Journal of Political Ideologies

ISSN: 1356-9317 (Print) 1469-9613 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjpi20

Chinese isms: the modernization of ideological

discourse in China

Ivo Spira

To cite this article: Ivo Spira (2018) Chinese isms: the modernization of ideological discourse in
China, Journal of Political Ideologies, 23:3, 283-298, DOI: 10.1080/13569317.2018.1502937

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2018.1502937

Published online: 06 Sep 2018.

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JOURNAL OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES
2018, VOL. 23, NO. 3, 283–298
https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2018.1502937

ARTICLE

Chinese isms: the modernization of ideological discourse in

China
Ivo Spira
Department of Cultural Studies and Oriental Languages, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

ABSTRACT
The many words in ‘-ism’ in Western languages, from ‘anarchism’ to
‘Zenonism,’ are the linguistic manifestation of a significant European
conceptual innovation in scholarly and ideological discourse. Briefly
put, there is an intense reductionism in these concepts that underlies
their effective rhetorical deployment in various forms of ideological
and expository discourse. While isms originated in Europe, they were
eventually appropriated by speakers of other languages and became a
significant factor and indicator of change in modern society on a
global scale. Concepts such as ‘feminism,’ ‘socialism’ and ‘nationalism’
were instrumental in transforming history in the Far East, and so this
article explores the appropriation of isms as zhǔyì 主義 in Chinese. The
article focuses on how ‘ismatic reasoning’ came to dominate Chinese
intellectual and political discourse in the 20th century, zooming in on
the case of political ideals for China in the modern world. The historical
contingency and change of particular isms, as well as local conceptual
innovations, are highlighted in the article.

From ‘Unitarianism’ to ‘terrorism’, isms form an important part of modern man’s conceptual
toolkit. Although isms originated in Europe, the European case is not necessarily the clearest
instance of this conceptual phenomenon, nor the one with the greatest historical impact. In
the Chinese case, the phenomenon is neatly identifiable in linguistic terms, and it had such an
impact on Modern Chinese history that the early twentieth century may justifiably be called
the ‘Age of Isms’.1 While it is hardly surprising from a present-day perspective that ‘com-
munism’ became a key concept in China, it is perhaps less obvious why the concept of ‘ism’
(zhǔyì 主義) itself has become one. But even more striking is the rise of endemic ‘ismism’, a
trend by virtue of which the mere possession of an ism was elevated to the status of a magic
formula, since having an ism lent direction, orientation and commitment to one’s enterprise.
This is probably where the real significance of the Chinese case lies: the way in which the
nation’s future as well as individual destinies were subordinated to the ‘ism model’ on a large
scale. People let isms become the master concepts of their individual lives and social
community, and so isms became social key concepts (Grundbegriffe) in the Koselleckian
sense.2 While this article is mainly an exposition of how Western isms were adopted and
adapted in China, I also offer some thoughts on why a profoundly tradition-bound society all
of a sudden adopted the logic of Western isms in a big way.

CONTACT Ivo Spira ivo.spira@ostas.lu.se

© 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
284 I. SPIRA

Why are isms so ubiquitous to begin with? As soon as we need to give a quick sketch
of how different intellectual and political positions relate to each other, we tend to turn
to isms. Journalistic texts are a treasure-trove of such sketches. Consider the following
example from the New York Times (Sept, 1939): ‘At last the issue stands clear. Hitlerism
is brown communism, Stalinism is red fascism.’3 This is a good illustration of how isms
are used to make a point about the political landscape in a manner that favours rhetoric
over nuance. Now take a more recent example from the British magazine Third Way:
‘The Viet Cong fought to end Western imperialism, and to install communism. The
Afghan mujahidin fought to end Soviet occupation, and implement islamism.’4
Although this example is less stirring and more sober than the first, it still paints
with a broad brush, relying on parallelism to assert the functional equivalence of the
two cases. While isms naturally belong to the domain of polemical and ideological
language, they are also important in scholarly discourse, which in spite of academic
polemics ostensibly aims for objectivity. Isms are convenient concepts for contrasting
different political ideologies:
It is convenient to analyze the main ideological responses to these issues in the twentieth
century Muslim world in terms of secularism and Islamism. . .. Usually secularists have
adopted Western-derived ideologies to govern the areas of life considered non-religious,
and this is true even when they are politically anti-Western in intention. Nationalism is the
prime example.5

But even in the non-political sphere, isms abound:

Symbolism links different periods of the 1890s together just as Romanticism connects
different attempts at ideal art at the close of the century, which are usually recapitulated
under the concept of Symbolism. In the twentieth century the tradition continues in the
forms of Expressionism and Surrealism as well as in formalism. This tradition is inter-
rupted by the return to the allegory as a form of expression in post-modernism.6

Words ending in -ism allow one to refer succinctly to a principled point of view, even a
whole system of thought, in a single word. This makes them especially useful for
constructing mini-histories and blitz surveys of any particular intellectual or political
landscape. Such concise terms for complex doctrines and systems of thought are only
possible because the form of the term itself does not cover, nor even transparently
reflect, its meaning. While it is true that this is a property of words in general, it
acquires special significance in the case of social categories, since people are not
indifferent to what words other people use about them and may indeed be directly
affected by the use of particular words and concepts, for example bureaucratic cate-
gories, ethnic labels, or concepts of moral judgement, as these tend to have practical
consequences. Stones, on the other hand, cannot react to geological terminology,
however much the geologists may dispute among themselves.
So far this is simply a restatement of the fact that social categorization is of some
consequence to the fate of individual people. But in the case of isms, their use first in
religious and later in ideological polemics, as well as their pretension to objective
categorization in the encyclopaedic tradition, has made them into particularly effective
and highly contested concepts. Naturally, contestedness and emotional intensity only
increases through their close association with moral values and their use as designations
for overall frameworks or world views (due to the fact that so much hinges on them),
 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 285

but what makes them all the more controversial, in some cases even dangerous, is that
they are often imposed as labels from the outside and used as conceptual tools in the
exercise of power. The unchecked ad-hoc production of new isms for this purpose only
adds to the parasitic nature of ismatic discourse. For the Western form -ism (and -isme,
-ismus etc.), there is also a certain etymological resonance that contributes to all this
furore, in that the suffix was already used in Ancient Greek to form verbal nouns with a
certain social relevance.7
In other words, what is going on here is that we have a linguistic device at our disposal
which allows for intense semantics and convenient reference at the same time. The rhetorical
versatility of this device becomes even more striking when we include the related suffix -ist (as
in communist) and realize that it is a part of a wider rhetorical phenomenon which may be
called ‘ismatic reasoning’, which makes use of these ‘ismatic concepts’. In other words, I claim
that there is an underlying form of reasoning that can aptly be labelled ideological and
reductionist, and which I take to be essential to modern political and intellectual life.

Chinese ‘Ismism’
Did the Chinese adopt Western ismatic discourse simply because they realized the rheto-
rical potential of the words in -ism? While rhetorical usefulness cannot be disregarded as a
factor, it seems that it was rather the exploration and mapping of Western cultural
categories that triggered the adoption of isms in China. Isms were introduced in Chinese
through the mediation of Japanese in the late 1890s and early 1900s. Linguistically, this
happened through the adoption of a new suffix-like form, zhǔyì 主義 from Japanese (where
it was pronounced shugi), as the equivalent of English -ism, French -isme, and so forth,
producing Chinese isms such as shèhuìzhǔyì 社會主義 ‘socialism’, literally ‘society-ism’,
and Ōuhuàzhǔyì 歐化主義 ‘Westernization’, lit. ‘Europeanize-ism’. These forms were not
only adopted in Chinese, but also in Korean and Vietnamese, so that the phenomenon
described for China in this article is actually only a part of a greater East Asian story, in
which Japan played a key role.8 Although the form zhǔyì exists in premodern Chinese
sources, its Japanese analogue was first used in the modern senses of ‘ism’, ‘doctrine’ and
‘ideology’ in Japanese in the 1860s and 1870s.
The first years of the twentieth century saw the proliferation of texts in which
Chinese isms, or zhǔyì, were key concepts. Many of these texts were translations or
adaptations, often from a Japanese original, which could in turn be a translation or
adaptation of a Western text. In the early stages, isms mostly had an epistemic function,
helping reform-minded intellectuals make sense of the treasury of ‘new knowledge’ that
was available from Western and Japanese sources. As an example, take the introduction
to the translation of parts of W. D. P. Bliss’ A Handbook of Socialism (1895), published
in Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary journal Mínbào in 1906. The translation itself skips over
Bliss’ introduction with its many different (but purportedly equivalent) definitions of
‘socialism’ and goes straight for the delimitation of ‘socialism’ against ‘anarchism’.9 The
way in which the translator introduces his work is illuminating:
This article is a translation of a section of W. D. Bliss’ A Hand Book of Socialism.

Among the revolutionaries of the present age, there are three major zhǔyì (‘isms’, ‘doc-
trines’, ‘systems’).
286 I. SPIRA

● Shèhuìzhǔyì (社會主義, lit. ‘society-ism’) Socialism [in English]

● Wúzhèngfǔzhǔyì (無政府主義 lit. ‘no-government-ism’) Anarchist [sic!]
● Xūwǔzhǔyì (虛無主義 lit. ‘nothingness-ism’) Nihilism

Their theory, history, factions, and movements (yùndòng) [= activity?] all differ [from each
other]. The [present] translator takes profound delight in investigating the true situation
[of these doctrines] and plans to present them to the world of learning one by one. Since I
detest shallow scholarship and incoherent discourse, I resolved to translate famous works
of the nations of the Far East and Far West in particular, so that [they may] guide us on
the road ahead.10

The purpose of the translator is to give a quick orientation in a new situation, which is
characteristic of the use of isms in early twentieth century China. Different isms are compared
to each other, with the ultimate aim of finding models for China’s future development. The
close link between the acquisition of new knowledge and the search for political ideals
eventually led to a preoccupation with fundamental solutions to national problems. Such
solutions – which were doubtless ‘ideological’ – were posited as a priori ideals that were
expected to solve all the nation’s troubles in one stroke. They came to be seen as the positive
key to the transformation of a traditional empire into a modern state, and the transformation
of its subjects into modern citizens. Zhǔyì ‘ism’ as a noun ended up expressing a positive
conceptualization of ideology, which is a valuation that is diametrically opposed to the
connotations attached to English noun ism and its European cognates.11
Commitment to an ism thus became widely perceived as something desirable. The spirit
of this commitment to isms can be clearly perceived in the opening lecture Sun Yat-sen
(modern China’s founding father figure) gave on his political system, the ‘Three People’s
Principles’, in Chinese sānmínzhǔyì, a word that I tentatively render here as ‘tridemism’, for
reasons of structural transparency (more on this below):

Today I have come speak to you all about tridemism (sānmínzhǔyì). What is tridemism?
Taking the simplest definition, tridemism is an ism (zhǔyì) to save the country. What is an
ism? An ism is a kind of thought, a kind of belief, and a kind of force. In general, when
people study the principles of some matter, at first thought emerges; when thought has
mastered them, belief arises; when there is belief, force emerges. Therefore, with isms, first
belief arises from thought, and then force emerges from belief, after which it is completely
established. [. . .] To believe in tridemism can produce enormous power, and this kind of
enormous power can save China.12

Sun here speaks about how theoretical understanding can lead to power via belief – and
the key to this magical-sounding transformation is the unifying concept of ‘ism’. Sun
could count on being understood when he opened his 1924 lecture by talking about the
‘ism’, for the idea that having an ism was essential was already firmly established, going
back to the first decade of the twentieth century. We find another strong formulation of
the importance of having an ism in an article by Fù Sīnián about why the Chinese are so
‘weak-spirited’ (1916):

Those without ism (zhǔyì) are not human, because human beings must always have an
ism; only stones, earth, grass, wood, animals, and half-animal savages are such that they do
not have intelligence, and hence have no ism. People who have no ism cannot get things
done. In order to get something done, one always needs to establish a goal, and to have a
road leading to that goal.
 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 287

Whatever the ism, having an ism is better than not having an ism. . .. [The fact] that the
Chinese have no ism is the reason why their spirit is so weak. How pitiful is this weak-
spirited Chinese!13

The idea here is that without an ism to guide one’s actions, one is lost. Other texts make it clear
that the isms that the writers of these years have in mind are a priori ideals that can be used as
blueprints for shaping the future. The political imagination is unleashed on the future of
society and its constructs elevated to the status of ultimate goals. This eruption of imagination
is reflected in the phenomenon that Koselleck called ‘temporalization’ (Verzeitlichung), in
which concepts do not merely register what we perceive in the space of our experience
(Erfahrungsraum), but simultaneously refer to the ideals we have for the future, pointing to
our horizon of expectation (Erwartungshorizont).14 Chinese isms lexically denote the active
position taken with regard to the shaping of future history, as do many Western isms.
The rise of this ‘ism model’ is closely linked to the discovery of ‘society’ as an
important category in diagnosing China’s ills. This discovery was brought about by the
failure of Western-style parliamentary democracy in China during the 1910s and the
realization that all individual problems were intertwined in the fabric of society. As a
result, only solutions that would address all problems simultaneously were considered
adequate. However, the notion of a total solution paved the way for ideological and
totalitarian systems during the 1920s, so that the age of intellectual exploration in the
first two decades eventually gave way to the age of ideology in the thirties and forties, as
ideas hardened into ideologies.
Apart from the specific historical circumstances at the time, an argument can also be
made that traditional correlative thinking, in which fixed correspondences between sets
of political and cosmological categories were used to drive serious arguments, increased
Chinese receptivity to Western ismatic discourse. In addition to this rhetorical and
argumentative predisposition for closed-circuit reasoning, on a philosophical level,
certain strands of epistemological optimism may have amplified the appeal of ideology
as the ultimate solution. In particular, the belief that correct thinking and naming, and
especially correct moral and ritual behaviour, has the power to put the world in order
has a long standing in the Chinese tradition. The voluntarism implied by the traditional
assumption of the ontological primacy and practical power of thought remained an
important part of Chinese thinking in the republican period.15 Combined with the
tendency to see society in terms of a holistic cultural system, this voluntarism logically
leads to a wholesale rejection of traditional culture, in Lin Yü-sheng’s words, the
‘totalistic cultural iconoclasm’ of the May Fourth era.16
While the Chinese ‘Age of Isms’ was real enough, one should not forget that there were
also critical voices, both by those who opposed ideological thinking on principle, such as the
thinker Hú Shì 胡適, and those that denied the relevance of Western isms for China, such as
the writer Lǔ Xùn 魯迅. Hú Shì forcefully voiced his opposition to isms and ideological
thinking in the so-called ‘Debate on Issues and Isms’ that took place in 1919. Hú Shi’s
argument was basically that isms are vague and unscientific categories that are used to
concoct theories that have no basis in reality. Lazy people or villains then employ these to
manipulate others.17 In the debate, he faced Lǐ Dàzhāo 李大釗, who argued for the necessity
of fundamental solutions and for the usefulness of isms for propaganda. He would later go on
to found the Chinese Communist Party together with Chén Dúxiù in 1921.
288 I. SPIRA

Lǔ Xùn for his part argued that in the case of China, principled commitment to a
cause had been the exception rather than the rule. As he saw it, a few young hot-heads
might sacrifice their life for imported Western isms, but the great mass of Chinese had
since time immemorial mainly been concerned with surviving the ravages of warring
parties, regardless of the proclaimed cause of this or that group.18 As the examples of Lǐ
Dàzhāo and Lǔ Xùn make clear, the whole ism-model itself was contested to some
degree, not only single isms, which were contested all the time.

The Chinese category of ism concepts

There is considerable diversity among Chinese ism concepts, but the emerging picture is far
more uniform than that of isms in the West, in the sense that a part of the semantic
spectrum of Western isms is not present in Chinese isms. It is in this sense that my claim
about the distinctness of the Chinese case of ismatic language should be understood. The
semantic core area of Chinese isms is firmly situated in the socio-political domain and is
closely associated with political activism of all kinds. This contrasts with Western isms,
historically speaking. Chinese isms are also used extensively in the scholarly and artistic
domain, especially where the focus is on a principled stance and the social dimension rather
than on the precise nature of the category being constructed.
Which semantic categories are left behind, going from West to East? The most obvious are
the following (using English–Chinese equivalence pairs to illustrate, asserted equivalence
being indicated with the ‘:=’ sign): (a) plain verbal nouns, such as criticism, translated as
pīpíng 批評 (‘criticizing’) or pínglùn 評論 (‘critique’), (b) natural phenomena and medical
conditions, such as magnetism := cíxìng 磁性, lit. ‘magnet nature’, and rheumatism :
= fēngshībìng 風濕病 lit. ‘rheumatism illness’, (c) religions, denominations and sects, for
example, Buddhism := fójiào 佛教 ‘Buddha’s teaching’, Judaism := yóutàijiào 猶太教 ‘Jewish
teaching’, protestantism := xīnjiào 新教 ‘new teaching’, or := jīdūjiào 基督教 ‘Christian
teaching’, (d) behaviour associated with a certain ethnic or linguistic group, Anglicism,
Atticism, (e) discriminatory attitudes and behaviour, for example, sexism := xìngbié qíshì 性
別歧視 ‘gender discrimination’. In the last category we have the notable exception of
zhǒngzúzhǔyì 種族主義 ‘racism’, which was historically read as ‘doctrine based on race’, as
a ‘scientific’ and positively proposed concept. It is nowadays read with a semantic structure
similar to that of ‘sexism’: ‘attitude and practice discriminatory against someone’s race’.
Not all examples can be readily explained by these categories: Maoism for
example, which is not usually rendered with -zhǔyì in Chinese, even if this is
what one would expect based on the account above. One refers to Mao’s teachings
and theories as Máo Zédōng sīxiǎng 毛澤東思想 ‘Máo Zédōng thought’. The reasons
for this may be rhetorical and ideological rather than linguistic, perhaps out of
deference to Marx and Lenin, given that ‘Marxism–Leninism’ is rendered as Mǎ–Liè
zhǔyì 馬列主義, lit. ‘Mǎ [Marx]-and-Liè [Lenin]-ism’. Here the implication would
be that only these giants deserve (!) an ‘ism’. Or perhaps it was in order to evade
accusations of dogmatism, or to underscore the unique and inimitable nature of
Maoism. The same goes for Mao’s successors in power: one does not use isms to
name their theoretical constructs in Chinese. Each successive leader gets his own
place on the podium, only a step further down from their predecessors: ‘Deng
 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 289

Xiaoping theory’, Jiang Zemin’s ‘three represents’ [sic], and Hu Jintao’s ‘scientific
development view’.
Going in the opposite direction, from East to West, which isms are now filtered out,
that is, which zhǔyì formations have no Western translation equivalents in -ism? There
are at least three different categories: (a) Chinese isms with semantically condensed or
syntactically complex bases, so that a translation with the suffix -ism would become
unwieldy, perhaps especially if there is no easy one-word base in the Western language,
or where a classicizing translation would be obscure (such as tridemism instead of
‘Three People’s Principles”). (b) Chinese isms that are too rooted in the Chinese
historical experience to be concisely translatable. (c) Chinese isms that are most likely
translations of Western terms that do not end in -ism, such as kāifàngzhǔyì 開放主義
“open door policy”, lit. “open-up-ism”.19 Some Chinese isms, of course, have no
established English equivalent at all, especially ad-hoc creations, such as bàntángzhǔyì
半糖主義, lit. ’half-sugar-ism’, the precept and practice of keeping a romantic relation-
ship from getting too sweet and sticky by only taking half the ‘sugar’ that you actually
crave.
Categories (a) and (b) may overlap, as in the notorious case of Sun Yat-sen’s
sānmínzhǔyì 三民主義, where one cannot find a transparent and idiomatic translation
even with paraphrastic strategies. The conventional English translation equivalents are
‘The Three Principles of the People’ or ‘The Three People’s Principles’. Above, I
attempted a less conventional, but in some ways more accurate, classicizing translation,
‘tridemism’, but although useful in terms of conveying a more complete impression of
the Chinese word, it is admittedly both obscure and awkward. The structure of the
Chinese concept is quite complex, since the term is an abbreviation and fusion (a
‘package’) of the three components of the ideology, namely

(1) mínzúzhǔyì 民族主義 ‘nationalism’, lit. ‘nation-ism’ [‘nation’: mín 民 ‘people’

+ zú 族 ‘clan’]
(2) mínquánzhǔyì 民權主義 ‘democratism’, lit. ‘people’s-authority-ism’
(3) mínshēngzhǔyì 民生主義, ‘principle of people’s livelihood’, lit. ‘people’s-liveli-
hood-ism’

Each of the ‘sub-isms’ starts with mín 民 ‘people’. Thus in sānmínzhǔyì, sānmín ‘three
people’ stands for the three sub-isms, and the whole word for the superordinate
ideology that they form when taken together. It is also illuminating that while mínzú
‘nation’ in the first sub-ism is a modern word, both mínquán and mínshēng of the two
others are expressions that had a degree of conceptualization in ancient times. It is thus
likely that ancient semantics impinges on the meaning of mínquánzhǔyì
and mínshēngzhǔyì to some extent, so that translating them as, for example, ‘democ-
racy’ and ‘socialism’, respectively (as some have done) will at best be a crude simplifica-
tion. In sum: Sun Yat-sen’s concept sānmínzhǔyì is autochthonous as well as
structurally complex.
Other words of a similar structure include sān-W-zhǔyì 三W主義 (lit. ‘three W
ism’, Luó Jiālún’s 羅家倫 concept summarizing the principles of Western science),
Hú Shì’s bābùzhǔyì 八不主義 ‘eight don’ts ism’ (the eight don’ts of his programme
of literary reform),20 and sānbùzhǔyì 三不主義, ‘three don’ts ism’. The last of these,
290 I. SPIRA

where the recurring morpheme in the base of the constituent principles is bù 不

‘not’, has historically speaking been used for at least three different sets of principles.
First, Chiang Kai-shek employed it as a formula to remind his soldiers to behave well
towards the local population in the areas they passed through, enjoining them to
refrain from conscripting carriers, occupying private dwellings, or seizing
provisions.21 Second, it is a package concept for the principles of 不抓辮子，不扣
帽子，不打棍子’don’t grab [others’] queues [= ‘exploitable advantage’], don’t slap
labels on [others], don’t beat [with] the stick’.22 This is one of the ‘democratic
principles of the CCP’, according to ZDC, which associates it with Dèng
Xiǎopíng’s 鄧小平 1978 admonition to break the stifling practices of the Gang of
Four.23 The pattern seems to have become independent to the point that it is simply
a productive and even ad hoc way of saying ‘three don’ts’. We have, for example,
nánrén sānbù zhǔyì 男人『三不』主義 ‘male three-not-ism’ (bu zhǔdòng, bù kàngjù,
bù fùzé 不主動， 不抗拒， 不負責 ‘not take the initiative, not resist, not take
responsibility’), also known as àiqíng sānbùzhǔyì 愛情三不主義 ‘three-not-ism of
love’.24 It is apparent that this morphological pattern is useable in a broad range of
domains, from ideology to lifestyle.
From what has been said in the preceding paragraph, it is also clear that many
Chinese isms are deeply rooted in the Chinese experience of the twentieth century.
They reflect (and often directly designate) the trends, movements, attitudes, stereotypes,
and ideals of the times, whether they are autochthonous or not.25 If we take a concept
like xíngshìzhǔyì 形式主義, lit. ‘form-ism’, we see that its use in Communist criticism
of excessive adherence to the dogma instead of the spirit of revolution creates new
conditions for subsequent use. The concept is already constrained in a way that differs
from versions of ‘formalism’ elsewhere.
Another interesting example in this context is zìyóuzhǔyì 自由主義 (1899,26 Jap.
riyūshugi, 1886), which is the conventional term for ‘liberalism’. As an ideal it has not
been especially successful when compared to the variants of ‘nationalism’, ‘socialism’
and ‘communism’. The actual lack of success is no doubt due to the radicalization and
polarization of the political landscape in the 1920s, when both humanism and liberal-
ism were squeezed between nationalism on the one hand and communism on the other.
Still, it cannot have helped that zìyóu in traditional language is closer to meaning
‘unrestrained’ in a morally ambiguous way, rather than ‘free to act’ in an affirmative,
positive sense, not to mention that a legal interpretation in terms of ‘having certain
well-defined freedoms’ was certainly absent in premodern times. Latin liber, by con-
trast, could refer to the freed slave, and so Western conceptions of freedom came to
imply or at least connote ‘liberation’.27 The subsequent development of liber (with its
various analogues and derivatives in the West) and of zìyóu converge,28 but the
lingering divergent senses remain in the background as something that a speaker can
activate if she chooses to.
Some Chinese lexicalizations with -zhǔyì are much more current than their structural
counterparts in Western languages, even for Western-derived concepts. Mínzhǔzhǔyì 民主
主義, lit. ‘people rule ism’, is much more current than its English structural equivalent
democratism.29 In this vein we find a wide range of zhǔyì with identifiable models or
pragmatic parallels in Western languages, but which have a form without -ism. An early
example is tiěxuèzhǔyì 鐵血主義 ‘blood-and-iron-ism’ for ‘blood and iron policy’, i.e.
 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 291

‘Bismarckian policy’. Bismarck(ian)ism exists, or rather existed, in English, but not the
putative blood-and-iron-ism.30 Another significant difference between Western and
Chinese -isms is that the noun zhǔyì 主義 is an independent, culturally central word in
Chinese, while the English noun ism is largely confined to meta-discourse, satirical
commentary, and anti-ism polemics. The Chinese word for ‘ism’ had strong positive
connotations for many speakers in the early twentieth century, as it became the vehicle
for a social key concept. This difference between English ism and Chinese zhǔyì is also
interesting etymologically: the English noun ism has developed from the suffix -ism
(originally Ancient Greek), whereas in Chinese, it is the suffix -zhǔyì that has developed
from the noun zhǔyì (through the mediation of Japanese).
It is clear that the Chinese were not merely copying the Japanese translations of
Western -isms into their own language. The formative -zhǔyì was and still is
productive in Chinese, so there are significant groups of zhǔyì that are not directly
based on a Western or Japanese model. Even in the translation of foreign words
there are many variants, and it is not a given that the variants are semantically
equivalent. The comparison between Western and Chinese isms offers a valuable
lesson: even when words, concepts, or structures have a Western origin, neither is
their meaning constrained by Western semantics or political practice, nor is the
ease of back-translation to be taken for granted. In other words, equivalence is
doubtful.

Ideals for China as a modern state in the world

In order to give a more concrete picture of isms in early twentieth-century China, I will
now introduce some of the isms that conceptualize a state’s constitution and its place in
the world. To take an ism that is very interesting from an axiological point of view,
consider ‘militarism’:

Among the essential factors in state-building in the twentieth century there is this
momentous prodigy, which can be used to make a weak state strong, and a lost state
enduring. What is it? What is it? It is called jūnguómínzhǔyì (‘militarism’).

Jūnguómínzhǔyì is a most glorious word and is the of the highest value.31

These are the opening lines of a 1904 article which reads as a whole-hearted endorse-
ment of militaristic policies, presenting such policies as the way to remedy China’s
misfortunes. This is hardly the kind of evaluation of ‘militarism’ that we are used to, at
least since the end of World War II. Even before then it was hardly a positive concept.
In addition to jūnguómínzhǔyì 軍國民主義 ‘militarism’ (lit. ‘army-citizen-ism’, 190232),
which is the term used in the quoted passage, we also find jūnzhèngzhǔyì 軍政主義
‘militarism’ (lit. ‘army-administration-ism’, 1903)33 and jūnguózhǔyì ‘militarism’ (lit.
‘army-state-ism’, Jap. gunkokushugi, 1896).
However, the positive value attached to ‘militarism’ in the article becomes quite
understandable when one sees it in its historical context: A China under huge internal
and external pressure, in the last year of the Qing Dynasty. In other words, the
absorption of Western categories was not by any means a mechanical process but
involved a re-evaluation within the new context. One finds similarly enthusiastic
292 I. SPIRA

endorsements of ‘nationalism’ and ‘statism’, which were readily conceived of by many

reformists and activists as positive ideals.
The example of ‘militarism’ also reflects another of the major ways in which the
lexical and conceptual field of isms is defined by historical context: China’s search for a
place in the modern world and its determination to become a strong, modern nation.
An intense soul-searching set in right after the Sino-Japanese war of 1895, when China’s
place in the new world order was one of the key questions. The frantic search for
solutions to China’s problems led to an upheaval in which China’s place in the world
was relativized through an extension of the geographical and historical horizon to
include the rest of the world. This extension meant a reorientation with respect to
the conception of history: history came to be seen as makeable, so that it became
possible to imagine the planned transformation of China into a modern state, a China
refashioned in the likeness of certain new ideals. These ideals – and the methods to
achieve their realization – were to a large extent conceptualized in terms of isms, as for
example in this text by Liáng Qǐchāo (1899):

A guest puts Rèn Gōng [Liáng Qǐchāo] in a difficult spot and says: did you not formerly
profess that there is no just war in the Spring and Autumn Annals? Mòzi’s learning of
non-attack? How is what [I] say today not of the same kind? [I,] Rèn Gōng, say: There is
cosmopolitanism (shìjièzhǔyì) and nationalism (guójiāzhǔyì). . . . The single greatest ques-
tion revolving in the hearts of the great politicians of all states is the China Question.
Therefore, the China Question is nothing short of a World Question. When the Chinese
speak of nationalism, then it is nothing short of cosmopolitanism. So in my thinking today
there is decidedly no retreat. Thank you.34

This dichotomy is also posed by another text from 1903, with a different word for
‘nationalism’:

In the advancement of a country’s national government, for the purpose of success there is
only the clash and harmonious adjustment of two great isms (zhǔyì). So what are these two
isms? They are cosmopolitanism (shìjièzhǔyì) and cultural nationalism (guócuìzhǔyì, lit.
‘state-essence-ism’).35

The dichotomy of ‘cosmopolitanism’ and ‘nationalism’ is also explored in another

article, ‘America’s Cosmopolitanism’.36 Here the contradiction between them is
resolved by saying that American nationalism carries cosmopolitanism within itself,
since the whole concept of the American nation is based on the immigration of
different peoples. This differs from Liáng Qǐchāo’s text, where Chinese nationalism is
said to constitute cosmopolitanism because the ‘China Question’ has global relevance.
Besides shìjièzhǔyì 世界主義, lit. ‘world-ism’ (Jap. sekaishugi, 1893), there is also the
term sìhǎizhǔyì 四海主義 ‘four-sea-ism’. While the ‘Four Seas’ is a traditional way of
referring to the ‘world’, implying ‘everything that is within the Four Seas’, it presumably
also reflects Confucius’ dictum that ‘all within the Four Seas are [the gentleman’s]
brothers’.37 This highlights the fact that modern Chinese isms often contain references
to traditional texts and concepts, as we saw in the case of Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles
above. In the case of shìjièzhǔyì a further historical dimension becomes relevant, since
shìjiè ‘world’ was introduced as an equivalent of Sanskrit loka the translation of
Buddhist texts in medieval times. One can also see a certain difference in the definitions
of these two related concepts in the encyclopaedic dictionary Xīn Ěryǎ (1903):
 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 293

To break down national borders and take the whole society of the world as the basis and
seek the development and progress of the whole is called shìjièzhǔyì (cosmopolitanism).38

When the ideal of human society is based in the equality/brotherhood (tóngrén 同仁) of
each people/group/tribe (qún 群) within the four seas, it is called sìhǎizhǔyì
(cosmopolitanism).39

There are many grounds for the resonance of ‘cosmopolitanism’ in the Chinese tradi-
tion. Not only the ancient ideals of 'dàtóng' and 'tàipíng', but also the universalist notion
of the Empire as all that is under heaven, of the co-extension of the Empire with the
inhabited world, regardless of ‘nationality’. Even later, when the social and national
revolutions were in ascendance, ‘cosmopolitanism’ was clearly classed as a sort of
elevated ideal, here interestingly associated with ‘individualism’:
Recently, among people whose thinking is elevated, there are those who believe in
[xiāngxìn] individualism [gèrénzhǔyì] and those who believe in cosmopolitanism
[shìjièzhǔyì].40

But the ancient idea of a World utopia after the manner of the Chinese sages was
shattered through the confrontation with Western powers in the nineteenth century,
whence the popularity of nationalism and militarism. Cosmopolitanism, whether in its
Chinese or Western form, was dismissed as an impractical idea.41 As Shùn Dédèng 順
德鄧 put it in 1903:
There is both nationalism (guójiāzhǔyì) and cosmopolitanism (shìjièzhǔyì). Nevertheless,
cosmopolitanism is [based on a state where] the world is in perfect order, and all men and
states are equal, perhaps this may be encountered in the future, after the twentieth century,
but in present-day history, it is simply not the case. So what is it that dominates present-
day history? Only nationalism. In nationalism, the people (rén 人) of one country (guó 國)
all know that love for their country is a crucial factor in the survival of the country in the
world. Now a land that occupies one section of the globe is called a ‘country’ (guó 國).
When countries are juxtaposed to each other, there is international (guójì 國際 “between
states”) competition. When there is international competition, one [country] rises while
the other perishes, one prospers while the other declines, all of which happens by
necessity.42

Here the isms are characteristically inscribed in a Social Darwinist narrative, where
competition and the struggle for survival is the only law. Guójiāzhǔyì is one of the
Chinese terms used to express the concept of ‘nationalism’. It is based on the core
concept of ‘state’, guójiā, which has seen a drawn-out semantic development starting
from the sense of ‘dynastic family’. The relationship between guójiā ‘state’ and
guójiāzhǔyì ‘nationalism’ is specified in the 1903 encyclopaedic dictionary Xīn Ěryǎ as
follows:
Taking the state (guójiā) to be the ultimate component of the body of human society is
called guójiāzhǔyì.43

Thus guójiāzhǔyì might perhaps be translated more accurately as ‘state nationalism’ or

‘statism’, which becomes even more apparent when we see that one of its conceptual
antonyms is píngmínzhǔyì 平民主義 lit. ‘plain people -ism’ (Jap. heiminshugi, 1886).
Píngmínzhǔyì eventually acquired a number of senses, including ‘populism’, but when it
contrasts with guójiāzhǔyì, the sense is closer to ‘democracy’, since the point is that the
294 I. SPIRA

people, and not the state as such, should be the basis and ultimate beneficiary of
government.44
There are at least three other terms that loosely correspond to ‘nationalism’, so that
we have the following set of ‘equivalents’:
guójiāzhǔyì 國家主義 ‘state-ism’ (Jap. kokkashugi, 1883)

mínzúzhǔyì 民族主義 ‘nation-ism’ (Jap. minzokushugi, 1915)

guócuìzhǔyì 國粹主義 ‘state-essence-ism’ (Jap. kokusuishugi, 1896)

guómínzhǔyì 國民主義 ‘state-people-ism’ (Jap. kokuminshugi, 1893)

Of these, the most common modern equivalent of English nationalism is mínzúzhǔyì.

Here the focus is on the nation as an ethnic unit, and this unit as a basis for the state. It
is historically associated with thinking in terms of race (something which it has in
common with the concept mínzú ‘nation’), as becomes clear in the following definition
from the Xīn Ěryǎ:
To unite people of the same race (zhǒng 種) and differentiate people of different races in
order to build a state of one nation, this is called nationalism (mínzúzhǔyì).45

In other words, in mínzúzhǔyì the focus is on the nation state. Guócuìzhǔyì, on the other
hand, focuses on the ‘cultural essence’ of the nation (here guó means ‘state’ in the sense of
‘country’), and might perhaps be rendered as ‘cultural nationalism’. Xīn Ěryǎ again:
Taking the development of the existing particular character of the country (guó 國 ‘state’)
as the main thing is called guócuìzhǔyì (‘country-essence-ism’).46

The conceptual antonym we find in an article from 1902 is telling: Ōuhuàzhǔyì 歐化主
義, literally ‘Europeanize-ism’, i.e. ‘Westernization’.47 Guómínzhǔyì on the other hand is
built on the modern concept of ‘citizen’ (guómín, lit. ‘state people’), and takes the
patriotic citizen as its basis.48 Hence it is not surprising that it occurs in contexts where
it is not unreasonable to see it as a rendering of ‘republicanism’.49 We also find it in
jūnguómínzhǔyì ‘militarism’, literally ‘army-citizen-ism’. The connection between
‘army’ and ‘citizen’ in this ideal for a modern state is explicitly thematized in the article
quoted above.50

Conclusions
The significance of isms is to be found not so much in the isms themselves as in the
kind of discourse that is being conducted with them. Ismatic reasoning – that is
reasoning by means of ism-like categories – is characterized by the application of a
closed set of abstract concepts that are manipulated in a sort of schematic argumenta-
tion in which fixed correlations form the basis for deductions that give the impression
of logical rigour, while the line of argument actually follows a particular teleology
towards a necessary conclusion. The mini-theory of history is a paradigmatic case:
In present-day America and Europe, it is the age of the permutations of nationalism
(mínzúzhǔyì) and national imperialism (mínzú dìguózhǔyì). In present-day Asia, it is the
age of permutations of imperialism (dìguózhǔyì) and nationalism. As far as Europe is
 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 295

concerned, the nineteenth century was the age of the complete domination of nationalism.
Its beginnings were back in the second half of the eighteenth century. National imperialism
completely prevails in the twentieth century. And its beginnings are found in the second
half of the nineteenth century. Today’s world is nothing short of a stage for the real-life
drama between these two great isms.51

Various rhetorical devices, first among them forms of reification and personification,
make for stirring prose with forceful metaphors. Even where the rhetoric is toned down
and the closed-circuit argumentation is less extreme, the assertion of a set of exclusive
categories still tends to be dominant (as in Chéng Qíbǎo’s 程其保 article ‘A Contrastive
Discussion of Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism’, 1923). Moreover, isms are exten-
sively employed in summary characterizations of people (as in a 1907 biography of
Mikhail Bakunin52).
Simplifying, reductionist surveys and mini-theories of history can also be conducted
without isms, since there are other ways of making abstract nouns in Chinese, other
ways of referring to theories and movements (e.g. in Chinese using the suffixes shuō 說
‘theory’ or pài 派 ‘current; faction’), and other ways of suggesting socio-political
relevance or turning up the rhetorical temperature.53 That being said, Chinese isms
highlight how isms can and overwhelmingly do fuse all these aspects into one con-
ceptual formula: a certain intensity, socio-political relevance, and a utopian emphasis
on a priori social ideals, which are all beautifully brought out in the positive Chinese
key concept zhǔyì ‘ism’.
Further, the Chinese case is instructive in that we can affirm with certainty that the
rhetorical value of an ism does not remain fixed over time, and is certainly not the same
all over the globe. Rather, its content and valuation depend on the particular historical
circumstances it reflects, and especially the relations that are established with other
isms. We have seen that the appropriation of Western ism models was not automatic: it
was a process of appropriation that involved significant differentiation, innovation,
negotiation, redefinition, and re-evaluation. Also, Western, Japanese, and traditionally
Chinese elements are combined in intricate ways, not only linguistically, but also
philosophically and rhetorically. As we have seen, a certain traditional Chinese ten-
dency towards voluntaristic thinking and correlative reasoning resonated well with
ideological reasoning imported from the West.

Notes
1. Wáng Fànsēn 王汎森 ‘“Zhǔyì shídài” de láilín – Zhōngguó jìndài sīxiǎngshǐ de yīge
guānjàn fāzhǎn’「主義時代」的來臨― 中國近代思想史的一個關鍵發展 [The Advent
of the ‘Age of -zhǔyì’ – A Key Development in the History of Modern Chinese Thought]
Dōngyà guānniànshǐ jíkān 4 (June 2013), 1–92.; Chén Yuán 陳原‘ ‘“Zhǔyì” de shídài
zhōngj’ié le ma?’” “主義”的時代終結了嗎？[Is the Age of’‘‘ism’’ Over?], in Chén 2002,
‘110–’31. Chóngfǎn yǔcí de mìlín 重返語詞的密林 [Returning to the Forest of Words]
(Liǎonìng jiàoyù chūbǎnshè, 2002).
2. The reader is referred to my book A Conceptual History of Chinese -Isms (Leiden: Brill,
2015) for a thorough treatment of the philological and historical particulars.
3. ‘The Russian Betrayal’, Editorial, New York Times 18 September 1939, reprinted in The
New York Times Book of World War II 1939-1945: The Coverage from the Battlefield to
the Home Front (Black Dog & Leventhal, Nov 5, 2013), pp. 55–56.
4. Anthony McRoy, ‘Al Qa’eda. Partners in Crime’, Third Way (Summer 2004), pp. 8–10.
296 I. SPIRA

5. William E. Shepard, Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism: A translation and critical analysis
of ‘Social Justice in Islam’ (Leiden: Brill, 1996), p. xii.
6. Øivind Storm Bjerke, Edvard Munch and Harald Sohlberg: Landscapes of the Mind
(New York, National Academy of Design 1995), p. 90.
7. H. M. Höpfl, ‘Isms,’British Journal of Political Science 13 (1983: 1), pp. 1–17; Istvan Hahn,
‘Die Begriffe auf – ismos’, in Charlotte Welskopf (Hrsg.), Soziale Typenbegriffe im alten
Griechland un ihr Fortleben in den Sprachen der Welt: Band 4, Untersuchungen
ausgewählter altgriechischer sozialer Typenbegriffe und ihr Fortleben in Antike und
Mittelalter (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1981), pp. 52–99.
8. For Japanese, see Spira, op. cit., Ref. 2, pp. 119–126; Saitō Tsuyoshi 斉藤毅 (1978), Meiji
no kotoba. Higashi kara nishi e no kakehashi 明治の言葉：東から西えの架け橋 [The
Language of the Meiji [Period], Mediating Between East and West] (Tōkyō: Kōdansha
1978), ch. 11. For Vietnamese, see Hoàng Thi Châu, ‘Das Äquivalent für das Suffix -ismus
(von -ismos) im Vietnamesischen,’ Charlotte Welskopf (Hrsg.), Soziale Typenbegriffe im
alten Griechland un ihr Fortleben in den Sprachen der Welt: Band 7, das Fortlebenden
altgriechischen sozialer Typenbegriffe in der Sprachen der Welt (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag,
1982), pp. 618–625.
9. W. D. P. Bliss 1895: A Handbook of Socialism: A Statement of Socialism in its Various
Aspects, and a History of Socialism in All Countries, Together with Statistics, Biographical
Notes on Prominent Socialists, Bibliography, Calendar, Chronological Table, and Chart
(London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co; New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons 1895), pp. 13–15.
10. Yuān Shí’s 淵實 introductory comment to Bliss, Yuān Shí 淵實 (tr.), ‘Wúzhèngfǔzhǔyì yǔ
shèhuìzhǔyì’ 無政府主義與社會主義 [‘Anarchism and Socialism’], (Mínbào 9, 1906), p. 1
[text pagination].
11. While individual concepts lexicalized as ‘-ism’ nouns can have a positive valuation in a
given discourse (e.g. ‘patriotism’), ‘ism’ itself is at best enumerative and at worst derisive.
12. Sūn Zhōngshān 孫中山, ‘Sānmínzhǔyì’, 三民主義 [The Three People’s Principles], [1924],
in id., Sūn Zhōngshān quánjí 孫中山全集 [Complete Works of Sūn Zhōngshān], ed.
Guǎngdōngshěng shèhuì kēxuéyuàn lìshǐ yánjiūshì, Zhōngguó shèhuì kēxué yuàn jìndàishǐ
yánjiūsuǒ Zhōnghuá mínguó shǐ yánjiūshì, and Zhōngshān dàxué lìshǐxì Sūn Zhōngshān
yánjiūsuǒ, 11 vols. (Běijīng: Zhōnghuá shūjú 2006), vol. ix. pp. 183–427, p. 183.
13. Fù Sīnián 傅斯年, ‘Xīnqì báoruò zhī Zhōngguórén’ 心氣薄弱之中國人 [‘The Weak-
Spirited Chinese’] (1916), as quoted in Wáng Fànsēn, ‘“Zhǔyì shídài” de láilín –
Zhōngguó jìndài sīxiǎngshǐ de yíge guānjàn fāzhǎn’, pp. 46–47.
14. Reinhart Koselleck, ‘Die Verzeitlichung der Begriffe’, in R.Koselleck Begriffsgeschichten
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2006), pp. 77–86; cf. Helge Jordheim, ‘Against
Periodization: Koselleck’s Theory of Multiple Temporalities’, History and Theory 51 (2)
(2012).
15. Spira, op. cit., Ref. 2, pp. 196–202.
16. Lin Yü-sheng has shown that the traditional Chinese ‘monistic and intellectualistic mode
of thinking’ moulded the ‘cultural-intellectualistic approach of the first and second gen-
erations of the Chinese intelligentsia’ and eventually evolved into the ‘totalistic cultural
iconoclasm’ of the May Fourth era (Lin Yü-Sheng, The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness.
Radical Antitraditionalism in the May Fourth Era (Wisconsin, The University of
Wisconsin Press, 1979), 54–55).
17. See Spira, op. cit., Ref. 2, pp. 169–172.
18. Lǔ Xùn 魯迅, [1918], ‘“Lái le”’ 『來了』 [It’s Here], in Lǔ Xùn sānshíniánjí 魯迅三十年
集 [Collection of Thirty Years of Lǔ Xùn[‘s Work]], 30 vols. (Hong Kong: Xīnyì
chūbǎnshè), Vol iv., pp. 65–68; idem, [1918] ‘“Shèngwǔ”’ "聖武" [Sages and Soldiers],
ibid. pp. 71–74.
19. Zhǔyì dà cídiǎn, p. 37.
20. Zhǔyì dà cídiǎn 主義大辭典 [The Great Dictionary of Isms], ed. Liú Jiànguó 劉建國
(Běijīng: Rénmín chūbǎnshè 1995), p. 11.
 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 297

21. John Fitzgerald, Awakening China. Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1996), p. 292.
22. Zhǔyì dà cídiǎn, p. 14.
23. Zhǔyì dà cídiǎn, pp. 14–15; Hànyǔ dà cídiǎn 漢語大詞典 [Great Dictionary of Chinese],
ed. Luó Zhúfēng 羅竹風, 12 vols. and index (Shànghǎi: Shànghǎi císhū chūbǎnshè and
Hànyǔ dà cídiǎn chūbǎnshè 1986–1994, gives the same principles with a slightly different
wording.
24. ‘Aìqíng sānbùzhǔyì’ 愛情三不主義 [‘The Three “No”s-ism of Love’], available at <http://
www.baike.com/wiki/爱情三不主义> (accessed 11 November 2014).
25. kāifàngzhǔyì 開放主義 OPEN-UP ISM ‘open-door policy’, shēngguānzhǔyì 升官主義 RISE
OFFICIAL ISM ‘careerism in the civil service’, shēngxuézhǔyì 升學主義 RISE STUDY ISM
‘preoccupation with studying (at university etc.) without regard for actual learning’,
bàijīnzhǔyì 拜金主義 WORSHIP MONEY ISM ‘mammonism’ (a very common word in
China). Many are linked of course to the ideological battles fought in China:
fēngtóuzhǔyì 風頭主義, xiǎoquánzizhǔyì 小圈子主義, guócuìzhǔyì 國粹主義 STATE
ESSENCE ISM ‘cultural nationalism’. Others align with central traditional concepts:
dàtóngzhǔyì 大同主義 GREAT SAME ISM ‘doctrine of the Great Unity; utopianism’, 升官
主義 RISE OFFICIAL ISM ‘careerism in the civil service’, jiān’àizhǔyì 兼愛主義 UNIVERSAL
LOVE ISM.
26. Liáng Qǐchāo, ‘Bìshìmài yǔ Gélánsīdùn’ 俾士麥與格蘭斯頓 [Bismarck And Gladstone], in
Liáng 1936, vol. 6, zhuānjí 2, ‘Zìyóushū’ 自由書 Yǐnbīngshì héjí 飲冰室合集 [Collected
Works of the Ice-Drinker’s Studio], 9 vols. (Běijīng: Zhōnghuá shūjú, 1989), pp. 3–4; orig.
published in Qīngyíbào 清議報 27 (1899).
27. For Chinese, see Hànyǔ dà cídiǎn, s.v. zìyóuzhǔyì.
28. The following definition from 1903 shows that zìyóu is being fitted into a modern semantic
context: ‘To hold that every person ought to be free with respect to the governing of
human society, this is called zìyóuzhǔyì.’ (以人群之統制。宜令人人自由者。謂之自由
主義; Xīn Ěryǎ 新爾雅 [The New Ěryǎ], comp. Wāng Róngbǎo 汪榮寶 and Yè Lán 葉瀾,
ed. Shěn Guówēi 沈國威, 1903; repr. Tōkyō: Hakutekisha 1995, p. 69–70).
29. The latest quote given by the Oxford English Dictionary is from 1834. The Chinese
Gigaword Corpus has 2,601 hits. This kind of absence in the model language is quite
interesting, but it occurs also in imitator languages, such as Arabic with respect to
conservatism: in Arabic there is a word for ‘conservative’, muḥāfiẓ, but no current one-
word expression for ‘conservatism’; the putative morphological equivalent would be the
abstract noun muḥāfaẓa, but this means ‘province’.
30. ‘ism, n.’ OED Online (Oxford University Press, October 2014), available from <http://
www.oed.com>, s.v. Bismarckism, Bismarckianism (accessed 11.10.2014).
31. See note 31 above
32. Fènhé shēng 奮翮生, ‘Jūnguómín piān’, Xīnmín cóngbào 新民叢報 1 (1902), pp. 79–88,
p. 80.
33. Dàwǒ 大我, ‘Xīn shèhuì zhī lǐlùn (xù dìbā qī)’ 新社會之理論（續第八期）[‘The Theory
of New Society, cont. from No. 8‘], Zhèjiāngcháo 浙江潮 9 (1903), pp. 9–23, p. 5.
34. Liáng, ‘Dá kè nán’ 答客難 [Answering a Guest’s Difficult Questions], in id., Yǐnbīngshì héjí
飲冰室合集 [Collected Works of the Ice-Drinker’s Studio], 9 vols. (Běijīng: Zhōnghuá
shūjú 1989), vol. ii., part 39, pp. 2129–2140; orig. published in Qīngyíbào 清議報 33
(1899).
35. Fēi shēng 飛生, ‘Guóhún piān’ 國魂篇 [‘On the National Soul’], Jiāngsū 江蘇 1 (1903),
pp. 1–18, p. 12.
36. Yì tán 譯譚 [Translation Talk]: Měiguó zhī shìjièzhǔyì 美國之世界主義 [America’s cosm-
popolitanism], Wànguó gōngbào万国公报 214 (1906), pp. 65–67.
37. 子夏曰：「商聞之矣：『死生有命，富貴在天』。君子敬而無失，與人恭而有禮。
四海之內，皆兄弟也。君子何患乎無兄弟也？」Zǐxià said: ‘I have actually heard it
said: “Death and life depend on fate, wealth and high status depend on Heaven.” The
gentleman shows earnest diligence and is remiss in nothing; in his interaction with others
298 I. SPIRA

he is respectful and is characterised by ritual propriety. All within the Four Seas are his
brothers. Why should the gentleman be troubled about not having brothers?’ (Lúnyǔ 論語
46.6 as given in Thesaurus Linguae Sericae, text record MOZI LY 12.5.0.0.2.0, accessed
25.06.2016. Translation by Christoph Harbsmeier. http://tls.uni-hd.de).
38. Xīn Ěryǎ, op. cit., Ref. 28, p. 57.
39. ibid., p. 70.
40. Zhǐyǎn 只眼， ‘Wǒmen jiūjìng yīngdāng bu yīngdāng ài guó’ 我們究竟應當不應當愛國
[Ought we After All to Love Our Country or Not], Měizhōu pínglùn 25 (1919), 2.
[‘Ought We After All to Love Our Country or Not’], Měizhōu pínglùn 25 (1919), p. 2.
41. In communist dogma, however, the concept of ‘cosmopolitanism’ did not fare so well:
‘Cosmopolitanism is imperialism and covert qīnlüèzhǔyì [lit. “aggress ism”, i.e. “policy of
aggression”]’ (Zhǔyì dà cídiǎn, p. 86).
42. Shùn Dédèng 順德鄧, ‘Lùn guójiāzhǔyì. . .’ [‘On Nationalism. . .’] 論國家主義。。。，
Zhèngyì tōngbào 政藝通報 (1903), p. 1.
43. Xīn Ěryǎ, op. cit., Ref. 28, p. 69.
44. Lùn píngmínzhǔyì yǔ guójiāzhǔyì zhī fèi-xīng 論平民主義與國家主義之廢興 [On the
abolition or revival of populism and nationalism], Editorial (社說), Eastern
Miscellany = Dōngfāng zázhì 東方雜誌 8 (1907), pp. 146–148.
45. Yú yī 余一, ‘Mínzúzhǔyì lùn’ 民族主義論, Zhèjiāngcháo 浙江潮 1, 3 (1–8).
46. Xīn Ěryǎ 新爾雅 [The New Ěryǎ], comp. Wāng Róngbǎo 汪榮寶 and Yè Lán 葉瀾, ed.
Shěn Guówēi 沈國威 (1903; repr. Tōkyō: Hakutekisha 1995), p. 70.
47. ‘Shíshì mànlùn (wǔzé): Rìběn guócuìzhǔyì yǔ Ōuhuàzhǔyì zhī xiāozhǎng’ (1902) 時事慢論
（五則）：日本國粹主義與歐化主義之消長 [The Contraction and Expansion of
Japanese Cultural Nationalism and Europeanizationism], Xīnmín cóngbào 新民叢報
(1902); Guócuìzhǔyì yǔ Ōuhuàzhǔyì (1914).
48. See e.g. Zhí Jué 直覺, 國民主義（未完）, 牖報 4 (1907), pp. 1–15, 8.
49. Ariga Nagao 有賀長雄, ‘Dì shíjiǔ shìjì wàijiāo yīlǎn (xù)’ 第十九世紀外交一覽,
Qīngyíbào 清議報 40 (1900).
50. Tuō Jī 脫羈, ‘Jūnguómínzhǔyì’ 軍國民主義, Mínjué 民覺, 第1-5期 (1904), héběn,
pp. 1–11, p. 1.
51. Liáng Qǐchāo, ‘Guójiā sīxiǎng biànqiān yìtóng lùn’ 國家思想變遷異同論 [A Comparative
Account of the Development of State Thought], Xīnmín cóngbào 新民叢報 10 (1902),
19–34 (text pagination 1–16).
52. ‘Bākūníng zhuàn (láigǎo)’ 巴枯寧傳（來稿 [A Biography of Bakunin (Reader
Contribution)] Mínbào 民報 16 (1907), pp. 1–14, e.g. p. 5.
53. Spira, op. cit., Ref. 2.