Glacial Lake outflow disaster –

handling Parechu Crisis in District

Kinnaur, Himachal Pradesh in 2005
A District Magistrates perspective
Glacial Lake outflow disaster – handling Parechu Crisis in District Kinnaur, Himachal
Pradesh in 2005: A District Magistrates perspective

Introduction:

District Kinnaur located in north-eastern part of Himachal Pradesh is one of the remotest
districts in the State. It shares a long border with Tibet on the eastern side. Total land area
of the district is 6401 sq. km. Kinnaur is a notified scheduled area. Administratively the
district is divided into three sub divisions, viz. Pooh, Kalpa and Bhabanagar, each headed by
a Sub Divisional Magistrate. Further, the district has 5 Tehsils and 1 Sub-Tehsil. Being a
bordering district, Kinnaur has an Army brigade headquartered at Pooh. The borders are
manned by Indo Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) having its battalion headquarters at district
headquarters. District Kinnaur shares 145 km of international border with Tibet.

Geographically, the entire district is hilly comprising of rugged, rocky and tall
mountains. The temperature during winter months is extremely low and reaches sub-zero at
many places resulting in heavy snow fall. The principal river in the district is Satluj. The river
enters the district from Tibet near Shipkila. It is joined at Khab (falling in Pooh Sub division)
by another major river Spiti which comes from Spiti valley of District Lahaul & Spiti. Spiti
river emanates from Tibet area and many tributaries join the river at various places on its
course from Spiti valley to Kinnaur. Parechu nallah is also one of the tributary of Spiti River
and joins the river at a place called Sumdo located just at the border of Kinnaur district with
Spiti Valley. Sumdo has a small presence of Army, ITBP and State police. Further
downstream of Khab, Spiti river loses its identity and merges with Satluj. The terrain of
district Kinnaur though mountainous is variable at various places. The area of the district
adjoining Tibet border (upstream areas of Satluj River) is a typical cold desert with very less
vegetation. As one goes downstream, there is a zone with scanty vegetation and further
downstream has good vegetation and tree cover, As a result of weathering process caused
due to of excessive snowfall, the terrain has become very fragile. The problem has been
compounded with the ongoing construction activity. Because of all these, the area is quite
prone to landslides and avalanches.

National highway 22 (NH 22) acts as the life line of the district. The NH 22 starts from
Ambala and goes through Chandigarh, Shimla, Narkanda and Rampur into district Kinnaur.
Further, it goes through the district right up to the Tibet border near Kaurik. The portion of
NH 22 can be typically divided into 2 parts in district Kinnaur. A small stretch of the road
from Chaura border (first village of district Kinnaur adjoining Shimla district) up to Wangtu
although traverses along the river Satluj is at a good height from the river course. This
portion is maintained by National highways division of Public works department. This
stretch of road never had any major disruptions barring an occasional landslide. Further
from Wangtu up to Sumdo, there is a stretch of road totalling 148 kms which besides

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traversing along the river Satluj up to Khab and then along river Spiti; is also having much
less height from the river course. Due to this, the road is always prone to disruptions
because of flash floods. This stretch also has 7 major bridges across river Satluj which are
also prone to damage in the event of flooding. In the year 2000, major flash floods had
taken place in river Satluj, which had extensively damaged NH 22 from Khab up to Wangtu
along with washing away of all the major bridges along the course. Because of the
restoration of NH 22 after year 2000 floods, the hill slopes became highly unstable due to
fresh cutting. The portion of road from Wangtu to Sumdo is maintained by Border Roads
Organization (BRO) also called Garrison Reserve Engineer Force (GREF) because of its
strategic importance to Army. Various villages of the district are connected by a criss-cross
of link roads emanating from NH 22. As a result there is lot of dependence on NH 22 for
connectivity and any disruption of this road causes disruption of traffic beyond that point.
The road was developed after 1962 war with China. A lower altitude alignment along the
river course was followed at that time as there was hardly any recorded flash flood in river
Satluj at that time. Moreover, a lower alignment road is always more dependable in winter
season when it snows more at heights compared to a valley. However, the situation
changed considerably due to various factors like deforestation, construction activity, and
climate change. The reported road construction activity in Tibet area has further aggravated
the situation. All these factors combine to create landslides and artificial dam formations
resulting in flash floods in the river. The geography of the area can be understood from the
maps at Fig 1.

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 Figure 1: Map of Kinnaur District

The principal economy of the area is based on horticulture. Apple is the mainstay of
horticultural crops in the district. Harvesting period of apple starts around September and
continues till middle of November. The apple variety of district is extremely good and
generally it is sold at a premium in the markets of New Delhi and Chandigarh. In addition, off
seasons vegetable, particularly Peas is also grown, which is generally harvested in the later
part of June and July.

History of flooding in the district:

District Kinnaur has been prone to flash floods from cloud burst in the past. Depending upon
their severity, they have been known to cause extensive damage to life and property. Some
of the events in the past are enlisted below:

1. Flood in Dulling Khad: The cloud burst took place in this left bank tributary of Satluj
River in the night of 4th/5th of September 1995. About 23 residential houses,
workshops of the transport department, poultry farm and other government
infrastructure was damaged besides washing away of 300 meters of NH 22 causing
vehicular disruption for months.

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 2. Flood in Panvin Khad: This is a tributary of river Satluj on its left bank. The cloud
burst resulted in flooding in this tributary in the night of 11th/12th August 1997. As
many as 19 people lost their lives. 103 houses and 4 bridges were washed away. As a
result, the district was cut off from the rest of the country for months together.
3. Flood in Brua Khad: Brua Khad is a tributary of Baspa River, in turn a tributary of
Satluj. The cloud burst in this tributary took place on 7 th June 2000. The flood washed
away 20 houses and a number of government buildings besides rendering 69 houses
as unsafe. The affected families had to be relocated as a result.
4. Floods in Satluj: Satluj never had any major recorded flooding till year 2000. On the
night of 31st July/ 1st August 2000, a major flooding took place. The cause of the flood
though not known with certainty, it was presumed that it resulted either because of
cloud burst in Tibet region or because of bursting of an artificial lake similar to
Parechu. The flood caused extensive damage killing 56 people. Besides, NH 22 was
damaged in a major way from Khab up to Wangtu. About 12 bridges were washed
away during the flood. The district could only be connected to the outside world
after 7 months’ time. Essential commodities had to be brought through helicopters
as the stock of various commodities were very limited when the flood struck. Even
the restoration equipment like bulldozers, air compressors for drilling had to be
brought through heavy lift helicopters. Besides evacuating the people, even some of
the cash crops were evacuated through the helicopters. Being totally unprepared,
district administration had to work really hard to bring the things back on rails.

Background of Parechu crisis:

As pointed out earlier, Parechu nallah is a small tributary of Spiti River and joins the river at
a place called Sumdo. Spiti river further joins the river Satluj at Khab. In the normal times,
Parechu is just a small stream and one just can't imagine that it had the potential of creating
the fury it eventually did on 26 th June 2005. The first information about the crisis came
through a communication received from the Ministry of Home Affairs to the State
Government on 29th of July 2004. Citing army sources, the ministry had warned the state
government about the formation of an artificial dam thus creating a huge reservoir of water
on Parechu nallah as a result of blockade due to a large land slide. Around the same time
the information got leaked to the print and electronic media which started beaming the
satellite imagery of the Parechu block resulting in a lot of panic among the general public.
The actual extent of water stored was uncertain as the experts could only calculate the
surface area of the lake without knowing about its depth. The estimates varied a great deal
between various agencies involved. The Central Water Commission (CWC) had given an
assessment of storage volume of 55 mcm in Feb 2005 while the estimate from the Chinese
government was 25 mcm.

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The following table depicts the varying estimates of water level rise from the bed level made
available by CWC at various point of time:

Location August 2004 October 2004 Feb 2005

Sumdo to Khab 13 m 5m 10 m
Khab to Tapri 10 m 5m 7m
Tapri to Nathpa 7m 5m 7m

Figure 2: Assessment of expected water level rise at various points of time

Though Government of India raised the issue of sharing the information about water levels
with Chinese government at diplomatic level, the information was hardly available at the
district level. Everyone was groping in dark about the extent of water stored and likely
damage it can cause in case of its sudden bursting. Common people were seen saying that
the damages would be worse than year 2000. It was prudent under the given circumstances
to be prepared for the worst. Immediately, the crisis management group under the Chief
Secretary, Himachal Pradesh held a meeting to decide on the actions to be taken. In the
district, the then Deputy Commissioner held a meeting of the district disaster management
team. These meetings continued till the first half of September 2004. Some of the decisions
which were taken as a strategy during this and subsequent meetings were as follows:

 Identification of the vulnerable villages: About 15 villages were identified as

vulnerable. The villages identified were- Shalkher, Chango, Niti Chango, Leo, Dubling,
Lower Pooh, Spillow, Akpa, Skiba, Powari,Tangling, Kilba, Baltrang, Choling and Tapri.
It was decided to evacuate these villages immediately and the evacuation plan was
accordingly worked out. The villagers in the most vulnerable locations like Leo
actually moved to safer locations under the fear of flood which really disrupted their
normal lives.

Other preventive measures initiated:

 Night movement of all the vehicles was stopped from 9 pm to 5 am to avoid any
accident during night time.
 The general public was informed through public address system and hooters about
the danger of the flood.
 It was decided to dismantle the Karcham Bailey bridge but the idea was
subsequently dropped as it might have affected day to day life and caused
unnecessary panic.
 The area was divided into sectors and the vehicles with hooters were deployed 24
hour in the sectors to warn pre designated areas in the eventuality of any flood.

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  Additional deployment of police, home guards, and doctors teams equipped with
rescue and relief materials was done.
 Stocking of the essential commodities, medicines was ordered.
 The district authorities were provided with the satellite phones by Ministry of Home
Affairs Govt. of lndia and they were in communication with the army authorities and
Government of India about any eventuality.

There were quite a few occasions when false alarms were pressed that the water from
Parechu has started moving in but it never came. Electronic media was the principal
contributor towards this. This resulted in a lot of panic among the citizens. The people were
generally unhappy at the temporary dislocation from their houses. There was a panic buying
of food items. People were worried about the fate of their apple crop as the harvesting
season had almost approached. The transporters who are generally from outside the district
were hesitant to come to the district due to the panic of flood. By way of abundant caution,
a huge stockpile of rations and fuel was stored in the district without having adequate
storage space. Subsequently in the winters, it became a problem to look after this material
lying in open at many places.

Under these conditions, media had a field day and many juicy stories creating a lot of panic
were aired on the electronic media. We may curse media for creating panic. However, it had
a positive role to play also. First was the creation of awareness among the general public.
Secondly by playing the issue over and over again, it gave this issue (from Governments'
perspective) the seriousness it deserved. Government of India was taking keen interest in

the issue and made efforts to provide various tools like Satellite phones, information sharing
which were essential for tackling the disaster. Subsequently, in the winters of 2004, once
the immediate threat was over and the issue was out of media glare, the satellite phones
were withdrawn and were not provided again despite the request for the same. The
immediate threat of Parechu receded towards the end of August, 2004 as by this time the
temperatures in the Tibetan region are very low and the lakes start freezing. I joined as
Deputy Commissioner on 15th September 2004 .

First task on hand was to immediately see the area physically and to understand the
geography. We continued the precautions which were being taken till the first week of
October. Thereafter as the threat was minimal, most. of the precautionary measures were
scaled down and we had to start preparing for the next summers. There was even
scepticism among few experts as well as the local people that probably the blockade at
Parechu is of permanent nature and would probably never burst. I shared the same
sentiments when I saw the video footage of the blockade made available through the
diplomatic sources. This however did not deter us from preparing ourselves in the event of
this disaster.

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Pre flood Preparations-in year 2005:

In the year 2005, when we started preparing ourselves for the Parechu crisis, the foremost
priority with us was to save the human life with least disruption to the normal lives of the
people. We focused on strengthening the communication system and a protocol for flow of
information to the vulnerable villages and for clearing of the NH22 was laid out. Some of the
important actions taken by district administration were as follows:

1. Strengthening of communication system: This was one of the most important

priorities for handling Parechu situation. It was assessed that if we receive timely
information, the 1st village in the course of the flood, Shalkher can get about 45
minutes to 1 hour reaction time. This much time is enough to save human life and
moveable property. From the past experience, it was known that the
telecommunication network is not very reliable in such situations.
Telecommunication system in district Kinnaur is not very reliable even in the normal
times as the exchanges shut down in case of any electric failure which is quiet
common in the district. Satellite phone communication could have been the best in
such situation but the Satellite phones were taken away in the winters of 2004 and
were not available in 2005 despite the request from the district administration.
Under such situations the only reliable and time tested mode of communication
available was Wireless communication over Ham radios. In district Kinnaur, we had
four active wireless communication systems belonging to the Army, ITBP, State
Police and HPSEB (State Electricity Board). Besides, after 2000 floods district
administration had also set up its own network which was not being used very often
and was lying in disuse. We held a joint meeting at district level of all the agencies
and worked out a convergence and communication protocol. Information from all
the networks was to converge at District Control room as well as at Sub divisional
control room at Pooh. Further the control rooms were in turn directed to pass on the
information to upstream and downstream to vulnerable areas. Important
destinations where the information had to be passed outside the district was four
downstream districts of Shimla, Bilaspur, Mandi and Kullu, downstream
hydroelectric dams mainly 300 MW BASPA project and 1500 MW SJVN (Satluj Jal
Vidyut Nigam) project, besides informing Honb’le Chief Minister and senior officers
at the state headquarters. At six of the vulnerable locations we stationed people
with wireless sets and big industrial hooters (which we purchased during our
preparation) to be blown as and when any information about flood comes. For rest
of the vulnerable locations including for clearing of the NH 22, the job was to be
done by siren fitted vehicles. For further up gradation of police wireless network Rs 8
Lakhs were provided during the winters of 2004. Likewise we upgraded, expanded
and made the wireless network of district administration functional and brought the
PWD(Public Works Department) and IPH (Irrigation and Public Health Department)

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 under its coverage as these two departments play an important role in restoration
works.
2. Education of the villagers about evacuation: The vulnerable villages were educated
about warning system, evacuation in case of warning and other do’s and don’ts in
case of flood situation. Locations for evacuation were already identified. Panchayati
Raj bodies were involved in this exercise.
3. Rescue and relief equipment: The rescue and relief equipment immediately
required in flood situation like tents, tarpaulins, blankets search lights etc were
purchased and kept at the disposal of Tehsildars.
4. Stocking of essential commodities and medicines: Adequate precautions were
taken to ensure that we have sufficient stocks of essential commodities, medicines,
horticultural and agricultural medicines.
5. Restoration of alternate route (old Hindustan Tibet road): Old Hindustan Tibet (HT)
road was the only road in the district before the 1962 war with China when it was
extensively used. After the war, the new NH22 got constructed and as a result the
old road went into disuse. In the floods of 2000, the road was restored for use by
light four wheel drive vehicles. Though extremely dangerous road having a width as
much as that of an ordinary jeep, and having steep fall in the valley with no
protection on the valley side, it served as the main lifeline in 2000 floods. In its entire
stretch, the road covers a length of about 80 Km thus providing some sort of
connectivity to almost 2/3rd of the district. After the NH22 was restored post 2000
floods, the road again went into disuse and got damaged at most of the points as the
road is subjected to lot of avalanches in winters and landslides in summers. We felt
that in case of any flood, this road had to be restored again. The task was assigned to
two Executive Engineers of PWD to complete the restoration before the flood season
of 2005 which as per the past experience is around July-August. The restoration work
was already on when the flood struck us.

Onset of Floods- 26th June 2005:

About a week before the onset of floods, there was a sudden rise in the temperature and
weather became very hot. This resulted in excessive melting of glacial ice and winter snow .
District Kinnaur had incidentally experienced one of the heaviest snowfalls in the 2004
winters. Result was a sharp rise in the levels of Satluj River. There were some media reports
that the rise in water level was because of Parechu breach. This was strongly denied by the
district administration as we were getting information about Parechu water level almost on
a daily basis from an automatic telemetry station which was installed by CWC at Sumdo in
the winters of 2004. However the rise in the water levels was really alarming and it was felt
that in case of a breach of Parechu at this juncture, the damages caused would be extensive.
Just to be on cautious side, an emergency meeting was called in the Deputy Commissioners
office on 25th June to rehearse the communication system.

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 On 26th June 2005, Sunday, a call was received from ITBP forward post at 10.00 am
to Deputy Commissioner that the Parechu had breached. As there were many false alarms in
the past, the Commandant was asked to confirm the news which was confirmed by him.
Immediately the information was passed on to the district control room to start the drill of
communication to all concerned. Thereafter DC personally informed all the senior state
government officers. The district control room was immediately made active. Information
was also passed on to the electronic media which relayed this information on television sets
and played a great role in saving many a lives. As per the drill, the hooters in the villages
informed the affected villages on time. Likewise the siren vehicles cleared the NH22. As per
information received subsequently, the first villages of Shalkher and Chango got information
more than 1 hour before the flood hit. Likewise the most vulnerable village Leo got about 45
minutes advance information for saving themselves and their property. At various locations,
the state police, home guards and ITBP helped in clearing the road and helped people in
removing their moveable assets. The communication network was giving almost real time
information about the location of the head of the flood and the extent of water level rise.
The information was duly passed onto all the downstream areas as well as the media. The
information about the extent of damages also started flowing in. The flood crossed near
district headquarters at about 1.30 pm and there was a lead time of about 3.5 hours. In the
downstream district of Shimla in Rampur area, they got a lead time of 8 hours along with
accurate information about extent of water level rise. All this was possible because of timely
information and good communication network.

Damages caused due to flood:

The flood resulting from Parechu bursting was a major flood. The water level rise near
Sumdo was about 80 feet. The flood water flow resulted in the formation of a temporary
artificial lake in Spiti river because of the stoppage of flows of Spiti River, The water level
rise at Khab was about 60 feet. Further downstream, the level was about 30-40 feet. Near
district headquarters, the water rose for about 20-30 feet, The level remained high for
about 4-5 hours after which the water started receding. Despite this extensive damage,
because of timely warning, not even a single human life was lost. We could even save the
cattle and there was no animal death reported Not even a single vehicle got washed away in
the floods in spite of the precariously close proximity of NH22 to the river.

However, damages caused to the public and private property was extensive. The brief
outline of the damages caused to public property is as follows:

 NH 22 was damaged extensively all along its 148 km stretch.

 10 major bridges were washed away and 3 bridges were rendered unsafe.
 Link roads emanating from NH 22 were also damaged. About 12 Link roads were
damaged during the flood.
 About 15 government buildings were damaged / washed away.

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  Disruption of all telecommunication links within the district. At many points the
optical fibre cable of telecom network got washed away or disrupted because of the
landslides.
 Because of washing away of transmission poles and conductors falling along the river
course there was extensive disruption of electricity in the district.
 Damage to Forests: The forest wealth all along the river course was also badly
affected.

Besides the public property, private property also suffered extensive damage. The damage
caused to private property are enumerated below:

1. Private houses washed away 107

2. Belongings of families washed away 16
3. Private agricultural/horticultural land washed away 30 Ha
4. Fruit trees washed away 10,000

Figure 3: Damage to private property

Despite a loss of 107 houses, belongings of only 16 families got washed away and the rest
could save their belongings because of the timely warning.

Immediate challenges for the administration:

After the flood passed through the district, a meeting of district disaster management team
was held in the evening. Some of the immediate challenges confronting the district for
which decision was to be taken in the meeting were as follows:

1. Actual assessment of the damages: This information was immediately required to

plan for rescue, relief and restoration operations. Preliminary information from our
communication stations had already been received. This information was not
sufficient to tell us about the extent of damages to NH22 and various other facilities
on which future restoration depended. Immediately the teams of home guards
volunteers were dispatched to various upstream and downstream areas. They were
asked to collect information first hand and pass on the information through wireless
network. Likewise, the entire district was divided into various small sectors on the
basis of preliminary information of the blockage points. Field level functionaries like
Patwaris, Panchayat Secretaries etc were appointed as Sector officers of these areas.
They were to communicate with a police contact person (police constables) duly
equipped with wireless sets. Their job was to give the district control room daily
information about the extent of damages, availability of essential commodities and
any other problem in their areas. Besides they were to act as the government-public
interface. As the entire district was cut off from outside world and various areas

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 within the district were also cut off from each other, these sector officers played a
very important role for many days till the restoration was completed. At district
level, the district control room was made operational round the clock to compile and
collate all the information from the field level agencies and take remedial action at
the district level.
2. Reaching out to the cut off villages: Leo, Tangling and Powari villages were totally
cut off from the district and we did not have any information about these villages.
Teams of ITBP, home guards and state police were constituted and sent to these
villages. The teams were equipped with basic relief materials and ham radio and
were asked to camp in the villages till the communication links with the villages were
restored.
3. Evacuation of the tourists: District Kinnaur is a tourist haven in summers. It was the
peak time for tourism industry of district Kinnaur when it was hit by floods.
Evacuation of Foreign and Indian tourists was an immediate priority. State
government was requested to provide helicopter flights to evacuate the tourists.
Indian Air force was also requisitioned by the state government. To remove the
feeling of panic among the tourists, message was flashed in electronic media that
helicopter flights are being arranged to evacuate tourists. The flights were arranged
free of cost by the state government. Some of the tourists had come with their own
vehicles and a lot of luggage. We earmarked a safe parking lot and a temporary cloak
room for keeping their extra luggage. For proper booking of flights and management
of helicopter services, officers were deployed at the helipad itself where a control
room was opened. At various remote locations makeshift helipads had to be
activated for landing of the helicopters. A total of 183 helicopter flights were carried
out to evacuate 106 foreign and 1789 Indians.
4. Air dropping of essential commodities and relief material in remote cut off villages:
In some of the remote and cut off villages, there was information about shortage of
essential commodities. Besides it was felt that some of the essential items like
blankets, tents, tarpaulins, clothes, candles, and matchboxes should be airdropped.
The helicopters were requested to carry this task in these villages.
5. Restoration of immediate means of communication for the villages: As the road
network got disconnected, it was important to immediately restore the pedestrian
pathways for the villagers to walk freely. For this the directions were given to PWD,
GREF and rural development department. Besides for the movement across the river
at points where the bridges were washed away, the task of installing ropeways for
human transportation was assigned to the PWD department. In about one week after
the flood, about 12 human ropeways were installed. Besides for easy movement of
essential commodities and other materials to the villages, ropeways for material
transportation were installed. A total of 23 such ropeways were installed throughout
the district by various agencies.

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 6. Transportation of essential commodities: Many of the perishable commodities were
in short supply in the district. A lot of effort was required to provide the citizens with basic
essential commodities.
7. Evacuation of pea crop nearing harvest: As pointed out earlier, in the summers, pea
is grown as off season vegetable which is generally harvested in the later part of June
and July. The harvest time of Pea crop was almost on when the floods hit the district.
It was imperative to work out some way of transporting the pea crop out of the district
or else provide some relief to the farmers for the loss of the crop. As it was almost
impossible to take out the pea crop out of the district because of the disruption of the
road links, various proposals were sent from the district administration to the state
government for providing relief to the farmers. State government finally announced
doing the special crop survey (Special Girdawari) and a compensation of Rs 2200 per
bigha for the standing pea crop. The entire revenue staff was pressed to do crop
survey in record time and an amount of Rs 3.5 Crores was distributed through the
revenue staff as relief to farmers for their pea crop.
8. Restoration of Old HT: As already pointed out, the restoration of old HT was
already in progress when the flood hit us. Expediting the restoration work was the
immediate priority. PWD department was asked to work over time for the restoration.
Massive work of restoring the entire stretch of old HT measuring 80 km was done in 1
month except at one point where a massive RCC retaining wall with a bridge had to
be constructed which took about 1 more month. With the opening of old HT road,
about 2/3rd of the district got connected through light four wheel drive vehicles
making the movement of essential commodities very easy.
9. Running the relief camp in affected villages: Our main relief camp was run in Leo
village where approximately half of the village got washed away. The villagers were
housed in the governmental buildings. A great help to these villagers was done by the
villagers of nearby areas mainly Hango, Chulling and Nako. Some policemen had also
gone to the village immediately before the flood hit the village and they also helped
the villagers in organizing the relief camp. Local Panchayat, Mahila mandal, Yuvak
mandals come together to run the relief camp successfully. Once the relief was
distributed individually to the affected villagers, the camp was stopped.
10. Distribution of relief amount to the affected villages: Over the next few days of the
flood, revenue agencies carried out distribution of relief amount and material to the
affected people. Families with complete loss of belongings were provided with 6
months free ration. Besides blankets, tents, clothes and tarpaulins were distributed to
the affected people. A total relief amount of Rs 32 Lakhs were distributed to people
over the next few days.

These were some of the issues which were discussed in the meeting. These were tackled
over the next few days of the flood . Besides these administrative issues which crops up
during any disaster management situation, certain other issues also need to, be handled
properly. I am high lighting some of these issues and how we coped with them:

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 1. VVIP visits: In the immediate after math of any disaster situation, one has to be
prepared to have a flurry of VVIP visits. District Kinnaur was no exception to this. On
28th June Chief Minister, Himachal Pradesh visited district Kinnaur along with two
senior ministers to review the arrangements of disaster management. On 29th June
Home minister of India visited along with Chairperson of National Advisory Council
and Chief Minister to review the arrangements and take stock of the situation. On 1 st
of July Central relief team came for assessing the extent of disaster. Such visits
certainly consume a lot of precious time and mental energy of Incident commander.
One has to be prepared with a proper presentation of the event, the extent of
damages, likely problem areas and extent of outside support needed. However, such
visits also bring urgency in the government system for faster delivery. Also many of
the problems can be tackled during such visits. In our case, we strongly put forth the
case of giving adequate relief to farmers for pea. crop and adequate monetary
assistance to the state government for restoration works which was promptly given to
us.
2. Media management: Media if not properly managed in the post disaster situation is
likely to carry all kinds of stories which may be way off the track. On 26 th June and
thereafter, my cell phone was flooded with phone calls from various electronic and
print media for interviews and information. Rather than shunning them, I tried my
best to provide them accurate information. Information as provided was duly carried
as such in the media. National media was brought to district Kinnaur on 29 th June to
carry stories on district Kinnaur and we provided all the available information to
them. Subsequently, we authorized the public relations officer to officially interact
with media on a regular basis. At district level, a regular press briefing was held on
alternate days by me along with Superintendent of Police and other senior district
level officials.
3. Political opportunism: Under the given political scenario in our country, in such
disaster situations, politicians try their best to gain political mileage. There is a
tendency to blow small problems out of proportions to occupy some space in the
newspapers. I do not deny that some genuine issues are not raised in the process.
However most of the times the issues raised are frivolous. In our case, we tried to
make them understand to cooperate as far as possible and only bring the genuine
issues to our knowledge. It had a desired impact to a great extent. Moreover, bringing
the exact facts to knowledge of media greatly counters any malicious campaign.
Panchayati Raj institutions can really work in a non-political manner in such
situations. We were receiving a lot of complaints regarding favouritism in the booking
of tickets for the helicopter flights, most of it politically motivated. We made
Chairman Zila Parishad as the chairman of screening committee to screen the
applications for helicopter flights and made chairperson Panchayat samiti as the
member of such committee. After this we never received any complaint and as per my
knowledge, the screening of applications was done very fairly by the screening
committee.

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 4. Morale of employees working in disaster relief: I have observed that after first few
days of hectic work by the disaster relief workers, many of the people are liable to
break down under certain stress. I experienced this with many of our employees
working under stressful conditions. As a leader of the team, one has to really motivate
them, discuss and sort out their personal problems and tackle any stressful situation
himself for the purpose of motivating the employees.
5. Morale of Public at large: Not just the disaster relief workers but general public at
large is also prone to demotivation under such situations. Some sort of assurance is
required to the people to come out of such situation. After initial one week of disaster,
I along with SP walked to almost all the villages and discussed and sorted out the
problems of the villagers and assured them about speedy restoration. The worries of
the villagers about their pea and apple crop and supply of essential commodities were
addressed during such meetings. Such visits had a tremendous effect on the morale of
the general public.

Provision of essential commodities in the district:

As a lot of overstocking was done of the essential commodities in 2004, sufficient quantity
of non-perishable food items like wheat, rice and sugar were available in the district.
However perishable food items like wheat flour, edible oil, salt etc were not available in
sufficient quantities in the district when the flood came. Likewise our stock of LPG, Diesel,
Petrol and Kerosene oil were inadequate and barely sufficient for few days. We immediately
resorted to rationing for these items. In 2000 floods, most of .the rations were airlifted.
However we had the flexibility of transporting these rations through head load, mules and
small vehicles because of comparatively better condition of the old HT road. A district level
team was constituted to fix transportation rates for ration transport. Immediately the task
for transportation was assigned to a district Ievel cooperative society KINFED on the
approved rates fixed by committee. Within a few days, tender was floated for this work.
Committee also kept on revising the rates of transportation as and when the road conditions
improved. A huge quantity of rations was transported by these means in the district. Some
ration in remote locations was even transported by helicopter. No scarcity was noticed in
any part of the district during the entire relief operation. Even in case of fresh vegetables,
no significant scarcity was noticed during the period. Some of the fresh vegetables like
onion, potato and tomato were transported through helicopter and sold to people. Local
traders were also keen to bring fresh vegetables from outside district on head load for
which we fixed higher transportation and selling rates. Police department run canteen was
also requested to provide the supplies of fresh vegetables to ward off any scarcity.

Restoration works:

Once the immediate jobs at hand were addressed, we shifted our focus on the early
restoration of NH 22. Normalization of life of common people depended upon early
restoration of NH 22 and its bridges which was to be done by GREF. However the sense of
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urgency was missing in GREF. A lot of political and bureaucratic pressure was required to
move GREF. The CM had to speak to the Home Minister for early restoration. The Director
General Border Roads was also requested by state government and army authorities for
early restoration. Meetings were held in Delhi by Secretary Border management with senior
GREF and state officials to review the progress. At district level, a regular feedback
was given to CM and senior state government officials regarding the progress of the
restoration works. State PWD chipped in and restored a substantial portion on NH 22
including 1 Bailey bridge. Lot of coordination was required between GREF, PWD and Army
engineers to get the work done. With all the efforts and some good work done by
GREF in the end, the District headquarter was connected with the rest of the country in one
and a half months’ time. All the damaged road portions on NH 22 were restored except
launching of the bailey bridges with in 2 months. Electricity restoration was very quick. It
took about 3 days to restore electricity in the district headquarters, another 15 days to
restore the electricity in major portions of district, and within 1 month electricity was
restored in the entire district. This was due to excellent efforts from the engineers on State
electricity board. The progress of telecommunication restoration was however quite tardy.
The restoration operations were going on very fast and we had expected to complete the
entire restoration work within 3 months of the flooding event and well before the onset of
apple season. However as god would have wished, a major tragedy struck us on 8 th of
September putting a spanner in our restoration works.

Set back in restoration operations - Kharo tragedy:

A bailey bridge at Kharo with a span of 200 feet was being erected by 18 Engineer's
regiment of Army. The officers constructing the bridge were doing the work very steadily.
Bridge collapsed a day before its scheduled launching on 8 th September while the army men
were on work on the bridge tightening its screws. The bridge went down in the river along
with all the men working on it. 34 army men including a Lt Col and a captain died in the
tragedy. It was one of the biggest peace time tragedies for army. A massive search
operation was launched to fish out drowned bodies by joint teams of Army, ITBP, Home
guards and Police. Special divers were also called from water sports institute and Navy. The
efforts of the district administration were appreciated by the army authorities. Immediate
relief of Rs. 50,000 each for the deceased was provided by state government. As a result of
this tragedy the initial target of restoring all the damages within 3 months was hampered.
Army took upon it as a challenge to erect the bridge. However because of the tragedy they
were over cautious in their approach thus delaying the launching by another two months
thus offsetting all the previous efforts. The bridge was finally restored on 2 nd November
2005. Final restoration could be done on 10 th of November that is four and a half months
after the floods. Considering the extent of damages caused by Parechu floods, this was
commendable.

Transportation of apple crop:

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As per the initial target, the restoration work would have been over before the end of
September when the apple season starts. However because of the Kharo tragedy, the target
was offset. The immediate problem at hand was how to transport the apple crop worth over
Rs 100 Crores out of the district We also had to provide apple packaging material for the
packaging of apple. We worked out a proposal for providing transportation subsidy for
apple packaging material as well as filled apple boxes. The state government finally gave its
approval for the proposal with a financial liability of about Rs 4 Crores. Special 24 hour
barriers had to be set up at various locations for stamping and authenticating the transport
subsidy forms supplied to the suppliers and farmers for the same. Most of the crop from
upper areas of Kinnaur had to be transported via old HT road, but due to acute shortage of
light vehicles, the rates of transportation started increasing. Similarly the truckers were
overcharging people for transporting apple crop on trucks. District administration had to fix
rates for transportation. At the same time, we invited transporters from outside the district
in a big way which helped in lowering the rates of transport.

Rehabilitation

Rehabilitation of the disaster affected is a sine-qua-non in any disaster management. The

rehabilitation work has to be planned right at advance so that by the time immediate relief
and restoration is over; one can start the rehabilitation works. The major works carried out
in rehabilitation in district Kinnaur were as follows:

1. Shifting of two unsafe villages: Two of the villages in district Kinnaur, namely Leo
and Skiba were rendered totally unsafe because of the cutting and erosion by flood
waters. A complete rehabilitation plan was worked out for these villages. An
alternate safe land was identified and a plot of 4 Biswa each was allotted to all the
families of the village. As an aid for house construction, all the families who had lost
their houses in the flood were given a financial aid of Rs 27,500 each on Indira
Awaas Yojana (IAY) pattern irrespective of their income status. IRDP families were
assisted under lAY and other families were assisted under Rajiv Awaas Yojana, a
state government scheme. For developing other infrastructure in the village, money
was given to various departments for developing roads, street lights, drinking water
and other facilities.
2. Allotment of house sites to families having lost their houses: 4 Biswa house site was
allotted to each of the 148 affected families.
3. Financial aid of Rs 27,500 was given for the construction of houses to 40 families.
4. Land in exchange of washed away agricultural and horticultural land is being
provided to the people and for

Long term mitigation strategy:

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A long term mitigation strategy has to be chalked out to avoid such kind of situation in the
Satluj valley considering the fact that this was the second time this valley has been badly hit
by floods of this magnitude. There are reports of many more such lakes in Tibet region. That
will put a strategic border area of the country always at the risk of flooding. Three strategies
could possibly work in this situation:

 Development of a higher alignment road: This is the foremost prerequisite. NH 22

should be developed at a higher alignment so that it is immune from any kind of
flooding in the Satluj River.
 Government of India through diplomatic channels should enter into an agreement
with government of China for sharing of information about water levels and any
other relevant information relating to flooding which can be used for forewarning.

Critical Success Factors:

A general review about handling of the Parechu crisis in totality was that it was handled
quiet efficiently considering the enormity of the flood situation and going by the past
experiences. I would like to specify some of the factors which played a major role in efficient
management of the crisis:

1. Forewarning of the flood situation: Parechu crisis was different from the other crisis
occurring in the country in the sense that in this particular situation we were already
forewarned about the possibility of such a disaster. As a result the administration
was already geared to face such an eventuality. Without forewarning, the results
would have been different. This is because in the normal times, there is no flood
warning system available with the district administration. Therefore for future there
is a need to have an automatic advanced flood warning system installed in the
forward areas of the district.
2. Credible communication network: The timely and efficient communication was the
key to saving human lives. Even during the relief and restoration works,
communication system played a very important role. A robust communication
network could be developed for any future disaster situation.
3. Close coordination between various agencies involved in disaster management was a
very important factor in timely restoration. As a team leader, I was to coordinate
with many agencies namely Army, GREF, PWD, ITBP, Police, Food supplies all having
different work practices and methodologies. The delivery of results is faster if you
have a personal rapport with the officers concerned.
4. In tackling this crisis, district administration received ample political and bureaucratic
support from state headquarters. Such a support is very important for tackling any
major disaster. Incident Commander has to be in regular touch with the higher

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 officials and regular briefing of the Chief Minister to apprise him about the ground
situation and problem areas also helps a lot.

Constraints:

Having discussed about the various success factors, it would be appropriate to discuss some
of the constraint factors in this crisis. The factors are enumerated below:

 Lack of accurate information about extent of water and likely flooding from any
agency. As a result we had to prepare for the worst.
 Relief manual does not take into account various expenses which have to be borne
during the disaster like helicopter flights etc. Relief for agricultural and horticultural
crops prescribed in the NCCF guidelines is not at all commensurate to the losses
suffered by the farmers. Even the money prescribed for land development is way
short of the actual costs .
 Disaster management planning is at a very primitive stage at district level. The
disaster management plans though prepared in the districts are not very useful in
times of disasters. Mock drills and system preparedness is missing. District
administration is ill equipped and ill trained to handle disasters. No organized system
of disaster management exists in the districts and it boils down to the efficiency of
coordinating agency as to how it handles the disasters. It would be appropriate that
the disaster management system in India should move away from being Individual
centric and should strive towards being System centric.

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