PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE Research Article PROCRASTINATION, DEADLINES, AND PERFORMANCE: Self-Control by Precommitment Dan Ariely! and Klaus Wertenbroch: 'Massachuseus Institute of Technology anulINSEAD, Fontainebleau, France Abstract—Procrastinarion i all 100 familiar to most people, People delay writing up their research (30 we hear!) repeatedly declare thes will start cheir diets tomorrow, or postpane until nest week doing etd Jobs around the house. Yet people also sometines attempt 10 control their procrastination by setting deadlines for themselves. I this a cle, we pose thace questions: (a) Ave people willing 10 seifimpore meaningful (ie Ave selFimposed deadlines eetive in improving task performance {} When selfimposing deadlines, do people set them optimally, for ‘maximum performance enhancement? A set of studies examined these issues experimentally, showing that the answer is "yes" othe frst no ‘questions, and “no” to the thin. People have self-control problems, they recognize ther and they 1ry to control them by: self imposing costly) deaallines ty avercome procrastination? (b) conily deailines. These deadlines help people control procrastination ‘but they are nor as effective as some externally inposed deadlines in ‘improving task performance (Good resolutions te useless temps to inefere with cent laws. Tei ois pres. The re i absolutely i Osc Wile, The Plane of Doran Gay Self-control problems arise when preferences are inconsistent across time or cootext (e.g. Ainslie, 1975; Loewenstein, 1996). For ‘example, before going to 4 restaurant dieters may choose not to have certme brdlée, but when the time comes to have dessert they may give in to the temptation and onder it afterall, omy to regret having eaten it aller the meal is over. The issue is not whether having creme brOlée is, right oF wrong, but tha ordering it i inconsistent with the decision, makers preferences both before sn afte he event. One way {0 think bout these issues is that individuals have a set of preferences, X, at some point in time (or under a certain set of enxironmental condi tions) and a different set of preferenees, Y, a some other point in time, In the case of the ereme brig, dieters may prefer no to con ne it (Y) before going to the restaurant, prefer to eat it (X) when ‘ordering dessert and consuming it atthe restaurant, a prefer not 10 have eaten it after the meal is over (Y). This type of systematic pref ‘rence reversal is ofien described by hyperbolic time discount (e.g. Ainslie, 1975: Kitby, 1997: Laibson, 1997), under which imme: diately available rewards have a disproportionate effeet om preter fences relative t0 more delayed rewards, causing a ine-inconsistent tuste for immediate gratification, Creme beilée poses but minor self-control problem. Examples of nioze important self-control prob lems include not exercising enough, scratching a rash, nal biting verspending, pro smoking. engaging in unsafe sex, abu ‘rastination, and so forth Adress correspondenes to Dan Arey, Massishusets Istituto Tech «uy 38 Meni Dr, E86.129, Combe, MA 02142: ea: ails @inice VoL. 13, NO, 3. MAY 202 ne of the causes for the apparent changes in preferences over time is changes inthe saliency ofthe costs and henettsof the activity in question (Akerlof, 1991), Foc example, well in advance of actully ‘aking on the responsibilty of writing a book, the benefits of com= pleting such a tsk loom large, and the costs seem small, Conse authors take on such tasks. But as the deane draws closer. ‘of the costs and benefits changes. Authors become in creasingly aware of the costs (the time needed for completing the task), while the benefits become increasingly less clear, Although such time-inconsistent preferences may form serious ‘obstacles fo following a planned course of action, they ean be over: ‘come. In addition to exercising willpower to resis temptation (Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), people can bind. or precommit, their owa behavior (Prelec, 1989; Schelling 1992; Strot, 1956: Thaler & Shefrin, 181; Wertenbroch, 1998). For example, people who want to die, but recognize that eréme brie ‘will tempt them to deviate from ther plan, can preempt temptation by ing to a restaurant with a less tempting menu. A wealth of ane- dlotes describes examples of binding behavior, inchiding freuen health retreats where some foo! types are not avaiable, saving in non-interes-bearing Christmas clubs, or buying small packiges of cigaretes in order to reduce consumption (Wertenbroch, 199%). An fexteme example was provided by Schelling (1992), who described sdruy addicts sending self-ineriminating letters tobe held in wus (and mailed tothe person they fer the most will ind oat about thei ad tion) in the event of a relapse into drug use. What characterizes bind ing behavior isthe voluntary imposition of constraints (that ate costly allem 10 resis ve overcome) on one’s future choices in a sta future temptations ‘Although time-inconsistent preferences and self-conteol have been the subject of much theoretical analysis in psyehology and eco nomics (Ainslie, 1975; Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994; Hoch & Loewen: stein, 1991; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; O'Donoghue & Rabi 1999, 2000; Prelee, 1989; Strz, 1956; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981; Tversky & Shaft, 1992), controlled empirical evidence of self-con two strategies ip saree, The few studies that have looked at slf-con- twol show that people do attempt to impose costly rest themselves, In th showed with experimental and field data that people ae willing to orgo quantity discounts on goods that they may be tempted 10 ove ‘consume, eflectively paying a “self-control premium” to implement iment strategy of rationing their own consumption of Similarly, Read, Loewenstein, and Kalyanaraman (1999) asked participants to pick three rental movies either simultaneously (for later consumption) or sequentially (for more immediate consump. tion). Their results showed tht participants used the simultaneous choices to precommit to watching more "high-beow” (as opposed 10 more tempting “low-brow") movies. fn the domain of medical testing, Tope and Fishbach (2000) allowed participants to set the magnitude of self-imposed penalties for fling to undergo small, unpleasant ‘medical procedures. Their results showed that participants used these Copyright © 2002 American PAychologcal Society — 219 domain of consumer choice, Wertenbrach (1998) |PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance penalties strategically as procommitment devices, setting higher pen- alles for more aversive procedures. ‘What remains unclear from the studies that have documented such self-control behavior is the extent to which tempts to impose reste lions on oneself are successful. The work we report here examined self ‘contol empirically, with «focus on procrastination, In particular, we ‘were interested in the effectiveness of seting potentially costly dead- Tines as a way to overcome procrastination. To address this issue, we looked at tasks on which performance could be evaluated objectively. Using performance measures. we could test not only whether people we selimposed deadlines as precommitment- mechanisms, but also whether o no these mechanisms improve perfirmance, We asked three «questions regarding procrastination, slfcontrl, and performance: + Do people selt-impose costly deadlines om tasks in which procrat on may impede performance? + Are people correct in imposing deadlines on themselves? In other words, are self-imposed deadlines effective in improving task p formance’? + Do people set their deadlines optimally, for maximum performance enhancement? PILOT STUDIES ‘The two pilot studies took place within the context of a semester: long course (14 weeks) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MFT), Participants were students in the class, and as part of their ‘course requirement had 10 write ether three short papers (Pilot Sudy 1) oF one short paper (Pilot Study 2). The instructor explained that each student was fie to choose the dates by whic he or she commit ted 10 hand in the short papers, but that the deadlines had t© be an- nounced in advance and were binding Exch ofthe deadlines was scored by taking its distance (number of days) from the ks day’ lass, Thus, a score of zero implies a planned submission on the lst day of class (as would be predicted! inthe ab- sence of self-control problems). Any other response indicates «| more severe deadline than necessary. In the fist pilot std. the mean deal Tine seross all three papers was 21.2 days before he end ofthe course, ‘an sgniticaly earlier thn the last possible dealing, (83) = 805, p< O01, The mean deadline was 32.8 days before the end of the couse for the frst paper, 27) = 5.72, p< 001: 20.4 days before the end forthe second paper, (27) = 5.04, p < O01; and 10:4 days before the end for the tht paper, 27) = 405, p <1. These results show thatthe stu dens set themselves deadlines well before the lst day’ of eas, “To rule out the possibility that students selfimpose deadlines be- cease of preference for distributing events evenly over time (Loe wenstein & Prelee, 1993). in Pilot Study 2 we gave the students a Single ask. The mean selfimposed deadline in this ease was 41.59 clays before the end ofthe course, (21) = 15.44, p < O01, suggesting ‘that setting catly deadlines is strategic, and not an outeome ofa desire to space tasks evenly STUDY 1: THE FREE-CHOICE/NO-CHOICE STUDY Method Participants Study 1 took place during a semestersong executve-education course at MIT. Participants were 99 professionals, most of whom par 20 ticipated in the class via interactive video. The two sections of the ‘course (which, based on reconls provided by the executive-edueation Program, didnot differ in overall academic performance) were each assigned toa different condition (so there sas no random assignment ‘of individuals to treatments but rather « random assignment of sec- tions to neatments) Procedure During the first lecture, the instructor went over the syllabus, Which included instrctions for the study. One part of the course re ‘quirements was to write three short papers. Students in the no-chvice section (48 stents) were given fixed, evenly spaced deadlines forthe pers (paper a the end of each third ofthe course). Students in the Jree-choice section (S1 studeots) were given detailed instructions bout setting their own deadlines (asin the pilot studies). These in- sf that each student was fre to choose the dates by steuetions inc ‘which he of she wanted to and in the short papers. Four externa con. straits were set regarding the dates: Fis, students had to hand in thir papers no later thao the lst leture; second, students had to an- ounce the deadlines for submission prior tothe second lecture: thd the dates were final and cowld not be changed: and fourth, the dates ‘were binding, such that each day of delay beyond the dealline would cause a 15 penalty inthe paper's overall grade, Finally, it was ex- plained clearly that dhere were no grade advantages for early submis sions because the instuctor would not provide grades or feedhack on the assignments before the end of the course. Explaining to the st- dents that there would be no Feeback before the end ofthe course was important because it eliminated incentives for students to hand in pa pers early in oder to gt foedhack that they could use to improve sub sequent papers fact, the extemal incentives for the students in the free-choice section encouraged submission of all three papers on the lst posi ble day. By setting their deadlines as late as possible, the students ‘would have the most ime to work on the papers, the highest fexibil- ‘iy in aranging their workload, and the opportunity to lear the most shout the topie before submitting the papers. Students also had an incentive to set submission dates lite because the penalty would be Applied only to late submissions and n0t to early ones, Finally, sta sents who wanted to submit assignments early could privately plan todo so without precommitting to the instructor OF eourse, such vate deadlines might be less psychologically meaningful than {deadlines they set withthe instrector, and hence more pliant and ess effective Results and Discussion First, we examined the declared deadlines foreach ofthe three pa pers. Again, each deadline was scored by taking its distance (number ff days) from the last day of elas, so that a score of zero indicates a planned submission on the last day of class (perfectly normative) ‘Other responses indicate the severity of the deadlines the students posed on themselves. The mean deadlines were significantly earlier than the last possible deailine—1.78 days before the end of the course forthe fist paper, (44) = 8.4, p < 001: 2607 days before the end forthe second paper, (44) = 8.10, p< ,001; and 9:88 days before the en for the third paper, 444) = 497, p < O01. Figure | shows that only 43 deadlines (32%) were set forthe final week of jority of the deadlines were set peor to the last lecture, class The VOL. 18. NO. 3, MAY 2002PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE Dan Ariely and Klaus Wertenbroch Paper 3 Paper 2 Paper | Frequency last week), plotted separately the last day of las, These results indicate that people are willing to sel-impose dead Tines to overcome procrastination, even when these deadlines are costly (Our fist question) The students could have chosen less bin: ing private deadlines, but instead chose deadlines that involved more ‘grade penalty for bein the risk of losing grade points ater potential cost Tr seems that they were willing to take ‘o apply the self-control mechanism of precomimitme 'Next, we compte the grades in the two sections to se if fey ty in setting deadlines caused higher or lower grades compare with externally imposed, evenly spaced deadlines. There were three poss ble predictions: (a) If students do not have self-control problems, steater flexibility should lead to higher grades. (b) If students do self-control problems, and if they both use deadlines to overcome these problems and set chese deadlines optimally, greater flexibility | shuld low thant soe Higher pads fue ote total mambse VOL. 13.NO. 3, MAY 2002 ww ia 1 1. Frequency distribution of the declared deadlines in Study 1 as function ofthe week of lass (Week I the fist week, and Week 14 the self-control problems, and they use deadlines to overcome these prob. Jems, but do no set these deadlines optimally, greater flexibility lead 1 lower grades. In sum, flexibility, compared with evenly spaced deadlines, should lead 1 lower grades only if people have self-sontol problems yet do n The results| 2 their own deadlines optimally Supported the thin! prediction. The grades in the no-choice section (= 88.75) were higher tha h 85.67), 197) = 33. = 008, Inaddition to having a direct effet on per es in the free-choiee section (M have a secondary effect on other aspects of performance that also re quire the investment of time as a resource. A nal idate for this measure isthe students” performance on a final project that was ddue on the last day of elas, Grades forthe final project showed the same effect: Scores were lower in the free-choice section (M than in the no-choice section (M = 86), (95) = 4.15, p <1. sy that students with late selF-imposed deadlines forthe thre 2. We se the tern ea 21PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance ‘al tsks might not have had sufficient time to dedicate to the final project. Although the students were instructed about the penalties asso ated with missing the deadlines, it is possible that students in he free ‘choice section, compared with those in the no-choiee section, treated these deadlines as less binding bocause they were selF imposed.” To ‘demonstrate that the better performance in the no-choice setion was ‘eased! bythe timing ofthe deadlines and not by the perceived force of| the externally impxised deadlines, we compared the performance of the students in dhe no-choive section with the petformance of these students ia the free-choice section who chose evenly spaced (or almost evenly spaced) dates for submission. This comparison isolates the ef Feet of dealline type (self vs, external on performance. W these wo _groups with similarly spaced deadlines differed in their performance, the overall diference between the sections could be atvibuted to the nature ofthe deadlines (self vs. extemal). However, if students who spaced their deadlines evenly showed similar performance regardless ‘of the nature of the deadline, the overall difference between the sec tions was likely due to the timing of the deadlines. The results showed that the performance difference between the two) sections decreased ‘dramatically and became nonsignificant when only those students who had evenly spaced deullines were included in the analysis (effect size redaced by 59%), This comparison sugzess thatthe overall elfect of selFimposing deadlines was due primacily o the timing of the dea. lines, not just a weaker perceived potency of sel-imposed deal STUDY 2: THE PROOFREADING STUDY ‘The combined resulls of the pilot studies snd Study 1 suggest that decision makers who face situations in which they can sel-impose deadlines recognize two contig forces. On the one hand, they re: ize the value of binding themselves to overcome procrastination; on the other hand, they understand the normative reasons to set the dead: lines these two perspectives and eome up with deadlines whose timing is subsptimal (as shown in Study 1) hut beter than delaying all dea lines to the last possible day. Thus, we hypothesize that performance lander selFimposed deadlines is lower than performance under exter. nally imposed, evenly spaced deadlines but higher than performance under maximally delayed deadlines (whe all tasks are due sims ‘neously atthe end of the period), To examine this hypothesis, we now focus on oor second and thd questions: whether self-imposed dead- Tines improve performance and, if so, whether people know how to set deadlines for maximum performance enhancement. Suady 2 was de signed 1o examine these questions in a eontrolled experimental setup, roving u more sensitive test of the effect of deadlines on perfor ‘mance than Study | did, coupled with a more objective performan Method Participams In MIT's newspaper and on bulletin boants, we placed an al look ing for “native English speakers 1 help us proofed papers by other students evaluate writing skills We aso noted that payment would 2. Fvdence aginst this argument i tht all stents (n both sections) tended thc pepers on orto the eines 22 late as possible. We propose that decision makers combine | be contingent on the quality of the proofreading, with 10¢ paid per ‘conetly detected error and a $1 penalty for each day of delay. A total ‘oF 60 students participated in the study, randomly assigned to the three ‘experimental conditions. Procedure We chose a task that people cared about bat one whose outcome was not central to their lives (in contrast to the course grades in the Previous studies}, We also wanted task for which performance seares ‘would be moe objective and for which we could pay participants a ‘cordingly. We therefore designed a prooffeading tsk in which we de Tiberately planted spelling and grammatical mistakes, We used a postmodern text generator to ceate text that was grammatically €or ul as shown by the following sample ‘Sexual Met sini impossible sys Foucault: however, acoeding toe Selby]. 6 oot soc sul eit tha sities possible, hut her the nti ara ore wold sy the sini, sel eit: Ts D’Erltel2| hols that we Hate w chose betwcenpremedeen dete theory a suhcural eins impingthe leo the observer poet We created three such texts with 3 length of about 10 pages each, and inserted i each of them a total oF 100 grammatical and spelling Study 2 included thre different conditions. In each condition, we clearly explained tothe participant tha their payotTs would depend ‘now many errors they detected and on the time of submission of cach proofread text, Partisipants were told that submitting their tasks cay was permited (without inereasing their compensation), but that ‘delay in submission would result ina penalty oF $1 for each day of de lay. In the evealy-spaced: deadlines condition, participants had to sob ‘nit one ofthe three texts every 7 days i the end-deadline condition, hey had o submit all three texts atthe end of 3 weeks (21 days); amd nthe selfimpased-deaalnes condition, they hal to choose their own ‘dealne foreach of the three texts within the J-week window (as in the previous studies). Results and Discussion Fins. we determined whether the sel mposed-deallines condition replicated the resulls of the previous studies, The results showed that participants in this condition chose to space out their proofteading asks, FQ, 38) = 63.28, p < 01, thus showing a preference for self imposing costly deallines ‘We analyzed three aspects of performance across the different con dltons: number of errors detected. delays in submissions, and earm- ings (see Fig. 2), Alldliferences were statistically significant (all ps < (in the expected direction. As predicted the number of rots cor rectly detected was highest in the evely-spaced-deadlnes condition Followed hy the self-imposed-deadlines condition, with the lowest pe formance in the end-deadline condition, Results were similar for par- ticipants delays in submitting their proofreading work (in tis case, shorter delays resulted in higher payoffs). Parieipants’ earnings re- ected s combination of error detection and delay and thus show the same pattern of resus, 4. The texegemeraing engine on the Wel at pte ewhre ipa OL. 13, NO.3, MAY 2002PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE Dan Ariely and Klaus Wertenbroch 160; 20 16) 120) 80} 40| 30) BEE sey paced dates Self-imposed deadlines End deadline | Errors detected (A) Fig, Delays in submissions (B) Mean errors detected (a). delays in submissions (b), and ear ol Earnings (C) hused on standard erors). Delays are measured in days, earings in dollars Next. se examined the san measures focusing on the participants in the selfimposed-deadlines condition who had spaced their tasks evenly, or approximately evenly (n = 10), Mierring the results of Sty the differences between the evenly-space-deadlines condition and the ("sophisticated") sel-imposedaleadlnes condition decreased ds matically and became nonsignificant forall dependent measures: delay in submissions (effect size reduced by 384), errors detected (effect size reduced by 795), and ear 2s (elect size reduced by 55%). Tis reduction in effect sizes provides additional evidence that a central cause of the lower performance in the self-imposed-dealines cond tion compared with the evenly-space he, we asked participants to evaluate their ov adlines condition was subop: timal spacing ofthe al experience fn five atributes: how much they liked the task, how interesting it was, how va, how good th ad the quality ofthe wi mat ical quality was, and how effectively the text communicated the ideas timed im it. Rex ses to all questions were on a 10-point scale, ‘on which higher eumbers represented higher quality ratings, An analy sis of the average subjective evaluation across the five questions re vealed a 57) = 17.06, p <.001 patra that was the opposite of the performance results, FU2, Participants in the evenly-spaced-deadlines condition liked the task the least (M = 22.1, followed by the partic pants in the sel-imposed-deadiines condition (Mf = 28.12), followed by participants in the end-deadline condition, who liked the tsk the most, or disliked i the last (M = 37.9), These results are not surptis ing. as the texts were n aningless and the tasks were boring if ot an est that the pattern would have been reversed if the task had been inherently enjoyable; participants in the evenly-spaced {deadlines condition would have enjoyed it the mos, followed by pat VoL. 13.N0.3. MAY 2002 ticipants in the sel-imposed-deaines ‘cpa inthe end sndition, and finally by par caine conuition In axition, we asked participants to estimate how much time they had spent on each ofthe three texts. "The time estimates revealed micro 45.76,» <.001, india hat increased time spent on the task caused the evaltation tobe mee image of the subjective evaluations, F(2, 57) negative, Participant in te evenly-spaced-lealines condition indicat they spear dhe most time sIPimposed- de fn the task (ME mn sper he task (M = 84 min, participa inthe itermediate amount of time dines condition spent (69.9 min, and participants in the end-deadline cond the last ime on the task (MF 50.8 min), Taken together the results show that when deadline constraints inereased, performance in proved, time spent on the task increased. and enjoyment of the task de cased (because of enhanced recognition of the tre ow quality of the 1s). The effectiveness of the consrants themselves depended on the type of eonstraint—selfimposed dealnes improved performance, but ‘ott the same depree as evenly spaced deadlines. GENERAL DISCUSSION Te studies presented here show’ that people sometimes impose deadlines on themselves, even when missing these deadlines leads to penalties. In a world without sef-contrl problems, sich behavior mative. raional decision maker with time-conss tent prefereaces would not impose constraint on his or her choiees. But if people impulsively procrastinate, and if they also are aware of their bow & Tirole, in press; O'Done contly deadlines can be stegic ation problems (e.g, Be hue & Rabin, 1999), slf-imposi and reasonable. Study demonstrated that sel-imposed deadlines do 223PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCt Procrastination, Dead not enhance performance as much as externally imposed, evenly spaced deadlines. The results from Study 2 show that performance under self imposed deadlines is lower than performance under evenly spaced dead: lines, but higher than performance under maximally delayed deallines, ‘We ean now return othe toe questions posed earlier. (a) Do people selt-impose cosily deadlines to overcome procrastination? (b) Are sel imposed deadlines effective in improving tusk performance? (e) Do people set self-imposed Uadlines optimally? The answee a the frst 180 ‘questions is “yes” and the answer tothe last question i "v0." Our find ings demonstrate that people understand the value of binding them- selves to overcome procrastination, even inthe face of strong normative reason for sting deadlines as late as possible. Our participants showed ‘some sophistication in their understanding of their wn procrastination problems, but many didnot set their deadlines to bind themselves opti mally, Whether our evidence of such “imperfect” sophistication (or partial naive”) reflects biased slF-perception, cognitive limitations in caltrating deadlines, or a deliberate mixed strategy of balancing Mexi- bility and self-control is « question for future research. What is clear from our empirical evidence is that procrastination isa teal behavioral problem, that people stratepcally try to curt it by using easly se ‘pose deadlines, and that self-imposed deadlines ste not always a ef Fective as some external deadlines in boosting tsk performance “Acknowledgments—We thank Jove Femando Cares Mendenes Oliveira Sivaforhis humor and advice andthe editor a tw anonynoss review efor their helpful comments REFERENCES, Aime, (97S), Spouse A tar hor fps ning ‘onto Pool Bey, 2 3-98 24 ‘ion. InW>D. 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