RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED

Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

NUNEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. L-50581, JANUARY 30, 1982

(DUE PROCESS OF LAW WAS DENIED)

Summary

PUBLIC OFFICER IN VIOLATION OF GRAFT AND CORRUPTION

Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails the validity of the Presidential Decree creating
the Sandiganbayan, He was accused before such respondent Court of estafa through falsification of public
and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in
several cases

Whether the trial of the accused, a public official, by the Sandiganbayan unduly discriminates against the accused, in
light of the difference of the procedures (especially appellate) in the Sandiganbayan vis-a-vis regular courts.

The Constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan precisely
in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It
follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as
January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused
therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. 

this Court in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno a 1949 decision, that the general guarantees of the Bill of Rights, included
among which are the due process of law and equal protection clauses must “give way to [a] specific
provision, ” in that decision, one reserving to “Filipino citizens of the operation of public services or
utilities.” The scope of such a principle is not to be constricted. It is certainly broad enough to cover the
instant situation.

RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT

COSEP VS. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 110353, MAY 21, 1998;

(LACK OF EVIDENCE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT – RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED INNOOCENT)

Petitioner, Tomas Cosep, was the Municipal Planning and Development Coordination Officer of Olutanga,
Zamboanga del Sur. In 1987, the Municipality decided to construct an artesian well for one of its localities. Hence, it
secured the services of private complainant Angelino E. Alegre to undertake the said project, under a pakyaw
arrangement for the contract price of P5,000.00 payable after completion of the project. Petitioner, being the Planning
Officer of the Municipality, monitored the progress of the construction.
After the project was finished, petitioner secured the amount of P5,000.00 from the Municipal Treasurer. However,
only P4,500.00 was given to the private complainant, the balance being allegedly withheld by petitioner as
reimbursement for his expenses in processing the papers in the Municipal Treasurers Office.

Aggrieved, private complainant filed a complaint before the Sandiganbayan, First Division, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 17503 against petitioner for violating Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019. 

In the early case of U.S. v. Carrington,20 we have asserted the public document character of the municipal
payroll; as such, it is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. 21 The same can only be rebutted by
other competent evidence22 and cannot be overcome by the testimony of a single witness.23 As earlier stated,
private complainant never even offered any evidence to contravene the presumption that the recitals in the municipal
payroll giving his status as a head laborer were true. Besides, the Time and Payroll Sheet, having been signed by the
Municipal Treasurer, it is clothed with the presumption of regularity, particularly since it was not objected to by the
private complainant.

Accordingly, when the guilt of the accused has not been proven with moral certainty, it is our policy of long
standing that the presumption of innocence of the accused must be favored and his exoneration be granted
as a matter of right

in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the Sandiganbayan insofar as it convicted and sentenced petitioner
Tomas Cosep of violating Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 is hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner Cosep is ACQUITTED on
grounds of reasonable doubt. Costs against the appellant.

 must be borne in mind that criminal cases elevated by convicted public officials from the Sandiganbayan
deserve the same thorough review by this Court as criminal cases involving ordinary citizens, simply
because the constitutional presumption of innocence must be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

People of the Philippines vs. Rodrigo Calma

G.R. No. 127126,    September 17, 1998
(RAPE – TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCER
)

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Rodrigo Calma was charged with two (2) counts of Rape on his two daughters, namely,
Annalyn and Roselyn, ages 15 years old and 11 years old respectively, and one (1) count of Acts of
Lasciviousness on his youngest daughter, Irene, age 5 years old.
All three witnesses testified on the repeated loathsome acts done by their own father to them in details as
examined and cross-examined by both prosecution and defense. The testimony of the three victims, withstood
the test of cross-examination. They spontaneously, clearly and credibly spoke of the details of their
defilement. Their testimonies were also corroborated by the medico-legal report conducted by Dr. Jesusa Vergara,
the medico-legal officer who examined them. The defense did not dispute the time, the place, the manner and the
frequency of the sexual abuses. Neither did the defense show that their hymenal lacerations were the results of other
causes. 
On defense, the accused-appellant denied his daughters' accusations. He charged that Myrna Ignacio, his
common law wife and mother of his children, coached his daughters to lie. He claimed that he had seriously hurt
her in the past, twice by electrocution on suspicion of infidelity. Also, seeking to help accused-appellant, his mother,
Catalina Calma, and their neighbors, testified that accused-appellant's daughters, especially Annalyn, showed much
affection towards their father.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused of the crimes charged despite failure of the prosecution
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:
 A reasonable doubt is not such doubt as any man may start by questioning for the sake of a doubt; nor a
doubt suggested or surmised without foundation in facts or testimony, for it is possible always to question
any conclusion derived from testimony, but such questioning is not what reasonable doubt is. Rather, it is that
state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence leaves the mind of the judge
in that condition that he cannot say that he feels an abiding conviction to a moral certainly of the truth of the
charge. Absolute certainty is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge but moral certainty is
required, and this certainty must attend every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the
offense. Absolute, mathematical, or metaphysical certainty is not essential, and besides, in judicial investigation, it is
wholly unattainable. Moral certainty is all that can be required. The arguments of accused-appellant are premised
on the misconception that reasonable doubt is anything and everything that removes a statement from the matrix of
certitude. It bears repeating that even inconsistencies and discrepancies in the prosecution evidence, unless treating
of the elements of the crime, would not necessarily bring about a judgment of acquittal. In this case, there is not
even any inconsistency or discrepancy to speak of. All things considered, the evidence against the accused-
appellant established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt on all three (3) charges. The appeal is denied. Death
penalty is accordingly imposed.

EQUIPOISE RULE

PRIMA FACIE

The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional,
presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused.

Corpuz v People 194 SCRA 73 (1991)

(false Checks)
Facts: Petitioner seeks reversal of the lower court’s decision finding him guilty for corrupt behavior of public funds.
The accused was the acting supervising cashier at the Provincial Treasurer’s office. He denied having
misused the whole amount of P72,823.08 which was discovered to be a shortage from the government funds
contending that the P50,000.00 was the unliquidated withdrawal made by their paymaster Pineda thru the 4 checks
he issued while the petitioner was on leave and that he was forced by their Provincial Treasurer Aluning to post
said amount in his cash book despite not actually receiving the amount.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in observing the presumption of innocence of the accused of the charge against
him

Held: It is held that presumption of innocence of the accused should yield to the positive findings that he
malversed the government funds considering all the evidences presented that point out to his guilt on the charge
imputed against him. Records shows that the checks issued for the paymaster were duly liquidated to the accused
and there were inconsistent entries on his cash books and that he was not really on leave on the day the said checks
were disbursed by the paymaster.
People v. Mingoa

G.R. No. L-5371, 26 March 1953

Facts:

The Accused was charged with the crime of malversation of public funds. The Accused appealed in the Court of
Appeals which this court certified the case here on the ground that it involved a constitutional question. However, the
Accused did not present any evidence to support his claims. The Accused now contended that the trial court
convicted him on mere presumptions of criminal intent and that it violates the constitutional right of the Accused to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.

Issue

Whether or not the constitutional right of the accused on presumption of innocent was violated.

Held:

The SC ruled that the contention that this legal provision violates the constitutional right of the accused to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved cannot be sustained. Furthermore, it is generally held in the United
States that the legislature may enact that when certain facts have been proven they shall be prima facie evidence of
the existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be rational connection between
that facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the others is not
unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common experience. This is in line with
the excerpt from Cooley, in his work on constitutional limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, pp. 639-641, which states that, “there
is no constitutional objection to the passage of law providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by
contrary presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient
to overcome such presumption of innocence.” Thus, the SC emphasized in the present case that the statute creates
a presumption of guilt once certain facts are proved, which however, the Accused didn’t have the evidence to support
his claim.

AGBANLOG VS. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 105907, MAY 24, 1993;

The Accused was charged with the crime of malversation of public funds

The elements of malversation of public funds or property punishable under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code are
:

a) That the offender is a public officer;.

b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;.

c) That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable;.

d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence permitted
another person to take them. (II Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, p. 391 [1981 ed.])
The prosecution has established (a) that appellant received in his possession public funds; (b) that he could not
account for them and did not have them in his possession when audited; and (c) that he could not give a satisfactory
explanation or reasonable excuse for the disappearance of said funds. (Cabello v. Sandiganbayan, 197 SCRA 94
[1991]) The prosecution is not required to present direct evidence of the misappropriation, which may be impossible
to do. (Villanueva v. Sandiganbayan, 200 SCRA 722 [1991]).

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon
demand by any duly authorized officer, is a prima facie evidence that he has put such funds or property to personal
use. (Art. 217, last paragraph, Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 1060).

Dizon-Pamintuan v. People
(ROBERRY)

Facts :

Teodoro Encarnacion, Undersecretary, DPWH was in his house. Five unidentified masked armed persons
appeared and poked their guns to his driver and two helpers. They were made to lie face down on the floor.
The robbers ransacked the house and took away jewelries and other personal properties including cash.

After the intruders left, he reported the matter immediately to the police. He was later told that some of the lost items
were Chinatown area. He and his wife posed as a buyer and were able to recognized items of the jewelry stolen
displayed.

The trial court held that the prosecution was able to prove by evidence that the recovered items belong to the
spouses Encarnacion.

Petitioner complained that the judgement made was based on a mere presumption.

Issue :

Whether the prosecution proved the existence of the third element: that the accused knew or should have known that
the items recovered from her were the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft? 

Held :

The court held that the constitutional presumption will not apply as long as there is some logical connection between
the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the interference of one fact to another will not hinder it.

Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 expressly provides that “mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of
value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.

In this case, the petitioner was unable to rebut the presumption. She relied solely on the testimony of her brother
which was insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence, and, on the contrary, even disclosed that the
petitioner was engaged in the purchase and sale of jewelry and that she used to buy from a certain Fredo who has
the jewelry.

DEVIE ANN ISAGA FUERTES v. SENATE OF PHILIPPINES, GR No. 208162, 2020-01-07

Devie Ann Isaga Fuertes (Fuertes) is among the 46 accused in Criminal Case No. 2008-895, pending before Branch
30 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City.[3] She and her co-accused had been charged with violating the Anti-
Hazing Law, or Republic Act No. 8049, for the death of Chester Paolo Abracia (Abracia) due to injuries he allegedly
sustained during the initiation rites of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity.[4] Fuertes is a member of the fraternity's sister
sorority, Tau Gamma Sigma, and was allegedly present at the premises during the initiation rites.[5

Issues:

The primary issue to be resolved by this Court is whether or not Sections 5 and 14 of the Anti-Hazing Law should be
declared unconstitutional.

This Court, however, must first rule upon whether or not the Petition is a proper remedy, and whether or not bringing
the Petition directly before this Court was a proper recourse.

Hence, generally, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Exceptionally,
under R.A. No. 8049, the participation of the offenders in the criminal conspiracy can be proven by the prima facie
evidence due to their presence during the hazing, unless they prevented the commission of the acts therein

RIGHT TO BE HEARD

People vs. Holgado, G.R. No. L-2809, March 22, 1950;

(RIGHT TO BE HEARD UNDER A COUNSEL)

G.R. NO. 111709 AUGUST 30, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
VS.
ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C.
INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, AND JOHN DOES, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

MELO, J.:

FACTS: IN THE EVENING OF MARCH 2, 1991, "M/T TABANGAO," A CARGO VESSEL OWNED BY THE PNOC
SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION, LOADED WITH 2,000 BARRELS OF KEROSENE, 2,600
BARRELS OF
REGULAR GASOLINE, AND 40,000 BARRELS OF DIESEL OIL, WITH A TOTAL VALUE OF P40,426,793,87, WAS
SAILING
OFF THE COAST OF MINDORO NEAR SILONAY ISLAND. THE VESSEL, MANNED BY 21 CREW MEMBERS,
INCLUDING
CAPTAIN EDILBERTO LIBO-ON, SECOND MATE CHRISTIAN TORRALBA, AND OPERATOR ISAIAS
ERVAS, WAS
SUDDENLY BOARDED, WITH THE USE OF AN ALUMINUM LADDER, BY SEVEN FULLY ARMED PIRATES
LED BY EMILIO
CHANGCO, OLDER BROTHER OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT CECILIO CHANGCO. THE PIRATES,
INCLUDING ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS TULIN, LOYOLA, AND INFANTE, JR. WERE ARMED WITH M-16 RIFLES, .45 AND .38
CALIBER
HANDGUNS, AND BOLOS. THEY DETAINED THE CREW AND TOOK COMPLETE CONTROL OF THE VESSEL.

ON OCTOBER 24, 1991, AN INFORMATION CHARGING QUALIFIED PIRACY OR VIOLATION OF

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
NO. 532 (PIRACY IN PHILIPPINE WATERS) WAS FILED AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANTS:

THAT ON OR ABOUT AND DURING THE PERIOD FROM MARCH 2 TO APRIL 10, 1991, BOTH DATES
INCLUSIVE, AND FOR SOMETIME PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT THERETO, AND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION
OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT, THE SAID ACCUSED, THEN MANNING A MOTOR LAUNCH AND ARMED WITH
HIGH
POWERED GUNS, CONSPIRING AND CONFEDERATING TOGETHER AND MUTUALLY HELPING ONE
ANOTHER,
DID THEN AND THERE, WILFULLY, UNLAWFULLY AND FELONIOUSLY FIRE UPON, BOARD AND SEIZE
WHILE IN
THE PHILIPPINE WATERS M/T PNOC TABANGCO LOADED WITH PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, TOGETHER
WITH THE COMPLEMENT AND CREW MEMBERS, EMPLOYING VIOLENCE AGAINST OR INTIMIDATION
OF
PERSONS OR FORCE UPON THINGS, THEN DIRECT THE VESSEL TO PROCEED TO SINGAPORE
WHERE THE
CARGOES WERE UNLOADED AND THEREAFTER RETURNED TO THE PHILIPPINES ON APRIL 10, 1991,
IN
VIOLATION OF THE AFORESAID LAW.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE GUILTY OF PIRACY?

RULING: YES, THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WERE GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF PIRACY. THE COURT
FIND THE
ACCUSED ROGER TULIN, VIRGILIO LOYOLA, ANDRES INFANTE, JR. AND CECILIO CHANGCO
GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT, AS PRINCIPALS, OF THE CRIME OF PIRACY IN PHILIPPINE WATERS DEFINED IN
SECTION 2(D)
OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 532 AND THE ACCUSED CHEONG SAN HIONG, AS ACCOMPLICE, TO SAID
CRIME.

ARTICLE 122. PIRACY IN GENERAL AND MUTINY ON THE HIGH SEAS. — THE PENALTY OF
RECLUSION
TEMPORAL SHALL BE INFLICTED UPON ANY PERSON WHO, ON THE HIGH SEAS, SHALL ATTACK OR
SEIZE A VESSEL OR,
NOT BEING A MEMBER OF ITS COMPLEMENT NOR A PASSENGER, SHALL SEIZE THE WHOLE OR PART
OF THE CARGO
OF SAID VESSEL, ITS EQUIPMENT, OR PERSONAL BELONGINGS OF ITS COMPLEMENT OR PASSENGERS.
PEOPLE VS TULIN (PIRACY IN PHILIPPINE WATERS)
G.R. No. 111709, August 30, 2001

FACTS:

“M/T Tabangao,” a cargo vessel loaded fuel was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island when it was
suddenly boarded, by seven fully armed pirates. The pirates were armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber
handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew and took complete control of the vessel. “M/T Tabangao” then sailed
to and anchored about 10 to 18 nautical miles from Singapore’s shoreline where another vessel called “Navi
Pride” received the cargo under the supervision of accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong.

Accused-appellants were arrested and charged with qualified piracy for violating Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy
in Philippine Waters) and were convicted as principals of the crime charged, except for accused-appellant Hiong
who was convicted as an accomplice. On appeal, Hiong ratiocinates that he cannot be convicted of piracy in
Philippine waters as defined and penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a], respectively of PD 532 because Republic Act
No. 7659 has impliedly superseded PD 532. He reasons out that Presidential Decree No. 532 has been rendered
“superfluous or duplicitous” because both Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Presidential
Decree No. 532 punish piracy committed in Philippine waters. He maintains that in order to reconcile the two laws,
the word “any person” mentioned in Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree No. 532 must be omitted such that
Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only apply to offenders who are members of the complement or to passengers of
the vessel, whereas Republic Act No. 7659 shall apply to offenders who are neither members of the complement or
passengers of the vessel, hence, excluding him from the coverage of the law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused-appellant Hiong was guilty of piracy?

RULING:

Yes, Hiong was guilty of piracy.

Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy must be committed on the
high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by
Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to include offenses committed “in
Philippine waters.” On the other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law
on piracy embraces any person including “a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine
waters.” Hence, passenger or not, a member of the complement or not, any person is covered by the law.

Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532.
There is no contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to
construe or interpret the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the
intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in
one of the “whereas” clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is “among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries.” For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and
piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.

RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM

G.R. No. 127845                                March 10, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
LODRIGO BAYYA
INCEST RAPE

FACTS:
Respondent, Lodrigo Bayya was charged and convicted with the crime of incestuous rape as defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659 before the Regional Trial
Court in Ilagan, Isabela.
On Appeal, respondent challenged the penalty of death against him on the grounds that the information charging of
the offense did not made any mention of Republic Act 7659 and that he was only charged using Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, hence, the penalty should be that which is provided for in the Revised Penal Code and not
as provided for in Republic Act 7659. As such, in convicting him under the provisions of Republic Act 7659, a
transgression of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a transgression of the respondent’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against him.

HELD:
Yes, the respondent may only be convicted of the charges under the information indicting him and nothing
more.

In the case under scrutiny, the information does not allege the minority of the victim, Rosie S. Bayya, although the
same was proven during the trial as borne by the records. The omission is not merely formal in nature since
doctrinally, an accused cannot be held liable for more than what he is indicted for. It matters not how conclusive and
convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense, not charged in the
Complaint or information on which he is tried or therein necessarily included. He has a right to be informed of the
nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial. To convict an accused of an offense higher
than that charged in the Complaint or information on which he is tried would constitute unauthorized denial of that
right.