Name: Ernesto Stephen C.

Gordovez

Course and Section: Political Science 3-2

Subject: Political Economy

Professor/Instructor: Jumel G. Estrañero

University: De La Salle University Dasmariñas

Working On and Off the (Football) Pitch:

Soft Power, Sports, and the Political-Economic Implications and Causes of Qatar’s Pursuit
of the World Cup

I. Introduction

Qatar is a small state – only 11,521 square kilometers (Government Communications

Office, n.d.) – located on a small desert peninsula jutting outward from the larger Arabian
Peninsula (Crystal, Anthony & Zeidan 2023). The country is a constitutional emirate ruled by an
emir, currently His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani (Government Communications
Office, n.d.). Despite being a small country with a small population, Qatar is one of the richest
countries in the world primarily due to its rich energy reserves. Specifically, Qatar is one of the
world’s largest producers of crude oil, having the 13th-most barrels of proven oil reserves in the
world (25,244,000,000 barrels) and producing an approximate 1,300,000 barrels of oil per day
(International Trade Administration, 2022). To add to that, Qatar, as of 2022, is the world’s top
exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) (Chapa, 2022), with its emir targeting for Qatar’s LNG
production to reach an even higher 126 million tons a year by 2027 (Awadalla, 2022).

Qatar’s wealth has afforded it two unique opportunities (Grix, Brannagan, & Lee, 2019).
First of all, Qatar’s wealth has enabled it to stay a monarchy, repelling any calls for greater
democracy. It does this through “the offering of generous government subsidies to [its] citizenry
– accrued from the sale of natural resources – in exchange for political allegiance” (Giddens &
Sutton, 2013 as cited in Grix et al., 2019; Beblawi & Luciani, 2015 as cited in Grix et al., 2019).
Second, and perhaps more important, Qatar has been able to use its wealth to fund “far greater
levels of progress and modernization than most Middle Eastern countries” (Fox et al., 2006 as
cited in Grix et al., 2019). Indeed, Qatar has been “undergoing a process of massive urban and
infrastructural development”, with the example of its capital city Doha changing “from an
inconspicuous midsized town into a bustling hotspot with an alluring waterfront area and a
signature skyline” (Scharfenort, 2012). Qatar, as a result, has been radically transformed “from a
poor, nomadic state into a wealthy settled one in a matter of decades” (Peterson, 2006 as cited in
Grix et al., 2019), with its people “over the course of one generation [going] from being almost
reduced to starvation by the collapse of the state’s once dominant pearl fishing market, to living
in air-conditioned, modern, and luxurious compounds, surrounded by five-star hotels, malls, and
leading American universities (Fromherz, 2012 as cited in Grix et al., 2019).

Qatar’s wealth has also allowed it “to position [itself] as an emerging and vital actor in
international affairs” (Grix et al., 2019) through several international investments made by its
various investment bodies. Notable examples of this are Al Jazeera, Qatar’s state-owned news
media which rivals some of the globe’s major media corporations, the Qatar Investment
Authority’s noteworthy portfolio, and several international humanitarian and mediation efforts
such as donating to aid the United States deal with 2005 Hurricane Katrina’s aftermath (Grix et
al., 2019).

With growth comes ambitions, and a lot of Qatar’s ambitions can be found in its National
Vision 2030 (QNV 2030), stating its intent to develop itself into “an advanced country by 2030,
capable of sustaining its own development and providing for a high standard of living for all of
its people” (Qatar General Secretariat, 2008 as cited in Grix et al., 2019). Another of its main
aims is “to increase Qatar’s economic, political, and cultural role in the region, particularly
within the framework of the GCC, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation” (Scharfenort, 2012). In pursuit of its numerous aims, QNV 2030 provides a
“roadmap for implementing national strategies”, with specific long-term outputs being outlined
in the document. The long-term objectives contained within QNV 2030 are all based upon
principles of sustainable development, pursuing holistic human, social, economic, and
environmental development as a result.

It is as a result of these – of Qatar’s geographical limitations, of its global ambitions, of

its wealth, and QNV 2030 – that it has come to pursue, among others, an international strategy of
using sports for its own political and economic gain. Its bid for the 2022 FIFA World Cup – and
its hosting of said tournament – is part of this overarching strategy.

II. Body

Sports has become more than just playing. Instead, “since World War II and the advent of
the television age, there have been significant transformations in sport and sporting cultures”
(Nauright, 2004). Sports has transformed into a tool by which “states sought ways to position
themselves in the global hierarchy of nations”, with sports and related events becoming “integral
components of a global political economy, which has… [shifted its focus to] branding, theming,
and [the] consumption of image and lifestyle”. They have also become “key factors in local and
national development strategies.” As a result of the evolution of sports’ role in society, Qatar,
like other countries, has also sought to use it to further its own political-economic ends.

Amara (2013) names four pillars of Qatar’s international sports strategy. First, there is
Qatar’s investment in the sports industry. Qatar has engaged “in an aggressive campaign of
investment in the global business of sport via its sovereign fund, Qatar Sports Investment (QSI)”.
Among the QSI’s most notable purchases is that of French football Ligue 1 side Paris Saint-
Germain (PSG) in 2011 for an estimated 100 million British pounds (Grix et al., 2019; Amara,
2013; Paris Saint-Germain, n.d.). Since its purchase of PSG, QSI has poured millions into the
club, resulting in “several Ligue 1 and world transfer records [being broken] (Grix et al., 2019)
and the dominance of PSG in the French top football league, winning 8 out of 10 domestic
league titles since QSI’s acquisition (Paris Saint-Germain, n.d.). Among PSG’s most notable
transfers is the purchase of Neymar, one of the world’s top football players, from La Liga’s FC
Barcelona for an approximate 200 million pounds (Grix et al., 2019). World-renowned players
Lionel Messi and Kylian Mbappe also reside in the club. Aside from QSI and its portfolio, Al
Jazeera, specifically its subsidiary beIN Sports, has also acquired multiple TV rights to broadcast
many major sports competitions (Amara, 2013; Grix et al., 2019; Brannagan & Giulianotti,
2015).

The second and third pillars of Qatar’s international sports strategy are event hosting and
athlete development. The 2022 FIFA World Cup (WC2022) is only one of a long list of events
that Qatar has hosted. Grix et al. (2019) note that “between 2004 and 2022 alone Qatar will have
staged a total of twenty-four… [sports] tournaments”, including the 2006 Doha Asian Games,
the 2011 AFC Asian Cup, the 2018 FIG Artistic World Gymnastics Championships, the annual
Professional Golfer’s Association’s European Tour, and many more (Grix et al., 2019; Amara,
2013; FIFA, 2010). Successful hosting of such events allows Qatar to “position [itself] in the
minds of international audiences alongside notions of excellence, admiration, and leadership”
(Grix et al., 2019). The thrust for athletic development is also part of Qatar’s ambition to be
“the hub for sporting excellence in the region” (Amara, 2013). As a result of this, Qatar has
formed several institutions for scouting and training talents, primarily through its Aspire
Academy.

The final pillar of Qatar’s international sports strategy is sports diplomacy and branding.
Qatar is part of a whole host of international governing bodies for sports. It also hosts several
forums on sports such as the annual Aspire4Sport Exhibition, the annual Securing Sport
Symposium, and the Doha GOALS Forum (Grix et al., 2019). This feeds into the aforementioned
desire to be a hub of sporting excellence in the Middle East, giving it further diplomatic standing
(in addition to that which it gains from its membership in international sports bodies), prestige,
and a better global image.

It is no wonder, then, that Qatar put forward its bid to host WC2022, the world’s biggest,
grandest football competition. “…to Qatari authorities,” write Brannagan & Giulianotti (2015),
“the tournament epitomized [Qatar’s] desire to be seen as a truly global sporting destination, a
fundamental driver of Qatar’s wider international strategy.” The details of Qatar’s bid may be
found in the Federation Internationale de Football Association’s (FIFA) 2010 evaluation report
of the matter. “The Qatar bid’s hosting concept”, it states, “which is in line with Qatar’s national
development strategy presents a novel approach to event operations and legacy.” Qatar’s
proposal was for a concentration of facilities and venues within a relatively compact 60
kilometer radius – something well-suited for a country as small as Qatar. Among WC2022’s
proposed legacies were to be a “carbon-neutral World Cup”, for modular sections of stadiums to
be disassembled and used to construct 22 stadiums in developing countries, and for WC2022 to
be the first World Cup held in the Middle East. Qatar’s bid offered 7 host cities and 12 stadiums
– the minimum required by FIFA – with 3 stadiums to be renovated and 9 to be constructed, with
a budget of approximate $3 billion.

FIFA’s mention of the Qatari WC2022 bid’s alignment “with [its] national development
strategy” refers specifically to QNV 2030. Secretary-General of Qatar’s Supreme Committee for
Delivery and Legacy (SC) Hassan Al Thawadi noted that WC2022 represented “an exceptional
event whose importance is not limited to football competitions, but rather an embodiment of the
objectives that Qatar established in its National Vision 2030” (The Peninsula, 2022). Among the
aforementioned objectives are economic diversification, support for environmental initiatives,
human development, and social progress. As Qatar’s Ambassador to Belgium, H.E. Al-Hajri,
said in an interview with the Brussel Times (2022), “hosting the World Cup can… be considered
a means to achieving [QNV 2030] as projects tied to this worldwide event are intended to
promote posttournament sustainability.” In other words, WC22-related projects also tackle
objectives set in the QNV 2030, thereby allowing Qatar to hit two birds with one stone. For
instance, tourism development is one of the main approaches by which Qatar aims to diversify its
energy-reliant economy. In fact, it is one of the pillars of QNV 2030; and the World Cup with its
tourists and its global attention gives Qatar an opportunity to promote its tourism sector. Tourism
development for Qatar started in the early 2000s with the creation of the Qatar Tourism
Authority, with an initial $15 billion plan “to reinvent Qatar as a premier tourist destination”
(Scharfenort, 2012). In line with this, hotels in Qatar and their occupancy, coupled with the
growth of Qatar as an international destination for tourism, conferences, forums, and so on, have
steadily increased.

Number of Hotels in Qatar

110 109 109
106
102
98

83 85
81
74
66
58
48

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Data from Qatar’s Planning and Statistics Authority’s reports titled “Qatar in Figures”

Number of Hotel Occupants in Qatar

7,000,000

6,000,000

5,000,000

4,000,000

3,000,000

2,000,000

1,000,000

0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Data from Qatar’s Planning and Statistics Authority’s reports titled “Qatar in Figures”
 In general, however, there are several reasons as to why countries seek sporting mega-
events like the World Cup. Szymanski (2011) writes that, for one, politicians view these events
as forms of political endorsement, citing the examples of Nazi Germany’s 1936 Olympics,
fascist Italy’s 1934 World Cup, and the 2008 Beijing Olympics. These events bring glory and
prestige to the host nation, which also consequently boosts the popularity of incumbent
politicians. “There is reason to believe,” notes Szymanski, that happy citizens are very likely to
vote for incumbent political parties in democratic regimes and at least tolerate or even admire
non-democratic regimes that can claim responsibility.” This point is echoed by Bar-On (1997),
who noted how Latin American politicians, generals, and authoritarian military regimes used
such events to maintain existing power relations.

Szymanski also cites economic benefits as another motivation for seeking to host such
events. Sporting mega-events have two main avenues of revenue: construction and activities that
take place during the events themselves. However, he questions their actual significance, noting
that “the consensus among ex post studies is that the measurable economic impacts are
negligible.” Nauright (2004), though, postulates the opposite, writing that “mega-events have
differential long-term financial and social benefits for various groups in host communities.”
Alalawneh, Mammadov, and Alqasem (2021) also note how big sports events can be catalysts
“for rapid urbanization… because of their positive economic, political, or state image abroad”, as
well as how “sport has become an active and stimulating part of the economy, [which] has
become dependent on sport as a tool for creating value-added and generating profits.”

Another reason for why countries in general seek hosting rights for sporting mega-events
is how these can serve as avenues by which to project soft power. Soft power, as defined by Nye
(2004), is “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.”
This is the exact opposite of hard power, which is the usage of traditional might in order to attain
an end one desires. As Brannagan & Giulianotti (2015) write: “…culture represents a key field
for the pursuit and exercise of soft power, notably through sport, the arts, education, and media.”
Such events, of course, allow a nation to showcase its culture for the world to see – something
that Qatar itself did, particularly, for example, with its stadiums which “honor Qatar’s heritage
through a harmonious and creative balance between the country’s past and current Western
influence”, integrating “local elements in a sophisticated reinterpretation of cultural heritage to
sustain national pride” (Scharfenort, 2012). This allows for countries to “brand” themselves,
much like companies embark on campaigns by which to affect public perception.

Brannagan & Giulianotti (2015) write several specific images that Qatar wants to
associate with itself using its sports strategy. First, it wants to exemplify its “supremacies as a
microstate”. They want to, as previously mentioned, highlight their excellence, their
professionalism, their responsibility. Qatar wants to showcase its development to the world; how
far it’s come. Infrastructure plays a large role in this, but a wider discussion on infrastructure will
follow in a later paragraph. In the words of Ambassador al-Hajri: “Most importantly, [the World
Cup] will shed light on what the country has gained and will gain in building a positive, social,
economic, and cultural legacy for the country, the region, and the world.” Second, Qatar wants to
project peace, security, and integrity. As it lacks in hard power, “Qatar’s security policy is by
necessity centered on the exercise of soft power through peaceful international cooperation and
association with the values of peace, security, and integrity.” As such, it has positioned itself as a
“key centre for dialogue on global issues and peace-building”, much like how it has aimed to
position itself as a hub for sports in the region. Grix et al. (2019) make mention of something
known as the “neighbourhood effect”. Qatar, though itself not experiencing instability and
conflict like its neighbors, can have a negative reputation associated with it as a result of its
proximity with countries who do experience instability and conflict. So, projecting peace,
security, excellence, integrity, and so on allow it to distance itself from its more hostile neighbors
(Grix et al., 2019; Brannagan & Giulianotti, 2015).

So, Qatar, therefore, pursued the right to host the WC2022 as a result of a variety of
reasons, namely its international sports strategy, QNV 2030, potential political and economic
gain, soft power projection, and others. Whether Qatar succeeded in achieving its desired goals,
however, is another matter altogether. As Grix et al. (2019) note: “states’ ambitious objectives
through sport and sports mega-events do, in many cases, fail to live up to their projected
expectations.” For Qatar, the effects of WC2022 on its political economy can be said to be a
mixed bag, containing both positive and negative ramifications.

III. Analysis

Qatar’s WC2022, in some ways, resulted in positive effects. Aside from being the first
World Cup in the Middle East – a feat worthy of pride by itself – WC2022, according to FIFA
(2023) statistics, had 5 billion people engaged worldwide, with over close to 1.5 billion viewers
in total, almost 6 billion engagements on social media with 262 billion cumulative reach across
all platforms, and also boasting the first woman referee (Stephanie Frappart) in World Cup
history as well as the first-ever female trio (Frappart alongside Neuza Back and Karen Diaz) to
officiate the World Cup.

Qatar, motivated by the infrastructure necessary for the World Cup, was also able to
manufacture and experience a boom in the construction and production sector as a result of all
the work needed to be done to meet its commitments. Not only did Qatar refurbish and build new
stadiums, but it also built key transport infrastructure to accompany – something that will have
economic and social benefits in the long-term. Included in Qatar’s major projects are its multi-
billion Rail and Metro Project, the Hamad International Airport, the Doha Bay Crossing, the
New Doha Port Development Project, and others (Moubaydeen et al., 2013/2014). In addition,
the growth of sectors related to the construction of infrastructure also aided in the diversification
of Qatar’s economy – a goal of QNV 2030.

Infrastructure, aside from benefitting the construction and production sectors, also has
knock-on effects on tourism. As Ambassador Al-Hajri said, “…all eyes will turn to witness the
achievements undertaken not only to host this international event but also to make Qatar a major
long-term tourism destination.” The hosting of international events, of course, brings a spotlight
onto Qatar, making people around the world witness it and its displays of culture, of architecture,
and so on. The construction of buildings – landmarks and tourist attractions – such as the Doha
Metro, Msheireb Downtown Doha, and the National Museum further entices people to visit
Qatar. The various hotels and other such buildings also adds to Qatar’s tourist attractiveness.
Tourism is also further enhanced by Qatar’s policy-aligned efforts to continue to host
international events and forums, bringing more people to it.

In fact, in keeping with the aim of maintaining tourism gains during the WC2022, the
Qatar Tourism Authority (2023) launched “a new international multi-media campaign to drive
forward the country’s tourism goals and cement its ambition to welcome more than six million
visitors a year by 2030.” The country’s largest-ever tourism marketing campaign, it “reflects
Qatar’s commitment to expanding its tourism... in line with Qatar’s National Vision 2030.” This
and other programs like it are absolutely necessary for World Cup gains to translate into long-
term boons.

Qatar, as a result of the World Cup, has also been given the opportunity to “rebrand”
itself in the eyes of the world. Its stunning architecture, its culture, its “excellence” in hosting the
games, and other such measures have allowed it to portray a good side of itself to the world.
Brand image, especially in the modern world, has effects on far more things that only reputation
and prestige. It will, first of all, have the potential to allow Qatar to have a greater role in global
geopolitical affairs, pursuant to its goal of doing so, as a result of proving itself through the
hosting of the World Cup. Second, it will also have economic effects as well, with “image”
potentially translating into trade deals and increased foreign investment. In fact, Qatar, after the
announcement of it winning the rights to WC2022, has experienced a rise in foreign trade and
foreign investment. “[Qatar] is capitalising on its newfound international profile and inbound
foreign direct investment (FDI) is soaring,” writes Barklie (2022). Qatar, post-announcement of
its acquisition of WC2022 hosting rights, has soared to become the 3rd leading foreign direct
investment (FDI) destination per capita in the world, with 59 FDI projects (GlobalData, 2021 as
cited in Barklie, 2021). Qatar’s foreign exports also rose in value post-2010 (the year of it
winning the bid), but this boom was short-lived, having returned to pre-2010 levels in 2015.
Qatar’s imports, though, are also interesting, with them being mostly machinery and transport
equipment probably as a result of Qatar’s infrastructure projects.
 Qatar's Foreign Trade
(million QR)
500,000

400,000

300,000

200,000

100,000

0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Exports Imports

Data gathered from Qatar’s Planning and Statistics Authority’s reports titled “Qatar in
Figures”

Qatar, though, seems to be its own worst enemy, with its own actions resulting in the
erasure or minimization of gains it has achieved as a result of WC2022. For instance, its goal to
be a tourism center in the region is affected, first of all, by its climate. Qatar is a hot country,
which is why WC2022 was moved from summer to winter to combat its hot temperatures.
Yearly averages in the country range from 14°C to 41°C, with temperatures in most months
easily exceeding 30°C (Thomas, 2022; Winehouse, 2022). Temperatures in the hottest months
range from 30°C to 40°C (Grix et al., 2019). This hot climate – and the drama surrounding it
brought about by concerns on the effects of the Qatari summer heat on WC2022 if it had been
held during its original schedule – have “arguably forced many onlookers to seriously question
Qatar’s suitability as an appealing summer holiday destination (New York Times, 2015 as cited
in Grix et al., 2019).

Furthermore, Qatar’s hospitality, which it was supposed to exemplify to the world during
WC2022, was marred by several happenings. Most notably among these is Qatar’s policy on
beer during WC2022. Culturally, Qatar is a very conservative nation subscribing to the Wahhabi
branch of Islam like Saudi (Scharfenort, 2012) in which “behavior in public spaces is highly
regulated” (Malone, 2022). This included the regulation of the drinking of beer in public. Now,
beer drinking is commonplace during football games and in football stadiums. The two cultures,
then, inevitably clashed regarding this issue. However, the issue itself is not the prohibition on
the drinking of beer per se. The main issue is how it was handled. Originally, Qatar had given the
okay for the drinking of beer during WC2022 and in or near WC2022 venues, which was the
reason why Budweiser – FIFA’s long-standing exclusive beer provider since 1986 – had
renewed its contract with FIFA for WC2022. However, this was eventually changed merely two
days away from the World Cup – after fans had bought their tickets with certain expectations of
what they could and could not do during the event. As the Football Supporters’ Association, a
group of English and Welsh football fans, put it: “Some fans like a beer at the match, and some
don’t, but the real issue is the last minute u-turn which speaks to a wider problem – the total lack
of communication and clarity from the organising committee towards supporters. If they can
change their minds on this at a moment’s notice, with no explanation, supporters will have
understandable concerns about whether they will fulfil other promises relating to
accommodation, transport, or cultural issues” (Stonehouse, 2022; Panja, 2022; Tural, 2022;
Malone, 2022; FIFA, 2022). What makes it worse is how this was not the only last-minute
change by the Qatari organizers, who had previously asked in August 2022 for WC2022 to be
delayed by a few days (Turak, 2022).

Therein lies the double-edged sword of the spotlight that the World Cup places upon
countries. While it allows countries to showcase their good side, it also allows for the world to
see and discover the skeletons in their closets. With soft power comes the risk of soft
disempowerment, defined by Brannagan & Giulianotti (2015) as “occasions in which a given
state may upset, offend, or alienate others, leading to a loss of attractiveness or influence.”

Indeed, Qatar’s attempts to shape its global image and project its soft power was sullied
by its own actions. The winning of the WC2022 bid which was supposed to bring prestige and
greater opportunities for Qatar was marred by allegations of bribery and corruption. This, in turn,
 stains Qatar’s efforts to become a global center for sports, and its efforts to show itself as worthy,
as excellent, as modern, and so on. The fact that attendance numbers for the games were
allegedly falsified also adds another mark against Qatar, with several news outlets and audience
members noticing how the official attendance numbers did not match with either real-life scenes
of empty seats or even with official announced stadium capacities (Collins, 2022; Jones, 2022;
Otto, 2022; Braddick, 2022).

Alleged
Stadium Game Official Capacity
Attendance
Al Bayt Qatar vs Ecuador 67,372 60,000
Khalifas International Stadium England vs. Iran 45,334 40,000
Al Thumama Stadium Netherlands vs. Senegal 41,721 40,000
Ahmad Bin Ali Stadium USA vs. Wales 43,418 40,000
Attendances vs Stadium Official Capacities
Data from https://www.foxsports.com.au/football/world-cup/qatar-world-cup-crowds-show-
17000-fans-have-disappeared/news-story/b27c9b41d6f61cbbaac7ffdc2f7f9146

Perhaps the worst issue that damaged Qatar’s gains was Qatar’s issue with migrant
laborers and the kafala system. The kafala system, with kafala meaning “sponsorship”, originally
arose in Gulf states as a result of the need for foreign labor as a result of these states’ small
populations (Robinson, 2022). Essentially, what it means is that foreign workers had to have a
sponsor vouch for them in order to be able to work in the country. The state would give
sponsorship permits to local individuals or companies, allowing them to employ and vouch for
foreign laborers. In return, the sponsor would cover travel expenses and provide housing. The
system was, as Houtan Homayounpour, former head of the Qatari office of the UN’s
International Labour Organization (ILO), supposed to protect workers at first. “The sponsor was
supposed to take care [of the workers], ensure their safety, ensure their well-being.” Over time,
however, it became a system many describe as “modern slavery.”
 Qatar was no different, and the World Cup’s demand for infrastructure heightened the
demand for migrant labor. As a result, a majority of Qatar’s population was made up of these
foreign laborers, mostly men coming from poorer countries in Asia like Nepal and the
Philippines. The vulnerability experienced by these laborers is exemplified by several examples
(ter Haar, 2018). Hefty recruitments fees are demanded by recruiters, and many have to take out
loans in order to afford them. In effect, what they are paying is essentially their future wages
from Qatar. However, workers are sometimes reassigned by their sponsors to lesser paying jobs,
keeping them in a form of debt slavery. Migrant workers also had to work under the hot Qatari
sun without guaranteed time off. They were also not allowed to organize in order to bargain
collectively. Sometimes, their passports were confiscated, and they had to ask their employers
for prior permission before leaving their country or their job.

QATAR'S POPULATION
3,000,000

2,500,000

2,000,000

1,500,000

1,000,000

500,000

0
2004 2010 2015 2020

Data from Qatar’s Census

 Live Births Natural Increase Rate
2008 17,210 10.6
2009 18,351 10.4
2010 19,504 10.3
2011 20,623 10.8
2012 21,423 11.7
2013 23,708 10.8
2014 25,443 10.4
2015 26,622 10
2016 26,816 9.3
2017 27,906 9.4
2018 28,069 9.3
2019 28,412 10.2
2020 29,014 9.2
Data from Qatar’s Planning and Statistics Authority’s reports titled “Qatar in Figures”

The two previous tables together show the jump in Qatar’s migrant population, with live births
only constituting a very small amount of the population growth between years, thereby showing
the increase in Qatar’s demand for migrant labor as time went on.

The deaths of migrant laborers was also a very heated issue, with the Qatari government
having failed to investigate their deaths and logging a majority as merely having died of natural
causes. While Qatari authorities report only 37 non-work related deaths and only three from
work-related accidents, it itself recorded that 15,021 non-nationals died between 2010 and 2019,
but its statistics did not record ages, occupations, or causes. Estimates from various organizations
like The Guardian, Amnesty International, and others place the true number of deaths in the
thousands, owing to bad working and living conditions. However, unless the Qatari government
releases its statistics on the matter, the truth can never be ascertained (Dart, 2022; Human Rights
Watch, 2020.; Amnesty International, 2021; Pattison, 2022; International Labour Organization,
2021; Panja & Sharma, 2022; Page & Worden, 2022).

Though reforms have been made regarding the kafala system, critics have said they are
either ineffective, unenforced, or they do not go as far as they need to go. Furthermore, critics
also say that even if reforms have been made, it was too late, since the majority of these changes
came from the Qatari government’s three-year partnership with the ILO from 2017 to 2019 –
already the later years of the construction for the World Cup. (Dart, 2022; Human Rights Watch,
2020.; Amnesty International, 2021; Pattison, 2022; International Labour Organization, 2021;
Panja & Sharma, 2022; Page & Worden, 2022).

IV. Recommendations

It is obvious that Qatar must change if it wishes to continue to pursue its sports-oriented
policy, for the spotlight it places upon itself can prove to be its downfall in the end. If it wishes to
open itself up to the world, then it must accede to the world’s demands, such as with
accommodation for foreign cultures and practices like beer drinking and with their kafala system.
Even if sports is the instrument in the pursuit of international political-economic goals, the fact
remains that the traditional rules of playing the political game still apply. Qatar must not be
merely shiny on the outside but rotten on the inside. It must change. And this is not merely for
moralistic reasons, but also for reasons of realpolitik. This is the way it rehabilitates its global
image. This is the way it redeems itself in the eyes of the world. This is the way it says that it is
undoing its past mistakes and is moving towards a greater, brighter future. This way, it does not
look like a hypocrite, claiming to aim to achieve a good thing while doing devious things to
achieve it. The ends, in this case, do not justify the means; for the means are the very reason why
Qatar was criticized.

First and foremost, Qatar must truly abolish its kafala system. It is not enough to pass
laws – they must also enforce it. Furthermore, it is not enough to abolish it merely on paper but
not in spirit. The anti-laborer practices, regardless of whether they fall under kafala or not, must
be acted against by the Qatari government. In this manner, they can redeem themselves in the
eyes of the world; sinners atoning for past mistakes, willing to change for the better, for the
future.
 Second, and this may be hard for Qatar due to its autocratic nature, there must be some
transparency regarding the deaths of migrant laborers. Again, this will restore Qatar’s public
image in the world, undoing its past mistakes.

Third, Qatar must use what it has built and what it has achieved for the common global
good. The building of stadiums in developing countries using modules from WC2022 is a
brilliant idea. Its belief in football as a force that can change the world is, at least in my opinion,
well-founded. What it has to do is to actually push through with what it says it is – an
upstanding, excellent hub of diplomacy, of peace, of sports, and others.

The recommendations could go on and on, but they all will boil down to this one
fundamental essence: for Qatar to actually be as good as it says it is. And that is easy to say, but
incredibly hard to do. As of now, even if Qatar proceeds with its current policies and plans
regarding tourism, QNV 2030, hosting sports events, and so on, its reputation stands tainted as a
result of the aforementioned issues brought to further light by the magnifying glass that WC2022
placed upon the country. It cannot ignore that; and so it must act upon that primary issue of its
reputation first and foremost before doing anything else.

V. Conclusion and Way Ahead

In conclusion, therefore, Qatar’s World Cup bid is a result of a variety of factors, but they
are all the result of the ascendance of sports and soft power in the modern game of politics. First,
Qatar’s own political-economic policy, exemplified by its strategy of sports diplomacy and by
QNV 2030, demands it to be so. And this is a result of – second – Qatar’s circumstances. Not
only is it geographically small, but its population is also small and it lacks the military might to
exercise hard power. Therefore, it has to rely on soft power. Third, hosting WC2022 offered
Qatar various benefits, ranging from rebranding, to economic, to political, to social.
 While Qatar got some good out of WC2022, it also got a lot of negative repercussions as
the result of the backlash against its own actions, such as against the sudden banning of beer and
against the abusive, oppressive kafala system. This severely damaged Qatar’s image, which it
had sought to build through the hosting of sports events like WC2022. Therefore, Qatar must
“atone for its sins”, per se, and work to right the wrongs that it has committed in the past, thereby
repairing its global reputation and its image.

Will Qatar follow the recommendations set in this paper? Only time can tell, for it is still
far too early at the time of this writing to judge such a thing. However, what this does tell us is
how sports and mega-events – soft power, essentially – is becoming an even more important tool
of public political-economic policy than it ever was before. The days of using hard power to beat
nations into submission are slowly receding, with the current wars of today being death throes of
old ways ingrained into human civilization’s psyche. Slowly, even countries like Qatar are able
to use soft power in order to carve for themselves a place under the sun; to elevate themselves on
the global stage. Qatar’s sports are only one example. Look at Japan and Korea spreading their
culture worldwide. Look at the various international organizations that impose rules and
regulations upon member countries. Even the discussed pressure placed upon the Qatari
authorities by the rest of the world is an exercise of soft power. One can look anywhere and see
the ascendance of soft power.

The way ahead, therefore, is to acknowledge this truth and learn from it. Hard power will
always be a threat, sure; but hard power can be disarmed by soft power if it is strong enough. As
Mark Twain once said: “The only safe and sure way to destroy your enemy is to make him your
friend.” And that is precisely what soft power does – whether through sports, or culture, or food,
or diplomacy, or whatever else.
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