assume arguendo that the petitioners’ resort to the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari is proper, the instant petition would still be denied. A petition for certiorari will
prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist. 16 The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.17 Here, there was no hint of whimsicality or gross and patent abuse of discretion on
the part of the CA when it dismissed the appeal of the petitioners for the failure of the latter to
file their appellants’ brief.
Section 1 (e), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court succinctly provides that:
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. – An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of
Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
xxxx
(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or
memorandum within the time provided by these Rules; x x x
In a long line of cases, this Court has held that the CA’s authority to dismiss an appeal for
failure to file the appellant’s brief is a matter of judicial discretion. Thus, a dismissal based on
this ground is neither mandatory nor ministerial; the fundamentals of justice and fairness must
be observed, bearing in mind the background and web of circumstances surrounding the case.18
Having in mind the peculiar circumstances of the instant case, we find that the petitioners’
excuse for their failure to file their brief was flimsy and discreditable and, thus, the propriety
of the dismissal of their appeal. Indeed, as aptly ruled by the CA, the records of the case
clearly showed that the petitioners, through their counsel, received the January 30, 2009
Resolution which required them to file their appellants’ brief. Thus:
The records of this case are clear that the Resolution of 30 January 2009 requiring the
[petitioners] to file the required brief was received by a certain Ruel de Tomas for
[petitioners’] counsel on 05 February 2009. Hence, mere denial by [petitioners’] counsel of the
receipt of his copy of the Resolution cannot be given weight in the absence of any proof that
the said person is neither an employee at his law office nor someone unknown to him.
Likewise, it is highly implausible that any person in the building where [petitioners’] counsel
holds office would simply receive a correspondence delivered by a postman.19
Verily, the petitioners were only able to offer their bare assertion that they and their counsel
did not actually receive a copy of the January 30, 2009 Resolution and that the person who
apparently received the same was not in any way connected with their counsel. There was no
other credible evidence adduced by the petitioners which would persuade us to exculpate them
from the effects of their failure to file their brief.
The Court notes that, in concluding that the petitioners indeed received a copy of the January
30, 2009 Resolution, the CA was guided by the Report of the Judicial Records Division of the
CA and by the certification issued by the Postmaster of Quezon City. Indubitably, the
petitioners’ bare assertions could not overcome the presumption of regularity in the
preparation of the records of the Post Office and that of the CA.20
Nonetheless, the petitioners cite a cacophony of cases decided by this Court which, in essence,
declared that dismissal of an appeal on purely technical ground is frowned upon and that, as
much as possible, appeals ought to be decided on the merits in the interest of justice and
equity.
The petitioners' plea for the application of the principles of substantial justice in their favor
deserves scant consideration. The petitioners should be reminded that technical rules may be
relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and to benefit the deserving.21 While the petitioners
adverted to several jurisprudential rulings of this Court which set aside procedural rules, it is
noted that there were underlying considerations in those cases which warranted a disregard of
procedural technicalities to favor substantial justice. Here, there exists no such consideration.
The petitioners ought to be reminded that the bare invocation of "the interest of substantial
justice" is not a magic wand that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural
rules. Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-
observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they
are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be
relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.22
In Asian Spirit Airlines v. Spouses Bautista,23 this Court clarified that procedural rules are
required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be
relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed:
We agree with the petitioner’s contention that the rules of procedure may be relaxed for the
most persuasive reasons. But as this Court held in Galang v. Court of Appeals:
Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may
have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be
followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a
litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed.
In an avuncular case, we emphasized that:
Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases.1âwphi1 Courts and
litigants alike are, thus, enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some
instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended
to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the
interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable
causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is
equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to
insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. The instant case is no exception to this
rule.
In the present case, we find no cogent reason to exempt the petitioner from the effects of its
failure to comply with the Rules of Court.
The right to appeal is a statutory right and the party who seeks to avail of the same must
comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost. More
so, as in this case, where petitioner not only neglected to file its brief within the stipulated time
but also failed to seek an extension of time for a cogent ground before the expiration of the
time sought to be extended.
In not a few instances, the Court relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure to
afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. This is in line with
the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance
to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection should, thus, not
serve as basis of decisions. In that way, the ends of justice would be better served. For, indeed,
the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of
contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the
administration of justice. In this case, however, such liberality in the application of rules of
procedure may not be invoked if it will result in the wanton disregard of the rules or cause
needless delay in the administration of justice. It is equally settled that, save for the most
persuasive of reasons, strict compliance is enjoined to facilitate the orderly administration of
justice.24 (citations omitted)
Reiterating the foregoing in Dimarucot v. People of the Philippines,25 this Court stated that:
The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is merely a statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in accordance with the law. The party who seeks to avail
of the same must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to
appeal is lost.
Strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the orderly and speedy
disposition of justice. The Rules must be followed, otherwise, they will become meaningless
and useless.26 (citations omitted)
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DISMISSED.
The assailed Resolutions dated May 18, 2009 and June 29, 2009 issued by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 91665 dismissing the petitioners’ appeal are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
C. Application of procedural laws
BPI vs. CA, G.R. No. 168313, October 6, 2010
G.R. No. 168313               October 6, 2010
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO BARZA, in his capacity as the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Br. 61, FIRST UNION GROUP
ENTERPRISES and LINDA WU HU, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Through the present petition for review on certiorari,1 petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI) seeks the reversal of: (1) the Court of Appeals (CA) decision of November 2, 2004, 2 in
"Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Hon. Romeo Barza, et al." docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
75350 and (2) the CA resolution of May 25, 2005 3 denying BPI’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The assailed CA ruling affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 61 dated August 26, 2002,4 granting First Union Group Enterprises (First Union) and
Linda Wu Hu’s (Linda) Motion to Dismiss dated March 26, 2002. A subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied.5
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
First Union borrowed from BPI the sums of Five Million Pesos (PhP5,000,000.00) and One
Hundred Twenty Thousand U.S. Dollars and 32 cents (USD123,218.32), evidenced by
separate promissory notes.6
As partial security for the loan obligations of First Union, defendant Linda and her spouse
(Eddy Tien) executed a Real Estate Mortgage Agreement dated August 29, 1997,7 covering
two (2) condominium units. Linda executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement dated April
14, 19978 where she agreed to be solidarily liable with First Union for its obligations to BPI.
Despite repeated demands to satisfy the loan obligations upon maturity, First Union failed to
pay BPI the amounts due.
On October 16, 2000, BPI initiated with the Office of the Sheriff of the RTC of Pasig extra-
judicial foreclosure proceedings against the two (2) mortgaged condominium units to satisfy
First Union and Linda’s solidary obligations.
After due notice and publication, the properties were sold at public auction on June 29,
2001.9 BPI was the highest bidder, having submitted a bid of Five Million Seven Hundred
Ninety Eight Thousand Four Hundred Pesos (PhP5,798,400.00). The proceeds of the auction
sale were applied to the costs and expenses of foreclosure, and thereafter, to First Union’s
obligation of Five Million Peso (PhP5,000,000.00). After so applying the proceeds, First
Union still owed BPI a balance of Four Million Seven Hundred Forty Two Thousand Nine
Hundred Forty Nine & 32/100 Pesos (PhP4,742,949.32), inclusive of interests and penalty
charges, as of December 21, 2001.10 Additionally, First Union’s foreign currency loan
obligation remained unpaid and, as of December 21, 2001, amounted to One Hundred Seventy
Five Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four Thousand & 35/100 US Dollars
(USD175,324.35), inclusive of interest and penalty charges.
The Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money
First Union’s and Linda’s continued failure to settle their outstanding obligations prompted
BPI to file, on January 3, 2002, a complaint for collection of sum of money with the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 61.11 The complaint’s verification and certificate of non-forum shopping
were signed by Ma. Cristina F. Asis (Asis) and Kristine L. Ong (Ong). However, no
Secretary’s Certificate or Board Resolution was attached to evidence Asis’ and Ong’s
authority to file the complaint.
On April 1, 2002, First Union and Linda filed a motion to dismiss 12 on the ground that BPI
violated Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules); BPI failed to attach to the
complaint the necessary board resolution authorizing Asis and Ong to institute the collection
action against First Union and Linda.13
On August 7, 2002, BPI filed an "Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss,"14 arguing that the
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping sufficiently established Asis’ and Ong’s
authority to file the complaint and proof of their authority could be presented during the trial.
Further, BPI alleged that a complaint "can only be dismissed under Section 5, Rule 7 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure if there was no certification against forum shopping." The
provision, according to BPI, "does not even require that the person certifying should show
proof of his authority to do so."15
Instead of submitting a board resolution, BPI attached a "Special Power of Attorney" (SPA)
dated December 20, 2001 executed by Zosimo A. Kabigting (Zosimo), Vice-President of
BPI.16 The SPA authorized Asis and Ong or any lawyer from the Benedicto Versoza Gealogo
and Burkley Law Offices to initiate any legal action against First Union and Linda.
In their Comment17 to BPI’s Opposition, First Union and Linda challenged BPI’s reading of
the law, charging that it lacked jurisprudential support.18 First Union and Linda argued,
invoking Public Estates Authority v. Elpidio Uy,19 that "an initiatory pleading which does not
contain a board resolution authorizing the person to show proof of his authority is equally
guilty (sic) of not satisfying the requirements in the Certification against Non-Forum
Shopping. It is as if though (sic) no certification has been filed." 20 Thus, according to First
Union and Linda, BPI’s failure to attach a board resolution "shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for dismissal of the
case without prejudice x x x."21 First Union and Linda likewise questioned the belated
submission of the SPA, which in any case, "is not the board resolution envisioned by the rules
since the plaintiff herein is a juridical person."22
BPI’s Reply23 to the Comment argued that the cited Public Estates Authority case is not
authoritative since "what is proscribed is the absence of authority from the board of directors,
not the failure to attach the board resolution to the initiatory pleading." 24 BPI contended that
the "primary consideration is whether Asis and Ong were authorized by BPI, not the failure to
attach the proof of authority to the complaint."25 BPI also begged the "kind indulgence of the
Honorable Court as it inadvertently failed to submit with the Special Power of Attorney the
Corporate Secretary’s Certificate which authorized Mr. Zosimo Kabigting to appoint his
substitutes."26
On August 22, 2002, the RTC issued its assailed Order 27 granting First Union’s and Linda’s
Motion to Dismiss.28 The trial court denied BPI’s Motion for Reconsideration29 on November
13, 2002.30
Proceedings before the CA
BPI, on February 5, 2003, filed a petition for certiorari 31 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
before the CA. It alleged that that lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint despite the submission of the SPA
and the Corporate Secretary’s Certificate.32
In their Comment to the petition,33 First Union and Linda submitted that the petition is an
improper remedy since an order granting a motion to dismiss is not interlocutory. They
contended that the dismissal is final in nature; hence, an appeal, not a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65, is the proper recourse.
The CA disagreed with First Union and Linda’s contention. The assailed order, according to
the CA, categorically stated that the dismissal of the complaint was without prejudice. 34 As a
dismissal without prejudice, the order is interlocutory in nature and is not a final order.35
The CA, however, found that BPI failed to comply with the procedural requirements on non-
forum shopping.36 Citing Sec. 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the CA ruled that the
requirement that a petition should sign the certificate of non-forum shopping applies even to
corporations since the Rules of Court do not distinguish between natural and civil
persons.37 Digital Microwave Corp. v. Court of Appeals, et al.38 holds that "where a petitioner
is corporation, the certification against forum shopping should be signed by its duly authorized
director or representative."
While the CA did not question the authority of Asis and Ong as bank representatives, the Bank
however failed to show - through an appropriate board resolution – proof of their authority as
representatives. To the CA, this failure warranted the dismissal of the complaint.39
The CA lastly refused to accord merit to BPI’s argument that it substantially complied with the
requirements of verification and certification; BPI only submitted the SPA and the Board
Resolution after it had filed the complaint.40
THE PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS
BPI maintains in the present petition that it attached a verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping to its complaint. Contesting the CA’s interpretation of Shipside v. Court of
Appeals,41 it argues that the Supreme Court actually excused Shipside’s belated submission of
its Secretary’s Certificate and held that it substantially complied with the rule requiring the
submission of a verification and certificate of non-forum shopping as it did, in fact, make a
submission. From this starting point, it now asks the Court to excuse its belated submission.42
BPI likewise contends that it is in a better position than the petitioner in Shipside because the
latter only submitted a secretary’s certificate while it submitted a special power attorney
signed by Zosimo. On this same point, BPI also cites General Milling Corporation v. National
Labor Relations Commission43 where the Court held that General Milling’s belated submission
of a document to prove the authority of the signatories to the verification and certificate of
non-forum shopping was substantial compliance with Rules of Court.
BPI finally urges the Court to reverse and set aside the Decision of the CA and to remand the
case to the RTC of Makati City for further proceedings under the principle that "technicality
should not defeat substantial justice."44
THE RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
In their Memorandum dated September 25, 2009,45 First Union and Linda allege that BPI’s
"position on the submission of the Board Resolution has been one of defiance." 46 BPI’s failure
to submit the required board resolution is not an inadvertence but a wilful disregard of the
Rules and a blatant refusal to heed the order of the RTC. First Union and Linda point to BPI’s
opposition to the Motion to Dismiss as proof of BPI’s wilful disregard. BPI argued in this
opposition that (1) the Rules do not require the presentation of a board resolution, and (2)
proof of such authority need not be attached to the initiatory pleading but can be presented
during trial.47
Further, instead of submitting a board resolution, BPI submitted a special power of
attorney.48 It was only after First Union and Linda pointed out that the submitted special power
of attorney cannot bind a juridical entity did BPI change its position. Only then did BPI claim
that it merely inadvertently failed to submit the required secretary’s certificate.49
This belated change of position, according to First Union and Linda, does not entitle BPI to
the jurisprudential exception established by the Court in Shipside where the Court held that the
relaxation of the rule requiring verification and certification of non-forum shopping is only for
"special circumstances or compelling reasons."50
THE COURT’S RULING
We rule in the respondents’ favor.
This Court has repeatedly emphasized the need to abide by the Rules of Court and the
procedural requirements it imposes. The verification of a complaint and the attachment of a
certificate of non-forum shopping are requirements that – as pointed out by the Court, time
and again – are basic, necessary and mandatory for procedural orderliness.
Thus, we cannot simply and in a general way apply – given the factual circumstances of this
case – the liberal jurisprudential exception in Shipside and its line of cases to excuse BPI’s
failure to submit a board resolution. While we may have excused strict compliance in the past,
we did so only on sufficient and justifiable grounds that compelled a liberal approach while
avoiding the effective negation of the intent of the rule on non-forum shopping. In other
words, the rule for the submission of a certificate of non-forum shopping, proper in form and
substance, remains to be a strict and mandatory rule; any liberal application has to be justified
by ample and sufficient reasons that maintain the integrity of, and do not detract from, the
mandatory character of the rule.
The rule, its relaxation and their rationale were discussed by the Court at length in Tible &
Tible Company, Inc. v. Royal Savings and Loan Association51 where we said:
Much reliance is placed on the rule that "Courts are not slaves or robots of technical rules,
shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be,
conscientiously guided by the norm that on balance, technicalities take a backseat against
substantive rights, and not the other way around." This rule must always be used in the right
context, lest injustice, rather than justice would be its end result.
It must never be forgotten that, generally, the application of the rules must be upheld, and the
suspension or even mere relaxation of its application, is the exception. This Court previously
explained:
The Court is not impervious to the frustration that litigants and lawyers alike would at times
encounter in procedural bureaucracy but imperative justice requires correct observance of
indispensable technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper dispensation. It has long
been recognized that strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the
prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial business.
Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to
suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law is important in ensuring the effective
enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice.
These rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed to provide
for a system under which a suitor may be heard in the correct form and manner and at the
prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they acknowledge.
It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in
the orderly administration of justice. Justice has to be administered according to the
Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality. We have been cautioned and
reminded in Limpot v. Court of Appeals, et al., that:
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the
protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to
propose that substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as often
suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it will result in
prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept is much
misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give both kinds of law, as
complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties.
Observance of both substantive rights is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the
source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
xxxx
x x x (T)hey are required to be followed except only when for the most persuasive of reasons
them may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of
his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. x x x While it is true that
a litigation is not a game of technicalities, this does not mean that the Rules of Court may be
ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of
the issues and their just resolution. Justice eschews anarchy.
In particular, on the matter of the certificate of non-forum shopping that was similarly at issue,
Tible52 pointedly said:
x x x the requirement under Administrative Circular No. 04-94 for a certificate of non-forum
shopping is mandatory. The subsequent compliance with said requirement does not excuse
a party's failure to comply therewith in the first instance. In those cases where this Court
excused the non-compliance with the requirement of the submission of a certificate of non-
forum shopping, it found special circumstances or compelling reasons which made the strict
application of said Circular clearly unjustified or inequitable. x x x [Emphasis supplied.]
This same rule was echoed in Mediserv v. Court of Appeals53 where we said in the course of
allowing a liberal justification:
It is settled that liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations where there may
be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not
subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance
with the rules. After all, rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical
sense; they are used only to help secure substantial justice. [Emphasis supplied.]
To be sure, BPI’s cited Shipside case also involved the absence of proof – attached to the
petition – that the filing officer was authorized to sign the verification and non-forum
shopping certification. In the Motion for Reconsideration that followed the dismissal of the
case, the movant attached a certificate issued by its board secretary stating that ten (10) days
prior to the filing of the petition, the filing officer had been authorized by petitioner’s board of
directors to file said petition. Thus, proper authority existed but was simply not attached to the
petition. On this submission, the petitioner sought and the Court positively granted relief.
In the present case, we do not see a situation comparable to the cited Shipside. BPI did not
submit any proof of authority in the first instance because it did not believe that a board
resolution evidencing such authority was necessary. We note that instead of immediately
submitting an appropriate board resolution – after the First Union and Linda filed their motion
to dismiss – BPI argued that it was not required to submit one and even argued that:
The Complaint can only be dismissed under Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure if there was no certification against forum shopping. The Complaint has. The
provision cited does not even require that the person certifying show proof of his authority to
do so x x x.54
In fact, BPI merely attached to its opposition a special power of attorney issued by Mr.
Kabigting, a bank vice-president, granting Asis and Ong the authority to file the complaint.
Thus, no direct authority to file a complaint was initially ever given by BPI – the corporate
entity in whose name and behalf the complaint was filed. Only in its Reply to the Comment to
plaintiff’s Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss did BPI "beg the kind indulgence of the
Honorable Court as it inadvertently failed to submit with the Special Power of Attorney the
Corporate Secretary’s Certificate which authorized Mr. Zosimo Kabigting to appoint his
substitutes."55 Even this submission, however, was a roundabout way of authorizing the filing
officers to file the complaint.
BPI, interestingly, never elaborated nor explained its belatedly claimed inadvertence in failing
to submit a corporate secretary’s certificate directly authorizing its representatives to file the
complaint; it particularly failed to specify the circumstances that led to the claimed
inadvertence. Under the given facts, we cannot but conclude that, rather than an inadvertence,
there was an initial unwavering stance that the submission of a specific authority from the
board was not necessary. In blunter terms, the omission of the required board resolution in the
complaint was neither an excusable deficiency nor an omission that occurred through
inadvertence. In the usual course in the handling of a case, the failure was a mistake of counsel
that BPI never cared to admit but which nevertheless bound it as a client. From this
perspective, BPI’s case is different from Shipside so that the ruling in this cited case cannot
apply.
Under the circumstances, what applies to the present case is the second paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court which states:
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of
the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case
without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing.
We thus hold that the dismissal of the case is the appropriate ruling from this Court, without
prejudice to its refiling as the Rules allow.1avvphi1
We end this Decision by quoting our parting words in Melo v. Court of Appeals:56
We are not unmindful of the adverse consequence to private respondent of a dismissal of her
complaint, nor of the time, effort, and money spent litigating up to this Court solely on a so-
called technical ground. Nonetheless, we hold that compliance with the certification
requirement on non-forum shopping should not be made subject to a party’s afterthought, lest
the policy of the law be undermined.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitioner’s petition for review on certiorari, and AFFIRM the
decision dated November 2, 2004 of the Court of Appeals, in Bank of the Philippine Islands v.
Hon. Romeo Barza, et al. (CA-G.R. SP No. 75350), and the subsequent resolution dated May
25, 200557 denying BPI’s Motion for Reconsideration. The complaint filed against the
respondents is DISMISSED without prejudice. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
CMTC International Marketing Corp vs. Bhagis International Trading Corp., G.R. No.
170488, December 10, 2012
G.R. No. 170488               December 10, 2012
CMTC INTERNATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
BHAGIS INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Resolutions dated August 19, 20051 and November 15, 20052 of the Former
Special Twelfth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84742.
The facts of the case follow.
Petitioner instituted a Complaint for Unfair Competition and/or Copyright Infringement and
Claim for Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Makati (trial court).3
On February 14, 2005, the trial court rendered a Decision4 dismissing the complaint filed by
petitioner. The fallo of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Complaint for Unfair Competition and/or Copyright
Infringement and Claim for Damages is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to
cost.
SO ORDERED.5
After receiving a copy of the trial court’s Decision, petitioner seasonably filed a Notice of
Appeal before the Court of Appeals (appellate court) on March 4, 2005.6
Thereafter, the appellate court issued a Notice to File the Appellant’s Brief on May 20, 2005,
which was received by the law office representing petitioner on May 30, 2005, stating as
follows:
Pursuant to Rule 44, Sec. 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure you are hereby required to
file with this Court within forty-five (45) days from receipt of this notice, SEVEN (7) legibly
typewritten, mimeographed or printed copies of the Appellant’s Brief with legible copies of
the assailed decision of the Trial Court and proof of service of two copies upon the appellee/s.7
However, despite said notice, petitioner failed to file its appellant’s brief timely. Hence, on
August 19, 2005, the appellate court issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal filed by
petitioner. The full text of said Resolution reads:
Considering the report of the Judicial Records Division dated 17 August 2005 stating that no
appellant’s brief has been filed as per docket book entry, the Court RESOLVES to consider
the appeal as having been ABANDONED and consequently DISMISS the same pursuant to
Sec. 1(e), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.8
Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration with
Motion to Admit Appellant’s Brief,9 which was filed forty-two (42) days late from the date of
its expiration on July 15, 2005.
On November 15, 2005, the appellate court denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
with Motion to Admit Appellant’s Brief. It ruled that one of the grounds by which the Court of
Appeals may, on its own motion or that of the appellee, dismiss the appeal is the failure on the
part of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief within the time
prescribed by the Rules of Court, viz.:
For this Court to admit the appellant’s brief after such wanton disregard of the Rules would
put a strain on the orderly administration of justice.
As held in the case of St. Louis University vs. Cordero, 434 SCRA 575, 587, citing Don Lino
Gutierres & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 61 SCRA 87:
"It is necessary to impress upon litigants and their lawyers the necessity of strict compliance
with the periods for performing certain acts incident to the appeal and the transgressions
thereof, as a rule, would not be tolerated; otherwise, those periods could be evaded by
subterfuges and manufactured excuses and would ultimately become inutile.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration with
Motion to Admit Appellant’s Brief is perforce DENIED.
SO ORDERED.10
Accordingly, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court questioning
the August 19, 2005 and November 15, 2005 Resolutions of the appellate court. Thus,
petitioner presents the following grounds to support its petition:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT SACRIFICED SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN FAVOR OF PROCEDURAL
TECHNICALITIES WITH ITS DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER’S APPEAL FOR FAILURE
TO FILE THE APPELLANT’S BRIEF ON TIME WITHOUT CONSIDERING AT ALL
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER’S APPEAL DESERVED FULL CONSIDERATION
ON THE MERITS.
B. IN THE INTEREST OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE, PETITIONER’S APPEAL SHOULD
BE REINSTATED CONSIDERING THAT THE ERRORS OF THE TRIAL COURT IN
RENDERING ITS APPEALED DECISION ARE EVIDENT ON THE FACE OF THE SAID
DECISION AND MORE SO AFTER AN EXAMINATION OF THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD.
1. The trial court’s ruling that petitioner should have established actual
confusion in the minds of buyers is contrary to jurisprudence.
2. The trial court did not state the facts upon which it based its conclusion
that petitioner’s trademark is strikingly different and distinct from that of
defendant’s.
3. Respondent labeled its products in a manner confusingly similar to that
of petitioner’s.
 4. The trial court erred in finding that respondent did not pass off its
products as that of petitioner’s.11
Simply, the issue to be resolved is the propriety of the dismissal of petitioner’s appeal for its
failure to file the appellant’s brief within the reglementary period.
Petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred in dismissing its appeal, since dismissal of
appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon and the rules of procedure ought not to
be applied in a very technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure substantial justice.
For its part, respondent maintains that the appellate court did not err in dismissing petitioner’s
appeal for its failure to file the required appellant’s brief within the reglementary period. It
stresses that in the absence of persuasive reason to deviate therefrom, rules of procedure must
be faithfully followed for the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious
dispatch of judicial business.
We find merit in the instant petition.
Time and again, this Court has emphasized that procedural rules should be treated with utmost
respect and due regard, since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy
the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of
justice. From time to time, however, we have recognized exceptions to the Rules, but only for
the most compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to the Rules would defeat rather than
serve the ends of justice.12
In Obut v. Court of Appeals,13 this Court reiterated that it "cannot look with favor on a course
of action which would place the administration of justice in a straightjacket, for then the result
would be a poor kind of justice if there would be justice at all. Verily, judicial orders are
issued to be obeyed, nonetheless a non-compliance is to be dealt with as the circumstances
attending the case may warrant. What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-
litigant if to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint of defense
rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities."
The same principle was highlighted in Philippine National Bank and Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Philippine Milling Company, Incorporated, et al.[14 where the Court ruled that
even if an appellant failed to file a motion for extension of time to file his brief on or before
the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals does not necessarily lose
jurisdiction to hear and decide the appealed case, and that the Court of Appeals has discretion
to dismiss or not to dismiss appellant’s appeal, which discretion must be a sound one to be
exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play having in mind the
circumstances obtaining in each case.
Ergo, where strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the petition, the strict
application of the rules of procedure may be relaxed, in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction.15 Thus, a rigid application of the rules of procedure will not be entertained if it
will obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice in the light of the prevailing
circumstances in the case under consideration.
In the instant case, it is apparent that there is a strong desire to file an appellant’s brief on
petitioner’s part.
When petitioner filed its motion attaching therewith its appellant’s brief, there was a clear
intention on the part of petitioner not to abandon his appeal. As a matter of fact, were it not for
its counsel’s act of inadvertently misplacing the Notice to File Brief in another file, petitioner
could have seasonably filed its appellant’s brief as its counsel had already prepared the same
even way before the receipt of the Notice to File Brief.
It bears stressing at this point then that the rule, which states that the mistakes of counsel binds
the client, may not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in outright
deprivation of the client’s liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires. In
rendering justice, procedural infirmities take a backseat against substantive rights of litigants.
Corollarily, if the strict application of the rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote
justice, this Court is not without power to exercise its judicial discretion in relaxing the rules
of procedure.16 ]
Also, it must be stressed that petitioner had no participatory negligence in the dismissal of its
appeal.1âwphi1 Hence, the ensuing dismissal of its appeal was completely attributable to the
gross negligence of its counsel. For said reason, the Court is not averse to suspending its own
rules in the pursuit of justice. Where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the
client of due process of law, or when the interests of justice so require, relief is accorded to the
client who suffered by reason of the lawyer’s gross or palpable mistake or negligence.17
All told, petitioner should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.
Nevertheless, considering that this Court is not a trier of facts, the appropriate action to take is
to remand the case to the appellate court for further proceedings, for it to thoroughly examine
the factual and legal issues that still need to be threshed out.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED, insofar as
this case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings, subject to the
payment of the corresponding docket fees within fifteen (15) days from notice of this
Decision.
Let the records and the CA rollo of this case be transmitted accordingly.
SO ORDERED.