G.R. No.

93833 September 28, 1995

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's
office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner
offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." 1

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral
damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to
costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the
civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. 2 The
transcript reads as follows:

Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) — Good Afternoon M'am.

Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) — Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo,

nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na,
magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.

CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako noon.

ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)

CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing
ganoon —

ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka,
kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon
ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review
mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi
ka sa akin makakahingi.

CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up

to 10:00 p.m.

ESG — Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa

hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung
paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka
kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).

CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.

ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.
 ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on
your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang
nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam noon.

ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo

ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako.

CHUCHI — Eh, di sana —

ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak.

Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.

CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako.

ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung

paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng
nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.

ESG — Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka

puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.

CHUCHI — Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.

ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka

makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa
akin, dahil tapos ka na.

CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.

ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no,
nilapastangan mo ako.

CHUCHI — Paano kita nilapastanganan?

ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo.

Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka.3

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping
and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." An information charging
petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:

INFORMATION
 The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of
Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:

That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the
above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by Ester
S. Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape
recorder secretly record the said conversation and thereafter
communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to other person.

Contrary to law.

Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.

MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal

Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order
May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts
charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A.
4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the
communication.4

From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this
Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division)
of June 19, 1989.

On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the
trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:

[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A.

4200. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do
not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion
correctible by certiorari.5

Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent
Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable provision of
Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the
conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private
conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication. 8 In relation to this, petitioner
avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise
the facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A.
4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and that
consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal
under the said act. 10

We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of
a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and
interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11 or
absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by
all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a
tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication.
The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by
the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
"even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without
the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's
conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal,
unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties
themselves or by third persons. Thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Tañada: That qualified only "overhear".

Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy

would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not made
by all the parties but by some parties and involved not criminal cases that would be
mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for example civil cases or special
proceedings whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the parties but perhaps
by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties because the actuation of the
parties prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative
of their intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your Honor, that
the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?

Senator Tañada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.

Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense but
as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?

Senator Tañada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations
taken without the authorization of all the parties.

Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?

 Senator Tañada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the
observation of one without his knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair, it is
not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the parties. I
believe that all the parties should know that the observations are being recorded.

Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.

Senator Tañada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of
directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties
know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and observations are being made
should know that the observations are being recorded.

Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.

Senator Tañada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please be
informed that whatever you say here may be used against you." That is fairness and
that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging statements
against his own interest, well, he cannot complain any more. But if you are going to take
a recording of the observations and remarks of a person without him knowing that it is
being taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is being recorded may be used
against him, I think it is unfair.

xxx xxx xxx

(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)

Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as now
worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized under
Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is done secretly.

Senator Tañada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the
communication between one person and another person — not between a speaker and
a public.

xxx xxx xxx

(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)

xxx xxx xxx

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications.
Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of
the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of
R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
"Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of
the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed." 14

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does
not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a
point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to
share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in
a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between
individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These
definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of
"meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February
22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts
about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to
rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by
Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:

It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from
their conversations being overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature
of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people have
some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Free conversations are often
characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of
anti-social desires of views not intended to be taken seriously. The right to the privacy
of communication, among others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution.
Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the nature
of conversations between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of
his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures and
satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free exchange
of communication between individuals — free from every unjustifiable intrusion by
whatever means.17

In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of telephone
wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private
conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise
was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following the principle
that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused." 20 The instant case turns on a
different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200
suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of
private communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.

WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and
leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA               June 16, 2015

Re: Letter· of Court of Appeals Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso for Entitlement to Longevity Pay
for His Services as Commission Member III of the National Labor Relations Commission

x-----------------------x

A.M. No. 12-9-5-SC

Re: Computation of Longevity Pay of Court of Appeals Justice Angelita A. Gacutan

x-----------------------x

A.M. No. 13-02-07-SC

Re: Request of Court of Appeals Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando that Her Services as
MTC Judge and as COMELEC Commissioner be considered as Part of Her Judicial Service
and Included in the computation/adjustment of Her longevity pay

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

Prefatory Statement

The Consolidated Cases

and the Affected Parties

For the Court’s consideration are the following: (1) letter-request dated August 22, 2012, of Court of
Appeals ( CA) Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando; 1 (2) letter-request dated September
11, 2012, of CA Associate Justice Angelita A. Gacutan; 2 and (3) motion for reconsideration3 dated
November 7, 2012, of CA Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso. 4

The petitioners are all Justices of the Court of Appeals. Justices Veloso and Fernando claim longevity
pay for services rendered within and outside the Judiciary as part of their compensation package .
Justice Gacutan, who has recently retired, claims deficiency payment of her longevity pay for the
services she had rendered before she joined the Judiciary, as well as a re-computation of her
retirement pay to include the claimed longevity pay.

Interest in the outcome of these consolidated cases goes beyond that of the petitioners; some
incumbent justices and judges, before joining the Judiciary, also served in the Executive Department
and would like to see these previous services credited in the computation of their longevity pay.
Others who had also previously served with the Executive Department currently enjoy longevity pay
credit for their executive service; they would like to see their mistakenly granted longevity pay credits
maintained.

Thus, the Court’s decision on these consolidated cases, whether to find for or against the petitioners,
will likewise affect the interests of other judges and justices in similar circumstance, including several
members of this honorable court participating in these matters.

Antecedents
A. Letter-Request of Justice Salazar-Fernando

In her letter dated August 22, 2012, 5 Justice Salazar-Fernando requested that her services as Judge
of the Municipal Trial Court ( MTC) of Sta. Rita, Pampanga, from February 15, 1983 to July 31, 1987,
and as Commissioner of the Commission on Elections ( COMELEC ), from February 14, 1992 to
February 14, 1998, be considered as part of her judicial services "as in the case of Hon. Bernar do P.
Pardo, Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court." Accordingly, Justice Salazar-Fernando
requested that her longevity pay be adjusted "from the current 10% to 20% of [her] basic salary
effective May 25, 1999."

We referred this letter-request to Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Chief of the Office of Administrative
Services ( OAS ), for study and recommendation.

In her February 18, 2013 Memorandum, 6 Atty. Candelaria recommended that Justice Salazar-
Fernando’s services as MTC Judge be credited as judicial service that can be added to her present
longevity pay. Atty. Candelaria, however, recommended the denial of Justice Salazar-
Fernando’srequest that her services at the COMELEC be also credited for her present longevity pay.
Nonetheless, she recommended that Justice Salazar-Fernando’s services in the COMELEC be
included in the computation of her longevity pay upon retirement "as in the case of Justice Pardo."

B. Letter-Request of Justice Gacutan

In her letter7 dated September 11, 2012, Justice Gacutan requested that: (a) her services as
Commissioner IV of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) , from March 3, 1998 to
November5, 2009, be credited as judicial service for purposes of retirement; (b) she be given a
longevity pay equivalent to 10% of her basic salary; and (c) an adjustment of her salary, allowances
and benefits be made from the time she assumed as CA Justice on November 6, 2009. In the Court’s
Resolution8 of November 13, 2012, we required the Fiscal Management and Budget Office (FMBO )
to comment onJustice Gacutan’s letter. In her Comment of January 4, 2013, Atty. Corazon G. Ferrer-
Flores, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief of Office of the FMBO, recommended that: (1) Justice
Gacutan’s request for the crediting of her services as Commissioner IV of the NLRC as judicial
service be granted, but only for purposes of her retirement benefits, to take effect on her compulsory
retirement on December 3, 2013;and (2) Justice Gacutan’s request that her salary and allowances be
adjusted retroactive from her assumption of office in the CA on November 6, 2009, be denied. 9

C. Motion for Reconsideration of Justice Veloso

In his November 7, 2012 motion for reconsideration, 10 Justice Veloso assailed the Court’s October 23,
2012 Resolution11 that denied his request for the crediting of his services as NLRC Commissioner as
judicial service for purposes of adjusting his salary and benefits, specifically his longevity pay.

Justice Veloso claimed that Republic Act No. (RA) 9347 which amended Article 216 of the Labor
Code should be applied retroactively since it is a curative statute. He maintained under this view that
he already had the rank of a CA Justice as NLRC Commissioner before he was appointed to the
appellate court on February 4, 2004.

We referred Justice Veloso’s motion for reconsideration to the FMBO for report and recommendation
in our Resolution of November 27, 2012.12

In her Report and Recommendation dated February 15, 2013, 13 Atty. Ferrer-Flores recommended
that Justice Veloso’s motion for reconsideration be denied since the points he raised were a rehash of
his arguments in his July 30, 2012 letter-request. 14
 Our Rulings

I. Letter of Justice Salazar-Fernando in A.M. No. 13-02-07-SC

a. Services as MTC Judge

We grant the request of Justice Salazar-Fernando to credit as judicial service her previous services
as MTC Judge of Sta. Rita, Pampanga, as judicial service in the computation of her longevity pay.

Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Bilang ( B.P. Blg.) 129 provides:

Section 42. Longevity pay. – A monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay shall
be paid to the Justices and Judges of the courts herein created for each five years of continuous,
efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary; Provided, That in no case shall the total
salary of each Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is added, exceed the salary of the
Justice or Judge next in rank. [Italics supplied; emphasis and underscoring ours]

We find it undisputed that Justice Salazar-Fernando served as MTC Judge from February 15, 1983 to
July 31, 1987. This service constitutes continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the
Judiciary and, hence, should be included in the computation of her longevity pay.

b. Service as COMELEC Commissioner

We deny, however, the inclusion of Justice Salazar-Fernando’s request to credit her services as
COMELEC Commissioner, from February 14, 1992 to February 14, 1998, as judicial service for
longevity pay purposes.

The only service recognized for purposes of longevity pay under Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 is
service in the Judiciary, not service in any other branch of government. The CO MELEC is an agency
independent of the Judiciary; hence, service in this agency cannot be considered as service rendered
in the Judiciary.

We find Justice Salazar-Fernando’s invocation of the case of Justice Pardo, to support her claim to
longevity pay, misplaced.

b.1. Our Pardo Ruling

In In Re: Request of Justice Bernardo P. Pardo for Adjustment of His Longevity Pay, 15 we held that
the inclusion of Justice Pardo’s service in the COMELEC in the computation of his longevity pay upon
his retirement was predicated on the factual circumstances peculiar to him: he was an incumbent CA
Justice when he was appointed COMELEC Chairman, and was appointed to the Supreme Court after
his service with the COMELEC, without any interruption in his service .

The Court ― based on its reading of Section 3 of B.P. Blg. 129 16 ― did not consider his intervening
service in the COMELEC, an office outside the Judiciary, as a disruption of his service in the
Judiciary.

Notably, the Court in In Re: Justice Pardo liberally interpreted the phrase "the Court" in Section 3 of
BP 129 to mean the entire judiciary, not just the Court of Appeals. The provision reads:
Any member who is reappointed to the Court after rendering service in any other position in the
government shall retain precedence to which he was entitled under his original appointment, and his
service in the Court shall, for all intents and purposes , be considered as continuous and
uninterrupted. (emphases supplied)

This provision was an amendment to Section 3 of BP 129 which, as originally worded, referred only to
the organization of the CA, the appointment process of its justices, and the means by which seniority
of rank is determined among the CA justices. Executive Order No. 33 added this phrase, and hence
Section 3 now reads as:

Sec. 3. Organization. There is hereby created a Court of Appeals which shall consist of a Presiding
Justice and fifty Associate Justices who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines. The
Presiding Justice shall be so designated in hi s appointment, and the Associate Justice shall have
precedence according to the dates of their respective appointments, or when the appointments of two
or more of them shall bear the same date, according to the order in which their appointments were
issued by the President. Any member w ho is reappointed to the Court after rendering in any other
position in the government shall retain the precedence to which he was entitled under his original
appointment, and his service in the Court shall, for all intents and purposes, be considered as
continuous and uninterrupted.

Thus, had the Court given a more literal interpretation of the phrase added by EO No. 33,then it
would have interpreted its application to refer to an incumbent CA justice only. The phrase, after all,
had been added to Section 3 of BP 129, which referred to the organization of the CA. Following this
interpretation, Justice Pardo’s service in the COMELEC would not have been appreciated in
determining his longevity pay, as he was reappointed not to the CA, but to the Supreme Court.

Instead, the Court, taking a more liberal approach, interpreted the phrase "the Court" to mean the
entire judiciary. It noted that the additional phrase in Section 3 used the generic word "Court" instead
of Court of Appeals, and that to apply the stricter application of interpreting "Court" to mean "Court of
Appeals" would "lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the
lawmakers."

Thus, following this more liberal approach, Justice Pardo’s one-time service outside of the judiciary
was considered part of his service in the judiciary for purposes of determining hi s longevity pay. The
same may be applied, for instance, to a trial court judge who rendered service outside the judiciary
and then returned to being a member of the bench.

Thus, the Court’s ruling in In Re: Justice Pardo is authority for expanding EO No. 33’s amendment to
Section 3 of BP 129 to all members of the judiciary.

b.2. The liberal Pardo ruling cannot and should not be extended to allow members of the
judiciary to leave and return more than once, without interrupting the continuity of their
service.

The next question to be asked, then, refers to the frequency by which members of the judiciary may
be able to serve in other branches of government without breaking their ‘continuo us and
uninterrupted’ service. Did the ruling in Justice Pardo’s case allow members of the judiciary to leave
for other branches of government numerous times, and still maintain continuous and uninterrupted
service in the judiciary? The answer to this question is a resounding no.

A critical aspect of Justice Pardo’s case was the absence of any gap in his service from the time he
was appointed as Caloocan City Judge in 1974, until he retired as an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court in 2002. He occupied the positions of District Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch 34, Caloocan City, from May 3, 1974 to January 17, 1983; Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
43, Manila, from January 18, 1983 to March 29, 1993; Associate Justice of the CA, from March 30,
1993 to February 16,

1995; Chairman, COMELEC, from February 17, 1995 to October 6, 1998; and Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court, from October 7, 1998 to February 10, 2002.

In these lights, Justice Pardo’s case has nothing to offer by way of jurisprudential precedent in terms
of determining whether Section 3 of BP 129 allows judges and justices to leave the judiciary several
times without breaking their continuous service. There was no occasion to rule on this issue, as
Justice Pardo left the judiciary only once, to serve in the COMELEC.

Proceeding from this conclusion, the next level of inquiry leads us to examine whether Section 3 of
BP 129 allows multiple breaks in judicial office and considers these breaks as part of a continuous
and uninterrupted judicial service.

The amendment to Section 3, as worded and interpreted in In Re: Justice Pardo , refers to the
reappointment of a member of the judiciary after serving in another branch of government. The judge
shall retain the precedence to which he was entitled under his original appointment, and his judicial
service shall be considered uninterrupted.

This service outside the judiciary, however, should only occur once, as in Justice Pardo’s case.
Section 3 refers to an original appointment , which is the first appointment by which a lawyer
becomes a member of the judiciary. As he progresses in the judiciary ― whether by staying in his
original post or by being appointed in other posts ― he acquires seniority, which is especially
applicable in determining his retirement and longevity pay. Once he leaves the judiciary, however, his
original appointment is cut off; hence, Section 3 can only refer to the judge’s return to the judiciary as
a "reappointment." He needs to get re-appointed back to the judiciary, as he is no longer part of it.

Section 3 works to bridge the gap between the time the judge left his original appointment and his
reappointment to the judiciary, provided the gap in service was rendered in another branch of
government. Once reappointed to the judiciary, however, he can no longer avail of Section 3, as
Section 3 speaks of an original appointment. A second reappointment, after another service in a
different government agency, would be succeeding the first reappointment, and not the original
appointment. Section 3 operates to bridge an original appointment with a reappointment, and not to
connect a reappointment with a second appointment. Had the latter interpretation been the intent
behind the law, then it should and would have made this situation clearer.

Further, the application of Section 3 appears to be limited to service in a single position in

government outside of the judiciary. Section 3 speaks of "any other position in the government," and
thus uses a singular noun. After this single service, the judge or justice invoking the application of
Section 3 must have returned to the judiciary in order for his service to be deemed uninterrupted.

Additionally, it must not be lost on us that we have already given Section 3 a liberal interpretation
in In Re: Justice Pardo. To top this exercise of liberality with another liberal interpretation of the same
provision, when the law is clear regarding its application, would amount to judicial legislation that
furthers the interests within our ranks.

To recapitulate, Section 3 applies to any judge or justice, who left the judiciary, served in a single
non-judicial governmental post, and returned to the judiciary. This was what happened in the case of
Justice Pardo, when after a long and continuous service in the judiciary, he left to serve in the
COMELEC and from there was subsequently appointed to the Supreme Court.

b.3. Justice Fernando is not entitled to her request even under the liberal Pardo ruling.

Justice Salazar-Fernando effectively asks us in her present case to give her the benefit of our Pardo
ruling although the attendant facts of her case differ from those of Justice Pardo’s and do not
approximate the factual situation that Section 3 requires.

In the first place, her record shows that her services in between her judicial services were not
continuous and uninterrupted.

We find that after Justice Salazar-Fernando’s stint as MTC Judge in July 1987, she was named
Chairman of the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) where she served
from August 1987 to February 13, 1992. During this period, she concurrently held directorship posts
at the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and at the Office of Transport Cooperatives (OTC). In the
later part of 1991,Justice Salazar-Fernando held the position of Officer-in-Charge/Assistant Secretary
of the Land Transportation Office.

It was only after Justice Salazar-Fernando’s stints at the LTFRB, LRTA, and OTC all non-judicial
offices that she was appointed as Commissioner of the COMELEC on February 14, 1992, and served
in this capacity until February 15, 1998. Three (3) days later, or on February 18, 1998, she started to
serve as a consultant in the COMELEC until October 6, 1998.

Parenthetically, her service as consultant is not a "position in government" that should be considered
a part of her government service as she did not occupy any specific position in government.
Moreover, it was only five (5) months after her COMELEC consultancy, or on March 25, 1999, that
Justice Salazar-Fernando was appointed as Associate Justice of the CA. Thus, significant gaps in her
judicial service intervened so that her situation did not comply with the requirement in Section 3 that
only a single non-judicial position should intervene in her judicial service record.

Reduced to the bare essentials, the issue for us is whether we should apply with liberality a ruling that
had already been very liberally interpreted by this Court, under facts that do not entitle Justice
Fernando to recognition of continuous service under the requirements of Section 3.

Our brief and direct answer is that we cannot and must not allow the crediting of Justice Salazar
Fernando’ s COMELEC service for longevity pay purposes. Acceding to her request will constitute an
outright judicial legislation that the Court cannot undertake under the Constitution. As earlier noted,
Justice Salazar-Fernando’s de tails do not at all approximate the factual circumstances Section 3 of
BP 129 that speaks of, nor the factual situation in In Re: Justice Pardo.

If we had been liberal in the past and this liberal ruling is now cited, we should, at the very least, not
go beyond the facts under which our past liberality had been extended. If we further read liberally a
Court ruling that only came to being because of past liberality, we stand to hear a re-echo of the
charge that this Court selectively applies its liberality in favor of its own . (In fact, a favorable ruling in
these consolidated cases may already raise eyebrows and questions as the Court will be ruling on
matters that will directly affect some of its participating Members .)

To sum up, Justice Salazar-Fernando’s services as COMELEC Commissioner cannot be included in

the computation of her longevity pay, now or upon her retirement .

II. Letter-Request of Justice Gacutan in A.M. No. 12-9-5-SC

 a. Longevity Pay for Services as NLRC Commissioner

We deny Justice Gacutan’s request that her past services in the NLRC be recognized for purposes of
her longevity pay. She served as a Commissioner IV of the NLRC from March 3, 1998 to November
5, 2009, or for a period of eleven years and eight months.

Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 is clear and explicit: a judge or justice should have rendered five years of
continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the Judiciary in order to qualify for a monthly longevity
pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay.

We point out that the NLRC is an agency attached to the Department of Labor and Employment – an
adjunct of the Executive Department – albeit for policy and program coordination only. Under the
circumstances, Justice Gacutan’s past service as NLRC Commissioner cannot be credited as judicial
service for longevity pay purposes since she did not render such service while with the Judiciary.

b. NLRC Services Considered in Retirement Pay

Nonetheless, Justice Gacutan’s service as NLRC Commissioner is creditable as part of overall

government service for retirement purposes under RA 910, as amended. Section 1 of this law
provides:

Section 1. When a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals who has rendered at least
twenty years' service either in the judiciary or in any other branch of the Government, or in both, (a)
retires for having attained the age of seventy y ears, or (b) resigns by reason of his incapacity to
discharge the duties of his office, he shall receive during the residue of his natural life, in the manner
hereinafter provided, the salary which he was receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation.
And when a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals has attained the age of fifty-
seven years and has rendered at least twenty years' service in the Government, ten or more of which
have been continuously rendered as such Justice or as judge of a court of record, he shall be likewise
entitled to retire and receive during the residue of his natural life, in the manner also hereinafter
prescribed, the salary which he was then receiving. It is a condition of the pension provided for herein
that no retiring Justice during the time that he is receiving said pension shall appear as counsel
before any court in any civil case wherein the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof is the adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the
Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office, or collect any fee for his
appearance in any administrative proceedings to maintain an interest adverse to the Government,
insular, provincial or municipal, or to any of its legally constituted officers.

Considering the express wordings of RA 910, which include service "in all other branches of the
Government" as creditable service in the computation of the retirement benefits of a justice or judge,
Justice Gacutan’s service as NL RC Commissioner should be credited as part of her government
service for retirement purposes under RA 910, as amended.

III. Motion for Reconsideration of Justice Veloso in A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA

a. Background.

The chairman and members of the NLRC were entitled to receive an annual salary at least equivalent
to the allowances and benefits of the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the CA,
respectively, prior to the amendment of Article 216 of the Labor Code by RA 9347 .
Under RA 9347 (which took effect on August 26, 2006), 17 NLRC commissioners were given the
equivalent rank of a CA Justice. The Labor Code, as now amended by Section 4 of RA 9347, reads:

Article 216. Salaries, Benefits and Emoluments. The Chairman and members of the Commission
shall have the same rank , receive an annual salary equivalent to, and be entitled to the same
allowances, retirement and benefits as those of the Presiding and Associate Justices of the Court of
Appeals, respectively. [italics supplied, emphasis ours]

In his present motion, Justice Veloso claims that RA 9347 should be given a retroactive application.
With the equivalent rank of a CA Justice from the time RA 9347 was amended, his service as NLRC
Commissioner should be considered as judicial service for purposes of his longevity pay.

b. Our ruling and the reasons therefore

b.1. RA 9347 does not provide for retroactivity.

We disagree with Justice Veloso’s position and thus deny his motion.

First, nothing in the language of RA 9347 expressly indicates the intention to give it retroactive effect.
We emphasize that statutes, as a rule, apply prospectively, unless the legislative intention to give
them retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. 18 In
"case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the retroactive effect." 19

Nor is retroactivity discernible, even by implication, from the provisions of RA 9347. It is not implied
from the law’s legislative intent, nor from the deliberations in Senate Bill No. 2035 (which became RA
9347).20

In Re: Request of Retired Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo T. Ponferrada for Automatic
Adjustment of His Retirement Benefits to Include Special Allowance Under R.A. 9227, 21 the Court
refused to extend the benefits provided by RA 9227 to official s of the Judiciary who retired prior to
the passage of this law. RA 9227 granted a special allowance to justices, judges, and all other
positions in the Judiciary with the equivalent rank of justices of the CA or judges of the RTC. Since
the position of Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) carries the same rank as an Associate Justice of
the CA,22 retired DCA Ponferrada asked for the inclusion of the RA 9227 special allowance in his
retirement pay.

The Court denied the request, noting that RA 9227 did not expressly provide for retroactivity so that
those who had retired at the time of its enactment would be covered. Although the grant was
extended to retired SC and CA justices, this was justified under Section 3-A of RA 910, as amended,
which states:

SEC. 3-A. In case the salary of Justices of the Supreme Court or of the Court Appeals is increased or
decreased, salary shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the salary or the retirement
pension which a Justice x x x who retired was receiving at the time of his cessation in the office:
Provided, That any benefits that have already accrued prior to such increase or decrease shall not be
affected thereby.23 [underscore ours]

According to the Court, parity in rank and salary does not automatically mean parity in retirement
benefits under Section 3-A of RA 910. Notably, the automatic adjustment of retirement benefits was
expressly extended by RA 910, as amended, but only to Justices of the SC and the CA, not to judicial
officials with the equivalent rank. Additionally, since he retired prior to the passage of RA 9227, DCA
Ponferrada could not even invoke the automatic adjustment of his retirement pay under Section 3-A
of RA No. 910, as amended, to support his request. 24

In the same way, RA 9347 was en acted into law only on July 27, 2006. Justice Veloso had, by then
(on February 4, 2004) left his post as NLRC Commissioner to assume the position of Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals. In the absence of any clear intent to give RA 9347 any retroactive
effect, Justice Veloso cannot validly claim that he held the rank of a CA justice during his stint as
NLRC Commissioner from 1989 to 2004.

b.2. RA 9347 is not a curative statute.

"A curative statute is enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings,
instruments or acts of public authorities[,] which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with
certain existing legal requirements."25Simply put, curative laws are enacted to validate acts done that
otherwise would be invalid under existing laws.

RA 9347 is not a curative statute since it was not intended to supply deficiencies, abridge superfluities
in existing laws, or curb evils; the insertion of the word "rank" in Article 216 was merely to emphasize
the increase in salaries and benefits of the NLRC Commissioners and labor arbiters.

b.3. Grant of Equivalent Rank is not Service in the Judiciary

At any rate, even if we recognize retroactivity as requested, the conferment of the rank of a CA
Justice to Justice Veloso during his tenure as NLRC Commissioner would not entitle him to longevity
pay.

Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 is clear: a judge or justice shall be paid a monthly longevity pay equivalent
to 5% of the monthly basic pay for each five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service
rendered in the Judiciary. Service in the NLRC, even with the rank of a CA Justice, is not service with
the Judiciary for purposes of longevity pay. Justice Veloso’s service in the NLRC, however, m ay be
credited as part of his government service for retirement purposes under RA 910, as in the case of
Justice Gacutan .

IV. General Discussions

With each of the consolidated petitions directly ruled upon, the following discussions are submitted to
expound on the conclusions reached and to generally comment on the issues the Dissents raised.

At the core of the issues raised is the question: should the past service of incumbent justices and
judges, rendered at the Executive Department, be recognized under Section 42 of BP 129 ( the
longevity pay provision ) on the ground that their previous executive positions now carry the rank,
salary, and benefits of their counterparts in the Judiciary?

The law governing this issue is of course the longevity pay provision, heretofore quoted, 26 whose
salient points are summarized below:

1. The longevity pay is a monthly pay equivalent to 5% of monthly basic pay;

2. Recipients are the Justices and Judges of courts;

3. For each five years of continuous, efficient and meritorious service;

 4. The service is to be rendered in the Judiciary;

5. In no case shall the total salary of each Justice or Judge, after his longevity pay is added,
exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank.

What would otherwise be a simple stand-alone provision is complicated by subsequent laws that
grant the same ranks, salaries and benefits.

- "as those of" their counterpart judge or justice (for the National Prosecution Service), or

- "as those of the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals (for the
National Labor Relations Commission), and

- the [ "rank, prerogatives, salaries, allowances, benefits and privileges"] as their counterpart
Justice or Judge (for the Office of the Solicitor General).

These new levels of rank and salary are essentially what the present petitioners and the incumbent
justices and judges cite as basis for the grant or increase of their longevity pay.

Another complicating factor involves the past rulings of this Court where past executive service had
been recognized, not only for retirement pay purposes, but for longevity pay purposes upon
retirement. Interestingly, no in-depth look appears to have been made in these past rulings, although
their results cannot be in doubt ― the Court recognized past executive services for longevity pay
purposes.

Interestingly, the Dissents, led by Justice De Castro, take a multi-pronged critique of the ponencia
generally chastising it for being overly strict in its reading of Section 42.

Among others, she posits that the ponencia disregards long established rulings of the Court on
longevity pay without a clear finding of the legal error made, and disregards as well the liberal
interpretation the Court has applied in these rulings; that the ponencia disregards too the intent of the
relevant laws (referring to the subsequent laws that grants ranks, salaries and benefits similar to
those of their counterparts in the Judiciary), the legal presumption of legislative awareness, and
consideration of prior laws and jurisprudence in enacting a statute; and claims that the
contemporaneous construction given by the Department of Justice and other Executive branch
officers, which disc loses a similar treatment of the longevity pay provision of Section 42, de serves
the court’s respect. Last but not the least, Justice De Castro analyzes Section 42 and concludes that
longevity pay is not a mere benefit but is a component of the salary that should not be withheld from
executive officers with the same rank, salary and benefits as their counterparts in the Judiciary.

For his part, Justice Velasco essentially joins the Dissent of Justice De Castro and questions the
ponencia’s proposal to "freeze" the longevity pay grants for justices and judges who have been
credited with their past service in the Executive Department. He posits too that "what matters is their
receiving, for purposes of computing longevity pay, the salary of a Justice of the CA at the time they
served as NLRC Commissioners." If this is the case, Justice Veloso claims they should be credited
with their service with the NLRC for purposes of their longevity pay.

Faced with these complications and dissents, the Court should not forget that our duty, first and
foremost, is to correctly interpret the law as written, not to stick to our past rulings at all costs nor to
consider our personal interests. In doing this, we must also be reminded that at the center of the
dispute is Section 42 of BP 129 – the provision on longevity pay that we must consider with a fresh
eye.
The consolidated cases, too, do not embody claims by executive officers against their own
Department for the enforcement of what the law involving their Department provides. These cases
involve claims by CA justices – members of the Judiciary – who look up to laws involving the
Executive Department to secure, maintain or increase the longevity pay that provides benefit for
judges and justices. Our primary focus, however, must be the interpretation of our own law ― BP 129
and its Section 42.

A. Statutory Construction & Interpretation Perspectives

a. First rule of statutory construction: the plain meaning rule.

The primary rule in addressing any problem relating to the understanding or interpretation of a law (in
this case, the provision granting longevity pay) is to examine the law itself to see what it plainly says.
This is the plain meaning rule of statutory construction. 27

The first aspect that offers itself in the examination of the law is its title, which gives us a direct
indicator of the exact subject matter of the law. In the present cases, the law under which the
disputed longevity provision can be found is B.P. Blg. 129, An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefore and For Other Purposes (simplified as BP 129 or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980).

This title alone already suggests that its provisions specifically relate to members of the judiciary,
unless an express contrary intent is made by the legislature. No such exception clause is evident
under the terms of BP 129 or in any of the other related laws (specifically, in R. A. 9347, 9417, and
10071) discussed in this ponencia .

As discussed more extensively below, these other general laws do not specifically mention at all the
longevity provision under BP 129, a specific grant made only to the judges and justices in the
Judiciary.

Section 42 of this law has heretofore been quoted, but for convenience is again quoted below –

Section 42. Longevity pay . – A monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay shall
be paid to the Justices and Judges of the courts herein created for each five years of continuous,
efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary ; Provided , That in no case shall the total
salary of each Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is added, exceed the salary of the
Justice or Judge next in rank. [italics supplied; emphasis and underscore ours ]

As written, the language and terms of this provision are very clear and unequivocal: longevity pay is
granted to a judge or justice (and to none other) who has rendered five years of continuous, efficient
and meritorious service in the Judiciary. The granted monthly longevity pay is equivalent to 5% of the
monthly basic pay.

The plain reading of Section 42 shows that longevity pay is not available even to a judicial officer who
is not a judge or justice. It is likewise not available, for greater reason, to an officer in the Executive
simply because he or she is not serving as a judge or justice. It cannot also be available t o a judge or
justice for past services he or she did not render within the Judiciary as services rendered outside the
Judiciary for purposes of longevity pay is not contemplated by law.

Significantly, the Court has had occasion to speak about the purpose of longevity pay. In In Re:
Request of Justice Bernardo P. Pardo for Adjustment of His Longevity Pay, 28 the Court categorically
declared that the purpose of the law in granting longevity pay to judges and justices is to recompense
them for each five y ears of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the Judiciary; it
is the long service in the Judiciary - from the lowest to the highest court of the land – and not in any
other branch of government, that is rewarded, 29

In the case of the judge or justice now asking for the tacking of his/her past executive service, the
reason for the denial is simple and needs no intricate or complicated exercise in interpretation: these
past services were undertaken outside the Judiciary and are not the services the law contemplates.
The tacking, to put it bluntly, violates the clear purpose and wording of Section 42 of BP 129.

To look at Section 42 from another perspective, if indeed (as some would argue) the intent is to grant
executive officers longevity pay pursuant to their respective grants of benefits similar to that provided
under Section 42 of BP 129, this presumed grant should be understood to be limited to the executive
officer’s continued, efficient and meritorious service in the Executive Department, to be given while
the executive officer is still with that department.

When the public officer with equivalent rank, salary and benefits transfers to the Judiciary , the
longevity pay to which he may have been entitled under the law applicable to his previous Executive
Department position, and which he may have been receiving because of his continued service in that
department, will simply have to be disregarded and discontinued.

At the point of transfer, Section 42 of BP 129 will now apply and operate, and will require five (5)
years of continued and efficient service in the Judiciary before it can start to be earned. This
application may sound hard and illiberal, but this is the logical consequence of the combined effect of
the Judiciary’s BP 129 longevity provision and the laws granting parity to benefits applicable to the
Judiciary.

To reiterate for emphasis, for a transferring public official, now a new justice or judge, to be entitled to
longevity pay under the terms of Section 42, he must first render continued, efficient and meritorious
service in the Judiciary for at least five years; his prior continued service in his previous department
will not and should not be counted.

b. The general laws that the Dissents cite cannot prevail over a specific law.

General laws (such as Republic Act Nos. [RA] 9347, 9417, and 10071) that generally grant the same
ranks, salaries and benefits to public officers in the Executive Department as those of their specified
counterparts in the Judiciary, cannot prevail over a special law such as BP 129 that specifically grants
longevity pay solely to justices and judges who have rendered five (5) years of continuous, efficient,
and meritorious service rendered in the Judiciary.

A basic principle of statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a general law. 30 A later
enactment like RA 9347 and RA 10071 cannot override BP 129 because the latter, as a special law,
must prevail regardless of the dates of the enactment of these other laws. 31

As we held in Hon. Bagatsing v. Judge Ramirez,32 a general provision must give way to a particular
provision. As a special provision on the grant of longevity pay, Section 42 of BP 129 governs and is
controlling; to hold otherwise, as the dissent suggests, is to violate its clear mandate.

Following the rule on general and special laws, the general laws granting the same salaries and
benefits cannot apply to the longevity pay provision that, by its specific and express terms, is solely
for the benefit of judges and justices who have shown loyal service to the Judiciary; it is not for those
who have been granted similar ranks, salaries and benefits as those of their counterpart judges and
justices. That they cannot be beneficiaries of longevity pay is clinched by its purpose – the reward is
intended for those with loyal service to the Judiciary.

c. Is there room for liberality in reading and interpreting Section 42?

As a general rule and contrary to the Dissent’s view, no room or occasion exists for any liberal
construction or interpretation; only the application of the letter of the law is required by basic statutory
construction principles.

We should not forget that liberality is not a magic wand that can ward off the clear terms and import of
express legal provisions; it has a place only when, between two positions that the law can both
accommodate, the Court chooses the more expansive or more generous option. It has no place
where no choice is available at all because the terms of the law are clear and do not at all leave room
for discretion.

In terms of the longevity pay’s purpose, liberality has no place where service is not to the Judiciary,
as the element of loyalty – the virtue that longevity pay rewards – is not at all present.

We cannot overemphasize too that the policy of liberal construction cannot and should not be to the
point of engaging in judicial legislation – an act that the Constitution absolutely forbids this Court to
do. We may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute or include, under its
terms, situations that were not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. We cannot rewrite the law to
conform to what we think should be the law.

In the present case, where the law is clear, we should likewise be clear and decisive in its application
lest we be accused of favoritism or accommodating former colleagues, or indirectly, ourselves, who
will all inevitably retire from our judicial posts.

d. Administrative construction is merely advisory and is not binding upon the courts.

We take exception to the Dissent’s invocation of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction to

support its expansive reading of RA 9347 in relation with Section 42 of BP 129.

The Dissent conveniently fails to mention that contemporaneous constructions of administrative or

executive agencies are merely at best advisory and not binding on the courts, for by the Constitution
and the law, the courts are given the task of finally determining what the law means. 33

We do so under our authority to state what the law is 34 and deference to an agency’s statutory
interpretation should be withheld whenever it conflicts with the language of the statute, as in the
present case.

In Peralta v. Civil Service Commission,35 the Court had occasion to state and held:

Administrative construction, if we may repeat, is not necessarily binding upon the courts. Action of an
administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of
law, or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either
the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment.

Thus, while the Executive possesses discretion in the implementation of laws, we should not forget
the reason for the Judiciary’s existence. We are the interpreters of the law and the Constitution, not
the Executive, and when a legal error exists, we must step in and intervene, however long and hard
the Executive’s previous implementation of the law had been.

e. The question of Judicial Legislation

Judicial legislation, in simplest terms, happens when the Court adds to what the law provides and
does so in the guise of interpretation, as the present dissents now want to do by seeking to tack and
to credit, for longevity pay purposes, the past services that justices and judges rendered in the
Executive Department.

In fact, in their discussions, the Dissents take the view that the ponencia has engaged in judicial
legislation because it restricts the concept of salary merely to the "basic pay."

This Resolution does, in fact, reflect the views imputed to it and it has not been shy or hesitant from
the very start in taking this position. But rather than being narrow and illiberal in doing this, we believe
that our position hews to the letter of the law so that our stance cannot be the basis for the charge of
judicial legislation.

Judicial legislation in fact transpires when the Court reads into the law an interpretation that the four
corners of that law cannot b ear. This expansive interpretation – i.e., that the term "salary" under
Section 42 includes longevity pay so that equivalency of "salary" translates to the mandatory
recognition of longevity pay – is unfortunately what the dissents espouse, driven perhaps by thoughts
of what the law ought to be.

What "ought to be" as a matter of policy is not within the jurisdiction of this Court to decide upon. The
Court eloquently spoke in Canet v. Mayor Decena about this judicial limit, albeit in the context of
discussing the maxim expression unius est exclusio alterius (literally, what is expressed puts an end
to what is implied). The Court said:36

In other words, it is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one person,
thing, act, or consequence excludes all others, as expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expressio
unius est exlusio alterius. Elsewise stated, expressium facit cessare tacitum – what is expressed puts
an end to what is implied. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislative body would not
have made specific enumerations in a statute, if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and
confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an omission, neither
could the Court presume otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a legislative lacuna
cannot be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the
scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An
omission at the time of the enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied
however after later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert into the
law what they think should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if
its attention has been called to the omission.

Courts should not, by construction, revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislature,
nor rewrite the law to conform with what they think should be the law. Nor may they interpret into the
law a requirement which the law does not prescribe. Where a statute contains no limitations in its
operation or scope, courts should not engraft any. And where a provision of law expressly limits its
application to certain transactions, it cannot be extended to other transactions by interpretation. To do
any of such things would be to do violence to the language of the law and to invade the legislative
sphere. [emphases ours]
Applied to the present consolidated cases, we cannot go beyond the terms of Section 42 by
expanding its terms to what it does not include: when the law speaks of service "in the Judiciary," it
means what it says and cannot include service outside the Judiciary. To relate this to the statutory
construction rule discussed above give n the express and clear terms of the law, the basic rule to
apply is: "legislative intent is to be determined from the language employed, and where there is no
ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction." 37

B. The Grant of Rank, Benefits and their Implications

a. Judicial Rank and Executive Rank.

The grant of a "rank" equivalent to (or even "the same as" ) "those of the" grantee’s counterpart judge
or justice is a matter that has not been the subject of extensive jurisprudential c overage. Hence, the
subject of this Resolution proceeds on a path that so far remains untrodden. The novelty of the issue
posed need not deter us as the matters before us call for resolution and should be written about if
only to serve as guides for the future.

The Judiciary recognizes the ranks that the law accords to judges and justices. These judicial ranks
wholly pertain to the Judiciary as an independent, separate and co-equal branch of government.
Under our current constitutional set-up, no legislative or executive grant, fiat or recognition of rank
can make the grantee, who is not a judge or justice, a judicial officer, without violating the
constitutional principles of separation of powers and independence of the Judiciary.

As a consequence, the grant of rank at the same level as the grantees’ counterpart judges or justices
is not and cannot be a conferment of "judicial rank" and does not thereby accord the grantees
recognition as members of the Judiciary. For incumbent judges and justices who had previous
government service outside the Judiciary , it follows that the grant of rank to them under their old
executive positions does not render their service in these previous positions equivalent to and
creditable as judicial service, unless Congress by law says otherwise and only for purposes of
entitlement to salaries and benefits.

To be sure, Congress can create and recognize ranks outside of the Judiciary that are equivalent to
the ranks it has created for the Judiciary, but again, this recognition doe s not thereby create "judicial
ranks" outside of the Judiciary, nor constitute the grantees of these ranks as judges and justices.
Technically, what Congress creates or grants are executive ranks that are equivalent to judicial ranks.

Notably, even for those within the Judiciary itself, the recognition of "judicial rank" in favor of those
who are not justices or judges does not thereby make the grantee a justice or a judge who is entitled
to this formal title; the grantee may be entitled to the benefits of the rank but he/she remains an
administrative official in the Judiciary, separate and distinct from the justices and judges who directly
exercise judicial power, singly or collegially.

b. Commonalities and Divergence of Terms and Conditions of Government Service.

The principle of separation of powers between the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches of
government ordains that each of these three (3) great branches of government has exclusive
cognizance of, and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. 38

Each branch cannot invade the domain of the others. 39 This principle presupposes mutual respect by
and between the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial departments and entitles them to be left alone to
discharge their assigned duties as they see fit. 40
We generally draw attention to this constitutional principle to emphasize that while all officials in the
three branches of government are government officials, vast differences may exist in the terms and
conditions of their government service; these are ultimately traceable to the separation of power
principle.

Government officials perform specifically assigned functions peculiar to their respective departments
and these functions justify their differing terms and conditions of government service. In the context of
the present consolidated cases, distinctions must necessarily exist between one who is appointed to
the position of a judge or justice, (which position carries law-defined salaries, benefits, and conditions
specific to judges and justices), and one who is appointed to an executive position with the equivalent
rank, salary or benefits of a justice or judge in the Judiciary.

The extent to which those with equivalent executive and judicial ranks have commonalities or diverge
in their salaries and benefits is a matter that the Constitution leaves, within limits, to the discretion of
the Legislature as a matter of policy. What is important to recognize is the legal reality that the
divergence of salaries and benefits across government, even among those with equivalent ranks, is
not at all unusual because these positions belong to different branches of government and undertake
functions peculiar to their departments.

A convenient example to cite is the allowance benefit that members of the Office of the Solicitor
General are given as peculiarly their own – honoraria and allowances from client departments,
agencies and instrumentalities.41 Members of the Judiciary do not enjoy these same benefits.

On the part of the Judiciary, the disputed longevity pay also serves as a good example. By its terms,
longevity pay is peculiar to the Judiciary as discussed above. Significantly, in all the cited laws that
grant similarity of ranks, salaries, and benefits between executive officials and their counterparts in
the Judiciary, no mention at all is made of longevity pay and its enjoyment outside the Judiciary.
Longevity pay, of course, is not unique as a feature of judicial life that is wholly the Judiciary’s own;
there are other benefits that the Judiciary enjoys – by law, by rule or by practice – that are not
replicated in the executive agencies, in the same manner that there are benefits in executive
agencies that the Judiciary does not share.

In this sense, it approximates the absurd to claim that the grant of the "same" benefits to executive
officials with the "same" rank should encompass all the benefits that the comparator judge or justice
enjoys.

b.1. The Question of Fairness.

A tempting question to raise when comparisons are made across branches of government and when
equivalency of salaries and benefits comes into focus, is the essential fairness, or lack of it, that
results or should result.

The Judiciary, for example, may raise the point – if we are the comparators and all our benefits
should be enjoyed by the Solicitors, is there no resulting unfairness because no la w grants the
Judiciary the same privilege of enjoying the benefits that the Office of the Solicitor General enjoys?

To be sure, unfairness may factually result, but this is not a matter for the Judiciary to examine in the
absence of a case where this factual issue is raised and is relevant. Nor is there any indefensible
inequality as a matter of law viewed from the prism of the legal measuring standard ― the equal
protection clause. Notably, the Judiciary and the Executive Department belong to different branches
of government whose roles and functions in government differ as pointed out above. Thus, ground/s
for distinctions may exist that render any seeming unfairness not legally objectionable.
If the issue of unfairness will surface at all, this would transpire when the terms of the longevity
provision under BP 129 would be disregarded, i.e., if longevity pay would be recognized in favor of
the NLRC, the prosecutors and the solicitors under the terms of their respective laws, when longevity
pay – by the express terms fashioned out by Congress – should be granted only to those who have
served continuous, efficient, and meritorious service in the judiciary.

Similarly unfair would be the tacking of previous services outside of the Judiciary rendered by judges
and justices, incumbent or retired, for purposes of longevity pay under Section 42. Of course, the
main issue in this situation would be legality, but this situation, to our mind, is one that is both illegal
and unfair. Unfairness comes in because of the grant of what is not legally due.

D. The Salary and Longevity Pay

a. The Applicable Law on Salary

An examination of BP 129 shows that its Section 41 treats of "salaries" of judges, while Section 42
provides for longevity pay.

Under Section 41, the "salaries" or compensation (and allowances) that judges shall receive shall be
the amount that the President may authorize following the guidelines set fort h in Letter of
Implementation (LOI) No. 93, pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 985, as amended by PD
1597.

PD 985, as amended by PD 1597, implemented a position classification and compensation

standardization scheme (Scheme) :

(1) under which positions are classified by occupational groups, series and classes according
to the similarities or differences in duties, responsibilities, and qualification requirements; and

(2) by which the rates of pay for each of the positions and employee groups/classes are
determined according to the salary and wage schedules fixed by the Decree to be uniformly
app lied to all belonging to a particular position.

Under Section 4 of PD 985, this position classification and compensation standardization scheme
shall apply to all positions in the national government, that under PD 1597’s amendment now includes
the justices and judges in the Judiciary.

Section 11 of PD 985 provides for the "Salary Schedule " under the compensation system for
positions pa id on annual or monthly basis. The Schedule consists of twenty-eight grades with each
grade having eight prescribed steps. Each grade represents a level of work difficulty and
responsibility that distinguishes it from the other grades in the Schedule. Each class of position in the
Position Classification System is assigned a "salary grade" and determines the position’s salary
rate.42

Under the Scheme, every covered position receives a "salary" or compensation corresponding to the
position’s "salary grade" under the "Salary Schedule." Otherwise stated, all covered positions or
employees belonging to a particular "salary grade," regardless of the department, bureau, office, etc.,
to which they belong, shall receive the same "salary rate," expressed as annual, in pesos, as fixed
under the "Salary Schedule" (subject to certain salary rate increments for each step within each
salary grade). In short, a particular "salary grade" equates to a specific, fixed "salary rate."
Prior to its amendment by PD 1597, Section 4 of PD 985 exempted from the position classification
and compensation standardization scheme the following positions or group of government officials
and employees: (1) elected officers and those whose compensation is fixed by the Constitution; (2)
heads of executive departments and officials of equivalent rank: (3) chiefs of diplomatic missions,
ministers, and Foreign Service officers; (4) Justices and Judges of the Judicial Department; (5)
members of the armed forces; (6) heads and assistant heads of GOCCs, including the senior
management and technical positions; (7) heads of state universities and colleges; (8) positions in the
career executive service; and (9) provincial, city, municipal and other local government officials and
employees. The salaries or compensation and allowances of these exempted positions are those to
be authorized by the President.

Pursuant to PD 985’s mandate, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Letter of Implementation
(L OI 93) adopting an integrated compensation scheme for positions in the Judiciary. In almost the
same fashion as PD 985, Para graph 3.0 of LOI 93 enumerated the various positions in the Judicial
Component of the Judiciary, i.e., Justices and Judges of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals,
Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, Court of Agrarian Relations, the First and Second Level
Courts, the Clerks of Court of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and the corresponding
"salary rates" for each position, expressed as annual, in pesos.

With PD 1597’s amendment, those previously exempted positions, i.e., Justices and Judges of the
Judicial Department, are now included in the coverage of Section 4 of PD 985. PD 985, as amended
by PD 1597, now limits the exemptions to elected officers; to those whose compensation is fixed by
the Constitution; and to local government officials and employees.

Note that Section 11 of PD 985, as amended by PD 1597, and even Paragraph 3.0 of LOI 93,
provided for fixed "salary rates" for each "salary grade" expressed as annual, in pesos. As matters
now stand, the "salary" or compensation that an employee or a position in the government will receive
is the prevailing "salary rate," fixed under the "Salary Schedule," that corresponds to the employee or
position’s "salary grade."

The "salary rate" as expressed in annual fixed rates, based on the "salary grade" referred to under
LOI 93 pursuant to PD 985, as amended by PD 1597 is the "salary" referred to in Section 41 of BP
129, i.e., an amount or salary rate fixed as annual, in pesos, that is based on the recipient’s salary
grading.

b. Longevity Pay under Section 42.

Section 42 of BP 129 provides for the payment and the manner of computing longevity pay, i.e., to be
paid monthly, based on the recipient’s monthly basic pay at the rate of 5% for each five years of
continuous, efficient and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary. Note that the amount of
longevity pay to which a recipient shall be entitled is not a fixed amount, in contrast with the "salary"
under Section 41; it is a percentage of the recipient’s monthly basic pay which, at the least, is
equivalent to 5%.

Also, the payment of longevity pay is premised on a continued, efficient, and meritorious service: (1)
in the Judiciary; and (2) of at least five years. Long and continued service in the Judiciary is the basis
and reason for the payment of longevity pay; it rewards the loyal and efficient service of the recipient
in the Judiciary.

From these perspectives, longevity pay is both a branch specific (i.e., to the judges and justices of the
Judiciary) and conditional (i.e., due only upon the fulfillment of certain conditions) grant. In negative
terms, it is not an absolute grant that is easily transferrable to other departments of government.
 b.1. Salary and Longevity Pay compared.

In contrast with longevity pay, the "salary" under Section 41 entitles the official or employee to its
receipt from day one (or the first day of the first month) of his service. Its basis or reason for payment
is the actual performance of service or assigned duties, without regard to the months or years the
recipient has been rendering the service.

Note, too, that the service contemplated under Section 42 for entitlement to longevity pay is service in
the judiciary. This intent is clear not only from Section 42’s explicit use of the word "judiciary" to
qualify "service," but also from the title of the statute to which this specific provision belongs, i.e., "The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980." In these lights, the "same salary" that Article 216 of the Labor
Code speaks of and to which the NLRC Commissioners shall be entitled, should be read and
understood as the salary under Section 41 or the "salary rate," as provided under the "Salary
Schedule" that corresponds to the "salary grade" of their counterpart justice or judge. Other laws that
grant other public officers in the executive department with the "same salary" as their counterpart
justice or judge (i.e., RA Nos. 9417 and 10071) should likewise be read and understood in this way.

b.2. Nature of Longevity Pay.

Based on these considerations, longevity pay should be treated as a benefit or an "add-on" and not a
part, let alone an integral component of "salary," contrary to the Dissents’ position.

This consequence necessarily results as "salary" and longevity pay: (1) are treated under different
sections of BP 129; (2) have different bases for determination or computation; and (3) have different
reasons for the payment or grant.

In addition, Section 42 of BP 129 does not categorically state that the monthly longevity pay shall
form part of the "salary" or is an integral or inseparable component of “salary.” Even the most liberal
interpretation of Section 42 does not reveal any intention to treat longevity pay in this manner ― as
part, or as an integral component, of “salary.”

On the contrary, Section 42 makes it clear that the "salary," which the Dissents submit serve as basis
of the "salary" of executive officers with the same rank of a justice or judge, is that referred to or
contemplated in Section 41.

b.3. Section 42 Analyzed.

Note in this regard that the last clause of Section 42 which states that: "in no case shall the total
salary of each Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is added , exceed the salary of the
Justice or Judge next in rank."

The use of the term "total salary" under the first portion of Section 42’s last clause, presupposes an
addition of components, and should be understood to refer to the total compensation received . This
"total salary" is the "salary" (or the salary rate fixed under the "Salary Schedule" as the recipient’s
monthly compensation corresponding to his "salary grade") plus the "add-on" longevity pay (or that
portion or percentage of the "salary" as fixed under the Salary Schedule) equivalent to at least 5% of
the monthly salary.

In formula form, this should read –

Section 41 Salary + Section 42 Longevity Pay = Total Salary

Where:

Salary = monthly salary rate of position per the Salary Schedule

Longevity Pay = monthly salary rate x 5%.

That the word "total" was added to "salary" under the first portion of Section 42’s last clause, in no
way signifies that longevity pay is an integral part of the "salary" which a Justice or Judge will receive
each month by virtue of his position/rank/salary grade.

The word "total" was added simply to qualify "salary" (the recipient’s "salary" fixed under the "Salary
Schedule") plus any longevity pay to which he may be entitled. This treatment, to be sure, does not
make the longevity pay a part of the "salary."

In short, "total" simply modified "s alary," and in effect denotes that amount received or to be received
as total compensation, and distinguishes this resulting amount from the "salary" received each month
by virtue of the position/salary grade.

Note, too, the word "salary" under the last portion of Section 42’s last clause which is not qualified or
modified by the word "total," in contrast with the "total salary" under the first portion.

The last portion states: the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank: this "salary" of the Justice or
Judge next in rank should not be exceeded by the "total salary" (or total compensation) of the
recipient. The "salary" under the last phrase, when read together with the "total salary" under the first
phrase, shows that "salary" is distinct, and to be pa id separately from longevity pay, so that the latter
cannot be an integral part of "salary."

To sum up, the "same salary" to be received by the public officials in the Executive Department, with
the same rank of justice or judge, is the "salary" of the justice or judge under Section 41. The "salary"
referred to in Section 41, in turn, and as explained above, is the "salary rate" fixed under the "Salary
Schedule" corresponding to the position’s "salary grade."

Notably, Justice De Castro’s proposition that the term "salary" constitutes the basic monthly salary
plus the longevity pay when the Congress enacted RA Nos. 9417, 9347, and 10071 is not reflected in
any of the congressional deliberations. What the deliberations clearly reveal is simply the intention to
increase the "salaries" of the covered public officers in the Executive Department to the level of the
"salaries" received by or granted to their counterpart in the Judiciary.

This "salary" cannot but refer to the fixed sum that the system of "salary rate," "Salary Schedule," and
"salary grade" speaks of. It cannot refer to the variable amount of "total salary" that the dissent refers
to, as the basis or comparator cannot be a variable amount that reflects the seniority that a judge or
justice has attained after years in the service.

Ironically, Justice De Castro’s cited case – Re Longevity pay of Justices of the Sandiganbayan,
appearing at page 42 of this ponencia – best illustrates how the "salary" and "total salary" concepts
operate.

E. The complete parity that the dissent advocates is a policy matter that Congress has not so far
expressed.
The legislative history and record of the laws (that grant the same ranks, salaries, and benefits to
officers in the Executive department equivalent to their specified counterparts in the Judiciary) do not
support the Dissent’s view that these laws grant full parity in rank, salaries, and benefits or equal
treatment between the executive officers/grantees and the comparator judges and justices whose
longevity pay arises from BP 129.

In fact, the legislative history and record of these statutes positively show that Congress has not yet
gone as far as the Dissents would want them to go―to recognize full parity that includes the grant of
longevity pay under BP 129 to executive officers in the Executive Department.

As the discussions below will show, the Dissent, without delving deep into legislative history and
record of the statutes it cited as bases, took the easy route of resorting to hasty generalizations to
support its tenuous theory that these laws operate under the principle of " equal in qualifications and
equal in rank, equal in salaries and benefits received."

This interpretative route may be easy but is a very dangerous one in its implications, as Congress has
not in any way shown that it has intended officers with the same rank and qualifications across
government to receive equal pay and equal benefits.

For this kind of "equalization" to prevail, the government must be ready to embark on a comparison,
not only of rank and qualifications, but on the quantification of job content and valuation of jobs of
equal value, involving similar or allied activities undertaken across government.

This is the requirement that the "equal pay for equal work" principle established in jurisdictions with
more advanced social legislation than the Philippines. 43 To be sure, this is a serious policy matter
that, under the terms of the Constitution, is not for this Court but for Congress to establish .

To fully support these contentions, we embark on a brief look into the laws that the Dissent itself
cited.

a. RA 934744 affecting the NLRC.

RA 9347 lapsed into law on July 27, 2006. This law was passed to address the then urgent need to
improve the administrative and operational efficiency of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), particularly its rate of disposition of pending cases and the reduction of its ballooning backlog
of labor cases.45 In dealing with these issues, Congress then focused on measures that would
encourage productivity and efficiency and boost the morale of NLRC officials.

The congressional measures Congress passed included the increase in the number of commissioner-
members of the NLRC, the creation of positions for commission attorneys who would assist the NLRC
commissioners in deciding the labor cases, and a provision for retirement benefits to NLRC
commissioners and labor arbiters equivalent to the retirement benefits of justices of the CA and
judges of the RTCs, respectively.

In appreciating RA 9347, note that as early as Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, the commissioners
of the NLRC were already given the same salary and benefits as justices of the CA . As the old Article
216 of the Labor Code provided, before the amendment:

Article 216. Salaries, benefits and other emoluments. The Chairman and members of the
Commission shall receive an annual salary at least equivalent to, and be entitled to the same
allowances and benefits as those of the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of
Appeals, respectively. The Executive Labor Arbiters shall receive an annual salary at least equivalent
to that of an Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment and shall be
entitled to the same allowances and benefits as that of a Regional Director of said Department. The
Labor Arbiters shall receive an annual salary at least equivalent to, and be entitled to the same
allowances and benefits as that of an Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Labor and
Employment. In no case, however, shall the provision of this Article result in the diminution of existing
salaries, allowances and benefits of the aforementioned officials. (As amended by Section 8,
Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)46

This old provision did not include retirement benefits in its wording. Thus, as enumerated, entitlement
to equivalence was limited to salaries, allowances and benefits. To address the perceived legislative
gap, the amendatory RA 9347 expressly included the word retirement in the enumeration. This grant
applied to both commissioners and labor arbiters of the NLRC.

Aside from this observation, note too that the old Article 216 of the Labor Code did not give labor
arbiters the salary, allowances and benefits equivalent to those of the Regional Trial Court (RTC )
judges. Apart from addressing the issue on retirement benefits, RA 9347 also sought to deal with the
then situation of labor arbiters in terms of their salaries and emoluments.

Thus, the congressional intent in RA 9347 was to deal with two gaps in PD 442 with respect to the
salaries, benefits, and emoluments of the members of the NLRC.

The first was the grant of salaries and benefits to labor arbiters equivalent to those of RTC judges,
and the second was the express inclusion of the retirement benefits of the labor arbiters and NLRC
commissioners at the levels equivalent to those of RTC judges and CA justices, respectively.

In the discussions and exchanges among the members of Congress – among them, the explanatory
note of Senator Ramon Revilla Jr. in Senate Bill No. 1204 47 and the sponsorship speech of Senator
Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada of Senate Bill No. 2035 (the senate bill that led to RA 9347) 48 – nowhere did
they deal with the issue of longevity pay as a benefit that should be accorded to labor arbiters and
commissioners of the NLRC.

In this light, we believe that to make the hasty generalization that the word benefit as enumerated in
Article 216 of the Labor Code should include longevity pay would run counter to the intention of the
law. Note that had it been the intent of Congress to give the labor arbiters and commissioners of the
NLRC all the benefits enjoyed by the members of the Judiciary as provided in BP 129 and in other
laws specifically applicable to members of the Judiciary, then it should not have amended Article 216
of the Labor Code by including "retirement benefits" in the enumeration. Congress should have left
the provision as it is since it already provides for the general term benefit.

Parenthetically, retirement pay is a specific form of allowance under the general term benefits.
Congress had to include this item as an express benefit precisely because the use of the general
word benefit in the old Article 216 of the Labor Code did not include all the benefits then being
enjoyed by judges and justices of the Judiciary.

In providing for retirement benefits, Congress significantly did not simply state that the NLRC shall
enjoy the terms and benefits of judges and justices under their retirement law, RA 910, where
longevity pay is a special and specific provision. Congress contented itself with the plain insertion of
"retirement pay" and stopped there.

Thus, as matters now stand, NLRC officials retire under the retirement law applicable to executive
officials, with parity of the terms of this retirement law with those of their counterparts in the Judiciary.
Retirement benefits specific to the Judiciary, however, were not and should not be interpreted to be
wholly included.

b. RA 941749 affecting the OSG.

RA 9417 passed into law on March 30, 2007. As in the case of RA 9347, this law was passed to
address the plight of the members of the Office of the Solicitor General ( OSG ) by upgrading their
salaries and benefits to improve their efficiency as the Republic’s counsel.

In the sponsorship speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile regarding Senate Bill No. 2249, the
predecessor Senate Bill of RA 9417, Senator Enrile pointed out that the Senate’s Committee on
Justice and Human Rights, in crafting Senate Bill 2249, aimed to address the following issues
regarding the OSG:

1. Increase the number of staff of the OSG and upgrade their positions;

2. Increase the existing 15 legal divisions of the OSG to 30;

3. Provide health care services, insurance coverage and scholarship and other benefits to all
OSG employees subject to the availability of funds;

4. Grant franking privileges to the OSG;

5. Establish a provident fund within the OSG; and

6. Grant retirement benefits to qualified employees. 50

As in the case of the NLRC, it must again be noted that this enumeration is specific with respect to
the benefits granted to members of the OSG: it particularly referred to the benefits to be granted.
Although Section 3 of RA 941751 provides that the Solicitor General shall have the same qualifications
for appointment, rank, prerogatives, salaries, allowances, benefits and privileges as the Presiding
Justice of the CA (and an Assistant Solicitor General as that of a CA Associate Justice), RA 9417 still
allocated express provisions for the other benefits to be enjoyed by the members of the OSG. These
provisions are the following:

Section 4- Compensation52

Section 5- Benefits and Privileges53

Section 6- Seminar and Other Professional Fees 54

Section 7- Transportation Benefits 55

Section 8- Other Benefits56

Section 10- Grant of Special Allowances57

Had Congress really intended to grant the benefit of longevity pay to the members of the OSG, then it
should have also included in the list of benefits granted under RA 9417 a provision pertaining to
longevity pay. This provision is glaringly missing and thus cannot be included via this Court’s decision
without running afoul of the rule that prohibits judicial legislation. Nor can this Court recognize the
past service rendered by a current judge or justice in the OSG for purposes of longevity pay.

A closer examination of this law shows that what Congress did was to grant benefits that were
applicable to the type of service that the OSG provides.

For example, OSG lawyers are entitle d to honoraria and allowances from client departments,
agencies and instrumentalities of the Government. 58

This benefit is only proper as the main function of the OSG is to act as the counsel of the Government
and its officers acting in their official capacity. On the other hand, this benefit is not applicable to
member s of the Judiciary as they do not act as advocates but rather as impartial judges of the cases
before them, for which they are not entitled to honoraria and allowances on a per case basis.

Another indicator that should be considered from the congressional handling of RA 9417 is that
Congress did not intend to introduce a strict one-to-one correspondence between the grant of the
same salaries and benefits to members of the executive department and of the Judiciary. The
congressional approach apparently was for laws granting benefits to be of specific application that
pertains to the different departments according to their personnel’s needs and activities. No
equalization or standardization of benefits was ever intended on a generalized or across-the-board
basis.

F. The structure of the laws providing for the salaries and benefits of members of the Judiciary,
prosecutors, and public officers in the OSG and the NLRC further negate the Dissent’s view that
these laws intended equal treatment among them.

We cannot also agree with the Dissent’s position that the laws providing for the salaries and benefits
of members of the Judiciary, the prosecution service, the OSG solicitors , and the members of the
NLRC aim to provide equality among these public officers in their salaries and benefits.

In terms of salaries, their rationalization has been addressed through Position Classification and
Compensation System of the government under PD 985, PD 1597 and LOI 93, heretofore discussed.
It is through the amendments of these legislative enactments that parity and equity can both be
achieved in government.

On the other hand, a look at the structure of the laws affecting the Judiciary, the prosecutors, the
OSG, and the NLRC shows that there could be no equal treatment among them. Notably, under
Section 16, par. 6 of RA 10071,59 only the prosecutors would have an automatic increase in salaries
and benefits in case the salaries and benefits in the Judiciary increase. This provision, by itself,
shows that Congress did not intend full parity, because increases in the salaries and benefits of
prosecutors would not lead to an automatic increase in the salaries and benefits of members of the
Judiciary.

Extending our judicial lens even further, the laws increasing the salaries and benefits of executive
officers in the OSG and the NLRC do not also provide for an automatic increase should there be
increases in the salaries and benefits of the Judiciary; neither do these laws increase the salaries and
benefits of the members of the Judiciary should the salaries and benefits of these public officers
increase.

Had Congress really intended full parity between the Judiciary and other public officers in the
executive department, it would have provided for reciprocity in the automatic increase of salaries,
benefits and allowances, and the upgrading of the grades or levels of the emoluments of these public
officers.

Instead, the laws, as currently worded, allow for a situation where an increase in the salaries and
benefits of prosecutors would not result in the increase in the salaries of members of the Judiciary,
the OSG and NLRC. Thus, instead of equalization, the prosecutors (who were merely granted a rank
at par with their named counterparts in the Judiciary) would be in a better position than the actual
judges and justices themselves, in the absence of a similar provision of law giving the same benefits
to justices and judges in the event additional emoluments would be given to these prosecutors.

The inevitable conclusion from all these is that Congress, in increasing the salaries and benefits of
these officers, merely used the salary levels and benefits in the Judiciary as a yardstick to make their
salaries and benefits comparable to fellow government employees engaged in the administration of
justice.

At the risk of endlessly belaboring a point, we cannot, without engaging in the prohibited act of judicial
legislation, construe that the Dissent’s cited laws fully intend and recognize full parity in rank, salaries,
benefits, and other emoluments among the public officers mentioned.

G. The Dissent’s cited cases of Santiago, Gancayco, Dela Fuente and Guevara-Salonga are not
controlling in the present case, as they are a strained and erroneous application of Section 42 of BP
129 that should be abandoned.

The dissent’s invocation of the cases of Judge Santiago and Justices Gancayco, Dela Fuente, and
Guevara-Salonga cannot be applied to the present case as they are erroneous applications of
Section 42 of BP 129 in relation with RA 910 or the Judiciary’s retirement law.

Nor can these cases be cited to support the position that these past rulings already established that
the past services in the Executive Department of incumbent and retired justices and judges, should
be given credit for purposes of longevity pa y under Section 42 of BP 129.

a. The Guevarra-Salonga & Dela Fuente Cases

The grants of longevity pay to Justice Guevara-Salonga and Justice Dela Fuente, in particular, were
based on a misinterpretation and misunderstanding of the Judiciary’s retirement law ― RA 910, read
in relation to Section 42 of BP 129 ― and its interaction with RA 10071, which granted prosecutors
the same rank and benefits (including retirement benefits) of their counterparts in the Judiciary.

Although RA 910 recognized, for purposes of retirement pay, past services in the Judiciary or in any
other branch of the Government, the longevity pay provision under Section 42 of BP 129 recognizes
only services in the Judiciary in determining the longevity pay of 5% of the basic salary (given for
each five years of service) that is carried over into retirement from the service.

In considering the longevity pay in the cases of Justices Guevarra-Salonga and Dela Fuente, the
Court mistakenly recognized their services as prosecutors to be services in the Judiciary, because
RA 1007160 granted prosecutors the same rank and benefits (including retirement benefits) as their
counterparts in the Judiciary.

The Court failed to fully appreciate that the longevity pay provision under RA 910, in relation with
Section 42 of BP 129, is unique to the Judiciary and can be enjoyed only for services actually
rendered, and by those who retired, in this branch of government. Thus, services at the Department
of Justice, i.e., outside of the Judiciary, should not have been recognized as additional judicial service
for purposes of longevity pay on retirement.

Notably, the Court did not comprehensively discuss in these cited rulings the nature of service
required for the longevity provision to apply, nor the purpose, reason and history of the longevity pay
provision under BP 129, for the Dissents to conclude that the Court already treated the past service in
the Executive Department to be equivalent to service in the Judiciary.

As we earlier discussed, under our system of Government, the Judiciary is separate from, serves a
purpose and functions, and has powers, duties and prerogatives distinct from those of the Executive
Department. Hence, the Court, in these Resolutions, could not have regarded service in the
Executive as unqualifiedly equivalent to service in the Judiciary.

It should be considered, too, that an acceptance of past service in the Executive as service in the
Judiciary may have no basis. The qualification for the grant by the Judiciary should be its
determination that there had been continuous, efficient, and meritorious service. No such
determination can be done by the Judiciary if it will simply recognize longevity pay based solely on
service in a position under the Executive Department with rank, salaries, and benefits equivalent to
specified positions in the Judiciary.

To reiterate, for clarity and emphasis, if the Judiciary would recognize past service in the Executive
simply because of the equivalency of rank, salaries and benefits, the situation would be legally
problematic as it would have no way of knowing for itself if the grantee would qualify (based on
efficient and meritorious service) since the past service would be with the Executive, not with the
Judiciary. Of course, for this Court to simply recognize that past executive service w ill be credited
under Section 42 of BP 129 constitutes prohibited judicial legislation for going beyond the
requirement that service should be in the Judiciary.

b. The cited Sandiganbayan case.

Re: Longevity Pay of the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan (Sandiganbayan case) 61 is a very
interesting case that Justice De Castro uses as part of her argument on the liberal stance the Court
has taken on longevity pay.

Significantly, this case did not treat the longevity pay under Section 42 as an integral component of
the salary of the recipient, to be given to and applied in equal degree and force, and under absolute
circumstances to public officials in the Executive Department granted the "same salary" as their
counterpart in the Judiciary.

The Sandiganbayan ruling, in fact, does not apply to the factual situation of the present case; it solely
involves Justices of the Sandiganbayan ― members of the Judiciary. Note the following
pronouncement in that case:

x x x longevity pay once earned and enjoyed becomes a vested right and forms part of the salary of
the recipient thereof which may not be reduced despite the subsequent appointment of a justice or
judge next higher in rank who is not entitled to longevity pay for being new and not having acquired
any longevity in the government service. Furthermore, diminution or decrease of the salary of an
incumbent justice or judge is prohibited by Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution; hence, such
recipient continue to earn and receive addition l longevity pay as may be warranted by subsequent
services in the judiciary, because the purpose of the Longevity Pay Law is to reward justices and
judges for their long and dedicated service as such. The provision of the law that the total salary of
each justice or judge concerned, after adding his longevity pay, should not exceed the salary plus
longevity pay of the justice or judge next higher in rank, refers only to the initial implementation of the
law and does not proscribe a justice or judge who is already entitled to longevity pay, from continuing
to earn and receive longevity pay for services rendered in the judiciary subsequent to such
implementation, by the mere accident of a newcomer being appointed to the position next higher in
rank.

These pronouncements reveal the Court’s recognition of a situation where a Justice or Judge who
has rendered service in the Judiciary for a considerable length of time and who will receive a total
compensation that far exceeds the "salary" that a newly appointed Justice or Judge, who has not
rendered any prior service in the Judiciary, will earn or receive based simply on his "salary grade."
The former, the "long-serving" Justice or Judge, will earn far more than the latter, the "newly-serving"
Justice or Judge, because of the "add-on" longevity pay that he (the long-serving Justice or Judge)
will receive for his continued long service in the Judiciary, aside from the "salary" to which the latter
(the newly-serving Justice or Judge) shall only be entitled.

The Court realized this scenario as problematic and the obvious inequity it may bring if it were to cons
true strictly the words of Section 42. It is iniquitous for the "long-serving" Justice or Judge if the "add-
on" pay (longevity pay) that he earned under the law for his long and dedicated service in the
Judiciary would be reduced or eliminated altogether simply because of a new Justice or Judge w ho
will not be entitle d to any "add-on" pay for lack of the required long and dedicated service in the
Judiciary, and who will thus receive lesser total compensation.

The Court met the case head on and declared that the limitation refers only to the "initial
implementation of the law and does not proscribe a justice or judge, who is already entitled to
longevity pay, from continuing to earn and receive longevity pay for services rendered in the judiciary
subsequent to such implementation, by the mere accident of a newcomer being appointed to the
position next higher in rank." This case assumes importance in the present consolidated cases as it
stresses the purpose of longevity pay as discussed and interpreted in these pronouncements: " to
reward justices and judges for their long and dedicated service as such, " i.e., as justices or judges.

It highlights, too, that " salary" and the "longevity pay" are separate components of a judge’s or
justice’s total compensation , and that such total compensation can be variable because seniority or
years in the service is a factor taken into account.

Most importantly, this case is an example of the Court’s prompt decisive action to act with liberality
when such action is called for.

c. Moving On

Construing Section 42 as we do in this Resolution does not and will not negate the applicable laws,
contrary to Justice De Castro’s Dissent. Rather, the interpretation that the term "salary" does not
include longevity pay will rectify the error that the Court’s past rulings have created on this subject.

To recapitulate, the Court’s prior rulings treated longevity pay as part of the "salary" – a ruling that, as
explained, runs counter to the express and implied intent of BP 129. They are erroneous because
they introduced and included in the definition and composition of "salary" under Section 41 an
element that the law did not intend to include, either expressly or impliedly.

Hence, the most compelling reason now exists to abandon the above-cited cases: they were clear
and grossly erroneous application of the law. In jurisdictional terms, they involved an interpretation
not within the contemplation of words expressed by the statute; hence, they were gravely abusive
interpretation62 that did not and cannot confer any vested right protected by the due process clause.
The worst approach the Court can take now is to compound the problem by perpetuating our past
mistakes and simply burying our heads in the sand of past-established rulings.

The first decisive move for the Court is to declare, as it hereby declares, the abandonment of our
rulings on longevity pay in the cases of Santiago, Gancayco, Dela Fuente, and Guevara-Salonga and
to strike them out of our ruling case law, without, however, withdrawing the grants to those who have
benefitted from the Court’s misplaced final rulings.

Along these lines, the Court also hereby expressly declares that it does not disavow the longevity pay
previously granted to the retired justices and judicial officials for services rendered outside the
Judiciary. They may continue enjoying their granted benefits as their withdrawal now will be
inequitable.

With the same objective, those still in the service who are now enjoying past longevity pay grants due
to past services outside the Judiciary, shall likewise continue with the grants already made, but their
grants will have to be frozen at their current levels until their services outside the Judiciary are
compensated for by their present and future judicial service.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we resolve to:

(1) NOT the Memorandum dated February 18, 2013 of Atty. Eden T. Candelaria and the
Report and Recommendation dated February 15, 2013 of Atty. Corazon G. Ferrer-Flores;

(2) GRANT the request of Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando that her services
as Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Rita, Pampanga be included in the computation of
her longevity pay;

(3) DENY the request of Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Femando that her services as
COMELEC Commissioner be included in the computation of her longevity pay;

(4) DENY the request of Associate Justice Angelita Gacutan that her services as NLRC
Commissioner be included in the computation. of her longevity pay from the time she started
her judicial service;

(5) DENY with finality the motion for reconsideration of Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso
for lack of merit; and

(6) DIRECT the Clerk of this Court to proceed with the handling of granted longevity pay
benefits under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, pursuant to the guidelines and
declarations outlined in the Moving On portion of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992

GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA SALAZAR, respondents.

Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.

Gerardo S. Alansalon for private respondent.

ROMERO, J.:

For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it would seem that her close association with Delfin
Saldivar would mean the loss of her job. In May 1982, private respondent was employed by Globe-
Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GMCR) as general systems analyst. Also employed by
petitioner as manager for technical operations' support was Delfin Saldivar with whom private
respondent was allegedly very close.

Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment and spare parts
worth thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing, caused the investigation of
the latter's activities. The report dated September 25, 1984 prepared by the company's internal
auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that Saldivar had entered into a partnership styled Concave
Commercial and Industrial Company with Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon
Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier of petitioner often recommended by Saldivar. The report
also disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner's missing Fedders airconditioning unit for his own
personal use without authorization and also connived with Yambao to defraud petitioner of its
property. The airconditioner was recovered only after petitioner GMCR filed an action for replevin
against Saldivar.1

It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that Imelda Salazar violated company
reglations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the company's interests. Evidence
showed that she signed as a witness to the articles of partnership between Yambao and Saldivar. It
also appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the Fedders airconditioner
but failed to inform her employer.

Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner company placed private respondent
Salazar under preventive suspension for one (1) month, effective October 9, 1984, thus giving her
thirty (30) days within which to, explain her side. But instead of submitting an explanations three (3)
days later or on October 12, 1984 private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal
suspension, which she subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave
benefits, 13th month pay and damages, after petitioner notified her in writing that effective November
8, 1984, she was considered dismissed "in view of (her) inability to refute and disprove these
findings. 2

After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated July 16, 1985, ordered petitioner company to
reinstate private respondent to her former or equivalent position and to pay her full backwages and
other benefits she would have received were it not for the illegal dismissal. Petitioner was also
ordered to pay private respondent moral damages of P50,000.00. 3
On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations, Commission in the questioned resolution
dated December 29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid decision with respect to the reinstatement of private
respondent but limited the backwages to a period of two (2) years and deleted the award for moral
damages. 4

Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for having committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding that the suspension and subsequent dismissal of private respondent were illegal and in
ordering her reinstatement with two (2) years' backwages.

On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for petitioner GMCR.

The inestigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin Saldivar's acts in conflict with his
position as technical operations manager, necessitated immediate and decisive action on any
employee closely, associated with Saldivar. The suspension of Salazar was further impelled by th.e
discovery of the missing Fedders airconditioning unit inside the apartment private respondent shared
with Saldivar. Under such circumstances, preventive suspension was the proper remedial recourse
available to the company pending Salazar's investigation. By itself, preventive suspension does, not
signify that the company has adjudged the employee guilty of the charges she was asked to answer
and explain. Such disciplinary measure is resorted to for the protection of the company's property
pending investigation any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee. 5

Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated Salazar's right to due process
when she was promptly suspended. If at all, the fault, lay with private respondent when she ignored
petitioner's memorandum of October 8, 1984 "giving her ample opportunity to present (her) side to
the Management." Instead, she went directly to the Labor Department and filed her complaint for
illegal suspension without giving her employer a chance to evaluate her side of the controversy.

But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar's preventive suspension, we hold that her eventual
separation from employment was not for cause.

What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful dismissal so as to "make whole" the victim who has
not merely lost her job which, under settled Jurisprudence, is a property right of which a person is not
to be deprived without due process, but also the compensation that should have accrued to her
during the period when she was unemployed?

Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:

Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate
the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the
time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement. 6 (Emphasis supplied)

Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor
Code:

Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employments, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause as provided in the Labor
Code or when authorized by existing laws.
 Sec. 3. Reinstatement. — An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall by
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to backwages."7 (Emphasis
supplied)

Before proceeding any furthers, it needs must be recalled that the present Constitution has gone
further than the 1973 Charter in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to marginalized groups
of society, including labor. Given the pro-poor orientation of several articulate Commissioners of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986, it was not surprising that a whole new Article emerged on Social
Justice and Human Rights designed, among other things, to "protect and enhance the right of all the
people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural
inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good." 8 Proof of the
priority accorded to labor is that it leads the other areas of concern in the Article on Social
Justice, viz., Labor ranks ahead of such topics as Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform, Urban
Land Roform and Housing, Health, Women, Role and Rights of Poople's Organizations and Human
Rights.9

The opening paragraphs on Labor states

The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for
all.

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of
work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits is may be provided by law. 10 (Emphasis
supplied)

Compare this with the sole.provision on Labor in the 1973 Constitution under the Article an
Declaration of Principles and State Policies that provides:

Sec. 9. The state shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality
in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and
regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State shall ensure the rights
of workers to self-organization, collective baegaining, security of tenure, and just and
humane conditions of work. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration. 11

To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure" as one of the rights of labor which the State
is mandated to protect. But there is no gainsaying the fact that the intent of the framers of the present
Constitution was to give primacy to the rights of labor and afford the sector "full protection," at least
greater protection than heretofore accorded them, regardless of the geographical location of the
workers and whether they are organized or not.

It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who substantially
contributed to the present formulation of the protection to labor provision and proposed that the same
be incorporated in the Article on Social Justice and not just in the Article on Declaration of Principles
and State Policies "in the light of the special importance that we are giving now to social justice and
the necessity of emphasizing the scope and role of social justice in national development." 12

If we have taken pains to delve into the background of the labor provisions in our Constitution and the
Labor Code, it is but to stress that the right of an employee not to be dismissed from his job except for
a just or authorized cause provided by law has assumed greater importance under the 1987
Constitution with the singular prominence labor enjoys under the article on Social Justice. And this
transcendent policy has been translated into law in the Labor Code. Under its terms, where a case of
unlawful or unauthorized dismissal has been proved by the aggrieved employee, or on the other
hand, the employer whose duty it is to prove the lawfulness or justness of his act of dismissal has
failed to do so, then the remedies provided in Article 279 should find, application. Consonant with this
liberalized stance vis-a-vis labor, the legislature even went further by enacting Republic Act No. 6715
which took effect on March 2, 1989 that amended said Article to remove any possible ambiguity that
jurisprudence may have generated which watered down the constitutional intent to grant to labor "full
protection." 13

To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to show an authorized, much less a legal,
cause for the dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, not only to be entitled to
reinstatement, but ay well, to full backwages." 14

The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of
backwages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to her status before she lost her job,
for the dictionary meaning of the word "reinstate" is "to restore to a state, conditione positions etc.
from which one had been removed"15 and in the latter, to give her back the income lost during the
period of unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past, would perforce make her "whole."

Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been thwarted when reinstatement has not been
forthcoming and the hapless dismissed employee finds himself on the outside looking in.

Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for denying reinstatement under
the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto; that reinstatement can no longer be effected in
view of the long passage of time (22 years of litigation) or because of the realities of the
situation; 16 or that it would be "inimical to the employer's interest; " 17 or that reinstatement may no
longer be feasible; 18 or, that it will not serve the best interests of the parties involved; 19 or that the
company would be prejudiced by the workers' continued employment; 20 or that it will not serve any
prudent purpose as when supervening facts have transpired which make execution on that score
unjust or inequitable 21 or, to an increasing extent, due to the resultant atmosphere of "antipathy and
antagonism" or "strained relations" or "irretrievable estrangement" between the employer and the
employee. 22

In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of backwages and separation
pay 23 or solely separation pay. 24

In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the first place the wording of the
Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement. . . . and to his full backwages. . . ." 25 Under the principlesof statutory
construction, if a statute is clears plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the
maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the
words employed by, the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the
court from construing it differently. 26 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words,
to:have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found
in the statute.27 Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no
departure. Neither does the provision admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the Court, there
may be a ground or grounds for non-application of the above-cited provision, this should be by way of
exception, such as when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations
between the employer and the employee.
In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a position where he enjoys
the trust and confidence of his employer; and that it is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of
antipathy and antagonism may be generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and productivity of
the employee concerned.

A few examples, will suffice to illustrate the Court's application of the above principles: where the
employee is a Vice-President for Marketing and as such, enjoys the full trust and confidence of top
management; 28 or is the Officer-In-Charge of the extension office of the bank where he works; 29 or is
an organizer of a union who was in a position to sabotage the union's efforts to organize the workers
in commercial and industrial establishments; 30 or is a warehouseman of a non-profit organization
whose primary purpose is to facilitate and maximize voluntary gifts. by foreign individuals and
organizations to the Philippines; 31 or is a manager of its Energy Equipment Sales. 32

Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately. Otherwisey

reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is invariably engendered between
the parties as a result of litigation. That is human nature. 33

Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one's right;
otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could be easily separated from the service, by
merely paying his separation pay on the pretext that his relationship with his employer had already
become strained. 34

Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as systems analyst is one that
may be characterized as a position of trust and confidence such that if reinstated, it may well lead to
strained relations between employer and employee. Hence, this does not constitute an exception to
the general rule mandating reinstatement for an employee who has been unlawfully dismissed.

On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence reposed in her by engaging in transactions that
may have created conflict of interest situations? Petitioner GMCR points out that as a matter of
company policy, it prohibits its employees from involving themselves with any company that has
business dealings with GMCR. Consequently, when private respondent Salazar signed as a witness
to the partnership papers of Concave (a supplier of Ultra which in turn is also a supplier of GMCR),
she was deemed to have placed. herself in an untenable position as far as petitioner was concerned.

However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public respondent that such a circumstance did not create
a conflict of interests situation. As a systems analyst, Salazar was very far removed from operations
involving the procurement of supplies. Salazar's duties revolved around the development of systems
and analysis of designs on a continuing basis. In other words, Salazar did not occupy a position of
trust relative to the approval and purchase of supplies and company assets.

In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss of confidence. As we
have held countless times, while loss of confidence or breach of trust is a valid ground for
terminations it must rest an some basis which must be convincingly established. 35 An employee who
not be dismissed on mere presumptions and suppositions. Petitioner's allegation that since Salazar
and Saldivar lived together in the same apartment, it "presumed reasonably that complainant's
sympathy would be with Saldivar" and its averment that Saldivar's investigation although unverified,
was probably true, do not pass this Court's test. 36 While we should not condone the acts of disloyalty
of an employee, neither should we dismiss him on the basis of suspicion derived from speculative
inferences.

To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would be most inequitous because
the bulk of the findings centered principally oh her friend's alleged thievery and anomalous
transactions as technical operations' support manager. Said report merely insinuated that in view of
Salazar's special relationship with Saldivar, Salazar might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar's
questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating private respondent is wanting from the records.

It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report came out after Saldivar had already resigned
from GMCR on May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not have the opportunity to refute management's
findings, the report remained obviously one-sided. Since the main evidence obtained by petitioner
dealt principally on the alleged culpability of Saldivar, without his having had a chance to voice his
side in view of his prior resignation, stringent examination should have been carried out to ascertain
whether or not there existed independent legal grounds to hold Salatar answerable as well and,
thereby, justify her dismissal. Finding none, from the records, we find her to have been unlawfully
dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission
dated December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner GMCR is ordered to REINSTATE private
respondent Imelda Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to her salary for a period of two (2)
years only.

This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109445 November 7, 1994

FELICITO BASBACIO, petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FRANKLIN DRILON in his capacity
as Secretary of Justice, respondent.

Amparita S. Sta. Maria for petitioner.

MENDOZA, J.:

This case presents for determination the scope of the State's liability under Rep. Act No. 7309, which
among other things provides compensation for persons who are unjustly accused, convicted and
imprisoned but on appeal are acquitted and ordered released.

Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted of frustrated
murder and of two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and the wounding of
the latter's wife Florida and his son Tirso, at Palo, Calanuga, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, on the night of June
26, 1988. The motive for the killing was apparently a land dispute between the Boyons and petitioner.
Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after
their bonds had been cancelled.

Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioner's appeal proceeded to judgment, however, as
the appeal of the other accused was dismissed for failure to file his brief.

On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on the ground that
the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. He had been pointed to
by a daughter of Federico Boyon as the companion of Balderrama when the latter barged into their
hut and without warning started shooting, but the appellate court ruled that because petitioner did
nothing more, petitioner's presence at the scene of the crime was insufficient to show conspiracy.

Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, sec. 3(a), which provides for
the payment of compensation to "any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but
subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal." 1 The claim was filed with the Board of
Claims of the Department of Justice, but the claim was denied on the ground that while petitioner's
presence at the scene of the killing was not sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet,
considering that there was bad blood between him and the deceased as a result of a land dispute and
the fact that the convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis for finding that he was
"probably guilty."

On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the Board's ruling. Said the Secretary of Justice
in his resolution dated March 11, 1993:

It is believed therefore that the phrase "any person . . . unjustly accused, convicted and
imprisoned" in Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7309 refers to an individual who was wrongly
accused and imprisoned for a crime he did not commit, thereby making him "a victim of
unjust imprisonment." In the instant case, however, Claimant/Appellant cannot be
deemed such a victim since a reading of the decision of his acquittal shows that his
exculpation is not based on his innocence, but upon, in effect, a finding of reasonable
doubt.
Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari. Neither Rule 45 nor Rep. Act No. 7309,
however, provides for review by certiorari of the decisions of the Secretary of Justice. Nonetheless, in
view of the importance of the question tendered, the Court resolved to treat the petition as a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.

Petitioner questions the basis of the respondent's ruling that to be able to recover under sec. 3(a) of
the law the claimant must on appeal be found to be innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted
in the trial court. Through counsel he contends that the language of sec. 3(a) is clear and does not
call for interpretation. The "mere fact that the claimant was imprisoned for a crime which he was
subsequently acquitted of is already unjust in itself," he contends. To deny his claim because he was
not declared innocent would be to say that his imprisonment for two years while his appeal was
pending was justified. Petitioner argues that there is only one requirement for conviction in criminal
cases and that is proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to present such proof, the
presumption that the accused is innocent stands and, therefore, there is no reason for requiring that
he be declared innocent of the crime before he can recover compensation for his imprisonment.

Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require that every time an accused is acquitted on
appeal he must be given compensation on the theory that he was "unjustly convicted" by the trial
court. Such a reading of sec. 3(a) is contrary to petitioner's professed canon of construction that when
the language of the statute is clear it should be given its natural meaning. It leaves out of the
provision in question the qualifying word "unjustly" so that the provision would simply read: "The
following may file claims for compensation before the Board: (a) any person who was accused,
convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal."

But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted [and] imprisoned." The fact
that his conviction is reversed and the accused is acquitted is not itself proof that the previous
conviction was "unjust." An accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons and his conviction by
the trial court may, for any of these reasons, be set aside. For example, he may be acquitted not
because he is innocent of the crime charged but because of reasonable doubt, in which case he may
be found civilly liable to the complainant, because while the evidence against him does not satisfy the
quantum of proof required for conviction, it may nonetheless be sufficient to sustain a civil action for
damages.2 In one case the accused, an alien, was acquitted of statutory rape with homicide because
of doubt as to the ages of the offended parties who consented to have sex with him. Nonetheless the
accused was ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages and ordered deported. 3 In such a case to
pay the accused compensation for having been "unjustly convicted" by the trial court would be utterly
inconsistent with his liability to the complainant. Yet to follow petitioner's theory such an accused
would be entitled to compensation under sec. 3(a).

The truth is that the presumption of innocence has never been intended as evidence of innocence of
the accused but only to shift the burden of proof that he is guilty to the prosecution. If "accusation is
not synonymous with guilt,"4 so is the presumption of innocence not a proof thereof. It is one thing to
say that the accused is presumed to be innocent in order to place on the prosecution the burden of
proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. It is quite another thing to say that he is
innocent and if he is convicted that he has been "unjustly convicted." As this Court held in a case:

Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with homicide, we
emphasize that we are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only the
constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build an
airtight case for conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do
not exist.5
To say then that an accused has been "unjustly convicted" has to do with the manner of his
conviction rather than with his innocence. An accused may on appeal be acquitted because he did
not commit the crime, but that does
not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been the victim of an "unjust
conviction." If his conviction was due to an error in the appreciation of the evidence the conviction
while erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not, on the other hand, correct to say as does
respondent, that under the law liability for compensation depends entirely on the innocence of the
accused.

The phrase "unjustly convicted" has the same meaning as "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment"
in art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code. What this Court held in In re Rafael C. Climaco  6 applies:

In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it
must be shown beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not
supported by the evidence, and the same was made with conscious and deliberate
intent to do an injustice . . . .

To hold a judge liable for the rendition of manifestly unjust judgment by reason of
inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be shown, according to Groizard, that
although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the performance of his
duty, that diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the
rendering of any public service. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply
a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation.
Inexcusable mistake only exists in the legal concept when it implies a manifest injustice,
that is to say, such injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation,
even though there is a misunderstanding or error of the law applied, yet in the contrary it
results, logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and indisputable manner, in the
notorious violation of the legal precept.

Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of which the accused is
unjustly imprisoned, but, in addition, to an unjust accusation. The accused must have been "unjustly
accused, in consequence of which he is unjustly convicted and then imprisoned. It is important to
note this because if from its inception the prosecution of the accused has been wrongful, his
conviction by the court is, in all probability, also wrongful. Conversely, if the prosecution is not
malicious any conviction even though based on less than the required quantum of proof in criminal
cases may be erroneous but not necessarily unjust.

The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question for the prosecutor in filing a case in court is
not whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt but only whether "there is reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof."
Hence, an accusation which is based on "probable guilt" is not an unjust accusation and a conviction
based on such degree of proof is not necessarily an unjust judgment but only an erroneous one. The
remedy for such error is appeal.

In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to show that petitioner's conviction by the trial court
was wrongful or that it was the product of malice or gross ignorance or gross negligence. To the
contrary, the court had reason to believe that petitioner and his co-accused were in league, because
petitioner is the father-in-law of Wilfredo Balderrama and it was petitioner who bore the victim a
grudge because of a land dispute. Not only that. Petitioner and his coaccused arrived together in the
hut of the victims and forced their way into it.
The Court of Appeals ruled there was no conspiracy only because there was no proof that he did or
say anything on the occasion. Said the appellate court.

Both eyewitness testimonies fail to show the appellant Felicito Basbacio to have
committed any act at all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having said anything at
all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having committed anything in furtherance of a
conspiracy to commit the crimes charged against the defendants. It seems to be a frail
and flimsy basis on which to conclude that conspiracy existed between actual killer
Wilfredo Balderrama and Felicito Basbacio to commit murder and two frustrated
murders on that night of June 26, 1988. It may be asked: where was the coming
together of the two defendants to an agreement to commit the crimes of murder and
frustrated murder on two counts? Where was Basbacio's contribution to the commission
of the said crimes? Basbacio was — as the record shows — nothing but part of the dark
shadows of that night. . . .

One may take issue with this ruling because precisely conspiracy may be shown by concert of action
and other circumstances. Why was petitioner with his son-in-law? Why did they apparently flee
together? And what about the fact that there was bad blood between petitioner and the victim
Federico Boyon? These questions may no longer be passed upon in view of the acquittal of petitioner
but they are relevant in evaluating his claim that he had been unjustly accused, convicted and
imprisoned before he was released because of his acquittal on appeal. We hold that in view of these
circumstances respondent Secretary of Justice and the Board of Claims did not commit a grave
abuse of its discretion in disallowing petitioner's claim for compensation under Rep. Act No. 7309.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993

JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ULPIANO L. DE LOS SANTOS, respondent.

Don P. Porciuncula for petitioner.

Eulogio Nones, Jr. for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of the order of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission dated October 30, 1992, dismissing the petitioner's appeal from a decision of
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration on the ground of failure to post the required
appeal bond.1

The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended, providing
that:

In the case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may
be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in an amount equivalent to the
monetary award in the judgment appealed from.

and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended, reading as follows:

Sec. 6. Bond — In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter involves a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the
Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award.

The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying these rules to
decisions rendered by the POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the case of
licensed recruiters for overseas employment because they are already required under Section 4, Rule
II, Book II of the POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to post a cash bond of
P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000, thus:

Upon approval of the application, the applicant shall pay a license fee of P30,000. It
shall also post a cash bond of P100,000 and surety bond of P50,000 from a bonding
company acceptable to the Administration and duly accredited by the Insurance
Commission. The bonds shall answer for all valid and legal claims arising from
violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the license, and/or accreditation
and contracts of employment. The bonds shall likewise guarantee compliance with the
provisions of the Code and its implementing rules and regulations relating to
recruitment and placement, the Rules of the Administration and relevant issuances of
the Department and all liabilities which the Administration may impose. The surety
bonds shall include the condition that the notice to the principal is notice to the surety
and that any judgment against the principal in connection with matters falling under
 POEA's jurisdiction shall be binding and conclusive on the surety. The surety bonds
shall be co-terminus with the validity period of license. (Emphasis supplied)

In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000 with the Philippine
National Bank in compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, "to primarily answer
for valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims."

Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains the appeal bond requirement but suggest that
the rules cited by the NLRC are applicable only to decisions of the Labor Arbiters and not of the
POEA. Appeals from decisions of the POEA, he says, are governed by the following provisions of
Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules:

Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The appeal shall be filed within the
reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof
of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as
provided in Section 6 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a memorandum of appeal
which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the
relief prayed for; and a statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed
decision and/or award and proof of service on the other party of such appeal.

A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not
stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.

Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award. (Emphasis supplied)

The question is, having posted the total bond of P150,000 and placed in escrow the amount of
P200,000 as required by the POEA Rules, was the petitioner still required to post an appeal bond to
perfect its appeal from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC?

It was.

The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition to the cash and surety
bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is
required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA. Obviously, the appeal bond is intended to
further insure the payment of the monetary award in favor of the employee if it is eventually affirmed
on appeal to the NLRC.

It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money placed in escrow are supposed to guarantee
the payment of all valid and legal claims against the employer, but these claims are not limited to
monetary awards to employees whose contracts of employment have been violated. The POEA can
go against these bonds also for violations by the recruiter of the conditions of its license, the
provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules, E.O. 247 (reorganizing POEA) and the
POEA Rules, as well as the settlement of other liabilities the recruiter may incur.

As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably intended to provide for a standing fund, as it were, to
be used only as a last resort and not to be reduced with the enforcement against it of every claim of
recruited workers that may be adjudged against the employer. This amount may not even be enough
to cover such claims and, even if it could initially, may eventually be exhausted after satisfying other
subsequent claims.
As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed grants a monetary award of about P170,000 to the
dismissed employee, the herein private respondent. The standby guarantees required by the POEA
Rules would be depleted if this award were to be enforced not against the appeal bond but against
the bonds and the escrow money, making them inadequate for the satisfaction of the other
obligations the recruiter may incur.

Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of the employee to exceed the amount of
P350,000, which is the sum of the bonds and escrow money required of the recruiter.

It is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed on local employers, as the petitioner
observes, but there is a simple explanation for this distinction. Overseas recruiters are subject to
more stringent requirement because of the special risks to which our workers abroad are subjected
by their foreign employers, against whom there is usually no direct or effective recourse. The
overseas recruiter is solidarily liable with a foreign employer. The bonds and the escrow money are
intended to insure more care on the part of the local agent in its choice of the foreign principal to
whom our overseas workers are to be sent.

It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case),
care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an
integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam
pereat. 2 Under the petitioner's interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the
aforementioned POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it
has posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but we do not see any such
redundancy; on the contrary, we find that Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17. The rule
is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently
inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and
harmonious whole.

Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of the overseas recruiter prescribed
in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and the escrow agreement under Section 17 of the
same Rule, it is necessary to post the appeal bond required under Section 6, Rule V, Book VII of the
POEA Rules, as a condition for perfecting an appeal from a decision of the POEA.

Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of the working class, conformably to the
mandate of the Constitution. By sustaining rather than annulling the appeal bond as a further
protection to the claimant employee, this Court affirms once again its commitment to the interest of
labor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 191894               July 15, 2015

DANILO A. DUNCANO, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (2nd DIVISION), and HON. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules) with prayer for issuance of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeks to reverse and set aside the August
18, 2009 Resolution1 and February 8, 2010 Order2 of respondent Sandiganbayan Second Division in
Criminal Case No. SB-09-CRM-0080, which denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
la9k of jurisdiction.

The facts are plain and undisputed.

Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional Director of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as classified under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758. 3 On
March 24, 2009,4 the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, filed a
criminal case against him for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No.
6713,5 allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about April 15, 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused DANILODUNCANO y ACIDO, a high
ranking public officer, being the Regional Director of Revenue Region No. 7, of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, Quezon City, and as such is under an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations
under oath of his assets, liabilities and net worth and financial and business interests, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to disclose in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities
and Networth (SALN) for the year 2002, his financial and business interests/connection in Documail
Provides Corporation and Don Plus Trading of which he and his family are the registered owners
thereof, and the 1993 Nissan Patrol motor vehicle registered in the name of his son VINCENT LOUIS
P. DUNCANO which are part of his assets, to the damage and prejudice of public interest.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

Prior to his arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss With Prayer to Defer the Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest7 before respondent Sandiganbayan Second Division. As the OSP alleged, he
admitted that he is a Regional Director with Salary Grade 26. Citing Inding v. Sandiganbayan 8 and
Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,9 he asserted that under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, as
amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249,10 the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try and
hear the case because he is an official of the executive branch occupying the position of a Regional
Director but with a compensation that is classified as below Salary Grade 27.

In its Opposition,11 the OSP argued that a reading of Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g) of the subject law
would clearly show that the qualification as to Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to officials of
the executive branch other than the Regional Director and those specifically enumerated. This is so
since the term "Regional Director" and "higher" are separated by the conjunction "and," which
signifies that these two positions are different, apart and distinct, words but are conjoined together
"relating one to the other" to give effect to the purpose of the law. The fact that the position of
Regional Director was specifically mentioned without indication as to its salary grade signifies the
lawmakers’ intention that officials occupying such position, regardless of salary grade, fall within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. This issue, it is claimed, was already
resolved in Inding. Finally, the OSP contended that the filing of the motion to dismiss is premature
considering that the Sandiganbayan has yet to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

Still not to be outdone, petitioner invoked the applicability of Cuyco v. Sandiganbayan 12 and Organo v.
Sandiganbayan13 in his rejoinder.

On August 18, 2009, the Sandiganbayan Second Division promulgated its Resolution, disposing:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES the instant Motion to Dismiss
for being devoid of merit. Let a Warrant of Arrest be therefore issued against the accused.

SO ORDERED.14

The respondent court ruled that the position of Regional Director is one of those exceptions where the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction even if such position is not Salary Grade 27. It was opined that
Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249 unequivocally provides that respondent court has jurisdiction over
officials of the executive branch of the government occupying the position of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Salary Grade 27 and higher, of R.A. No. 6758, including those officials
who are expressly enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (g). In support of the ruling, this Court’s
pronouncements in Indingand Binay v. Sandiganbayan 15 were cited.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied; 16 Hence, this petition.

Instead of issuing a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, the Court required
respondents to file a comment on the petition without necessarily giving due course thereto. 17 Upon
compliance of the OSP, a Rejoinder (supposedly a Reply) was filed by petitioner.

At the heart of the controversy is the determination of whether, according to P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249, only Regional Directors with Salary Grade of 27 and
higher, as classified under R.A. No. 6758, fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Arguing that he is not included among the public officials specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1)
(a) to (g) of the law and heavily relying as well on Cuyco, petitioner insists that respondent court lacks
jurisdiction over him, who is merely a Regional Director with Salary Grade 26. On the contrary, the
OSP maintains that a Regional Director, irrespective of salary grade, falls within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. We find merit in the petition.

The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution.18 By virtue of the powers vested in him by the Constitution and pursuant to Proclamation
No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No.
1486.19 The decree was later amended by P.D. No. 1606, 20 Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129,21 P.D. No. 1860,22 and P.D. No. 1861.23

With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was retained as provided for in Section 4,
Article XI thereof.24 Aside from Executive Order Nos. 1425 and 14-a,26 and R.A. 7080,27 which
expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 was further modified by R.A. No.
7975,28 R.A. No. 8249,29 and just this year, R.A. No. 10660.30

For the purpose of this case, the relevant provision is Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, which states: SEC.
4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.– The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:

"A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:

"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and

provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;

"(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director
and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;

"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.

"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade ‘27’ and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution; and

"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

"B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

"C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and
14-A, issued in 1986.

x x x"
Based on the afore-quoted, those that fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are: (1)
officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2) officials specifically
enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades. 31 While the first part of
Section 4 (A) covers only officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its
second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade
27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.32

That the phrase "otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher" qualifies "regional director and
higher" is apparent from the Sponsorship Speech of Senator Raul S. Roco on Senate Bill Nos.
1353and 844, which eventually became R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8249, respectively:

As proposed by the Committee, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction over the cases
assigned to it only in instances where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the
positions of regional director and higher or are otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher by the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity at the time of the commission of the offense. The jurisdiction, therefore, refers to a certain
grade upwards, which shall remain with the Sandiganbayan. 33 (Emphasis supplied)

To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 7975 was enacted for that Court to
concentrate on the "larger fish" and leave the "small fry" to the lower courts. This law became
effective on May 6, 1995 and it provided a two-pronged solution to the clogging of the dockets of that
court, to wit:

It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public officials whose salary grades were at Grade
"26" or lower, devolving thereby these cases to the lower courts, and retaining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan only over public officials whose salary grades were at Grade "27" or higher and over
other specific public officials holding important positions in government regardless of salary grade; x x
x34 (Emphasis supplied)

The legislative intent is to allow the Sandiganbayan to devote its time and expertise to big-time cases
involving the so-called "big fishes" in the government rather than those accused who are of limited
means who stand trial for "petty crimes," the so-called "small fry," which, in turn, helps the court
decongest its dockets.35

Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions enumerated by the law. 36 In this category, it is
the position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. 37 The
specific inclusion constitutes an exception to the general qualification relating to "officials of the
executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989." 38 As ruled in
Inding:

Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if the accused is occupying
a position lower than SG 27, the proper trial court has jurisdiction, can only be properly interpreted as
applying to those cases where the principal accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27 and
not among those specifically included in the enumeration in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g). Stated
otherwise, except for those officials specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g), regardless of
their salary grades, over whom the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG
27 shall be under the jurisdiction of the proper trial courts "where none of the principal accused are
occupying positions corresponding to SG 27 or higher." By this construction, the entire Section 4 is
given effect. The cardinal rule, after all, in statutory construction is that the particular words, clauses
and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every
part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce
a harmonious whole. And courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a
statute, if at all possible. Ut magis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives
effect to the whole of the statute – its every word. 39

Thus, to cite a few, We have held that a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, 40 a department
manager of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth), 41 a student regent of the
University of the Philippines,42 and a Head of the Legal Department and Chief of the Documentation
with corresponding ranks of Vice-Presidents and Assistant Vice-President of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) 43 fall within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or higher. Neither does he hold any
position particularly enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g). As he correctly argues, his case is, in
fact, on all fours with Cuyco.1avvphi1 Therein, the accused was the Regional Director of the Land
Transportation Office, Region IX, Zamboanga City, but at the time of the commission of the crime in
1992, his position was classified as Director II with Salary Grade 26. 44 It was opined: Petitioner
contends that at the time of the commission of the offense in 1992, he was occupying the position of
Director II, Salary Grade 26, hence, jurisdiction over the cases falls with the Regional Trial Court.

We sustain petitioner's contention.

The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No. 3019,
as amended, unless committed by public officials and employees occupying positions of regional
director and higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office.

In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner admittedly occupied the position of Director
II with Salary Grade "26" under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic
Act No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction, and acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in suspending petitioner from office, entitling
petitioner to the reliefs prayed for.45

In the same way, a certification issued by the OIC – Assistant Chief, Personnel Division of the BIR
shows that, although petitioner is a Regional Director of the BIR, his position is classified as Director
II with Salary Grade 26.46

There is no merit in the OSP’s allegation that the petition was prematurely filed on the ground that
respondent court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. Records disclose that
when a warrant of arrest was issued by respondent court, petitioner voluntarily surrendered and
posted a cash bond on September 17, 2009.Also, he was arraigned on April 14, 2010,prior to the
filing of the petition on April 30, 2010.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The August
18, 2009 Resolution and February 8, 2010 Order of the Sandiganbayan Second Division, which
denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, are REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 104712. May 6, 1992.]

MANUEL T. DE GUIA, in his capacity as Councilor of the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro

Manila, Petitioner, v. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; PROCEDURAL INFIRMITY BRUSHED ASIDE WHERE

ISSUE INVOLVED POLITICAL EXERCISE OF QUALIFIED VOTERS. — The Court observes that
petitioner does not allege that he is running for reelection, much less, that he is prejudiced by the
election, by district, in Parañaque. As such, he does not appear to have a locus standi, a standing in
law, a personal or substantial interest. He does not also allege any legal right that has been violated
by Respondent. If for this alone, petitioner does not appear to have any cause of action. However,
considering the importance of the issue involved, concerning as it does the political exercise of
qualified voters affected by the apportionment, and petitioner alleging abuse of discretion and
violation of the Constitution by respondent, We resolve to brush aside the question of procedural
infirmity, even as We perceive the petition to be one of declaratory relief. We so held similarly through
Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras in Osmeña v. Commission on Elections.

2. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES CONSTRUED ACCORDING TO ITS OBJECT. —

No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile. We must therefore, as
far as we can, define its meaning, its significance, its reason for being. As it has oft been held, the key
to open the door to what the legislature intended which is vaguely expressed in the language of a
statute is its purpose or the reason which induced it to enact the statute. If the statute needs
construction, as it does in the present case, the most dominant in that process is the purpose of the
act. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to
be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the
mischief, and secure the benefits intended. A construction should be rejected that gives to the
language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was
enacted, and that tends to defeat the ends which are sought to be attained by the enactment.

3. ID.; ID.; SECTION 3, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7166 (AN ACT PROVIDING FOR SYNCHRONIZED
NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS); PURPOSE. — A careful analysis of the provisions of Sec. 3
shows that the purpose of districting/apportionment of the sanggunian seats is to reduce the number
of positions to be voted for in the May 11, 1992, synchronized elections and ensure the efficiency of
electoral process.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ELECTION BY DISTRICT CONSTRUED. — As they now stand in relation to the
districting/apportionment of local government units for purposes of election under Sec. 3 of R.A.
7166, it is clear that: (1) for provinces with two (2) or more legislative districts contemplated in par.
(a), they shall continue to be elected by district; (2) for provinces with single legislative districts, as
they have already been apportioned into two (2) districts each under par. (b), they shall henceforth be
elected likewise by district; (3) for cities with two (2) or more legislative districts, e.g., the cities of
Manila, Cebu and Davao, they shall also continue to be elected by district under the first part of par.
(c); and, (4) for the thirteen (13) municipalities in the Metro Manila Area, which have already been
apportioned into two (2) districts each under the second proviso of par. (c), they shall likewise be
elected by district in the regular elections of May 11, 1992. Then, that should leave us the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-district cities and the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipalities
outside Metro Manila, which remain single-districts not having been ordered apportioned under Sec. 3
of R.A. 7166. They will have to continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992, elections,
although starting 1995 they shall all be elected by district to effect the full implementation of the letter
and spirit of R.A. 7166. That is the true import of par. (d).

DECISION

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the validity and the enforcement by respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) of its RESOLUTION NO. 2313, adopting rules and guidelines
in the apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan in provinces with only one (1) legislative district and the Sangguniang Bayan of
municipalities in the Metro Manila Area for the preparation of the Project of District Apportionment by
the Provincial Election Supervisors and Election Registrars (Annex "A", Petition), RESOLUTION NO.
2379, approving the Project of District Apportionment submitted pursuant to Resolution No. 2313
(Annex "B", Petition), and RESOLUTION UND. 92-010 holding that pars. (a), (b) and (c), and the first
sentence of par. (d), all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply to the May 11, 1992 elections (Annex "C",
Petition).

Petitioner Manuel T. De Guia is an incumbent Member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality
of Parañaque, Metro Manila, having been elected in the January 1988 local elections. He prays, more
particularly, for reversal of the position of respondent insofar as it affects the municipality of
Parañaque and all the other municipalities in the Metro Manila Area. He claims that the second
proviso of par. (c), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, which requires the apportionment into district of said
municipalities does not specify when the members of their Sangguniang Bayan will be elected by
district. He would consequently lean on par. (d) of Sec. 3, which immediately succeeds par. (c), to
support his view that the elected members of these municipalities mentioned in par. (c) should
continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992 elections.

Paragraph (d) states that" [F]or purposes of the regular elections on May 11, 1992, elective members
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large in accordance with
existing laws. However, beginning with the regular elections in 1995, they shall be elected by district."
Petitioner therefore insists that the elected members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque fall
under this category so that they should continue to be elected at large until the 1995 regular
elections.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

Before addressing the crux of the controversy the Court observes that petitioner does not allege that
he is running for reelection, much less, that he is prejudiced by the election, by district, in Parañaque.
As such, he does not appear to have a locus standi, a standing in law, a personal or substantial
interest. 1 He does not also allege any legal right that has been violated by Respondent. If for this
alone, petitioner does not appear to have any cause of action.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

However, considering the importance of the issue involved, concerning as it does the political
exercise of qualified voters affected by the apportionment, and petitioner alleging abuse of discretion
and violation of the Constitution by respondent, We resolve to brush aside the question of procedural
infirmity, even as We perceive the petition to be one of declaratory relief. We so held similarly through
Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras in Osmeña v. Commission on Elections. 2

Now on the meat of the dispute.

On November 18, 1991, Congress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the President on November
26, 1991. It is "An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral
Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes." At issue in this case is the
proper interpretation of Sec. 3 thereof which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 3. Election of Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and

Sangguniang Bayan. — The elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘(a) For provinces with two (2) or more legislative districts, the elective members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan shall be elected by legislative districts . . .

‘(b) For provinces with only one (1) legislative district, the Commission shall divide them into two (2)
districts for purposes of electing the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan . . .

‘(c) The number and election of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang
Bayan in the Metro Manila Area, City of Cebu, City of Davao and any other city with two (2) or more
legislative districts shall continue to be governed by the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of Republic
Act No. 6636 . . . Provided, further, That, the Commission shall divide each of the municipalities in
Metro Manila Area into two (2) districts by barangay for purposes of representation in the
Sangguniang Bayan . . . and,

‘(d) For purposes of the regular elections on May 11, 1992, elective members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large in accordance with existing laws.
However, beginning with the regular elections in 1995, they shall be elected by district . . ."cralaw
virtua1aw library

On November 20, 1991, respondent COMELEC, invoking authority of the Constitution, the Omnibus
Election Code, R.A. 6636, R.A. 6646 and R.A. 7166,3 issued Resolution No. 2313 and the
subsequent resolutions in question.

On February 20, 1992, in view of the perceived ambiguity in the meaning of par: (d), particularly in
relation to par. (c), Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, petitioner filed with COMELEC a Motion for Clarification of its
Resolution No. 2313 inquiring whether the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque and
the other municipalities of Metro Manila enumerated therein, which are all single-district
municipalities, would be elected by district in the May 11, 1992 or in the 1995 regular
elections.cralawnad

Meanwhile, on March 3, 1992, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2379 approving the guidelines
submitted by the Provincial Election Supervisors and Municipal Election Registrars concerned
pursuant to Resolution No. 2313, and stating therein its purpose in recommending to Congress the
districting/apportionment of Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan seats. i.e., to reduce
the number of candidates to be voted for in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections. In this Project
of Apportionment, Parañaque together with the other twelve (12) municipalities in the Metro Manila
Area was divided into two (2) districts with six (6) elective councilors for each district.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary

On March 10, 1992, COMELEC resolved petitioner’s Motion for Clarification by interpreting Sec. 3,
R.A. 7166, to mean that the election of elective members of the Sangguniang Bayan, by district, of
the thirteen (13) municipalities in the Metro Manila Area shall apply in the May 11, 1992 elections
(Resolution UND. 92-010, prom. March 10, 1992). Petitioner says that he received copy of Resolution
UND 92-010 on March 13, 1992.

On April 7, 1992, apparently not satisfied with this third Resolution of COMELEC, petitioner filed the
instant petition asserting that under par. (d), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166 the elective members of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod and the Sangguniang Bayan, for purposes of the May 11, 1992 regular
elections, shall be elected at large in accordance with existing laws. He would include in this class of
sanggunian members to be elected at large those of the municipality of Parañaque.

Petitioner therefore imputes grave abuse of discretion to COMELEC in promulgating Resolution No.
2313, Resolution No. 2379 and Resolution UND. 92-010 which clarifies, contrary to his view, that the
district apportionment of the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area is applicable to the May 11, 1992
regular elections.

We have carefully examined pars. (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, and its precursor bills on
synchronized elections, Senate Bill No. 1861 and House Bill No. 34811, and We realize the web of
confusion generated by the seeming abstruseness in the language of the law. Some framers of the
law were even fazed at the empirical implications of some of its provisions, particularly Sec. 3 thereof,
and they admitted in fact that said provisions were susceptible of varied interpretations, as borne by
the sponsorship and explanatory speeches now spread in the Journals of Congress. Hence, We can
understand why petitioner would interpret Sec. 3 as he would. But if we pursue his course, we may
conclude in absurdity because then there would have been no reason for R.A. 7166 to single out the
single-district provinces referred to in par. (b), and the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area
mentioned in the second proviso of par. (c), to be apportioned at once into two (2) districts each if the
members of their respective sanggunian after all would still be elected at large as they were in the
1988 elections.

No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile. We must therefore, as
far as we can, divine its meaning, its significance, its reason for being. As it has oft been held, the key
to open the door to what the legislature intended which is vaguely expressed in the language of a
statute is its purpose or the reason which induced it to enact the statute. If the statute needs
construction, as it does in the present case, the most dominant in that process is the purpose of the
act. 4 Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to
be suppressed, 5 and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress
the mischief, and secure the benefits intended. 6 A construction should be rejected that gives to the
language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was
enacted, and that tends to defeat the ends which are sought to be attained by the enactment. 7

The reason for the Promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in the explanatory note of Senate Bill No.
1861 which states in part:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"This bill proposes to set the national and local elections for May 11, 1992, and provide for the
necessary implementing details. It also endorses reforms and measures to ensure the conduct of
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. Specifically, it seeks to: (1) Reduce the number
of positions to be voted for by providing therein that the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan be elected not at large, but by district . . ."cralaw
virtua1aw library

That respondent COMELEC is cognizant of this legislative intent of R.A. 7166 is reflected in the
"WHEREAS" clauses constituting the preamble to Resolution No. 2379. Thus —

"WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, in order to reduce the number of candidates to be voted
for in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections recommended, among others, to the Congress of the
Philippines, the districting/apportionment of sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan seats;

"WHEREAS, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act 7166, and approved by the
President of the Philippines on November 26, 1991, adopting among others, the recommendation of
the Commission on Elections aforestated;

"WHEREAS, pursuant to, and in implementation of Republic Act 7166, particularly Section 3 thereof,
the Commission promulgated Resolution No. 2313, directing the Provincial Election Supervisors and
Election Registrars concerned to submit, after consultation, public hearings, and consensus-taking
with the different sectors in the community, the Project of District Apportionment of single legislative-
district provinces and municipalities in the Metro Manila area;chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREAS, the established criteria/guidelines in the determination of the district apportionment are
as follows: a. compactness, contiguity and adjacentness of territory; b. apportionment shall be based
on the 1990 census of population; c. no municipality, in the case of provinces, and no barangay, in
the case of cities and municipalities, shall be fragmented or apportioned into different districts."cralaw
virtua1aw library

This avowed policy of having sanggunian members elected by district is also manifest from the four
corners of Sec. 3 of R A. 7166. 8 Thus, a careful analysis of the provisions of Sec. 3 shows that the
purpose of districting/apportionment of the sanggunian seats is to reduce the number of positions to
be voted for in the May 11, 1992, synchronized elections and ensure the efficiency of electoral
process. Considering that the single-district provinces and the municipalities in the Metro Manila
Area, which are all single-districts, and under pars. (b) and (c) have already been apportioned into
two (2) districts, they will henceforth be electing the members of their Sangguniang Panlalawigan and
Sangguniang Bayan by district in the coming May 11, 1992, elections, although under par (d), the
single-district cities and all the municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area which are all likewise
single-districts, will have to continue electing at large the members of their Sangguniang Panlungsod
and Sangguniang Bayan as they have yet to be apportioned. But beginning the regular elections of
1995, they will all have to be elected by district. By then, COMELEC would have had enough time to
apportion the single-district cities and the municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area.

As they now stand in relation to the districting/apportionment of local government units for purposes
of election under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, it is clear that: (1) for provinces with two (2) or more legislative
districts contemplated in par. (a), they shall continue to be elected by district; (2) for provinces with
single legislative districts, as they have already been apportioned into two (2) districts each under par.
(b), they shall henceforth be elected likewise by district; (3) for cities with two (2) or more legislative
districts, e.g., the cities of Manila, Cebu and Davao, they shall also continue to be elected by district
under the first part of par. (c); and, (4) for the thirteen (13) municipalities in the Metro Manila Area,
which have already been apportioned into two (2) districts each under the second proviso of par. (c),
they shall likewise be elected by district in the regular elections of May 11, 1992.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary

Then, that should leave us the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single - district cities and the
Sangguniang Bayan of the municipalities outside Metro Manila, which remain single-districts not
having been ordered apportioned under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166. They will have to continue to be elected
at large in the May 11, 1992, elections, although starting 1995 they shall all be elected by district to
affect the full implementation of the letter and spirit of R.A. 7166. That is the true import of par. (d).
Consequently, as We view it, where he stands, petitioner must fall.

WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion, much less grave, on the part of respondent, and for
lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 78687 January 31, 1989

ELENA SALENILLAS AND BERNARDINO SALENILLAS, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HONORABLE RAYMUNDO SEVA, JUDGE OF
BRANCH 38 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CAMARINES NORTE and WILLIAM
GUERRA, respondents.

Jose L. Lapak for petitioners.

Jose T. Atienza for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari which seeks the reversal and setting aside of the decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals 2 dismissing the petition for certiorari against Judge Raymundo Seva of the Regional
Trial Court of Camarines Norte and the private respondent, William Guerra, involves a pure question
of law i.e., the coverage and application of Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended,
known otherwise as the Public Land Act.

The facts are undisputed.

The property subject matter of the case was formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-
1248, issued by virtue of Free Patent Application No. 192765, in favor of the spouses, Florencia H. de
Enciso and Miguel Enciso. The said original certificate of title was inscribed in the Registration Book
for the Province of Camarines Norte on December 10, 1961. On February 28, 1970, the patentees,
the Enciso spouses, by an Absolute Deed of Sale, sold the property in favor of the petitioners, the
spouses Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas for a consideration of P900.00. Petitioner Elena
Salenillas is a daughter of the Encisos. As a result of the aforementioned sale, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-8104 of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte was issued in the name of the
Salenillas, cancelling Original Certificate of Title No. P-1248. On June 30, 1971, the petitioners
mortgaged the property now covered by T.C.T. No. T-8104 with the Rural Bank of Daet, Inc. The
mortgage was subsequently released on November 22, 1973 after the petitioners paid the amount of
P1,000.00. Later, or on December 4, 1975, the petitioners again mortgaged the property, this time in
favor of the Philippine National Bank Branch, Daet, Camarines Norte as security for a loan of
P2,500.00.

For failure of the petitioners to pay their loan, extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding, pursuant to Act No.
3135, was instituted by the Philippine National Bank against the mortgage and the property was sold
at a public auction held on February 27, 1981. The private respondent, William Guerra, emerged as
the highest bidder in the said public auction and as a result thereof a "Certificate of Sale" was issued
to him by the Ex Officio Provincial Sheriff of Camarines Norte. Ultimately, on July 12, 1983, a
"Sheriff's Final Deed" was executed in favor of the private respondent.

On August 17,1983, the Philippine National Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of Camarines
Norte at Daet, a motion for a writ of possession. The public respondent, Judge Raymundo Seva of
the trial court, acting on the motion, issued on September 22, 1983 an order for the issuance of a writ
of possession in favor of the private respondent. When the deputy sheriff of Camarines Norte
however, attempted on November 17, 1983, to place the property in the possession of the private
respondent, the petitioners refused to vacate and surrender the possession of the same and instead
offered to repurchase it under Section 119 of the Public Land Act. On August 15, 1984, another
motion, this time for the issuance of an alias writ of possession was filed by the private respondent
with the trial court. The petitioners, on August 31, 1984, opposed the private respondents' motion and
instead made a formal offer to repurchase the property. Notwithstanding the petitioners' opposition
and formal offer, the trial court judge on October 12, 1984 issued the alias writ of possession prayed
for the private respondent. The petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the order but their motion
was denied.

Undeterred by their initial setback, the petitioners elevated the case to the respondent Court of
Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari claiming that the respondent trial court judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order dated October 12, 1984 granting the writ of possession,
and the order dated October 22, 1984, denying their motion for reconsider consideration.

In a resolution dated January 23, 1985, the respondent appellate court gave due course to the
petition; required the parties to submit simultaneous memoranda in support to their respective
positions; and restrained the trial court and the private respondent from executing, implementing or
otherwise giving effect to the assailed writ of possession until further orders from the
court. 3 However, in a decision promulgated on September 17, 1986, the respondent Court of Appeals
dismissed the case for lack of merit. According to the appellate court:

It must be noted that when the original owner, Florencia H. Enciso whose title, OCT No.
P-1248, was issued on August 9, 1961, executed a deed of absolute sale on February
28, 1970 of the property covered by said title to spouses Elena Salenillas and
Bernardino Salenillas, the five year period to repurchase the property provided for in
Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended could have already started.
Prom this fact alone, the petition should have been dismissed. However, granting that
the transfer from parent to child for a nominal sum may not be the "conveyance"
contemplated by the law. We will rule on the issue raised by the petitioners. 4

xxx xxx xxx

Applying the case of Monge, et al. vs. Angeles, et al., 5 the appellate court went on to hold that the
five-year period of the petitioners to repurchase under Section 119 of the Public Land Act had already
prescribed. The point of reckoning, ruled the respondent court in consonance with Monge is from the
date the petitioners mortgaged the property on December 4, 1973. Thus, when the petitioners made
their formal offer to repurchase on August 31, 1984, the period had clearly expired.

In an effort to still overturn the decision, the petitioners moved for reconsideration. Their motion
apparently went for naught because on May 7, 1987, the respondent appellate court resolved to deny
the same. Hence, this petition.

Before us, the petitioners maintain that contrary to the rulings of the courts below, their right to
repurchase within five years under Section 119 of the Public Land Act has not yet prescribed. To
support their contention, the petitioners cite the cases of Paras vs. Court of Appeals  6 and Manuel vs.
Philippine National Bank, et al. 7

On the other side, the private respondent, in support of the appellate court's decision, states that the
sale of the contested property by the patentees to the petitioners disqualified the latter from being
legal heirs vis-a-vis the said property. As such, they (the petitioners) no longer enjoy the right granted
to heirs under the provisions of Section 119 of the Public Land Act. 8
In fine, what need be determined and resolved here are: whether or not the petitioners have the right
to repurchase the contested property under Section 119 of the Public Land Act; and assuming the
answer to the question is in the affirmative, whether or not their right to repurchase had already
prescribed.

We rule for the petitioners. They are granted by the law the right to repurchase their property and
their right to do so subsists.

Section 119 of the Public Land Act, as amended, provides in full:

Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead
provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or
legal heirs within a period of five years from the date of the conveyance.

From the foregoing legal provision, it is explicit that only three classes of persons are bestowed the
right to repurchase — the applicant-patentee, his widow, or other legal heirs. Consequently, the
contention of the private respondent sustained by the respondent appellate court that the petitioners
do not belong to any of those classes of repurchasers because they acquired the property not
through inheritance but by sale, has no legal basis. The petitioners-spouses are the daughter and
son-in-law of the Encisos, patentees of the contested property. At the very least, petitioner Elena
Salenillas, being a child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the latter. As such, and even on this score
alone, she may therefore validly repurchase. This must be so because Section 119 of the Public Land
Act, in speaking of "legal heirs," makes no distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos.

Moreover, to indorse the distinction made by the private respondent and the appellate court would be
to contravene the very purpose of Section 119 of the Public Land Act which is to give the
homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the State
had gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor in clearing and cultivating it. 9 Considering that
petitioner Salenillas is a daughter of the spouses Florencia H. Enciso and Miguel Enciso, there is no
gainsaying that allowing her (Elena) and her husband to repurchase the property would be more in
keeping with the spirit of the law. We have time and again said that between two statutory
interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.

Guided by the same purpose of the law, and proceeding to the other issue here raised, we rule that
the five-year period for the petitioners to repurchase their property had not yet prescribed.

The case of Monge et al. vs. Angeles, et al., 10 cited as authority by the respondent Court of Appeals
is inapplicable to the present controversy. The facts obtaining there are substantially different from
those in this case. In Monge the conveyance involved was a pacto de retro sale and not a foreclosure
sale. More importantly, the question raised there was whether the five-year period provided for in
Section 119 "should be counted from the date of the sale even if the same is with an option to
repurchase or from the date the ownership of the land has become consolidated in favor of the
purchaser because of the homesteader's failure to redeem it. 11 It is therefore understandable why the
Court ruled there as it did. A sale on pacto de retro immediately vests title, ownership, and, generally
possession over the property on the vendee a retro, subject only to the right of the vendor a retro to
repurchase within the stipulated period. It is an absolute sale with a resolutory condition.

The cases 12 pointed to by the petitioner in support of their position, on the other hand, present facts
that are quite identical to those in the case at bar. Both cases involved properties the titles over which
were obtained either through homestead or free patent. These properties were mortgaged to a bank
as collateral for loans, and, upon failure of the owners to pay their indebtedness, the mortgages were
foreclosed. In both instances, the Court ruled that the five-year period to. repurchase a homestead
sold at public auction or foreclosure sale under Act 3135 begins on the day after the expiration of the
period of redemption when the deed of absolute sale is executed thereby formally transferring the
property to the purchaser, and not otherwise. Taking into account that the mortgage was foreclosed
and the mortgaged property sold at a public auction to the private respondent on February 27, 1981,
with the "Sheriff's Final Deed" issued on July 12, 1983, the two offers of the petitioners to repurchase
the first on November 17, 1983, and the second, formally, on August 31, 1984 were both made within
the prescribed five-year period.

Now, as regards the redemption price, applying Sec. 30 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
petitioners should reimburse the private respondent the amount of the purchase price at the public
auction plus interest at the rate of one per centum per month up to November 17, 1983, together with
the amounts of assessments and taxes on the property that the private respondent might have paid
after purchase and interest on the last named amount at the same rate as that on the purchase
price. 13

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 17, 1986, and the
Resolution dated May 7, 1987 of the Court of Appeals, and the Orders dated September 22, 1983,
October 12, 1984, and October 22, 1984 of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one ENTERED directing the private respondent to
reconvey the subject property and to execute the corresponding deed of reconveyance therefor in
favor of the petitioners upon the return to him by the latter of the purchase price and the amounts, if
any, of assessments or taxes he paid plus interest of one (1%) per centum per month on both
amounts up to November 17, 1983.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 93177               August 2, 1991

B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN, MARIELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, CAPT.
MANUEL ISON, COL. LUISITO SANCHEZ, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO, LTC. ARSENIO TECSON,
LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO, LTC. JACINTO
LIGOT LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PERA,
MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO, CAPT. DANILO
LIM, CAPT. ELMER AMON, CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, THE PTI INVESTIGATING PANEL
COMPOSED OF: COL. MANUEL S. MENDIOLA, COL. VIRTUD NORBERTO L. DAGZA MAJ.
FELIX V. BALDONADO and MAJ. ESTELITO L. PORNEA and GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO.
14 COMPOSED OF: B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL.
ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA and
CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, respondents.

No. 95020               August 2, 1991

B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMIMO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL.
ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T.
MALLILLIN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Q.C.,
LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA., respondents.

No. 96948               August 2, 1991

B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN. MARCELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO PN,
CAPT. MANUEL ISON PN, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO PN (M), LTC. ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC.
RAFAEL GALVEZ PA, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO PA, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO PA, LTC.
JACINTO LIGOT PA, LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER PA, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS PA, MAJ.
CESAR DE LA PENA PN (M): MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA PA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES PA,
CAPT. JAIME JUNIO PA, CAPT. DANILO LIM PA, CAPT. ELMER AMON PAF CAPT. VERGEL
NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL.
ROMEO ODI COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T.
MALLILLIN PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14, respondents.

No. 97454               August 2, 1991

AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RODOLFO BIAZON, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GEN.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL MAJOR GEN. CESAR NAZARENO and LT.
COL. ALBERTO OLARIO, Commanding Officer of the PNP/INP Detention
Center/Jail, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 86,
CAPTAIN REYNALDO S. RAFAEL, 1 LT SERVANDO A. BAOANAN PN(M), 1 LT. WILFREDO
JIMENEZ PAF 1 LT. ATANACIO T. MACALAN JR PMM 2LT ELISEO T. RASCO PC, 2LT JONAS
CALLEJA PC, 2LT JAIRUS JS GELVEZON III PMM 2LT JOSELITO CABREROS PMM 2LT
MEMEL ROJAS PN(M) and 2LT HERMINIO L. CANTACO PC, respondents.
Armando M. Marcelo and Rainier L. Madrid for petitioners Luisito Sanchez, Tiburcio Fusillero, Ericson
Aurelio, Levino Valencia, Danilo Arnon Vergel Nacino, Florencio Flores, Benigno Junio and Joey
Sarroza.
Manuel Q. Malvar for Rafael Galvez and Danny Lim.
Manuel E. Valenzuela for Arsenio Tecson
Mariano R. Santiago for Alfredo Oliveros.
Ricardo J.M. Rivera for Manuel Ison.
Castillo, Laman, Tan and Pantaleon for Danilo Pizarro.
Alfredo Lazaro for Romelino Gojo.
Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. for Jose Comendador.
Jonathan B.S. Rebong and Efren C. Carag for Marcelo Blando.
Pablito V. Sanidad for Franklin Brawner and Ericson Aurelio.
Efren C. Moncupa for All Tecson.
M.M. Lazaro & Associates for respondents Ligot and Ison .
Baldomero S.P. Gatbonton, Jr. for Jacinto Ligot.
Salvador B. Britanico for Cesar de la Pena.
Gilbert R.T. Reyes for Danilo Pizarro.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for petitioners in G.R. No. 93177.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same parties and
related issues arising from the same incident.

The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and
97454 are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged
participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989.

The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code (Murder).

In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, they are questioning
the conduct of the Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel constituted to investigate the charges against
them and the creation of the General Court Martial GCM convened to try them.

In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the legality of GCM No. 14,
seek certiorari against its ruling denying them the right to peremptory challenge as granted by Article
18 of Com. Act No. 408.

In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are
assailed on certiorari on the ground that he has no jurisdiction over GCM No. 14 and no authority
either to set aside its ruling denying bail to the private respondents.

In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City in a petition for habeas corpus directing the release of the private respondents. Jurisdictional
objections are likewise raised as in G.R. No. 95020.
 I

Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel had been
constituted pursuant to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990, to investigate the petitioners in
G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948. The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated January 30, 1990,
individually addressed to the petitioners, to wit:

You are hereby directed to appear in person before the undersigned Pre-Trial Investigating
Officers on 12 Feb 90 9:00 a.m. at Kiangan Hall, Camp Crame Quezon City, then and there to
submit your counter-affidavit and the affidavits of your witnesses, if any, in the pre-trial
investigation of the charge/charges against you for violence of AWs _______________. DO
NOT SUBMIT A MOTION TO DISMISS.

Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be
deemed a waiver of your right to submit controverting evidence.

On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn
statements of witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion.

At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds,
prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days within which to file their objections in writing This was
done through a Motion for Summary Dismissal dated February 21, 1990.

In a resolution dated February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5
days from notice to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.

On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration of the foregoing denial and the
PTI Panel gave them 7 days within which to reduce their motion to writing. This was done on March
14,1990.

The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by
Article of War 71, which provides:

Art. 71. Charges Action upon. — Charges and specifications must be signed by a person
subject to military law, and under the oath either that he has personal knowledge of, or has
investigated, the matters set forth therein and that the same are true in fact, to the best of his
knowledge and belief.

No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thorough and impartial
investigation thereof shall have been made. This investigation will include inquiries as to the
truth of the matter set forth in said charges, form of charges, and what disposition of the case
should be made in the interest of justice and discipline. At such investigation full opportunity
shall be given to the accused to cross-examine witnesses against him if they are available and
to present anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in defense or mitigation, and the
investigating officer shall examine available witnesses requested by the accused. If the
charges are forwarded after such investigation, they shall be accompanied by a statement of
the substance of the testimony taken on both sides. (Emphasis supplied.)

They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted merely of a roll call and that no
prosecution witnesses were presented to reaffirm their affidavits. while the motion for summary
dismissal was denied, the motion for reconsideration remains unresolved to date and they have not
been able to submit their counter-affidavits.
At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 96948 manifested that they were
exercising their right to raise peremptory challenges against the president and members of GCM
No.14. They invoked Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 for this purpose. GCM No. 14 ruled, however,
that peremptory challenges had been discontinued under P.D. No. 39.

In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied
by GCM No.14. He thereupon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition
for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction.
After considering the petition and the answer thereto filed by the president and members of GCM
No.14, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order granting provisional liberty to Ligot.

On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the order for his release and to
declare in contempt the commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail for disobey 'ng the said order. He later
also complained that Generals De Villa and Aguirre had refused to release him "pending final
resolution of the appeal to be taken" to this Court.

After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional liberty of Ligot, as well as of
intervenors Ltc Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros, and later of
additional intervenors Ltc Romelino Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison.

On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia:

(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting the right to bail to all
persons with the defined exception is applicable and covers all military men facing court-
martial proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed orders of General Court- Martial No. 14 denying
bail to petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken assumption that bail does not apply to
military men facing court-martial proceedings on the ground that there is no precedent, are
hereby set aside and declared null and void. Respondent General Court-Martial No. 14 is
hereby directed to conduct proceedings on the applications of bail of the petitioner, intervenors
and which may as well include other persons facing charges before General Court-Martial No.
14.

Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail before General Court-Martial No. 14, this
Court reiterates its orders of release on the provisional liberty of petitioner Jacinto Ligot as well
as intervenors Franklin Brawner and Arsenio Tecson.

On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with this Court a petition
for habeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The
petition was referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where it was raffled to respondent
Judge Antonio P. Solano. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the
petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.

II

The Court has examined the records of this case and rules as follows.

It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given several opportunities to
present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990,
and then again after the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until
March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for
reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. This they did on March 13, 1990.
The motion was in effect denied when the PTI Panel resolved to recommend that the charges be
referred to the General Court Martial for trial.

The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due process because the investigation
was resolved against them owing to their own failure to submit their counter-affidavits. They had been
expressly warned In the subpoena sent them that "failure to submit the aforementioned counter-
affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of (their) right to submit controverting
evidence." They chose not to heed the warning. As their motions appeared to be dilatory, the PTI
Panel was justified in referring the charges to GCM No. 14 without waiting for the petitioners to submit
their defense.

Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard.1âwphi1 If it is

not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights.

There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel. Moreover, it is
now settled that "even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-
martial of jurisdiction." We so held in Arula v. Espino,1 thus:

x x x           x x x          x x x

But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-martial
of jurisdiction.

The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it is directory, not mandatory, and
in no way affects the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 93 L
ed 986 (1949), the Court said:

We do not think that the pre-trial investigation procedure by Article 70 (The Philippine
counter-part is article of war 71, Commonwealth Act 408) can properly be construed as
an indispensable pre-requisite to the exercise of the Army General court martial
jurisdiction.. The Article does serve important functions in the administration of court-
martial procedures and does provide safeguards to an accused. Its language is clearly
such that a defendant could object to trial in the absence of the required investigation. In
that event the court-martial could itself postpone trial pending the investigation. And the
military reviewing authorities could consider the same contention, reversing a court-
martial conviction where failure to comply with Article 70 has substantially injured an
accused. But we are not persuaded that Congress intended to make otherwise valid
court-martial judgments wholly void because pre-trial investigations fall short of the
standards prescribed by Article 70. That Congress has not required analogous pre-trial
procedure for Navy court-martial is an indication that the investigatory plan was not
intended to be exalted to the jurisdictional level.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate General of the Army
did hold that where there had been no pre-trial investigation, court-martial proceedings
were void ab initio. But this holding has been expressly repudiated in later holdings of
the Judge Advocate General. This later interpretation has been that the pre-trial
requirements of Article 70 are directory, not mandatory, and in no way effect the
jurisdiction of a court-martial. The War Department's interpretation was pointedly called
to the attention of Congress in 1947 after which Congress amended Article 70 but left
 unchanged the language here under consideration. compensable pre-requisite to the
exercise of Army general court-martial jurisdiction

A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pretrial investigation under article of
war 71 would of course be altogether irregular but the court-martial might nevertheless have
jurisdiction. Significantly, this rule is similar to the one obtaining in criminal procedure in the
civil courts to the effect that absence of preliminary investigation does not go into the
jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings.

As to what law should govern the conduct of the preliminary investigation, that issue was resolved
more than two years ago in Kapunan v. De Villa,2 where we declared:

The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of petitioners, there was substantial compliance
with the requirements of law as provided in the Articles of War and P.D. No. 77, as amended
by P.D. No. 911. The amended charge sheets, charging petitioners and their co-respondents
with mutiny and conduct unbecoming an officer, were signed by Maj. Antonio Ruiz, a person
subject to military law, after he had investigated the matter through an evaluation of the
pertinent records, including the reports of respondent AFP Board of Officers, and was
convinced of the truth of the testimonies on record. The charge sheets were sworn to by Maj.
Ruiz, the "accuser," in accordance with and in the manner provided under Art. 71 of the
Articles of War. Considering that P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, is only of
suppletory application, the fact that the charge sheets were not certified in the manner
provided under said decrees, i.e., that the officer administering the oath has personally
examined the affiant and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood its
affidavit, does not invalidate said charge sheets. Thereafter, a "pretrial investigation" was
conducted by respondent Maj. Baldonado, wherein, pursuant to P.D. No. 77, as amended by
P.D. No. 911, petitioners were subpoenaed and required to file their counter-affidavit.
However, instead of doing so, they filed an untitled pleading seeking the dismissal of the
charges against them. That petitioners were not able to confront the witnesses against them
was their own doing, for they never even asked Maj. Baldonado to subpoena said witnesses
so that they may be made to answer clarificatory questions in accordance with P. D, No. 77, as
amended by P.D. No. 911.

The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not been constitute in accordance with Article 8 of
the Articles of War because General Order No. M-6, which supposedly convened the body, was not
signed by Gen. Renato de Villa as Chief of Staff.

Article of War No. 8 reads:

Art. 8. General Courts-Martial. — The President of the Philippines, the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of Constabulary and, when empowered by the
President, the commanding officer of a major command or task force, the commanding officer
of a division, the commanding officer of a military area, the superintendent of the Military
Academy, the commanding officer of a separate brigade or body of troops may appoint general
courts-martial; but when any such commander is the accuser or the prosecutor of the person
or persons to be tried, the court shall be appointed by superior competent authority. ...

While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not signed by Gen. De Villa, there is no doubt that he
authorized it because the order itself said it was issued "By Command of General De Villa" and it has
not been shown to be spurious. As observed by the Solicitor General, the Summary Disposition Form
showed that Gen. De Villa, as Chief of Staff, AFP, actually constituted GCM No. 14 and appointed its
president and members. It is significant that General De Villa has not disauthorized or revoked or in
any way disowned the said order, as he would certainly have done if his authority had been
improperly invoked. On the contrary, as the principal respondent in G.R. No. 93177, he sustained
General Order No. M 6 in the Comment filed for him and the other respondents by the Solicitor
General.

Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge, we note that this was originally provided for under
Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War), as amended by Rep. Act No. 242, on June 12, 1948,
to wit:

Art. 18. Challenges. — Members of general or special courts-martial may be challenged by the

accused or the trial judge advocate for cause stated to the court. The court shall determine the
relevancy and validity thereof, and shall not receive a challenge to more than one member at a
time. Challenges by the trial judge advocate shall ordinarily be presented and decided before
those by the accused are offered. Each side shall be entitled to the peremptory challenge, but
the law member of the court shall not be challenged except for cause.

The history of peremptory challenge was traced in Martelino v. Alejandro,3 thus:

In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the passage in 1935 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1 (otherwise known as the National Defense Act), except for a handful
of Philippine Scout officers and graduates of the United States military and naval academies
who were on duty with the Philippine Army, there was a complete dearth of officers learned in
military law, its aside from the fact that the officer corps of the developing army was
numerically made equate for the demands of the strictly military aspects of the national
defense program. Because of these considerations it was then felt that peremptory challenges
should not in the meanwhile be permitted and that only challenges for cause, in any number,
would be allowed. Thus Article 18 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408), as
worded on September 14, 1938, the date of the approval of the Act, made no mention or
reference to any peremptory challenge by either the trial judge advocate of a court- martial or
by the accused. After December 17,1958, when the Manual for Courts-Martial of the Philippine
Army became effective, the Judge Advocate General's Service of the Philippine Army
conducted a continuing and intensive program of training and education in military law,
encompassing the length and breadth of the Philippines. This program was pursued until the
outbreak of World War 11 in the Pacific on December 7, 1941. After the formal surrender of
Japan to the allies in 1945, the officer corps of the Armed Forces of the Philippines had
expanded to a very large number, and a great many of the officers had been indoctrinated in
military law. It was in these environmental circumstances that Article of War 18 was amended
on June 12,1948 to entitle "each side" to one peremptory challenge, with the sole proviso that
"the law member of court shall not be challenged except for cause.

On September 27,1972, President Marcos issued General Order No. 8, empowering the Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military personnel and
such other cases as may be referred to them.

On November 7,1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation, Composition,

Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant to military Tribunals). This decree disallowed the
peremptory challenge, thus:

No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. Challenges for cause may be entertained to insure
impartiality and good faith. Challenges shall immediately be heard and determined by a
majority of the members excluding the challenged member. A tie vote does not disqualify the
challenged member. A successfully challenged member shall be immediately replaced.
On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1498, or the National Security Code,
which was a compilation and codification of decrees, general orders, LOI and policies intended "to
meet the continuing threats to the existence, security and stability of the State." The modified rule on
challenges under P.D. No. 39 was embodied in this decree.

On January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of the
state of martial law throughout the Philippines. The proclamation revoked General Order No. 8 and
declared the dissolution of the military tribunals created pursuant thereto upon final determination of
the cases pending therein.

P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and the other general orders mentioned
therein. With the termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created
thereunder, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.

It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself
ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio
legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul.

Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in L P.D. No. 39
became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of
Proclamation No. 2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was
automatically revived and now again allows the right to peremptory challenge.

We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the right to peremptory challenge
remains withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn when
martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so withdrawn, it could still be
considered no longer operative, having been cast out under the new dispensation as, in the words of
the Freedom Constitution, one of the "iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime.

The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments of martial law. It is curious that the
present government should invoke the rules of that discredited body to justify its action against the
accused officers.

The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory challenge may be exploited by a
respondent in a court-martial trial to delay the proceedings and defer his deserved Punishment. It is
hoped that the accused officers in the cases at bar will not be so motivated. At any rate, the wisdom
of Com. Act No. 408, in the light of present circumstances, is a matter addressed to the law-makers
and not to this Court. The judiciary can only interpret and apply the laws without regard to its own
misgivings on their adverse effects. This is a problem only the political departments can resolve.

The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question the propriety of the petition for certiorari and
mandamus and the petition for habeas corpus filed by the private respondents with the Regional Trial
Courts of Quezon City. It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed
Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order
their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings.

The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 1 29, the Court of Appeals is vested with
"exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of
Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions." Rather
irrelevantly, the petitioners also cite the case of Yang v. Court of Appeals4 where this Court held that
"appeals from the Professional Regulation Commission are now exclusively cognizable by the Court
of Appeals.
It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the case cited refer to ordinary appeals and not to
the remedies employed by the accused officers before the respondent courts.

In Martelino, we observed as follows:

It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power over the
proceedings of courts-martial, and that mere errors in their proceedings are not open to
consideration. The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction. But it is equally true that in the
exercise of their undoubted discretion, courts-martial may commit such an abuse of discretion
— what in the language of Rule 65 is referred to as "grave abuse of discretion" — as to give
rise to a defect in their jurisdiction. This is precisely the point at issue in this action suggested
by its nature as one for certiorari and prohibition ... .

The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on
petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.5 In the absence of a law providing that the decisions,
orders and ruling of a court-martial or the Office of the Chief of Staff can be questioned only before
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, we hold that the Regional Trial Court can exercise
similar jurisdiction.

We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally
not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied
in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where we observed that "the right to a speedy
trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.

The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows:

The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the
constitutional coverage on the right to bail.

Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the
framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government
for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected
from the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of and against
the existing political system.

x x x           x x x          x x x

National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court that release
on bail of respondents constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say 1,000
putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25,1990 Order
were sustained, on "provisional" bail. The sheer number alone is already discomforting. But,
the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which could
very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court,
and replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of government and
justice.

The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection clause
is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated
and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The
accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But
they cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right
that is extended to civilians.

On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 that they had not been charged after
more than one year from their arrest, our finding is that there was substantial compliance with the
requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial.

The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with this Court on February 18, 1991, and was
referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for raffle, hearing and decision. It was heard on
February 26, 1991, by the respondent court, where the petitioners submitted the charge
memorandum and specifications against the private respondents dated January 30, 1991. On
February 12, 1991, pursuant to Office Order No. 31-91, the PTI panel was created and initial
investigation was scheduled on March 12, 1991 at 2:00 p.m. On March 20, 1991, the private
respondents received the copies of the charges, charge sheets and specifications and were required
to submit their counter-affidavits on or before April 11, 1991. There was indeed a delay of more than
one year in the investigation and preparation of the charges against the private respondents.
However, this was explained by the Solicitor General thus:

... The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete it pre-charge investigation
only after one (1) year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were
involved in the failed coup. All of them, as well as other witnesses, had to be interviewed or
investigated, and these inevitably took months to finish. The pre-charge investigation was
rendered doubly difficult by the fact that those involved were dispersed and scattered
throughout the Philippines. In some cases, command units, such as the Scout Rangers, have
already been disbanded. After the charges were completed, the same still had to pass review
and approval by the AFP Chief of Staff.

While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless must reiterate the following admonition:

This Court as protector of the rights of the people, must stress the point that if the participation
of petitioner in several coup attempts for which he is confined on orders of Adjutant General
Jorge Agcaoili cannot be established and no charges can be filed against him or the existence
of a prima facie case warranting trial before a military commission is wanting, it behooves
respondent then Major General Rodolfo Biazon (now General) to release petitioner.
Respondents must also be reminded that even if a military officer is arrested pursuant to
Article 70 of then Articles of War, indefinite confinement is not sanctioned, as Article 71 thereof
mandates that immediate steps must be taken to try the person accused or to dissmiss the
charge and release him. Any officer who is responsible for unnecessary delay in investigating
or carrying the case to a final conclusion may even be punished as a court martial may direct. 6

It should be noted, finally, that after the decision was rendered by Judge Solano on February 26,
1991, the government filed a notice of appeal ad cautelam and a motion for reconsideration, the latter
was ultimately denied, after hearing, on March 4, 1991. The 48- hour period for appeal under Rule 41,
Section 18, of the Rules of Court did not run until after notice of such denial was received by the
petitioners on March 12, 1991. Contrary to the private respondents' contention, therefore, the
decision had not yet become final and executory when the special civil action in G.R. No. 97454 was
filed with this Court on March 12, 1991.

III

Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well to reiterate the following observations of the
Court in Arula:
 The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of judgment and discretion (AW
71). A petition for certiorari, in order to prosper, must be based on jurisdictional grounds
because, as long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in
the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be
reviewed or corrected only by appeal. Even an abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to
justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.

As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not acted with grave abuse of
discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the Court and the reversal
of the acts complained of by the petitioners. Such action is indicated, however, in G.R. No. 96948,
where we find that the right to peremptory challenge should not have been denied, and in G.R. Nos.
95020 and 97454, where the private respondents should not have been ordered released.

ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948,
the petition is GRANTED, and the respondents are DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise the
right of peremptory challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454,
the petitions are also GRANTED, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the
private respondents are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992

LYDIA O. CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION and THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, Republic Act No. 6683 was
approved on 2 December 1988 providing for benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation
from the government service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed
qualified to avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act, as follows:

Sec. 2. Coverage. — This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the
National Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters, as well as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits
authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency
employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive
years of government service as of the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the
coverage of this Act.

Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an
application on 30 January 1989 with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which,
however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2)
month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980. A recourse by petitioner to the
Civil Service Commission yielded negative results. 1 Her letter for reconsideration dated 25 April 1989
pleaded thus:

xxx xxx xxx

With due respect, I think the interpretation of the Honorable Commissioner of RA 6683
does not conform with the beneficent purpose of the law. The law merely requires that a
government employee whether regular, temporary, emergency, or casual, should have
two consecutive years of government service in order to be entitled to its benefits. I
more than meet the requirement. Persons who are not entitled are consultants, experts
and contractual(s). As to the budget needed, the law provides that the Department of
Budget and Management will shoulder a certain portion of the benefits to be allotted to
government corporations. Moreover, personnel of these NIA special projects art entitled
to the regular benefits, such (sic) leaves, compulsory retirement and the like. There is
no reason why we should not be entitled to RA 6683.

xxx xxx xxx 2

Denying the plea for reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) emphasized:

xxx xxx xxx

 We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted. The provision of Section
3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 does not only require an applicant to
have two years of satisfactory service on the date of separation/retirement but further
requires said applicant to be on a casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment
status as of December 2, 1988, the date of enactment of R.A. 6683. The law does not
contemplate contractual employees in the coverage.

Inasmuch as your employment as of December 31, 1988, the date of your separation
from the service, is co-terminous with the NIA project which is contractual in nature, this
Commission shall sustain its original decision.

xxx xxx xxx3

In view of such denial, petitioner is before this Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari,
insisting that she is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683. Her arguments:

It is submitted that R.A. 6683, as well as Section 3.1 of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular
Letter No. 89-1 requires an applicant to be on a casual, emergency, temporary or
regular employment status. Likewise, the provisions of Section 23 (sic) of the Joint
DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-1, implementing guidelines of R.A. No. 6683, provides:

"2.3 Excluded from the benefits under R.A. No. 6683 are the following:

a) Experts and Consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to

perform specific activities or services with a definite expected output: i.e.
membership in Task Force, Part-Time, Consultant/Employees.

b) Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including

those of the Philippine Constabulary and Integrated National Police (PC-
INP).

c) Appointive officials and employees who retire or elect to be separated

from the service for optional retirement with gratuity under R.A. No. 1616,
4968 or with pension under R.A. No. 186, as amended by R.A. No. 6680
or P.D. No. 1146, an amended, or vice- versa.

d) Officials and employees who retired voluntarily prior to the enactment of

this law and have received the corresponding benefits of that
retirement/separation.

e) Officials and employees with pending cases punishable by mandatory

separation from the service under existing civil service laws, rules and
regulations; provided that if such officials and employees apply in writing
within the prescriptive period for the availment of the benefits herein
authorized, shall be allowed only if acquitted or cleared of all charges and
their application accepted and approved by the head of office concerned."

Based on the above exclusions, herein petitioner does not belong to any one of them.
Ms. Chua is a full time employee of NIA entitled to all the regular benefits provided for
by the Civil Service Commission. She held a permanent status as Personnel Assistant
A, a position which belongs to the Administrative Service. . . . If casuals and emergency
employees were given the benefit of R.A. 6683 with more reason that this petitioner who
 was holding a permanent status as Personnel Assistant A and has rendered almost 15
years of faithful, continuous service in the government should be similarly rewarded by
the beneficient (sic) purpose of the law. 4

The NIA and the Civil Service Commission reiterate in their comment petitioner's exclusion from the
benefits of Republic Act No. 6683, because:

1. Petitioner's employment is co-terminous with the project per appointment papers kept by the
Administrative Service in the head office of NIA (the service record was issued by the Watershed
Management and Erosion Control Project (WMECP), Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija). The project,
funded by the World Bank, was completed as of 31 December 1988, after which petitioner's position
became functus officio.

2. Petitioner is not a regular and career employee of NIA — her position is not included in its regular
plantilla. She belongs to the non-career service (Sec. 6, P.D. No. 807) which is inherently short-lived,
temporary and transient; on the other hand, retirement presupposes employment for a long period.
The most that a non-career personnel can expect upon the expiration of his employment is financial
assistance. Petitioner is not even qualified to retire under the GSIS law.

3. Assuming arguendo that petitioner's appointment is permanent, security of tenure is available only

for the term of office (i.e., duration of project).

4. The objective of Republic Act No. 6683 is not really to grant separation or retirement benefits but
reorganization 5 to streamline government functions. The application of the law must be made
consistent with the purpose for which it was enacted. Thus, as the expressed purpose of the law is to
reorganize the government, it will not have any application to special projects such as the WMECP
which exists only for a short and definite period. This being the nature of special projects, there is no
necessity for offering its personnel early retirement benefits just to induce voluntary separation as a
step to reorganization. In fact, there is even no need of reorganizing the WMECP considering its short
and limited life-span. 6

5. The law applies only to employees of the national government, government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters and local government units.

Due to the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting interpretations of the parties, the Court is called
upon to define the different classes of employees in the public sector (i.e. government civil servants).

Who are regular employees? The Labor Code in Art. 280 (P.D. No. 492, as amended) deems an
employment regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. No equivalent definition can be
found in P.D.No. 807 (promulgated on 6 October 1975, which superseded the Civil Service Act of
1965 — R.A. No. 2260) or in the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292 promulgated
on 25 July 1987). The Early Retirement Law itself (Rep. Act No. 6683) merely includes such class of
employees (regular employees) in its coverage, unmindful that no such specie is employed in the
public sector.

The appointment status of government employees in the career service is classified as follows:

1. permanent — one issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to which
appointment is made, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Act and the Rules and
Standards promulgated in pursuance thereof; 7
2. temporary — In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes necessary in the public
interest to fill a vacancy, a temporary appointment should be issued to a person who meets all the
requirements for the position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil service
eligibility: Provided, That such temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months, but the
appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available. 8

The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes the Career Service as:

(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate
examination is required;

(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these
include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific
and technical positions in scientific or research institutions which shall establish and
maintain their own merit systems;

(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant

Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant
Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as
may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by
the President.

(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are appointed
by the President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign
Affairs;

(5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a
separate merit system;

(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing

governmental or proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career service; and

(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled. 9

The Non-Career Service, on the other hand, is characterized by:

. . . (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized
for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or
which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or
which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was
made.

Included in the non-career service are:

1. elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;

2. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure
of the President and their personal confidential staff(s);

3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and
their personal or confidential staff;
 4. contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in
accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job requiring special
or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a
specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year and performs or accomplishes
the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and
supervision from the hiring agency.

5. emergency and seasonal personnel. 10

There is another type of non-career employee:

Casual — where and when employment is not permanent but occasional, unpredictable,
sporadic and brief in nature (Caro v. Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70; Manuel v. P.P. Gocheco
Lumber Co., 96 Phil. 945)

Consider petitioner's record of service:

Service with the government commenced on 2 December 1974 designated as a laborer

holding emergency status with the NIA — Upper Pampanga River Project, R & R
Division. 11 From 24 March 1975 to 31 August 1975, she was a research aide
with temporary status on the same project. On 1 September 1975 to 31 December
1976, she was with the NIA-FES III; R & R Division, then on 1 January 1977 to 31 May
1980, she was with NIA — UPR IIS (Upper Pampanga River Integrated Irrigation
Systems) DRD. On 1 June 1980, she went to NIA — W.M.E.C.P. (Watershed
Management & Erosion Control Project) retaining the status of temporary employee.
While with this project, her designation was changed to personnel assistant on 5
November 1981; starting 9 July 1982, the status became permanent until the
completion of the project on 31 December 1988. The appointment paper 12 attached to
the OSG's comment lists her status as co-terminus with the Project.

The employment status of personnel hired under foreign — assisted projects is considered co-
terminous, that is, they are considered employees for the duration of the project or until the
completion or cessation of said project (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 39, S. 1990, 27 June 1990).

Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and benefits regular, temporary,

casual and emergency employees who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years
government service.

Resolution No. 87-104 of the CSC, 21 April 1987, provides:

WHEREAS, pursuant to Executive Order No. 966 dated June 22, 1984, the Civil Service
Commission is charged with the function of determining creditable services for retiring
officers and employees of the national government;

WHEREAS, Section 4 (b) of the same Executive Order No. 966 provides that all
previous services by an officer/employee pursuant to a duly approved appointment to a
position in the Civil Service are considered creditable services, while Section 6 (a)
thereof states that services rendered on contractual, emergency or casual status are
non-creditable services;
 WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the aforesaid provisions inasmuch as some
contractual, emergency or casual employment are covered by contracts or
appointments duly approved by the Commission.

NOW, therefore, the Commission resolved that services rendered on contractual,

emergency or casual status, irrespective of the mode or manner of payment therefor
shall be considered as creditable for retirement purposes subject to the following
conditions: (emphasis provided)

1. These services are supported by approved appointments, official

records and/or other competent evidence. Parties/agencies concerned
shall submit the necessary proof of said services;

2. Said services are on full time basis and rendered prior to June 22,
1984, the effectivity date of Executive Order No. 966; and

3. The services for the three (3) years period prior to retirement are
continuous and fulfill the service requirement for retirement.

What substantial differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency, seasonal, project, co-
terminous or contractual personnel? All are tenurial employees with no fixed term, non-career, and
temporary. The 12 May 1989 CSC letter of denial 13 characterized herein petitioner's employment
as co-terminous with the NIA project which in turn was contractual in nature. The OSG says
petitioner's status is co-terminous with the Project. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 1991
(5 April 1991) characterizes the status of a co-terminous employee —

(3) Co-terminous status shall be issued to a person whose entrance in the service is

characterized by confidentiality by the appointing authority or that which is subject to his
pleasure or co-existent with his tenure.

The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be further classified into the following:

a) co-terminous with the project — When the appointment is co-existent

with the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was
made or subject to the availability of funds for the same;

b) co-terminous with the appointing authority — when appointment is co-

existent with the tenure of the appointing authority.

c) co-terminous with the incumbent — when appointment is co-existent

with the appointee, in that after the resignation, separation or termination
of the services of the incumbent the position shall be deemed
automatically abolished; and

d) co-terminous with a specific period, e.g. "co-terminous for a period of 3

years" — the appointment is for a specific period and upon expiration
thereof, the position is deemed abolished.

It is stressed, however, that in the last two classifications (c) and (d), what is termed co-
terminous is the position, and not the appointee-employee. Further, in (c) the security of
tenure of the appointee is guaranteed during his incumbency; in (d) the security of
tenure is limited to a specific period.
A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency employees. We
see no solid reason why the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the
former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early
retirement to regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees. But specifically excluded from
the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued
that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The legislature would not have made a specific
enumeration in a statute had not the intention been to restrict its meaning and confine its terms and
benefits to those expressly mentioned 14 or casus omissus pro omisso habendus est — A person,
object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. 15 Yet
adherence to these legal maxims can result in incongruities and in a violation of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.

The case of Fegurin, et al. v. NLRC, et al.,  16 comes to mind where, workers belonging to a work
pool, hired and re-hired continuously from one project to another were considered non-project-regular
and permanent employees.

Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four (4) successive projects during a span of fifteen
(15) years. Although no proof of the existence of a work pool can be assumed, her service record
cannot be disregarded.

Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."

. . . In Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, We ruled that the equal protection
clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a
reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable
where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these
are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present
conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the
present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. 17

Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection
clause were we to sustain respondents' submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a
class of government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by said law. The maxim
of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not be the applicable maxim in this case but the
doctrine of necessary implication which holds that:

No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application.
There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at
the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide
for the unfolding events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is
enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine
of necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much
a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to
contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or
to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all
such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from
its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is
deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater
includes the lesser, expressed in the Maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus. 18
During the sponsorship speech of Congressman Dragon (re: Early Retirement Law), in response to
Congressman Dimaporo's interpellation on coverage of state university employees who are extended
appointments for one (1) year, renewable for two (2) or three (3) years, 19 he explained:

This Bill covers only those who would like to go on early retirement and voluntary
separation. It is irrespective of the actual status or nature of the appointment one
received, but if he opts to retire under this, then he is covered.

It will be noted that, presently Pending in Congress, is House Bill No. 33399 (a proposal to extend the
scope of the Early Retirement Law). Its wording supports the submission that Rep. Act No. 6683
indeed overlooked a qualified group of civil servants. Sec. 3 of said House bill, on coverage of early
retirement, would provide:

Sec. 3. Coverage. — It will cover all employees of the national government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, as well as the personnel of all local
government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular,
temporary, casual, emergency and contractual employees, regardless of age, who have
rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years government service as of the date
of separation. The term "contractual employees" as used in this Act does not include
experts and consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to perform specific
activities or services with definite expected output.

Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including those of the PC-
INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act. (emphasis supplied)

The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law is to trim the bureaucracy, hence,
vacated positions are deemed abolished upon early/voluntary retirement of their occupants. Will the
inclusion of co-terminous personnel (like the petitioner) defeat such objective? In their case, upon
termination of the project and separation of the project personnel from the service, the term of
employment is considered expired, the office functus officio. Casual, temporary and contractual
personnel serve for shorter periods, and yet, they only have to establish two (2) years of continuous
service to qualify. This, incidentally, negates the OSG's argument that co-terminous or project
employment is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient, whereas, retirement presupposes
employment for a long period. Here, violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution
becomes glaring because casuals are not even in the plantilla, and yet, they are entitled to the
benefits of early retirement. How can the objective of the Early Retirement Law of trimming the
bureaucracy be achieved by granting early retirement benefits to a group of employees (casual)
without plantilla positions? There would, in such a case, be no abolition of permanent positions or
streamlining of functions; it would merely be a removal of excess personnel; but the positions remain,
and future appointments can be made thereto.

Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered years of continuous
service should be included in the coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as long as they file their
application prior to the expiration of their term, and as long as they comply with CSC regulations
promulgated for such purpose. In this connection, Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1990 (5
March 1990) implementing Rep. Act No. 6850, 20 requires, as a condition to qualify for the grant of
eligibility, an aggregate or total of seven (7) years of government service which need not be
continuous, in the career or non-career service, whether appointive, elective, casual, emergency,
seasonal, contractual or co-terminous including military and police service, as evaluated and
confirmed by the Civil Service Commission. 21 A similar regulation should be promulgated for the
inclusion in Rep. Act No. 6683 of co-terminous personnel who survive the test of time. This would be
in keeping with the coverage of "all social legislations enacted to promote the physical and mental
well-being of public servants"22 After all, co-terminous personnel, are also obligated to the
government for GSIS contributions, medicare and income tax payments, with the general
disadvantage of transience.

In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of
petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683 is unreasonable,
unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a
reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law. While the application was filed after
expiration of her term, we can give allowance for the fact that she originally filed the application on
her own without the assistance of counsel. In the interest of substantial justice, her application must
be granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2) years — the minimum
requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental
projects.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

Let this case be remanded to the CSC-NIA for a favorable disposition of petitioner's application for
early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683, in accordance with the pronouncements in this
decision.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-37251 August 31, 1981

CITY OF MANILA and CITY TREASURER, petitioners-appellants,

vs.
JUDGE AMADOR E. GOMEZ of the Court of First Instance of Manila and ESSO PHILIPPINES,
INC., respondents-appellees.

AQUINO, J.:

This case is about the legality of the additional one-half percent (½%) realty tax imposed by the City
of Manila.

Section 64 of the Revised Charter of Manila, Republic Act No. 409, which took effect on June 18,
1949, fixes the annual realty tax at one and one-half percent (1-½ %).

On the other hand, section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law, Republic Act No. 5447, which took
effect on January 1, 1969, imposed "an annual additional tax of one per centum on the assessed
value of real property in addition to the real property tax regularly levied thereon under existing laws"
but "the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per centrum.

That maximum limit gave the municipal board of Manila the Idea of fixing the realty tax at three
percent. So, by means of Ordinance No. 7125, approved by the city mayor on December 26, 1971
and effective beginning the third quarter of 1972, the board imposed an additional one-half percent
realty tax. The ordinance reads:

SECTION 1. An additional annual realty tax of one-half percent (1/2%), or in short a

total of three percent (3%) realty tax (1-½% pursuant to the Revised Charter of Manila;
1% per Republic Act No. 5447; and ½% per this Ordinance) on the assessed value ... is
hereby levied and imposed.

Esso Philippines, Inc. paid under protest the sum of P16,092.69 as additional one-half percent realty
tax for the third quarter of 1972 on its land and machineries located in Manila.

On November 9, 1972, Esso filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the recovery
of the said amount. It contended that the additional one-half percent tax is void because it is not
authorized by the city charter nor by any law (Civil Case No. 88827).

After hearing, the trial court declared the tax ordinance void and ordered the city treasurer of Manila
to refund to Esso the said tax. The City of Manila and its treasurer appealed to this Court under
Republic Act No. 5440 (which superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of Court).

The only issue is the validity of the tax ordinance or the legality of the additional one-half percent
realty tax.

The petitioners in their manifestation of March 17, 1981 averred that the said tax ordinance is still in
force; that Ordinance No. 7566, which was enacted on September 10, 1974, imposed a two percent
tax on commercial real properties (like the real properties of Esso and that that two percent tax plus
the one percent tax under the Special Education Fund Law gives a total of three percent realty tax on
commercial properties.
Esso Philippines, Inc., now Petrophil Corporation, in its manifestation of March 2, 1981, revealed that
up to this time it has been paying the additional one-half percent tax and that from 1975 to 1980 it
paid the total sum of P4,206,240.71 as three percent tax on its real properties.

In this connection, it is relevant to note that section 39(2) of the Real Property Tax Code, Presidential
Decree No. 464, which took effect on June 1, 1974, provides that a city council may, by ordinance,
impose a realty tax "of not less than one half of one percent but not more than two percent of the
assessed value of real property".

Section 41 of the said Code reaffirms the one percent tax on real property for the Special Education
Fund in addition to the basic two percent realty tax.

So, there is no question now that the additional one-half percent realty tax is valid under the Real
Property Tax Code. What is in controversy is the legality of the additional one-half percent realty tax
for the two-year period from the third quarter of 1972 up to the second quarter of 1974.

We hold that the doctrine of implications in statutory construction sustains the City of Manila's
contention that the additional one-half percent realty tax is sanctioned by the provision in section 4 of
the Special Education Fund Law that "the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of
three per centum.

The doctrine of implications means that "that which is plainly implied in the language of a statute is as
much a part of it as that which is expressed" (In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41, 45, 90; 82 C.J.S. 632,
73 Am Jur 2nd 404).

While the 1949 Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty tax at one and a half percent, on the other
hand, the 1968 Special Education Fund Law definitively fixed three percent as the maximum real
property tax of which one percent would accrue to the Special Education Fund.

The obvious implication is that an additional one-half percent tax could be imposed by municipal
corporations. Inferentially, that law fixed at two percent the realty tax that would accrue to a city or
municipality.

And the fact that the 1974 Real Property Tax Code specifically fixes the real property tax at two
percent confirms the prior intention of the lawmaker to impose two percent as the realty tax proper.
That was also the avowed intention of the questioned ordinance.

In invalidating the ordinance, the trial court upheld the view of Esso Philippines, Inc, that the Special
Education Fund Law refers to a contingency where the application of the additional one percent realty
tax would have the effect of raising the total realty tax to more than three percent and that it cannot be
construed as an authority to impose an additional realty tax beyond the one percent fixed by the said
law.

At first glance, that appears to be a specious or reasonable contention. But the fact remains that the
city charter fixed the realty tax at 1-½% and the later law, the Special Education Fund Law, provides
for three percent as the maximum realty tax of which one percent would be earmarked for the
education fund.

The unavoidable inference is that the later law authorized the imposition of an additional one-half
percent realty tax since the contingency referred to by the complaining taxpayer would not arise in the
City of Manila.
It is true, as contended by the taxpayer, that the power of a municipal corporation to levy a tax should
be expressly granted and should not be merely inferred. But in this case, the power to impose a realty
tax is not controverted. What is disputed is the amount thereof, whether one and one-half percent
only or two percent. (See sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 2264.)

As repeatedly observed, section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law, as confirmed by the Real
Property Tax Code, in prescribing a total realty tax of three percent impliedly authorizes the
augmentation by one-half percent of the pre-existing one and one- half percent realty tax.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is reversed and set aside. The complaint of Esso
Philippines, Inc. for recovery of the realty tax paid under protest is dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 14129             July 31, 1962

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.

Padilla Law Office for defendant-appellee.

REGALA, J.:

This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
dismissing the information against the defendant.

The records show that the statement of the case and the facts, as recited in the brief of plaintiff-
appellant, is complete and accurate. The same is, consequently, here adopted, to wit:

In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance of
that Province, defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the
finding a probable cause that the crime charged as committed by defendant. Thereafter, the
trial started upon defendant's plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information
on the ground that as justice of the peace the defendant is one of the officers enumerated in
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding
that a justice of the peace is within the purview Section 54. A second motion was filed by
defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs.
Macaraeg, (CA-G.R. No. 15613-R, 54 Off. Gaz., pp. 1873-76) where it was held that a justice
of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
Acting on this second motion to dismiss, the answer of the prosecution, the reply of the
defense, and the opposition of the prosecution, the lower court dismissed the information
against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense.

Both parties are submitting this case upon the determination of this single question of law: Is a justice
the peace included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code?

Section 54 of the said Code reads:

No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the
Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no
classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any
manner in a election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve
public peace, if he is a peace officer.

Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended among the officers
enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. He submits the aforecited section was taken
from Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, which provided the following:

SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. — No judge of the First Instance,
justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee
of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall
aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part therein
otherwise than exercising the right to vote.
When, therefore, section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words "justice of the peace,"
the omission revealed the intention of the Legislature to exclude justices of the peace from its
operation.

The above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. It is to be noted that under Section 449 of the
Revised Administrative Code, the word "judge" was modified or qualified by the phrase "of First
instance", while under Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, no such modification exists. In other
words, justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative
Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance and justice
of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity therefore to include justices of the
peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader
term, "judge." It was a term not modified by any word or phrase and was intended to comprehend all
kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, Judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations,
judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.

It is a well known fact that a justice of the peace is sometimes addressed as "judge" in this
jurisdiction. It is because a justice of the peace is indeed a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by
virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority (U.S. v. Clark, 25 Fed. Cas. 441, 422). According
to Bouvier Law Dictionary, "a judge is a public officer lawfully appointed to decide litigated questions
according to law. In its most extensive sense the term includes all officers appointed to decide
litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is
said, who are judges of facts."

A review of the history of the Revised Election Code will help to justify and clarify the above
conclusion.

The first election law in the Philippines was Act 1582 enacted by the Philippine Commission in 1907,
and which was later amended by Act. Nos. 1669, 1709, 1726 and 1768. (Of these 4 amendments,
however, only Act No. 1709 has a relation to the discussion of the instant case as shall be shown
later.) Act No. 1582, with its subsequent 4 amendments were later on incorporated Chapter 18 of the
Administrative Code. Under the Philippine Legislature, several amendments were made through the
passage of Acts Nos. 2310, 3336 and 3387. (Again, of these last 3 amendments, only Act No. 3587
has pertinent to the case at bar as shall be seen later.) During the time of the Commonwealth, the
National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 23 and later on enacted Commonwealth Act No.
357, which was the law enforced until June 1947, when the Revised Election Code was approved.
Included as its basic provisions are the provisions of Commonwealth Acts Nos. 233, 357, 605, 666,
657. The present Code was further amended by Republic Acts Nos. 599, 867, 2242 and again, during
the session of Congress in 1960, amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 3036 and 3038. In the history of our
election law, the following should be noted:

Under Act 1582, Section 29, it was provided:

No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for elections, nor shall he be eligible during
the time that he holds said public office to election at any municipal, provincial or Assembly
election, except for reelection to the position which he may be holding, and no judge of the
First Instance, justice of the peace, provincial fiscal, or officer or employee of the Philippine
Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner
or take part in any municipal, provincial, or Assembly election under the penalty of being
deprived of his office and being disqualified to hold any public office whatsoever for a term of 5
year: Provide, however, That the foregoing provisions shall not be construe to deprive any
person otherwise qualified of the right to vote it any election." (Enacted January 9, 1907; Took
effect on January 15, 1907.)
Then, in Act 1709, Sec. 6, it was likewise provided:

. . . No judge of the First Instance, Justice of the peace provincial fiscal or officer or employee
of the Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or
influence in any manner to take part in any municipal provincial or Assembly election. Any
person violating the provisions of this section shall be deprived of his office or employment and
shall be disqualified to hold any public office or employment whatever for a term of 5 years,
Provided, however, that the foregoing provisions shall not be construed to deprive any person
otherwise qualified of the right to vote at any election. (Enacted on August 31, 1907; Took
effect on September 15, 1907.)

Again, when the existing election laws were incorporated in the Administrative Code on March 10,
1917, the provisions in question read:

SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. — No judge of the First Instance,
justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee
of the Philippine Constabulary or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall
aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part therein
otherwise than exercising the right to vote. (Emphasis supplied)

After the Administrative Code, the next pertinent legislation was Act No. 3387. This Act reads:

SEC. 2636. Officers and employees meddling with the election. — Any judge of the First
Instance, justice of the peace, treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province, any officer or
employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the police of any municipality, or any officer or
employee of any Bureau of the classified civil service, who aids any candidate or violated in
any manner the provisions of this section or takes part in any election otherwise by exercising
the right to vote, shall be punished by a fine of not less than P100.00 nor more than P2,000.00,
or by imprisonment for not less than 2 months nor more than 2 years, and in all cases by
disqualification from public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage for a period of 5 years.
(Approved December 3, 1927.) (Emphasis supplied.)

Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act No. 357 was enacted on August 22, 1938. This law
provided in Section 48:

SEC. 48. Active Interventation of Public Officers and Employees. — No justice, judge, fiscal,
treasurer or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, the Constabulary of
the national, provincial, municipal or rural police, and no classified civil service officer or
employee shall aid any candidate, nor exert influence in any manner in any election nor take
part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace
officer.

This last law was the legislation from which Section 54 of the Revised Election Code was taken.

It will thus be observed from the foregoing narration of the legislative development or history of
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code that the first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was
effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by
defendant-appellee. Note carefully, however, that in the two instances when the words "justice of the
peace" were omitted (in Com. Act No. 357 and Rep. Act No. 180), the word "judge" which preceded in
the enumeration did not carry the qualification "of the First Instance." In other words, whenever the
word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance", the words "justice of the peace"
would follow; however, if the law simply said "judge," the words "justice of the peace" were omitted.
The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology would seem to justify the conclusion that
when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in Rep. Act No. 180, it did not intend to
exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as already
comprehended in the broader term "judge".

It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World War had destroyed congressional records which
might have offered some explanation of the discussion of Com. Act No. 357 which legislation, as
indicated above, has eliminated for the first time the words "justice of the peace." Having been
completely destroyed, all efforts to seek deeper and additional clarifications from these records
proved futile. Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn from the historical background of Rep. Act No. 180
is sufficiently borne out by reason hid equity.

Defendant further argues that he cannot possibly be among the officers enumerated in Section 54
inasmuch as under that said section, the word "judge" is modified or qualified by the phrase "of any
province." The last mentioned phrase, defendant submits, cannot then refer to a justice of the peace
since the latter is not an officer of a province but of a municipality.

Defendant's argument in that respect is too strained. If it is true that the phrase "of any province"
necessarily removes justices of the peace from the enumeration for the reason that they are
municipal and not provincial officials, then the same thing may be said of the Justices of the Supreme
Court and of the Court of Appeals. They are national officials. Yet, can there be any doubt that
Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals are not included in the prohibition? The
more sensible and logical interpretation of the said phrase is that it qualifies fiscals, treasurers and
assessors who are generally known as provincial officers.

The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee.
Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been
omitted intentionally. If that rule is applicable to the present, then indeed, justices of the peace must
be held to have been intentionally and deliberately exempted from the operation of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code.

The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus" can operate and apply
only if and when the omission has been clearly established. In the case under consideration, it has
already been shown that the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the
enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. Rather, they were
merely called by another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, justices of
the peace were just called "judges."

In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus" to this case, defendant-appellee cites
authorities to the effect that the said rule, being restrictive in nature, has more particular application to
statutes that should be strictly construed. It is pointed out that Section 54 must be strictly construed
against the government since proceedings under it are criminal in nature and the jurisprudence is
settled that penal statutes should be strictly interpreted against the state.

Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict interpretation of penal statutes, defendant asserts
that the spirit of fair play and due process demand such strict construction in order to give "fair
warning of what the law intends to do, if a certain line is passed, in language that the common world
will understand." (Justice Holmes, in McBoyle v. U.S., 283 U.S. 25, L. Ed. 816).

The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is
criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has
been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already mentioned,
there has been no such omission. There has only been a substitution of terms.

The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be
considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. This has been recognized time and
again by decisions of various courts. (3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 56.) Thus, cases will
frequently be found enunciating the principle that the intent of the legislature will govern (U.S. vs.
Corbet, 215 U.S. 233). It is to be noted that a strict construction should not be permitted to defeat the
policy and purposes of the statute (Ash Sheep Co. v. U.S., 252 U.S. 159). The court may consider the
spirit and reason of a statute, as in this particular instance, where a literal meaning would lead to
absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers (Crawford,
Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294). A Federal District court in the U.S. has well said:

The strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean such construction of it as to deprive
it of the meaning intended. Penal statutes must be construed in the sense which best
harmonizes with their intent and purpose. (U.S. v. Betteridge 43 F. Supp. 53, 56, cited in 3
Sutherland Statutory Construction 56.)

As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, the language of criminal statutes,
frequently, has been narrowed where the letter includes situations inconsistent with the legislative
plan (U.S. v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354; See also Ernest Brunchen, Interpretation of the Written Law (1915)
25 Yale L.J. 129.)

Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the purpose of the statute
is to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and
various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian
Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition under the old statute, are now within its
encompass. If such were the evident purpose, can the legislature intend to eliminate the justice of the
peace within its orbit? Certainly not. This point is fully explained in the brief of the Solicitor General, to
wit:

On the other hand, when the legislature eliminated the phrases "Judge of First Instance" and
justice of the peace", found in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, and used
"judge" in lieu thereof, the obvious intention was to include in the scope of the term not just one
class of judges but all judges, whether of first Instance justices of the peace or special courts,
such as judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. . . . .

The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice of the peace court, and to so construe the
law as to allow a judge thereof to engage in partisan political activities would weaken rather
than strengthen the judiciary. On the other hand, there are cogent reasons found in the
Revised Election Code itself why justices of the peace should be prohibited from
electioneering. Along with Justices of the appellate courts and judges of the Court of First
Instance, they are given authority and jurisdiction over certain election cases (See Secs. 103,
104, 117-123). Justices of the peace are authorized to hear and decided inclusion and
exclusion cases, and if they are permitted to campaign for candidates for an elective office the
impartiality of their decisions in election cases would be open to serious doubt. We do not
believe that the legislature had, in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, intended to create
such an unfortunate situation. (pp. 708, Appellant's Brief.)
Another factor which fortifies the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the administrative or
executive department has regarded justices of the peace within the purview of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code.

In Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. v. The Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Justice, etc. (G.R. No. L-
12601), this Court did not give due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction against the respondents, for not setting aside, among others, Administrative Order No. 237,
dated March 31, 1957, of the President of the Philippines, dismissing the petitioner as justice of the
peace of Carmen, Agusan. It is worthy of note that one of the causes of the separation of the
petitioner was the fact that he was found guilty in engaging in electioneering, contrary to the
provisions of the Election Code.

Defendant-appellee calls the attention of this Court to House Bill No. 2676, which was filed on
January 25, 1955. In that proposed legislation, under Section 56, justices of the peace are already
expressly included among the officers enjoined from active political participation. The argument is that
with the filing of the said House Bill, Congress impliedly acknowledged that existing laws do not
prohibit justices of the peace from partisan political activities.

The argument is unacceptable. To begin with, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed amendment to
Rep. Act No. 180 as a whole and not merely to section 54 of said Rep. Act No. 180. In other words,
House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed re-codification of the existing election laws at the time that it was
filed. Besides, the proposed amendment, until it has become a law, cannot be considered to contain
or manifest any legislative intent. If the motives, opinions, and the reasons expressed by the
individual members of the legislature even in debates, cannot be properly taken into consideration in
ascertaining the meaning of a statute (Crawford, Statutory Construction, Sec. 213, pp. 375-376),
a fortiori what weight can We give to a mere draft of a bill.

On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee's contention that justices of the peace are not
covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To accept it is to render ineffective a policy
so clearly and emphatically laid down by the legislature.

Our law-making body has consistently prohibited justices of the peace from participating in partisan
politics. They were prohibited under the old Election Law since 1907 (Act No. 1582 and Act No.
1709). Likewise, they were so enjoined by the Revised Administrative Code. Another which
expressed the prohibition to them was Act No. 3387, and later, Com. Act No. 357.

Lastly, it is observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of "expressio
unius, est exclusion alterius" in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the peace are not covered by
Section 54. Said the Court of Appeals: "Anyway, guided by the rule of exclusion, otherwise known
as expressio unius est exclusion alterius, it would not be beyond reason to infer that there was an
intention of omitting the term "justice of the peace from Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. . . ."

The rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of the peace from the
purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has given the reason for the
exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule of expressio
unius est exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied. (Appellant's Brief, p. 6.)

Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular persons
or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other persons or things not so
enumerated should not have been included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so
including them, the maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius, should not be invoked.
(Blevins v. Mullally 135 p. 307, 22 Cal. App. 519.) .
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside
and this case is remanded for trial on the merits.
G.R. No. L-33140 October 23, 1978

J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., JOSE M. TUASON, NICASIO A. TUASON, TERESA TUASON,
CELSO S. TUASON and SEVERO A. TUASON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
MANUELA AQUIAL, MARIA AQUIAL, Spouses JOSE M. CORDOVA and SATURNINA C.
CORDOVA, respondents.

Sison Law Office and Senensio O. Ortile for petitioners.

Hill & Associates Law Office for respondents Aquials.

Antonio E. Pesigan for respondents Cordovas.

AQUINO, J.:

This is another litigation regarding the validity of the much controverted Original Certificate of Title No.
735 covering the Santa Mesa and D Estates of the Tuason mayorazgo or Entail with areas of 877
(879) and 1,625 hectares, respectively (Barrette vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888; Benin case, infra).

On October 1, 1965, Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in forma pauperis in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal Pasig Branch X, wherein they prayed that they be declared the owners of a
parcel of land located at Balara, Marikina, Rizal (now Quezon City) and bounded on the north by
Sapang Mapalad, on the south by the land of Eladio, Tiburcio on the east by Sapang Kolotkolotan,
and on the west by Sapang Kuliat The land, which has an area of three hundred eighty-
three quiñones was allegedly acquired by their father by means of a Spanish title issued to him on
May 10, 1877 (Civil Case No. 8943).

They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon that
land, they discovered that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of defendants Mariano, Teresa,
Juan, Demetrio and Augusta all surnamed Tuason pursuant to a decree issued on July 6. 1914 in
Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration.

They further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No. 735, were issued to
defendants J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., University of the Philippines and National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority (Nawasa) which leased a portion of its land to defendant Capitol Golf Club.

Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due to
certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding. They asked for damages.

Defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction,
improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment. The plaintiffs opposed that motion. The
lower court denied it. The grounds of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as affirmative defenses in
the answer of defendants Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They insisted that a preliminary
hearing be held on those defenses.
On January 25, 1967, the spouses Jose M. Cordova and Saturnina C. Cordova, who had bought
eleven hectares of the disputed land from the plaintiffs, were allowed to intervene in the case.

On September 5, 1970, the lower court issued an order requiring the parties the Register of Deeds of
Rizal to produce in court on October 16, 1970 OCT No. 735 and certain transfer certificates of title
derived from that first or basic title. Later, the court required the production in court of the plan of the
land covered by OCT No. 735 allegedly for the purpose of determining whether the lands claimed by
the plaintiffs and the intervenors are included therein.

On February 11, 1971, the Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed the instant civil actions of
certiorari and prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the complaint and
enjoined from proceeding in the said case. After the petitioners had filed the proper bond, a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued. Respondents Aquial and Cordova answered the petition. The
parties, except the Aquials, filed memoranda in lieu of oral argument.

The issue is whether OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be questioned at this late hour
by respondents Aquial and Cordova. The supposed irregularities in the land registration proceeding,
which led to the issuance of the decree upon which OCT. No. 735 was based, are the same issues
raised in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the lower court. The 1965 decision of Judge
Eulogio Mencias in those cases, in validating OCT No. 735, is annexed to the complaint of the
Aquials. It is cited by them to support their support their action and it might have encouraged them to
ventilate their action in court.

On appeal to this Court, that decision was reversed and the validity of OCT No. 735 and the titles
derived therefrom was once more upheld. (Benin vs. Tuason, L-26127, Alcantara vs. Tuason, L-
26128 and Pili vs. Tuason, L-26129, all decided on June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531).

The ruling in the Benin, Alcantara and Pili cases was applied in Mara, Inc. vs. Estrella, L-40511, July
25, 1975, 65 SCRA 471. That ruling is simply a reiteration or confirmation of the holding in the
following cases directly or incidentally sustaining OCT No. 735: Bank of the P. I. vs. Acuña, 59 Phil.
183; Tiburcio vs. PHHC, 106 Phil. 447; Galvez and Tiburcio vs. Tuason y de la Paz, 119 Phil.
612; Alcantara vs. Tuason, 92 Phil. 796; Santiago vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. 110 Phil. 16; J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bolaños, 95 Phil. 106; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Santiago, 99 Phil. 615; J.
M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. De Guzman, 99 Phil. 281; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Aguirre, 117 Phil.
110; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindong, 116 Phil. 1227; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs.
Magdangal, 114 Phil. 42; Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, L-30889, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503,
and People's Homesite and Housing Corporation vs. Mencias, L-24114, August 16, 1967, 20 SCRA
1031.

Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and
do not disturb what has been settled) it becomes evident that respondents Aquial and Cordova
cannot maintain their action in Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the long settled holding of the
courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.

It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again and again,
consuming the court's time and energies at the expense of other litigants: Interest rei publicae ut finis
sit litium." (Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, supra).

Finding the petition for certiorari and prohibition to be meritorious, the trial court is directed to dismiss
Civil Case No. 8943 with prejudice and without costs. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 210164               August 18, 2015

ROMMEL C. ARNADO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORANTE CAPITAN, Respondents,

CONCURRING OPINION

SERENO, CJ:

In Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration, 1 we emphasized the variable nature of a

person's citizenship, which cannot be determined with finality or become the basis of rules that can be
applied to any and all proceedings thereafter. We said:

Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,

whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand. 2

In election contests, this pronouncement gains significance, as elective local officials are
constitutionally allowed to run and serve for three consecutive terms. 3 While citizenship is a
continuing requirement that must be possessed not only at the time of election or assumption of
office, but also during the entire tenure of the official, 4 it is not a continuing disqualification to run for
and hold public office.5

As such, each case involving the question of an elective official's citizenship must be treated anew in
accordance with the surrounding relevant facts and applicable laws.

In this regard, I agree with some of the statements of J Brion in his Dissenting Opinion. Indeed, the
Court's ruling in Maquiling v. COMELEc6 went only so far as to determine whether Rommel C.
Arnado (Amado) was qualified to run for public office in the 2010 elections. It did not operate as, nor
was it intended to be, a final determination of Amado's citizenship that would forever derail his career
as a public official.

In Maquiling, we reiterated that natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their citizenship
by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country may qualify to run for public office
upon taking the Oath of Allegiance 7 and making a sworn renunciation of their foreign
citizenship.8 Arnado subjected his citizenship to attack when he continued to use his United States
(US) passport to travel in and out of the country despite previously renouncing his US citizenship. The
Court ruled that his use of his US passport nullified the effect of his previous renunciation of US
citizenship. While he did not lose his Philippine citizenship in the process, he reverted to his status as
a dual citizen and remained as such at the time that he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 2010 elections. Under Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code, those with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective
local position.

Considering that the Court had pinpointed the defect in Amado's oath of renunciation, the simple act
of taking the oath anew would have been enough compliance with the requirement of the law.

The Decision found that from the time Amado used his US passport to travel in and out of the country
up to the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy for the succeeding elections in 2013, there had been no
change in his circumstances. 9 He still had not made a sworn renunciation of his US citizenship. Thus,
the ruling in Maquiling still applies: that Arnado had dual citizenship when he filed for his candidacy
on 1 October 2012.

It did not matter that Maquiling was promulgated months after Arnado had filed for candidacy. Since
he was not totally unaware that the use of his US passport might have adverse consequences on his
candidacy for the 2013 elections, the Decision concludes that he should have been prudent enough
to remedy whatever defect there might have been in his citizenship. 10

Even J. Brion concedes that Amado could have been more circumspect in order to secure his
qualification to run for public office. 11 However, it is insisted that the members of this Court should
remove the present case from the shadow of Maquiling and arrive at its resolution based merely on
the attendant factual and legal considerations specific to it. 12

It cannot be denied that by virtue of its being a decision of the Court that joins the country's body of
laws as jurisprudence, Maquiling serves as a "legal consideration" in the resolution of the present
case. Maquiling' s application cannot be helped, especially since the Decision therein hinged not only
on relevant laws, but largely on the facts then presented before the Court. Thus, while the legal
conclusion in Maquiling was not a final determination of Amado's citizenship - as it applied only for
purposes of the 2010 elections - the facts on which its legal conclusion was founded cannot be totally
ignored.

A person's citizenship may be "threshed out again and again" 13 in every proceeding as long as it
becomes relevant and necessary. Except for some clearly unmeritorious cases, it is always a good
idea to decide on the merits, especially in election controversies in which the law is sometimes placed
at odds with the will of the people. At the same time, the Court puts a premium on economy, and
where previous declarations of one's citizenship become pertinent, those cases may be used as a
take-off point if only to emphasize the differences and similarities, as well as the measures that were
taken in the interim.

One point of contention between the Decision and the Dissenting Opinion is the finding that Arnado
used his US passport for his travels in and out of the country on 12 January 2010 and 23 March
2010.

One point of contention between the Decision and the Dissenting Opinion is the finding that Arnado
used his US passport for his travels in and out of the country on 12 January 2010 and 23 March
2010.

Maquiling indeed made a finding that Arnado used his US passport for travel on those dates. In the
Court Resolution dated 2 July 2013, we said:

Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be interfered with by the
courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of said agencies, or unless the
aforementioned findings are not supported by substantial evidence.1âwphi1 They are accorded not
only great respect but even finality, and are binding upon this Court, unless it is shown that the
administrative body had arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence before it to such an
extent as to compel a contrary conclusion had such evidence been properly appreciated.

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that COMELEC First

Division found that Arnado used his U.S. Passport at least six times after he renounced his American
citizenship. This was debunked by the COMELEC En Banc, which found that Arnado only used his
U.S. passport four times, and which agreed with Amado's claim that he only used his U.S. passport
on those occasions because his Philippine passport was not yet issued. The COMELEC En Banc
argued that Amado was able to prove that he used his Philippine passport for his travels on the
following dates: 12 January 2010, 31 January 2010, 31 March 2010, 16 April 2010, 20 May 2010, and
4 June 2010.

None of these dates coincide with the two other dates indicated in the certification issued by the
Bureau of Immigration showing that on 21 January 2010 and on 23 March 2010, Arnado arrived in the
Philippines using his U.S. Passport No. 057782700 which also indicated therein that his nationality is
USA-American. Adding these two travel dates to the travel record provided by the Bureau of
Immigration showing that Arnado also presented his U.S. passport four times (upon departure on 14
April 2009, upon arrival on 25 June 2009, upon departure on 29 July 2009 and upon arrival on 24
November 2009), these incidents sum up to six.

The COMELEC En Banc concluded that "the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge,
his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use." This conclusion, however, is not
supported by the facts. Arnado claims that his Philippine passport was issued on 18 June 2009. The
records show that he continued to use his U.S. passport even after he already received his Philippine
passport. Arnado's travel records show that he presented his U.S. passport on 24 November 2009,
on 21 January 2010, and on 23 March 2010. These facts were never refuted by Arnado.

Thus, the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc is based on a misapprehension of the facts that the use of
the U.S. passport was discontinued when Amado obtained his Philippine passport. 14 (Emphases
supplied)

It is important to clarify that the certification from the Bureau of Immigration indicated that Amado
arrived in the country using his US passport on 12 January 2010 and 23 March 2010. 15 The Court
gave full credence to the certification, not only because it carried with it the presumption of regularity,
but more important, Arnado never bothered to refute the contents thereof.

On the basis of this finding, the Court rejected the claim that Amado's use of his US passport several
times were mere isolated acts that were done only because he was not yet issued his Philippine
passport.16

To my mind, this is the turning point of Maquiling that regrettably still applies in this case: that
whatever professions of faith and allegiance to the Republic that Amado claims when his citizenship
is in question, the fact remains that during the instances that he used his US passport despite having
a Philippine passport in his possession, those same professions became hollow. And, that up to the
filing of Amado's Certificate of Candidacy for the 2013 elections, he failed to remedy the fatal blow
that such repeated use of his US passport dealt on his electoral qualifications.

I therefore concur with the DISMISSAL of the PETITION.