Rallos v. City of Cebu, G.R. No.

202651, August 28, 2013

FACTS:
• Lots 485-D and 485-E of the Banilad Estate, Sambag I, Cebu City were
expropriated to be used as a public road in 1963.
• The Heirs of Fr. Rallos alleged that the City of Cebu occupied the lots in bad
faith sans the authority of the former’s predecessors-in-interest, who were the
registered owners of the subject parcels of land.
• The City of Cebu contended that the subject parcels of land are road lots and
are not residential in character.
•  the RTC rendered a Decision, which found the City of Cebu liable to pay the Heirs of Fr.
Rallos just compensation.

• Lucena Rallos admitted that there are ve other pending actions for indirect contempt
which she led relative to Civil Case No. CEB-20388. She, however, claims that the
issues in the other ve petitions are di erent from that raised before this Court now.
Lucena’s claim cannot be sustained. Since the elements of litis pendentia concur in the
instant petition and SCA No. CEB-38292, this Court so holds Lucena guilty of forum
shopping.

ISSUES:

W/N: that Lucena Rallos heirs of of Fr. Rallies are guilty of Forum shopping

RULINGS:

YES, Lucena B. Rallos is guilty Forum shopping

-Forum shopping is the act of litigants who repetitively avail themselves

of multiple judicial remedies in di erent fora, simultaneously or successively, all
substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts
and circumstances; and raising substantially similar issues either pending in or
already resolved adversely by some other court; or for the purpose of increasing
their chances of obtaining a favorable decision, if not in one court, then in
another.”

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 Roxas v. Republic Real Estate Corporation,G.R. No. 208205,
June 1, 2016
FACTS:

• Atty. Roxas of RGR & Associates, counsel for RREC since August 6, 1990, filed before this
court a complaint against the three CA Justices who nullified the Wire of Execution and
Sheriff De Jesus Notice. The Complaint was for the Justices alleged misconduct and
violation of section 3 of RA no. 3019 in Relation to Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code.
• RREC terminated the services of RGR & Associated (Atty. Roxas law ffirm), due to loss of
confidence and breach of trust.
• RREC also filed a manifestation informing the court that atty. Roxas' complaint against the
CA justices was filed without RREC’s knowledge and conformity.
• Atty. Roxas admits that he filed his Pro Hac Vice Petition in his personal capacity
and without RREC's authority, Atty. Roxas asserts that RGR & Associates is RREC's
rightful counsel.
• According to Atty. Roxas, the termination of RGR & Associates' legal services was made in
bad faith. RREC's engagement with his firm was made allegedly "on a contingent or a 'no
cure, no pay' basis. Atty. Roxas prays for attorney's fees beyond quantum meruit.
Specifically, he asks for "the full amount upon the terms and conditions of his contingency
contract with RREC.
• RREC President Catalina B. Blanco filed before this Court a Petition on Final
Execution and Settlement, a third pleading on the same case with the same set of
facts, without the aid of counsel as the company could no longer afford Siguion
Reyna's services.
• Atty. Roxas filed a Manifestation reiterating that the payment to RREC and Pasay City
should reflect its current real value. He argues that the award of P10.9 million should be
equivalent to the value of the reclaimed land RREC could have purchased in 1962, which
was 109 hectares at P10.00 per square meter.

ISSUES: Whether or not, the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the Writ of Execution and
Sheriff De Jesus' Notice of Execution and Notice to Pay as null and void.

RULINGS: NO, The Court of Appeals correctly declared the Writ of Execution and Sheriff De
Jesus' Notice null and void. We find no reversible error in the Court of Appeals

RREC's relentless pursuit of this case vexes this Court. Even afterRepublic v. Court of Appeals
had become final and executory, RREC repeatedly filed motions and petitions before this Court
despite our express prohibition on filing further pleadings.

The Court had already declared the agreement between RREC and Pasay City null and void.

This Court's decision cannot be amended by the trial court or the sheriff. Absent an order of
remand, we cannot allow attempts to adjust or vary the terms of the judgment of this Court.

A judgment, once final, is immutable and unalterable.

 Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC

Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., G.R. No. 207132,
December 6, 2016

FACTS:

• GAMCA led a petition with the RTC of Pasig citing the following: (1) the
DOH’s August 23, 2010 letter-order on the ground of grave abuse of discretion;
and (2) paragraphs c.3 and c.4, Section 16 of RA No. 10022, as well as Section
1(c) and (d), Rule XI of the IRR, as unconstitutional.
Sec. 16 RA no. 10022 (AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8042, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE MIGRANT WORKERS AND OVERSEAS FILIPINOS ACT OF 1995, AS AMENDED,
FURTHER IMPROVING THE STANDARD OF PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF THE WELFARE
OF MIGRANT WORKERS, THEIR FAMILIES AND OVERSEAS FILIPINOS IN DISTRESS, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES)
• (c.3) No group or groups of medical clinics shall have a monopoly
of exclusively conducting health examinations on migrant workers
for certain receiving countries;

• " (c.4) Every Filipino migrant worker shall have the freedom to
choose any of the DOH-accredited or DOH-operated clinics that
will conduct his/her health examinations and that his or her rights
as a patient are respected. The decking practice, which requires an
overseas Filipino worker to go rst to an of ce for registration and
then farmed out to a medical clinic located elsewhere, shall not be
allowed;

• AMCOW led a motion for leave to intervene and to le an opposition-in-

intervention.
• The RTC issued a decision in favor of GAMCA and denied the motion
for inhibition of AMCOW.
ISSUES:

W/N the application of Section 16 of Republic Act No. 10022 to the GAMCA violates the
international customary principles of sovereign independence and equality
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RULIINGS:

YES, The Supreme court also held that the RTC’s decision misapplied the principle of
sovereign independence and equality to the present case. GAMCA failed to prove that the GCC
has extended its sovereign immunity to GAMCA. Sovereign immunity belongs to the State. RA
No. 10022 prohibits hospitals and clinics in the Philippines from practicing the referral decking
system, and employers from requiring OFWs to procure their medical examinations from
hospitals and clinics practicing the referral decking system. The regulation applies to Philippine
hospitals and clinics, as well as to employers of OFWs. It does not apply to the GCCs and their
visa processes.

  
The City of Bacolod v. Phuture Vision Co., Inc., G.R. No.
190289, January 17, 2018
FACTS:

• Respondent Phuture processed, completed and submitted its Application for Permit to
Engage in Business, Trade or Occupation to operate bingo games at SM Bacolod and paid
the fees therefor to the Permits and Licensing Division of the City Mayor of Bacolod City. It
was then issued a claim slip for its permit.

• Phuture commenced bingo operations at SM Bacolod prior to the issuance of the actual
hard copy of the mayor’s permit.

• Later, respondent learned that its bingo outlet was padlocked by agents of the O ce of
the City Legal O cer and a copy of a Closure Order was posted at the entrance of the
bingo outlet

• Phuture claimed that such closure was tainted with malice and bad faith and that
petitioners did not have the legal authority to shut down said bingo operations.

• Phuture’s led an Application for the issuance of a temporary mandatory order

and/or preliminary mandatory injunction to remove the padlock installed at respondent’s
place of business at SM Bacolod and allow it to conduct unhampered bingo operations

• The RTC denied the Application and dismissed the case for lack of merit. On appeal, the
CA concluded that the respondent was denied its proprietary right without due process of
law.

• Accordingly, the appellate court ordered the case to be reinstated and remanded to the
RTC to determine if damages should be awarded.

• Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE:
W/N the petitioners may be held liable for damages in favor of respondent.

RULING:

NO, As to the primary issue of whether petitioners are liable to the respondent for
damages, respondent Phuture alleged that petitioners are guilty of surreptitiously padlocking
its SM bingo outlet in a "patently arbitrary, whimsical, capricious, oppressive, irregular, immoral
and shamelessly politically motivated" manner and with clear discrimination since the majority
owners of the company are the sons of petitioner Mayor Leonardia's political rival, then
Congressman Monico Puentevella. Such contention is clearly but non sequitur, grounded as it
is in pure conjecture.

Considering that respondent had no legal right to operate the bingo operations at the outset,
then it is not entitled to the damages which it is demanding from petitioners.
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  Republic v. Fetalvero, G.R. No. 198008, February 4, 2019

FACTS:

• Fetalvero owned a 2,787-square meter parcel of land in Iligan City, Lanao del Norte
• DPWH Region X took 569 square meters from Fetalvero's property to be used in its ood
control project.
• Fetalvero demanded payment for the entire area at P15,000.00 per square meter.
• under Presidential Administrative Order No. 50, series of 1999, the just compensation
Fetalvero was entitled to was only P2,500.00 per square meter, or a total of
P1,422,500.00, plus 10% thereof. The rate was based on the Bureau of Internal
Revenue zonal valuation in 1999, when the property was taken. Despite negotiations,
the parties failed to agree on the amount of just compensation.
• the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), led before the Regional Trial Court a
Complaint for expropriation against Fetalvero. It prayed "for the determination and payment
of the just compensation and the entry of a judgment of condemnation of the 569 square
meters portion of property.”
• the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement, and agreed on the following

• 1. That the area involved is 1,428 square meters.

• 2. That the price per square meter is Nine Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (PHP
9,500.00) per square meter or a total of Thirteen Million Five Hundred
Sixty[-]Six Thousand & 00/100 (PHP 13,566,000.00) which latter is the
amount to be paid in full b[y] the plaintiff to the defendant not later than
September, 2009.

• 3. After September, 2009, it will earn interest at 12% per annum until fully paid.

• 4. Expenses for documentation and transfer to the account of Plaintiff.

• Fetalvero led before the trial court a motion to approve the Compromise Agreement and
for the issuance of judgment

• The Republic opposed the Motion, arguing that since the Compromise Agreement was not
legally binding, "it cannot be the subject of a valid writ of execution or
garnishment." Moreover, the government still owns its funds and properties that were in
o cial depositaries; thus, these cannot be garnished or levied.

ISSUE:
W/N government funds may be seized under a writ of execution or a writ of
garnishment in satisfaction of court judgments.

RULINGS:

NO. Government funds may not be seized under a writ of execution or a writ of
garnishment in satisfaction of court judgments

The general rule is that government funds cannot be seized by virtue of writs of
execution or garnishment. Simply put, "no money can be taken out of the treasury without an
appropriation.
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 Republic of Indonesia Vs. Vinzon
G.R. No. 154705, June 26, 2003
Facts:

Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a Maintenance
Agreement in August 1995 with respondent James Vinzon, a sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade
and Services.

The Maintenance Agreement stated that respondent shall maintain specified equipment at the
Embassy Main Building, Embassy Annex Building and the Wisma Duta, the official residence of
petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin.

Petitioners claim that sometime prior to the date of expiration of the said agreement, they
informed respondents that the renewal of the agreement shall be at the discretion of the
incoming Chief of Administration, Minister Counselor Azhari Kasim. However, he allegedly found
respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in
the Maintenance Agreement.

Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement in a letter dated August 31, 2000.

Respondent Vinzon filed a complaint against the petitioners. In turn, petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint, alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has
sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a party-defendant in the Philippines.

The said Motion to Dismiss further alleged that Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor
Kasim are diplomatic agents as defined under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
and therefore enjoy diplomatic immunity.

an Opposition to the said Motion to Dismiss alleging that the Republic of Indonesia has
expressly waived its immunity from suit. He based this claim upon the following provision in the
Maintenance Agreement:

"Any legal action arising out of this Maintenance Agreement shall be settled according to
the laws of the Philippines and by the proper court of Makati City, Philippines."

The trial court denied herein the petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss. It likewise denied the Motion for
Reconsideration subsequently filed.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court’s decision that petitioners
have waived their immunity from suit by using as its basis the above-mentioned provision in the
Maintenance Agreement.

Ruling:
NO. Generally, all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A
contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations.”

 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY

PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OFFICE, Petitioners, v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION)
AND NACUSIP/BISUDECO CHAPTER/GEORGE EMATA, DOMINGO
REBANCOS, NELSON BERINA, ROBERTO TIRAO, AMADO
VILLOTE, AND BIENVENIDO FELINA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 174747, SECOND DIVISION, March 09, 2016, LEONEN, J.:

Money claims against government include money judgments by courts, which

must be brought before the Commission on Audit before it can be satis ed.

Petitioner's Board of Trustees already issued the Resolution on September 23,

1992 for the release of funds to pay separation bene ts to terminated
employees of Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation.. Under these
circumstances, it is presumed that the funds to be used for private respondents'
separation bene ts have already been appropriated and disbursed. This would
account for why private respondents' co-complainants were able to claim their
checks without need of ling a separate claim before the Commission on Audit.

FACTS:

Asset Privatization Trust was a government entity created 1986 for the purpose
of conserving, provisionally managing, and disposing of assets that have been
identi ed for privatization or disposition. NACUSIP/BISUDECO Chapter is
the exclusive bargaining agent for the rank-and- le employees of Bicolandia
Sugar Development Corporation, a corporation engaged in milling and
producing sugar.

Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation had been incurring heavy losses. It

obtained loans from Philippine Sugar Corporation and Philippine National
Bank, secured by its assets and properties. Subsequently, the Philippine
National Bank ceded its rights and interests over Bicolandia Sugar
Development Corporation's loans to the government through Asset
Privatization Trust.

The Asset Privatization Trust, pursuant to its mandate to dispose of government

properties for privatization, decided to sell the assets and properties of
Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation. It issued a Notice of Termination
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 to Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's employees, advising them that
their services would be terminated within 30 days. NASUCIP/BISUDECO
Chapter received the Notice under protest.

After the employees' dismissal from service, Bicolandia Sugar Development

Corporation's assets and properties were sold to Bicol Agro-Industrial
Producers Cooperative, Incorporated-Peñafrancia Sugar Mill.

As a result, several members of the NACUSIP/BISUDECO Chapter led a

charging Asset Privatization Trust, Bicolandia Sugar Development
Corporation, Philippine Sugar Corporation, and Bicol Agro- Industrial
Producers Cooperative, Incorporated-Peñafrancia Sugar Mill with unfair labor
practice, union busting, and claims for labor standard bene ts.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the Complaint and ruled that there was no union
busting.
However, the Labor Arbiter found that although Asset Privatization Trust
previously released funds for separation pay, 13th month pay, and accrued
vacation and sick leave credits for 1992, Emata, et. al. refused to receive their
checks "on account of their protested dismissal." Their refusal to receive their
checks was premised on their Complaint that Asset Privatization Trust's sale of
Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation violated their Collective
Bargaining Agreement and was a method of union busting.

While the Labor Arbiter acknowledged that Emata, et al.'s entitlement to these
bene ts had already prescribed under Article 291 of the Labor Code, he
nevertheless ordered Asset Privatization Trust to pay Emata, et al. their bene ts
since their co-complainants were able to claim their checks.
Asset Privatization Trust deposited with the National Labor Relations
Commission a Cashier's Check in the amount of P116,182.20. It led a Notice
of Partial Appeal, together with a Memorandum of Partial Appeal, before the
National Labor Relations Commission.

Under Executive Order No. 323 dated December 6, 2000, Asset Privatization
Trust was succeeded by Privatization and Management Of ce.

The NLRC dismissed the Partial Appeal for failure to perfect the appeal within
the statutory period of appeal. Privatization and Management Of ce moved for
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 reconsideration, which was denied. Privatization and Management Of ce led
before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari which was denied. The CA
ruled that the grant of separation pay to Emata, et al. was anchored on the
nding that Privatization and Management Of ce had already granted the same
bene ts to the other complainants in the labor case.

Privatization and Management Of ce moved for reconsideration, but the

Motion was denied. Hence, this Petition was led.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondents' separation bene ts may be released to

them without ling a separate money claim before the Commission on Audit

RULING:
Yes.
This case is unique, however, in that though private respondents' separation
bene ts were already released by petitioner, they refused to collect their
checks "on account of their protested dismissal." Their refusal to receive
their checks was premised on their Complaint that petitioner's sale of
Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation violated their Collective
Bargaining Agreement and was a method of union busting. It was not because
of negligence or malice. It was because of their honest belief that their
rights as laborers were violated and the grant of separation bene ts would
not be enough compensation for it. While private respondents' allegations
have not been properly substantiated, it would be unjust to deprive them of
their rightful claim to their separation bene ts.

29

DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW

Moreover, private respondents' co-complainants were able to collect their

checks for their separation bene ts during the pendency of the Complaint
without having to go through the Commission on Audit.
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 Under Section 26 of the State Auditing Code, the Commission on Audit has
jurisdiction over the settlement of debts and claims "of any sort" against
government.
The purpose of requiring a separate process with the Commission on Audit for
money claims against government is under the principle that public funds may
only be released upon proper appropriation and disbursement.

Money claims against government include money judgments by courts,

which must be brought before the Commission on Audit before it can be
satis ed.
Petitioner's Board of Trustees already issued the Resolution on September 23,
1992 for the release of funds to pay separation bene ts to terminated
employees of Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation. Private respondents'
checks were released by petitioner to the Arbitration Branch of the Labor
Arbiter in 1992. Under these circumstances, it is presumed that the funds to be
used for private respondents' separation bene ts have already been
appropriated and disbursed. This would account for why private
respondents' co-complainants were able to claim their checks without need
of ling a separate claim before the Commission on Audit.

In this instance, private respondents' separation bene ts may be released to

them without ling a separate money claim before the Commission on Audit. It
would be unjust and a violation of private respondents' right to equal protection
if they were not allowed to claim, under the same conditions as their fellow
workers, what is rightfully due to them.
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