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First Steps on the Road to Kadesh: The Beginning of Tensions

between Egypt and Ḫatti as Documented in the Amarna Letters
Norbert van Cleve

Abstract

An attempt is made to trace the development of Egypt’s relation to Ḫatti as described in the Amarna letters. The results are
compared with evidence from Hittite sources about the confrontations between the two countries. It is found that the
Amarna correspondence ends around the time of the initial Hittite incursions in Amqu after the defection of Aitakama,
possibly the event that Muršili II describes as the “first breaking of trust” by the Hittites. While preparations for a punitive
expedition against Aitakama are documented, the Egyptian attack on Kadesh and other events that led to the Second
Syrian War, appear to have occurred after the end of the Amarna period. A demand by Aziru of Amurru that pharaoh swear
by Amun, apparently overlooked by many authors, suggests that Aziru’s second journey to Egypt occurred after the death of
Akhenaten, since correspondents are otherwise judicious about invoking the name that was proscribed in the Amarna era.
The proposed sequence of events allows the Daḫamunzu affair to play out in harmony with the known facts of the Amarna
succession, especially the reign of Ankhkheperure Neferneferuaten, who is frequently ignored in the discussion.

At some point near the end of the 18th dynasty, war broke out between Egypt and the Hittite Empire.
The course of this war, which was fought on and off until it culminated in the battle of Kadesh
between pharaoh Ramesses II and Hittite king Ḫattušili III, to finally end in a formal peace treaty
between the two powers, is reasonably well documented, for example in William J. Murnane’s “The
Road to Kadesh” (1990). What remains unresolved is when exactly hostilities began.

One hotly disputed issue is the significance of a letter thought to be dating to the reign of 18th
dynasty king Akhenaten. It had been written to Aziru, a ruler of Amurru, and was received while
Aziru was in Egypt. This letter was either handed over to or confiscated by the Egyptian authorities
and became part of the royal archives in Akhetaten, modern el-Amarna, Akhenaten’s capital city. In
this letter, Aziru is informed of substantial Hittite military activity in a region known as Amqu, north
of modern Lebanon. In addition, four almost identical letters from different senders, all claiming to
be present in Amqu at the time, speak of a certain Aitakama of Kadesh, who assisted the Hittites and
set fire to cities of the king of Egypt.

The question is whether these events are part of a prelude to hostilities between Egypt and Ḫatti, or
a snapshot from within an already raging conflict. A frequently held view is that Akhenaten
precipitated the war by an initial attack on Kadesh, which had drifted from Egyptian control into the
sphere of Hittite king Šuppiluliuma. This is supposed to have provoked a Hittite counterattack
against Egyptian held Amqu.

To help answer the question of when hostilities began, the present paper will trace the development
of Egyptian-Hittite relations as described in the Amarna correspondence, and compare the results
with Hittite reports on the outbreak of war. The fate of Mitanni, which was crushed by the Hittites
during the reign of Akhenaten (Cordani 2013) will be followed as well.

For the text of the Amarna letters, originally written in cuneiform on clay tablets, the English
translations published by William L. Moran (1992) will be used. Individual letters are identified by
the abbreviation EA, followed by a number. Sections within longer letters may be marked by
additional numbers. Moran sorts the letters by correspondent first, then attempts a chronological
order within each correspondence. Therefore, a higher number does not necessarily mean that the
letter in question was written or received later.
Anyone working with the Amarna collection must keep in mind that the cuneiform clay tablets used
in the correspondence were found in the archives of Akhetaten, the capital city of Egypt during the
very brief Amarna period and for a few years after. Letters from the time of Amenhotep III and the
first years of Amenhotep IV (who soon changed his name to Akhenaten) may never have been
transferred to the Amarna archive from the previous capital, Thebes. Also, some correspondence
may have been transferred to Thebes when the court of Tutankhamun moved back there,
potentially leaving us in the dark about important developments very early or late in the reign of
Akhenaten. This, and the usual vagaries of discovery, need to be kept in mind to ensure sufficient
caution when interpreting the corpus.

Egypt, Mitanni, and Ḫatti during the reign of Amenhotep III

It becomes clear straight away that conflict between Mitanni and Ḫatti was a reality before
Akhenaten became king. In EA 17, Tušratta of Mitanni informs Amenhotep III of a victory he has won
over the Hittites, sending some of the booty to Egypt, as a present, but in all likelihood also to
corroborate his story and show himself as a valuable ally. In the legible remainder of the
correspondence, however (EA 19-25), emphasis is on a mausoleum that Tušratta wants to erect in
honor of his grandfather, various gifts, and a marriage alliance between Egypt and Mitanni. A threat
from Ḫatti does not appear imminent anymore. In fact, the list of gifts that Tušratta sends to Egypt
on one occasion (EA 22), includes over 6000 arrows of various kinds and other military equipment
that Tušratta would have required for his own troops if he had been at war. In EA 23, he even talks
about sending his goddess, Šauška of Nineveh, to Egypt for a visit. If his country had been in danger,
one would have expected him to want her close. As such, it is tempting to link any evidence of a
brief clash between Ḫatti and Mitanni, followed by a period of relative peace, to the time of
Amenhotep III.

Tušratta’s situation appears to change before the death of Amenhotep, however. In one of his last
and longest extant letters to the Egyptian king, EA 24, he requests molten gold statues of his sister
and daughter, both in Egypt as Amenhotep’s “alliance wives” (EA 24, §25). Maybe the statues would
have been of sentimental value only, but they may also have been intended to be displayed
prominently, as official reminders of the close alliance between Mitanni and Egypt and therefore as
a warning to anyone with hostile intentions against Tušratta’s realm that Egypt would not remain
passive in the event of an attack.

The latter is suggested by the next section of the same letter (§26). Tušratta proposes an agreement
of mutual military support between Egypt and Mitanni, suggesting that Mitanni may have been
under pressure. In §27, he mentions something good that Amenhotep had done for the people of
Awar (and possibly for others as well, the text is damaged). Without that act, Tušratta would have
been “very distressed”. As it is, he feels great relief. In the same section, he expresses concern about
a possible disinformation campaign against him, urging his counterpart to believe nothing unless it
comes from Mane or Keliya, the official messengers between Mitanni and Egypt. There is no talk of
war in the readable parts of the letter, but Amenhotep had clearly made Tušratta feel safer.
Regarding the gold statues, Amenhotep died before they were delivered, and the affair was handed
down to his son, Akhenaten.

Meanwhile, relations between Egypt and Ḫatti appear to have been cordial. The only extant letter of
the Amarna collection that is likely to have been sent to Amenhotep, EA 44, was written for a Hittite
prince who introduces himself as Zita. It is courteous in tone and mentions the usual exchanges of
gifts. Zita sends “a present of 16 men”. In return, he hopes for gold.
Egypt, Mitanni, and Ḫatti during the reign of Akhenaten

The Hittites reduced Mitanni, and Tušratta was killed, during the reign of Akhenaten (Murnane 1990,
p. 6-9), but the Amarna letters show little evidence of this significant development. Military reports
will of course have been stored in a different archive, not in the so labelled “Place of the Letters of
the Pharaoh” (Moran 1992, p. xvi), the palace room in which our “Amarna letters” were originally
found. Our only chance to learn anything about the “first steps on the Road to Kadesh” from this
source is therefore the associated political correspondence.

After the death of Amenhotep, Tušratta writes a letter to Tiye, his widow and the new king’s mother,
attempting to solicit her support in receiving the solid gold statues mentioned above (EA 26). He
feels short-changed by Akhenaten, who had sent gold-plated wooden statues. Curiously, Tušratta is
now talking about statues of himself and his daughter (EA 27, 19-27). His sister is not mentioned.
Whether this apparent discrepancy is due to a missing letter, damage to extant ones, modern
misunderstanding, death, or some other reason, will not concern us here.

Akhenaten had initially showed interest in good relations with Mitanni (EA 27, 7-12), but now
Tušratta has to positively beg for some token of respect and affection. One might speculate about
the Amarna king being stingy or out of pocket, but considering the importance of diplomatic gifts, it
should be considered that his reluctance may indicate a downgrading of the relationship with
Mitanni, from “ally” to “neutral”. This would have hinted to Šuppiluliuma that Egypt was not going
to interfere in what has become known as the First Syrian War (for terminology cf. Cordani 2011b).

The two final letters if one follows the order proposed by Moran (EA 28 and 29) provide little
additional information, but it becomes clear that the relationship between Tušratta and Akhenaten
was not a happy one. The king of Mitanni accused Akhenaten of being obstinate in matters of
releasing various messengers back to their respective lords, growing increasingly frustrated (e.g., EA
28, 20-28). As no letters from Akhenaten to Tušratta have survived, it is hard to determine whether
we are observing poor chemistry or political calculus by the Amarna king.

It is, perhaps, noteworthy that, even in what appears to be his last extant letter to Akhenaten,
Tušratta remains concerned with his mausoleum project (EA 29, 143-147, 162-165). He is clearly not
aware of any signs of the First Syrian War, the Hittite campaign that will bring the demise of his
kingdom and the end of his own life. Cordani (2013) believes that the Mitannian correspondence
was cut short by the outbreak of hostilities.

Apart from Zita’s message, in all likelihood sent to Amenhotep III, only two letters from Ḫatti are
preserved in a legible state in the Amarna corpus1. Both appear to have been sent either to
Akhenaten or a later king.

In the first (EA 41), the sender identifies himself as “Šuppiluliumaš, Great King, King of Ḫatti”. The
recipient is referred to only as “Ḫuriya”, which allows for almost any throne name that contains
“ḫprw-Rˁ”. This could be either Neferkheperure Akhenaten, Ankhkheperure Neferneferuaten or
even Smenkhkare, or Nebkheperure Tutankhamun (Dodson 2018, p. 55). Even Kheperkheperure Ay
is a fit, at least theoretically, although the abandoning of Akhetaten as royal residence during the
reign of Tutankhamun would seem to rule him out. Expressly excluded is Amenhotep III, whose
praenomen (throne name) was Nebmaatre, rendered as Nibmu(w)areya, Mimmureya, Nimmureya
or similar in the Amarna correspondence (Moran 1992, p. 383).

1
EA 43, which “refers to malicious men and someone’s murder”, has been marked by Moran (1992, p. 116) as “too
fragmentary for translation”. Sign forms, according to Moran, point to a Hittite origin.
The tone of the Hittite letter is friendly. Šuppiluliuma is clearly seeking to establish positive relations
with a new king of Egypt, continuing the friendship that existed during the reign of that king’s
predecessor. This definitely suggests a pre-war situation, in the view of this author.

Akhenaten would be a likely addressee, as we have reason to believe that Amenhotep III had good
relations with Ḫatti. Tutankhamun, on the other hand, should definitely be ruled out, unless his
father didn’t start the war against Ḫatti after all2. As will be shown, such a scenario is likely.
Šuppiluliuma sends gifts to his correspondent, despite the fact that the new king is holding such
presents back (EA 41, 14-15). Ironically, it would seem that the matter again relates to statues.

The few legible fragments of the next letter from Ḫatti (EA 42) suggest that a serious diplomatic
faux-pas has occurred: Šuppiluliuma is furious about his Egyptian counterpart having placed his own
name “over” that of the Hittite king in a tablet, and accuses him of upsetting good relations. There is
no hint of war, but on a personal level at least, relations are strained. The fragment contains no
names, but a petrographic study confirms its Hittite origin (Goren et al. 2004, p. 32).

The end of Mitanni

As stated above, the Amarna correspondence has little to contribute on the demise of Mitanni, the
Hurrian kingdom of Tušratta, during the First Syrian War. In no particular order, ˁAbdi-Ašratu, one of
the strongmen of Amurru, who claims loyalty with Egypt, reports an attempt by “the king of the
Ḫurri forces” to take his land (EA 60, 13-19). Rib-Hadda of Gubla (Byblos) tells pharaoh that “the king
of Ḫatti has seized all the countries that were vassals of the king of Mittani” (EA 75, 35-48). In EA 58,
which is badly broken, one Teḫu-Teššup informs Egypt of a military expedition conducted by the king
of Mitanni. No details can be discerned, but something happens at “the waters”. Rib-Hadda also
mentions an expedition by the king of Mitanni. He “came out as far as Ṣumur, and though wanting to
mar[ch] as far as Gubla, he returned to [h]is own land, as there wa[s n]o water for him to drink” (EA
85, 51-63). With water being mentioned in both letters, one might speculate that they were
reporting on the same event3. Finally, a damaged letter, written by an unknown sender, maybe the
Egyptian vassal Akizzi of Qaṭna (Moran 1992, p. 129), speaks of a messenger from Egypt who has
been to Mitanni and found “3 or 4 kings who were hostile to the king of Ḫatti” (EA 56, 36-42). With
this, we lose sight of Mitanni.

Hittite encroachment

EA 51, written on behalf of Addu-nirari from Nuḫašše, reveals that his territory had been added to
the Egyptian empire by Thutmose III (Manaḫpiya). He reports that the king of Ḫatti had approached
him with an offer of alliance. Addu-nirari had rejected the offer and professes continued loyalty with
Egypt. He does, however, request military support. Not all the letter is legible, but it may be inferred
from what remains that territory had been removed from Egyptian control and that a threat to
Nuḫašše existed.

2
Bryce (1990) cites the accession date of Šuppiluliuma proposed by Wilhelm and Boese as a reason to argue that the letter
may have to be dated post Akhenaten. In that case, according to Bryce, the friendly tone would categorically rule out any
possibility of war between Egypt and Ḫatti during the reign of the Amarna king. Bryce also quotes Wilhelm and Boese as
arguing that “Ḫuriya” might have been “a haplographical error for ana [Ana]Huriya”, meaning “to [Ankh]kheperure”, who
would today be identified as Neferneferuaten. It is of course also possible that the Hittite court was aware of two Egyptian
rulers and deliberately truncated the throne name in an effort to address both of them at the same time, leaving it to the
Egyptian court scribe to sort out the finer details during their presentation of the letter.
3
Intriguingly, the “Deeds of Šuppiluliuma” mention a water problem in connection with Mitanni as well: “The harvest
which was [ ……, ……. ] in Wašukan[ni …….] there was no water at all” (Fragment 26, XXXIV, 23 ii, Güterbock 1956b, p. 85).
The region of Nuḫašše is generally thought to have been located somewhere between Aleppo and
Ḥama, according to Goren et al. (2004, p. 92), to the north of modern Lebanon. The letter reveals
the extent of Hittite “infiltration” into the northern borderlands of the Egyptian empire at some
point during the Amarna period. Later, Aziru of Amurru will confirm a Hittite presence in Nuḫašše
and express a fear that the Hittites may move into his own land (EA 167, 11-15). Cordani (2013)
explains that Nuḫašše had been under Mitannian control and “was probably compelled by the
defeat of Tušratta” to make contact with Egypt.

Egypt neglects the border countries – or so it appears

A recurring theme in the Amarna correspondence is the call for troops. Vassals kept accusing their
local enemies of attacks on Egyptian interests, clearly in an attempt to lure pharaoh into bolstering
their defences. In the north, however, a Hittite menace begins to manifest itself, and the calls for aid
sound increasingly sincere.

EA 59 is a message from the citizens of Ṭunip. They remind pharaoh that Manaḫpirya (Thutmose III)
used to rule their city. But now, they have not received a single message for 20 years, despite several
attempts on their part. This implies a very long time, whether the 20 years are taken literally or not.
They feel abandoned. Their ruler Aki-Teššup has died, it seems, and they ask for his son, who is in
Egypt, to be sent home. EA 59, 21-33, may imply that the ruler of Ṭunip died a violent death in Hittite
country:
“And now Aziru is going to hear that in Hittite territory a hostile fate has overtaken your servant, a ruler (and) your
gardener. Should his (the king’s) troops and his chariots be delayed, Aziru will do to us just as he did to Nii. If we ourselves
are negligent and the king of Egypt does nothing about these things that Aziru is doing, then he will surely direct his hand
against our lord.”

The letter was written after Aziru had entered Ṣumur, a garrison city of the king, relatively late in the
Amarna era, and yet the king appears to have undertaken nothing (EA 59, 34-38).

In a letter to Namḫurya4, Akizzi of Qaṭna alleges that Aziru is in league with Ḫatti, accusing both him
and “the king of Ḫatti” of having robbed Qaṭna (EA 55, 38-66). At the same time, he is certain that
the king’s troops could “certainly take Aziru” if only they were deployed (EA 55, 16-24).

Moran (1992, p. 131) interprets the Ṭunip letter as “a reference to a recent Egyptian defeat”, but
against this is both the longstanding neglect of Ṭunip and Akizzi’s confidence of success, if only
troops would be sent. As such, EA 59 merely documents pharaoh’s continued inaction.

Further south, Rib-Hadda of Gubla, who has his own issues with Aziru, joins the choir of disappointed
vassals by reminding the king that “for years archers would come out to inspect [the coun]try, and
yet now that the land of the king and Ṣumur, your garrison-city, have been joined to the ˁApiru, you
have done nothing” (EA 76, 30-37). Later, the same Rib-Hadda provides evidence of a change in
Egyptian administrational practice: “When the commissioner of the k[ing was wi]th us, it was to
hi[m] that [we used to writ]e; we cannot write t[o hi]m (now)” (EA 85, 75-87).

It cannot, however, be said that Egypt had never done anything. On one occasion, relating to a
situation involving ˁAbdi-Aširta and the navy of Arwada, the king – in all likelihood Amenhotep III –
had responded. But even then, Egyptian action had been far too lenient in the eyes of Rib-Hadda:
“When the archers came out, all the property of ˁAbdi-Aširta in their possession was not taken away,
and their ships, by an agreement, left Egypt” (EA 105, 14-21).

4
In all likelihood an unusual spelling of Napḫururiya, pharaoh Neferkheperure Akhenaten (Moran 1992, p. 383).
But at least the current king’s father had listened to Rib-Hadda, sent archers and taken successful
action, even capturing ˁAbdi-Aširta (EA 131, 30-40). Now however, the enemy is sufficiently bold to
resist Egyptian troops, and Ṣumur is under siege (EA 103-109). This, at least, is the report of Rib-
Hadda.

Egypt intervenes in Ṣumur

At some point, while Rib-Hadda is in Beirut to negotiate an alliance (EA 136, 24-36), members of his
family who are trying to achieve peace with Aziru (EA 136, 6-15) shut him out of his city (EA 136, 24-
36 and EA 137, 14-26). He finds himself in exile at the court of Ammunira (Ḫammuniri) of Beirut. In
several letters sent from there (EA 136-138), Rib-Hadda reminds the king of how his father had
stopped and captured ˁAbdi-Ašrati5, when that ruler seized Ṣumur (EA 138, 26-38). Now Aziru, ˁAbdi-
Ašrati’s son, has done the same thing while also moving against Gubla.

It is a known fact that Egypt’s vassals kept fighting, scheming, and slandering each other, which
makes it difficult to determine what exactly happened in Ṣumur. It does appear though, as if Aziru
went too far in touching that city. While Rib-Hadda is still in Beirut (EA 142, 15-24), his host receives
orders to prepare for “the arrival of the archers of the king” (EA 141, 18-35 and EA 142, 25-31).
Zimreddi of Sidon is also ordered to make such preparations (EA 144, 13-21), while Abi-Milku of Tyre
uses his report on the capture of Ṣumur as an opportunity to accuse that very Zimreddi of actually
being in league with Aziru (EA 149, 64-73).

We only have Rib-Hadda’s angle on the sequence of events. It is therefore possible that the
situation, as the Egyptian commanders found it upon arrival, was less clear-cut than Rib-Hadda had
suggested. Had there been open hostilities between the Egyptian army and Aziru, the latter would
not have gotten off with a mere reprimand. As it is, Egypt left him in charge of Amurru.

Maybe EA 171 belongs here. Aziru assures the pharaoh of his loyalty and blames Yanḫamu for
stalling his attempts to be useful. He also refers to “[Pu]wuru, [the archer]-comma[nder of the king,
my lord]”, who has “reached” him. Aziru claims that the commander has understood the situation
and will speak for him. The presence of archers may place this letter with the Ṣumur incident. Goren
et al. (2004, p. 114) place the origin of the clay used to write it in the region of Ṣumur or Irquata, in a
triangle between modern-day Tripoli and Tartus on the coast and Tell Nebi Mend and Ḥama inland.

Rib-Hadda’s main purpose in life was, it seems, to foil what he perceived to be the evil schemes of
Aziru against himself and Egypt. In EA 126, however, he briefly reports on an additional threat:
Hittite troops have set fire “to the country” (EA 126, 43-52). Illegible text obscures where exactly
they were operating, and the letter is hard to place chronologically, but Rib-Hadda believes that the
Hittites are being mobilized with intention to seize Gubla (EA 126, 53-60). He may have been
paranoid and certainly had an axe to grind, but his reports of Hittites in the vicinity are likely to be
valid.

Rib-Hadda’s successor, Ili-rapiḫ, will later accuse Aziru of having killed a commissioner of the king (EA
139, 12-17 and EA 140, 5-16), of association with Aitakama, an attack on Amqu, and an attempt to
seize that region. He also hints at the king of Ḫatti being “active” (EA 140, 16-33).

5
An alternative rendering of the name ˁAbdi-Aširta, also spelled ˁAbdi-Aširti (Moran 1992, p. 379).
Aziru – the part-time vassal

We know from the preamble of a treaty between Aziru’s grandson, Duppi-Teššup, and Hittite king
Muršili II, that Aziru became a Hittite vassal at some point during the reign of Šuppiluliuma, albeit
not, initially, a dependable one (Murnane 1990, p. 15). For the duration of the Amarna
correspondence though, he consistently professes loyalty to Egypt (cf. EA 156), blaming various
people, like Yanḫamu or the “magnates of Ṣumur”, for stalling his efforts (EA 157, 6-16). This was
likely part of a plea of innocence in the face of various accusations. Aziru speaks of a potential Hittite
threat against his country, but not as something that is already manifesting itself. He merely asks
that pharaoh supply troops in the event of the Hittites actually moving in (EA 157, 25-33).

Virtually all of Aziru’s letters betray a sense of nervousness. Egypt obviously did not trust him, and
he kept having to justify himself, over Ṣumur, but also for allegedly having hidden himself when an
Egyptian messenger, Ḫani, visited (EA 161, 23-34). Aziru swears to have been in Ṭunip at the time
and to have been informed too late (EA 161, 11-22). He was, however, at home when a messenger
from Ḫatti called (EA 161, 47-53), which does little to improve his standing.

Pharaoh complaining that Aziru had “provided for the messenger of the king of Ḫatti, but did not
provide” for pharaoh’s own messenger (EA 161, 47-53), is significant. In a situation of open war
between Egypt and Ḫatti, the very reception of a Hittite messenger would have been treason. As it
is, pharaoh is merely complaining about discourtesy. One may again infer that the situation between
Egypt and Ḫatti had not escalated yet.

Many of Aziru’s letters are replies to pharaoh’s accusations (EA 158, 36-38 / EA 160, 20-32 / EA 161,
11-34 and 47-53), suggesting that Egypt was keeping him under close scrutiny. Where other vassals
lament never hearing from their lord, Aziru is getting more attention than he can want. He has been
in Egypt at least once (EA 161, 4-10) and now appears to have been summoned again (EA 161, 23-
34), looking for excuses to delay the journey (EA 156, 9-14, EA 162, 42-54).

The Amarna corpus contains one letter from the palace to Aziru. It is full of harsh criticism, openly
threatening death “by the axe of the king” in case of disloyalty (EA 162, 33-38). At the same time, it
is obvious that Egypt would prefer to retain Aziru’s service as a vassal. Pharaoh offers him the excuse
of having been set up by others “for their own advantage. They want to throw you into the fire” (EA
162, 30-32). Aziru is also coaxed by the promise that, in case of loyal service, there is nothing “that
the king will not do for you” (EA 162, 33-38).

One of the mistakes Aziru is accused of is to be “at peace with the ruler of Qidša”, the infamous
Aitakama of Kadesh mentioned above, “a ruler with whom the king is fighting” (EA 162, 22-29). Still,
the king leaves open the option that Aziru does perhaps “act loyally”, merely scolding him for
following his own judgment instead of consulting his lord (EA 162, 22-29).

In EA 164 and 165, Aziru offers a final excuse for not making the journey to Egypt: The king of Ḫatti
has come to Nuḫašše, and Ṭunip and Amurru are under threat. Aziru claims to be afraid of the
Hittites who are “only two day-marches” from Ṭunip and might attack the city (EA 165, 28-41). He
desires to remain in Amurru until they have departed from his borders.

At a previous occasion, the Hittites had actually entered Amurru, or so Aziru claims. This had
happened “because the king, my lord, did not let me stay to guard his land” (EA 165, 28-41), clearly
an allusion to a previous, forced journey to Egypt.

Aziru repeats his fears, almost verbatim, in a letter to Ḫaay, his “brother”, who appears to be in
Egypt (EA 166), and in a fragment (EA 167). Again, as before, the Hittites are not invading. It is
merely Hittite operations near the borders that are causing concern.
Finally, having run out of excuses for delaying his journey, the ruler of Amurru finds himself cornered
and announces preparations to appear before the king (EA 164).

Aziru’s second journey to Egypt and the return of Amun into the royal correspondence

Bringing the correspondence of Aziru into a chronological order is notoriously difficult, but one detail
instantly catches the eye of the reader and permits a relative dating of his second appearance in
Egypt: a prominent reference to Amun in a letter to Tutu, a palace official. Aziru claims to be afraid
of the king and of Tutu (EA 164, 27-34), and wants to put Tutu, the king, and the magnates, “under
oath to my gods and to Aman” not to hurt him (EA 164, 35-42). Since the worship of Amun was not
encouraged during the reign of Akhenaten, this should suggest that Aziru’s second journey occurred
after the death of that king.

It might be argued that Aziru was unaware of the ban imposed by the Amarna pharaoh, but against
this is the fact that neither he nor any other correspondent ever use the name of Amun in letters to
the king after Amenhotep III. In addition, Rib-Hadda’s judicious handling of the banned god’s name
suggests that the vassals were well informed.

Rib-Hadda would sometimes invoke Amun in the initial blessing at the beginning of his letters, but
only ever in correspondence with officials like Ḫaya (EA 71), Amanappa (EA 77, EA 86, EA 87), or an
unnamed “magnate” (EA 95)6.

He never used the name when blessing the king, consistently referring only to the Lady of Gubla
(except when sufficiently angry or depressed to skip the blessing altogether, e.g., in EA 93). One
statement stands out in this context: Rib-Hadda claims that “the gods and the Sun and the Lady of
Gubla have granted that you be seated on the throne of your father’s house (to rule) your land” (EA
116, 55-69). This is where one might have expected a reference to Amun, king of the gods. Instead,
Rib-Hadda refers to the Sun.

While clearly avoiding any mention of Amun himself, Rib-Hadda does refer to the official Amanappa
(Amenhotep in Egyptian, “Amun is satisfied”) by his full name, even in letters to the king (e.g., EA 79,
6-12). Other correspondents consistently avoid Amun, even when addressing officials.

Returning to Aziru, it is perhaps not entirely irrelevant that his very life depended on making a good
impression – not to mention the potential repercussions of demanding that a pharaoh swear by a
god whose worship that same pharaoh had personally outlawed. We can probably trust that Aziru
carefully weighed his words before committing them to his scribe.

All this would suggest that the bulk of the Rib-Hadda and Aziru portion of the Amarna corpus should
be associated with Akhenaten, while Aziru’s second journey to Egypt would fall into the reign of a
successor, Neferneferuaten or perhaps even Tutankhamun.

6
Moran (1992, p. xxix) is aware of this, but does not elaborate. The blessings that include Amun are worded as:

EA 71: “May Aman, the god of the king, your lord, establish your honour in the presence of the king, your lord”.
EA 73: “May the Lady of Gubla establish your honour in the presence of the king, your lord”.
EA 77: “May Aman, the god of the king, your lord, and the Lady of Gubla establish your honour in the presence of the king, your lord”.
EA 86: “May Aman, the god of the king, your lord, establish your honour in the presence of the king, your lord”.
EA 87: “May Aman and the Lady of Gubla establish your honour in the presence of the king, your lord”.
EA 95: “May Aman and the Lady of Gubla establish your honour in the presence of the king, your lord”.

It is difficult not to notice that the relatively late EA 87 and 95 omit “the god of the king, your lord”, and that the break
occurs between two letters to Amanappa. EA 73, the first letter to Amanappa, omits Amun. While the facts are duly noted,
given the problems associated with dating the Rib-Hadda correspondence, no conclusions will be drawn.
EA 170 – the Hittites attack Amqu

EA 170 went on file in the royal archive, despite being addressed to Aziru. It was sent by Aziru’s
deputies, Baaluya and Bet-ili. They report that “troops of Ḫatti under Lupakku have captured cities of
Amqu, and with the cities they captured Aaddumi. May our lord know (this). Moreover, we have
heard the following: Zitana has come and there are 90,000 infantrymen that have come with him.
We have, however, not confirmed the report, whether they are really there and have arrived in
Nuḫašše” (EA 170, 14-35).

This is also the moment when Aitakama appears to openly reveal his Hittite allegiance7. In four
letters, almost identically worded, four Egyptian vassals, claiming to be on scene in Amqu, report
that the ruler of Kadesh has assisted the Hittites and set cities of the king of Egypt on fire (EA 174-
176 and EA 363).

Mutual accusations of collusion with enemies of Egypt were common practice among vassals and
cannot always be taken seriously. In this case, however, we have not only four almost identical
letters, but an additional, specific report of a Hittite presence, even naming two commanders, and
we know from EA 162 that Egypt was already at war with Aitakama. After several reports of
sightings, this is the first definite incursion of native Hittite troops into Egyptian territory and may
therefore be the moment when squabbles between more or less loyal vassals gradually turn into
armed conflict between Egypt and Ḫatti.

Aitakama – the traitor from Kadesh

Many of the Amarna letters deal with tensions between Aitakama (spelled Aitukama or Etakkama by
some translators) of Kadesh and other Egyptian vassals.

EA 190, the fragment of a letter from Egypt to a vassal, ordering him to “guard the land of the king,
your lord”, to guard Puḫuru, and also Kadesh and a garrison city, confirms that Kadesh was at some
point a part of the Egyptian empire. The order to guard or be on one’s guard is a recurring formula in
pharaonic letters to vassals.

That Aitakama himself was a vassal is revealed in EA 189, a letter sent by Aitakama to the king of
Egypt. The letter does not state when and to what pharaoh he is writing, but it contains the usual
assurance of loyalty. Aitakama accuses the mayor of Damascus, Biryawaza, of having defamed him
before the king and of having burned his cities. Biryawaza had “allowed all of the cities of the king,
my lord, to go over to the ˁApiru”, but loyal Aitakama had restored them (EA 189, rev. 9-18). He
serves the king, while Biryawaza is causing the loss of the king’s lands (EA 189, 19-27).

The letter is a typical example of the standard mutual accusation scheme that is so frequent in the
Amarna literature. The correspondent is always loyal, while his enemies are always disloyal. The
enemy is therefore attacking cities of the king, while the correspondent is restoring cities to the king.
For Aitakama though, the scheme would not work out. At some point, he was officially branded as a
traitor (EA 162, 22-29). But not yet.

When Akizzi of Qaṭna reports to Namḫurya, in all likelihood Neferkheperure Akhenaten (Moran
1992, p. 383), that Aitakama, supported by Teuwatti of Lapana and Arsawuya of Ruḫizzi, have
attacked Upu, which belongs to Egypt, word on the street is that “the king, my lord, will not come

7
He had been mentioned as a Hittite recruiter in EA 53, but wherever text is legible, his actions are consistently presented
as his own (EA 53, 24-39, EA 151, EA 197). EA 140, 16-33, may describe Aitakama’s part in the attack on Amqu during
Aziru’s stay in Egypt.
forth” (EA 53, 45-51). This again confirms that Egypt had not acted and was not expected to act, not
even against Aitakama, while Akhenaten ruled8.

Akizzi also begs the pharaoh to support Qaṭna, of which he is the ruler, against Aitukama, who, he
claims, is in the service of the Hittites and trying to coerce him to appear before the king of Ḫatti (EA
53, 4-23). This would suggest that Aitakama was already flying the Hittite flag, but Egypt had not yet
intervened militarily (EA 53, 45-55). While Aitakama and his allies are active in Upu, one Tašša is
operating in Amqu (EA 53, 56-62).

How exactly Aitakama finally ended up on the wrong side of Egypt is not revealed in the Amarna
correspondence, but we can see from EA 162, 22-29 that Egypt was at war with him during Rib-
Hadda’s exile (EA 162, 1-6) and before Aziru’s second journey to Egypt (EA 162, 42-54).

As mentioned above, Aziru had been accused of being “at peace with the ruler of Qidša, a ruler with
whom the king is fighting” (EA 162, 22-29). There is no mention of Ḫatti in the context of that letter,
and pharaoh’s boast to Aziru that “you yourself know that the king does not fail when he rages
against all of Canaan” (EA 162, 39-41) is not readily compatible with the idea of a recent, humiliating
defeat in a battle near Kadesh. At the same time, an Egyptian victory over Aitakama would have – at
least temporarily – solved the problem9. The “fighting” would have been over. We are therefore
either looking at low-level action, or a mere declaration of a state of war, with Egypt still preparing
for the actual campaign.

Egypt mobilizes

It is often difficult to assign individual Amarna letters to specific events, but some letters do appear
to be related to Egypt’s mobilization against Aitakama. A very intriguing one is EA 191. It was written
by Arsawuya of Ruḫizza. He has received orders to prepare for the arrival of the archers of the king,
and enthusiastically requests permission to send troops of his own as well, to accompany them into
war. The reason this letter is so interesting is the fact that it was sent by the very Arsawuya who had
been accused by Akizzi of Qaṭna of being in league with Aitakama (EA 53, above). Akizzi had reported
that nobody was expecting the king to act. When he finally did, Arsawuya was either very quick to
ditch his ally, or else the accusation was, as so often, not entirely accurate.

Tiwati is making preparations as well (EA 193). If this is Teuwatti of Lapana, as Moran (1992, p. 385)
seems to think, Aitakama’s second alleged ally would also have deserted him.

Biryawaza of Damascus is standing by “with my troops and chariots, together with my brothers, my
ˁApiru and my Suteans, at the disposition of the archers” (EA 195, 24-32)10.

In the context of Egyptian preparations and the beginning of hostilities, the following letter, EA 196,
is difficult to place. Biryawaza writes to the king, urgently requesting a large force against the king of

8
That Egypt eventually did send archers, both into the Ṣumur situation and against Aitakama, may be related to the
passing of power from Akhenaten to the perhaps more forceful Neferneferuaten. If the latter was indeed Nefertiti, she
would have posed for the traditional pharaonic “smiting scene”, as herself and while she was “merely” a queen, even
trading the ceremonial mace for what appears to be a ḫpš, the short sickle sword carried by army officers. For a photo of
the relief, cf. Dodson (2020, p. 61, fig. 68).
9
Several authors appear to assume that the Egyptian move against Kadesh ended in defeat. This, however, is not
suggested in the “Deeds of Šuppiluliuma”. A successful punitive expedition is equally possible. As such, the boast in EA 162,
in itself, does not suggest that Akhenaten was not the pharaoh who attacked Aitakama. What does speak against placing
EA 162 after an engagement at Kadesh is the absence of any definitive outcome, good or bad.
10
It is worth a passing note that Biryawaza appears to be the only Amarna correspondent willing to admit to connections
with the infamous ˁApiru.
Ḫatti. The garrison of the king has left him. All “the servants of the king [have g]one (run off) [to]
Ḫatti, and all the commissione[rs of the king], my [lo]rd, who came [forth]…” At this point there is a
fairly large gap in the text, which might have referred to the commissioners being defeated.

A defeat might be suggested on the basis of the phrase “who came forth”, which often refers to a
war effort, and by the following legible text, which talks about wives and a daughter-in-law, and
contains the exclamation, “No one has ever done such a thing” (EA 196, 27-33). If this view was
accepted, a “large force” would be requested because a smaller one had been routed.

On the other hand, Biryawaza asks for 200 men “to guard the cities of the king, [my] lord, [un]til [I]
see the archers [of the king], my lord” (EA 196, 33-43). The “deed” referred to above is laid at the
feet of Biridašwa of Aštartu, not the Hittites. This would permit a different interpretation: EA 196
comes before 195 in chronological order. The Hittites are menacingly close, and the few Egyptian
and auxiliary troops in the area have fallen back and regrouped to prepare a viable defence, in the
event of actual Hittite aggression. In so doing, they have left Biryawaza unprotected, and local ruler
Biridašwa is using the situation as an opportunity to attack him. In the usual Amarna vernacular,
Biridašwa has “moved the land of [the king], my lord, and [his] cities to rebellion (EA 196, 33-43). In
that case, EA 196 would merely describe a potential threat and the usual panicked response, not the
aftermath of a defeat.

EA 197, again from Biryawaza, appears to support the second view. Following an incident, in which
horses and chariots had allegedly been given to the ˁApiru and not to the king (EA 197, 1-4),
hostilities broke out between Biryawaza and Biridašwa of Aštartu” (EA 197, 5-12). The affair
escalated into open hostilities between Biryawaza and several of his neighbours. EA 197, 31-42,
clarifies that this letter was written after Aitakama had “caused the loss of the land of Kissa”
(Kadesh) and while Arsawuya and Biridašwa were “causing the loss” of Apu. The king is advised to
“look carefully to his land lest the enemies take it”. Arsawuya is still regarded as an ally of Aitakama,
while we already know that he will soon join the Egyptian mobilization against him (EA 191 above).

This would place EA 196 and 197 before the mobilization and in the vicinity of Akizza’s report of an
attack by Aitakama, Teuwatti and Arsawuya on Upu, with Damascus, and therefore Biryawaza,
remaining loyal (EA 53, discussed above). The advice to the king to “look carefully to his land” would
suggest that Egypt had not yet responded. In this scenario, Damascus became hard pressed by
Aitakama’s betrayal, exacerbated by some vassals aiding him while remaining formally loyal to
Egypt, and the usual rivalries between local rulers. The initial Hittite advance caused fear and
strengthened Aitakama. However, when it became clear that the pharaoh was sending archers,
some of the vassals quickly returned into the fold. EA 195, Biryawaza’s “standing by” letter, would
then have been written before the arrival of the archers and would fit in with the initial Egyptian
mobilization against Aitakama, not after an Egyptian defeat.

A number of other correspondents submit declarations of intent to support archers of the king, e.g.,
EA 201 to EA 206. Whether these belong with the Aitakama correspondence or not, is not readily
determined. They do not yield additional information, and are therefore not relevant for the
purposes of this present paper.

The Hittite Side – Šuppiluliuma and Muršili II

One of the most important Hittite texts on the beginning of hostilities between Ḫatti and Egypt is the
“second plague prayer” of Muršili II11. Egyptian prisoners of war had brought the plague to Ḫatti,
where it killed both Šuppiluliuma and his successor, Arnuwanda, bringing Šuppiluliuma’s younger

11
CTH 378.II, on KUB 14.8, 14.10, 14.11 (Czyzewska 2012, p. 4).
son Muršili II to the throne (Czyzewska 2012, p. 196). When the king wrote his prayers, the plague
had raged unabated “for 20 years”, a phrase that should perhaps be taken to say “for a very long
time”. Muršili had beseeched the gods to reveal the reason for the perceived punishment through
oracle, dream or pronouncement by a man of god, but the divine ones had not answered. Finally,
Muršili finds his answer in the text of two ancient tablets. One deals with a ritual of the Mala River
that had been performed to appease the gods in the past, but not recently. The other reveals to
Muršili that his father Šuppiluliuma had violated a treaty with Egypt by attacking Amqu. When
Muršili approaches the gods about this, they finally confirm that this breach of trust is the cause of
their fury. Muršili begs the gods to relent as Ḫatti has already paid restitution for her crime by the
death of her people. The text of this plague prayer exists in three manuscripts and one small
fragment. In the translation by Czyzewska (2012, p. 234-236), the central part about the broken
treaty with Egypt runs as follows:
The second tablet (deals with) the city of Kuruštama: how the Stormgod of Ḫatti carried the men of Kuruštama to the land
of Egypt and how the Stormgod of Ḫatti made a treaty concerning them (i.e. the men of Kuruštama) and the men of Ḫatti.
Furthermore, they were put under oath by the Stormgod of Ḫatti. Since the men of Ḫatti and the men of Egypt were bound
by the oath by the Stormgod of Ḫatti, and the men of Ḫatti proceeded to turn about; the men of Ḫatti suddenly
transgressed the oath of the gods. My father sent infantry and chariotry and they attacked the border region of the land of
Egypt, the land of Amka, [Manuscript A: And again he sent (them), and again they attacked]. When the men of Egypt
became afraid, [B: they sent again], they came and they asked my father outright for his son for kingship. When my father
gave them his son, as they led him off, they killed him. My father became angry, he went to the land of Egypt, attacked the
land of Egypt and destroyed infantry and chariotry of the land of Egypt. Even then, the Stormgod of Ḫatti, my lord, let my
father prevail by (his) judgement, and so he defeated the infantry and chariotry of the land of Egypt, and he destroyed
them. When they brought back to Ḫatti the prisoners of war whom they captured a plague broke out among the prisoners
of war and they began to die [Manuscript B: kept dying]. When they transported the prisoners of war into the land of Ḫatti,
the prisoners of war brought the plague into the land of Ḫatti. And from that day on there has been continual dying in the
land of Ḫatti. When I found the aforementioned tablet dealing with the land of Egypt, I inquired from the god by an oracle
(saying): “Concerning that thing mentioned earlier (i.e. the oath) which was done by the Stormgod of Ḫatti; because the
men of Egypt and the men of Ḫatti were bound by the oath by the Stormgod of Ḫatti (and) because the damnaššara-deities
(were) inside the temple of the Stormgod of Ḫatti, my lord [Manuscript B: inside the temple of the god], but the men of
Ḫatti on their own suddenly broke the word (lit. transgressed the word). If the Stormgod of Ḫatti, my lord, is angry on
account of it?” This was confirmed.

Muršili here confesses to an unprovoked Hittite attack on Amqu during the reign of his father
Šuppiluliuma. If Manuscript A is followed, a second attack occurred at some point, perhaps after an
Egyptian reaction to the initial Hittite move. The Egyptians sought to establish peace by a most
unusual kind of marriage alliance, appealing to Šuppiluliuma to send one of his sons to become king
of Egypt. When a prince was sent, he died, murdered by the Egyptians en route, according to Muršili.
If the second plague prayer was to be studied in isolation, one might conclude that fallout from the
alleged murder was what led to full scale war. However, the more detailed “Deeds of Šuppiluliuma”,
Muršili’s account of his father’s life, reveal a more complex series of events.

The first fragment of the “Deeds” that deals with events relevant to the Amarna correspondence is
the Hittite war against Mitanni, which is placed in context with a Hittite attack on the region of
Carchemish. Güterbock (1956b, p. 84-85) translates as follows:
And when [my father …………], thereupon to the k[ing of Mitanni he sent a message] and [wrote] him thus: [" ............. I]
came before [ ............. ] (the town of) Carchemish (acc.), the to[wn ...................... ] I attacked, but to thee [I wrote thus]:
'Come! Let us figh[t!' But thou] didst not come [to a battle]. So now [...................... ] and the country to thee wi[th .......... ].
So come and [let us] fight! [ .......... "] But he stayed in (the town of) [Wašukanni], he did not [answer(?) …. ] and did not
[come] to a battle. [So my father went] there after [him]. The harvest which was [ ……, ……. ] in Wašukan[ni …….] there was
no water at all [ ……………… ]the towns which (nom.) [ ………….. were] looted(?) [ ………… ] around [ …………… ] with str[aw (or:
fruit) ………. ]. And again [ ……………… ] to drink [ ……………. t]o my father [ … (broken)

Next, Hittite activities in the regions of Kadesh (Kinza) and Nuḫašše are described, but again, text is
lamentably fragmentary. It does not even become clear whether the Hittites attack or support
Kadesh. In the translation of Güterbock (1956b, p. 85), the fragment reads:
But when [ …………… ] and (the town of) Kinza (nom.) [ ............. ] had been burned [down ………….. ] the army [ …………. ] and
the lords up (there) [ bes[ide ...................... ] in the countrv of Nuḫassi to [my] br[other (?) ………. ]. And they, both of them,
came to my fath[er ......... ] and they [stayed in ……… ] with my father. (next paragraph broken)

The next section of the “Deeds” initially deals with fighting between the troops of Muršili’s brother
and tribal warriors, and then turns to an outbreak of hostilities between Ḫatti and Egypt. We learn
that Šuppiluliuma had at some point, we are not told when, conquered Kadesh, a vassal territory of
the Egyptian empire during the Amarna era, according to EA 189 and 190, and later a traitor to
Egypt, as described above. Later, the Hittites had also conquered Murmuriga and parts of the
territory of Carchemish. Believing their enemies to be cowed, they withdrew the bulk of their army,
leaving only a garrison of 600 men in Murmuriga. The Hurrians seized the opportunity and began a
siege on Murmuriga, while Egyptian troops attacked Kadesh. The Hittites swiftly mobilized and
mounted a counterattack, liberating the trapped garrison. The deployment of multiple armies and a
reference to the mountains of Tegarama in the damaged text may suggest that the war was fought
for some time. When the enemy gave way, Šuppiluliuma moved against Carchemish. With the siege
firmly established, or perhaps not until after the final victory, he ordered his generals Lupakki and
Tarḫunta(?)-zalma to undertake a punitive expedition against Egypt – an attack on Amqa (Amqu).

Šuppiluliuma claimed to have taken Carchemish after a siege of only 7 days, with a “terrific battle”
on day 8 (Güterbock 1956b, p. 95), but one should note Cordani’s (2011b) caution that some time
spans given by Muršili may be symbolic. This part of the “Deeds” is surprisingly well preserved. The
relevant sections of text, according to Güterbock (1956b, p. 92-95), read as follows:
Tribal troops came in multitude and attacked his army by night. Then the gods of his father helped my brother, (so that) he
defeated the tribal troops of the enemy and [slew] them. And when he had defeated the tribal troops, [the country] of [the
enemy] saw him, and they were afraid, and all the countries of Arziya and Carchemish made peace with him and the town
of Murmuriga made peace with him (too). In the country of Carchemish, Carchemish itself, as the one town did not make
peace with him. So the Priest, my brother, left six hundred men and chariots and Lupakki, the commander of ten of the
army, in the country of Murmuriga, (while) the Priest came to Ḫattusa to meet my father. But my father was in (the town
of) Uda and performed festivals. So he met him there. But when the Hurrians saw that the Priest was gone, the troops and
chariots of the Hurrian country came - and Takuhli, the amumikuni, was among them - and surrounded Murmuriga. And
they were superior to the troops and chariots of Ḫatti who were (there). To the country of Kinza, which my father had
conquered, troops and chariots of Egypt came and attacked the country of Kinza. Word was brought to my father: "The
troops and chariots which are up in Murmuriga, the Hurrians have surrounded them!" Thereupon my father mobilized
troops and chariots and marched against the Hurrians (var.: into the Hurrian country). And when he arrived in the country
of Tegarama, he made a review of his troops and chariots in (the town of) Talpa. Then he sent his son Arnuwanda and Zita,
the chief pretorian, from Tegarama ahead into the Hurrian country. And when Arnuwanda and Zita came down into the
country, [the enemy] came against them for battle. Then the gods of my father helped them, [(so that) they defeat]ed [the
enemy]. But the enemy [ ....... ] below the town and went [down] from the town [in order to escape(?) …………. the
mountains of the country of Tegarama [ ............... ]. When [my father he]ard: "Ahead of time he [will go and] escape down
from the town!" - when, however, my father came down into the country, he did not meet the enemy from the Hurrian
country. So he went down to (the town of) Carchemish and surrounded it and [ ....... ]-ed [ ..... on this side] of it and on that
side, (so that) he [surr]ounded it [completely]. The river [ ...... . ] below the place [ ......... ..... ] ships . [ ..... ....... ... ] (he) took,
then] [... (broken)

While my father was down in the country of Carchemish, he sent Lupakki and Tarḫunta(?)-zalma forth into the country of
Amka. So they went to attack Amka and brought deportees, cattle and sheep back before my father. But when the people
of Egypt heard of the attack on Amka they were afraid. And since, in addition, their lord Nibḫururiya had died, therefore
the queen of Egypt, who was Daḫamunzu(?), sent a messenger to my father and wrote to him thus: "My husband died. A
Son I have not. But to thee they say, the sons are many. If thou wouldst give me one son of thine, he would become my
husband. Never shall I pick out a servant of mine and make him my husband! ....... I am afraid!"

(Šuppiluliuma holds a council, and decides to send his envoy Ḫattušaziti to Egypt. In the meantime) until Ḫattušaziti came
back from Egypt, my father finally conquered the city of Carchemish. He had besieged it for seven days, and on the eighth
day he fought a battle against it for one day and [took(?)] it in a terrific battle on the eighth day, in [one] day.

With the extraordinary request by an Egyptian queen, a widow without a son, asking Šuppiluliuma to
send a son of his to become pharaoh, the “Deeds” turn from warfare to the incident that has
become known as the “Daḫamunzu Affair”.
The section of the “Deeds” that follows is of great importance as it contrasts with the events in
Amqu described in the Amarna correspondence. As discussed earlier, Egyptian vassals had been
concerned about the treason of Aitakama of Kadesh and his band of rebels, Teuwatti and Arsawuya,
and had reported apparently unprovoked Hittite incursions into Nuḫašše and, finally, Amqu. They
had called for Egyptian aid, suggesting that Egyptian troops were not initially present in significant
numbers. Nothing in the correspondence had pointed to an Egyptian campaign, which the vassals
would have been obliged to support. Nor was there any hint of the failure of such a campaign. The
calls to prepare for the arrival of the archers seem to have been issued after the events of EA 170
and related letters, not before. However, when an Egyptian envoy, Ḫani, arrived to discuss a possible
marriage alliance with Ḫatti, an angry Šuppiluliuma accused Egypt of aggression. Güterbock (1956b,
p. 97) translates this section as follows:
[" ... ] I [myself] was [ .... friendly, but you, you suddenly did me evil. You [came (?)] and attacked the man of Kinza whom I
had [taken away(?)] from the king of Ḫurri-land. I, when I heard (this), became angry and I sent [forth] my own troops and
chariots and the lords. So they came and attacked your territory, the country of Amka. And when they attacked Amka,
which is your country, you probably were afraid; and (therefore) you keep asking me for a son of mine (as if it were my)
duty.

Šuppiluliuma’s assertion that he was friendly and Egypt suddenly became hostile is in sharp contrast
to Muršili’s plague prayers, which had spoken of the Hittites as the ones who first broke trust. What
also surprises, initially, is that Šuppiluliuma is adamant to have taken Kadesh from “the king of Ḫurri-
land”, i.e., Mitanni. That statement appears to contradict EA 189, where Aitakama claims loyalty
with Egypt. The contradiction is not resolved within these texts, but, as Cordani (2011a) explains,
“Šuppiluliuma defeated and brought back to Ḫatti Šutatarra, chief of Qadesh, along with his sons, at
the end of the First Syrian War (CTH 51.I: A, Obv. 40–43)”.

That Muršili had to consult ancient tablets to realize that, in reality, his father was the culprit and not
Egypt, may be taken as indication of a complex and potentially confusing situation, whether it
initially involved Kadesh or not. Šuppiluliuma, it would appear, had somehow and at some point,
acted on bad information and broken trust unawares – unless Muršili, after 20 years of plague, was
so desperate to be reconciled to the gods that he would confess to anything.

Everything becomes Ḫatti’s fault

Muršili does not provide any detail regarding the initial Hittite attack against Amqu. In particular,
there is no hint to a motive. Maybe this is what has caused so many authors to assume that the
attack must have been preceded by Egyptian aggression against Kadesh, in a conflict that is clearly
documented in the Amarna correspondence. There may, however, be an alternative explanation.

Having captured the ruler of Kadesh and then released him, Šuppiluliuma would naturally have
considered himself overlord over Šutatarra and his sons. Aitakama, however, swore fealty to Egypt.
His later “defection” back to Ḫatti would have been perceived by the Hittites as the restoration of
loyalty. After that, Šuppiluliuma would have felt justified in discouraging any military action against
his servant. With Hittite troops close as Aitakama was fighting Egyptian vassals, some kind of
incident was likely to occur12.

Much later, under intense pressure to explain and rid Ḫatti of a plague, and preferably exonerate
himself from all responsibility, Muršili will take a dim view to his father’s activities in Amqu. Having
discovered an old tablet in the archives, he sees an opportunity to condemn Šuppiluliuma’s actions

12
Murnane’s (1990, p. 20) observation that none of the Amqu incidents, or their respective triggers, were seen as having
“broken the formal state of peace” between Egypt and Ḫatti, would suggest relatively minor incidents or fighting by proxy,
not full-scale campaigns or direct confrontations between Egyptian and Hittite armies.
as the violation of the Kuruštama agreement. And having the king’s evidence presented to them,
after 20 years of failing to explain the fury of the gods, the priests are only too happy to blame Amqu
as the reason for Ḫatti’s trouble.

It is not my intention to speculate about the exact sequence of events that caused both Egypt and
Ḫatti to take the first steps on the “road to Kadesh”. What seems clear, though, is that the situation
described in the Amarna letters best fits with a border incident in Amqu and Egyptian preparations
for a strike against Aitakama, while Šuppiluliuma’s angry outburst to Ḫani must of necessity be
placed after an actual Egyptian attack on Kadesh. The two events are therefore separate in time,
despite the fact that both Amqu and Kadesh, both Egypt and Ḫatti, and even Lupakki (but not
Zitana), feature in both of them.

The identity of Nibḫururiya

Güterbock (1956b, p. 98) quotes Ḫani as saying:

“Nibḫururiya, who was our lord, died; a son he has not. Our lord's wife is solitary. We are seeking a son of our Lord for the
kingship in Egypt, and for the woman, our lady, we seek him as her husband!”

The transliteration from cuneiform supplied by Güterbock is Ni-ip-ḫu-ru-ri-ia-aš, usually interpreted

as Nebkheperure (Nb-ḫprw-Rˁ), which is Tutankhamun. This ties in nicely with the reappearance of
the name of Amun referred to above, which suggests that events reported late in the Amarna corpus
fall into the reign of that king, while the Daḫamunzu affair would have occurred after his death.

The point is that the king had died without a son. How long he had been dead and when and how
the Hittites had first learned about his death is not stated13, but his widow claimed to be faced with
the prospect of having to marry a “servant”. In addition, she confessed to being afraid.

The identity of Daḫamunzu

Since Federn (1960), it has been accepted that “Daḫamunzu” represents the cuneiform version of
Egyptian t3-ḥm.t-nsw, “the king’s wife”. As such, it does not help identify a specific person.

When Akhenaten died, he was succeeded by Ankhkheperure Neferneferuaten, one of the female
pharaohs of Egypt (for a detailed discussion on that ruler see Dodson 2020). Her identity and many
details of her reign are disputed and will not be discussed here14. Some facts, however, are clear,
and will be presented briefly.

Neferneferuaten had a son, stepson or, according to some, even a younger brother, Tutankhaten,
the later Tutankhamun. DNA testing has conclusively proven that Tutankhamun was the son of a
skeletonized mummy found in KV55, who was in turn the son of Amenhotep III and Tiye (Hawass et
al. 2010) and therefore the mummy of either Akhenaten or his full brother. The precise identity of
the mummy depends on the age at death, which cannot be determined at this time due to a lack of
published data (van Cleve 2022).

Whether Tutankhamun was indeed Akhenaten’s own son or perhaps his secretly adopted nephew is,
however, immaterial. A block from Amarna, reused in Ashmunein (documented, including a photo,

13
Which is why the discussion surrounding Tutankhamun’s “delayed burial” is moot. There is no reason why the king
should not have died in spring, as proven by the wreath of flowers on his coffin, while his death did not become known or
relevant to Šuppiluliuma until autumn, when the letter from Egypt reached him (van Cleve 2021).
14
The majority of authors seem to favour Neferneferuaten Nefertiti, Akhenaten’s widow. According to Dodson (2020, p.
83), her rule was a co-regency with Tutankhamun from the start, making it impossible that she should be the Daḫamunzu.
by Dodson 2020, p. 47-49) clearly documents the official policy of the Amarna court, according to
which Tutankhaten (in this case spelled Tutankhuaten) was a king’s son and therefore a legitimate
heir to the throne. The inscription on the block runs:

s3 nsw nht.f mry.f twt ˁnḫ w itn

King’s Son of his body, his beloved, Tutankhuaten

Because of this, Neferneferuaten had a choice: she could govern safely as regent for the young son
of the king until he came of age, or step up and rule in her own name as pharaoh, either alone or in a
co-regency with the boy, as Hatshepsut had done with Thutmose III.

As aptly demonstrated by her royal cartouches, Neferneferuaten chose the latter option. The
cartouches are reproduced here, because they reveal an important aspect of her kingship: not only
did she have access to a legitimate son of the deceased king, but she consistently derived her own
legitimacy from Akhenaten, not from Tutankhamun, and presented herself as acting on behalf of her
husband. In other words, she was – in contrast to Daḫamunzu – not desperate to remarry.

Neferneferuaten’s cartouches are discussed by Dodson (2020, p. 74). Two of the most frequent
combinations of throne name (Ankhkheperure, left) and given name (Neferneferuaten, right) are:

ˁnḫ ḫprw rˁ mry nfr ḫprw rˁ nfr nfrw itn mry wˁ n rˁ

Left: Ankhkheperure, loved by Neferkheperure (Akhenaten)

Right: Neferneferuaten, loved by the Sole one of Re (Waenre, a title unique to Akhenaten)

ˁnḫ ḫprw rˁ mry wˁ n rˁ nfr nfrw itn 3ḫt n hi.s

Left: Ankhkheperure, loved by the Sole one of Re (Akhenaten)

Right: Neferneferuaten, effective for (in the sense of “acting on behalf of”) her husband
To sum up, Neferneferuaten had a “son”, whether her own, a stepson, or even a brother, who would
access the throne in a co-regency or after her death. She defined her rule as acting on behalf of her
husband, in all likelihood Akhenaten. The Amarna administration was firmly in place, which means
that – at least initially – she had a solid power base and no reason to fear. We also know that she
ruled for at least 3 years, due to a graffito in the tomb chapel of Pairy, Theban Tomb TT139 (Dodson
2020, p. 80).

Finally, the reappearance of Amun in the royal correspondence before Aziru’s second journey to
Egypt might just possibly fit with the new king’s policy. The TT139 graffito mentioned above, a
prayer to Amun, contains two poorly preserved cartouches of the new king. Both are of the “Name,
loved by deity” type, but in both cases the name of that deity is lost, apart from the first sign, the
feather i. This would suggest itn (Aten) or imn (Amun). Dodson believes that the second cartouche,
containing the name Neferneferuaten, might just possibly have read “loved by Amun”.

In support of that, it would seem most unusual if both cartouches of the royal name referred
identically to being “loved by Aten”. It is more likely that the new cartouches join Amun to Aten,
offering an olive branch to the old traditions and promising a more tolerant new regime. All this
would suggest that the proscription of Amun had ended by year 3 of Neferneferuaten15.

This tallies with the well-known fact that Tutankhaten changed his name to Tutankhamun soon after
his accession. The obvious similarity between that king’s throne name, Nebkheperure (Nb-ḫprw-Rˁ),
and the Nibḫururiya (Ni-ip-ḫu-ru-ri-ia-aš) of the “Deeds of Šuppiluliuma”, is additional evidence
against the perception of Neferneferuaten as Daḫamunzu. Dodson (2020, p. 79-80) and others reject
the idea outright, as is done here.

Later, when Tutankhamun dies, after a very short reign for such a young king, we are faced with a
different situation entirely. Initially, everything appears to have proceeded in an orderly fashion and
according to plan. The “opening of the mouth” ceremony depicted in the young king’s tomb
(Manassa Darnell 2015) proves without any doubt that Ay acceded to the throne without delay.

The experienced old administrator then appointed general Nakhtmin, often referred to among
Egyptologists as “Nakhtmin B”, to be his own successor. Everything appeared to be in hand, until
Nakhtmin suddenly vanished from history. Details on that disappearance and its consequences can
be found in van Cleve (2021) and the literature quoted there. For the purposes of the present paper,
it will suffice to briefly sum up the situation that both Ay and Ankhesenamun suddenly found
themselves in.

Ay’s rule was bitterly resented by his rival, Horemheb (Kawai 2010), who, it has been alleged, may
even have been involved in whatever happened to Nakhtmin. Without an heir and with the old
Amarna administration gone, Ay must have realized that his archenemy, who was well connected
within the military, would become the next king (as indeed he did). Ay stood to lose his entire legacy.
He may well have been prepared to take drastic measures to prevent that, perhaps even demoting
himself to placeholder king and aspiring co-regent to Zannanza16, his new and powerful successor.

That a ruling pharaoh, Ay or somebody else, was actively involved in the Daḫamunzu affair, can be
deduced from an angry letter sent by Šuppiluliuma to an Egyptian king following the death of his son
(van den Hout 1994). In addition, there is no indication of an interregnum anywhere between
Akhenaten and Horemheb that would have allowed for the Daḫamunzu to act on her own.

15
Should this idea have to be rejected, the second journey of Aziru to Egypt would definitely fall into the sole reign of
Tutankhamun, but before the relocation of the court to Thebes.
16
The name or title of Šuppiluliuma’s son in the “Deeds” (Güterbock 1956c, p. 108).
Meanwhile, Tutankhamun’s wife, Ankhesenamun, was a widow. She had no son, and her very old
protector had no heir. Her own father had been branded a heretic, and her mother was probably
dead. A very young woman, she was one of the last survivors of the 18th dynasty royal family. To
save her position, quite possibly her life, as Horemheb was moving into position to finally grasp the
throne, she may have had no choice but to find safety in a marriage – perhaps even to Horemheb
himself, her former “servant”, who could use her for additional legitimacy. A foreigner on the
throne, of powerful royal lineage but king of Egypt only because and as long as he was her husband,
would have restored both her safety and dignity. She would have retained her title and status as the
king’s wife, t3 ḥm.t nsw, Daḫamunzu. As stated above, such a solution would hardly have appealed
to Neferneferuaten. She was pharaoh, king17 of Egypt.

Discussion

Much has been written on the chronology and sequence of events of Šuppiluliuma’s First Syrian War
and the conflicts that followed. Within that context, the sole purpose of this paper is to establish
which phases of those wars played out during the Amarna era, and whether or not the shift from
Akhenaten to Neferneferuaten and Tutankhamun can be discerned.

The sequence of core events that is proposed here is the following:

- Aziru’s second journey to Egypt occurs during the reign of Neferneferuaten or early in the
sole reign of Tutankhamun, before the relocation to Thebes
- Hittite troops become embroiled in Aitakama’s war in Amqu, Muršili’s “first breach of trust”
- Egypt prepares a punitive expedition against Aitakama, vassals are summoned in support
- The court of Tutankhamun, including the royal archives, commences its relocation to Thebes
once Tutankhamun has become the only ruler; end of the Amarna correspondence
- The Hurrians commence the siege of Murmuriga
- Egypt executes the punitive expedition against Aitakama of Kadesh during the sole reign of
Tutankhamun. The operation may or may not have been a success
- Šuppiluliuma mobilizes his troops, a possibly lengthy war against the Hurrians is fought
- The siege of Carchemish begins
- Death of Tutankhamun, Ay becomes king
- During or after the siege of Carchemish, the Hittites attack Amqu a second time
- Disappearance of Ay’s successor, Nakhtmin B
- Ankhesenamun, backed by Ay, writes to Šuppiluliuma, requesting a prince
- Šuppiluliuma sends Zannanza, who dies
- Ḫatti begins a campaign against Egypt, beginning of the Second Syrian War

Based mainly on Aziru’s demand that pharaoh swear to Amun not to harm him (EA 164), and on the
fact that the letter is part of the Amarna correspondence, it is claimed that Aziru’s second stay in
Egypt must have fallen into the reign of Neferneferuaten or the early years of Tutankhamun, before
the relocation of the court back to Thebes. It is also argued that the Amqu incident that occurred
during Aziru’s stay (EA 170) fits well into the context of Muršili’s “first breach of trust” and less well
into the situation following the Egyptian attack on Kadesh, for which there is no evidence at all in the
Amarna corpus.

The Egyptian attack on Kadesh would have been executed during or after the relocation of the court,
and the – quite possibly significantly later – Hittite revenge attack on Amqu would have occurred

17
There is no separate word in Egyptian for a queen regnant.
shortly before or even after the death of Tutankhamun. Both events are therefore absent from the
Amarna canon.

A potential problem here is that a relatively straightforward sequence of events – the attack on
Kadesh, the war against the Hurrians, the siege of Carchemish, and finally the second attack on
Amqu – would have to be stretched over the best part of the reign of Tutankhamun, certainly six
years or so18.

Filling most of that time with Egyptian preparations for the raid on Kadesh, the following Hittite
campaigns in Murmuriga and against “the Hurrian country” in general, possibly with additional
operations “in the mountains of the country of Tegarama” and maybe elsewhere as well (text is both
damaged and broken again), and finally the siege of Carchemish, it might be plausible that the
fighting would have taken up most of the time Tutankhamun spent in Thebes, not allowing
Šuppiluliuma to avenge the raid on Kadesh until shortly before or even after the death of the young
king of Egypt.

Cordani (2013), and several others, would maintain that “the expedition to Amqa described in EA
170 presents many similarities with an analogous raid reported in DS 28”, one of the fragments of
the “Deeds of Šuppiluliuma”, and that they must therefore at least represent parts of the same
campaign if not specifically the same event. This, of course, is not necessarily the case.

Schulman (1978) counters the idea by citing the three wars fought between Israel and Egypt
between 1956 and 1973, essentially in the same places and by the same commanders. Similarities
between the two world wars come to mind as well. Without detail information, the bombardment of
Scarborough by the German navy might fit well into the context of a sketchy account of WWII.

Groddek (2007) adds that Amqu was a border region and, as such, a natural arena for enemy
attacks19. He sees no reason to insist on one single engagement.

Instead of an early Egyptian attack on Kadesh, this paper suggests a Hittite incursion into Amqu,
perhaps triggered by the wars between Aitakama, who had shifted his allegiance from Egypt back to
Ḫatti, and neighbors who had remained loyal to Egypt. There would, initially, have been no Egyptian
military involvement. In that case, EA 170 and related letters would describe this initial incident,
soon after the reign of Akhenaten, while the “Deeds” tell the story of a later, simultaneous attack by
Hurrites and Egyptians against Hittite interests, and the conflict that followed.

Amqu is likely to have been targeted twice, in two separate campaigns. Muršili’s second plague
prayer was neither an exercise in chronology nor in military history, but a confession of sin. If he says
that “again he sent, and again they attacked”, he is merely confessing that the same transgression
was committed twice, with no reference to the amount of time that passed between the
transgressions. It is therefore not strange that the best part of an entire reign – albeit a short one –
would fit between them.

A final note may be required on the restituted text of KUB 19.15 + KBo 50.24, seen by Miller (2007)
and others as evidence that only Akhenaten can possibly have been Nibḫururiya, despite the obvious
mismatch of the names and everything else that speaks against the equation.

18
If Neferneferuaten ruled in a co-regency with Tutankhamun from the start, as convincingly argued by Dodson, the new
king would probably have spent at least three years of his reign in Akhetaten.
19
As witnessed by the accusation against Aziru regarding an attack on Amqu (EA 140), and by the fragment of a report sent
by an Egyptian vassal. He had repulsed an attack in that region and was sending 10 prisoners to the king (EA 173). The
report cannot be related to the Hittite incursion, unless that was indeed no more than a skirmish.
Miller (2007) expressly states that his hypothesis “collapses completely” if it turns out that
Tutankhamun was Akhenaten’s son, or if Horemheb was already pharaoh when the events described
in the tablets occurred. Both conditions are met:

- The DNA analysis performed by Hawass et al. (2010) confirms beyond reasonable doubt that
Tutankhamun was either Akhenaten’s son or nephew.
- The Ashmunein block referred to earlier demonstrates that Tutankhamun (as Tutankhuaten)
was officially propagated as “king’s son” during the Amarna era, and therefore a legitimate
heir to the throne.
- Horemheb was Muršili’s obvious point of contact when his vassal, Tetti, defected to Egypt.
- Horemheb was the one who acted when the Egyptian vassal Zirtaya defected to Ḫatti20.
- Muršili refers to Zirtaya as Horemheb’s servant, making Horemheb Zirtaya’s lord. It
therefore suggests itself that Horemheb would have been pharaoh when KUB 19.15 + KBo
50.24 was written21.

That Horemheb is referred to by his birth name is unproblematic. KUB 19.15 + KBo 50.24 is an
informal text, talking about Horemheb, not to him. In addition, Muršili and Horemheb “were [not] at
all on [goo]d terms”. It would be perfectly normal for the Hittite king to deny his adversary the
honour of using his throne name.

Horemheb wielded great power under Tutankhamun and certainly Ay, who he barely, if at all,
recognized as king (Kawai 2010). On the basis of this, Devecchi and Miller (2011) suggest that Muršili
would have been sufficiently pragmatic to accept the de facto position of his rival.

Apart from constituting an unusual (but not impossible) departure from the traditions of
brotherhood among Great Kings, such pragmatism would have elevated Horemheb, further
strengthening his position. Because Muršili and Horemheb were on such bad terms, the purposes of
the Hittite king would have been much better served by corresponding with his official counterpart,
the king. It would have put Horemheb, a commoner according to Devecchi and Miller, in his proper
place, instead of encouraging his delusions of grandeur.

In any case, the notion of a Great King treating a commoner as his equal is sufficiently unusual to not
be suggested when all the surrounding evidence stands against it.

Conclusion

The Amarna correspondence appears to document the first incursion of Hittite troops into Amqu,
Muršili’s “first breaking of trust”, but there is nothing to suggest military action of a magnitude that
might cause Egypt to sue for peace. There is also no indication of Egyptian troops having been
deployed against Ḫatti, although preparations for an expedition against Aitakama of Kadesh were
clearly underway. Hittite troops had repeatedly been reported as active near Amqu, but had not yet

20
That Zirtaya could have been some kind of personal servant is excluded both by his writing to a king, and by the fact that
Muršili sent “troops and chariots” to fetch him.
21
Groddek (2007) had arrived at the same conclusion, and for the same reasons, while adding that the situation was a
typical “tit for tat” (“Wie Du mir, so ich Dir”), placing the correspondents on the same level. The response by Devecchi and
Miller (2011), that Groddek had been “overly literal” in his reading of the text, does not convince. Groddek is also clear
about the fact that Nibḫururiya can only have been Tutankhamun.
been confronted by Egypt. Kadesh had not yet been attacked. Of the war between Ḫatti and Egypt,
we have only seen the merest beginning, and maybe not even that.

Finally, a desperate situation for both Ay and Ankhesenamun developed soon after the death of
Tutankhamun. By complete contrast, the passing of Akhenaten had not left behind a frightened,
helpless, and isolated widow in dire need of protection, but a strong, assertive ruler: Ankhkheperure
Neferneferuaten, king of Egypt.

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Page background: Close-up of a limestone relief, originally from Amarna, depicting Nefertiti smiting
a captive on the cabin of her barge. Found at Hermopolis, from the reign of Akhenaten. On display at
the Museum of Fine Arts. Boston, Cat #63.260. Wikimedia Commons. Author: Captmondo. Used
under the Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported (CC BY-SA 3.0) licence.

All hieroglyphs have been written using JSesh 7.5.5, by Serge Rosmorduc (2014)
http://jsesh.qenherkhopeshef.org

22
The author wishes to thank the University of Chicago and Misty and Lewis Gruber for making this publication available
online as part of the Electronic Publications Initiative (EPI). © The University of Chicago. The Electronic Publications
Initiative of the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago | The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago
(uchicago.edu)