DOMINGO NEYPES, et al., v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

G.R. No. 141524, Sept. 14, 2005, En Banc (Corona, J.)

DOCTRINE
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules of Court and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh
period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

FACTS
Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob
Obania, and Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of
land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands,
Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon,
Josefa, Salvador, and Carmen.

On 12 February 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground
that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of
dismissal on 3 March 1998 and on the 15 th day thereafter or on 18 March 1998, filed a
motion for reconsideration. On 1 July 1998, the trial court issued an order dismissing the
motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on 22 July 1998. Five days
later, on 27 July 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on 3
August 1998.

On 4 August 1998, the trial court denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was
filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners on 31 July 1998. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order on 3 September 1998.

Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the Court of
Appeals (CA). They claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal, arguing
that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on 22 July 1998 since
this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for
reconsideration.

However, the CA dismissed the petition, ruling that the 15-day period to appeal
should have been reckoned from 3 March 1998 or the day they received the 12 February
1998 order dismissing their complaint. Hence, petitioners filed this petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE
Whether the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from 3 March
1998 or the day petitioners received the trial court’s order dismissing their complaint.
(NO)
RULING
NO. The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is
merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply
with the requirement of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to
appeal. The period of appeal is fixed by both stature and procedural rules. BP 129, as
amended, provides:

Sec. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days
counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment or decision
appealed from. x x x

Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15)
days from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. x x x

Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.,
the Court declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order
of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the
issues raised there. This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan
v. Haldeman, et al. where the Court considered the order denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.

According to Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court which was the
prevailing law prior to the passage of BP 129, the appeal period previously consisted of 30
days. BP 129, however, reduced this appeal period to15 days. In the deliberations of the
Committee on Judicial Reorganization that drafted BP 129, the raison d’etre behind the
amendment was to shorten the period of appeal and enhance the efficiency and
dispensation of justice. The Court has since required strict observance of this reglementary
period of appeal. Seldom has it condoned late filing of notices of appeal, and only in very
exceptional instances to better serve the ends of justice.

In setting aside technical difficulties and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals,
the Court has not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit
liberal application of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed
with, its decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set
by law. But in those rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there
always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial
system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict
enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full
opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.
 To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15
days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this “fresh
period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial
Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court.

The Court thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within
the fresh period of 15 days, counted from 22 July 1998 (the date of receipt of notice
denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with
Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days
from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word “or”
signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be
construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of “or” in the above
provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of
judgment or within 15 days from notice of the “final order,” which refers to the 1 July 1998
order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which
shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The
original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for
strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when
a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner,
the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review
the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While the
Court aims to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at
some definite time, it likewise aspires to deliver justice fairly.