Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Slingshot 043
Slingshot 043
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PRESIDENT:
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VICE PRESIDENT? Tony Bath
SECRETARY: TREASURER:
EDITOR :
f I
Charles Grant,
263 Folkestone Road,
Dover,
Kent.
(Tel. .Dover 1986)
. . COMMITTEE
Bob 0 ’ Brien
Malcolm Woolg ar
Ed Smith
Richard Nelson
Mrs. Sue Barker
Neville Dickinson
Harold Gerry
Stephen Reed
EDITORIAL NOTES
NOTICES
Luton and district Society members are asked to get in touch with
R. Fensome, 16 St. Peters Road, Luton, Beds. , LV 1 lPQ, with a view to
fighting championship battles and general communication of mutual interest.
3
SOCIETY WARGAMES CHAMPIONSHIP
So far (i.e. up to 10th July) 39 players have taken part. The leading
contenders at present are:
BOOK REVIEW
Bv Bob O’Brien
WAR GAMES THROUGH THE AGES 3,000 BC to 1,500 AD. This book, 260 pages
of text, 12 photo illustrations, plus black and white drawings (Stanley Paul,
London c2.75 > is by far the best book that Don Featherstone has written and it
can be recommended, not only as a general primer for those contemplating
wargaming in this period, but for two things that alone make it worth while.
First, his concept of Army Fighting Assessment charts, and second, the most
extensive bibliography I have ever seen in a book of this sort, covering
availability of figures, including flats ) suggested reading and pit torial
sources, and 10 pages of references to articles in wargaming and other
magazines.
The book starts with the Sumerians and goes on through 30 different
peoples and races) setting out their fighting styles and weapons, and giving
a Fighting Assessment of each type of force. There will be plenty to argue
about, and no two people will ever agree entirely on the assessments for their
favourite people. However) this is all to the good, and Don is to be con-
gratulated on introducing a new idea into wargaming, which merits close
attention, and has the advantage for us that it can be adapted to the Society
Rules in particular. Above all, Don brings an enthusiasm and energy to the
subject that cannot fail to com.municate to the reader and I thoroughly
recommend it.
4
T RADING POST
The raiders (commanded by R.B. Nelson) had 750 points and at the
start of the battle could lay out troops anywhere west of the Dodona. In
addition the raiders had a waggon train valued at 250 points which could’only
be laid out North of the Pineta. The waggon train moved at 4” on the road
and 2” off it. The pursuers, under M. Murgatroyd, totalled 1,000 point$ and
were permitted to lay out troops anywhere within 6” of the E. baseline.
The effect of these dispositions was to ensure that the raiders had to
fight well forward to protect their waggon train. 1
5
The raiders put light infantry in the Oakwood, with cavalry in the open
ground W. of the wood, and the main infantry force on Pineta ridge. The aim
of these dispositions was to inflict a heavy defeat on any enemy forces thrusting
straight down the road.
In fact the pursuers cautiously.did not make any attempt on the bridge
and road and put their whole force into the Oakwood, where they were resisted
by the defender ’ s light troops. The delay thus caused permitted the waggon
train to cross the Pineta bridge, and the raiders now withdrew to a new position
along the line of the Pineta. This move took the Pursuers by surprise and a
further delay ensued before an assault could be mounted on this position. This
was again forestalled by a further retreat by the pursuers, this time on the Leda
Bridge. There ensued a few periods of fast mover-rents, finally culminating in
the raiders establishing an infantry square round the bridgehead, despite the
rout of their heavy cavalry.
At this point the time limit intervened, and it was found on counting the
points that the result was a draw. It was interesting that despite the relatively
close terrain, the battle was basically one of movement (nearly 30 periods in
3 hours) with no contact between the opposing main bodies. The raiders were
however glad to escape with their booty, particularly as the mere fact of. their
retreat meant that their Reactions tended to be very bad.
11. Under Research Group Rules and with armies of 1) 100 points each,
Andrew Green (Gauls) , defeated the Persians of Charles Grant, who writes
“This traumatic experience was a prime example of how a battle, seemingly
firmly in one ’ s hands, can suddenly slip through the fingers. It happened in this
wise. The situation as shown is after some four moves.
6
The Gauls deployed four infantry war-bands of various strengths and a
unit of light cavalry, 30 strong, while I, by way of experiment, had an 811
cavalry force, two regiments of heavy and three of light. At first all went well
. and very much according to plan, and I was able to concentrate two light cavalry
regiments (52 altogether) against his warband IV. Their charge was a
complete success (indeed, throws of ‘plus 4’ and ‘plus 2’ meant something of
an “overkill ‘I) . On the other side of the West Hill warband II went into uncon-
trolled advance, ending up ‘in the blue’ sitting without orders at the southeast
end of West Hill. Following up the light cavalry, the Scorpion heavies went
zooming round the hill, fell upon, and shattered, Warband III. Meantime, in
the centre and right my cavalry moved forward. With its ’ first sight’ reaction
the enemy light cavalry on East Hill went into ’ uncontrolled advance’ . This
was splendid, as my right wing light cavalry had orders to evade and draw on
the enemy horse, thus allowing the Susa heavy cavalry to turn right and charge
their flank. The whole plan was scuppered when my own light cavalry went into
uncontrolled advance, with my dice throw of 12! So,ztead of massing 44
cavalry (23 of them heavy) against his 30 light, I had his 30 against my; 21.
At the same time, with the focal point of the cavalry fight so far forward I had
no option but to support my light chaps by charging his warband I with the Susa
regiment, to prevent his warband getting in on the flank of 9 cavalry. Still,
at first all went well, I pushed back both lots one move, then there was :a
startling reversal. My light cavalry broke, closely followed by the Susa
people, who were facing a francisca-armed load of infantry. My whole right
was crushed, as indeed was that of the Gauls 9 but when a tally was made on
time being called, the difference was 1496 in the enemy’ s favour. The loss of
210 points of heavy cavalry was decisive. Had the game proceeded it would
have been interesting to see what would have happened, as the next move would
have seen Army Reactions for both players. It could have been amusing’! ‘I
Tuthmosis left the frontier fortress of Tharu on 10th April 1479 B.C. and
set out at the head of an army of some 15,000 - 20,000 men. This national army
had been formed when Egypt became a military state after the overthrow of the
Hyksos. The armed forces had been vastly improved by the adoption of the war
chariot and various weapons of Canaanite origin and were now at the peak of
their efficiency. Unlike later Pharaohs, Tuthmosis III did not employ foreign
mercenaries and only used Nubians and natives of southern Palestine in small
numbers .
On the march out from Egypt the army was preceded by the Pharaoh and
his personal staff and the image of the god Amun was carried in a portable
shrine by priests. This, incidentally, is the only instance in Egyptian records ’
of the gods actually being borne into battle.
They covered the distance of 125 miles to Gaza in some 9 days and,
after staying there for the night, travelled the 80 miles to Yehem. Here, at
the foot of Mount Carmel, they made camp and rested whilst scouting operations
could be carried out. They stayed at Yehem for about 2 days in order to await
the return of the spies who had been despatched as soon as they had arrived
there. When the two spies arrived back and informed the King that the enemy
were on the ridge to oppose the Egyptians, he had to determine a plan of
campaign.
From Yehem there were three possible routes to Megiddo and Tuthmosis
neld a war council to decide which of these to take’. The Pharaoh favoured the
direct route via Aruna which would get the Egyptians to the city the quickest.
His officers argued that) because it was a narrow defile, the progress would
be slow and the army could be in danger from an enemy attack when they
emerged into the plain. Also that the pass was too narrow to maintain a
military formation and that the forces would be strung out in a thin line. This,
they argued, could lead to the advanced guard’s coming into contact with the
enemy before the rearguard had even left Aruna. They also feared that the
enemy would attack the thin line of Egyptians from the heights of the defile and
that they would be unable to use the chariotry. The alternative routes suggested
were one that went north of Zefti and issued to the north of Megiddo, and the
other issued from the mountains from the direction of Taanach. They said that
by adopting the latter route there would be ample opportunity for manoeuvres
and that the Egyptians could bring all their forces into action at once.
The wings of the Asiatic army at this time were detached forces hold-
ing Taanach and the Kina Valley respectively. Between these wings was a strong
central reserve which could be rushed to whichever point was threatened. Had
8
the Pharaoh adopted the suggested route of his chiefs of staff the army would have
had to fight its way up the Megiddo road against the full force of the enemy. Had
they travelled by the road to the north of Zefti, the enemy would have had time
to make fresh dispositions after discovering that he was not taking either of the
direct routes. By choosing the Aruna road he came out on the enemy’ s right
flank and was now in the plain by Kina. The Egyptians soldiers saw, before
them, a wide expanse of level land stretching for half a mile to the Kina, I and
they proceeded to form into battle line ready to resist attack and also to protect
the main body still behind them. Megiddo was now scarcely a mile away.
I
The enemy had failed to block the exit from the hills and SO the :
initiative lay now with the Egyptians. Why the enemy did not post an adequate
detachment at the mouth of the Pass to attempt to prevent the Egyptians from
emerging into the plain is hard to understand. The enemy appear to have had no
idea by which route the Egyptian Army was coming until it actually arrived in
the Kina valley. This was probably due to the lack of an adequate intelligence
service or an underestimation of the Egyptian plan of campaign. Had they
knowh that the Egyptians were camped at Aruna, they could have met them with
full force as they came out of the pass. i
The Asiatics had recalled their main body from the direction of Taanach
some 4 or 5 miles away, in preparation for the attack the next day. The
Asiatic camp was probably pitched on Hill I between the Egyptians and Megiddo.
This was situated on an elevated piece of ground and also served to protect the
weakest wall of the City.
On the morning of the battle Tuthmosis III was informed that the
extension of the army, north across the Kina stream towards the northw’est
of Megiddo and south east of hill A, was completed. He was also told that the
Egyptian front was clear of the enemy. Hill A provided a good position t:o
.
,.
10
station a force to protect the south wing and prevent the flank being turned. The
other wing rested on Hill F. This formation meant that the army was strung out
in a relatively thin line and formed part of a huge circle with the Asiatic, camp
in the centre. This extension of the line had taken place under cover of dark-
ness and all the chariots were with that portion of the army north of the Kina.
The Asiatic force was drawn up around the edge of the hills 1) H ‘and G
and, therefore, had the sloping sides of the hills as a natural defence against
the Egyptians. The forces put into the field by the Asiatics would have been the
biggest array encountered by the Egyptians at any one time. This would ‘have
been in the order of 10,000 to 15,000 men, consisting of chariotry and
infantry armed with spear and bow. Chariots formed a considerable portion
of the Asiatic strength and would have been arranged in a position to charge
down the slopes to meet the Egyptians. This was probably between the north-
west side of Hill I and the south sidg of Hill H which was an area of gradual
‘slope approximately half a mile wide.
On 15th May 1479 B.C. battle commenced with all Egyptian chariot
charge at full speed towards the Asiatic ranks. They advanced upon the iHills
G , H and I from the south and west. The Egyptian south wing crossed the Kina
and attacked the enemy south wing. They broke through and proceeded to
attack the main Asiatic body, already smashed by the Egyptian chariot charge,
in the rear. The Asiatics fell back as the Egyptian wings enclosed them and the
army was driven back through its own camp to the city. The enemy did not
stand long (only 83 hands were taken) and fled, offering very little resistance,
either due to internal dissent or dismay at the size of the Egyptian army. They -- -
fell back and had to climb over hill I to reach the city as there were virtually
no chariots in which to escape. Had the Egyptians now pursued the enemy to -
the city they could have inflicted a great loss but, instead, they chose to’ plunder
the Asiatic camp. The thoughts of treasure had proved too much for their
discipline and, whilst they were looting the enemy camp, the Asiatics gained
time in which to reach the city.
The spoil of Megiddo included 924 chariots, 200 bronze cuirasses, 502
bows etc. , and 2,503 prisoners. Special items captured included the King of
Kadesh’ s chariot which had a pole of gold and the beautiful chariot of the Prince
. i
11
of Megiddo which was wrought with gold.
The fall of Megiddo and the towns and villages about it showed the
Asiatics that further resistance was useless. This crushed once and for all,
the Asiatic alliance.
Tuthmosis III was the best general Egypt ever produced and was the only
man who succeeded in making the country into a power. It is little wonder that
he was known as Menkheperre Tuthmosis III, “The Scourge of the Asiatics”. He
has even been regarded by historians as the “Napoleon of Ancient Egypt” and
must surely rank with other great generals of history including Alexander,
Caesar and Hannibal.
Column in Disorder
by Antistentor
A great deal has already been written on the Persian invasion of Greece,
but I would like to recommend “Persia and the Greeks” * which is a very up-to-
date and fully detailed account of the entire period, and very entertaininbly
written. Marathon is particularly well analysed, with Thermopylae there is a
careful discussion of the lie of the ground and the various theories regarding
the outflanking routes. There are useful facts such as the ship intervals: between
triremes, and the deployment of the Athenian hoplite regiments into battle line.
For those who are interested in the political side, you are given a readable
treatment of the Athenian democratic “revolution”, and an admiring recital of
the work of the Persian “envoys” who for a year before the actual invas+n had
worked in advance of the army in the Northern areas of Greece winning over the
tribes and working on the jealousies between state and state. ( * By A-R; Bu;rn)
On the wargaming side, the only unexpected notable event recently was
that most satisfying thing: a great cavalry charge. I fielded a late Rom’an army,
almost entirely infantry as has been my practice for some time now, and my
opponent’produced, almost the opposite, namely a Muslim Arab army, oyganised
in five cavalry and two camel regiments. No infantry. The enemy deplqyed
over the whole baseline initially, and I decided on a quick attack on the wing
opposite my compact force before the remote enemy wing could circle round
into contact. (The table was long, but only 4 feet wide, so it was a reasbnable
gamble) . My infantry did quite well, driving off the first cavalry attacks,
gaining ground, but ,couldn’ t cover enough frontage against such agile opposition,
so I had to commit my reserve and only effective mounted unit, consistiGg of a
dozen cataphracts. They charged a light cavalry force, which was routed in the
first melee. Then, disorganised, they charged into a supporting mediuq
cavalry unit which of course had a much better chance against them, but again
immediate’ rout, although the cataphracts counted only half their strength as
fighting in the melee. The final exploit was to counter-charge and route ,a third
line of horse despite some considerable disorganisation due to not being able to
halt and rally. All in all, a fine effort, which took them most of the way over
the board, - and making up for the failure of the infantry some of whom had
succeeded in getting themselves charged from front and rear simultanco@sly
rather disastrously. So both sides went home claiming spectacular victqries
(it being then nightfall) .
HOPLITE BATTLE-DRILL
By A. L. Nickels
Mr. Peter Harriss in the same issue comes close to the solution of the
question in his first paragraph, and it is a pity that he then allows himself to
be led astray by a too modest deference to the majesty of the printed word in
what, one supposes, purports to be. a learned work. In fact, some of the
greatest nonsense ever written has so appeared (I believe Richard and I think
alike on the merits of Tarn on galley oarage!) I have not read “Military Theory ,
and Practice in the Age of Xenophon”, but it is obvious from the extract
paraphrased that J.K. Anderson both jumps to conclusions and has never
practised what he preaches. Firstly, there is no evidence whatever, as Mr.
Harriss has pointed out, that the “slope arms” position was used; it is merely
the author ’ s preconception. Secondly, in all he writes about’lowering the spear
behind the hip and suddenly charging and thrusting the spear forward there 1s one
stultifying omission - he never mentions the shield at all, and quite obviously
fails to consider it.
I have been reluctantly driven to the conclusion that those persons who
claim that the underarm thrust was used in a formed hoplite battle have either
never really thought about the matter, or when it is brought to their attention
are so reluctant to abandon a cherished concept that they resort to all sorts of
special (and quite illogical) pleading, apparently prepared to die in the last
ditch in defence of their ideal!
I did not “dream up” the idea of the overarm thrust. Years ago I
measured out the dimensions of a 3-foot circular Argive shield, and found that
with it attached to my left arm (elbow against the central armslot) and held in
front of me with the upper rim level with my chin, it was physically impossible
to level a pole at my right side. Subsequent reasoning started from that primary
fact.
These figures show all that it is necessary to read into the text; E and
F are in a file advancing with their spears gripped at the point of balance and
resting easily on their shoulders (and it is quite easy; I have tried it with a
heavy pole; there is no strain). Two angles are shown for the spears; ;either
will pass over the man-in-front ’ s shoulder beside his crest. The shield ‘rests
at the left side. At the trumpet-signal the front rank lower their spears to the
stabbing position (G) and swing their shields in front of them. Hinder ranks
also swing their shields likewise. I should think it unlikely that they would
also lower their spears until necessary; then a slight flexing of the wrist does
it in a second.
And lest anyone reading the Anabasis Loeb translation as far as VI.v.27
should write in excitedly to say that it contains the words “and at the same time
HOPLITB BATTLB-DRILL
16
couched their spears ” may I point out. that this is merely Mr. Brownson
failing once more to keep “au pied de la lettre. ‘I The Greek text says, I”Kai
hama ta dorata kathiesan” and Greek scholars among our readers are invited
to write to me or the Editor if they can find any reason to read more into that
verb than the general sense of “let down, drop, lower. ”
i
My feelings then are that the book is an excellent guide but that, for true
authenticity, it shauld not be adhered to too rigidly. A unit in varied garb, but ’
with its figures all in the same position would indicate that the soldiers had
been trained to use their weapons in a certain manner but would also show them
to be individuals.
The first and most important rule is that the Umpire is always right!
In order to reinforce this, the players are kept as much in the dark as possible
and not told what the rules are. This article is thus going to make my life more
difficult in the future, and I shall have to introduce new rules in future
c,ampaigns . If you refer back to the article on the Sword campaign I will explain
some of the rules.
Rules are prepared in advance for any actions you expect may happen,
e. g . setting fire to buildings, attempts to drug or poison food, ambushes,
treachery, drawing the Sword. When somebody attempts to do something not
covered by your rules, such as hamstringing horses, you have to invent a rule
on the spot, involving arbitrary dice throws. The important thing is to keep
the rules simple with plenty of dice decisions so that the game keeps moving.
As examples we have -
V
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20
To set fire to a building. Throw one dice, add/subtract as follows c3
if a wooden building, c3 if using torches, -4 if attempting to fire outside of
building in rain, -4 if strong winds and attempting to fire outside. Score ~4,5,6 )
minor fire starts, doing partial damage before going out, score 7 or mar@
building catches and will be destroyed.
All else you need is a number of players, a suitable playing area,! and
a basic idea for the campaign. It is advisable to have two or even three Umpires
if you have any number of players, as things tend to get quite hectic !
Preferably the rules used should be familiar to the players, or very simpl;e to
operate, but can be amended to suit special condition or types of troops, e.g.
on Research Group rules one can introduce fighting factors such -1 if fighting
hand to hand against Unit A which has especially good armour, or morale’
factors such as +3 for a Germanic type army for the first 5 moves, thereafter
-2. These rule adjustments can also be controlled by the chance cards. ,
These type of rules involving chance cards etc. are not new, and
various examples can be found in Don Featherstone’s books and rules. Tony
Bath has also made use of them, do you remember write-ups on magic rules
where your units turn into frogs, stone, etc? I assume Tony uses similar,
methods in his Hyboria campaign, though he is somewhat secretive on the’
subject! (On the subject of Hyboria I must add that claims of Shemite success
over our glorious Vendhyan forces are grossly exaggerated, and that the head
of King Katr will adorn the walls of our capital ere the season is over! )
I :
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THE PHOTO PAGES
III. - Three modern military men?. in fact the guiding spirits of the Ancient
Wargaming Section of the Junior Infantrymen ’ s Battalion, Shorncliffe )
Kent. (See write-up in the November, ’ 7 1 “Slingshot”. All three, who
are) from left to right Lieutenants David Pinder , Charles Stewart Grant
and Graham Jowett-Ive, are, sadly, approaching the end of their
attachment to the J .I.B. , but will doubtless carry their ’ ancient’ act-
ivities with them when they rejoin their regiments.
IV. - The Society Profile of the month - in fact, “The Champion” - Stephen
Reed, whose biography one can read in this issue (Page 20).
“They’ re not ’ appy! I’ This clarion call identifies the senior member of
the ’ dreaded Reeds ’ as they are known in some wargaming circles. The call
means that Stephen Reed has looked at a situation on a table and a lightning
summing up has elicited the heading gem, as some poor unit has to face a
fraught morale test.
This capacity for quick appreciation of a situation and equally rapid and
decisive action is typical of him. Stephen Reed has probably one of the quickest
and most penetrating minds in wargaming today, and this has brought him the
Society Championship three times in a row, as well as making him a formidable
opponent in any period he chooses to play in.
22
Born 24 years ago, he has spent most of his life in Worthing, leaving
the Technical High School there after specialising in Maths. and Physics, and
then spending some time in Insurance and Teaching before settling for computer
work. Probably too authoritarian for teaching and unable to suffer fools gladly!
Would have done well in this profession about thirty years or so ago. I
Stephen Reed has probably been one of the reasons why Worthing has now
four of the Society’s eight 5-pointers in its numbers, everyone trying so hard
to beat him that their own game improves. Your best chance is to get his
brother to umpire. :
Society meetings would not be the same without Stephen and all who know
him hope he will stay in the game for a long time - after all, there are many of
us who want his scalp!
POINTS AT ISSUE
By Phil Barker.
I cannot agree with Dave Court’s suggestion that ancient Indian Warriors
should be classed as regulars. Regular to us implies full time troops, main-
tained by the state, and drilled.
Indians may well have been the first two, but certainly were not the
third, as Dave ’ s own article shows. On his definition, the barbarian body-
guard of an ancient British Chieftain would be regular.
,
If Indian chariots were not quite so erratic as most others, the reason
probably lies in their lack mobility, bringing to mind the old hunting gag about
“galloping madly off at a slow trot”. i
1 ~
Future revisions of the rules will have to take into account the Indian
23
custom of arming chariot and elephant drivers, but this will certainly make
such people more expensive.
E.Simond’s note on the size of the two Cohors equitata repeats inform-
ation often given, but unfortunately completely spurious. These figures do not
come from any ancient source, but are guesses by modern authors to explain
statements by Hyginus. A much more likely solution is that 4 or 8 32 strong
turmae of cavalry were simply added to a normal quingenary or milliary ala
respectively.
The Gothic lance I no longer really believe in. It certainly is not men-
tioned by any contemporary historian, these all specifying javelins. There is
no account of the Kontos being dropped in a close melee either.
Our reason for the change was partly the emphasis placed in several
ancient accounts on the long pointless Celtic sword needing plenty of room to
swing, but more so on the obvious parallels between Gauls and Britons.
In two battles) the final one against Caradoc and Mons Graupius, the
Celts managed to break contact and flee across steep hills without being caught
by the Roman auxiliary infantry, themselves light-armed. The poor old
legionaries didn’ t get into action at all in either battle.
The Editor hopes that he may be forgiven for taking advantage of his
position to add a few words. “I am somewhat astonished that Phil states he
places more reliance in what he reads ‘in a contemporary account, however
prejudiced, that the maunderings of some 19th century semi-historian, etc”.
I would have thought that contemporary writings, for a great variety of reasons,
should be treated with the greatest reserve, the prime causes being simply
propaganda or self-glorification of the writer. In a vastly more recent
historical period, for instance, would he accept the writing of Baron de Marbot)
who described in detail what happened between Napoleon and the King of Spain
when he, Marbot, informed them of the events of the 2nd May 1808 in Madrid.
It has been definitely established that Marbot was many hundreds of miles away
26
at the time he claimed to be delivering the despatch personally to the monarchs!
Quite apart from propaganda, genuine mistakes can be made, which cannot
always be checked, as was the case with German losses on 15th September 1940,
which investigation of German records after the war reduced, if I recall I
correctly, from 185 to 69, or something like that.
With the Celts, the detailed history of the Scottish fighting-man actually
begins, and it is fitting that it should start here, for the Celts provide a link
between the prehistoric and the historic periods.
The principle Celtic dialects may also be subdivided into four main ,
classes ; Gaulish, which is now obsolete, except for various inscriptionsl;
G oidelic ; Brythonic; and Belgic, the last Celtic language to cross over into
Britain, and which soon spread over most of southern and eastern England.
However) our attention is solely concerned with the two middle classes, the
Goidelic and the Brythonic. From the Goidelic, or “Q-Celtic” language, (so
called because it retained the original Indo-European “Q”, which was later
pronounced as a “K ‘I, but written as a “C ‘I, > is descended the Gaelic, the Irish
and the Manx tongues, while from the Brythonic, or “P-Celtic”, (named this
because it changed the Indo-European “Q” into “1~” , > is descended the Welsh,
Cornish and Breton tongues. The Pictish tongue should also come into this
sub-division, since it seems to have contained a large element of the early
Welsh words) no longer identifiable with the Welsh of today. The Brythoni,c
tongue was also very similar to Gaulish, and this, in turn, would point to their
having originally been the same language, or at least very similar strains, but,
on the Brythonic crossing over into Britain, it evolved in the present form.
27
Having dealt with the linguistic differences amongst the Celts, let us
now turn our attention to the cultural differences. There are two main phases
in the evolution of early Celtic society, the “Hallstatt” and the “La Tene”, both
of which have been named after the places where significant Celtic material has
been discovered. Admittedly, their immediate ancestors, the bronze-using
Urnfield people, as they have been called, spoke some form of Celtic language,
but the true Celts cannot date further back than the Hallstatt culture, which was
dated about 700 BC. During the next two-hundred years, iron slowly replaced
bronze in the manufacture of weapons and edged tools, although bronze con-
tinued to be used, mainly for ornamentation.
The first culture derives its name from Hallstatt, near Salzburg, in
Austria, where a large, prehistoric cemetery and salt-mine were discovered,
and the great number of antiquities subsequently unearthed there have cast
light on the daily life of prehistoric man. Their graves were remarkable in that
the body, burnt or unburnt, was laid under a four-wheeled wagon, under a
grave-mound. Horse-trappings, vessels, arms and equipment, personal orn-
aments, buckets, wine-jars, all have been found, and it is obvious that this
civilisation was vastly superior to that of the Bronze Age.
The men, or rather some of them, together with their chieftains, wore
trousers, or “bracae” ) with a knee-length tunic, often of linen, and elaborately
fringed and decorated, and caught in at the waist with a girdle. Examples of
this can be seen in Figs. 1 and 2. Fig 1 shows some engravings on a bronze
scabbard found at Hallstatt, while figure 2 shows two drawings, found on
pottery of the Hallstatt culture, discovered at Sopron, Hungary. Over the
tunic was worn a cloak, and the length and copiousness of the cloak would seem
to indicate its wearer ’ s social status’. They were armed with a long, iron sword,
for the cut-and-thrust style of fighting which they introduced, and also carried
29
a broad-bladed dagger, for close fighting. Heavy, broad-bladed spears were
also carried, together with shields. Again, from Fig. la, it can be seen that
these were oval shields, and thus would:pre-suppose that the larger, Celtic-
type shield belonged to a later period. The ordinary warrior preferred to go
bare-headed, with their hair elaborately coiffed, but the chieftain might wear
a bronze or iron helmet, and a superb example of this type was shown in the
March ’ 7 1 “Slingshot”, No. 34.) in an article by Peter Wilcox. As further
contact with the classical world increased, so too would the need for body
armour and helmets become more prevalent, descriptions of these will have
to be left over until a later article.
The shields would have been decorated largely with a geometrical design,
for even living animals were generally arranged in parallel bands of identical ,
figures around a decorated surface.
For defence, the Hallstatt culture built hill-forts, and one of the best
examples of these is at Heuneburg, on the upper Danube in southern Germany.
This fort is built of mud-brick, on top of stone foundations, and has a line of
projecting square bastions, obviously an import from the classical world. Its
relatively small size would seem to indicate that it was the stronghold of a
Celtic chieftain. Elsewhere more conventional hill-forts are to be found,
strengthened with timber-bracing, and are all varying sizes-, from those which
may have been the homes of chieftains, to larger ones which may have served
as tribal strongholds, and which would later develop into the “oppida”, or.
tribal capitals.
These forts include different principles, ranging from the single stock-
ade, through the bank and ditch, which could be single or multiple, to the wall
and ditch, or a wall alone. So far as dwelling places were concerned, the
rectangular houses from the pre-Celtic period were carried on into the
Hallstatt era.
In this way, the Hallstatt culture reigned supreme, until 500 BC . , with
the normal, gradual changes in culture, until a new cultural influence came into
being. This was the “la Tene”, and, as such, will form the basis of the next
article.
30
GUARDROOM
I should very much like to hear from anyone else who may be able’ to
31
shed light on the matter, particularly for other periods of Roman history than
the late Republic”.
From Alan Colquhoun in Teheran comes the following - “Re Ray Nelson’s
enquiry about the colour of ancient armour I am sure, as far as this part of the
world is concerned, that it must have been polished. One can only go by common
sense (although pictures, miniatures or specimens going back to Arab times
show helmets etc., as polished) but (a) there was plenty of labour to do the
polishing (b) metal is more attractive if polished (c) it was all smoothed to
take a polish (d) the materials for cleaning are readily available - sand and
fruit juice (e) things do not tarnish here as they do in England. For example,
we have a lot of copper and bronze in the house - trays, bowls, lamps, etc. - and
although they all shine brightly my wife tells me they have not been cleaned
for two months.
I have recently been in Beirut and also had a marvellous day at Byblos -
oldest of cities. It has a Crusader castle built from the ruins and Roman and
Greek temples themselves, with granite columns from Aswan - brought when?
Time out of mind, no doubt. ” .
Paul Hobson says “There has been some criticism of Sue and Phil
Barker ’ s “To the Divine Claudius ” in “Slingshot”. I agree with Phil on most of
the things he mentions but I do not believe that one type of army can beat any-
thing which it has to take on. I regard the idea of turning up to fight a champion-
ship battle against an unknown enemy as ridiculous. I agree with Ken Clark’s
note in the January, ’ 72 “Slingshot” about briefing the enemy on your army’s
nationality. Perhaps if you informed your enemy beforehand of the nationality
and century of your army one could achieve a more realistic situation. After
all, the composition of the army is still a surprise. If one always turned up
against an unknown opponent with exactly the same army, surely one would have
a serious handicap. I’ d like to point out to Phil regarding his ’ two-handed axes’
crusade that on the Alexander Sarcophagus we see in the hunting scenes men
armed with two-handed axes. Is it not possible that these were also used for
war? One last point. Phil says the Roman army is a good starter for beginners.
I would agree with him on that point but I find that my Roman army has a very
serious drawback which prevents it from winning battles and I feel that if I
could dispense with this my troubles would be over and my army would start
winning. The drawback is my own generalship!”
Some other odds and ends - Vesey Norman’s book, “The Medieval Soldier
has some quite interesting stuff at the beginning about the Franks, Lombards and
Vikings; for the followers~ of the ‘Divine Claudius ’ - among whom I am proud to
rank myself - an interesting force would be the Frankish army of 539, with
contingents from the Gallo-Roman cities ‘under their ancient banners andI
equipped as Remans’ (not Roman morale, though, I fear). Another thing ‘that
caught my eye here was that a surviving Viking bow, found in Ireland, is a 6ft.
longbow, in all essentials like those of Wales and England in the middle ages -
is this where the Welsh got it from?
*I have found the best way of simulating them to be the use of maps for
deployment and movement; if anything, it works even better for Ancients. All
that is required is paper, carbon paper, and pencil or biro. A map of the terr-
ain is drawn to scale (graph paper makes everything much easier) ) and carbon
copies distributed to the. participating commanders. Units are initially deployed
on the map (with their formations written on the order sheet) and moved on the
map until sighted.
The range of visibility is computed by dice, with allowances for hills etc.
There is no reason whatsoever why it should be set as low as 50 yards. Person-
ally I would set the minimum visibility at not less than twice the ordinary move
of the fastest troop type. Any unit “in sight” is put on the table. Units moving
“out of sight” may return to the map if their commander so wishes.
ON THESSALIAN RHOMBOIDS
By John Norris
In the May issue A.L. Nickels asked, “why does one not see the
Thessalian or rhomboid formation for cavalry on the wargame table? It has the
merits that Asclepiodotus claims for it in manoeuvre.. . I’
1 Fig. 1
Fig 2
A Hipparchia, consisting
of 8 Eilae (512 men),
represented by 25 figures
deployed in rhomboid
formation.
the Research Group Ancient Rules the Hipparchia will take one and a half moves
to deploy into line for a charge. Nevertheless, it will be possible for the line
to be formed facing ‘in any direction the commander may desire.
However, in Phil Barker ’ s book the size of the Thessalian Eile is given
as 64 men, half the size of the Greek Eile. The Greeks, of course, did not use
rhomboid formation, but a rather cramped and disorderly square. This leads
me to the hypothesis that the smaller Thessalian Eile was adopted to minimise
the disadvantages of the rhomboid formation in the charge and firing. The line
would be formed by deploying a long line of the smaller Eilae, each of which
would be far more manoeuvvrable than the ponderous formations of their Greek
or Persian cavalry opponents, squares and columns respectively. In the charge,
a series of wedges would strike the enemy line. There is a distinct analogy
with the Napoleonic “1’ orclre mixte” of two thousand years later.
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CONAN OF CIMMERIA