1. Ong Chia v.

Republic

Facts:

A Chinese national went to the Philippines and stayed here since then. When he was 66 years old he filed a
petition for naturalization to be a Filipino citizen. He testifies as to his qualification and presented evidence to
support his claims. The trial court granted such petition. However, he CA reversed the lower court’s decision when
the state appealed. The latter claim that the petitioner failed to support his petition with the appropriate
documentary evidence.

Ong Chia now contends that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which had merely been
annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and that such documents, not having been presented and formally
offered as evidence, are mere scraps of paper.

Issue:

Ong Chia now contends that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which had merely been
annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and that such documents, not having been presented and formally
offered as evidence, are mere scraps of paper.

Ruling:
Yes. The documents should be considered as evidence.

Rule 132 Sec 34 invoked by the petitioner is not applicable to the present case involving a petition for
naturalization. Rule 143 of the Rules of Court states, “These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and
election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not therein provided for, except by
analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.” The only instance when said rules
may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient."

So by claiming that he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, is not tenable. The reason
prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the
chance to object to their admissibility. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed
with the Court of Appeals

2. PEOPLE V. ADOR (432 SCRA 1)

Facts:

In convicting the accused of murder the trial court relied on the following evidences;

1. the accused was seen fleeing

2. the accused allegedly surrendered a handgun
3. the slug taken from the head of the victim was fired from the gun surrendered
4. the victim made a dying declaration
5. the paraffin test shows that the accused is positive of gunpowder

Issue:

whether or not the conviction is proper

Ruling:

No.

For circumstantial evidence to suffice,

1. there should be more than one circumstance;

2. the facts from which the inference are derived are proven and

3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, the following are the guidelines in appreciating circumstantial evidence:

1. it should be acted upon with caution;

2. all the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt;

3. the facts must exclude every theory but that of guilt; and
4. The facts must establish such certainty of guilt as to convince the judgment beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused is the one who committed the offense.

Measured against these guidelines, the conviction cannot stand for the following reasons:

1. the testimony of the prosecution witness that he saw accused fleeing from the crime scene is doubtful;

2. the gun surrendered by the accused does not appear to be the same gun presented during trial;

3. if the gun is not the same, it is uncertain where the slug taken from the head of the victim came from; 4. the
dying declaration which mentioned only the "Adors" can refer to anyone with that family name; and

5. scientific experts concur in the view that the result of a paraffin test is not conclusive. Plainly, the facts from
which the inference that the accused committed the crime were not proven. Accordingly, the guilt of the accused
was not established with moral certainty

4. Custodio V. Sandiganbayan

Facts:

1. Petitioners were members of the military who acted as Senator Aquinos security.
2. They were charged, together with several other, before the Sandiganbayan for the killing of Senator
Aquino who was fatally shot
3. Petitioners were also indicted for the killing of Rolando Galman who was also gunned down at the airport
tarmac
4. Sandiganbayan rendered a decision acquitting all the accused, which include the petitioners. However, the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan were later found to be a sham trial.
5. Court thus nullified said proceedings.
6. Re-trial ensued before the Sandiganbayan.
7. In its decision, Sandiganbayan, found the petitioners guilty as principals of the crime of murder in both
Criminal Cases.
8. Petitioners seek to present as new evidence, the finding of the forensic group.
9. Their report essentially concludes that it was not possible, based on the forensic study of the evidence in
the double murder case, that C1C Rogelio Moreno fired at Senator Aquino as they descended the service
stairway from the aircraft.
10. Petitioners submit that the review by the forensic group of the physical evidence constitutes newly
discovered evidence which would entitle them to a new trial under Rule 121 of Rules of Criminal
Procedure

Issue:

Should the case be re-opened based on the alleged new evidence

Ruling:

No. Before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown

(1) that the evidence was discovered after trial;

(2) that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence;

(3) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and

(4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted.

It appears from their report that the forensic group used the same physical and testimonial evidence hold out
during the trial. These materials were available to the parties during the trial and there was nothing that prevented
the petitioners from using them at the time to support their theory. Petitioners, in their present motion, failed to
present any new forensic evidence that could not have been obtained by the defense at the time of the trial even
with the exercise of due diligence.

The report of the forensic group essentially reiterates the theory presented by the defense during the trial of the
double murder case. Clearly, the report is not newly discovered.

A new trial will only be allowed if the new evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if
admitted. Also, new trial will not be granted if the new evidence is merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching
7. People vs. Yatar 428 SCRA 504

Facts:

The accused was convicted of the Special Complex Crime of Rape with Homicide when the DNA recovered from the
semen found in the victim’s vaginal canal matched his gene type. The accused contended that such testing was
violative of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.

Issue:

May the DNA Test results be used for accused conviction?

Ruling:

Yes. Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR
testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is
reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology. The science of DNA
typing involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of Court. DNA
profiling requires a factual determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented.

3. People V.Domingcil (419 SCRA 291)

Facts:

Belrey Oliver, an employee of Ferd’s Upholstery that the appellant went to their shop looking for a buyer of
marijuana. Oliver recounted telling the appellant that he knew of someone interested and ready to buy marijuana,
instructing him and ask appellant to bring one (1) kilo of the substance to a store located in front of the Divine
Word College of Laoag at around 1:30 p.m. of that same day.

Acting on the said report, SPO4 Ventura formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation against the appellant.
Momentarily, the back-up officers rushed to the scene and arrested the appellant.

Thereafter, the appellant was brought to the headquarters. The suspected marijuana was brought to and initially
examined by Dr. Joseph Adaya, an accredited physician of the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB), who certified that the
item consisted of three genuine mixtures of marijuana leaves with seeds. On the basis of her examination,
Superintendent Cid issued Chemistry Report No. D-074-94 with the following findings: specimen prove POSITIVE
result to the test for marijuana, a prohibited drug.

The trial court found the appellant guilty under Sec. 4 of Art. II, RA No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

The appellant filed an appeal contending that the lower court erred in convicting the victim.

It submits that there was an error in finding that the accused was not instigated and that the court erred in finding
the accused received 500 pesos despite denial.

Issue: Whether the appeal has merit.

Ruling:

The appeal has no merit. After a thorough and careful review of the records of this case, we find that the guilt of
the appellant was sufficiently established by the evidence, and the trial court’s judgment is well-supported by law
and jurisprudence

The foregoing testimony of SPO1 Orlando Dalusong was corroborated on material points by SPO4 Rodrigo Ventura,
then Chief of the Intelligence Section of the PNP of Laoag City who organized and conducted the operation and
was part of the buy-bust team itself.20 SPO4 Ventura remained steadfast and unwavering on cross-examination
despite intense grilling by the defense counsel.21

Police Superintendent Theresa Ann Cid, the Forensic Chemist assigned at the PNP Crime Laboratory Center at San
Fernando, La Union, confirmed22 Dr. Joseph Adaya’s initial finding that the substance seized from the appellant
was indeed marijuana, a prohibited drug.

It was also fairly established by SPO3 Diosdado Mamotos24 and SPO1 Loreto Ancheta25 that the confiscated
marijuana was the same substance examined by the forensic chemist and later presented as evidence in court.
The testimonies of the principal prosecution witnesses complement each other, giving a complete picture of how
the appellant’s illegal sale of the prohibited drug transpired, and how the sale led to his apprehension in flagrante
delicto. Their testimonies establish beyond doubt that dangerous drugs were in the possession of the appellant
who had no authority to possess or sell the same. More importantly, all the persons who obtained and received
the confiscated stuff did so in the performance of their official duties.

The material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. In this case, the prosecution adduced
proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant sold one (1) kilo of marijuana to poseur-buyer SPO1 Orlando
Dalusong in the entrapment operation.

The foregoing testimony of SPO1 Orlando Dalusong was corroborated on material points by SPO4 Rodrigo Ventura,
then Chief of the Intelligence Section of the PNP of Laoag City who organized and conducted the operation and
was part of the buy-bust team itself.

5. People vs. Fetalino, 525 SCRA 170

Facts:

1. This is a case of two counts of acts of lasciviousness and 3 counts of rape allegedley committed by the
father against his own daughter.
2. The victim testified that the appellant rape her on 3 separate instances.
3. She eventually revealed her sad experience to her mother. Then she was brought to the crime laboratory
for a medical examination.
4. It was found that the victim was already in a non-virgin state physically.
5. Appellant deny all the allegation and claimed that the present criminal charges were brought against him
in retaliation for the physical injuries he inflicted to his wife during one of their heated arguments which
became frequent. The wife even charged him with physical injuries which was raffled off to a different
branch of the court.
6. The trial court found appellant guilty as charged in all the cases filed against him.
7. The appellate court modified the decision of the trial court by acquitting appellant of the two charges of
rape and by downgrading the penalty imposed from death to reclusion perpetua.

Issue:

1. W/n the crimes charged have been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
2. W/n the court a quo gravely erred in imposing upon the accused-appellant the supreme penalty of death
as the age of the private complainant has not been sufficiently proved.

Ruling:

For the incidents that transpired on 2 different dates during which the accused inserted his finger into the vagina
of the appellant was indicted merely for two counts of acts of lasciviousness when the appropriate charges should
have been two separate counts of rape under Article 266-A(2) of the Revised Penal Code.

Art. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. - Rape is committed:

1) By a man who [shall] have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of
sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into
the genital or anal orifice of another person.

With these precedents, it is clear that the insertion of one's finger into the genital or anal orifice of another person
constitutes rape by sexual assault and not merely an act of lasciviousness.
8. People vs. Sartagod 221 SCRA 251

Facts:

1. This is a case of multiple rape against Vilma de Belen that happened inside their house at Laguna.
2. While they were sleeping, the appellant broke in and woke up Rogelio, vilama’s brother.
3. They tied him up and asked for the key to his cabinet.
4. Vilma who heard whispers went to the scene, when the 3 appellant saw her, they approach her and
started raping her. The 3 appellant took turns molesting Vilma.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the absence of fingerprints eliminates the possibility that the accused in ot at the scene of
the crime.
2. Whether or not police line up is required for proper identification

Ruling:

The court cannot sustain their theory that from the negative findings in the fingerprint examination
conducted in the course of the investigation in the instant case, it must be concluded that they could not
have been at the scene of the crime. Negative findings do not at all times lead to a valid conclusion for
there may be logical explanations for the absence of identifiable latent prints other than their not being
present at the scene of the crime.

The absence of one does not immediately eliminate the possibility that the accused-appellants could
have been at the scene of the crime.

These claims of irregularities are of little if not, of no significance at all. The natural desire in the victim
to seek retribution not simply from anybody who may be put before her but from the very same
offenders who actually did violence against her. It would be most illogical for an outraged victim to
direct her anger against anyone other than her three offenders. No amount of coaching will be sufficient
to counter the natural outrage of a rape victim against her abuser when said abuser is presented before
her in a police line-up.

Whether or not there was a previous police line-up, the fact is that they were positively identified at the
trial. There is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification. The complainant's
recognition of the accused-appellants as her attackers cannot be doubted.

9. People V. Domantay (307 SCRA 1 [1999])

Facts:

1. here the accused was convicted of complex rape with homicide for the death of 6 year old Jennifer
Domantay. He denied the accusation against him.
2. SPO1 Espinoza claimed that the accused-appellant agreed to answer all the queries that will be raised by
the investigator. He confessed everything that had happened without the presence of the counsel.
3. Espinoza also claimed that the accused admitted that he committed the crime and he even tells where he
put the bayonet that he used in stabbing the victim.
4. But the accused-appellant denied that there is a boundary dispute between him and the victim’s parents.
The accused was not accompanied by his counsel, neither was his statement made in writing.
5. A DPWR radio reporter conducted an interview to the accused-appellant.
6. The accused was accompanied by two police officers and there is no lawyer that is present. The accused
admitted again that he did the whole crime and claimed that he used the victim to revenge on the victim’s
parents.
7. Accused-appellant contends that his alleged 2 confessions are inadmissible in evidence because they had
been obtained in violation of Art. III, Sec 12(1) of the Constitution and that, with these vital pieces of
evidence excluded, the remaining proof of his alleged guilt, consisting of circumstantial evidence, is
inadequate to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue:

W/n the confession of the accused is admissible

Ruling:

YES. The court state that the provision applies to the stage of custodial investigation, that is, “ when the
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a
suspect.

R.A. No. 7438 has extended the constitutional guarantee to situations in which an individual has not been formally
arrested but has merely been "invited" for questioning.

In the case at bar, when accused-appellant was brought to the Malasiqui police station in the evening of October
17, 1996,[37] he was already a suspect, in fact the only one, in the brutal slaying of Jennifer Domantay already
under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed in Art. III, §12(1) of the Constitution applied to him.

But though he waived the assistance of counsel, the waiver was neither put in writing nor made in the presence of
counsel. For this reason, the waiver is invalid and his confession is inadmissible. We agree with the Solicitor
General, however, that accused-appellant's confession to the radio reporter, Celso Manuel, is admissible.

Accused-appellant claims, however, that the atmosphere in the jail when he was interviewed was "tense and
intimidating" and was similar to that which prevails in a custodial investigation. We are not persuaded. Accused-
appellant was interviewed while he was inside his cell. The interviewer stayed outside the cell and the only person
besides him was an uncle of the victim. Accused-appellant could have refused to be interviewed, but instead, he
agreed

10. State Prosecutors V. Muro (263 SCRA 505 [1994])

Facts:

1. This is a case against Judge Muro on the ground of ignorance of the law and grave misconduct and
violation of the provision in the code of Judicial Conduct.
2. The case at bar involves the prosecution of 11 charges against Emelda Marcos in violation of the Central
Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank Circular 960.
3. The respondent judge dismissed all 11 cases solely on the basis of the report published from the 2 news
papers, which the judge believes to be reputable, that the Pres of the Philippines lifted all foregin
exchange restrictions.
4. He further contends that the announcement of the President as published in the newspaper has made
such a fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for the judge to take judicial notice which is discretionary
on his part.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial notice on the
statement of the president lifting the foreign exchange restriction published in the newspaper as basis for
dismissing the case?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held the respondent judge guilty for gross ignorance of the law.

It cannot comprehend his assertion that there is no need to wait for the publication of the circular no. 1353 which
is the basis of the President’s announcement in the newspaper, believing that the public announcement is
absolute and without qualification and is immediately effective and such matter becomes a public knowledge
which he can take a judicial notice upon at his discretion.

it was premature for him to take judicial notice on this matter which is merely based on his personal knowledge
and is not based on the public knowledge that the law requires for the court to take judicial notice of.

For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should be present:

(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;

(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;

(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court

The fact that should be assumed as judicially known must be on such notoriety that such fact cannot be disputed.
Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge where the personal knowledge of the judge does not amount to the
judicial notice of the court.

The judge erred in taking cognizant of a law that was not yet in force and ordered the dismissal of the case without
giving the prosecution the right to be heard and of due process. The court ordered for the dismissal of the judge
from service for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the case motu proprio and
for erring in exercising his discretion to take judicial notice on matters that are hearsay and groundless with a
reminder the power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution at all times.

11. People v. Pugal (215 SCRA 247 [1994])

Facts:

1. This is a crime of robbery with homicide with the use of unlicensed firearms. The accused are Pugal,
Adduca and Soriano.
2. The 3 accused, while armed, went to the Salamanca’s house around 9pm to rob the family.
3. Erlinda Salamanca was compelled to give her earnings amounting 1k and his daughter in law’s ring.
4. The accused then saw Jacinto and shot the latter several times.
5. When jacinto’s body was brought to their house, Hizon noticed that his father’s false teeth were missing.
Efforts to look for the same at and near the place where Jacinto was killed proved futile.
6. 2 days after Jacinto died, Pugal went to the house of the Salamanca’s and handed over to Hizon the
missing artificial dentures of Jacinto which he allegedly found near the place where the victim was killed.
7. Appellant Pugal, the lone accused who appealed from the decision, assigns the following errors allegedly
committed by the court,

Issue:

1. And that the lower court erred in not acquitting Pugal on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Ruling:

In the case at bar, the appellant was positively identified by Hizon and Erlinda. The pretension that the appellant
was allegedly at his house at the time of the incident cannot stand against the clear and positive identification by
the prosecution witnesses. Also, the Solicitor general correctly concluded that considering the proximity in the
distance between the 2 houses, it was not physically impossible for appellant to be at the locus criminis and then
return to his house shortly afterwards.

12. People v. Lintang (128 ASCRA 511 [1983])

Facts:

This is a case of rape done to the victim estella who was forced to take an ornacol drug which left her dizzy and
weak preventing her to resist the inhumane acts done to her by the accused.

The ornacol drug is a medical preperation against cough and colds. Its prescribe dose is 2 capsules every 12 hours.
an overdoes of such drug is dangerous because of its sedative action, causes drowsiness.

1. The victim was 15 years old at the time was forced to drink 10 capsule at a time by the accused 19 years
old jeepney driver. Estella become dizzy and weak afterwards.
2. Accused Lintaf placed her in a jeep and took her to a squatters area where he consummate his evil intent.
3. The same evening the mother reported the outrage to the police.
4. In the medical examination it was confirm that the victim was raped.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:

Yes.

We hold that his guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The fact is that Estella knew nothing about Ornacol. It
was Lintag’s sales talk about "trips" which inveigled her into asking him to buy Ornacol. His culpability is sanctioned
by the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the
cause of the evil caused)

SEXUAL CONGRESS WITH A CONSCIOUS WOMAN WHOSE RESISTANCE IS TAKEN AWAY BY ADMINISTERING DRUGS,
CONSTITUTES RAPE;

the accused did in this case was to employ a subtle or sophisticated form of overcoming the resistance of the
victim by the use of Ornacol capsules. He was able to consummate his felonious objective, considering that the
victim was a mere teenager and considering the propensity of the present youth to succumb to drug addiction and
to indulge in practices which their parents consider immoral or unconventional.
 13. Strategic Alliance V. Rodstock Securities Inc. (G.R. No. 178158, December 4, 2009)

Facts:

1. Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) was granted a franchise to construct,
operate and maintain toll facilities in the North and South Luzon Tollways and Metro Manila Expressway.
2. CDCP Mining Corporation (CDCP Mining), an affiliate of CDCP, obtained loans from Marubeni Corporation
of Japan (Marubeni).
3. In 1983, CDCP’s name was changed to Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) in order to
reflect that the Government already owned 90.3% of PNCC and only 9.70% is under private ownership.
4. the PNCC Board of Directors (PNCC Board) passed Board Resolutions admitting PNCC’s liability to
Marubeni.
5. Marubeni assigned its entire credit to Radstock Securities Limited (Radstock), a foreign corporation.
6. PNCC and Radstock entered into a Compromise Agreement.
7. Under this agreement, PNCC shall pay Radstock the reduced amount of P6,185,000,000.00 in full
settlement of PNCC’s guarantee of CDCP Mining’s debt allegedly totaling P17,040,843,968.00 (judgment
debt asof 31 July 2006).
8. To satisfy its reduced obligation, PNCC undertakes to

(1) "assign to a third party assignee to be designated by Radstock all its rights and interests" to the listed
real properties of PNCC;

(2) issue to Radstock or its assignee common shares of the capital stock of PNCC issued at par value which
shall comprise 20% of the outstanding capital stock of PNCC; and

(3) assign to Radstock or its assignee 50% of PNCC’s 6% share, for the next 27 years, in the gross toll
revenues of the Manila North Tollways Corporation.

9. Strategic Alliance Development Corporation (STRADEC) moved for reconsideration. STRADEC alleged that
it has a claim against PNCC as a bidder of the National Government’s shares, receivables, securities and
interests in PNCC.

Issue:

Whether or not the Compromise Agreement between PNCC and Radstock is valid in relation to the Constitution,
existing laws, and public policy

Ruling:

The Corporation Code defines a sale or disposition of substantially all assets and property of a corporation as one
by which the corporation "would be rendered incapable of continuing the business or accomplishing the purpose
for which it was incorporated" - any sale or disposition short of this will not need stockholder ratification, and may
be pursued by the majority vote of the Board of Directors.

As a foreign corporation, with unknown owners whose nationalities are also unknown, Radstock is not qualified to
own land in the Philippines pursuant to Section 7, in relation to Section3, Article XII of the Constitution.

Consequently, Radstock is also disqualified to own the rights to ownership of lands in the Philippines. Contrary to
the OGCC’s claim, Radstock cannot own the rights to ownership of any land in the Philippines because Radstock
cannot lawfully own the land itself.

14. People v. Reanzares (344 SCRA 624 [2000])

Facts:

1. This is a case of Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD 532.

2. The case involves Spouses Gregorio Tactacan and Lilia Tactacan.
3. One evening the Spouses closed their store and left for home on board their passenger jeepney.
4. 2 unidentified men suddenly climbed on board.
5. Two (2) other persons, one of whom was later identified as accused Armando Reanzares, were seen
waiting for them at a distance. As soon as the vehicle stopped, the accused and his companion
approached the vehicle.
6. The unidentified men took Gregorio’s seiko wristwatch worth 2500 the beg of Lilia containing 1200.
7. Lilia was also killed during the outrage.

Issue: Whether or not the conviction against the accused for Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD 532 is
erroneous, as his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:

These attempts of the accused to discredit Gregorio obviously cannot hold ground. Neither can they bolster his
alibi.

For alibi to be believed it must be shown that

(a) the accused was in another place at the time of the commission of the offense, and

(b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene

In this case, the accused claims to have left for Bicol the day before the incident. To prove this, he presented his
father and brother but their testimonies did not meet the requisite quantum to establish his alibi.

Thus the trial court was correct in disregarding the alibi of the accused not only because he was positively
identified by Gregorio Tactacan but also because it was not shown that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the crime scene on the date and time of the incident. Indeed the accused is guilty.

But that the accused was guilty of Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD 532 was erroneous. As held in a
number of cases, conviction for highway robbery requires proof that several accused were organized for the
purpose of committing it indiscriminately. There is no proof in the instant case that the accused and his cohorts
organized themselves to commit highway robbery.

what the prosecution established was only a single act of robbery against the particular persons of the Tactacan 4
spouses. Clearly, this single act of depredation is not what is contemplated under PD 532 as its objective is to deter
and punish lawless elements who commit acts of depredation upon persons and properties of innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another thereby disturbing the peace and tranquility of the
nation and stunting the economic and social progress of the people. Consequently, the accused should be held
liable for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by RA 7659

15. People v. Tundag (342 SCRA 704 [2000])

Facts:

1. The complainant in this case is Mary Ann Tundag, daughter of the accused. She filed 2 separate complaint
for incestuos rape against her father, Tomas Tundag.
2. She alleged that she was 13 years old when she was raped by her father. her father even used a knife to
threatened her not to shout while he was raping her on both occasions.
3. Private complainant’s testimony is corroborated by medical findings that lacerations were present in her
hymen. Indeed, the appellant is guilty.
4. Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659, penalizes rape of a
minor daughter by her father as qualified rape and a heinous crime.
5. In this case, it was sufficiently alleged and proven that the offender was the victim’s father. However, she
admitted that she did not know exactly when she was born because her mother did not tell her. She
further said that her birth certificate was likewise with her mother. Failure to secure the Birth Certificate,
the prosecution, requested for judicial notice that the victim here is below 18 years old.

Issue:

Whether or not judicial notice is proper in the instant case

Ruling:

NO. Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof
because they already know them. As required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to any other matters such as age, a
hearing is required before courts can take judicial notice of such fact. Generally, the age of the victim may be
proven by the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim, or in the absence thereof, upon showing that said
documents were lost or destroyed, by other documentary or oral evidence sufficient for the purpose. The failure to
sufficiently establish victim’s age by independent proof is a bar to conviction for rape in its qualified form.
Independent proof of the actual age of a rape victim becomes vital and essential so as to remove an “iota of
doubt” that the case falls under the qualifying circumstances for the imposition of the death penalty set by law.

The father-daughter relationship has been treated by Congress in the nature of a special circumstance which
makes the imposition of the death penalty mandatory. In the case at bar, the special qualifying circumstance of
relationship was proved but not the minority of the victim, taking the case out of ambit of mandatory death
sentence
 16. Laureano v.Court of Appeals (324 SCRA 414)

Facts:

1. This is a case of illegal dismissal filed by Laureano, employee of Singapore Airline.

2. Sometime in 1982, Singapore Airlines hit a recession and initiated cost-cutting measures. Among the 17
excess Airbus pilot, 12 were found qualified. Unfortunately, Laureano was not one of the twelve.
3. Laureano instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter.
4. Singapore Airline moved to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds.
5. Before said motion was resolved, the complaint was withdrawn.
6. Thereafter, Laureano filed the instant case for damages due to illegal termination of contract of services
before the RTC.
7. CA reversed the decision of the RTC, it held that the action has already prescribed, the prescriptive period
was 4 years and action was filed beyond the prescriptive period.

Issue:

(a) W/N Philippine law must be applied and not Singaporean law.

(b) W/N action has already been prescribed.

Ruling:

(a) Philippine law must be applied. SC quoted the findings of the RTC, it says: "Neither can the Court determine
whether the termination of the plaintiff is legal under the Singapore Laws because of the defendant's failure to
show which specific laws of Singapore Laws apply to this case.

As substantially discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws
of Singapore. The defendant that claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of
proof. The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law should be applied.

(b) YES. Neither Article 1144 nor Article 1146 of the Civil Code is pertinent here. What is applicable is Article 291 of
the Labor Code. In the light of Article 291, we agree with the appellate court's conclusion that petitioner's action
for damages due to illegal termination filed again on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effective
date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982 has already prescribed.

Where the money claim was based on a written contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Court held that
the language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its application only to 'money claims specifically
recoverable under said Code' but covers all money claims arising from an employee-employer relations"

17. People v. kulais (292 SCRA 551)

Facts:

1. This is a case of Kidnapping for ransom allegedly committed by 12 individuals.

2. The information was filed before the RTS of Zamboanga City
3. of the 12 accused only 9 were apprehended.
4. The trial court found appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of kidnapping for ransom and one count of
kidnapping a woman and public officer, for which offenses it imposed upon him six terms of life
imprisonment. It also found him guilty of two counts of slight illegal detention for the kidnapping of
Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco
5. Thereafter Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma Sahiddan deKulais and Jaliha Hussin filed
their Joint Notice of Appeal.
6. In a letter dated February 6,1997, the same appellants, except Jailon Kulais, withdrew their appeal
because of their application for amnesty.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the trial court is faulted with the following errors:

a. In taking judicial notice of a material testimony given in another case by Lt.Melquiades Feliciano

b. On the assumption that Lt. Feliciano’s testimony could be validly taken judicial notice of

Ruling:

The accused was not denied due process.

As a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings, even if
these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and are actually pending before the
same judge.

Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial notice of the testimony of
Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the cases against the appellant. Hence, appellant
Kulais was not denied due process.

Hisconviction was based mainly on the positive identification made by some of the kidnapvictims.The elements of
kidnapping for ransom, as embodied in Article 267 of the RevisedPenal Code, having been sufficiently proven, and
the appellant, a private individual,having been clearly identified by the kidnap victims, this Court thus affirms the
trial court’s finding of appellant’s guilt on five counts of kidnapping for ransom.

18. Agueza v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (271 SCRA 1 [1997])

Facts:

1. This case ensued when petitioner and private respondent Arrieta and Lilia Perez, a bookkeeper,
employee of intertrade defaulted in the payment of loan secured by them from Metrobank.
2. Metrobank instituted a suit against the private respondents.
3. More than a year after private respondent Metrobank filed its original complaint, it filed an Amended
Complaint for the sole purpose of impleading petition as liable for the loan made by private respondents
Arrieta and Perez.
4. The trial court rendered its decision absolving petitioner from liability and dismissing private respondent
Metrobank’s complaint.
5. In setting aside the decision of the trial court, respondent CA ratiocinated such reversal, that no dispute
exists as to the promissory note and the suretyship agreement.
6. The controversy centers on whether the note was a corporate undertaking and whether the suretyship
agreement covered the obligation in the note.
7. The surety agreement presents a different problem. There is no question that Aguenza signed the
agreement, as shown from the evidence presented.
8. Aguenza feigns ignorance of the promissory note and claims his knowledge of it came only when he
received summons.
9. Aguenza also argues that the suretyship was executed to enable Intertrade to avail of letters of credit to
finance importations, which had all been paid in full, and therefore the agreement was thereby
terminated.

Issue:

1. Whether or not an admission in a pleading on which a party goes to trial may be contradicted by showing
that it was made by improvidence or mistake or that no such admission was made.

Ruling:

The general rule that "the allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against
the pleader" is not an absolute and inflexible rule and is subject to exceptions.

Rule 129, Section 4, of the Rules of Evidence, provides;

Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the
same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through a
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

In other words, an admission in a pleading on which a party goes to trial may be contradicted by showing that it
was made by improvidence or mistake or that no such admission was made, not in the sense in which the
admission was made to appear or the admission was taken out of context.

In the case at bench, we find that the respondent Court of Appeals committed an error in appreciating the
"Answer" filed by the lawyer of Intertrade as an admission of corporate liability for the subject loan. A careful
study of the responsive pleading filed by the counsel for Intertrade, would reveal that there was neither express
nor implied admission of corporate liability warranting the application of the general rule. Thus, the alleged judicial
admission may be contradicted and controverted because it was taken out of context and no admission was made
at all.

‘
19. Philippines American General Insurance Co, Inc v Sweet Lines Inc

Facts:

1. Petitioner were insurer and importers of Polyethylene.

2. This polyethylenes are to be shipped from US to Manila via Indian ship, SS Vishva Yash
3. upon arrival in the port of Manila, it sought the service of respondent Sweet line for the inter-island
shipment to Davao.
4. Upon arrival, petitioner found that some of the cargos were either missing or damaged
5. Petitioner filed a suit against Sweet Lines and Davao Veterans Arrastre.
6. Trial court ruled in favor of PHILAMGEN.
7. CA reversed on the basis of prescription

ISSUE: WON petitioner acted within the prescriptive period.

HELD: No. Philamgen did not act within the prescriptive period.

The shipment was discharged into the custody of the consignee on May 15, 1977, and it was from this date that
petitioners' cause of action accrued, with thirty (30) days therefrom within which to file a claim with the carrier for
any loss or damage which may have been suffered by the cargo and thereby perfect their right of action. Claim was
filed only on April 28, 1978, way beyond the period provided in the bills of lading and violative of the contractual
provision, the inevitable consequence of which is the loss of petitioners' remedy or right to sue. The SC said, “Even
the filing of the complaint on May 12, 1978 is of no remedial or practical consequence, since the time limits for the
filing thereof, whether viewed as a condition precedent or as a prescriptive period, would in this case be
productive of the same result, that is, that petitioners had no right of action to begin with or, at any rate, their
claim was time-barred.”

20. Republic v. Court of Appeals (296 SCRA 171 [1998])

Facts:

1. Petitioner filed a case for recission against the Quetulios and Abadillas alleging that the former sold the
land that had already been expropriated.
2. The Quetulios did not file an answer, but at the hearing on the motion for default, co-defendant
Hernando was permitted by the judge to appear as counsel for the defendants and file an answer.

Held:

SC ordered the decision of the RTC to be reinstated and ordered the CA to proceed with the hearing.

The trial court judge committed grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the petitioner’s complain and it was
grossly irresponsible for allowing Hernando to represent the respondents because he was then suspended in the
practice of law. It also erred for setting the pre-trial without formally ruling on the petitioner’s motion to declare
them in default. It further allowed, after the verbal request of Hernando to present annexes which are considered
by the trial court as actionable documents despite the fact that the petitioner was not a party thereto. The trial
court demonstrated bias and arbitrariness and the SC also found the CA to have erred in dismissing the petitioner’s
complaint which should have been given due course.

The SC noted that the compromise agreement entered by the parties was already final and executor even before
the affidavit or revocation was executed. It is a well settled doctrine that judicial compromise has the effect of res
judicata and is immediately executor and not appealable except a motion to set it aside has been filed due to
fraud, mistake and duress.

7. Zulueta vs. CA, 253 SCRA 699

Facts:

1. Zalueta is the wife of the private respondent, Dr Alfredo Martin a Doctor of Medicine
2. In the presence of her mother and driver and private respondents secretary, Zalueta opened her
husbands cabinet and found 157 documents consisting her husbands correspondence with his paramour
3. Zulueta filed the papers for evidence of her case of legal separation and disqualification from the practice
of medicine.
4. Mr. Martin brought an action for recovery of documents and for damages against Zalueta
5. The trial court rendered judgement in favor of Martin
6. The petitioner filed the petition for review with the supreme court

Issue:

WON the evidence obtained can be held inadmissible as it violated his right of privacy of communication?

Ruling:
YES. The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence.

The constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable” is no
less applicable simply because it is the wife.

The only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is if there is a “lawful order from the court or which public
safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding.”

21. Alano v. Court of Appeals (283 SCRA 269 [1997])

Facts:

1. This is a criminal involving a sale of land. Alano the accused allegedly defrauded Carlos, pretending to be
still the owner of the land, well knowing that he had previously sold the same to said Robert Carlos, sold
for the second time to Erlina Dandoy, depriving Carlos of his rightful ownership/possession of the said
land.
2. Alano Filed a petition for review of CA’s decision which affirms the RTC’s order, denying his motion for
suspension of proceeding of Criminal case ESTAFA on the ground that there was a prejudicial question
pending resolution in another civil case
3. In said civil case, Carlos filed a complaint against Alano seeking the annulment of the 2nd sale to Dandoy.
4. In his answer, Alano contended that he never sold the property to Carlos and that his signature in the
deed of absolute sale was forged, hence, the sale was fictitious and inexistent.
5. The civil case was filed 5 years before the criminal case for estafa was instituted.
6. RTC’s Decision to Alano’s Petition for Review: DENIED
7. CA’s decision: Dismissed – lack of merit

Issue:

Whether the pendency of the civil case is a prejudicial question justifying the suspension of the proceedings in
criminal case

Ruling:

The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play in a situation where a civil action and criminal action are both
pending, and both civil and criminal cases have similar issue or the issues in one is intimately related to the issues
raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is
satisfied.

A criminal action for estafa is a prejudicial question to a civil action for nullity of the alleged deed of sale and the
defense of the alleged vendor is the forgery of his signature in the deed.
Notwithstanding the apparent prejudicial question involved, SC agrees w/ the CA when it affirmed the
Order of the trial court denying petitioner’s motion for the suspension of the proceeding on the
ground that petitioner, in the stipulation of facts, had already admitted during the pretrial order of
the criminal case the validity of his signature in the first deed of sale between him and the Carlos, as
well as his subsequent acknowledgment of his 23 cash vouchers evidencing the payments made by
Carios. Petitioner even wrote Carlos offering to refund whatever sum the latter had paid.

Accordingly, petitioner’s admission in the stipulation of facts during the pretrial of the criminal amounts to a
waiver of his defense of forgery in the civil case. Hence, SC has no reason to nullify such waiver, it being not
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.

22. People v. Solayao (262 SCRA 255 [1996])

Facts:
1. The accused appellant was charge before the RTS of Naval with the crime of illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition under PD 1866
2. SPO3 Jose nino conducted an intelligence patrol to verify reports on the presence of armed persons
roaming around the barangays
3. Then they met the group of the accused appellant wearing a camouflage uniform, the accused appellant’s
companions seeing the govt agents, fled.
4. The accused appellant was found possessing 49 inch long homemade firearms locally known as latong.
5. When he asked accused-appellant who issued him a license to carry said firearm or whether he was
connected with the military or any intelligence group, the latter answered that he had no permission to
possess the same.
6. Thereupon, SPO3 Niño confiscated the firearm and turned him over to the custody of the policemen of
Caibiran who subsequently investigated him and charged him with illegal possession of firearm.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the homemade firearm.

Ruling:

By its very nature, an “admission is the mere acknowledgment of a fact or of circumstances from which guilt may
be inferred, tending to incriminate the speaker, but not sufficient of itself to establish his guilt.” In other words, it is
a “statement by the defendant of fact or facts pertinent to issues pending, in connection with proof of other facts
or circumstances, to prove guilt, but which is, of itself, insufficient to authorize conviction.” From the above
principles, this Court can infer that an admission in criminal cases is insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the commission of the crime charged.

Moreover, said admission is extra-judicial in nature. As such, it does not fall under Section 4 of Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules of Court which states:

“An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case
does not require proof.”

Not being a judicial admission, said statement by accused-appellant does not prove beyond reasonable doubt the
second element of illegal possession of firearms. It does not even establish a prima facie case. It merely bolsters
the case for the prosecution but does not stand as proof of the fact of absence or lack of a license.

23. Republic vs. CA 277 SCRA 633

Facts:

1. The regional trial court, after hearing, adjudicated a parcel of land in favor of Gacot.
2. The Solicitor General appealed to the CA, contending that the land was previously declared to be
property of the Republic in a decision rendered by judge Lorenzo Garlitos
3. A hearing was conducted however the government failed to present the said order judge garlito in
evidence
4. CA ruled in favor of Gacot because the order of judge Garlito not having been offered as evidence, it
cannot take judicial notice.

Issue: W/N CS should take judicial notice of the order of Judge Garlitos

Ruling:
Yes, Firstly, the rules of procedure and jurisprudence do not sanction the grant of evidentiary value in ordinary trial
of evidence which is not formally offered.

second, that adjective law is not to be taken lightly for without it, the enforcement of substantive law may not
remain assured.

The court must add, nevertheless, that technical rules of procedure are not ends in themselves but primarily
devised and designed to help in the proper and expedient dispensation of justice. In appropriate cases, therefore,
the rules may have to be so construed liberally as to meet and advance the cause of substantial justice.

A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case facts established in prior proceedings
in the same case of the authenticity of its own records of another case between the same parties, of the files of
related cases in the same court and of public records on file in the same court. In addition judicial notice will be
taken of the record, pleadings or judgement of a case in another court between the same parties or involving one
of the same parties, as well as of the records of another case between different parties in the same court. Judicial
notice will also be taken of court personnel.

24. LBP vs. Banal 434 SCRA 543

Facts:

1. A portion of X’s registered land was compulsory acquired by the DAR.

2. In the case for the determination of just compensation, the court merely took judicial notice of the
average production figures in the Rodriguez case pending before it and applied the same to this case.

Issue: Is the court correct?

Ruling. No,
The court is not correct.Under Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, it is explicit on the necessity
of a hearing before a court takes judicial notice of any matter.

Thus, During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon. After the trial, and before judgment or on
appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and
allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.

In the case at bar, the court failed to observe the above provisions because the courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in
the same court or before the same judge. They may only do so in the absence of objection" and "with the
knowledge of the opposing party.

25. Republic Glass Corp. vs. Qua 435 SCRA 489.

Facts:

1. Republic Glass Corporation and Gervel Inc together with respondent Lawrence Qua were stockholders of
Ladltek inc obtained loans from Metrobank and Private Development Corp with RGC and Qua as sureties.
2. The agreements stated that incase of default in the payment of ladtecks loan, the parties would
reimburse each other the proportionate share of any sum that any might pay to creditors.
3. Subsequently Ladteck defaulted on its loan obligation to metrobank PDCP. Hence Metrobank filed a
collection case against ladtech RGC and Qua
4. During the oendancy of the case RGC paid 7M (not full amount due) in which the former was not liable
anymore, leaving ladteck and Qua as defendants. Qua refused to pay.

Issue: W/N payment of the entire obligation is an essential condition for reimbursement

Ruling:

The agreements are contracts of indemnity not only against actual loss but against liability as well. In associalated
insurance $ surety co vs Chua, the court distinguished between a contract of indemnity against loss and a contract
of indemnity against liability. Here the agreement sued upon is not only one of indemnity against loss but of
indemnity against liability. While the first does not render the indemnitor liable until the person to be indemnified
makes payment or sustains loss, the second becomes operative as soon as the liability of the person indemnified
arises irrespective of whether or not he has suffered actual loss.

Whether the solidary debtor has paid the creditor, the other solidary debtors should indemnify the former once his
liability becomes absolute. However, in this case, the liability of RGC, Gervel and Qua became absolute
simultaneously when Ladtek defaulted in its loan payment. As a result, RGC, Gervel and Qua all became directly
liable at the same time to Metrobank and PDCP. Thus, RGC and Gervel cannot automatically claim for indemnity
from Qua because Qua himself is liable directly to Metrobank and PDCP.

The RGC payment will not automatically result in reimbursement. If a solidary debtor pays the obligation in part,
he can only recover reimbursement from the co-debtors only in so far as his payment exceed his share in the
obligation.0If the debtor pays less than his share in the obligation, he cannot demand reimbursement because his
payment is less than his actual debt.

26. Habagat Grill vs. DMC Urban Property Dev. Inc. 454 SCRA 653

Facts:

1. DMCI’s sister company filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry against Habagat Grill. It alleged that Habagat
Grill encroached on its property, thereby depriving them of lawful possession.
2. The MTC formed a team of three geodetic engineers (one each to represent DMC, Biraogo, and DENR) to
ascertain where Habagat Grill is actually located.
3. However, Biraogo’s engineer did not participate in the surveying activities; the two others submitted a
report which said that Habagat Grill occupied 934 sqm of the lot in question.
4. After necessary proceedings, The lower court ruled in favor of Habagat Grill, anchoring its decision on its
own estimations of the metes and bounds of the subject property in question.
5. DMC appealed, The CA gave greater weight to the testimony of DMC’s real property manager, Bienamer
Garcia, that Habagat Grill had been built on December 1, 1993. Testimony was credible, because he
(Garcia) had personal knowledge of the facts he had testified to.
6. CA further criticized petitioner for not presenting any evidence to show the basis of the latter’s alleged
authority to build Habagat Grill on the property, hence this petition.

Issue: Whether the Trial Court erred in taking judicial notice of the exact metes and bounds of the property – YES
Ruling:

Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof because
they already know them.

In this case, the MTC reached its conclusion favoring Habagat Grill by going beyond what Proclamation No. 20 says.
Instead of relying on the engineer’s reports, it depended on its own estimations of the metes and bounds of Times
Beach to conclude that Habagat Grill was necessarily inside the said recreation center.

The CA was correct in disregarding the findings of the trial courts, because they had erred in taking judicial notice
of the exact metes and bounds of the property. The appellate court aptly relied on the Report submitted by the
survey team that had been constituted by the trial court, precisely for determining the location of Habagat Grill in
relation to respondents’ lot.

27. Clarion printing house, Inc. vs. NLRC, 461 SCRA 27

Facts:

1. CPH is a company owned by EYCO Group of Companies (EYCO).

2. The former hired Miclat as marketing assistant on a probationary basis.
3. EYCO subsequently filed a petition for suspension of payment as well as an appointment of a
rehabilitation receivership committee before SEC on the ground that they are suffering financial difficulty.
4. Pursuant to this, a retrenchment occurred, thus terminating Miclat.
5. Conversely, Miclat filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC.
6. The latter claim that there was no notice that was given to her.
7. CPH contends that they are not liable for retrenching some employees because EYCO is being placed
under receivership, and a memorandum was given to employees, hence they substantially complied with
the notice requirement.
8. NLRC rendered its decision in favor of Miclat
9. Court of Appeals held that Clarion failed to prove its ground for retrenchment as well as compliance with
the mandated procedure. It further ruled that Miclat should be reinstated and paid backwages. Hence,
this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Miclat was illegally dismissed

Ruling:

It is well settled that for retrenchment to be justified, any claim of actual or potential business losses must satisfy
the following standards:

(1) the losses are substantial and not de minimis;

(2) the losses are actual or reasonably imminent;

(3) the retrenchment is reasonably necessary and is likely to be effective in preventing expected losses; and (4) the
alleged losses, if already incurred, or the expected imminent losses sought to be forestalled, are proven by
sufficient and convincing evidence.

From the provisions of P.D. No. 902-A, as amended, the appointment of a receiver or management committee by
the SEC presupposes a finding that, inter alia, a company possesses sufficient property to cover all its debts but
"foresees the impossibility of meeting them when they respectively fall due" and "there is imminent danger of
dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of assets of other properties or paralyzation of business operations."

The SEC appointed an interim receiver for the EYCO, rendering it unable to meet its obligation as they fall due, and
thus resulting to "complications and problems . . . to arise that would impair and affect [its] operations . . ." shows
that CLARION, together with the other member-companies of the EYCO Group of Companies, was suffering
business reverses justifying, among other things, the retrenchment of its employees.

28. Tantuico Jr. v. Republic. G.R. No. 89114, December 2,1991

Facts:

1. The republic of the Philippines represented by the PCGG filed for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages.
2. Francisco was included as defendant on the theory that he had taken undue advantage of his position as
chairman of the COA and with grace failure to perform his constitutional duties as such chairman, acting
and aided with defendant Spouses Marcos, facilitated in concealing the ill-gotten wealth.
 3. the respondent Sandiganbayan... denying the petitioner's motion for a bill of particulars on the ground
that the particulars sought by petitioner are... evidentiary in nature
4. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied
5. The court ruled that the essential elements of an action for recovery of ill-gotten wealth are sufficiently
alleged in the complaint. Hence, petitioner is not entitled to a bill of particulars.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the disputed
resolutions.

Ruling:

Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating the
questioned resolutions.

Where the complaint states ultimate facts that constitute the three (3) essential elements of a cause of action,
namely:

(1) the legal right of the plaintiff,

(2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and

(3) the act or omission of the defendant in... violation of said legal right, the complaint states a cause of action,
otherwise, the complaint must succumb to a motion to dismiss on that ground of failure to state a cause of action.

The allegations in the complaint, above-referred to, pertaining to petitioner are, therefore, deficient in that they
merely articulate conclusions of law and presumptions unsupported by factual premises.

Furthermore, the particulars prayed for, such as, names of persons, names of corporations, dates, amounts
involved, a specification of property for identification purposes, the particular transactions involving withdrawals
and disbursements, and a statement of other material... facts as would support the conclusions and inferences in
the complaint, are not evidentiary in nature.
29. Far East Marble (Phils.) Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 94093, August 10, 1993

Facts:

1. This is a case is a petition for certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of the CA which set aside the
order of the RTC on the ground that the complaint for foreclosure of chattel mortgage proceedings,
including the resolution of the motion for summary judgement may be pursued.
2. Private respondednt BPO filed a complaint for foreclosure of chattle mortgage with replevin against
petitioner Far East.
3. The complaint alleged thee on various date the Far east received from Commercial Bank and Trust
Company, now merged with plaintiff Bank , several loans evidenced by a promissory notes.
4. These notes have long matured. Despite repeated demands for payment, Far East failed and refused to
pay.
5. Due to these circumstances the plaintiff was constrained to file a suit against the Far east.
6. Subsequently Far East executed in favor of the plaintiff a chattel mortgage to secure the payment of its
loan obligation including interests and related charges.
7. Defendants Ramon and Luis Tabuena executed a continuing guaranty , whereby they bind themselves,
jointly and severally, to answer for the loan obligations.
8. Subsequently, Ramon and Luis Tabuena failed and refuse to pay said Far East accounts.
9. Plaintiff was constrained to file a suit against them.
10. Far East thereupon raised the affirmative defenses of prescription and lack of cause of action. It denied
the allegation of the complaint that BPI had made previous repeated requests and demands for payment.
11. It claimed that it had not received from BPI or its predecessor any demand for payment and thus, it had
"labored under the belief that they [the obligations] have already been written off" in the books of BPI .
12. BPI filed an opposition to the motion to hear affirmative defenses, alleging that its causes of action against
Far East have not been prescribed, since within 10 years from the time its cause of action accrued, various
written extrajudicial demands were sent by BPI and received by Far East.
13. On the same date, BPI filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that since Far East had
admitted the genuineness and due execution of the promissory notes and the deed of chattel mortgage
annexed to its complaint, there was no genuine issue as to any material fact, thus entitling BPI to a
favorable judgment.
14. The trial court Dismissed the complaint against the defendant Far East Marble (Phils.) Inc. for lack of cause
of action and on grounds of pre[s]cription
15. CA rendered a decision setting aside the order of the trial court

Issue: