The Metaphysics of Buddhist Experience and the Whiteheadian Encounter

Author(s): Kenneth K. Inada

Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Oct., 1975), pp. 465-488
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1398226
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Kenneth K. Inada The metaphysics of Buddhist experience and the
Whiteheadian encounter

In many respects, the metaphysics of Buddhism is equal or even superior to

that of Whitehead's. It is so deep and implicated that, to date, no ample philo-
sophic justification has been accorded it. On the other hand, it falls short of
Whitehead's system in terms of a consistent and systematic treatment, that is,
"to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which
every element of our experience can be interpreted."1 Whitehead was blessed
with a good mathematical and scientific background and the time to mature his
thinking which arise from such a background to touch upon the final things
that count. For all intents and purposes, his metaphysics was nearly complete,
such that he dared to articulate an exhaustive categorical scheme.
With the Buddha, however, we see a different story. Any treatment of any
entity or aspect of reality was suspect for he did not allow any definitive meta-
physicizing, generally referred to as views or points of view concerning reality
(drsti or ditthi).2 Yet, despite strong condemnation of metaphysical views,
we note that in subsequent Buddhist literature, both in the Theravada and
Mahayana traditions, there is a vast array of doctrines dealing with empirical
or phenomenal matters, together with the so-called nonempirical or non-
phenomenal matters, to suggest indeed a serious attempt at a complete ac-
counting of the nature of things. This attempt becomes more prominent with
the Mahayana schools of thought, but the Theravada, or early foundational
doctrines, are kept intact and are only expanded.
In a rather strange way then there is a convergence on a similar philosophical
track by Whitehead and Buddhism. But the convergence is, from the Buddhist
side, unintentional and places some of us who are Western-oriented in an
awkward position of being a bit presumptive in the comparative analysis. More
than this, I suppose, a comparative approach would be strained and pointless
unless we can present a fairly strong case for a Buddhist metaphysics of experi-
ence along the general lines delineated by Whitehead. Therefore, I shall first
try to construct a consistent Buddhist metaphysical basis of experience, one
which is based on the faith and premise that the Buddhist view of reality is
complete and sufficient.
I. BUDDHIST REALITY

General Remarks
Within a few centuries of the Buddha's demise, Buddhism distinguished itself
from other "forsaken ways" by the well-known Three Marks (tri-laksana),
that is, impermanence (anitya), non-self (anatman) and the enlightened state
of existence (nirvana). Later on, universal suffering (duhkha) was added to
make the Four Marks. Buddhist literature is replete with references to these
doctrines as a way of extolling the Buddhist way of life, but there is hardly any
systematic accounting of them in ways that would render understanding their
true import clear and unmistakable. In the highly metaphysical treatment of
dharmas, such as in the Abhidharmasection, the analysis turns out to be too

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466 Inada

succinct, too abstract, and too presumptive of basic Buddhist knowledge.

Given this state of affairs, it is indeed significant that Buddhism was able to
perpetuate itself by reaching down to the masses and commanding their atten-
tion; given the same state of affairs, on the other hand, it is indeed understand-
able why there have been generated so many variant and misleading conceptions
in the name of Buddhism. This certainly calls for a reexamination of what we
call Buddhist reality.
The four doctrines mentioned earlier are, to be sure, crystallizations of
Buddhist thought over the years, but they are nevertheless good indicators and
guidelines to follow in any metaphysical understanding. In many ways, they
constitute the marks of Buddhist reality, in the sense that any and all entities
or elements of experience must be in conformity with them. To the non-
Buddhist, it is rather difficult to comprehend, without adequate exemplification,
the nature and function of these marks.
The first factor to note is that the four doctrines are not principles which
govern or order the nature of existence. They are purely descriptive of true
reality and never deterministic in any way. Moreover, none is aloof from the
empirical nature of things. As a matter of fact, it is really the other way around,
that is, each is educible from the empirical nature of things. The second factor
is that all four have the character of mutually amplifying and defining each
other. They involve or implicate each other and are not separated or given an
independent status of whatever nature. For example, the doctrines of imper-
manence and non-self have a similar character in that as non-self is the "on-
tological" opposite of self (atman), so is impermanence the opposite of per-
manence (nitya). As such, both are antithetic to any persisting entities and both
point at the selfsame facet of reality. The third factor is that nirviana, as the
enlightened content, is at once in harmony, indeed identifiable, with the nature
expressed by the doctrines of impermanence and non-self. These three doctrines,
as the Sanskrit language reveals, are negative terms depicting the reality of
things. The other side of these negative terms, of course, is the fact of universal
suffering (duhkha). Suffering has then an unique function and meaning in
Buddhism. It is the starting point but a point that is not left behind or completely
obliterated without "traces" or references. It remains just as much a part of
reality, albeit in a deficient sense. And herein lies the basis for the inclusive and
extensive nature of Buddhist reality.

The Genetic Structure of Experience

No one intent on understanding the basic elements of experience could ill afford
to gloss over the Abhidharmasection of the Tripitaka [Three baskets of knowl-
edge]. As stated earlier, this section is a very abstract presentation, which
rambles on in detail and repetition of the mass of doctrines and factors of
experience, including the subtle factors leading to the enlightened realm; but

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467

it must be granted that the section, being a later development in Buddhist litera-
ture, does integrate, focus on and give a structural analysis of experience. It
brings into focus the principal ideas manifest in the Sutra (Discourses) and
Vinaya (Disciplines) sections.
It is to be noted that the structural nature of experience is not forsaken by
the Mahayana developments, although some schools may show trends of
denying or not bothering with such a scheme. And in time no doubt some
modern scholars will take up such trends and analyze only those unique features
beyond the basic Abhidharmic thought, in order to confer independent statuses
to the schools in question. This is too simplistic and erroneous. It runs counter
to the Buddhist spirit of "unity and diversity" and does not heed the advice
enunciated so clearly by the various patriarchs from Nagarjuna, Buddhaghosa,
Hui-neng to Shinran that they were only transmitting what the Buddha had
taught. One case in point is the philosophy of Vasubandhu. He was an Abhi-
dharmist converted to Mahayana at the instigation of his brother Asafiga. But
conversion was not abandonment of previous doctrines. In the subsequent
school which Vasubandhu helped to establish, the Vijfianavada (Fa-hsiang,
Consciousness-only or Phenomenalistic school), the basic structure of experi-
ence is retained but rendered more elaborate and accommodative by way of
the 100 dharmic analyses. In the analysis, Vasubandhu was careful to give due
respect to the foundational elements but added new elements or phases of
experience in order to present a more consistent and coherent nature of the
highly complex functions of the mental pole. Let us keep this in mind and
return to the discussion at hand.
The genetic structure of experience has been described in different ways,
from the general to the more specific and detailed.
1. Five skandhas (constituents of being)
a. rupa (corporeal nature of being)
b. vedana(sensitivity or general feeling of being, in the sense that a being is a
"bundle of feeling")
c. samjha (integrated awareness of perceptual objects)
d. samskara (activity in the being relative to the perceptual objects)
e. vijiana (discriminative play of ideas or concepts based on the perceptual
objects)
The five skandhas are listed serially to show the genetic flow, the continuity,
from the basic corporeal nature and up to the conscious realm. Each component
implicates or flows into the other realm. In the already complex organism that
we are, the inception of any particular experience is hard to pinpoint or locate,
because we must be mindful of the doctrines of anitya and anatman. The early
Buddhists spoke of sixteen moments of existence before one becomes conscious
of a perceptual object. The moments in question are the momentary flow within
the skandhas. Thus, according to this theory, we are forever "looking" to the
past moments for the thing or object.

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468 Inada

2. Twelve ayatanas (bases of Being)

Six "internal" bases: Six "objective" bases:
A. Sense faculties (indriyas) B. Objective realms (visayas)
1. eye (caksus) 7. eye objective datum (rupa)
2. ear (srotra) 8. ear objective datum (sabda)
3. nose (ghrdna) 9. nose objective datum (gandha)
4. tongue (jihva) 10. tongue objective datum (rasa)
5. body (kaya) 11. body objective datum (sprastavya)
6. mind (manas) 12. mind objective datum (dharma)
The best way to describe the ayatanas is by reference to the empiricist's
(Humean) accounting of perceptual process, that is, that one sees with the eye,
hears with the ear, etc., with the rise of the respective attendant subjective-
objective components. In this way, there is no mere subject or mere object apart
from the ongoing process. The one advance of the Buddhist, here, is the treat-
ment of the mind as just another sense faculty, an integrative one, whose
objective components are by and large fed by way of the five senses. The mind
is never closed in this sense but always remains a fluid force which integrates
as well as gives direction to the continuity of being.

3. Eighteen dhatus (spheres or regions of being)

1. ear faculty 13. consciousness by way of the eye
2. ear faculty region or realm (caksur-vijhina)
3. nose faculty 14. consciousness by way of the ear
4. tongue faculty region of realm (srotra-vijhdna)
5. body faculty 15. consciousness by way of the nose
6. mind faculty region or realm (ghrana-vijhana)
7. eye objective datum 16. consciousness by way of the
8. ear objective datum tongue region or realm (jihv5-vijhcna)
9. nose objective datum 17. consciousness by way of the
10. tongue objective datum body region or realm (kaya-vinjhna)
11. body objective datum 18. consciousness by way of the
12. mind objective datum mental objects (mano-vijhana)
As can be seen, the dhatus are further analysis of the ayatanas. They detail the
"conscious" realms of the faculties and show the interpenetrative nature of
all. The movements can be seen in different ways, that is, across numbers
1-7-13, 2-8-14, etc., downward numbers 1 through 6, 7 through 12, etc., any
combination across and downward, or just number 18 as a collective organiza-
tion of the whole process. It is with the dhatus that the philosophy of Vasuban-
dhu, Vijfianavada, begins by the elaborate analysis of the Eight-Vijiana Theory
and makes way for a greater cosmological treatment of the nature of being.

4. Dharma theory (factors or forms of experience)3

I refrain from enumerating the number of dharmas due to involvements of
space and time. Suffice it to say that they range from seventy-five for the
Sarvastivada to one hundred for the Vijfianavada. In this genetic structuring
of experience, once again, the basic skandhas, indriyas, visayas, dhdtus, and

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469

vijhanas are incorporated and given their due import, but it goes further in
elaborately analyzing the activities relative to the mental (caitasika or citta-
samprayukta-samskara) and nonmental (citta-viprayukta-samskdra)forms of
experience. For example, greed, ill will, anger, arrogance, shame, idleness, etc.,
are considered to be mental dharmic factors or forms; and acquisition, life-
force, subjective-objective components, life, and aging are nonmental factors.
In either case, these dharmasdescribe and alter the nature of one's being.
One of the greatest contributions or insights of the early Buddhists (perhaps
attributable directly to the historical Buddha) and followed very closely by
the Mahayana, is to divide the dharmic factors into the "constructive" or
"creative" (samskrta-dharmas)and the "nonconstructive" or "noncreative"
(asamskrta-dharmas)realms. The former is the category of the formed or that
which has been carved out, something done within the existential process. There
is a carving-out phenomenon of existence in that it is the result of appropriation
by way of the dharmic forces, ending in fragmentation of the process. The
latter (asamskrta-dharmas),however, is the exact opposite of the former. It is
the realm where the existential process is not strained, hindered, or hampered
by any of the dharmic factors. Thus although this category has also dharmic
character, it does not have it in the same manner as the former. For example,
one of the "nonconstructive" dharmas is space. Space is an universal dharma
in the sense that it exists pervasively throughout the total existential process.
It is neither a locatable nor manipulable dharma. It is not here or there but
always remains a vital component of any experience. Another example is the
nature of suchness or thusness of being (tathata), which is the result of achieving
enlightenment. Nevertheless, it functions thereafter as a "nonconstructive"
dharmic force of existence. Thus we observe that there must be an internal
consistency to all human experience, from the ordinary duhkha-bound realm
to the unbounded enlightened realm of existence. The Abhidharma thought
made it clear that no extraneous or transcendental force or factor is introduced
to explain the seen and unseen factors of experience. This is a basic position
which shows up in force in the subsequent developments of the Mahayana but
which scholars have tended to overlook.
We have now gone through a tedious abstract analysis of the Abhidharma
genetic structure of experience but have left out the crucial examination of the
term, genetic. The term is what makes possible the structural dynamics of
experience or what explains the nature of the experiential process itself. The
heart of the matter is to be seen in the next important doctrine.

The Experiential Process (pratitya-samutpada)

The Buddha, in a rather general way, explained to his disciples the causal nature
of experience in terms of the often quoted format (not formula) thus: "This
being, that becomes; from the arising of this, that arises; this not becoming,
that does not become; from the ceasing of this, that ceases."4 The format is

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470 Inada

applied to the famous Twelve-membered Wheel of Life which begins with

ignorance (avidyd) and ends with aging and death (jardmarana). So the popular
translation reads, "Conditioned by ignorance arise the play of perceptual
objects (samskara), conditioned by the play of perceptual objects arise con-
sciousness (vijhina), etc."
The Wheel of Life is technically known as pratTtya-samutpada(Sanskrit), or
paticca-samuppida (Pali). It is one of the most crucial concepts in Buddhism,
perhaps the alpha and omega of life-concept. The term is referred to in Early
Buddhism as the nidana doctrine because it exhibits the linking of the different
phases of experience, thus indicating the basis or ground of experience itself.
PratTtya-samutpadahas been translated in such various ways as, "causal
chain," "chain of causation," "causal genesis," "dependent origination,"
"theory of twelve causes," "relational origination," "conditioned origination,"
"dependent coarising," "dependently-coordinated-origination," etc. However,
one thing is clear; it is not a strict causality principle or a simple causation
theory. It is not a universal law or a formula that governs the order or the
cosmology of the world or the individual. In essence, it only depicts the multi-
faceted dependent or relational nature of ordinary experiential process, that is,
how events come and go or arise and subside. Most importantly, it has reference
to the concept of duhkha (suffering). In this respect, it is also synonymous with
the concept of samsara, the duhkha-bound cycle of being. The cycle is usually
referred to as the life-death cycle of being, to emphasize the incessant rounds
of grasping for something in the unenlightened realm of existence.
Let us pause here to examine the term in its Theravada (Hinayana, Abhid-
harma) and Mahayana senses. The great Russian Buddhologist, Th. Stcher-
batsky, made a remarkable distinction between the two as follows: "In Hina-
yana, in a word, we have a radical Pluralism, converted in Mahayana in as
radical a Monism."5
I wish to take exception to this assertion which has misled many since its
publication. In a very fundamental sense, Stcherbatsky has fallen into a mental
trap of his own making. He is eager to classify both schools as belonging rigidly
into the camps of either pluralism or monism. His logic is very simple. If a
school does not assert the categories of substance, quality, and motion but
admits the reality of sense data and the elements of the mind (dharmas), then
it must be a pluralistic system.6 If, on the other hand, a school looks at reality
as possessing a reality of its own (sva-bhava),something unproduced by causes
(akrtaka-asamakrta)and not dependent upon anything else (paratra nirapeksa),
then it must be a monistic system.7 His logic contains sweeping generalizations,
which may make sense from the general standpoint, but goes drastically
counter to the nature of Buddhist experience. Let us examine his point closely.
He elaborates:
In Hinayana the elements, although inter(de)pendent (sam.skrta-pratitya-samut-
panna), were real (vastu). In Mahayana all elements, because interdependent

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471

(Italics his) were unreal (sunya-svabhava-suinya).In Hinayana every whole

(rdsi-avayavin)is regarded as a nominal existence (prajhaptisat) and only parts
or ultimate elements (dharma) are real (vastu). In Mahayana all parts or ele-
ments are unreal (sunya), and only the whole, i.e., the Whole of wholes (dhar-
mata-dharma-kiya), is real.8

The most questionable interpretation in the preceding passage is with respect

to the term, "pratTtya-samutpanna," which he translates as "interdependent."
This presents a strong relational or coordinated connotation. He thinks that
the interdependent nature at once issues forth a kind of reality. It is tantamount
to saying that mutuality (paraspara apeksa) is sufficient to produce reality in
the Abhidharma or Hinayana system. Thus, according to him, for the Hinayana
the term signifies a phenomenon of dharmas in such a state; whereas, for the
Mahayana, it becomes the basis for the unreality (sunya) of the dharmas.
Furthermore, he is satisfied with the definition that dharmas are separate
entities or forces, that existence is an interplay of a plurality of subtle, ultimate,
and not further analyzable elements of matter, mind, and forces.9 These
dharmas obey the causal law of "dependently-coordinated-origination" (pra-
titya-samutpada).10
It is clear that Stcherbatsky has centered on the concept of ultimate elements
of existence to construct the basic Buddhist metaphysical position. (Indeed,
the title of his work, The Central Conception of Buddhismand the Meaning of
the Word, "Dharma," says so much.) It was a convenient position to arrive
at, but one that had a basic shortcoming, that is, a case of mistaken emphasis.
He saw or tried to see the elements (dharmas)first and not the process (pratltya-
samutpada). Or, he placed the primacy of the elements over that of the process.
In a way one cannot be too harsh on his oversight here, because he, as everyone
else, is accustomed to stress on the visible or tangible nature of things. So, once
establishing pluralism in Early Buddhism, he had nowhere to turn but to
monism of the Mahayana type to account for the so-called unreality (sunya)
of things.
The correct (proper) view of reality should be (as has always been in Bud-
dhism) on the experiential process and that within which the attendant factors
or forms (dharmas) should be understood as defining or characterizing that
process. The reality of experiential events is undeniable, but the manner in
which man describes his experience is in question.
By way of expansion, it should be noted that all of Nagarjuna's polemics
against the Abhidharmic views, starting with the initial chapter on Pratyaya
(Relational Condition), are lodged not so much on the "elements" of existence
(dharmas) per se as it is on the manner in which the dharmas are foistered into
the dominant position in the experiential process (pratitya-samutpdda).Whe-
ther it is the Abhidharmika or Madhyamika the process is granted, but the
way in which it is explained shows up the difference. The Abhidharmika stressed
the evanescent momentary dharmic states as they come and go, hence, their

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472 Inada

"realities." The Madhyamika, on the other hand, sought the basis for the
coming and going phenomenon with the "shadowy" existences of the various
dharmas. Thus, the fact of relational condition (pratyaya) or interdependent
nature (paraspara-apeksa) is not sufficient to explain the unique experiential
process. In the Prasannapadil1, Candrakirti explains that the term pratTtya
is a gerund signifying the phenomenon of "reaching" or "extending over," and
the term samutpada means origination or manifestation of the momentary
event. Thus in conjunction, pratltya-samutpada, refers to the dynamics of
momentary experiential existence.
The concept of duhkha again enters at this point. In a very significant sense,
it has direct reference to the experiential process in terms of pointing to the
inability to understand the nature and function of the process. That is, any
dharmic reference to the Wheel itself or its twelve components hampers under-
standing of the Buddhist nature of existence. The Wheel is not to be seen in
terms of the components or segments but as the continuity, the linking (nidana)
process itself. If one is able to see the Wheel in the latter sense, then the Wheel
turns either clockwise (anuloma) or counterclockwise (patiloma), or serially or
aserially, that is, it turns at a nondesignatable referential point. This is indeed
cryptic but not in the sense of the transcendental or impossible.
The concept of duhkha is basically in the "constructive" or "creative"
(samskrta) realm of existence.12 As all dharmas are forms of grasping phe-
nomena, the dharmic reference is decidedly forced or strained. As we know,
basic Buddhist teaching says that suffering is owing to desires or passions
(trsna) and the attachments (upadana)thereof. Now, in the above analysis, the
dharmas are the mental conformations (samskira) which are adhered to in the
entifiable sense. Such adherence is, to be sure, the very basis of consciousness
(vijhana,vikalpa),where postulated entities must be clear and distinct. However,
the postulational is narrow and limited as compared with the esthetic nature
of experience which goes beyond any circumscription.
Let us now expand on the inordinate nature of the experiential process. It
should not be doomed or fated to duhkha. Duhkha, after all, only refers to the
samsaric realm of existence. One need not be tied down to it. In fact, as sug-
gested all along, the tying-down process is of one's own making due to the
upadina-objectifying phenomenon. Even the Theravada tradition made it plain
that the grasping of the skandhasentails a basic form of suffering(pahcaskandha-
upadana).13But it was Nagarjuna who gave the clearest expression to the bold
insight that the samsaric realm is only the "covered" side of reality (samvrti-
satya), in the famous verses treating the spheres and limits of the twin concepts
of samsara and nirvana.'4 The empirical world of grasping and conceptual play
are not foreclosed to the states of release (nirodha) or rest (upasama).15They
are the very ingredients whereby the opening to the enlightened realm is pos-
sible, since the Buddhist truth of existence spans the relative as well as supreme

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473

natures.16 Thus in the classic verse on "doctrinal equation," Nagarjuna wraps

up everything in the following manner:1

We declare that whatever is relational origination (pratltya-samutpada) is of

the nature of emptiness (sunyata). It is a provisional name (thought construc-
tion, prajhapti) for the mutuality of being, and indeed, it is the middle path
(madhyamd-pratipad).

The equation (pratltya-samutpdda= sunyata=prajhapti = madhyama-pratipad)

is the crystallized message of Mahayana metaphysics. Subsequent develop-
ments all take note of it, the supreme example being the development of the
Chinese T'ien T'ai School, which centers on the Triple Nature of Truth:
Sunyata, Prajhapti, and Madhyamd-pratipad.
Now, the concept of sunyata, or sunyata as the basis of continued enlightened
existence, is not new to Nagarjuna. He was heir to the mass of Mahayana
literature known as the PrajhaparamitaSitras. 8 These early sitras of unknown
authorship exhibit the shift from the Theravada view of the Arhant Ideal to
the Mahayana view, which is the practice of the bodhisattva way of life (bod-
hisattvacaryd). The shift is underscored by a sweeping reassessment of Buddhist
doctrines and a reorientation of the nature of experience. It is a basically
revolutionary accounting of the content of enlightenment. Let us explore.
The Astasahasriski PrajhdapramitaSuitra,considered to be the oldest sutra
in this class, sets the tone of the Mahayana by raising several questions:
(1) What is the meaning of Mahayana (The Great Vehicle)?
"The term, Mahiayna, is a synonym of immeasurableness. 'Immeasurable-
ness' means infinitude. It is the same as space. As in space so in this vehicle
there is room for immeasurable and incalculable beings. One cannot see its
coming, its going, and its abiding natures. Thus one cannot seize its beginning,
its end nor its middle."19
This accounting points to the fact that the realm of existence is a totally open
and extensive affair. Nothing is left out, nothing is added on. In a grand meta-
physical sweep, the Mahayana wishes to account for everything within the
wide nature of experience but such experience or knowledge can only be at-
tained by the truly aspiring Buddhist, the bodhisattva, as distinguished from
the lesser aspirants called the srivaka (or sravaka-ydna, the way of one who
subscribes to Buddhist principles), and the pratyeka-buddha (or pratyeka-
buddha-yana, the way of intellectual effort and understanding of Buddhist
principles).
(2) What is the bodhisattva? Again the sitra says: "Nothing real is meant
by the word, 'Bodhisattva.' Because a Bodhisattva trains himself in non-
attachment to all dharmas. For the Bodhisattva, the great being, awakes in
non-attachment to full enlightenment in the sense that he understands all
dharmas."20Further, "A Bodhisattva is called a 'great being' (Mahasattva) in

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474 Inada

the sense that he will cause a great mass and collection of beings to achieve
the highest (state of existence)."21 Then Sariputra, a disciple with a Theravada
background, is made to say: "A Bodhisattva is called a great being in the sense
that he will demonstrate dharmasso that the great errors should be forsaken-
such erroneous views as the assumption of a self (atman), a being (sattva), a
living soul (fiva), a person (pudgala), of becoming (bhava), of not-becoming
(abhava), of annihilation (uccheda), of eternity (nitya), etc."22
(3) What are dharmas? After all, it is said that the bodhisattva trains or
disciplines himself in the prajhaparamitas.The piramitas refer to the six (or
ten) so-called spiritual excellences that,23 if practiced properly, will bring about
the nature of irreversibility, that is, the movement from one stage to the next
without retrogression until full enlightenment is attained. In the spiritual de-
velopment, the bodhisattvacourses in the paramitas but does not treat them as
dharmas, as objective factors, or as components of existence. The sutra says,
"He does not go near any dharmaat all, because all dharmasare unapproachable
and unappropriable."24 It is the foolish, untaught, and common people who
are accustomed to treat the dharmas as realities. But these people "have con-
structed all the dharmas. And, having constructed them, attached themselves
to (the idea of) the two extremes (i.e., existence and non-existence)."25 Because
of the adherence to the concepts of existence and nonexistence, (is or is not
framework), ordinary people attach the three temporal moments ... past,
present and future-to the dharmas. But dharmas do not go anywhere nor
remain in a place. Finally, having established or constructed their own limits
(koti) of being, ordinary people are not able to expand, extend, and realize the
true realm of existence (bhuzta-koti).26 The dharmasare not objects of manipula-
tion (anupalambha,anupalabdhi). They are not made (samskrta) nor are they
brought about (anutpada). They do not have self-nature of own-being (sva-
bhdva).27
Another sitra belonging to the same genre, goes on to say that the bodhi-
sattva "does not see any dharma as conditioned (samskrta) nor unconditioned
(asamskrta); he does not see existence as conditioned, or non-existence as
unconditioned; he does not see the sign as conditioned, or the signless as
unconditioned; he does not review the beingness or non-beingness of any
dharma, except in such a way that he does not transgress against the suchness
(tathata,iunyata) of all dharmas."28
A word of caution is in order here. The sunyata of all dharmas spoken of so
frequently in the suitrasis not really an imputation of the nature of suchness or
emptiness of the dharmasthemselves as independent of the experiential process.
Sunyata is a unique experience arrived at and has reference to the experiential
process as a whole and not to any of its constituent parts. The Buddhist is not
saying that each skandha or each dharma is empty or void, nor is he saying
that all these are grounded in the nature of sunyata. On the contrary, they
become empty or void as a result of enlightenment whose content is sunyata.

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475

Their "appearances" or signs (nimitta, laksana) are recognized by the bod-

hisattva but "he surrenders himself completely to the signless (animitta, alak-
sana) in the end."29 Thus, the signless state which is another characterization
of suchness (sunyata) means that the bodhisattva has no particular abode and
is therefore free and unlimitable.
In sum, the bodhisattvacaryi is to realize at once both the "constructive,"
appropriating nature and the "nonconstructive", nonappropriating nature of
all dharmas. When this is done, there is a further relinquishment of all signs
and the desiring process in order to gain full knowledge of all modes of being
(sarvakarajhatd). Thus, all outflows (asravas) cease, and one thrives in the
state of nonstraining outflows (anisrava-dharmas).
The bodhisattvacaryi has two basic facets: one is the strong vow to become
a buddha,and the other is to have concern for the welfare of all beings. On the
one hand, there is the path to full or complete knowledge (sarvajnata,prajhn),
and, on the other, the extensive nature of love, compassion (karund). Both
facets are mutually involved and are thus unique simultaneous developments.
For the Buddhist, the most basic question is: What is wisdom without com-
passion and what is compassion without wisdom? Or, put another way, he
would say, Aren't the two aspects really depicting the self-same reality?
In correcting perverted views on/of reality, the bodhisattvais skillful-in-means
(upiya-kausalya), not only in leading ordinary beings into the right path (the
classic example is given in Chapter II of the Lotus Sutra, where the father
succeeds in leading his children out of the burning house), but also in developing
his own existential (ontological) purity by increasing his wholesome forms of
existence. With respect to his own development, he moves from the conditioned
to the unconditioned, from the sign to the signless, from the dharmic to the
nondharmic nature of existence. In short, the bodhisattva sees the dharmic
signs, that is, understands the cause of their formations (samskrta-dharma),but
he is not caught up in them since he strives for the sunyata aspect of all dharmas.
The skillful-in-means also entails the fact that the bodhisattvacannot abandon
or will not realize for himself the true realm of existence (bhuta-koti), while in
the midst of his practice (pdramitds) unless all dharmas have been realized
within the context of iunyata.30This is the philosophic expression of Dharma-
kara bodhisattva's vow, as expressed in the Larger Sukhdvatl-vyuhaSutra, that
he will not forsake the sentient creatures of the world until all enter the Buddha-
field (Buddha-ksetra). At each state of development, the bodhisattva, without
losing sight of the Buddha-field, works at the identification or assimilation
(samatd) process. This is the meaning of the term, abhisamaya, a term central
to the host of commentarial siutrasbased on the PrajhnapramitaSitras.
In the foregoing discussion, we have witnessed the standard doctrines of
early Buddhism displayed but interpreted in a different sense. The main focus
should be on the manifestation of dharmas in the experiential process. In the
conditioned realm, all dharmas are "real" from one standpoint but from

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476 Inada

another they are illusory, imaginary, and misleading. In the nonconditioned

realm, however, all dharmas are nonproductive, nonarising, nonseizable, and
noncharacterizable. It is another way of asserting that the Wheel of Life both
turns and does not turn, neither affirms nor denies the dharmic structure of
things. The Wheel or pratitya-samutpada,in this sense, is deep and profound
(gambhira)as are the natures of sunyata and bhuta-koti(true realm of existence).
Rightly seen, it is the supreme realm of existence in the potential and actual
sense.
It is hoped that the discussion so far has brought on some understanding
of the early or basic ideas relative to the Mahayana in a way that also leads to
better understanding of its subsequent developments in the various forms. So
it is time to assess the ideas and derive some of the metaphysical implication
expressed therein.
(1) Reality in the Mahayana, as the name indicates, is an open, unbounded
(but not infinite) realm of existence. Every doctrine in Buddhism must be framed
within it. For example, the nature of suinyatais deep and profound from the
standpoint of the individual's ontology, but it is vast and extensive in terms of
the nonindividual or social ontology. Or, the concept of Bodhisattva Ideal is
synonymous with the concept of Mahayana Reality (bhuta-koti).
(2) Sunyata is the state of clear (ontological) being. Contrary to accepted
views on it, it is not what makes existence possible in the sense of a principle
or a substratum of existence. Rather, it is the foundation of true reality when
that clear state of being is achieved. When that happens, it becomes the ground
for the extensive, relational nature of all things. Thus it can be asserted that
sunyati is the ontological principle of Buddhism. It "brings" the various
dharmastogether by not allowing the dharmasto assert their false natures; thus
I have at times referred to it as the supreme experience of ontological together-
ness.
(3) Following from the preceding, the ground of reality is not given but
evolves out of a serious consideration and aspiration for the true nature of
things (true experiential process), which in turn involves an inordinate effort
by way of proper disciplinary training and practice, the Bodhisattvacarya.
Sunyata is not everywhere, unless one is speaking about the enlightened nature.
The initial vow (pranidhi-citta) of the bodhisattva is an exhibition of a strong
faith in the "other side" of what we normally assume to be reality. But this
does not entail any form of duality or dual nature of being or of reality. Paren-
thetically, there is no flat, undifferentiated aesthetic continuum, for such a
continuum cannot be an "unproduced" gift of nature.
(4) Full knowledge of the modes of being or simply wisdom is not an isolated
but a total affair. The best exemplification of the inclusive nature of any knowl-
edge or act is the concept of compassion (karunac).Nothing is left alone or
behind, for everything is accountable however dim or inconsequential the force
may seem to be.

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477

(5) Individual ontology or the dynamic cosmological construction (that is,

the genetic structure of being) is always coterminus or coextensive with the rest
of nature. The problem with unenlightened beings is that they do not realize
the nature of the terminus and extension; their understanding of the terminus
and extension is inherently closed or self-limiting. Therefore, their efforts are
usually misdirected. The Kisyapa Parivarta31 says in a graphic manner that
the clear nature of being or sunyata striven for by the Sravaka or Pratyekbuddha
is like a hole made in a wood by a termite, whereas, the bodhisattva'ssunyata is
like the infinite space (akasa). The former achievement is known as pudgala-
sunyatac,the sunyata limited to the individual only, whereas the latter, as dharma-
sunyata, is the sunyata of all dharmic elements or dharmic framework of being
and thus extends over and beyond the nature of the individual. In consequence,
for the Mahayana, reality that extends beyond the individual process remains
a potential ground for the process of enlightenment.
(6) From the foregoing, it can be asserted that the metaphysical and ethical
grounds are one and the same. There is a sense of the idealistic, but this is not
metaphysical idealism so far as it is known in the West. Buddhahood or nirvana
is the summum bonum, but it entails an expansive nature which "transcends"
local or individual cosmologies. Or that moral questions or morality must take
on larger dimensions beyond the individual or individuals concerned, if there
are to be any binding effects in the interrelational sense.
(7) The suffering or duhkha that the Buddhist speaks of is basically an on-
tological problem. Duhkha is much more than what is related to the mere
physical or mere mental poles, or a combination of the two. It arises in a subtle
way by virtue of the inability to come to terms with the impermanent nature of
being as well as the inability to resolve the dharmic factors at play. It is in the
karmically enforced realm of existence (sam.skrta).The question of good and/or
evil is not really germane to Buddhist ethics unless it is tied in with the meta-
physical and ontological nature of things. "Evil" for oneself and the resolution
thereof are activities that involve more than the self.
(8) Buddhahood, as the realization of the enlightened realm, is also char-
acterized by peaceful calm (sinta) and the feelings of freedom and bliss (siva).
As such it is far from mere quietism or indifference. It is in fact an extension of
the Bodhisattvacarya where, in having concern over the welfare of sentient
creatures, he develops a feeling of ultimate pity (anukampa). But as Buddhahood
is attained, the former bodhisattva, now a buddha,expresses his satisfaction in
total or whole ontological terms of peace, calm, and joy or bliss. Herein lies the
nature of complete or full freedom because it is now the abode of no dharmas,
no dharmic framework, no outflows, no duhkha of whatever kind. It is the
realm of suchness (tathatd), the receptacle of all beings (Tathigata-garbha),
and the embodiment of all dharmas (Dharmakaya, Dharmadhatu). Despite
all of this, Buddhism is not a philosophy advancing an Absolute or an Absolute
Realm of Existence in the preexisting as well as postexisting senses.

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478 Inada

(9) Despite the foregoing analysis, which has bordered on the mystical and
the impossible at times, Buddhist metaphysics is, nevertheless, consistent and
coherent within the nature of things. The one doctrine that has always been
at the core, whether in the unenlightened or enlightened sense, is relational
origination (pratTtya-samutpada).It is a doctrine that one begins with in terms
of the duhkha-orientednature and ends up with in terms of the sunyata-oriented
nature. The doctrine is pervasive but makes its curious (or unique) Buddhist
turn in the process from the conditioned to the unconditioned nature of things.
Subsequent literatures, such as the Lahkavatara Sitra, speak of that turn as a
revulsion (paravrtti) or a transformation (parinimana) of being; it is a turning
over of the duhkha-oriented outflows (asraya-paravrtti). The result of such a
turn has inspired such men as Nagarjuna to spell it out in the famous "doctrinal
equation" seen earlier (pratUtya-samutpida=sunyata=prajhapti=madhyami-
pratipad). Such an equation is quite baffling even to the Buddhist; how much
more to the non-Buddhist?

II

Whitehead says that metaphysics is nothing but the description of the generali-
ties which apply to all the details of practice.32 And in terms of the foundation
of metaphysics, he says that it "should be sought in the understanding of the
subject-object structure of experience, and in the respective roles of the physical
and mental functionings."33 This also implicates metaphysics into two con-
trasting terms, that is, "appearance" and "reality." Their distinction arises in
the process of self-formation of each actual occasion.34 "Reality" according
to Whitehead, is the objective content as given in the antecedent world of that
occasion.35 It is from which the occasion advances creatively. "Appearance,"
on the other hand, refers to the "difference between the objective content of
the initial phase of the physical pole and the objective content of the final phase,
after the integration of physical and mental poles."36 It is the effect of the
activity of the mental pole."37
There is thus an intimate interplay or bond between "reality" and "appear-
ance" in the subject-object perceptual process of the actual occasion. Paren-
thetically, it must be understood that Whitehead refers to the human individual
as a grouping of occasions, a society of occasions, a person or personal, but the
manner in which a single occasion and a society of occasions are involved in
process is essentially the same. Whitehead is keen on understanding the proper
function of the percipient subject. He says, "the living organ of experience is
the living body as a whole."38 Further, "there is inheritance of sense-perception
from the antecedent members of the personal succession."39 And he cautions
that "a mere sensationalist perception does not account for our direct observa-
tion of the contemporary world. There is some other factor present, which is
equally primitive with our perception of sensa. This factor is provided by the

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479

immanence of the past in the immediate occasion whose percipience is under

discussion."40
The foregoing metaphysics of experience bears striking resemblance to that
of the basic Buddhist genetic structure of being that was delineated earlier.
In both at least three factors are prominent: (1) there are no mere subject and
no mere object in the percipient process; (2) the process is not an isolated
phenomenon but extends beyond the living organism; and (3) the process, in
its internal activities, must be seen as movement from past states to the present
where much of the activities lodges within the organism, the human body.
There is, in short, relatedness that extends beyond the percipient as well as
within the unnoticed process that makes up the percipient itself.
In Buddhism, the continuity in terms of the skandha-members is inviolable.
Corporeal nature (rupa) may be taken to be the initial phase, but its content
of percipience is passed on to the high-grade activities called consciousness
(vijhnna) by way of the visceral conditions (vedana) manifesting themselves
throughout the organism. In the further analysis by way of the eighteen realms
(dhatu) of being or the dharmic structuring of experience, the sensa derived
from the sense faculties are granted but they are not dominant in the analysis
since there is something more important, more supreme in experience, that is,
the relational nature of being, both externally and internally but, in our dis-
cussion at hand, more internally. In early Buddhism, the relational nature
was described in terms of the twenty-four paccayas (pratyayas). Beginning
with hetu, the "root cause" (for example, the root of a tree), the Buddhist
elaborated on the very minute relational conditions present with respect to
the rise of the nature of ordinary (unenlightened) experience as well as to the
development of the path leading to enlightenment. The Sarvastivadins or later
Abhidharmikas reduced the twenty-four paccayas to a more manageable
Doctrine of Ten Causes.41 Whether the latter is an improvement over the former
is a moot question, however. The doctrine is divided into six major causes
(hetu) and four subsidiary relational conditions (pratyaya). They are minute
or microscopic facets, which describe the rise and subsidence of the experiential
events or of the process itself. The Mahayanist's pet metaphor here is the
conditions relative to the rise and subsidence of a wave (or waves) in the ocean.
A single wave or an aggregation of waves is not an isolatable or independent
phenomenon. Each has a relational structure as well as a content, both of
which are dynamically involved such that the mere sensationalist perception
is wholly inadequate in accounting for the nature of things.
Whitehead focuses on the same problem. He says, "the basis of experience
is emotional. Stated more generally, the basic fact is the rise of an affective
tone originating from things whose relevance is given."42 This is crystallized
into the doctrine of prehension whose mode of activity is defined as follows:
"An occasion is a subject in respect to its special activity concerning an object;
and anything is an object in respect to its provocation of some special activity

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480 Inada

within the subject."43 While datum becomes the prehended object, the subject
is thereby affected and develops a subjective form in regard to the datum. The
prehending subject is the way experience occurs.
The notion of a subjective form, the affective tone, strongly suggests a re-
lationship to the Buddhist dharmic analysis of experience. For, each dharma
is a definite form or mode of being expressing a particular event whether in the
conditioned or nonconditioned realm of existence. As seen earlier, even a
particular skandha is a form or dharma, so are the sense faculties, the different
kinds of consciousness, and the various mental conformations. But in Bud-
dhism, a form or mode in and of itself is not self-generative nor self-sustaining,
because it has to give way to the relational nature of being as well as the larger
context in which the concept of being ultimately appears. A dharma, being
evanescent, still exerts itself long enough to exhibit a certain characteristic to
an experience or of the percipient.
Both Whitehead and Buddhism converge upon several crucial elements of
experience as a way of accommodating the larger aspects of things. There are
three aspects in particular worth mentioning:
(1) An actual occasion or an event is never independent. As an actual oc-
casion prehends other entities, so is it influenced by them. The doctrine of
mutuality or mutual immanence holds for both systems.
(2) An actual occasion is never "vacuous." Part of this idea naturally comes
from the above. Whitehead says that "the term 'vacuous actuality' here means
the notion of a res vera devoid of subjective immediacy."44 This notion is
closely allied with the notion of "inherence of quality in substance" which is
also denied by him.45 The "other side" of vacuous actuality will then be an
actuality which is vitally related to the rest of nature, including its own self-
enjoyment ... the subjective immediacy which takes on the dynamic nature
of a subject-superject structure. But this entails a reassessment of the notions
of presentational immediacy and extensive continuum, both of which are
elaborate descriptions of the so-called horizontal (or serial) and vertical re-
lationships with respect to the concrescent process. This type of description is
not alien to the whole scheme of Buddhist experiential process.
(3) Given the nature of mutuality and nonvacuous actuality, Whitehead goes
on further to complete his cosmology. As he says, "the cosmological story, in
every part and in every chapter, relates the interplay of the static vision and the
dynamic history."46 The interplay of course reveals the paradoxical nature
involved, that is, permanent factors in the impermanent nature of things; in
general the play of the ideal opposites in process. For example, he says that
the ultimate facts of immediate experience are the actual entities, prehension
and nexus.47 Although these exhibit the facts of the concrescent process, they
are at the same time part and parcel of the dynamic nature of that process itself.
But the process is extensive since it "is an individualization of the whole uni-
verse."48 By saying this, Whitehead is cautious and does not wish to advance
the Platonic concept of a receptacle since the latter is "bare of all forms ... void,
abstract from all individual occasions."49 He wishes to work not from the
abstract notion of a container but from the concrete facts of experience as they
are related to the whole. He says that the "connectedness of things is nothing
else than the togetherness of things in occasions of experience."50 But in the
interplay of the static vision and the dynamic history there is a sense of the
"unbound permanence."

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481

As seen earlier, there is no difficulty here in relating to the metaphysics of

Buddhist experience. Although the Whiteheadian concepts of actual entities,
prehension and nexus are not precisely formulated in Buddhism, they seem to
be implicit in the metaphysics and are quite relevant for our discussion. For
instance, the Buddhist doctrine of andtman (non-self) is a kind of correlate of
the concept of actual entity for there is no way in which a self can ever be given
a definitive (continual) status within the impermanent nature of things. White-
head, in turn, is saying about the same thing when he asserts that "how an
actual entity becomes constitutes what that actual entity is; so that the two
descriptions of an actual entity are not independent. Its 'being' is constituted
by its becoming."51
The becoming process is expanded by the concept of prehension with regard
to the three factors: (1) subject, (b) datum, and (c) subjective form. These pre-
hensions can either be physical (other actual entities) or conceptual (eternal
objects). And they are also positive or negative in nature with their respective
subjective forms.52 In Buddhism the closest overall concept to prehension is
trsnd, the desiring process.53 It may take on positive and negative characters
with their respective forms (dharmas). Each dharma, as I understand it, is a
kind of (subjective) form of experience which specifies what that experience is
about, but a single dharma or a set of dharmas is still inadequate to describe
fully the becomingness (bhava). So just as Whitehead introduced the third
ultimate fact of experience, nexus, Buddhism also introduced the concept of
paccayas (pratyayas) to account for the interrelated nature of things. But, as
seen earlier again, Buddhism stressed on the foundation of all experiences as
a unique process of relational origination (pratTtya-samutpdda).The under-
standing of this latter concept was the key to grasping the depth and breadth
of being, from the microscopic to the macroscopic realm of existence. This
concept, I believe, is nearly identical to the Whiteheadian concept of creativity.
"Creativity is the universal of universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact.
It is that ultimate principle by which the many, which are the universe dis-
junctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the universe conjunc-
tively."54 Thus creativity is the way all experiences arise in a novel sense.
Whether Buddhism would interpret relational origination as the principle
of novelty as Whitehead does is not clear, but both would agree on the fact that
their respective doctrines are central or ultimate concepts with respect to
experience. In Buddhism, relational origination has two aspects: one the
duhkha-bound turning of the Wheel and the other, the non-duhkha or released
(nirodha)aspect in the turning of the Wheel. From the standpoint of the former,
there is no novelty of experience in the strictest sense since the flow of existence
is interrupted by the dharmic seizures, as it were, and from the latter, there is
nothing but novelty since there is no interruption of whatever kind and life is
co-incident (harmonious) with the larger framework of nature.
On the other hand, Whitehead in turn seems to be suggesting a type of

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482 Inada

Buddhist duhkha(dukkha in Pali) in his analysis of the concept of evil. He says,

"the ultimate evil in the temporal world is deeper than any specific evil. It lies
in the fact that the past fades, that time is a 'perpetually perishing'.... The
present fact has not the past fact with it in any full immediacy."55 This concept
of the ultimate evil is very close to the early Buddhist concept of viparinama-
dukkha, that is, evil or suffering due to the inability to accommodate changes in
the existential flow. This concept also extends over into the other more com-
plicated concept of suffering, sankhata-dukkha, that is, suffering due to the
"constructive" nature of mental play which in Whiteheadian terms might be
the indulgence in abstractive (conceptual) analysis or with reference to the
fallacy of misplaced concreteness.
Whitehead goes on to say that, "the nature of evil is that the characters of
things are mutually obstructive."56 This comes about because of "three meta-
physical principles: (1) that all actualization is finite; (2) that finitude involves
the exclusion of alternative possibility; (3) that mental functioning introduces
into realization subjective forms conformal to relevant alternatives excluded
from completeness of physical realization."57 While these metaphysical prin-
ciples are not mentioned or elaborated in Buddhism, still, the basis for the rise
of evil or suffering seems to focus for both on the same aspect of existence, that
is, the inability to accommodate the finite within the infinite nature of things
or the clash arising between the two. In Buddhism, we have noted that despite
duhkha the ultimate experiential process must be known or felt in terms of its
empty (uinyata) aspect. It enables the process to "entertain" all entities without
being caught up (obstructed) in their dharmic natures.
It is difficult to find a correlate term in Whitehead for sunyata. However, its
implications are not lacking. For this, we are invariably led to Whitehead's
own religious orientation. He says: "The task of Theology is to show how the
World is founded on something beyond mere transient fact, and how it issues
in something beyond the perishing of occasions. ... We ask of Theology to
express that element in perishing lives which is undying by reason of its expres-
sion of perfections proper to our finite natures. In this way we shall understand
how life includes a mode of satisfaction deeper than joy or sorrow."58 The
undying is the everlasting nature of things, which "is the content of that vision
upon which the finer religions are built ... the 'many' absorbed everlastingly
in the final unity."59
It is in religion then that Whitehead's philosophy or metaphysics comes to
full fruition and exposition. The seeming clashes of doctrines, such as the
metaphysical opposites, all arrive at a harmonious accommodation. From
the minuscule actual occasion to God, he has finally dared to seek the basis of
the everlasting undying nature and for the deeper ultimate satisfaction of the
universe. In his last lecture on "Immortality," Whitehead is quite explicit
concerning the two aspects of the universe, that is, the World of Fact and the
World of Value, which require each other.60 On the former, he also describes

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483

it as the World of Activity, of Change, of Origination and of Creativity. But of

the latter, he describes it as the world which emphasizes Persistence.61 Value,
according to him, is independent of any moment of time; it is timeless and
immortal.62 Yet, without the passing world of facts, value cannot exist. It is
relevant to the process of realization in the World of Activity, which there is
modification of events whose process of judgment is called evaluation. So the
process of evaluation exhibits an immortal world of coordinated value.63
Whitehead sums up: "Origination is creation, whereas Value issues into modifi-
cation of creative action. Creation aims at Value, whereas Value is saved from
the futility of abstraction by its impact upon the process of Creation. But in
this fusion, Value preserves its Immortality."64
Close observation reveals that Whitehead's terms, origination and creation
(creativity), are quite similar in intent to the Buddhist concept of relational
origination, which covers the whole range of events from the simple to the
complex. In both, the respective concepts refer to the total nature of change or
the creative process. Moreover, the Whiteheadian term, value or valuation,
can be related to the concept of sunyati. Though normally translated as empty
or emptiness (voidness) due to its etymological origin, sunyatd actually refers
to the state of completeness or fullness of being. It gives the "permanent" nature
or flavor to the process, and, in this sense, it is the supreme value of existence.
As we have seen, the world of dharmic factors must eventually be transformed
into a world of nondharmic factors without disrupting the general flow of
existence, a state of existence which takes on, as in Whiteheadian analysis, a
"permanent" or immortal character. Thus for the Buddhist, he who embodies
sunyata by attaining enlightenment lives immortally. This has a definite cor-
relate in Whitehead. He employs such terms as Personal Identity and Personality
and asserts that, "Personality is the extreme example of the sustained realization
of a type of value."65
There are, of course, problems involved in correlating the concepts of gsnyata
and value. Although both refer to the "supreme essence" of the experiential or
creative process, the method by which the concepts are arrived at differ drasti-
cally; one as a result of meditation, the other without such aids. Where one is
a description of the mirrorlike state of existence where all relative plays cease,
the other is not exactly that but the outcome of the intimate play of the physical
and mental poles.
Whitehead was not satisfied with the concept of Personality unless he could
relate it to the vision of the infinitude. After fumbling about for an appropriate
term, he settled for "Peace." He says, "I choose the term 'Peace' for that
Harmony of Harmonies which calms destructive turbulence and completes
civilization."66 He elaborates: "It is a broadening of feeling due to the emer-
gence of some deep metaphysical insight, unverbalized and yet momentous in
its coordination of values. Its first effect is the removal of the stress of acquisitive
feeling arising from the soul's preoccupation with itself. Thus Peace carries

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484 Inada

with it a surpassing of personality. There is an inversion of relative values."67

A few pages down he says that peace is the intuition of permanence.68
These passages certainly could have been uttered by a Buddhist, only sub-
stitute the word Peace with nirvana.As a matter of fact, he introduces the terms
"Buddhist Nirvana" later on but in a different and mistaken context.69
Although Peace is what Whitehead concluded with, in terms of the ultimate
status of things, it would seem that the concept was in reality a crystallization
of the successful incorporation of the concept of God as the highest form of
actuality. Peace is the conformation of Appearance and Reality, much the same
way that Nirvana is the conformation (collapse) of the relative and supreme
statuses of truth. But the conformation in Whitehead's case must be a parti-
cipation of God for "he is not before all creation but with all creation."70 He
goes on to say that, "analogous to all actual entities, the nature of God is
dipolar. He has a primordial nature and a consequent nature. The consequent
nature of God is conscious; and it is the realization of the actual world in the
unity of his nature, and through the transformation of his wisdom. The primor-
dial nature is conceptual, the consequent nature is the weaving of God's physical
feelings upon his primordial concepts. 71 While the primordial side is infinite,
free, complete, eternal, actually deficient and unconscious, the consequent side
is determined, incomplete, 'everlasting', fully actual and conscious.72
We have finally arrived at the ultimate concepts in the comparative explora-
tion. If God is the finest entity, is there something in the Mahayana to match it?
One could easily present a whole array of cognate terms, to be sure, but one
must be extremely wary of easy correspondence. What follows must be taken
as a conjecture with measured qualifications to go along with it.
It seems that Whitehead's God is a combination of several concepts derived
from the Mahayana tradition. For example, looking at it from the dipolar
aspect, the buddha(s) or tathigata(s) represents the primordial nature, and the
bodhisattva(s) represents the consequent nature. The Buddha-field or realm
(ksetra) is a potential ground of existence, a lure for all beings. The various
types of buddhasor tathagatas, such as, Vairocana (Infinite Light) and Amitayus
(Infinite Life) depict the total universal nature of existence. But the Buddha-
field is not alien to or transcendent of the world for, in a meaningful sense, it
manifests the world in terms of the Bodhisattva Ideal. The Ideal, as-delineated
earlier, refers to the concern for the welfare of all beings and the utilization of
skillful means to fare beings across to the other shore. This is exemplified by
the unselfish act or acts of the Bodhisattva Dharmakara, who patiently post-
pones his entrance into the nirvanic Realm or the Buddha-field until or unless
all beings are enlightened. Another graphic example is that of the Bodhisattva
Avalokitesvara, the God(dess) of Mercy, that is, literally, the God who looks
down on the sentient creatures. This bodhisattva, one of the most popular
deities in the East, has become the object of worship in a multipurpose sense,
such as, supplication for health, wealth, cure of illness, and the general well-

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485

being of society. It is the personification of the faith and embodiment of the

realms of ideality and actuality, and the ultimate concern for the individual and
society at large.
There is another set of concepts in the Mahayana which can be correlated
although specific details are lacking. This is the doctrine of Trikaya, that is,
Dharmakdya (Realm of Truth or Principle), Nirmanakdya (Realm of Trans-
formation), and Sambhogakiya (Realm of Bliss, Enjoyment or Peace). These
are three aspects of existence, that is, the descriptions on the states of existence
or forms of truth. Thus, the Dharmakaya expresses the general status of exis-
tence, the Nirmanakaya the possibility of change in the dharmic existence, and
the Sambhogakaya the nature of total enjoyment in the world, all of which
have related aspects in Whitehead's God.
Whitehead's characterization of God's nature shows striking similarities
to the Bodhisattva Ideal. God has concern for his purpose is "the attainment
of value in the temporal world."73 In the universe's creative act, "we conceive
of the patience of God, tenderly saving the turmoil of the intermediate world
by the completion of his own nature."74 Or, "He does not create the world,
he saves it; or more accurately he is the poet of the world with tender patience
leading it by his vision of truth, beauty, and goodness."75 And finally, "What
is done in the world is transformed into reality in heaven, and the reality in
heaven passes back into the world. By reason of this reciprocal relation, the
love in the world passes into the love in heaven, and floods back again into the
world. In this sense, God is the great companion ... the fellow-sufferer who
understands."76 Such a creature is indeed no less than a bodhisattva.
In the foregoing discussion, we have seen where both systems of metaphysics
have made way for a consistent treatment of the actualities or events in nature.
The Buddhist has a firm foundation in the experiential process and allows it to
expand further into the extensive nature of things by way of resolving the realm
of Appearance, the "constructed" nature of things, into Reality (tattva, tathata,
buddhata,etc.). And in the process, it permitted the yogic and devotional aspects
of life to nourish one's grasp of the great metaphysical heights which are the
two aspects of wisdom and compassion (prajha and karuna), the final status
of things. With Whitehead, again, the metaphysics, grounded in a consistent
constitution of the tinest actual entity, was carried through to its logical con-
clusion in the nature of God, the greatest and highest exemplar. Whitehead,
however, had no need for the strictly devotional discipline, but he pointed,
time and again, at the translinguistic vision to see things in the deeper sense . ..
the permanence in the flux, the infinitude in the finitude, and the value in the
valuational process.

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486 Inada

NOTES

1. Alfred North Whilehead, Process and Reality (New York: Macmillan, 1927), p. 4; hereafter
cited as PR.
2. The Brahmajala Sutta of Digha Nikdya, I, treats the "Sixty-two Theories," such as, to hold
that the world is eternal, noneternal, infinite, finite; that the soul is in the body, it is different from
the body; that the truth is destroyed at death, it continues despite death, etc.
3. Dharma (Sanskrit) or dhamma (Pali) is derived from the verb dharati, which means to hold,
carry, bear in mind, endure, and lasting. (Cf. Pali Text Society Pali-English Dictionary. Edited by
Rhys Davids and William Stede, p. 175.) The root of these terms is dhr which signifies the pheno-
menon of holding or supporting. Generally speaking, the dharma in terms of this phenomenon
reveals the basis for the structured nature of each moment or event.
4. Majjhima-Nikiya, II, 32; Samyutta-Nikaya, II, 28; Anguttara-Nikiya, V, 184, etc. Imasmin
sati, idam hoti, imass' uppadi, idam uppajjati; imasmin asati, idam na hoti; imassa nirodha, idam
nirujjhati.
5. The Conceptionof BuddhistNirvana (Leningrad: Publishing Office of the Academy of Sciences
of the USSR, 1927), p. 41.
6. The Conception, p. 39.
7. The Conception, p. 40.
8. The Conception, pp. 40-41.
9. Th. Stcherbatsky: The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word
"Dharma," Second Printing (Calcutta: Susil Gupta Ltd., 1956, pp. 60-61.
10. The Conception, p. 39.
11. Prasannapada,5.1. Stcherbatsky, The Conception,p. 85.
12. Buddhaghosa, the great Theravada patriarch, crystallized all sufferings into three categories:
(1) ordinary physical suffering (duhkha-duhkha),(2) suffering due to the inability to accommodate
change (viparinamadukkha),and (3) suffering due to mental constructions or dharmic analysis
(sankhita-dukkha). All three are, of course, incorporated in the Mahayana way of thinking. Confer
Buddhabhosa's Visuddhimagga,XVI, 499-502; Bhikkhu Nanamoli's translation as The Path of
Purification, published by R. Semage, (Colombo, Ceylon: M. D. Gunasena & Co., Ceylon: 1956),
pp. 567-571.
13. Samyutta-Nikiya, III, 20f, 31; Pali Text Society trans. KindredSayings, III, p. 20f, p. 30.
14. Mulamadhyamakakariki, XXV, 19, 20; hereafter cited as MK.
15. MK, XXV, 24.
t6. MK, XXIV, 8, 9, 10.
17. MK, XXIV, 18.
18. Edward Conze has done the most extensive work in this area by way of editing and translating
the bulky major works. Cf. especially his The Prajha-paramitaLiterature (The Hague: Mouton
& Co., 1960), which analyzes the known works and their contents.
19. Astasdhasrika Prajhiapdramit&, i, 23-24; Edward Conze, The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight
ThousandSlokas (Calcutta: The Asiatic Society, 1958); hereafter cited as AP. pp. 9-10.
20. The Perfection of Wisdom, p. 7.
21. The Perfection of Wisdom, p. 7.
22. The Perfection of Wisdom, p. 7.
23. The six paramitis are: ddna (charity or generosity), sTla(virtuous conduct), ksanti (forbear-
ance, patience), virya (mental energy), dhyina (concentration), and prajii (wisdom). The four
supplementary paramitas to make up ten in all are: upaya or upaya-kausalya (skillful in means),
pranidhina (strong resolution), bala (strength, power), andjiina (knowledge).
24. AP, p. 5.
25. AP.
26. AP, p. 6.
27. Edward Conze, The Large Suitraon Perfect Wisdom with the Divisions of the Abhisamayd-
lahkira, Parts II and III (Madison, Wisconsin: College Printing and Typing Company, 1964), p. 513.
28. The Gilgit Manuscript of the Astidasasdhasrikdprajhadparamitd, Chapters 55 to 70 Corres-
ponding to the fifth Abhisamaya. Ed. and trans. Edward Conze (Rome: Instituto Italiano per Il
Medio Ed Estremo Oriente, 1962), pp. 288-289.

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487

29. AP,p. 136.

30. AP, p. 147.
31. I am indebted to Nalinaksha Dutt for this reference. Cf. his Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism
and its Relation to Hlnaydna (London: Luzac & Company, 1930), p. 133.
32. PR, 19; also Alfred North Whitehead, Religion in the Making (London: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1929), p. 84, fn. 1; hereafter cited as RM.
33. Alfred North Whitehead, Adventuresof Ideas (New York: Macmillan, 1933), p. 268; here-
after cited as AI.
34. AI, p. 269.
35. AI.
36. AI, p. 270.
37. AI.
38. Al, p. 289.
39. Al, p. 276.
40. Al, p. 279.
41. The Doctrine of Ten Causes:
1. kirana-hetu (the main effectuating cause, for example, speaker speaks)
2. sahabhfi-hetu(coexistent or coevolving cause, for example, speaker-listenerrelationship)
3. sabhaga-hetu(similar nature cause, for example, relationship among listeners)
4. samprayukta-hetu(concomitant cause, for example, consistently present cause such as
the room or lighting)
5. sarvatraga-hetu (universally present cause, for example, in Buddhism, thls refers to
the universal nature of duhkha)
6. vipika-hetu (maturing or fruition cause, for example, listener understands)
Four Subsidiary Relational Conditions (pratyaya):
1. hetu-pratyaya (principal condition)
2. samanantara-pratyaya(sequential condition)
3. alambana-pratyaya(objective or objectifying condition)
4. adhipati-pratyaya(overturning or dominant condition)
42. AI, p. 226.
43. A, pp. 226-227.
44. PR, p. 43.
45. PR.
46. PR, p. 254.
47. PR, p. 30.
48. PR, p. 250.
49. AI, p. 381.
50. AI, pp. 299-300.
51. PR, pp. 34-35.
52. PR, p. 35.
53. Trsndis the general concept for the questioning or thirsting phenomenon. It is what lies at
the basis of the dtman or self-formation process. Within t.rsndproper, there is also the grasping or
clinging phenomenon known as upaddna,a term which points up the staticizing or permanentizing
activity, and which is at once antithetical to the fluency of life itself. There are also other terms used
by the Buddhist to point at some kind of a subjectivist principle, for example, grdhaka (percipient,
subject) and grahya (datum, object) interaction. However, like all other Buddhist doctrines, the
final aim is toward a nonbifurcated state of being, where there is neither grdhaka nor grihya in the
percipient process.
54. PR, p. 31.
55. PR, p. 517.
56. PR.
57. AI, p. 333.
58. AI, p. 221.
59. PR, p. 527.
60. The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, ed. Paul A. Schilpp (New York: Tudor Pub-
lishing Company, 1951), p. 683; hereafter cited as PANW.

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488 Inada

61. PANW,p. 684.

62. PANW.
63. PANW, pp. 685-686.
64. PANW, p. 686.
65. PANW, p. 690.
66. AI, p. 367.
67. PANW.
68. PANW, p. 369.
69. PANW, p. 373.
70. PR,p. 521.
71. PR,p. 524.
72. PR.
73. RM, p. 100.
74. PR, p. 525.
75. PR, p. 526.
76. PR, p. 532.

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