m

THE NATURE OF LANGUAGE

Although the foregoing inquiry into Eckhart's ontology has famil-

iarized us with the basic concepts necessary to understand most of
his favorite spiritual themes, another topic must be addressed before
we can proceed to them. We must consider his conception of lan-
guage. Eckhart's view of language not only sheds additional light on
his ontology and the puzzles still remaining, but also provides a con-
text for understanding such themes as the birth of the Son, the just
man, detachment, and the like. In addition, an understanding of his
attitude toward language should better enable us to comprehend his
use of it, why he often chose to express his thought not only through
the language of the schools, but also through various rhetorical and
poetic means. Underlying all of Eckhart's attempts to describe God
and what is divine in the world is the question of language. What can
it do? What are its limitations? The question of language, more par-
ticularly the question of the relation of universale or general concepts
(e.g., man, table) to the individual concrete objects (e.g., Peter, this
table) already had a long history by Eckhart's time. In the time of
Abelard, at the latest, as a result of his disputes with William of
Champeaux, medieval philosophers had been relieved of any naïveté
they may have had and could no longer simply assume that words cor-
responded to things, and that that was the end of the matter. Thomas
Aquinas offered a via media or common-sense solution which tried
to resolve the differences between the order of things and the order of
the mind, while preserving the validity of language as a generally ade-
quate medium for expressing truth about things. That this solution
did not put an end to the problem is evidenced by the writings of
Eckhart's contemporary, William of Ockham, and by the philosophy
of our own day.
For Eckhart too the question of language, its nature and its limi-

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 66 Meistei Eckhart

tations, had to be of great concern. However, for him it was not so

much a question of how general attributes relate to concrete things as
it was one of how the human mind with its limitations can deal with
the infinite. If one can conclude from his teaching on analogy and on
the unity of being that everything is in a sense infinite, it is equally
clear that he considered it illegitimate to apply the same terms both
to the realm of the infinite and to the realm of creatures as such. The
unbridgeable gap between God and creature must have a correspond-
ing equivalent in language.
The question is by no means tangential. Implicit in the question
about language is this question: Exactly what value does Eckhart put
on his philosophy? What does he think he has achieved when he tells
us that being is God, that creatures are nothing, or that there is
nothing so distinct and indistinct as God and creature? The clearest
indications of what he thinks human thought and its concepts can
achieve are contained in his deliberations concerning the names of
God. How are we to understand the various names given to God by
the authors of the Bible? Do such names really reflect something
truly divine, truly in God? Or are they simply the subjective imagin-
ings of the impotent human intellect?
As might be suspected, we are embarrassed by a wealth of con-
flicting statements and positions if we survey the works as a whole. It
becomes clear, when we examine the various statements, that in af-
fixing to his Tripartite Work the uncompromising dictum esse est
Deus, Eckhart was aware of the questionable character of what he
had thereby achieved. This esse that is God—can it really be grasped
by the human mind through human language? Or does it not rather
resemble the χ in an unsolvable mathematical equation? How can the
nothingness that creatures are grasp the immensity of the God-being?
Eckhart admits readily and often that creatures cannot, but because
man's awareness that he cannot comprehend God is in itself a kind of
knowledge, and because knowledge does not have to be adequate
knowledge to be knowledge of a sort, and finally, because men, in-
cluding biblical authors, do talk about God, the value of applying
names to God has to be discussed.
In both the Latin and the German works the point is frequently
made that God is beyond description. Eckhart's favorite ways of ex-
pressing this in Latin are to call God innominabilis (unnameable), in-
dicibilis (unable to be spoken of), ineffabilis (inexpressible), innar-
rabilis (indescribable), and incomprehensibilis (incomprehensible).
Eckhart sides with those who reject the idea that God is actually
"seen" in theophanies, because such an apparition must take place

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 67 The Nature of Language

through some kind of medium and is not a direct or immediate expe-

rience of God. Because no means or (created) medium has any real
similarity to God, he agrees with those who maintain that God can-
not be adequately grasped through such revelations [In Sap. n. 284;
LW Π, 616-617). God is unnameable because he cannot be measured
(pro immensitate), and we are given some indication of him only
through his external works, but these are far removed from him, in
the realm of dissimilarity (longe in regione dissimilitudinis·, Serm.
IX, n. 96; LW IV, 92). The Israelites were forbidden to make "any like-
ness of anything in heaven or on earth beneath" (Exod. 20:5), and,
Eckhart tells us, the more learned opinion of the day holds that God
cannot be represented through similarity with inferior things in such
a way that the divine essence can be seen in and through itself (In
Exod. n. I l l ; LW Π, 109). In the vernacular sermons we find him say-
ing much the same thing, quoting with approval a meister who said,
"Whoever thinks that he knows God—if he knows anything, then he
does not know God,"1 or, in his own words, after mentioning that
scripture contains many names for God: "Whoever perceives some-
thing in God and attaches thereby some name to him, that is not
God. God is above names and nature." 1 God is sunder namen (with-
out names) and ain logenung aller namen (a denial of all names) and
nie namen gewan (never acquired a name; Pr. 15; DW I, 253, 3 - 4 ) .

Naming God

In the Commentary on Exodus, Eckhart makes the names of God the

subject of a long inquiry.3 However, in contrast to his frequent prac-
tice of boldly stating his own thesis in opposition to the opinions of
learned professors, he devotes much space to refereeing the teachings
of various authorities. This makes more difficult the task of discern-
ing his own opinion. A possible reason for his reserve is that one of
the authorities he referees is Brother Thomas, with whom he tries to
disagree as seldom and as unobtrusively as possible. Nevertheless, if
one has the patience to follow him, one finds that he does arrive at
definite conclusions, conclusions which, as Koch has pointed out, are
much more in tune with the sober conclusions of Maimonides than
with those of the more optimistic Thomas.4 Indeed, the opinion of
Maimonides is given more space than that of any other thinker—
ancient, pagan, or Christian. Because the matter of naming God is so
crucial, we shall examine Eckhart's elaborations in some detail.
In medieval philosophy there are five ways of applying concepts

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 68 Meister Eckhart

or names to God. The first way, that of univocation or its opposite,

equivocation, is generally rejected because univocation would mean
that the name employed had exactly the same meaning when applied
to God as when applied to creatures. This, of course, must be rejected
by anyone whose notion of God contains any philosophical sophis-
tication. Equivocation is equally unsuitable since it postulates that
the name contains two completely separate meanings. Hence, even
though we understood the name when it referred to creatures, it
would offer us no real knowledge when we applied it to God. The sec-
ond way, that of negation, starts with a concept deriving from the
realm of creatures and, because of the limitations or imperfections
implied, denies that the concept can be applied to God. We do not
learn what God is, but we have not merely performed an improduc-
tive mental exercise since we thereby remove certain false attributes
from our idea of God. We learn, for example, that God is not matter
(which is all that "spiritual" really means), that he is infinite, that he
is undivided and indivisible. The third way, that of causality, like the
negative way, urges caution in attributing names to God. If we find,
for example, that what God has created is good or true, we should not
immediately conclude that God is good or true, but only that he is
the cause of goodness and truth. From effects one can draw conclu-
sions about God only insofar as he is their cause, not about what he
really is in himself. And God's effects, as Eckhart has told us, are far
from him in the realm of dissimilarity. The fourth way, that of emi-
nence, begins with a positive attribute observed in creatures, like
wisdom or goodness, and maintains that this same quality really
exists in God but in a higher manner than in the limited and imper-
fect creature. The fifth way, that of analogy, is similar to the way of
eminence but uses the language of analogy. The two ways have in
common that they maintain the validity of attributing the same posi-
tive term to God and creature as long as it is kept in mind that each
possesses this quality in different ways.
Eckhart begins his treatment of God's names by stressing that
several philosophers find God not so much unnameable as beyond
names. Because God contains the perfections of creatures in a more
excellent way, his name is rather omninominabile. This apparent en-
dorsement of the way of eminence is immediately clouded by quota-
tions from Augustine to the effect that all things can be said of God,
but nothing worthy or fitting can be spoken of him (n. 35, pp. 41—42).
After some remarks on Avicenna's calling God esse, which are not
pursued in any detail, Eckhart launches into a long discussion of
Maimonides's advocacy of the negative way and his claim that all

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 69 The Nature of Language

positive words applied to God are partly equivocal. In giving the Jew-
ish philosopher's arguments against positive names, Eckhart adds one
of his own, one that is worth noting because it reveals the perspective
from which he is arguing for the priority of negative names. Mai-
monides states that one way of applying positive names, namely, that
based on a relationship like father or companion, is illegitimate be-
cause such a relationship rests on similarity; but there can be no
similarity between God and creature, which makes this mode of at-
tributing a positive name improper. Eckhart remarks that perhaps a
more ingenious reason for this could be pointed out by noting that a
relationship requires that the things related be two and distinct; but,
as distinct from God, a creature is nothing and thus lacks any basis
for a relationship (n. 40, pp. 45-46). He then observes that Mai-
monides grants that one type of positive attribution is possible: that
of viewing God as a cause. However, God's effects, as Eckhart has as-
sured us, are far from him in the region of dissimilarity. Since this
type of attribution does not touch God as he is in himself but only as
seen through effects, names of God thus derived announce properly
only his works and are not suitable for God himself. The startling
conclusion is that positive names, which would be perfections in
creatures, such as merciful and generous, are not more so in God than
their opposites, such as anger and hate. These are all derived from
God's external activity, from his actions toward creatures, and thus
do not posit any attributes of God as he is in himself (nn. 4 1 - 4 4 ,
pp. 46—49). Part of the reason for this conclusion is no doubt the ne-
cessity of justifying those passages in scripture where God is de-
scribed as angry, hating, and the like. Nevertheless, to the extent that
Eckhart is agreeing with his Jewish colleague here, he is leaning to-
ward a position which severely limits the validity of attributing posi-
tive qualities to God.
In the following sections, in which he takes up the opinions of
Christian thinkers, his attitude seems to be more open toward posi-
tive names. Yet there are also signs that he wishes to exercise caution
and to maintain some distance from advocates of positive names and
that his agreement is more seeming than real (nn. 54-78, pp. 58-82).
Much of the argumentation need not detain us, and in any case would
have to be reproduced almost in its entirety to be understood. How-
ever, it is essential to try to determine the extent to which Eckhart
considered positive names to be applicable to God. Three points de-
serve our attention.
First, in laying down some ground rules he stresses the limita-
tions of human knowledge and the differences between concepts and

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 70 Meister Eckhart

the things they represent. Statements are said to correspond pri-

marily to the concepts contained in them and only secondarily to the
things represented by the concepts. Such concepts arise from acci-
dents or characteristics of the thing and not from the thing as a
substance or what it actually is (n. 55, pp. 60-61). Perhaps more im-
portant to remember when talking about nonmaterial reality is that
all human knowledge has its origin in the senses. The way we know
something and name it depends on our sense perception of it, so that
if we lack one of our senses the corresponding knowledge is also lack-
ing. What we perceive as multiple and distinct, however, must be
utterly one in God (n. 57, p. 62). The conclusion we are supposed to
draw seems to be that we must be careful not to assume that we know
more than we really do about a reality like God, who is so far re-
moved from the humble origins of human knowledge.
This leads Eckhart to a second important question: When we
give God various names which are distinct from each other in our
minds, is there something in God which justifies the multiplicity of
attributes, or is this multiplicity due solely to our way of knowing?
Thomas had taught that this multiplicity had a basis in God himself
and not just in the human intellect in the sense that God's infinite
perfection cannot be captured in any single human concept, and that
this justifies our use of several attributes. 5 Eckhart, however, denies
that there is any basis outside the human mind for the multiplicity of
concepts applied to God and considers it to be entirely due to our
human way of gathering knowledge from and through creatures.
Quoting Maimonides, he declares that God is one in every manner
and in every sense. There is no real or conceptual multiplicity in him.
He then adds, "Whoever sees two or distinction does not see God."6
Probably because of the implications of such statements for Chris-
tian doctrine on the Trinity, this text found its way into the bull of
condemnation under the articles that were suspected of heresy but,
with much explanation, capable of an orthodox interpretation. 7 Again,
Eckhart's arguments seem to be leading him toward a kind of ag-
nosticism, but he assures us that despite God's infinity such distinct
attributes are not false or empty of content when predicated of God,
because something real in God does correspond to them. 8 Neverthe-
less, he seems much less optimistic than the Angelic Doctor about
what such attributes tell us about God.
Finally, the fact that he thinks he can reconcile the opinion of
Thomas with that of pseudo-Dionysius gives further clues to his own
position on positive names. Pseudo-Dionysius, an advocate of the pri-
macy of the negative way, is quoted as saying that negations are true

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 71 The Nature of Language

of God while affirmations are unsuitable (incompactae). Eckhart ex-

plains that what pseudo-Dionysius meant to say was that the way we
attribute affirmative perfections to God is unsuitable since they are
perceived in the imperfect manner in which they are found in crea-
tures, but that the perfections themselves, like goodness, life, know-
ing, and the like, are suitable and true.9 As the editors point out,
Eckhart's argument is simply an excerpt from Thomas.10 One should
not too readily assume, however, that in borrowing his fellow Do-
minican's words he, like Thomas, has become an advocate of the pri-
macy of the way of eminence over the way of negation. First of all,
such a reversal contradicts the general tenor of his argument both be-
fore and after this passage. It seems much more likely that Eckhart
achieved the reconciliation by doing more violence to Thomas than
to pseudo-Dionysius. The modest concession that applying distinct
attributes to God is not totally wrong hardly qualifies Eckhart as a
proponent of the superiority of the way of eminence. We have already
seen him incorrectly assuming that his colleague Thomas agreed
with him in the question on analogy." Second, immediately after
turning pseudo-Dionysius into a Thomist, he brings his considera-
tion of the matter to a temporary conclusion by balancing this recon-
ciliation with quotations from Augustine and Paul to explain that, in
another sense (aliter), affirmations about God are false and unsuit-
able. Augustine is shown to argue that anyone believing that one's
thoughts about God grasp him as he is, is worshiping a false god and
that such thoughts must be abandoned as deceiving. Paul (1 Cor.
13:12) speaks of our seeing now only in a puzzle (in aenigmate) and
only partly (in parte·, n. 78, pp. 81-82).
To understand why Eckhart's posture toward affirmative attri-
butes is so reserved and his endorsement of negative attributes so elo-
quent in contrast to Thomas, who states that the way of eminence
gives us more knowledge of God, we must become aware of what
philosophical doctrine provides the basis for their choices. This doc-
trine can be none other than that of analogy. Thomas can say that we
attain more knowledge of God by conceiving him as good, wise, and
the like, than by the negative way, because his doctrine of analogy
stipulates that the qualities of goodness and wisdom really and prop-
erly inhere in both creature and God, though more properly, of course,
in God. Therefore, when we attribute goodness to God through the
way of eminence, that same goodness which we observe in creatures
is really and positively in God, although in a more eminent or higher
manner, that is, lacking the imperfections and limitations caused by
its being joined to creatures. Thomas would agree with Eckhart that

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 72 Meister Eckhart

all human knowledge arises from the senses, but the implications of
this are not as far-reaching for him. His view of analogy allows him to
consider this fact a reason for qualifying such a transfer of attributes
from creatures to God by saying that they are in God in a higher way.
But the origin of human knowledge will not present him with such a
formidable barrier for knowing God affirmatively as it will Eckhart.
For the latter the attribute will really be in only one of the objects
related by analogy. Health will no more be in urine than it will be in a
stone. And since human knowledge forms concepts with positive at-
tributes from its perception of creatures, it would seem that Eckhart
must conclude that such positive attributes cannot validly be applied
to God. Thus, when he borrows Thomas's distinction between that
which is attributed {id quod) and the manner in which it is attributed
[modus quo) to show in what sense positive attributes are true and in
what sense they are false (n. 78, p. 81), he seems to be assuming, as he
does elsewhere, a nonexistent agreement between Thomas and him-
self. For Eckhart the modus quo modifies essentially the id quod.
That which is attributed is for him really in only one of the analo-
gates, and to call God good is like calling the sun black.
This helps clarify why Eckhart does not share Thomas's opti-
mism concerning positive knowledge of God, but it also seems to of-
fer reasons why Eckhart should reject the possibility of such knowl-
edge utterly and completely. Yet we have evidence in this very discus-
sion of the names of God that Eckhart was not willing to do this.12
And how are we to understand his frequent avowal that God alone is,
properly speaking, being, one, true, and good?13 In searching for solu-
tions to these remaining problems, we must admit that it is difficult
to find texts that address them directly, but from the evidence avail-
able we can put together plausible explanations.
To begin with, although Eckhart frequently states that being,
one, true, good, and the like are properly said of God alone, this does
not necessarily mean that he thought that we are able to grasp the
essential meaning of these terms as they are applied positively to
God. The core of Eckhart's conception of analogy is that God and
creature, as distinct, are too different to be in any proper sense in-
cluded in the same term. Whatever goodness or truth creatures pos-
sess is nothing compared to the goodness and truth of God. Since
such terms are formed by us by means of creatures and apply properly
to creatures, they would seem to lose all value when transferred
across the unbridgeable gap to God. Thus, although at the very begin-
ning of his discussion of the verse from Exodus, Omnipotens nomen
eius (15:3; Almighty is his name) Eckhart asserts that God is in the

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 73 The Nature of Language

proper sense (proprie) almighty (n. 27, p. 32), it is quite a different

question (nn. 34ff., pp. 40ff.) to ask to what extent a human concept is
able to comprehend this truth. In those texts, therefore, where he
maintains that God alone is one, true, good, just, and the like, we
should not assume that he thinks we have an adequate comprehension
of these attributes. Everything said of God affirmatively is therefore an
improper attribution (impropríe¡ η. 44, p. 48), as Maimonides had
written. Even though God alone is really and properly being, one, true,
and good, human concepts are too feeble for us to say that such con-
cepts give us knowledge of God that even approximates the faint inti-
mations of divinity garnered from negative or apophatic attribution.
When, in concluding, Eckhart returns to the question of positive
attributes, he simply gives three reasons why it is false and wide of
the mark ( f a l s u m et incongruum) to apply them to God. First, they
are not in God according to their forms (formaliter) but only through
his power as creator of their forms (virtute). Thus they contain noth-
ing that is formally in God (n. 175, p. 151). Second, perfections do not
exist in things. To attribute to God perfections gleaned from things is
to reduce him, who is pure intellect, to a thing (n. 176, p. 152). Third,
in the order of human thought—and that is what this whole discus-
sion is all about—the esse which actuates an essentia has no positive
attributes added to it. The same must be true of God who is simply
esse (n. 177, pp. 152-153).
Is there any validity at all in applying such concepts to God? Or
are they simply false, like calling the sun black? There are indica-
tions of a softening of this seemingly categorical rejection. First of
all, as we learn from his position on analogy, such human concepts
are, at least, signs pointing to an incomprehensible reality beyond.
Like urine pointing to health and the tavern wreath pointing to wine,
the positive contents of concepts are symbols of the divinity. Only if
we think they are somehow adequate is it like calling the sun black.
And yet, if affirmations about God are merely symbolic, if they are
just signs, are they really in any sense analogous terms? Or are they
simply equivocal, having no more real connection to God than their
opposites?
There is some evidence that Eckhart does not think that affirma-
tions exhaust their function completely as signs of the divinity, al-
though this is clearly a large part, perhaps the largest part, of what
they do, and although he considers them of less value than apophatic
or negative attributes. Positive attributes are equivocal, but only
partly so. They are partly equivocal and partly spoken of God imper-
fectly [in imperfectione·, n. 178, p. 153). How, one might then ask,

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 74 Meister Eckhart

does this view really differ from that of Thomas, who says that God is
good, just, and the like in a higher manner (eminentius) than crea-
tures? The difference is apparently great, because Eckhart borrows
this line of argument from Maimonides in order to show that positive
attributes are inappropriate when applied to God and not, as Thomas
maintains, to show that they give us more knowledge of God than
negative attributes. However, he does assign positive concepts a role
in our knowledge of God, modest though it be. They provide the
knowledge that must be overcome in order to achieve negative at-
tribution. Borrowing the phrase from Thomas that all negation must
have a basis in affirmation, he explains that we must know what a
body is before we can intelligently say that God is noncorporeal or
spiritual (nn. 181—183, pp. 155-158). Positive concepts furnish the
content that is then denied God in apophatic attribution. Thus, posi-
tive attributes contribute in an essential way to human knowledge
of the divine, but not in the same measure as negative attributes.
They are the smaller of the two steps of a dialectic in which we posit
them only to deny them, in· order to achieve some hint of what the
divinity is.
What about general perfections, that is, positive attributes that
do not imply negation? God is in a proper sense almighty, good, just,
and the like, but because of Eckhart's conception of analogy he must
conclude that, to the extent that these are positive attributes and not
merely concepts which deny limits or imperfections in God, we have
no access to their essential meaning because our concepts of good-
ness and power are derived from creatures. Knowing God as good or
true does not remove this barrier blocking our view of him. We re-
main, as it were, on one side of a wall with only the faintest indica-
tion of what is on the other side.

Unum and Esse

Eckhart often shows a preference among the general perfections in

naming God. In such cases it is either esse or unum that is so hon-
ored. In the Commentary on Exodus we are given a reason for this
preference. It is not so much as positive attributes that they name
God. Rather, they function more properly and bring us further in our
search for knowledge of the divinity when employed according to the
negative way. This is clearly stated in the case of unum, though the
brevity here requires that we first examine more elaborate comments
in the Commentary on Wisdom (nn. 144-149; LW II, 481-487),

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 75 The Nature of Language

where Eckhart concludes by maintaining that "one" is more appro-

priately attributed to God than "good" or "true." 14 The attribute
unum is indistinct from number as well as distinct from number.
That is to say, it is not a number. Hence, both as distinct and indis-
tinct, unum is determined by negation. It is infinite and, in contrast
to verum and bonum, adds nothing positive to esse, not even concep-
tually (secundum rationem), but only a negation (secundum nega-
tionem). Unum signifies the purity, the core, or the summit of esse,
which the word esse itself does not do. What is negated when one
applies unum to God? Nothing. One negates that the nothing (nihil)
which is the opposite of esse can be predicated of God in any way. In
excluding the predicate nihil from God, unum denies that there is
any lack in God. Unum therefore expresses the highest possible form
of the negative way. It negates the possibility of there being anything
negative or lacking in God. This is the famous negation of negation
which comes closest of all to saying something about God [In Sap.
n. 148; LWII, 486). This negatio negationis is the only possible nega-
tion of God and is identical with unum when unum is employed ac-
cording to the negative way. Here negation turns into its opposite and
becomes "the purest and fullest affirmation: Ί am who am.'" 15
This last sudden transition to pure and complete affirmation
might at first glance seem to indicate that the leap from unum to esse
is at the same time a conversion from the negative way to that of posi-
tive attribution, but this is not the case. As we have explained above,
esse is properly attributed to God rather than to creatures, but be-
cause of his conception of analogy, Eckhart must conclude that the
positive content of esse as understood by the human intellect from
its knowledge of creatures has only a slight connection to God's esse.
What he wishes to say by calling sum qui sum the purest affirmation
is something else. Just previous to this paragraph he states as a condi-
tion of human knowledge the Aristotelian dictum that the truth of
an affirmative proposition consists in the identity of terms (n. 73,
p. 75). Thus when God says of himself ego sum qui sum, the re-
duplication of sum or, in other words, stating that esse is esse ex-
presses the perfect identity of himself with himself and is the purest
affirmative statement possible. This statement or affirmation is true
regardless of whether esse is a positive or negative attribution.
One might also ask whether the pure affirmation attained through
the negation of negation is not really just another way of stating the
way of eminence which Eckhart is, in fact, here endorsing. After all,
his claim that God is not esse but rather the purity of esse seems
difficult to distinguish from the statement that God is esse in a more

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 76 Meister Eckhart

eminent manner than creatures are. The difference is crucial for

understanding what Eckhart attempts to express through the nega-
tive way. The way of eminence, as we have seen, depends for its valid-
ity on both the objects joined by analogy really possessing the quality
in question. This quality must be in some sense the same in both as
well as different. This requirement does not hold true for the affirma-
tion gained from the negation of negation. In negating the limitation
of distinctness in calling God one, or in denying the esse of creatures
to God when calling him the purity of being, one does not maintain
that a positive quality found in creatures is in God in any real sense.
The imperfections and limitations found in creatures, and thus in
their positive attributes, are removed from the notion of God but are
not replaced by any other positive attributes.
When we come to examine just what kind of word Eckhart con-
siders esse to be in stating esse est Deus, we note that he gives clear
indications of considering esse much more effective as a negative at-
tribute than as a positive attribute in giving some sense of the divine
reality. In the Commentary on Exodus, when he returns to the ques-
tion of naming God and turns his attention to the Hebrew names and
their implications (nn. 144-184; LWII, 130-158), he reopens the dis-
cussion of the relative merits of positive and negative attributes, this
time giving only reasons that speak against the former (nn. 144—177)
and for the latter (nn. 178-183), as we have mentioned. Two names
receiving special consideration are the tetragrammaton, the name of
four letters,16 and the name qui est (he who simply is) or esse, which
emerged from Christian interpretations of ego sum qui sum. The fact
that they are discussed without criticism in such close proximity to
his clear statements on the merits of negative names is reason enough
to assume that Eckhart considered them to be negative. This inter-
pretation is further supported by the way in which he describes them.
The tetragrammaton, he tells us, "whatever it is and whatever the
four letters might be from which it has its name, is hidden, secret,
and is itself the inexpressible name of the Lord. This tetragrammaton
is not the name itself about which we are now talking, but is rather a
circumlocution of four letters for a certain name which is a holy mys-
tery." It is never spoken aloud, but is "inexpressible by nature and be-
cause of its purity, as is the substance of God which it signifies." 17
Since this name signifies the divine substance, its meaning is not
shared in any way with creatures (n. 147, p. 132). From all this it is
clear that the justification of the tetragrammaton as an apt name for
God is based upon its remoteness from positive speech.

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 77 The Nature of Language

A few pages later he begins his remarks on the preeminence of

"who is" or esse and cautiously suggests that perhaps esse is the
name of four letters since it actually has four letters and many hidden
(actually hiding) properties and perfections. It does not derive from
God as cause, nor does he share this name with anyone.18 Eckhart just
briefly mentions this tantalizing possibility of the identity of the two
names and prefers to take the case no further. However, this echoes
the view he expressed in the First Parisian Question—that in saying
sum qui sum and thereby, through reduplication, affirming that he is
the purity of being, God was actually hiding his identity rather than
revealing it." To support the claim of preeminence for esse, Eckhart
offers another argument which would seem to indicate its nature as a
negative name: esse is indistinct from all other names. Just as crea-
tures, as distinct from esse, are nothing and are insofar as they are
not distinct from God as esse, so the names of God can only over-
come the impotence of their positive, analogous meanings when they
are predicated of God by being subsumed into esse conceived nega-
tively as indistinct from them (n. 166, p. 146). Only in its function as
a negative attribute is esse able to include all other names. Precisely
as innominabile does esse become the nomen omninominabile pro-
claimed of God at the beginning of the discussion (n. 36, pp. 41—42).
Thus Eckhart is quite consistent when he concludes by stating the
general consensus among authorities that we cannot know what God
is, but only that we do not know him (n. 184, p. 158).
In summarizing Eckhart's conception of what the term esse, the
most central in his thought, means for man in his attempt to know
something of God, we can say that he considered it both a positive
and a negative attribute. However, the value of esse as a positive at-
tribute of God is less than esse as a negative attribute. As a positive
name for God, it is weak. Just as is the case with the other general
perfections such as true, good, and just, it is most properly a sign or
symbol pointing to a quite different reality, like the tavern wreath
pointing to wine. The reality symbolized is immense and beyond
human comprehension. Hence it is difficult to attribute to the human
concept, drawn entirely from a knowledge of creatures, a function be-
yond that of arbitrary sign for this infinite reality. And yet Eckhart
seems unwilling, in spite of his doctrine of analogy, to see in such a
concept only a sign and nothing more. It does express something that
is in God at least by virtue of his creative power (virtute) even if
it does not touch what he really is in himself. And through being
posited of him in order to be rejected as a means of attaining essential

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 78 Meister Eckhart

knowledge, it does seem to attain a slight grasp of him beyond the

merely symbolic.
What then does it mean to say esse est Deus2. It may be true that
esse is God and creatures a mere nothing, but this reflects the true
state of things rather than our positive knowledge of God. Our posi-
tive knowledge of esse corresponds more to the nothingness that the
being of creatures is. Understood in this sense, esse is something one
must try to get beyond. As a negative attribute, esse, the nomen in-
nominabile (unnameable name), must be conceded greater validity.
Precisely as esse does God remain hidden within himself beyond our
reach, and esse is the name which as nondistinct from other names
contains the hidden perfections of God. Taken positively and nega-
tively at the same time, it becomes the nomen omninominabile
(name including all names) which points paradoxically to what is
best approached by saying what it is not.

Further Evidence of Eckhart's View of Language

There is a wealth of evidence that the conclusions reached in the
Commentary on Exodus concerning the preeminence of the negative
way and the basic impotence of positive concepts of the human mind
when applied to God are decisive throughout Eckhart's works, even
though some passages might remain puzzling. In the Commentary
on John, for example, Eckhart assures us that we have a much better
idea of what God is not and where he does not dwell than what he is
and where he dwells. This statement is followed by some examples of
negative determinations: that God is not in time, that he is not in
division, that he is not in quantity, that he is not in anything that is
distinct, and so forth [In foh. n. 206; LW III, 173-174). God is one
because he is known by negation and is indistinct. He is incompre-
hensible (Serm. XXXVII, n. 375; LW IV, 320). One also finds in the
Latin sermons references to God's being unnameable (innominabilis-,
Serm. LV, 4, n. 547; LW IV, 458) or, because of his nature, unable to be
spoken [ex sui natura indicibilis; Serm. IV, 2, n. 30; LW IV, 31). He is
above every name, reason, and intellect [super omne nomen, ra-
tionem, et intellectum-, Serm. VIII, η. 84; LW IV, 80). He is unname-
able because we cannot measure him [pro immensitate sui) and
because he reveals himself to us only through his works, which are
far from him [longe] and bear no similarity to him [in regione dis-
simili tudiniS) Serm. IX, n. 96; LW IV, 92). At the same time, God can
be called all names ( omninominabilis) because he is above all names

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 79 The Nature of Language

and above all "one," that is, he is indistinct from everything else, and
thus precontains every name (praehabet omne nomen-, In Gen. I,
n. 84; LW I, 243-244).
Two vernacular sermons contain particularly interesting pas-
sages concerning "one" as applied to God. In the first, after explain-
ing that the human intellect perceives God as he is pure being (ein
lùtei wesen) and transcendent being [ein iibeiswebendez wesen),
Eckhart adds that being, goodness, and truth are equal in the breadth
of their application, that insofar as something is being, it is also good
and true. He then continues:

They [the professors] take goodness and put it on top of being: this
covers over being and makes a skin for it, for it is an addition. Then
they take him [God] as he is truth. Is being truth? Yes, for truth is
bound to being, for he said to Moses: "He who is has sent me" (Exod.
3:14). St. Augustine says: the truth is the Son in the Father, for truth
is bound to being. Is being truth? If one were to ask many professors
about this, they would say "Yes!" If one had asked me, I would have
said "Yes!" But now I say "No!" For truth is also an addition. Then
they take him as he is one. One is more properly one than what is
united [i.e., "united" implies the joining of two things]. That which
is one has had everything else removed. Yet what has been removed
has been added in the sense that it determines something as other.
And if he is neither goodness nor being nor truth nor one, what
is he then? He is nothing of anything (nihtes niht), he is neither this
nor that. Any thought you might still have of what he might be—he
is such not at all.20

The preacher is here trying to clarify our notion of God by purifying

it of all additions and, as we might expect from his conclusions in the
Commentaiy on Exodus, he elevates "one" above "good" and "true"
because it removes all (positive) additions. But here "one" is under-
stood to imply a possible positive quality in that it posits the object
to which it is attached as different from all else (divisum a quolibet
alio). Hence he finds it necessary to distinguish this concept of "one"
from the purely negative "one" or negation of negation (nihtes niht)
by which one achieves a higher notion of the divinity.
In a second sermon, Eckhart emphasizes the "one" of the way of
negation and the resulting indistinctness of God as the basis for the
oneness of creatures with God:

A learned teacher says: one is a negation of negation. If I say that God

is good, this adds something to him. One is a negation of negation
and a denial of denial. What does one mean? One indicates that to
which nothing is added. The soul perceives the divinity as it is pu-

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 80 Meister Eckhart

rifìed in itself where nothing is added, not even in thought. One is

the negation of negation. All creatures have a negation within them.
One creature denies that it is another creature. One angel denies that
it is another. But God has a negation of negation. He is one and ne-
gates everything else, for outside God nothing is. All creatures are in
God and are his very divinity, and this means the fullness I men-
tioned before. He is one Father of the whole divinity. I say, therefore,
one divinity because nothing has as yetflowedout, and nothing has
at all been touched or thought. In denying something to God—for
example, if I deny him goodness—of course I cannot deny anything
to him—in denying something to God I grasp something of him,
namely, what he is not. Even this has to be removed. God is one, he is
the negation of negation.21

Turning from his remarks on unum to some concerning esse, we

find Eckhart, in a variant version of the First Commentary on Gene-
sis, taking the position that esse does not reveal but rather hides
God's nature. After discussing the paradox which Augustine had
called attention to—that in calling God ineffable we in fact do say
something about him—Eckhart creates a paradox of his own. It is re-
markable that we should seek God's name, because his nature is hid-
den esse [cuius natura est esse absconditum·, nn. 298-300; LW I,
95-96). In German Sermon 83 he calls God nameless and denies that
he can be called good, better, or best because "these words are far
from God." For the preacher to say that God is wise is untrue. He
himself is wiser than God. He then introduces the term wesen into
the discussion, claiming it is untrue that God is ein wesen. In an
almost untranslatable formulation which combines metaphysics,
rhetoric, and poetry, he describes God as "ein vber swebende wesen
vnd ein vber wesende nitheit" (literal translation: an oversoaring
being and an overbeing nothingness). Leaving aside the verbal effects
achieved by the repetition of vber, the parallelism with contrast of
swebende and wesende, and the climax-anticlimax effect of nitheit,
we see that he first raises the wesen of God to let it soar above all else
and then immediately calls this phrase into question by raising him
yet further above wesen to nothingness. Shortly thereafter he repeats
the juxtaposition of being and nothingness, adding a negative modi-
fier to both. The goal he urges his audience to reach is to understand
together with God his (God's) "vngewordene istikeit vnd sin vnge-
nanten nitheit" (literal translation: uncreated is-ness and unnamed
nothingness; DW III, 441,1-443,7). Such descriptions gain in force
what they lack in precision. Nevertheless, their meaning is clear
enough. For us, God in his being remains hidden and essentially
unnameable.

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 81 The Nature of Language

One finds passages in the vernacular sermons which seem to in-

dicate that the soul can achieve a more vital and intimate knowledge
of God than what can be achieved through the way of negation. Such
knowledge is often connected with the highest power of the soul. In
Sermon 11 this power is described as "so lofty and noble that it per-
ceives [nimet] God in his own bare being" [in sînem blôzen eigenen
wesen) and "in his dressing room" (i.e., naked, in sînem kleithûs-,
DW 1,182,10; 183,4). A closer look at these formulations reveals that
they are based on the way of negation. God is seen stripped of the
clothing of positive terms which more hide than enhance his being.
At the same time, it must be admitted that such descriptions of the
soul's knowledge imply an intensity of experience beyond what one
would normally attribute to the mind's activity in logically removing
positive qualities applied to God. There seems to be an intuitive side
to such knowledge which in some sense crosses the barrier erected by
Eckhart's view of analogy and his predilection for the way of ne-
gation. In Sermon 9 he states that the intellect "pulls off God the
covering of goodness and perceives him bare, as he is stripped of good-
ness and being and of all names."21 In Sermon 7, where knowledge is
subordinated to baimheizicheit, which is not mercy or compassion
but rather the union of God and soul beyond knowledge, he describes
such activity as a breaking through: "Knowledge breaks through
truth and goodness and falls upon pure being and perceives God bare,
as he is without names.""
If the theologian and professor shows a clear preference for the
way of negation, the popular preacher frequently shows a preference
for images in order to convey his notion of God; and these images fre-
quently perform functions similar to terms used for the way of nega-
tion. In describing God as the final end and place of rest for all being,
he calls God "the hidden darkness of the eternal godhead" which "is
unknown, was never known, and never will be known" (diu ver-
borgen vinstemisse der ewigen gotheit und ist unbekant und wart
nie bekant und enwirt niemer bekant-, Pr. 22; DW I, 389, 3-8). The
loftiest power of the soul does not seek God as he is goodness or
truth: "it seeks in the depths and keeps on seeking and perceives God
in his oneness and in his solitude; it perceives God in his desert
wilderness and in his own ground."24 This combination of einunge
(oneness) and einoede (solitude) is certainly intentional. One can
hardly imagine a more striking word for the concept unum than
einoede, with its mixture of oneness and emptiness. Wiiestunge (des-
ert wilderness) reinforces the negation that oede effects. Grunt, a fa-
vorite expression of the preacher to describe the place of union, while

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 82 Meister Eckhart

not without some positive connotations, has no strict equivalent

in scholastic Latin and has the advantage of remaining general, or in-
distinct, and concrete at the same time. But to balance any positive
connotations grunt might have, we can return to the passage from
Sermon 7 quoted above, where the intellect is said to attain God as
pure being and without names. On the one hand, Eckhart wishes here
to praise the excellence of the intellect over the will, which in loving
God perceives God covered over with a skin or piece of clothing,
whereas the intellect perceives God "as he is known to it," that is, as
pure or bare being. To make clear the limitations of human knowl-
edge, however, he admits that it can never grasp God "in the sea/
ocean of his bottomlessness" [in dem mer sîner gruntlôsicheit·, DWI,
123, 1—3). If God has a grunt, it can only be described as gruntlôs.
What about knowledge in a mystical state? What about Paul,
who by grace was raised up to the third heaven and saw things that
one cannot and may not express (2 Cor. 12:2—4)? Eckhart assures us
that Paul was not able to put into words what he saw. One can only
understand something through its cause, through its limited manner
of existing, or through its external effects. God is neither caused, nor
is he limited, nor in his hidden stillness does he work; that is, the
immanent activity/stillness within the divinity has no external
effect. Therefore God remains unknown (unverstanden) and without
names (sunder namen, Pr. 80; DW III, 381,1-382,1). Whatever Paul
experienced changes nothing about Eckhart's basic thesis that God,
as he is in himself, cannot be named.

Summary
In summary we can note that, concerning the nature and validity of
concepts and language, Eckhart shares the starting point of Aristo-
telian scholastic thinkers that all human knowledge begins with the
apprehension of material things through the senses. However, since
there is no real positive similarity between God and creatures, and
since there are therefore no concepts that express a positive quality
that is really in a proper sense in both, our words are doomed to utter
inadequacy in trying to express something about God. Even such
simple terms as "good," "just," and the like, which might seem suit-
able for building a conceptual bridge, contain more error than truth
when applied to God. At the same time, Eckhart can maintain that
only God is being, truth, goodness, and that creatures as distinct from
him are none of these. Our creaturely and distinct language shares

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 83 The Nature of Language

our nothingness. Concepts like being, truth, and goodness in no way

express what God is really like. Rather, they merely point to or hint
at what he is, just as a tavern wreath points to wine without having
any similarity to wine. Because of the overwhelming disproportion
between what our concepts express and what God is, it is literally
true to say that calling God good is like calling the sun black. Because
the positive concepts we apply to God have no foundation in the utter
oneness of God and are derived from God's effects in creatures and not
from his nature, one positive name will not necessarily exclude its
opposite.25 As a consequence, one can accomplish more by establish-
ing what God is not, by removing imperfections and limitations from
our notion of him. This frees a positive core which we cannot grasp.
When all this has been said, does Eckhart really present us with a
unified and coherent view of language which clearly defines its capa-
bilities and limitations? More particularly, does his view of language
when applied to God in any way get beyond a kind of agnosticism
about God's nature? Does his view of analogy not logically lead to our
having to consider words applied to God and creature as being, in fact,
equivocal and thus really meaningless in what they tell us about
God? Two ways of treating this question seem appropriate. First of
all, to grant that the Dominican thinker did not completely solve the
problem of speaking about God in human language is hardly to admit
something shameful. The question could be posed (and often has
been posed) whether his colleague Thomas was any more successful
in dealing with the problem. Many scholars would answer that, in
stipulating in his doctrine of analogy that both God and creature
really ( formaliter) possess the quality expressed in a word like "good"
or "true," Thomas had merely shifted the problem to different ground:
How is it possible for both an infinite God and a lowly creature to
possess what is, in any real sense, the same attribute? Moreover, the
related questions raised by philosophers in subsequent centuries, and
particularly those raised most recently about the nature of communi-
cation and the impotence of language, indicate that the dimensions of
the problem have grown, but not our capacity to solve it. But to re-
spond only in this vein is to practice evasion. We must therefore, in
concluding, state his view briefly but with balance.
What evidence is there, then, for saying that for Eckhart words
like "good" or "true" really do have some meaning when applied to
God? Two lines of thought in his works indicate the illegitimacy of
concluding that he considered positive terms absolutely meaningless
or nothing but purely arbitrary signs when used to show something
about God. First, as already mentioned, positive terms provide the

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 84 Meister Eckhart

basis for apophatic description by furnishing the quality to be denied

God. While this does not take us far, it does seem to mitigate the
strictness with which Eckhart considered positive terms equivocal.
Second, we have seen that Eckhart does admit that positive terms cor-
respond to something in God. Because of the importance of this ad-
mission, it does not seem superfluous to quote from a Latin sermon
in which it is repeated:

In summary, note that everything which is written or said about the

blessed Trinity is not at all really that way or true. [And this is so]
first of all, because of the nature of the division between especially
distinct and indistinct, between the things of time and those of eter-
nity, between sensible and spiritual heaven, and between a material
and a spiritual body. Second, [this is so] because God is in and of his
nature inexpressible. This is why the psalmist says: "Every man is a
liar." It is true, however, that there is something in God that corre-
sponds to the Trinity which we enunciate and also [something that
corresponds] to other similar things.26

This final sentence clearly expresses the preacher's unwillingness to

consider positive terms absolutely meaningless when applied to God.
Something in God does correspond to them. But beyond this Eckhart
is unwilling to go. Because of the overwhelming dissimilarity be-
tween God and human language, no further claims can be made for
positive terms. While not utterly meaningless when we use them to
describe God, they transcend the state of complete impotence only to
an infinitesimal degree.
As a consequence, our search for God is paradoxical. Utterly one
with him and utterly nothing apart from him, we seek him but have
no adequate means of grasping him. And although he can be imagined
as pure and infinite light, he is, as the Hebrew scriptures teach, a
hidden and mysterious God. Let us give the preacher, and not the
thinker, the last word in the matter:

God is a word, a word unspoken.

Augustine says: "All writings are in vain. If one says that God is
a word, he has been expressed; but if one says that God has not been
spoken, he is ineffable." And yet he is something, but who can speak
this word? No one can do this, except him who is this Word. God is a
word that speaks itself. . . . All creatures want to utter God in all
their works; they all come as close as they can in uttering him, and
yet they cannot utter him. Whether they wish it or not, whether
they like it or not, they all want to utter God, and yet he remains
unuttered."

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 85 The Nature of Language

Consequences
Eckhart's evaluation of the possibilities and limitations of language
left its imprint on his works in many ways and helps explain many
puzzling aspects of structure and content. Further, it can be shown to
be a determining factor in the personal expression of his ideas which
we usually call style. Not that the preacher mentions his conception
of language as a consciously perceived force influencing him, but the
consistency between his expressed view of language and several ele-
ments in his practice is so striking that his conception of language
offers the best explanation for many aspects of his style.
One consequence of his view of language can be seen in the form
he chose for his major professional work. In contrast to many of his
colleagues, Eckhart chose to write an Opus trìpartitum instead of
the popular summa. In other words, he seems to have been less inter-
ested in leaving behind a system of philosophy or theology than in
offering his insights into various philosophical and theological ques-
tions. The systematic section of this major work, the Work of Propo-
sitions, was indeed to provide a foundation for what was to follow, but
it enjoyed no particular preeminence over the Work of Questions or
the Bible commentaries and sermons of the Work of Commentaríes.
These latter two parts make no attempt at systematic wholeness, and
it is the Bible commentaries with their lack of system and scholarly
method which the author chose to work on and some of which he
actually brought to completion. The open-endedness of what he
produced coincides well with what he thought philosophical lan-
guage can and cannot achieve. The reality of anything which goes be-
yond creatures, insofar as they are creatures, cannot be grasped by
such language in a way approaching wholeness. What language is
able to express about a divine object or an object which is indistinct
from the godhead will be less than what it omits. Words take on the
nature of symbols that indicate their objects from without much
more than from within. As a result, attempts at completeness lose
much of their charm, since for someone with Eckhart's view of lan-
guage any system will have a much weaker connection to its object
than it does for the philosopher who is convinced of the priority of
the way of eminence. An advocate of the priority of the negative way
like Eckhart must, rather, rest satisfied with making some good points
about God and about creatures insofar as the latter transcend them-
selves. One can point in the direction of truth but can do little more.
Eckhart's view of language also explains his great professional

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 86 Meistei Eckhart

tolerance of other thinkers and other traditions. A certain amount of

tolerance was widespread among medieval Christian thinkers who
respected Islamic, Jewish, and classical philosophers and borrowed
from them freely. What characterizes Eckhart within this tradition of
tolerance is his apparent lack of concern about those opinions that
might well conflict with established Christian thought. If one con-
siders the amount of positive religious truth which a doctrine con-
tains to be less than what it omits, the conflicts between doctrines do
not have to be taken as full-blown, irresolvable contradictions. At
least with regard to many statements about God, Eckhart held that,
although valid, they were no more so than their opposites. One can
consequently devote one's attention to the truth in them and worry
less about conflicts.
Taking this line of thought a step further, we notice that the
preacher as well as the professor finds it necessary, due to the nature
of human language, to make use of opposition and contradiction to
describe God. "One" is his preferred name for God because it de-
scribes him as both indistinct and distinct. This attribute overcomes
with some success the limitations of words because it contains op-
posites and includes within it a dialectical process. Although his ex-
planation of unum and his use of the pairs "indistinct"-"distinct" and
"dissimilar"-"similar" are the clearest examples of this dialectic, its
application is also implied in his execution of both sermons and com-
mentaries. In both, a text of scripture will often be interpreted in sev-
eral ways that defy any attempt to bring them into harmony. The
implication is that such an approach yields more than that offered by
the logic and concepts of the schools.
If concepts leave out more than they contain, and if words are at
best external signs for truths, then philosophy and natural theology
can claim no preeminent position for themselves in attaining these
truths. While Eckhart was obviously convinced that his profession
was capable of reaching valid and significant results, the frequency, as
well as the quality, of rhetorical and poetic features in his sermons is
striking and distinguishes him clearly from the other preachers of the
day who used scholastic thought as the basis for their sermons.28 Al-
though one should not exclude pastoral intentions as a reason for the
use of rhetorical and poetic devices, it must be admitted that the de-
valuation of philosophical language that his views imply provides the
theoretical justification for his practice of often turning to rhetoric
and poetry to express religious truth. Indeed, we often find that it is
through images that he is able to convey to us most satisfyingly his
most idiosyncratic and difficult thoughts. As we have seen in the case

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 87 The Nature of Language

of his conception of being, scriptural images, such as the sun sending

out rays that do not take root or hungering and thirsting in spite of
eating and drinking, are of perhaps more use to the thinker in ex-
plaining his thoughts than is the language of the schools.
Two consequences of this devaluation of conceptual language
must be pursued in detail. We shall examine first some of the preacher's
most personal and characteristic thoughts, themes that occur repeat-
edly in his works, and we shall have to examine them in the light of
his view of language. Second, we shall subject his modes of expres-
sion, his rhetorical and poetic style, to analysis in this same light.
Clearly, a result of an analysis of Eckhart's treatment of the divine
names is that he was very critical of the ability of language to express
what is truly important. Yet we should not emphasize only his con-
sciousness of the inadequacies of language, philosophical or other-
wise. For in reading his works we sense the appropriateness of the
adage that in recognizing the boundaries of language and human
thought one can in some sense transcend them. The finer passages in
his works move at the edge of human experience. One is shown vistas
of a union with God which takes place beyond the boundaries of ex-
perience. Both in his interpretations of scripture and in his use of lan-
guage in general, there is an underlying attempt to uncover what lies
hidden in words. One is given intimations of a core hidden from nor-
mal perception. Eckhart leaves no doubt about the power of words or
about what he considers to be the source of this power: "Wort hânt
ouch grôze kraft; man möhte wunder tuon mit Worten. Alliu wort
hânt kraft von dem ersten wort" (Words also have great power; one
can work wonders with words. All words have their power from the
first Word; Pr. 18; DW I, 306, 5-7).

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Authenticated
Download Date | 7/19/17 1:34 PM
Brought to you by | Cambridge University Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 7/19/17 1:34 PM