Classical Harmony - Rules of Inference and The Meaning of The Logical Constants Peter Milne

Classical Harmony: Rules of Inference and the Meaning of the Logical Constants
Author(s): Peter Milne

Source: Synthese , 1994, Vol. 100, No. 1 (1994), pp. 49-94
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20117919
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PETER MILNE
CLASSICAL HARMONY: RULES OF INFERENCE AND

THE MEANING OF THE LOGICAL CONSTANTS
ABSTRACT. The thesis that, in a system of natural deduction, the meaning of a logical
constant is given by some or all of its introduction and elimination rules has been
developed recently in the work of Dummett, Prawitz, Tennant, and others, by the
addition of harmony constraints. Introduction and elimination rules for a logical constant
must be in harmony. By deploying harmony constraints, these authors have arrived at
logics no stronger than intuitionist propositional logic. Classical logic, they maintain,
cannot be justified from this proof-theoretic perspective. This paper argues that, while
classical logic can be formulated so as to satisfy a number of harmony constraints, the
meanings of the standard logical constants cannot all be given by their introduction
and/or elimination rules; negation, in particular, comes under close scrutiny.
How do we justify rules of inference? What meanings do the logical

constants have? The proof-theoretic approach to these questions, in
itiated by Gerhard Gentzen and more recently taken up by Prawitz,
Dummett, Tennant and others, offers answers, but answers that are
thought to stop short of validating classical propositional logic and the
classical understanding of the logical constants.
Gentzen first formulated propositional logic in the format now known
as natural deduction. In this format, logical constants are governed by
rules for their introduction and elimination in proofs, that is, rules
governing when a proposition containing the constant in question in
dominant position may be inferred and what may be inferred from such
a proposition. The proof-theoretic approach says that a logical constant
is defined by its introduction rule(s) and elimination rule(s) or by some
subset of them. It is proof-theoretic precisely in that it denies semantic
considerations a role in the determination of the meaning of the logical
constants: it is their role in inference that fixes their meaning.
I take it that the intention of the proof-theoretic approach is to define
logical constants in some quite strict sense, so that the meaning of a
logical constant is exhausted by whichever of the rules of inference is
said to define it. Clearly, this is not the sort of definition in which
definiens and definiendum are interchangeable. Nevertheless, we can
explicitly formulate the exhaustiveness requirement: no use of the con
stant in question is not, in some sense to be specified, derivable from
Synthese 100: 49-94, 1994.

? 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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50 PETER MILNE
and/or justified on the basis of the putatively meaning-conferring ru

or rules.
In its crudest formulation, a proof-theoretic approach is effectively
demolished by Prior's connective tonk which has these introduction and
elimination rules:1
A A tonk B
AtonkB B
Any system of rules of inference that includes the icwA>introduction

and ?0flA>elimination rules allows proof of any sentence from any other,
hence proof of any sentence, provided at least one sentence can be
proved unconditionally. Prior's example shows that some constraint
must be placed on the permissible introduction and elimination rule(s)
governing a logical constant. Recent work in the proof-theoretic vein
has sought suitable constraints. Naturally, if the proof-theoretic ap
proach is not to stray into properly semantic territory these constraints
must have their basis in inferential considerations.
My title mentions 'harmony'. This has been a key term in recent
pursuit of suitable constraints. The introduction and elimination rule(s)
for a logical constant must exhibit a certain "harmony", a harmony
that is missing in the case of the rules for tonk. There have been a
number of different proposals as to exactly what this harmony consists
in, and it is primarily their evaluation that concerns much of the rest
of this article.2
A number of the authors whose work concerns us have argued that
constraints of harmony lead to intuitionist, not classical, propositional
logic. I shall argue that if the proof-theoretic approach justifies the
inference rules of intuitionist propositional logic then it does the same
for the rules of at least one formulation of classical propositional logic.
Quite independently of that claim, however, I shall argue that, at least
as presented by Prawitz, Dummett, and Tennant, the proof-theoretic
approach fails to yield an account of the meaning of negation. From
there we move on to an investigation of Dummett's views on negation
as they are found in The Logical Basis of Metaphysics, and thence to
an examination of the sense, if any, in which Prawitz's justifications of
elimination rules in terms of introduction rules do justify the rules in
question, ending with a re-appraisal of the role of rules of inference
and another proof-theoretic vindication of classical logic.

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MEANING OF THE LOGICAL CONSTANTS 51
1.
In what follows, I assume familiarity with systems of natural deduction

in which proofs are presented in tree, rather than linear, form. I shall
first present three such systems. They will be the main focus of the
subsequent discussion, although other systems will be introduced when
appropriate.
The following set of rules for a system of natural deduction is bor
rowed from Tennant's Natural Logic.
Introduction and elimination rules for minimal logic:
A-intro - A-ehm - -
AB ,. A a B A a B
A a B AB
v-intro A B v-elim [A] [B]
Aw B Ay B : ,;
Ay B_C C
C
-intro [A] ,. -^-ehm
A A ->B
B
B
A-?B
-i-mtro [A] A ~iA -l-ehm -.
1
-iA
Some of these rules, namely a-introduction, both a-elimination rules
both v-introduction rules, ??-elimination, and ~i-elimination, sta
conditions permitting immediate inference. The other rules are to b
read as follows:
[A]
B
represents a sub-proof with conclusion B in which A may occu

need not occur, as an assumption. All occurrences of A as
charged assumption in the sub-proof may be discharged in th
cation of the rule but no other assumption on which B depend
be discharged then.3

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52 PETER MILNE
Intuitionist logic results when either of these rules is added to minimal

logic:
1-elim 1 ,...?. ~~^4 Ay B
? disjunctive syllogism -.
(EFQ) A J y B B
Following Tennant, I shall assume that the first, th
quodlibet (EFQ), is the preferred rule.
Classical logic may be obtained by adding double
ation (DNE) or classical reductio ad absurdum (CRA) to
or by adding either of these or dilemma or the law o
(LEM) to intuitionist logic:
LEM-
A v DNE:=^-
~]A A . . CRA[-nA] Dilemma
JL B_B
A B
There are, of cour

such system that d
To the above rules
for negation, redu
the first and secon
RAA [A] [A]

: : A -\A
B i? B
-\A
Yet a third system for minimal logi

Lemmon's Beginning Logic, emplo
a , v , and -? , with, however, an im
of the "indirect" rules. A and B m
respective sub-proofs in v-elim; A m
sub-proof in ?? -intro; and A must
one of the sub-proofs in the negatio
of A (respectively, B) as an undischa
(or -proofs) must be discharged in t

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entails that neither of the following inference patterns, although accept

able in the first two systems, conforms to the modified rules:
?1 A-+B
B B
A-+B A-+B i
A -* (A -> B)
Lemmon adopts DNE as the rule to add to minim
obtain classical logic. He makes no provision for f
logic.5
2.
Gentzen remarked that its introduction rule or rules serve to define a
logical constant, its elimination rule or rules are consequences of its
introduction rule(s).6 Prawitz's gloss on Gentzen's remark develops out
of his work on the normalization of proofs: an elimination rule is
justified with respect to the corresponding introduction rule(s), justifi
cation being exemplified in the normalization procedures. Introduction
rules are self-justifying or require no justification. Dummett describes
Prawitz's procedure as one of showing that elimination rules are in
harmony with the introduction rules.
In illustration, I shall take the standard v -introduction and v -
elimination rules, common to minimal, intuitionist, and classical logic.
There are two introduction rules:
A B
AyB AyB'
and one elimination rule:
[A] [B]
Aw B C C
C
As Prawitz explains Gentzen's suggestion, the introduction rule
the meaning of ' v ' in terms of canonical proofs of disjunctions
cal in that the two cases of v -introduction are not by any me

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54 PETER MILNE
only inference rules that may yield a disjunctive conclusion. Now

suppose that the premise A v B in an application of the v -eliminati
rule is arrived at canonically, say as last step in a proof via a proof
with conclusion A. Then the complete proof looks like this:
2 [A] [B]
A 2x 22
Ay B C C
where the middle column

with conclusion C in which
If A does occur as an undis
transformed into the follo
assumptions without the
steps:
2
A
2i.
C
This represents the proof-tree obtained by placing a copy of t
2 above every occurrence of A as an undischarged assumption
If A does not occur as an undischarged assumption in the proo
C, an even simpler reduction is achieved: 2X is itself a proof o
the same or fewer assumptions. (In future I shall not bother t
separate account of the case when the indicated sentence does n
as an undischarged assumption in the sub-proof; it is invariably
Similarly, but more straightforwardly, if a is introduced can
then immediately eliminated we have a proof of, say, this form
2i ?j2
- which reduces to
A aB B
B
With these illustrations in mind, it is immediately evident wh

mination is not justified by ^^-introduction: there is no gene
dure for reducing a proof of the form

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2
A
A tonk B
B
to a proof of B from the same or fewer assumptions wher

of the reduction depends on the form of the original proof (
in the cases of a and v .
The key idea in Prawitz's interpretation of Gentzen is that
rules ought to have such forms as allow the normalization of
That is, one should never need to introduce a logical constan
to use the conclusion containing it as major premise in the el
the same constant. In his normalization theorems, Prawitz s
the inference rules of intuitionist and classical first-order l
this condition.7
Prawitz's view gives precedence to introduction rules over
rules. If, for example, we try to treat the rule form of
excluded middle (LEM) as an v-introduction rule, we find t
no longer justify the v-elimination rule of (minimal, intui
classical logic. Consider the following instance of v -elimin
[A] [-.A]
2i 22
A y-iA C C
C
in which the major premise to the instance of v -elimination

by an application of the LEM rule. There is no general me
transforms this into a more direct proof of the conclusion
basis of the component sub-proofs. Likewise, if we take t
double negation elimination (DNE) as a rule of ~i-elimination,
that we cannot justify it relative to the standard ~i-introduct
(minimal, intuitionist, and) classical logic in Tennant's formu
have

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56 PETER MILNE
2
-L
n-iA
which does not yield a more direct proof of A from the prem
Prawitz succeeds in justifying the standard elimination
logical constants construed intuitionistically and, hence, has
as providing a proof-theoretic completeness proof for intuiti
sitional logic. As the examples show, his method does not
certain rules of classical logic when they are construed in th
way. In order to prove that no extension was possible, on
suppose, have to go through every possible rule-extension of
logic that yields either classical logic or one of the uncountab
of intermediate propositional logics. The suggestion that com
has been proved proof-theoretically may therefore be prem
Prawitz gives precedence to introduction rules. There is no
sential to justification that relies on that primacy. What justi
the normalization procedures it appeals to, shows is that th
tion and elimination rules for a logical constant are in some
matched. We could, if we so wished, give precedence to e
rules.9 We could, and this would appear preferable, give n
cedence. We could say that both its introduction and elimin
are needed to confer meaning on a logical constant and
should be well matched in the way that justification deman
there should be harmony in both directions between introd
elimination rules. This accords best with Dummett's notion o
which might roughly be stated thus: what follows from a s
ought not outrun the grounds for its assertion, and vice
ificationist theories of meaning concentrate on grounds for
pragmatist theories on what belief in a proposition commits
adequate theory of language must take account of both as
aspects should be in harmony.
Tennant's conception of harmony has this bilateral ch
Natural Logic, he introduced the demand that introduction a
ation rules for a logical constant satisfy an explicit harmony

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To wit, that given the elimination rule(s) the conclusion to the introduc
tion rule(s) should express the logically strongest proposition that can
be introduced, and that given the introduction rule(s) the major premise
to the elimination rule(s) should express the logically weakest proposi
tion that can be eliminated. Here the proposition expressed by a sen
tence is the class of all sentences interderivable with that sentence. Talk
of propositions rather than sentences is needed for given, say, the
introduction rule(s) any elimination rule that allows elimination of a
sentence interderivable with the sentence eliminated in the standard
rule will do as well as the standard rule.
In illustration, we consider again the standard rules for v-introduc
tion and v-elimination. Taking v-elimination for granted, suppose that
A Y C and BY C, where V stands for the relation of logical
consequence (entailment), i.e. 'Y A' means that there is a proof with
conclusion A whose undischarged assumptions belong to the set T and
we write C in place of V when T = {C}.10 By a single application of
v-elimination, we have that A v B Y C. Hence A v B expresses the
logically strongest proposition that can be introduced. (That it can be
introduced is, of course, what the v-introduction rules tell us.)
Next, taking the v-introduction rules as given, suppose that, for any
set of sentences T,TU{C}YD whenever r U {A} Y D and T U {B} Y D.
By the v-introduction rules, A\-A v B and B\-Ay B, and conse
quently C h A y B. Hence A v B expresses the logically weakest prop
osition that can be eliminated.
Similarly, we have that if {A,B}\-C then, by a-elimination,
AaBYC, and if CYA and CYB then, by a-introduction,
CYA a B, so there is harmony between the rules for a-introduction
and a-elimination. On the other hand, if we turn our attention to tonk
and suppose that AY C then the best we can do employing tonk-elimin
ation is to show that BtonkA entails C, for BtonkA Y A whereas what
we want to show is that AtonkB entails C. Likewise, if we assume that
CYB then the best we can do in the light of the tonfc-introduction rule
is to obtain C Y BtonkA. There is not harmony between tonk-introduc
tion and ion/c-elimination rules.11
3.
What I want to suggest now is an unorthodox interpretation of an

essentially classical rule, that is, a rule whose addition to intuitionist

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58 PETER MILNE
logic yields classical logic. We shall then see how it meets the conditi
for harmony elaborated above.
I suggest that the classical rule of reductio ad absurdum (CRA)
read as an introduction rule. For reasons that will be made clea
Section 4 below, I shall confine attention here to the formulation o
CRA in the system of natural deduction borrowed from Tennan
though this is not an essential restriction.
A
serves as a rule that introduces A. Odder still than treating
introduction rule is the corresponding elimination rule, for it
familiar ~i-elimination rule but now understood with A, not
major premise. These two rules conform to the general schem
gives for introduction and elimination rules.12 As ?\A appea
introduction rule as a possibly undischarged assumption (rat
an assumption of arbitrary form) Prawitz terms the rule 'de
Dummett calls such rules 'oblique'.
Justification of the elimination rule is straightforward:
[iA]
2
_L
A -iA
1
yields
^A
2
1
as a more direct proof of absurdity.

CRA and the re-interpreted ~i -elimination rule exh
Tennant's sense, too. Taking the elimination rule f
suppose that, for any set of sentences T, if T U {~
by the elimination rule {A, ~iA}Y _L, and hence A
expresses the logically strongest proposition that can
Next, taking CRA for granted, suppose that {B, ~i

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MEANING OFxTHE LOGICAL CONSTANTS 59
BY A. Therefore, A expresses the weakest proposition that can be

eliminated.
CRA and its associated elimination rule cannot be ruled out if we
adopt either Prawitz's approach or Tennant's notion of harmony. By a
judicious interpretation of an essentially classical rule, we obtain a
proof-theoretic completeness proof for classical propositional logic, pro
vided that there is no other objection to the supposed completeness
proof for intuitionist logic. (And in one respect, the situation is much
improved: by Post's strong completeness theorem we know that there
can be no consistent rule-given extension of classical propositional logic,
i.e. no further rule governing the already introduced connectives that
is not already derivable can consistently be introduced.)
CRA differs from the introduction rules of intuitionist logic in one
regard: with CRA the conclusion is of lower complexity than the dis
chargeable assumption whereas in all other cases, the conclusion is
more complex than either the dischargeable assumption, if there is one,
or the premise or premises, if there is none. The corresponding property
for elimination rules would be that the conclusion is less complex than
the major premise. The re-interpreted ?i -elimination rule is not alone
in permitting a breach of this condition: both v-elimination and EFQ
(1-elimination) go much further in allowing conclusions of complexity
arbitrarily greater than that of the eliminated major premise.
Prawitz has mooted the following objection to treating CRA as an
introduction rule.13 To treat CRA as an introduction rule is to allow
that proof of an atomic sentence A on the assumption of its logically
more complex negation constitutes a canonical, meaning-conferring,
proof. He adds that, in turn, the proof of ?\A must depend on a proof
of A, in violation of molecularity constraints on theories of meaning.
There are four grounds, of varying strength, on which to rebut the
objection.
The first is that from the thesis that its introduction rule(s) serves to
define a logical constant it by no means follows that every introduction
rule determines, or helps determine, the meaning of the sentence it
introduces. We are by no means obliged to concede that applications
of CRA confer meaning on the sentences introduced. Of course, if we
do not, we lay ourselves open to the charge that CRA, unlike the
introduction rules of intuitionist logic, cannot be self-justifying or re
quire no justification. Certainly, it is not at all obvious what proof-theor
etic grounds could then be advanced in favour of CRA but, equally, it
is not clear that none could be found.

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60 PETER MILNE
If the complexity objection was compelling, then primacy would hav

to be given to the introduction rules, for, as just observed, the analogo
property of elimination rules fails to hold of v-elimination and EFQ.
But on the basis of what independent considerations must introducti
rules have primacy?
The complexity objection takes it for granted that syntactic co
plexity matches meaning-theoretic complexity. From the classical pe
spective, this is easily denied. Consider, for a moment, the realist w
believes all sentences to be either true or false, truth and falsity bei
on a par. Tradition dictates that the realist's semantics are given
terms of truth-conditions but they could just as easily be given by falsity
conditions or by a combination of both. Truth and falsity can each b
defined in terms of the other using negation, by which I mean that t
most natural way for a realist to construe negation is as a "togg
switch" that flips a proposition back and forth between semantic pole
of equal value. And, although it does not follow from this seman
viewpoint, it is strongly suggested by it that, for the realist, atomi
sentences and their negations are on a par.
This conception of negation can be given formal expression by mean
of an operator acting on well-formed formula in the following way:
?i is not the dominant connective in A then cA is ?\A; if A is of the
form ~iB then cA stands ambiguously for both iA, i.e. ?\~iB, a
B. Read attributes the idea for such a treatment of negation to t
Wittgenstein of the Tractatus.14 Loosely following Read, we can form
late introduction and elimination rules for c:
c-intro [A] oelim A cA.

: 1
cA
(In the o
RAA:
RAA' [A] [A]
B cB
cA
In the Lemmon-prompted system, we require the restriction that A

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must occur as an undischarged assumption in at least one of the sub

proofs and all its occurrences as an assumption if both sub-proofs are
discharged upon application of the rule.)
Both CRA and the standard ?i -introduction and i -elimination rules
(or 1-free CRA and RAA in the other systems) are derivable as special
cases. Evidently, the elimination rule is justified by the introduction
rule and, perhaps less evidently, the rules are in harmony in Tennant's
sense. The complexity complaint cannot be levelled against the ointro
duction rule.
The negation operator, ?i, is explained in terms of c, in the precise,
proof-theoretic sense that its introduction and elimination conditions
are derivable. Of course c is not an object-language sentential connec
tive but its behaviour is subject to introduction and elimination rules.
Moreover, it corresponds in some measure to the natural language
notion of 'the contrary of. Only in some measure, however, for in the
case of a sentence of the form ~iA, cA is ambiguous and so one would
do better to speak of 'a contrary' rather than 'the contrary'.15 If there
is an objection to this way of countering Prawitz's complexity objection,
it can only be that c is strictly metalinguistic, being syntactically parasitic
on ?i. But quite why that should be a problem is unclear.
Prawitz's objection to CRA as an introduction rule depends on the
meaning of -i being given by its introduction rule. As a fourth counter
to Prawitz's objection, I shall now argue that it is quite impossible for
?i-introduction to determine the meaning of ?i. In order to do this we
first recursively define what it is for a sentence to be essentially negative:
J_ is essentially negative;
no (other) atomic sentence is essentially negative;
for all A, ?\A is essentially negative;
A a B is essentially negative just in case A or B is;
A v B is essentially negative just in case A and B are;
A ?> B is essentially negative just in case B is.
THEOREM: There is no proof in classical (ergo in minimal and in

tuitionist) logic in which all premises and all discharged assumptions
save at most one disjunct of the major premise in each application of
v -elimination are not essentially negative and the conclusion is essentially
negative.
Proof. The theorem is demonstrated by induction on the length of
proof, the length of a proof being measured by the number of lines it

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62 PETER MILNE
contains. (Premises are just undischarged assumptions.) I shall ca

out the proof for the system of Tennant's Natural Logic.
Base: A one line proof is a proof of a sentence with itself as b
premise and conclusion; the theorem evidently holds of such a proo
Induction hypothesis: The theorem holds good of all proofs of leng
^ k, k a positive integer.
Now let 2 be a proof of length k -Y 1. We go through a proof
cases dependent on the rule of inference used to obtain the conclus
of 2.
(a) 2 is of the form
2i 22
A_B_
AaB
If 2 satisfies the conditions of the theorem, then so t
proofs 2i, with A as conclusion, and 22, with B as co
therefore, by the induction hypothesis, neither A nor B
negative. Consequently A a B is not essentially negative.
(b) a-elimination, v-introduction, and ??-elimination
similarly.
(c) 2 is of the form
[A] [B]
2i 22 23
Ay B C C
C
If 2 satisfies the conditions of the theorem then so too does t
with A v B as conclusion, and therefore, by the induction hy
most one of A and B is essentially negative. In that case,
of the two sub-proofs 22, with C as conclusion and pos
assumption, and 23, with C as conclusion and possibly B as a
satisfies the conditions of the theorem. By the induction h
again, C is not essentially negative.

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(d) 2 is of the form
[A]
Si
B
A-+B
If 2 satisfies the conditions of the theorem, then so too does the su
proof 2i with B as conclusion and possibly A as assumption. But then
by the induction hypothesis, B is not essentially negative and, hence
neither is A ?> B.
(e) If 2 satisfies the conditions of the theorem it cannot be of any
these forms:
[A] 2X 22 2X [-iA]
2x A -iA 1 2X
1 1 A 1
-iA A9
for in each case, we
negative conclusion,
As is readily seen, th
tions of minimal, in
It does not hold for
tollendo tollens and,
as basic - but redun
What does the the
essentially negative
negative premise or
negative, it cannot
assumption containin
governing a , v, and
whose premises and
infinite regress and
meaning-conferring
sumption or premise
introduction with p
and 1-free sentence
grounds for the un

178.191.134.120 on Thu, 13 Oct 2022 13:40:09 UTC
64 PETER MILNE
latter, such a rule must be context dependent, not purely formal,

only interpreted -i- and 1-free sentences can be judged to be incom
ible or absurd, as in the case of '0 = 1', familiar from intuitionist ar
metic.
We cannot always assume, as Prawitz would have us believe, that a
premise or discharged assumption of the form ~\A has really been
introduced canonically. Consequently, the meaning of negation cannot
be determined by the -i-introduction rule alone; that much is now
evident.
4.
The conclusion of the previous section might lead one to agree with
Michael Dummett, who has been reported as denying that negation is
a logical constant.17 In The Logical Basis of Metaphysics, he denies
that negation has a fixed, language-independent meaning.18 One can
make the connexion between these denials thus: the meaning of ne
gation is not constant therefore negation is not a constant. I hasten to
say that I have no grounds on which to attribute this precise thought
to Dummett.
In The Logical Basis of Metaphysics, Dummett employs this ?i
introduction rule, a special case of RAA which I shall dub -i-intro?>:
[A]
-iA
-nA'
To obtain intuitionist logic, one uses the first of these elimination rules,
to obtain classical logic, the first and second:
-i-elim/ A -\A -i-elimc ~i~iA

B A
These are, of
tively. Althou
tained by mean
-i-elimM
-\B

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(The theorem of Section 3 applies equally to these formulations of the

systems.)
RAA is often presented as an ?i -introduction rule. It may seem more
than a little odd that it alone suffices for minimal logic, and hence that
a formulation of minimal logic that employs -i-introo and -i-elimM is
preferable. Rather than read RAA solely as an introduction rule, I
think it best understood as a combined introduction and elimination
rule: every canonical ?i -introduction is preceded by a ~i-elimination.
The rule can be shown to be in harmony with itself in so far as (i) any
canonical -\ -introduction immediately followed by a ~i-elimination of
the introduced i can be reduced to a single application of RAA, and
(ii) RAA itself shows that the eliminated proposition is the weakest
that can be eliminated, the introduced proposition is the strongest that
can be introduced. By the same token, much the same could be said
of -i-intro/) itself, for there too an introduction of ?\A is preceded by
elimination of ~\A. Be that as it may, from here on I shall follow
Dummett in treating it as an introduction rule.
In response to Prior's tonk, Belnap proposed two criteria to be met
by the rules governing a putative logical constant.19 Firstly, the rules
must uniquely define the constant; secondly, the rules must constitute
a conservative extension, in the sense that no inference in which neither
premises nor conclusion contain the new constant should be provable
only by employing the newly added rules. Classical logic, defined, say,
by adding RAA and D NE to the rules for a , v, and ??, constitutes a
counter-instance to the second requirement for, famously, Peirce's Law
is a classical theorem not derivable in intuitionist logic, although it
contains no occurrence of ~i: ((A?>B)?>A)-+A. As for the first
requirement, it can be most simply illustrated using the a-introduction
and a-elimination rules. Suppose that, in addition to a, we consider
a connective * governed by analogous rules:
*-intro A_B *-elim A*B A*B

A*B A B
What we must show, for uniquene

rivable, for all A and B. A-elim f
A*B:

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66 PETER MILNE
A a B A a B
A B
A*B
The converse inference, from A*B to A a B, is derived analogously.
The rules for a , v , ?>, and _L define each of these uniquely.
RAA fails to define negation uniquely. Correspondingly, -i-intro?>
and -i-elimM fail to define negation uniquely. Likewise, Tennant's ~i
intro and ?i-elim rules fail to define negation uniquely. In the latter
case, they do define it uniquely modulo the identity of _L in the rules
but the rules do nothing to fix the meaning of 1. Indeed, 1 can stand
for an arbitrary fixed proposition, presumably one that does not contain
-i if there is to be any hope that the rules fix its meaning but formally,
even that restriction is not necessary. For any sentence p, the ?> -
introduction and ?? -elimination rules show that A?>p behaves in the
right way for it to be a candidate for -\A in minimal logic.20 (Minimal
logic emerges as the logic of personal prejudice: ?\A is asserted when
A entails the unacceptable.) The negation of minimal logic thus fails
to satisfy the first of Belnap's criteria.21
Prawitz's reduction procedures go a long way towards showing that
the introduction and elimination rules for a constant satisfy Belnap's
second criterion, for they are employed to show that a detour through
rules governing logical constants not occurring in either premise or
conclusion is unnecessary. Here, Dummett's formulation of intuitionist
logic hits a snag. The "local peak":
[A] 2,
22 A
2i ~nA 2x 22
A -iA A -iA
- reduces to -.
B B
The application
Of course, on it
that addition o
extension. Wha
demonstration t
What might gi
when ?i-elimM

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?i -introduction and ?i -elimination rules of minimal logic are in har

mony, both in his sense and in Dummett's, but Dummett's own ?i
introduction rule, -i-mtroD, is not in harmony with even the weak
elimination rule of minimal logic. We have what appears to be a quite
gratuitous disharmony: Dummett, with no clear motivation, has
adopted an unduly weak -i-introduction rule.
That -i-introz) is weak indeed is made evident by the fact that it and
-i-elimc are not jointly sufficient for classical logic.22 To see this let /
be a metalinguistic function on sentences of a language that includes
?? but not ?i. The function / maps sentences of the language onto
sentences of the language subject only to the constraint that, for all A,
f(A -+f(A)) = A. Now, define -iA to be A ->f(A). The rules of ->
introduction and -^-elimination suffice to show that, so defined, ~i
satisfies ?i-intro?>. Moreover, -]~]A classically entails A, for ?i?\A =
(A ->f{A)) -+f(A ->f(A)) = (A ->f{A)) -+ A and ((A ->f{A)) ->
A) ?? A is an instance of Peirce's Law. On the other hand, where A
and B are arbitrary atomic sentences, neither (A a (A?>f(A))?>B
nor (A a (A ?>f(A)) ?> (B ?>f(B)) is classically valid under all choices
off (A) and/(#). Consequently, neither ?i-elimM nor ?i-elim7 is deriv
able in the logic obtained when -i-intro^, and -i-elimc are taken as the
only negation rules. Unsurprisingly, neither disjunctive syllogism nor
modus tollendo tollens is derivable, for neither ((A ->f(A)) a
(A v B))-+B nor ((A -? B) a (B -*f(B))) -* (A -*f(A)) is classically
valid under all choices of f(A) and f(B).
In response to the failure of the reduction step in proofs involving
-i-introz) immediately followed by ?i-elim7 Dummett proposes to re
strict the -i-elim/ rule so that only atomic sentences are permitted as
conclusions. This, he says, still suffices for intuitionist logic.23 In this
he is, I believe, mistaken. Intuitively, the charge is plausible because
even when -i-elimc is added ?i-elimM is not derivable. (The use of -i
intro/) is essential to what follows; RAA and Dummett's restricted -1
elim/ do indeed suffice for intuitionist logic.)
In order to prove Dummett's claim mistaken, we consider amended
classical truth-value assignments. The assignments use the classical
truth-tables for a , v, and -* and so the usual rules for a , v, and -*
are sound with respect to truth-preservation under these assignments.
In addition to each value-assignment v, we introduce a function, g,
from the sentences of the language to truth-values. With negation we
associate the rule: for given g, v(~iA) = TRUE unless v(A) = TRUE

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68 PETER MILNE
and g(A) = FALSE. Dummett's ?i-intro/) is sound; -i-elim7, restri

to atomic conclusions, is sound provided that g(A) = FALSE, for
sentences A, whenever v(B) = FALSE for any atomic sentence
Taking our cue from Dummett's mention of Wittgenstein's Tractari
conception of logically independent elementary propositions, we co
sider the valuation that makes all atomic sentences TRUE and suppo
that g(A) = TRUE, g(B) = FALSE, for some pair of atomic senten
A and B. Under this arrangement Dummett's rules are sound bu
and ~iA are both TRUE and ~iB is FALSE, i.e., -i-elimM is not sou
hence not derivable in the system.24
The system that Dummett's amended rules give rise to is a weakeni
of intuitionist logic that, in a sense, lies parallel to minimal logi
minimal logic, {A,?\A}Y~\B for all B including atomic B, but t
inference from {A, -iA} to B, B atomic, is invalid. In Dummett's log
{A, -\A} Y B for all -i-free B but the inference from {A, ~\A} to ~\
B atomic, is invalid.
5.
Prawitz takes introduction rules as self-justifying then seeks harmonious

elimination rules. Dummett places much emphasis on what he calls
stability. Starting from, say, the introduction rule(s), one finds a har
monious elimination rule (or rules). Reversing direction one then seeks
an introduction rule (or rules) that is (are) in harmony with the elimin
ation rule(s). Stability is achieved when the initial and final introduction
rule(s) are the same and initial and final elimination rule(s) are the
same when one starts with the elimination rule(s). He illustrates with
the v-elimination rule of quantum logic. It is like the v-elimination
rule of section 2 except that in the sub-proofs headed by [A] and [B]
these are the only undischarged assumptions that are permitted to occur
in their respective sub-proofs. Now, the standard v-introduction rules
are in harmony with this restricted v-elimination rule. On the other
hand, the stronger standard v-elimination rule is in harmony with these
introduction rules. Hence the v rules of quantum logic are not stable
and, according to Dummett, therefore fail to define a logical constant.25
(This does not entail that for Dummett quantum-logical v is meaning
less, only that its meaning is not determined by the rules that govern
its introduction and elimination in inference.)
The v-introduction rules are in harmony with the restricted v-elimin

178.191.134.120 on Thu, 13 Oct 2022 13:40:09 UTC
ation of quantum logic in Tennant's sense, too. Perhaps motivated by

such examples, in Anti-realism and Logic, Tennant describes the earlier
harmony condition of Natural Logic as a necessary condition for the
acceptability of introduction and elimination rules. A necessary and
sufficient condition is obtained by the stipulation that introduction and
elimination rules succeed in defining a logical constant only if, granted
the introduction rule(s), the elimination rule is the strongest rule to
satisfy the earlier harmony condition, and, given the elimination rule(s),
the introduction rule is the strongest rule to satisfy the earlier harmony
condition. The new necessary and sufficient condition Tennant labels
'Harmony' with a capital 'H\ He maintains of it that his system of
intuitionist relevant logic (IRL) can be characterized as the least system
satisfying this condition.26
Prawitz, too, emphasises strength: given an introduction rule he seeks
the strongest elimination rule justified by the introduction rule. In this
section, I want to raise two sceptical doubts. Firstly, is the strongest
elimination rule justified? Secondly, how does an introduction rule
justify an elimination rule, or, more widely, what does harmony show?
To broach the first question, let me first define the connective ' <?'.
The formula A <?B is perhaps best read somewhat ungrammatically as
'A without B\ The new logical constant is governed by these two rules:
<? -intro A ?--elim [A]

By(A+-B) i
A^-B By C
C
where, in the <?-elimination rule, A is the only undischarged
tion, if any, in the sub-proof of B v C. The ?^-introduction
admit, unusual, for the constant <? is not dominant in the c
Nevertheless, these rules govern an intelligible logical con
that is strictly the dual of ?? . That duality is perhaps more e
we recast the ?> -introduction and ?? -elimination rules in the
form:

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70 PETER MILNE
?? -elim A a (A ?> B) ?> -intro [A a C]

B
C_?
A^B'
where, in the -* -introduction rule, A a C is the only undischarged
assumption, if any, in the sub-proof of B and we admit the case where
C "vanishes", i.e., in which B depends on A alone. (If we did not we
might end up with a logic with valid inferences but no theorems, not
that there is anything wrong with such a logic.)
Proof-theoretically, the meaning of ' <? ' just is given by the rules
governing its introduction and/or elimination. Classically, A *-B is just
A a -]B; the two are provably equivalent when the ??-introduction
and <? -elimination rules are added to classical propositional logic. In
terms of Kripke semantics for intuitionist logic we can stipulate that
A <?B is verified at a node just in case at that or some earlier node
A is verified and B is not, earlier nodes containing fewer verified
sentences.27
Now, in order to show harmony, first note that if a canonical <? -
introduction is immediately succeeded by <? -elimination this can only
be in the context of an application of v-elimination. We have a proof
of this form:
[A]
2 2, [B]
A A^-B Bv C 22
Bv (A +-B)_C_C_
C
which reduces to:
2
A [B]
BV C C C 28
C

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The rules are also in harmony in Tennant's sense. For suppose that
A Y B v C; then, by the ??-elimination rule, A <?BY C. And suppose
next that, for any C, if A Y B v C then D Y C; then, since AY B
v (A <? B) by the ??-introduction rule, we have that D Y A <? B.
The proofs in both cases appeal to the rules for v but this is no cause
for concern. Both the ?? -introduction and ??-elimination rule invoke
v. The ??-introduction rule is, to adopt Dummett's terminology, nei
ther pure nor simple, but it is none the worse for that.29 Just because
?? is not dominant in its introduction rule, it should neither surprise
nor alarm that use of the rules for v are needed in proving harmony.
The modified rules for ?> would similarly require appeal to the rules
for ?> in proofs of harmony. That this modified form is not required
is due to the convention that while conclusions are single, premises
may be multiple.
The point of all this is that, like the sub-proofs in the restricted
v-elimination of quantum logic, the sub-proof in ??-elimination is
restricted so that at most A occurs as an undischarged assumption. In
the Prawitzian justification of v-elimination nothing is made of this
fact. Hence, if, as Prawitz claims, unrestricted standard v-elimination
is justified by the v-introduction rules, an unrestricted version of ??
elimination should, equally, be justified. Similarly, if Tennant finds
unrestricted standard v-elimination and the v-introduction rules are
in harmony, as he does, so too should unrestricted ??-elimination be
in harmony with ??-introduction.
Wherein lies the problem? In a system including the verum constant.
T, with introduction rule
A
T
and no elimination rule, one can define a notion of negat
? A =dfT<-A. This notion is dual to intuitionist negation
?? is dual to ??. By ?? -introduction we have A v ~ A as a
What we should not have is that A a ? AY B, for BY A
not a theorem of intuitionist logic. That, however, is exactly
unrestricted ??-elimination rule delivers:

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72 PETER MILNE
A
T+-A Ay?
B
The unrestricted rule yields a classical negation and class

does not conservatively extend any system including v a
it is added: A v (A -* B) is a classical theorem, not a
theorem.
Let us look again at Prawitz's justification of the standard v-elimin
ation rule. It supposes that a canonical v-introduction is immediately
followed by an v-elimination, for example:
2 [A] [B]
A 2jX 2j2
Ay B C C
C
Can we always suppose that A v B has been introduced can
That is, no matter how the disjunctive premise was in fact arr
could we suppose it to have been derived canonically from t
or fewer premises than those in fact used? The supposition that
do this is an instance of what Dummett calls Prawitz's fund
assumption. If the fundamental assumption was to hold good o
would, at the very least, entail that if Y Y A v B then T Y A or
for any set of sentences T. This disjunctive property is enjo
intuitionist logic (when Y = 0) and by Heyting Arithmetic
comprises the Peano Axioms). It cannot, however, be assumed t
generally of all sets of premises r for let T = {A v B}; as A y B
we would have, by the disjunctive property, either Ay BY
Ay BY B or both; suppose, without loss of generality, it is the
A v B Y A; as, by v-introduction, BY A y B, we have, by the tr
vity of inference, that BY A. Now, A and B here are arbitr
tences, so we have that for any pair A, B, either AY B or B
both). This conclusion holds, in particular, of arbitrary pairs of
simple atomic sentences, a manifestly absurd conclusion in any
familiar logics with which Prawitz concerns himself. In consequ
cannot be assumed that the major premise to an applicatio
elimination could have been introduced canonically. But this ra
pressing question of just how Prawitz's justification of v-elimin

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does justify applications of that rule when the fundamental assumption

fails.
Just how pressing a question this is may be seen in the light of
the following argument. Suppose that TYAyB, TXU{A}Y C, and
T2 U {B} Y C, and suppose further that there is a proof 2 of A v B from
T in which the conclusion is introduced canonically as last step from a
sub-proof 2i of, say, A. Then, as Prawitz's reduction step makes clear,
one can obtain a proof of C from T U Ti by writing copies of the proof
2i above all occurrences of A in the proof of C from Tx U {A}. Now,
the vital point is that all that this relies on is the transitivity of valid
inference and is thus wholly acceptable to the quantum logician. He
has no qualms about accepting the legitimacy of Prawitz's reduction
step. What he does not accept is that the legitimacy of the reduction
step licenses the use of unrestricted v -elimination in contexts in which
the major premise has not been derived canonically by v-introduction.
Dogmatic assertion that it does is hardly an adequate reply, yet what
else remains to the Prawitzian justifier? True, the quantum logician has
at this point no positive argument for use of his restricted v -elimination
rule in these contexts but that is not of importance.
Prawitzian justification, Dummettian harmony, is not sufficient to
"derive" universally applicable elimination rules from introduction
rules. Matters are no better when "derivation" of introduction rules
from elimination rules is attempted. Taking ?> -elimination (modus
ponendo ponens) as given, the quantum logician can readily accept the
reduction step employed when ?? -introduction is immediately followed
by ?? -elimination, for again all that is appealed to is the transitivity of
inference. What the quantum logician takes issue with is the use of
?? -introduction to obtain conditional conclusions when these are not
immediately followed by ?? -elimination. In the presence of the stan
dard ?? -introduction and ?> -elimination rules, unrestricted v -elimin
ation is a derived rule of quantum logic, i.e., of a system with the a
rules, the v-introduction rules, and the restricted v-elimination rule.30
Hence the well-known problem of introducing a suitably well-behaved
conditional into quantum logic.
Does Tennant's conception of harmony fare any better? Let us take
the (unrestricted) v-elimination rule as given. We want to show that
ii AY C and BY C then A y BY C. Now, when AY C there is a proof
of C in which, at most, A occurs as an undischarged assumption;
likewise when BY C. Hence, no more is needed to establish that

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74 PETER MILNE
A y B Y C than the restricted v-elimination rule of quantum lo

Next, we take the v-introduction rules as given and suppose that, fo
any set of sentences T, T U {C} YD whenever T U {A} YD
r U {B} Y D. By the v-introduction rules, AYAy B and BYAy
and consequently CYA v B. Notice, however, that to obtain that
conclusion we would only have had to assume that CYD whene
AY D and B Y D; no more than that is needed in making the final st
of the argument. The rest that allows for T + 0 is just so much ext
baggage as far as the mechanics of the proof of harmony is concerne
It is exactly because this excess content in the unrestricted v-elimi
ation rule plays no essential role, in the proof of harmony that I w
to question the significance of Tennant-style harmony proofs. Give
that the excess content in the unrestricted rule plays no essential r
how does the proof of harmony license our use of that rule? W
should Harmony be determined by strength, rather than weakness
The quantum logician offers a further challenge to Tennant, a cha
lenge to harmony, not just to Harmony. Tennant proposes his notio
of harmony as a necessary condition for a logical constant. In p
harmony demands that the major premise in the elimination rule e
presses the weakest proposition that can be eliminated when the co
ditions for elimination are satisfied. Now this involves a presuppositi
a presupposition to which the quantum logician takes exception
denies that there may be any such thing as the weakest proposition
Consider ?? -elimination. We have that {A, A ?> B} Y B. Now, sup
that {A, C}Y B and {A, D} Y B. It A -> B expresses the weakest propo
tion that can be eliminated in the circumstances of -? -elimination t
CYA-+B and DYA-^B. But then Cy DYA-+B and, con
quently, by transitivity of inference, {A, C v D} Y B. It is exactly t
move from {A, C}YB and {A, D} Y B to {A, C v D}YB whose le
imacy the quantum logician denies, for it is tantamount to assumin
distributivity of a over v, as is readily seen by letting B be (A a
y (A a D).
The quantum logician rejects the standard -? -introduction rule, for
it precisely encapsulates the idea that A?>B expresses the weakest
proposition that can be eliminated in the circumstances of ?? -elimin
ation. He does not deny that any adequate conditional for quantum
logic should obey the ??-elimination rule. Indeed it is acclaimed a
virtue of the Sasaki hook that it does just that. This connective is
defined so: A => B = df i(A a ?\(A a B)). What the quantum logician

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does deny is that the only appropriate ?? -introduction rule must show
that A ?> B is the weakest proposition that can be eliminated in the
circumstances. Tennant's harmony condition denies that if a suitably
weak introduction rule that avoids this consequence can be found, the
introduction and elimination rules would then jointly define a logical
constant. It is, of course, true that they might not uniquely define the
constant, but then neither do the ?\-introduction and ~i-elimination
rules of minimal logic uniquely define ?i, yet they are in harmony.31 Is
Tennant's necessary condition too strong?
Just as he rejects the idea that there is a weakest proposition that,
together with A, entails B, so too the quantum logician rejects the
special case in which it is supposed that there is a weakest proposition
that, together with A, entails _L. The quantum logician accepts -i
elimination. Were he to accept that -iA expresses the weakest proposi
tion that, together with A, entails 1 then distributivity of a over v
would be re-instated. To see this, suppose that A, CY D and B, CY D.
Then, by ~i-elimination and the a rules, A, C a ?\D Y _L and B,
C a ?\DY 1. Were ?\(C a ?\D) to express the weakest proposition
that, together with C a ~iD, entails 1, we would find AY~i(C a ~]D),
and B Y ?\(C a ~\D), whence, by the quantum logician's own version
of v -elimination, A y BY~i(C a ~iD). By i-elimination and the a
rules, (A y B) a C, -\D Y 1. Consequently, should -i-iD express the
weakest proposition that, together with ~iD, entails J_, we would have
that (Ay B) a CY-\?\D, and so, by DNE - accepted in quantum
logic - and the a rules, (A y B) a CY D. Analogously to the case of
-^-introduction, the quantum logician denies that the only appropriate
?i-introduction rule(s) must show that ?\A is the weakest proposition
that can be eliminated in the circumstances of -1 -elimination.32
6.
With the sceptical doubts of the previous section in mind, I shall now
propose yet another conception of harmony, related to both Tennant's
and Prawitz's, and deploy it in justifying rules of inference. Like
Gentzen, Prawitz, and Dummett, I shall treat some rules as self-justify
ing. Unlike Gentzen and Prawitz I see no need to be committed to
uniformity in taking introduction or elimination rules as self-justifying.
Which type of rules, if any, are self-justifying will depend on the con
stant under investigation.

178.191.134.120 on Thu, 13 Oct 2022 13:40:09 UTC
76 PETER MILNE
The fundamental idea is that certain rules of inference require

justification, equivalently, are self-justifying (I shall use these locutio
interchangeably), because they characterize the constant involved. E
actly which rules are thought to require no justification, hence to cha
terize the constant concerned, affects the logic that results. Rather th
make dogmatic claims about which rules require no justification, I sh
adopt the hypothetical mode, showing that if some rule characterize
a constant then such-and-such follows, usually that use of some oth
rule is licensed. My preferred type of self-justifying rules are rules o
immediate inference. I mean by that that the premise or premises a
all sentences whose derivation is immaterial to the statement of
rule. Contrast, say, ?> -elimination, which is a rule of immediate infe
ence, and ?? -introduction, which is not. I shall say more about what
it means for a rule to characterize a logical constant shortly but fir
employ the notion in defining a conception of harmony.
Only its introduction rules are v-rules of immediate inference a
only they present themselves as requiring no justification. Let us ta
them as jointly characteristic of v. Given those rules (and the transit
ity of inference, which I shall not contest), any sentence C that
entailed by A v B is entailed also by A and by B, hence if the
introduction rules are to characterize v it can only be because A
expresses the logically strongest proposition that is entailed by A an
by B. We are, therefore, permitted to adopt the weakest rule th
ensures this is so. Such a rule is the rule of v-elimination restricted
that (i) A and B must occur as undischarged assumptions in th
respective sub-proofs, (ii) A and B are the only undischarged assump
tions in their respective sub-proofs, and (iii) all occurrences of A an
B as undischarged assumptions in their respective sub-proofs are
charged in the application of the rule. One might call this the strict
quantum v-elimination rule.
The strict quantum v-elimination rule was described as the weakest
rule ensuring that A v B expresses the strongest proposition entaile
by both A and B. Obviously, we can only seek a rule that is weak
up to interderivability. On the other hand, the strict quantum v
elimination rule merely restates in inferential terms what it is for
sentence to express the strongest proposition entailed by both A and
B. Consequently, no matter what other rules may be present in t
system, it must be the weakest, up to interderivability, that allows t

178.191.134.120 on Thu, 13 Oct 2022 13:40:09 UTC
fact about A v B to be demonstrated. We may conclude that it is in

harmony with the v -introduction rules which characterize v.
Modus ponendo ponens (MPP) gives us something less familiar. ?>
elimination is an immediate inference that brooks no argument. If it is
to be characteristic of ?? then A-+B must express the weakest propo
sition that, together with A, entails B, i.e., if {A,C}YB then
C I- A ?? B. We are therefore entitled to add the weakest rule - weak
est up to interderivability - that ensures that this is the case. A restric
ted form of ?> -introduction fits the bill. It is restricted in that A must
occur as an undischarged assumption in the sub-proof of B, that all
such occurrences of A must be discharged in an application of the rule,
and that at most one other sentence occurs as an undischarged assumption
in the sub-proof.
What if A on its own entails Bl Does it then make sense to describe
A-+B as expressing the weakest proposition that, together with A,
entails Bl By the -? -introduction rule we will have that A ?? B is a
theorem, provided that there is a proof of B from A in which A occurs
as an undischarged assumption. But in the presence of the standard a
introduction and a-elimination rules, such a proof can always be found
when AY B, so there is no cause for alarm.33 If AY B then A-+B
expresses nothing - it is a logical truth -, as required. If the reader is
unhappy with this suggestion, there is an alternative: use the modified
?? -introduction rule of section 5, raising the possibility of a theoremless
logic.
Because both the a-introduction rule and the a-elimination rules
are rules of immediate inference, we are faced with a choice. Let us
first suppose that the a-introduction and (jointly) the a-elimination
rules separately characterize a . For this to be the case, it must be that
A a B expresses the strongest proposition entailed jointly by A and B
and the weakest proposition entailing both A and B. This, of course,
is what Tennant's proof of harmony shows, and does so employing just
the a-introduction and a-elimination rules. Unsurprisingly, then, no
further rules governing a are required under the present conception
of harmony.
Something quite unexpected results, however, when we suppose, as
well we might, that the a-elimination rules on their own jointly charac
terize a . Any sentence C that entails A a B also entails both A and
B, hence the characteristic aspect must come down to the fact that

178.191.134.120 on Thu, 13 Oct 2022 13:40:09 UTC
78 PETER MILNE
A a B expresses the logically weakest proposition to have this property

Thus, if CYA and CYB then CYA a B. We are licensed to ado
the weakest rule - up to interderivability - that ensures that this la
condition is satisfied. The rule that suggests itself is this:
[C] [C]
CAB
AaB
restricted so that (i) C must occur as an undischarged a

both sub-proofs, (ii) C is the only undischarged assump
sub-proof, and (iii) all occurrences of C as undischarged a
the sub-proofs are discharged in the application of the ru
parent sense, this rule is a mirror image of, or is dual to
quantum v-elimination rule. It is readily seen to be in
Tennant's sense, with the a-elimination rules. However
why should we do this? - we allow vacuous occurrence
rule, it is not sufficient to allow derivability of the standa
tion rule! To see this, let us say that the set of sentences
entails A just in case some member of T classically en
elimination rules and the weak a-introduction rule ab
sound with respect to strong entailment. On the other h
and B are distinct atomic sentences, {A,B} does not str
AaB, since neither A nor B alone classically entails Aa
This failure to yield standard a-introduction is most int
the weak a-introduction rule seems by design sufficient
the orthodox algebraic/lattice-theoretic characterization of
AaB expresses the logically weakest proposition that en
and B. Indeed, it appears merely to reformulate that asse
ential terms. Given this observation, it is perhaps tempti
that semantic considerations enter in the gap between
introduction rule and the standard a-introduction rule.
The clue to what is amiss lies in the odd qualificatio
introduction rule, namely, that at most, one sentence
may appear as an undischarged assumption in the sub-pro
comes about because we assume, in the style of Tenna
proofs, that if any proposition expressible in the languag
together with the proposition expressed by A, entails B th

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sition is expressible by a single sentence of the language. On the other

hand, we are in the habit of deducing sentences from sets of sentences,
not just single sentences. It would be pleasing if we could find an
explanation for this that did not presuppose that when T entails A a
proposition expressed by the conjunction of some or all the sentences
in T entails A. Such an explanation can be found when we allow that
not only sentences but also sets of sentences express propositions. Only
two candidates suggest themselves for the proposition expressed by a
set of sentences:
(a) T expresses the weakest proposition that entails every propo

sition expressed by a member of T.
(b) T expresses the strongest proposition entailed by every pro
position expressed by a member of T.
They agree only when all the propositions in the set express the same
proposition. {A} expresses the same proposition as A. Only the first
underwrites the standard assumption that a set of sentences entails each
of its members, so we shall adopt it. Let us apply this to a-introduction.
We suppose, again, that the a-elimination rules on their own jointly
characterize a. In that case, AaB expresses the weakest proposition
that entails both the proposition expressed by A and the proposition
expressed by B. Consequently, for any set T, if T Y A and F Y B then
T Y A a B. We are entitled to add the weakest rule - up to interderiv
ability - that ensures that YYAaB when Y Y A and Y Y B. Clearly,
standard a-introduction does ensure this and any other rule that does
so yields the special case {A, B}YAaB because {A, B} Y A and
{A, B}Y B. We are therefore permitted to adopt the standard a-intro
duction rule.34
Let us look again at ?? -elimination. If MPP characterizes ?? then
A?>B expresses the weakest proposition such that the weakest proposi
tion that entails both it and (the proposition expressed by) A entails
B. Suppose that Y U {A} Y B. Then the proposition that expresses
T U {A} entails B; but the former proposition just is the weakest propo
sition that entails both A and the proposition expressed by T\{A}.35
Consequently, T\{A} Y A ?>B. We are permitted to add the weakest
rule - up to interderivability - that ensures that r\{^4} Y A ?> B when
T U {A} Y B. We can therefore add -? -introduction restricted so that
A must occur as an undischarged assumption in the sub-proof of B and
all such occurrences must be discharged in an application of the rule.

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80 PETER MILNE
The quantum logician's Sasaki hook fails to satisfy the ^ analogu

of ?? -introduction rule while obeying MPP. As well as obeying MPP,
it is also the case that, for all A, A => A is a theorem. Jointly, these
two conditions are often taken to characterize what it is to be a con
ditional. From the present perspective, we can say this: albeit that bei
governed by MPP helps characterize the Sasaki hook as a conditional,
the fact that it is so governed does not characterize the Sasaki hook.
The same can be said of counterfactuals and strict conditionals. It ma
be possible to give an inference-based, proof-theoretic characterizatio
of some or all of these but none is characterized by the fact that
obeys the ?? -elimination rule.36 Notice, however, that the quant
logician is in a different position from the advocate of strict and variably
strict conditionals. The latter can accept an ordinary conditional that
obeys the ?? -introduction and ?? -elimination rules in addition t
(variably) strict conditional. The quantum logician cannot allow su
an ordinary conditional. He must deny that it makes any sense to thin
of there being a conditional characterized by -? -elimination. We hav
seen already why he objects: he does not accept that there need be an
such thing as a sentence expressing the weakest proposition that joint
with A entails B. Presumably, then, he must say that the source of t
widely shared intuition that MPP is compelling as a rule of inference
must be traced either to semantic considerations or lie in the fac
that it follows from whatever rules characterize a more acceptab
conditional.
While ?? is hardly an intuitive constant, the methodology of th
present section applies equally to it. Taking <?introduction as char
teristic of ?? entails that if AY B y C then A <?BYC. This is exact
what <?elimination says. Hence <?elimination is in harmony with
introduction which characterizes ??. (Just as the quantum logician ob
jects to ?? -introduction, so too would he object to ?? -elimination.)
In systems that have an explicit -1 -elimination rule (or rules), this
usually a rule permitting immediate inference. Let us consider fir
Tennant's ~i-elimination rule,
A -iA
?
At best this rule characterizes ?i relative to _L an

do so, ?\A must express the weakest proposition t

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entails 1. Arguing as in the case of ??, we find that Tennant's i

introduction rule, restricted so that A must occur as an undischarged
assumption in the sub-proof of 1 and all such occurrences must be
discharged in an application of the rule, is the weakest rule (up to
interderivability) that underwrites this description of ~\A. (As with ?? ,
if A on its own entails 1 then ?\A is a theorem and all is well with the
introduction rule.)
If, instead of Tennant's elimination rule, we consider that ?i-elim/
characterizes negation we have, on the most obvious reading, that ?\A
expresses the weakest proposition that together with A entails every
sentence B. We then find that the weakest introduction rule is the
infinitary rule:
[A] [A] [A]

Bx B2 - - - Bj
~iA
in which A occurs as an undischarged assumption in every sub-proof
and all such occurrences are discharged in an application of the rule. Bx,
B2,. . . , Bi,. . . is an enumeration of all the sentences of the language.
Notice that because the elimination rule implicitly refers to all sentences
in the language, we would have to agree with Dummett that the mean
ing of negation is not constant, ?f we take the rule not just as characteriz
ing but as defining negation: so understood, its meaning changes when
there is an extension of the language.
Tennant's 1-elim rule, EFQ, understood as characterizing _L gives
us no further information. For suppose T to be some set of sentences
that entails every sentence A. Then in particular T entails JL and hence,
as required, _L expresses the weakest proposition with this property.
The same holds good if, instead of -l_-elim, we adopt this form of EFQ
or -i-elim:
A a ~iA
for, again, if T entails every sentence B then T entails A a ~iA and so

A a ?\A expresses the weakest proposition with this property. Contrast
ing this with -i-elim/ above we see that what further information we
get out of an immediate inference construed as characteristic of the

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82 PETER MILNE
constant or constants involved depends very much on how we read it.

Notice also that the elimination rules for 1 and the complex sentence
form A a ?\A implicitly involve quantification over the whole lan
guage.37
One route to classical logic is to add double negation elimination
(DNE). The negation rules of minimal or intuitionist logic - possibly
restricted as above, but -i-intro? alone is not sufficient - suffice to show
that ?i?1^4 expresses the weakest proposition that can be eliminated in
an application of DNE. For if FYA then T U {~iA} Y A a -\A,
whence, by, say, RAA, TY-i?iA. Hence no further rule is obtained
when DNE is taken as also, separately, characterizing negation. In the
absence, as in quantum logic, of suitable ?i -introduction rules, each of
DNE and double negation introduction when taken as characteristic
leads to the adoption of the other.
There are at least two other routes to classical logic. Modus tollendo
tollens and modus tollendo ponens are often thought of as intuitively
obvious rules of inference. Suppose, first, that we take modus tollendo
tollens (MTT) as characteristic of ?>. For this to be so, it must be
that if ru{-i?}h-b4 then T\{~iB}Y A->B. The weakest rule that
underwrites this conception of ?> is:
-\A
A->B
where iB must occur as an undischarged assumption in the sub-pro
of ?\A, and all such occurrences must be discharged in an applicat
of the rule. Addition of this rule to minimal logic yields classical lo
Disjunctive syllogism (MTP) is disputed by relevant logicians,
together with v-introduction it yields the Lewis paradox, {A, ~iA} Y
unless, like Tennant, one denies the transitivity of inference. For q
another reason, MTP is unacceptable to the quantum logician.
standard way to argue for it presupposes distributivity: if ?\A and
then either A and ~iA or B and ~iA, but the first is absurd, hence
have B and ~\A and so B. This, of course, also appeals to the princi
of consistency and so is not a purely proof-theoretic argument. Furt
in terms of the identification of propositions with closed sub-space
a separable real or complex Hubert space, MTP is readily seen t

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invalid. Despite the opposition of relevantists and quantum logicians,

many find MTP quite compelling. Dummett calls it an instance of
a fundamental argument and even the relevantist Tennant thinks it
admissible.38 What do we find if we take it as characterizing v and
hence as self-justifying? A v B must express the weakest proposition
that together with -\A entails B. The needed introduction rule is:
[-iA]
B
A v#'
subject to the by-now familiar constraints concerning undischarged as
sumptions. What if -\A entails Bl Then A v B is a theorem. Notice
that, as ?\A Y ~iA, A v ?\A is a theorem.
Thus far we have considered only rules of immediate inference as
self-justifying. While this is, I believe, in keeping with naive inferential
practice, there is no necessity to do so. To illustrate this other possibil
ity, let us examine some -1 -introduction rules, construing them as self
justifying and characterizing negation. If any rule bids fair to encapsu
late naive intuitions concerning negation it would, I think, be this form
of RAA:
[A]
B a-\B
-iA
perhaps restricted, as in Lemmon's Beginning Logic, so that A must

occur as an undischarged assumption in the sub-proof of B a ~iB and
all such occurrences are discharged in an application of the rule. Now,
suppose that when TU{A}YB a^B, TYC. Then, as {A,-iA}
Y A a ?\A, ~iAYC. Hence no further rule is needed to show that
?\A expresses the strongest proposition that can be introduced as the
conclusion to RAA. Suppose also that when Y U {A} Y B a C, Y Y ?iA.
Then {B, C} Y B a C and so C Y ~iB. Hence, again, no further rule is
needed to show that ?\B expresses the weakest proposition that can be
eliminated in an application of RAA. Three comments concerning RAA
are in order. First, RAA at best defines negation implicitly, for it uses

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84 PETER MILNE
-i in stating the antecedents to an introduction of -i. Second, in term

of Belnap's criteria, RAA does not define -i uniquely. Third, the
is implicit quantification over the sentences of the language in t
specification of RAA as, for fixed A, B can be any sentence of t
language although which sentence it is plays no part in determining t
form of the conclusion. Thus we must, with RAA, again allow that t
meaning of negation is language dependent, i.e., not invariant und
extensions of the language, if RAA defines negation.
Is there an invariant notion of negation? Dummett's -?-intro/j, su
gests an appropriate rule for such a constant. This ~i-introduction ru
will not lead to language dependence:
[A]
A a ?\A
iA
By arguments of the same form as those in the immedi

paragraph, we can establish that no further rule is neede
iA expresses the weakest proposition that can be intr
conclusion, and furthermore, that no further rule is ne
that -\A expresses the strongest proposition that can
from its position above the line in an application of the r
and second provisos concerning implicit definition and n
carry over unchanged.
What of the rules for tonkl Do they succeed in char
intelligible logic constant? Taken on its own to?A>elimina
for AtonkB ought to express the weakest proposition th
which is expressed by B itself, so the corresponding intr
should derive AtonkB from B, not A. Similarly, the tonf
rule fails to yield the tonfc-elimination rule when taken
a logical constant. There appears to be one further po
troduction and toflfc-elimination rules separately charact
constant. In this case, we would have that AtonkB s
expresses the strongest proposition entailed by A and
proposition entailing B. This requires that A and B ex
proposition. A and B being arbitrary, this is absurd
dealing with a language in which all sentences express the
tion (the language of absolute idealism?). Notice that wh

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absurd supposition concerning all natural languages the suggestion does

not constitute a purely proof-theoretic impropriety. Given our inferen
tial practices it is absurd, but it is not absurd tout court.
I have talked of rules "characterizing" a logical constant, a term I
borrow from Pascal Engel. He uses it in preference to 'defining' because
he allows that a rule (or rules) of inference or a semantic description
may characterize a logical constant without making it intelligible to
anyone who does not already have an intuitive understanding of it.39
My motive is similar, although not quite the same. To say that a rule
- or rules - of inference characterizes a logical constant is to say that
the rule significantly helps fix the identity of propositions containing
the constant insofar as that can be determined in inferential terms. If
this is somewhat vague, it is so precisely because it allows that neither
the meaning nor the identity of a logical constant need be exhausted
by a description of its role in inference. Consider negation, again.
We can take RAA or one of the intuitionist ?\ -elimination rules as
characterizing negation. Does that define negation? Hardly, for in the
light of the theorem of section 3, we know that an essentially negative
assumption must be made in the course of a sub-proof in every appli
cation of a ~i-introduction rule. Further, we know that we cannot
always suppose the introduction made in virtue of any familiar ~i
introduction rule. Our elimination rules give no non-standard grounds
for -i-introductions, i.e., they license only standard ?i -introduction
rules. Hence, it seems, we must suppose that semantic considerations
intrude either in furnishing grounds for asserting negated sentences or
in grounding assertion of 1. Likewise, we find that the quantum,
intuitionist and classical logician disagree over the grounds for asserting
disjunctive sentences in the absence of canonical grounds (grounds for
asserting a disjunct). Even if we took the standard v-elimination rule
as characterizing v , we would not circumvent that problem, for it is
in harmony with the standard v -introduction rules and so provides no
clue as to what grounds assertion of disjunction in the absence of
canonical grounds. But, as we saw in section 5, we cannot make believe
that disjunctions are never asserted in such conditions.
Finally, we must face the quantum logician's challenge to ?? -intro
duction. How can we claim on proof-theoretic grounds to know that a
language contains sentences expressing a unique weakest proposition
that in conjunction with A entails Bl Only if our inferential practice
unambiguously endorses at least a rule interderivable with our restricted

ff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff on Thu, 01 Jan 1976 12:34:56 UTC
86 PETER MILNE
form of ?> -introduction. (I take it for granted that we use MPP fo

all sorts of conditionals.) Brave is the logician who maintains any su
thesis about our everyday usage of 'if. . . then . . .'.
7.
Ultimately, then, what can be said of the enterprise that seeks to justify
logic proof-theoretically? Clearly, what emerges depends upon exactly
which rules one considers characteristic of the logical constants in the
above sense. Rules of immediate inference have a better claim to this
than either all introduction rules or all elimination fules. Stopping short
of definition, we have no need to live up to Belnap's demand that rules
uniquely define a logical constant, although if they do not and the
constant is held to have an unambiguous meaning in natural usage this
suggests another route by which semantic considerations may enter.
No problems attend conjunction. Here is a connective that can be
said to be defined by its introduction and elimination rules. No problems
attend the conditional if we take MPP as characteristic. In that case
too, we can say it is defined by its introduction and elimination rules.
The same cannot be said for negation and disjunction, especially the
first, for we may not even have uniqueness of negation, and because
semantic considerations intrude.
What of completeness? The methodology of the last section leads to
an unusual formulation of a number of logics, with the rules chosen as
characteristic of negation determining exactly which logic results. With
the exception of what I shall call 'basic logic', which adopts Dummett's
?i-intro/j) as the sole negation rule, they are all familiar as minimal,
intuitionist, and classical logic.40 They are all in Lemmon-style since
there is neither vacuous nor optional discharge of assumptions with the
indirect rules of inference. Belnap's demand for conservative extensions
is not met as one progresses from fragment to fragment of the logic
adding the logical constants (and we have not argued that it ought to
be).41 On the other hand, the logic is strong enough to validate derived
rules that can be used to generate fragments that meet the conservative
extension requirement.
Proofs in these systems cannot always be put in normal form. This
opens up another possibility. Following Tennant, we could demand
that only derivations in normal form count as proofs. We would, I
suspect, then end up with a series of relevant logics: basic quantum

178.191.134.1ffff:ffff:ffff on Thu, 01 Jan 1976 12:34:56 UTC
relevant logic; basic classical quantum relevant logic (with -l-intro/j,

and DNE as negation rules); minimal quantum relevant logic (with,
say, RAA as negation rule); intuitionist quantum relevant logic (with
RAA as negation rule and MTP as an v-elimination rule); and classical
quantum relevant logic (obtained by adding DNE or CRA to minimal
quantum relevant logic).42
A problem remains. Pedagogically there can be no doubt that MTT
and MTP are much more readily accepted by students being instructed
in logic than either EFQ or -i-elim/; indeed they are almost as readily
accepted as MPP itself. However, if either MTT is taken to characterize
the conditional or MTP to characterize disjunction the conditional turns
out to be material implication, which students - and others - find
counter-intuitive. This suggests that, at least as far as the conditional
is concerned, our inferential intuitions and inferential practice are ulti
mately grounded in semantic considerations; they are not self-sufficient
as the proof-theoretic approach requires. (Another possibility is that
our intuitions and practice are incoherent and in need of reform.)
I say only 'suggests', the pedagogic evidence certainly does not com
pel that conclusion, but if it is accepted then only a remains as a
logical constant whose meaning is exhausted by its inferential role. That
it alone remains is probably due in large measure to its triviality. If A
and B jointly entail C, then AaB entails C; if A entails B and A entails
C, then A entails B a C. I.e., if {A, B}YC then, by a-elimination,
A a B Y C; if AY B and A Y C then, by a-introduction, A Y B a C.
The inference rules for a appear to be nothing more than rules for
semantic descent. Perhaps it is this triviality of 'and' that leads Dummett
to suggest that 'and' might be an exception to the general claim that
addition of just one logical constant to a language with none cannot
yield a conservative extension in Belnap's sense.43
Some, such as Luntley, may think it too much to concede that even
the meaning of a can be defined proof-theoretically.44 To sceptics it
is, perhaps, worth remarking that conjunction is the only propositional
connective upon whose rules the quantum, intuitionist and classical
logician agree. Moreover, it is the only connective whose standard
introduction and elimination rules are in harmony (and Harmony) ac
cording to all of Prawitz, Dummett, Tennant and the present author.
And it is, of course, debatable whether to allow that, of all the logical
constants, the meaning of 'and' alone is determined by the rules govern
ing its introduction and /or its elimination in inference goes any way at

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88 PETER MILNE
all towards vindicating the proof-theoretic approach and Gentzen's

original intuition.45
NOTES
1 Prior (1960).
2 For notions of harmony, see Dummett (1987a, pp. 277-80); Dummett (1991, pp. 21
20, 246-51, 280-300, 320); Engel (1991, pp. 270-3); Prawitz (1977, pp. 2-40); Read
(1988, pp. 174-78); Tennant (1978, pp. 74-7); Tennant (1987, pp. 76-98).
3 For a sharp-tongued but clear-sighted discussion of natural deduction, see Tichy (1988
pp. 240-8).
4 Notice that while RAA introduces a conclusion of the form ~\A, it also involves a
negated sentence, ~\B, "above the line". Prawitz calls a rule that employs the constant
being introduced in this way an implicit rule.
5 The most obvious departure from Lemmon's system is that his is set out in linear, not
tree, form. He includes two further rules, modus tollendo tollens and double negation
introduction. Both are redundant, as he acknowledges; see Lemmon (1965, pp. 62, 64).
More surprisingly, if the latter rules are retained, then the negation rule, reductio ad
absurdum, is redundant; see Coburn and Miller (1977).
6 In Tennant's formulation (1987, p. 94): the introduction rules are constitutive, the
elimination rules explicative, of its meaning.
7 Prawitz's normalization procedures accomplish more than what Dummett calls "the
levelling of local peaks", i.e. the removal of proof-parts in which a connective is intro
duced only to be eliminated immediately. As Dummett puts it (1991, p. 250): "The other
reduction steps are auxiliary, being principally concerned to rearrange the order in which
the rules are applied, so that a proof in which a sentence is introduced by an introduction
rule, and only later removed by means of an elimination rule in which it is the major
premiss, can be transformed into one in which the elimination rule is applied immediately
after the introduction rule to form a local peak". Dummett goes on to warn that "the
ease with which these auxiliary reduction steps can usually be carried out should not
mislead us into believing them always to be possible". The Lemmon-style system pre
sented above is a case in point. In Lemmon's own system, it is not at all clear that even
the levelling of local peaks can be carried out. This is because he considers the inference
from r to A derivable only if there is a proof in which all (and only) members of T occur
as undischarged assumptions.
8 G?ran Sundholm (1986, p. 497) urges caution regarding the claim that completeness
has been established. See Sundholm, op. cit., for an overview of the proof-theoretic
approach.
9 As Peter Schroeder-Heister has done; see Schroeder-Heister (1985). His conception of
introduction and elimination rules is narrower than Prawitz's; v-introduction proves
problematic on his scheme. The same connective posed problems when Prawitz, too,
tackled the justification of introduction rules by elimination rules; see Prawitz (1975).
10 From the proof-theoretic perspective, one cannot talk of logical consequence or entail
ment without at least tacit reference to some system of deduction, i.e. some set of rules
of inference. But in the proofs of harmony, which system it is is irrelevant, provided

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that it contains the introduction and elimination rules for the logical constant under
investigation.
11 Tonk suffers from another peculiarity: for the other constants, immediately following
an elimination rule by the introduction rule for the eliminated constant gets us back to
where we started. For example: A a B\-A and A a BVB, by a-elimination, and, by
a-introduction, we obtain A a B \- A a B; similarly, by v-introduction, A \-A v B and
B\- A v B and taking these in the sub-proofs in an application of v -elimination we get
Av B\- Av B. On the other hand, ?orc/c-elimination followed by torc/c-introduction does
not return us to the starting point. Instead, we find that AtonkB \- BtonkA.
12 Prawitz (1979, p. 37).
13 Prawitz (1977, pp. 35-6).
14 Read (1988, pp. 178-82). Similar ideas have been advanced in the formal treatment
of Stoic logic; see Mueller (1979, p. 204) and Egli (1983, p. 81).
15 Univocality can be achieved as follows: define dA to be B if A is of the form ~iB and
to be iA otherwise. The rules for d are the same as for c. CRA and -i-elim are then
instances of d-intro and d-elim, respectively, and those instances of -i-intro in which the
discharged assumption is not of the form ?\B are instances of d-intro. Double negation
introduction (DNI) is derivable using only CRA and -i-elim, and given CRA and DNI
the remaining instances of ~i-intro are derivable. The definition of d allows us to speak
of the contrary. However, whereas with c we can say that a contrary of a contrary is the
original we cannot say with d that the contrary of the contrary is the original, for d~i?\A
is A, not ?\?\A. Perhaps no formal notion quite corresponds to the informal notion of
the contrary of a proposition.
16 The theorem holds for Lemmon's original system when the definition of essential
negativity is modified by substituting the clause:
?\A is essentially negative just in case A is not.
17 Luntley (1988, pp. 9-10, 109).

18 In what follows, all attributions to Dummett can be traced to Dummett (1991, pp.
291-6) unless otherwise stated.
19 Belnap (1962).
20 Cf. Dummett (1987b, p. 227).
21 Tennant's -i -introduction and ?i -elimination rules in conjunction with EFQ succeed
in defining negation uniquely. Similarly, so do RAA and -i-elim?. This fact lies behind
Timothy Williamson's demonstration that no language can contain intuitionist and classi
cal negations that attach to the same sentences; see Williamson (1988, pp. 110-12).
22 Contrary to what Dummett seems to imply; see Dummett (1991, p. 291).
23 In the offending passage (1991, p. 293), Dummett says: "If we are wanting to consider
elimination rules as self-justifying, we shall need to restrict their applications to those
whose conclusions are less complex than the premises. This will involve no loss of
generality for negation-elimination, however. We may even require the conclusion B to
be atomic, since the general form of the rule, as yielding any specific sentence as
conclusion, is derivable from this restricted form by the help of the rules governing other
operators".
24 As (A?>!)?>?\A stands to Tennant's -i-introduction rule, so (A -> ?\A) ?>~iA
stands to ~i-introD and (~iA -+ ?)->A stand to CRA. The ->introD analogue of CRA

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90 PETER MILNE
would be the rule corresponding to (~~\A -*A)?>A. However, adding the latter rule to
minimal logic does not yield classical logic: (?\A ?>A) ?>A is derivable in minimal logic
with LEM but adding LEM to minimal logic does not suffice to yield classical logic.
Oddly, Dummett discusses CRA but not its -i-intro^ analogue.
25 Dummett (1991, p. 288).
26 Given the similarity of CRA and the elimination rule associated with it in section 3 to
standard negation rules, I conjecture that one obtains a Harmonious classical relevant
logic by adding to Tennant's IRL CRA modified by the requirement that ?\A must occur
as an undischarged premise in the sub-proof of 1 and must be discharged in applying
the rule. Tennant has himself worked with this system minus the rules for the conditional;
see Tennant (1987, pp. 253-65, and the references therein).
In IRL, all proofs are required to be in normal form. It is this stipulation together
with the restriction on discharging assumptions that makes the logic a relevance logic.
(It is also this that leads to failures of the transitivity of inference: v-introduction is
permissible, disjunctive syllogism is permissible combining the two to obtain ex falso
quodlibet, a fallacy of irrelevance, is not permissible). Lemmon's formulation of classical
logic (and hence the third system of section 2) satisfies the restrictions on the discharge
of assumptions. It follows that not all proofs in Lemmon's system can be put into normal
form.
27 The verification conditions stated for A *-B are obtained by dualising those of A ?> B.
It might naturally be thought that the verification conditions of A <? B are therefore just
the falsification conditions for.A?>B and that, consequently, mirroring their classical
incompatibility, A?>B and A <?B are never jointly verifiable. This is not in fact the
case; see Milne (1991, pp. 33-41, 46-7). For the algebraic analogue of the intuitionist
reading of ' <?' see Potter (1990, pp. 170-1) on Brouwerian lattices.
28 Notice that if B occurs at most as an undischarged assumption in the sub-proof E2 of
C, then the v -elimination in each proof can be taken to be the restricted quantum
logical version.
29 Dummett (1991, pp. 256-8).
30 In algebraic mode, every Heyting lattice is distributive; see, e.g., Dummett (1977, pp.
173-4) and Potter (1990, p. 171). Adding the connective <? to quantum logic also
renders unrestricted v-elimination derivable, for every Brouwerian lattice is distributive;
see Potter, loc. cit.
31 While A^> B may not express the weakest proposition that, together with A, entails
B, no weaker proposition has this property, i.e., we can show in quantum logic that
if {A,C}\-B and A^>B\-C then CVA^B. The proof appeals to quantum logic's
orthomodular law. As a rule the orthomodular law says: if there is a proof of B from A
in which at most A occurs as an undischarged assumption then A v (B a -\A) may be
inferred from B. This rule is not valid in intuitionist logic nor in any logic intermediate
between intuitionist and classical, as is seen by letting B be any theorem of intuitionist
logic. By the orthomodular law, C \- (A => B) v (C a -\{A => B)) when A =?> B \- C. C a
-i(A^>B)\-CaA a -\(A a B), by DNE and the a rules. Now, if {A, C}VB then
C a -i{A => B) \-1, by the a rules and ~i-elimination, which is sound in quantum logic.
As EFQ is also sound in quantum logic, Ca ~i(A^> B) \- A^> B. Next, by restricted v
elimination, (A=> B) v (C a ^(A=> B))\-A^> B. Finally, C h A => B.
32 Since ~iA is provably equivalent to A =?> 1 in quantum logic, we know that if
{A, C} \- 1 and -\A\-C then C h iA.

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33 This trick of 'spurious' a-introduction immediately followed by a-elimination is very

useful, although not indispensable, in Lemmon's system; see Coburn and Miller (1977).
34 The weak a-introduction rule is dual to the strict quantum v-elimination rule. The
most natural formulation of an v-elimination rule dual to the standard a-introduction
rule makes resort to sequents with succedents containing more than one sentence, their
orthodox reading being that if all the sentences in the antecedent are true, then at least
one of the succ?dent sentences is true. As dual to {A, B}\- A a B, we would want
A v B \- {A, B}. However, such sequents lead naturally to classical, not intuitionist, logic;
see Dummett (1977, pp. 134-5). Dummett has recently claimed that the explanation of
such sequents presupposes understanding of 'or', whereas understanding sequents with
single-sentence succedents and antecedents of zero, one or more sentences, does not
require knowledge of the meaning of 'and', see Dummett (1991, p. 187). In view of
the duality between {A, B)\-AaB and A v B\-{A,B}, this failure of duality in the
prerequisites for understanding is more than a little mysterious. The explanation, I
believe, lies elsewhere.
On the assumption that sets of sentences express propositions, the only way to make
sense of the sequents {A, B}\- A a B and A v B \- {A, B} is to suppose that in the first
{A,B} expresses the weakest proposition that entails both (the propositions expressed
by) A and B (the a) reading, while in the second it expresses the strongest proposition
entailed by both A and B (the b) reading. Contrary to Dummett's contention, there is
nothing per se wrong with sequents with set succedents. The problem is that, when
coupled with sequents with set antecedents, there is not one proposition expressed by a
set of sentences but two (unless all sentences in the set express the same proposition).
However, this claim is seen to be well nigh incoherent when we remember that the
entailment relation holds between what is expressed by (sets of) sentences; what is
expressed cannot then depend on which side of the entailment symbol the sentences
stand. In Fregean terms, it is nonsense to think of the entailment relation as modifying
sense; it is a relation between Thoughts, not something that helps determine the Thought
expressed. We must settle for one or other of the a and b readings of the proposition
expressed by a sentence; we cannot have both. As noted in the text, common practice
chooses the a reading. (One explanation of what is wrong with tonk is that it tries to
capture in a single sentence the two readings of the proposition expressed by a pair of
sentences.)
35 This may not be quite obvious. Let y be the proposition expressed by the set of
sentences T, and similarly for other sets. If A ? T then any proposition that entails every
member of T entails every member of A, wherefore y entails 8. If T = Ai U A2 then y
entails both 81 and 8\, and so, where ( is the weakest proposition that entails both ?i
and ?>2, y entails (. On the other hand, as ( entails every sentence in Ai and every
sentence in A2, ? entails every sentence in T, and so entails y. As mutually entailing
propositions are identical y= (.
36 In similar vein to the remarks concerning counterfactuals, strict conditionals, and the
Sasaki hook, the fact that modal operators obey rules of immediate inference in natural
deduction formulations of modal logic cannot fully characterize the operators. For exam
ple, if it were the case that the immediate inferrability of O A from A characterized O
then O A would be interderivable with the strongest proposition entailed by A, but that
is just A itself. This, again, does not foreclose the possibility of a proof-theoretic definition

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92 PETER MILNE
of O, only it is not characterized by its introduction rule. This note was prompted by
Denyer (1989).
37 If not alone in this, then easily more readily than any other notion of harmony, the
present conception allows an explanation of why, in the presence of 1-elimination (EFQ),
there is no 1-introduction rule.
It is one thing to introduce into one's language a sentence that entails every other,
thereby expressing a logically strongest proposition; it is quite another to identify this
proposition with that expressed by all sentences of the form A a -\A. Hence those
disquieted by the Lewis paradoxes ought not to balk at 1-elimination (EFQ). What they
ought to object to is the characterization of -i in terms of 1 in the rule of ?i -elimination;
they could avoid that by using RAA as their sole negation rule.
38 Dummett (1991, p. 293); Tennant (1987, pp. 189-90). In Dummett's terminology
MTP is not single-ended and he does not consider any such rule self-justifying (op. cit.,
p. 256). Read's relevantist argument against disjunctive syllogism (1988, p. 33) is weak
indeed. "[I]f the ground for asserting 'F or ?' is P, say, then to learn that P is false (i.e.
'not-P' is true), far from enabling one to proceed to Q, undercuts the warrant for asserting
'P or ?' in the first place". This observation relies only on what Dummett calls the
principle of consistency - nothing warrants assertion of both P and not-P - and would
be accepted by all except dialethicists, hence does nothing to impugn the intuitive validity
of disjunctive syllogism.
Formally, on the relation of MTP to quantum logic there are two results to consider,
(i) Given the non-trivial part of distributivity of a over v, i.e., A a (B v C)\- (A a
B) v (A a C), we have that {?\A, A v B}\- (~\A a A) v (-iA a B), whence, by -i-elim7
and restricted v-elimination, we derive MTP. (ii) A \- (A v B) a (A v C), hence,
by orthomodularity, (A v B) a (A v C) VA v (((A v B) a (A v C)) a iA). Now,
A\-Av (B aC) and, using MTP twice, ((A v B) a (A v C)) a ~iA h B a C, whence
((A v B) a (A v C)) a ?\A \- A v (B a C). Consequently, using restricted v -elimination
and putting all this together, we obtain the non-trivial part of the distributivity of v over
a, i.e., (Av B)a(Av C)\-A a (B v C).
39 Engel (1991, pp. 42-43).
40 Let / be any function that associates sentences of the language with sentences of the
language. The ??-introduction and ??-elimination rules suffice to show that A ?>f(A)
behaves like iA in basic logic.
41 Read (1988, pp. 169-71) argues against the conservative extension requirement.
42 The 'quantum' in the title of these systems should not be taken too seriously, or it
refers to the v-elimination rule only. Under the closed sub-spaces of a Hubert space
interpretation, -i-elim7 - equivalently -i-elimination and _L-elimination - is sound, as is
DNE, but not even -i-introD is a sound introduction rule and, as we know, we cannot
add to quantum logic a conditional governed by the ??-introduction and -?-elimination
rules.
From the perspective of section 6 intuitionist, quantum relevant logic is somewhat
unnatural for if MTP, adopted as an v-elimination rule, is taken as characteristic a
classical quantum relevant logic results. Tennant's IRL does not explicitly adopt MTP as
an v-elimination rule but it is derivable given his modified rule for v-elimination; see
Tennant (1987, pp. 255-6).
43 Dummett (1991, p. 220).

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44 Luntley (1988, pp. 105-14).

45 My thanks to anonymous referees whose comments brought about several improve
ments. An earlier version of this article was read at the Issues in Philosophical and
Mathematical Logic Mini-Conference, Devonport, Auckland, New Zealand, in May,
1991.
Added in proof: I have recently found the suggestion that an instance of RAA be
regarded as simultaneously introducing one negated formula and eliminating another in
Gentzen's article 'Die Widerspruchsfreiheit der reinen Zahlentheorie' (see M. E. Szabo
(ed.), The Collected Papers of Gerhard Gentzen, North-Holland, Amsterdam, p. 168).
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94 PETER MILNE
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University of Edinburgh
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George Square
Edinburgh EH8 9JX
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