IUCN Media Analysis Report On Teesta (Bangladesh and Indian Media Scanning) - Jamil Ahmed

An Analytical Review of Media Reports
Context of Trans-boundary Aspects of the Teesta River
Research and Text

Bharat Bhushan
Jamil Ahmed
Editor
Bharat Bhushan
Technical Editor
Syed Badrul Ahsan
Research Associate
Madhurilata Basu
Shahreen Haq
Ecosystems for Life: A Bangladesh-India Initiative

PREFACE
Bangladesh and India share three major river systems:the Ganga, the Brahmaputra and the
Meghna. Along with their tributaries, these rivers drain about 1.75 million sq km ofland, with an
average runoff of 1,200 cu km. The GBM system also supports over 620 million people.Thus,
the need for cooperation on trans-boundary waters is crucial to the future well-being of these
millions.
That is precisely the motivation for the Ecosystems for Life: A Bangladesh- India Initiative
(Dialogue for Sustainable Management of Trans-boundary Water Regimes in South Asia) project.
IUCN wishes to promote a better understanding of trans-boundary ecosystems between
Bangladesh and India, by involving civil society in both counries and by providing a platform to
discuss issues common and germane to the region. The overall goal is an improved, integrated
management of trans boundary water regimes in South Asia. This four-and-a-halfyearinitiative is
supported by the Minister for European Mfairs and International Cooperation, the Netherlands.
Ecosystems for Life will develop, through dialogue and research, longer-term relationships
between various stakeholder groups within and between the countries. It will develop a common
understanding to generate policy options on how to develop and manage natural resources
sustainably such that livelihoods and water and food security improve.Inter-disciplinary research
studies will be conducted by bringing together experts from various fields from both countries so
that relevant issues are holistically grasped.
The initiative centres around five broad thematic areas:

• food security, water productivity and poverty;
• impacts of climate change;
• inland navigation;
• environmental security; and
• biodiversity conservation.
The media have an important role to play in awareness raising, consensus building and
internalising integrated water resources management in decision making. During the consultation
processes of the project, the civil society stakeholders have identified the need for involving media
in the dialogue processes and emphasized that keeping the concerned people fully informed is
an important strategy to deal with ‘misinformation’. It is foreseen that media activities will become
more proactive as the project progresses. The engagement of media in the dialogue processes
is an important strategy but due to sensitivities surrounding the project, clear protocols and
guidelines need to be established for interacting with the media.
Monitoring media is an essential tool to understand and analyse on how key issues relevant
to trans-boundary water management are reported in national and regional media outlets. Over
time it will also be a useful tool to evaluate the project’s impact on media and subsequent links to
policy formulation. The main objectives of media monitoring are to provide baseline information
on how the media is reporting on specific issues related to water and environment, to assess the
scientific accuracy of reporting, to identify opportunities for the project to proactively engage with
the media and to monitor and evaluate the influence of project activities on media reporting and
explore subsequent links to policy formulation.
The focus of this report will be the anticipated Teesta agreement. The media monitoring
report will thus identify the reflections of journalists on bilateral relations regarding trans-boundary
rivers, the concerns of the people affected regarding different issues related to water management
with focus on the Teesta agreement and also document the interaction of media with the scientific
community and researchers regarding these issues.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report is a case study of how the media in India and Bangladesh report on trans-border
resource sharing between the two countries. The focus of the study is the Teesta water-sharing
agreement which the two countries were expected to sign in September 2011 but were unable
to do so.
Expectations ran high both in India and Bangladesh on the possibility of an agreement
being reached on sharing the waters of the Teesta in the lean period. India and Bangladesh
have 54 rivers in common and at present a treaty exists only for one of the rivers – the Ganga.
Therefore, it was thought that an agreement on the Teesta could become a model for sharing the
waters of the rest of the common rivers too. However, this was not to be so as the agreement on
Teesta did not finally come about after the last minute objections about its share of the waters raised
by the Indian state of West Bengal, through which the Teesta flows before crossing into Bangladesh.
India-Bangladesh relations which were expected to be propelled into a higher orbit after
the Teesta Accord, in fact slipped a few notches following the non-starter of a visit by the Indian
prime minister to Dhaka. With the West Bengal state coming up with its reservations on a possible
deal between Delhi and Dhaka, the government of Bangladesh has found it difficult to explain why
things had suddenly taken a negative turn.
This report examines the hope, confusion and despair surrounding the Teesta water-
sharing agreement reflected in the Indian and Bangladeshi media in the run up to the scheduled
signing of the agreement, the inability of the two governments to do so and the subsequent
loss of political energy to push the agreement forward. The analysis of the media reportage is,
therefore, segregated into three phases – the period of run-up to the scheduled signing of the
agreement; the period of realisation that the agreement was unlikely to come through and its
eventual unfolding; and the aftermath of the inability of the two governments to ink the agreement.
The broad issues which were focused on were: the manner in which the media in India and
Bangladesh perceived and communicated the issue; the differences in reportage in the two
countries; the sources used by the media; the media’s own understanding of the issue of trans-
boundary resource sharing between neighbouring countries; the extent of interaction between media
functionaries and experts/researchers on trans-boundary resources; and finally, whether the media
in India and Bangladesh could have addressed the trans-boundary resource sharing issue differently.
The choice of the news media chosen for analysis ensured both national (India and
Bangladesh) as well as regional coverage (the states of West Bengal and Sikkim through which
the Teesta flows and irrigates agricultural land). In India, six English language newspapers and
three Bangla newspapers were selected for content analysis in addition to four English weekly
news magazines. In the case of Bangladesh, five Bangla newspapers, two English language
newspapers and two online news media sites were chosen for content analysis.
In the run-up to the scheduled signing of the Teesta Accord, media reportage in both
India and Bangladesh was situated in a co-operative framework. The media reflected the
expectation of bilateral relations moving into higher gear after the water-sharing agreement was
6 An Analytical Review of Media Reports • Ecosystems for Life

signed. During this period, the Indian media even invited Bangladeshi commentators to write
for their op-ed pages and editorials criticised the government for not being forthcoming enough
to the friendly overtures of Bangladesh. There seemed to be no expectation of anything going
amiss on the Teesta water-sharing agreement. This was the case with the Bangladesh media too,
although unlike in the Indian media in general there seemed to be a recognition that the eventual
agreement would depend on the Indian border state of West Bengal coming on board. In general,
the media did not go into the complexities of the potential agreement.
The second part of this media analysis – beginning a month before the scheduled date
of the signing of the agreement and ending a month after the inability of the two governments to
sign it – began in hope and ended in disappointment. However, one finds that media reportage in
both India and Bangladesh quickly moved to analysing the reasons why the deal could not come
through and its consequences for bilateral relations. A blame-game was reflected in the media
as well as arguing for a tit-for-tat attitude in the Bangladeshi press – no transit treaty without
the Teesta agreement. This was equally matched by a sense of despondency that an important
opportunity had been missed by the leadership of the two countries.
The difference between the Delhi-based media and the West Bengal media in India
was that while the former supported the water-sharing agreement and blamed the West Bengal
government for throwing a spanner in the works, the West Bengal media by and large took a
state centric attitude in justifying the position taken by its state government and defending its
position on the anticipated agreement.
The least detailed aspects of the proposed Teesta agreement in the media during
this period were: the rationale on either side of the border for the water-sharing agreement,
the contours of the agreement, and the strategies being explored, if any, for pushing for the
agreement to take place in the near future.
In the year following the inability of the two countries to sign the water-sharing deal, the
Indian media focused on efforts being made by India to still push through the agreement and
the pressure from Bangladesh to do so, the political fallout of not signing the agreement and the
lessons learnt by Delhi on taking the views of border states into account while entering into trans-
boundary resource sharing agreements with neighbouring countries.
The media content analysis showed up several shortcomings in reportage in both India
and Bangladesh. There was a fair amount of partisan and unattributed reportage on both sides of
the border. This was largely due to over-reliance of the media on unidentified sources—whether
they be in government, political parties or among other interested individuals and institutions
–and these sources being given equal weight as compared to identified sources or sources on
record. Unidentified sources can be afford to be partisan, create disaffection with government
policy and are unaccountable. The sources on record, on the other hand, have to make balanced
statements and their statements carry a certain amount of public accountability.
It was found that most reports lacked detailed contextualisation and hardly provided any
concrete data or information about the Teesta water-sharing agreement. No official documents
were quoted and surprisingly there were very few and sometimes no direct quotes even from the
ministers responsible for working out the water-sharing agreement. The headlines were often partisan.
Facts – both about the river and the details of water-sharing -- were a casualty in reportage
on the Teesta issue. When facts were used in the media reports, they were not sourced. There
were hardly any voices of those who would either be deprived or benefit from the waters of the
Ecosystems for Life • An Analytical Review of Media Reports 7

Teesta in the media. The views of the Indian state of Sikkim where the Teesta originates were
completely ignored. It would be unfair to blame journalists for not using facts because there are
hardly available in the public domain. However, they can be faulted for not reporting from the
areas affected by the water-sharing agreements – both in India and Bangladesh. The net result
was that the entire reportage on the issue was foggy, unclear and appeared to be partisan.
There was an almost complete lack of evidence of any research-media interface in the
reportage analysed. When it existed, it was used for rationalising partisan positions. In short, the
opinions of researchers/water experts were not used, as one would expect them to be used,
for balancing the views of or questioning the claims made by politicians. In fact, in much of the
reportage, whether from India or Bangladesh, there was hardly any serious attempt to balance
contrary views. There were very few exemplary reports from India, where this was attempted
through joint by-line reports by Indian and Bangladeshi journalists writing together.
The reporting framework was by and large co-operative, becoming rather confrontational
only when the Teesta Accord was not signed. However, what is remarkable is that such rancour,
if it could be called that, did not persist in the media and soon thereafter reportage reverted to
falling within a co-operative framework.
The media content analysis also showed that nationalistic sentiments were predominant
in reportage in both India and Bangladesh. However, nationalism as a sentiment was not always present
in a negative sense. Thus, for example, both in India and Bangladesh it was used to create a public
mood for reaching a settlement on a sharing the waters of the Teesta. It was used negatively, though,
in the Indian state of West Bengal where regional sentiments got the better of national sentiments.
Based on this analysis, several recommendations have been made in this report to help
improve media coverage of trans-boundary river water sharing. There is a need to educate the
media practitioners both in India and Bangladesh on international laws, norms and practices on
cooperation regarding management of international rivers explaining in easily accessible manner
the rights and responsibilities of both the upper and lower riparian states. There is also a need to
prepare ready-to-use media briefs about river water disputes and agreements which have worked
and those which haven’t – explaining why some agreements work and others do not. There is
a lack of information in the public domain about common rivers between India and Bangladesh.
Therefore, there is an urgent requirement of preparing media factsheets which provide information
on the seasonal flow, catchment area, command area, water usage projection, conflicting water
usage, ecology and livelihood practices around these rivers.
To help the media in presenting a balanced and comprehensive reportage, it is also
necessary to collate and publish an easily accessible list of public resources – whether individuals
or institutions – on trans-boundary water management. As India and Bangladesh share a very
large number of rivers, it may also be a good idea to prepare either individual media briefs on
these rivers or on groups of related rivers besides preparing information sheets on rights of border
states within a nation state when it comes to trans-boundary resource management.
Finally, this report recommends organising joint training workshops for Indian and
Bangladeshi journalists who specialise or would like to specialise on reporting on management of
trans-boundary rivers as well as joint field visits by them to the command areas of these rivers.

SHARING TRANS-BOUNDARY RESOURCES: THE
CASE OF REPORTAGE ON TEESTA WATER-SHARING
T he signing of a historic agreement on sharing of the waters of the Teesta River with Bangladesh
was to be the high point of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s much publicised two-day
visit to Dhaka on September 6 and 7, 2011. Fifteen years earlier, the two countries had signed
the Ganga Waters Treaty, to share the waters of the river Ganga during the lean season running
from January to May. Although India and Bangladesh share 54 common rivers, an agreement
exists only for the Ganga. The agreement on sharing the waters of the Teesta would have been
the second such agreement and would have provided a template for sharing the waters of the
remaining common rivers.
However, two days prior to the visit -- on September 4, 2012 -- came the unexpected
news that the Chief Minister of the state of West Bengal, Mamata Banerjee, one of the most
important allies of India’s ruling United Progressive Alliance expected to be present in Dhaka for
the singing of the Teesta Agreement, had dropped out of the Prime Minister’s official entourage.
She let it be known that she was unhappy with the terms of the agreement. She believed that
the ratio of water sharing in the proposed agreement went against the interests of the state she
leads – West Bengal.
The fallout of this announcement was swift. Despite consternation all around, the
Government of India, or the Union government as the government at New Delhi is referred
to, decided that the Teesta Agreement would not be signed during the impending visit of the
Prime Minister. It decided that West Bengal’s concerns would have to be addressed before any
agreement could be reached with Bangladesh. There was understandable disappointment in
Bangladesh because the two sides had been working on the agreement for long.
Newspapers went to town with analysing how this messy situation had come about.
There was debate over whether the West Bengal Chief Minister had been consulted at all or
adequately before scheduling the signing of the Teesta Agreement, which Union government
representative had briefed her, who might have been the ‘right person’ to brief her and what the
differences were between the Union and the State governments. Some newspapers painted the
West Bengal Chief Minister as being parochial and obstructionist. Others saw her concerns as
legitimate and justified her actions as protecting the interest of her state.
What is Teesta Water Sharing all About?

The Teesta originates in Lake Lahmo – also known as Tso Lahmo, Chho Lahmo or Chola Mu -- in
Northern Sikkim at the height of 5,330 metres where it is hardly a stream. Its major tributary is the
Rangeet River which meets it at the border of the Sikkim and West Bengal states of India.1 The
river courses 393 km through the entire length of Sikkim, West Bengal and then onto Bangladesh
where it merges with the mighty Brahmaputra.
1 Rivers in Sikkim; http://sikkim.nic.in/sws/glim_riv.htm

The Teesta traverses 172 km in the hilly region of India, 97 km in the plains of West
Bengal and another 124 km in the plains of Bangladesh. The Teesta irrigates lands in both North
Bengal as well as North-western Bangladesh, which was considered a drought-prone area till
the Dalia barrage was built by Bangladesh, and now produces three crops a year. India has also
built a barrage on the Teesta at Gazaldoba. The downstream barrage at Dalia depends on water
regulated and released upstream.2
The Teesta River enters Bangladesh near Nilphamari district and courses 45 kilometres
through the rice predominant districts of Rangpur, Lalmonirhat and Gaibandha before meeting
the Brahmaputra River in Kurigram. The Teesta River Floodplain (TRF), which includes the
extreme northwest region of the country, accounted for 14 percent of the total cropped area of
Bangladesh in 2001. In addition, it supports around 8.5 percent of the total population of the
country. About 63 percent of the total cropped area in the region is irrigated, indicating a direct
association between irrigation water availability and agricultural land use. At present, the TRF
along with the region left of the Ganges River is considered to be a ‘dry zone’.
The TRF is largely dependent on trans-boundary river inflow for the supply and
management of its water resources and agricultural production. The Teesta River barrage at
Gazaldoba in India controls the amount of water flow downstream to Bangladesh. In order to
increase the irrigation potential of the northwest region, Bangladesh constructed the Dalia barrage
on the Teesta River in Lalmonirhat district to provide irrigation water from the river through a canal
network. In the dry season, the exclusive control of the river water at Gazaldoba renders the
Dalia Barrage almost useless for diversion of water due to low flows. Moreover, sudden release
of excessive water through the Gazaldoba Barrage during the rainy season causes floods, bank
erosion and damages huge amounts of crops downstream. Steps, therefore, need to be been
taken to examine the water flow at both Gazaldoba and Dalia points in order to manage high and
low season water flows and minimize the economic losses.3
In the now food surplus region of Rangpur, over 750,000 hectares of farmland are
dependent on the waters of the Teesta for supplementary irrigation.4 However, the area faces
water shortage in the lean season – from October to April – and the two countries have been
trying to come to some kind of an agreement for water-sharing in this period. Apart from
irrigation, Bangladesh needs water in the lean period for drinking, industrial use, navigation and
5
environmental needs.
The issue of debate is the proportion in which India and Bangladesh should share the
Teesta waters in the lean season while taking into account the needs of both countries. What
complicates the issue is that there is no detailed or mutually acceptable water-flow measurement
data for the river. In July 1983, the two sides had decided on an ad hoc sharing of the waters of
the Teesta in the ratio of 36:39 per cent for Bangladesh and India, respectively -- leaving the
25 per cent remaining to be decided later. India takes the Gazaldoba barrage, also known as the
Teesta Barrage, as the point at which the water-sharing with Bangladesh is decided.
2 S. Chandrasekharan, Bangladesh-India: The Teesta Mess: The way forward; South Asia Analysis Group Paper number
4846; January 8, 2012.
3 Bangladesh must get its due share, The Daily Star, October 15, 2012. www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.
php?nid=253864
4 Pinaki Roy, Teesta Accord likely; Down To Earth; July 14, 2011. http://www.downtoearth.org.in/content/teesta-deal-
likely
5 The Tale of Two Rivers; The Hindu; September 6, 2011.

This study by focussing on the sharing of Teesta waters attempts to examine how the
media in India and Bangladesh have perceived and communicated on this issue; the relative
importance they gave to this issue, how the public perceptions of sharing of Teesta waters were
reflected in the media and how they differed in the two countries; understanding the sources used
by the media to report on the sharing of Teesta waters, and the extent of understanding in the
media of the issue of trans-boundary sharing of resources such as the Teesta waters. The study
will also examine the extent of interaction -- or the lack thereof – between the media, researchers
and experts while reporting on the water-sharing issue.
How did the media in India and Bangladesh fare when it came to reporting on sharing the
waters of the Teesta? What did it do right and where was it found deficient? How could it have
done things differently? This study seeks to answer some of these questions after analysing the
reportage on the issue in the major newspapers and news magazines of the two countries.
The primary aim of this study is, therefore, to examine ways in which the media can
further the understanding of a sharing of trans-boundary resources in a cooperative framework
and contribute to an improved system of sustainable management of resources. Based on its
analysis of Indian and Bangladesh media, this study will also recommend ways of overcoming the
shortcomings in the reportage on the Teesta issue.
Methodology
The period of analysis chosen for this study was from January 2010 to August 2012. The focus,
however, was the period August 2011 to October 2011 – the period preceding and following the
inability of the two countries to seal the Teesta Agreement in the meeting of the respective prime
ministers in Dhaka in the first week of September 2011. The cut-off date for the study was 31
August 2012.
The Indian news media chosen for analysis ensured both national (India and Bangladesh)
as well as regional (West Bengal and Sikkim state media within India) coverage. In India 9
newspapers-- six in English and three in Bangla were selected for content analysis. In addition,
four weekly magazines were also selected from India.
For this analysis, in India only the general interest newspapers and magazines were
chosen and a balance was maintained between English language and Bangla media (see, Table1).

TEESTA IN THE MEDIA -- JANUARY 2010 TO JULY 2011
INDIA
N
ews by its very nature is event driven. High level interactions between nations allow journalists
an opportunity to discuss not only the bilateral ties between the two countries but also
to situate them in the perspective of national interests. The reportage on the bilateral relations
between India and Bangladesh is no exception. In the period January 2010 to July 2011, there
were more than half a dozen important official interactions between Bangladesh and India. They
provided the incentive for reportage on a number of bilateral relations including the sharing of
river waters.
The high level visits which provided the impetus to journalists to write about India-
Bangladesh ties during this period were:
• Water Resources Secretary level talks on water-sharing in Dhaka (January 4-6, 2010)
• Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit to India (January 10-13, 2010)
• A meeting of the 37th Joint River Commission in New Delhi (March 17 to 20, 2010)
• Indian finance minister Pranab Mukherjee’s visit to Dhaka to sign a US $ 1 billion line of
credit to Bangladesh (August 7, 2010)
• Visit of a three-member delegation led by the Bangladesh Water Resources Secretary to
India (June 5 and 6, 2011)
• Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao’s visit to Dhaka (June 7-9, 2011)
• Chairperson of India’s ruling United Progressive Alliance government and Congress party
president Sonia Gandhi’s visit to Dhaka to receive the Bangladesh Freedom Honour (July
24-25, 2011)
• Indian External Affairs Minister S M Krishna’s visit to Dhaka (July 6-8, 2011)
These visits were used by the media to talk about India-Bangladesh ties -- although not
always about the sharing of the waters of the Teesta. These high level visits, it must be noted,
were precursors to the big event – the potential signing of an agreement on Teesta water-sharing
in September 2011. What is significant is that in the run up to September 2011, whenever the
issue of sharing of the Teesta waters was raised, it was in the larger context of moving the India-
Bangladesh relationship forward.
The most remarkable aspect of the media reportage during this phase was that the
bilateral relations between India and Bangladesh were situated in a co-operative framework
keeping the big picture in mind and not in a competitive or confrontationist perspective. There
was expectation in the media reportage that the relationship moving to a higher level and the
reports do not reflect any bickering which would suggest that the relationship was being seen as
a zero-sum game. This was also the period during which the Indian media also called upon a few
Bangladeshi journalists and commentators to write about the bilateral issues-- thus facilitating the
understanding of Bangladesh’s perspective by Indians.
The positive expectations that prevailed are amply reflected in headlines such as “India
willing to walk the extra mile with Bangladesh”, “From vision to action”, “Seizing the moment”,
“Delhi Dhaka sail throughTeesta Talks”, “Delhi Dhaka talks end on positive note”, “Natural

partners”, “India, Bangladesh narrow down differences on Teesta water-sharing”.6 One can see
that editorially the media seemed very positive in its tone and tenor.
However, what is surprising is that there was virtually no reporting of the Joint
Communiqué of PM Hasina’s visit to India where the two prime ministers directed their respective
Water Resources Ministers to convene the ministerial level meeting of the Joint River Commission
in the first quarter of 2010 on a sharing of Teesta waters in the lean season as well discuss issues
relating to Feni, Manu, Muhuri, Khowai, Gumti, Dharla and Dudhkumar rivers.7
While Indian news reports talked of taking the India-Bangladesh relations to a higher
trajectory, some apprehension was also expressed over India’s tepid response to Bangladesh’s
positive overtures. Thus, writing in The Times of India, an eminent editor from Bangladesh wrote:
Thus, writing in The Times of India, an eminent editor from Bangladesh wrote:
“The history of mutual suspicion, petty bickering on trade negotiations, cavalier attitudes
on border killings, dangerous gamesmanship with arms smuggling, etc. of last three decades
of Bangladesh-India relations would not normally justify the agreements that Sheikh
Hasina penned sometime ago in Delhi. Only a vision would. A vision of South Asia doing
what ASEAN did several years ago, of trusting neighbours rather than subverting them, of
fighting poverty and not using it to justify other failures, of a thriving marketplace of goods and
services rather of counting items in the negative list. In the latest agreement, Bangladesh
has moved towards such a vision. Has India responded? For us, the jury is still out.”
And then again:
“Take the two biggest concerns of the two sides: for India they are security and
connectivity with the north-east; for Bangladesh water-sharing and trade imbalance.
There is a feeling that the clarity and precision with which Bangladesh responded to the
neighbour’s concerns was not reciprocated in equal measure by India.
“On Bangladesh’s priorities water-sharing and trade imbalance there is no dramatic
progress. On Teesta water-sharing, the positive development is that the ministerial level
joint river commission meeting will be held within March, 2010. But it still leaves us with
an uncomfortable ambiguity about the outcome.”8
What is significant about this article in The Times of India is not that it takes a fairly
partisan Bangladeshi nationalist position but that it was published in India at all and that too
prominently in a leading national daily, giving an alternative point of view. For once, one finds a
newspaper allowing a commentator from Bangladesh to identify the major bilateral agenda issues
and his perception of progress or lack of progress on them. The significance of this is that such
publication of a contrary view could only have taken place in an atmosphere of confidence about
the future of the ties and a belief that all outstanding bilateral issues could be resolved amicably.
6 India willing to walk the extra mile with Bangladesh; The Times of India; January 9, 2010. Mahfuz Anam; From Vision
to Action; The Times of India; February 2, 2010. India, Bangladesh narrow down differences on Teesta Water-sharing;
India Today; January 5, 2010. “Seizing the Moment” ; Editorial comment; The Hindu; January 13, 2010. Haroon Habib;
Dhaka-Delhi talks end on positive note; The Hindu; June 8, 2011. And, C Rajamohan; Natural Partners; Indian Express;
July 8, 2011.
7 Joint communiqué of PM Sheikh Hasina’s India visit; January 12, 2010. High Commission of India in Dhaka. Available
at http://www.hcidhaka.org/SpechesDetails.php?id=66
8 Mahfuz Anam; op.cit.

That there was such an atmosphere is evident from editorial comment such as the following in The
Hindu which urged the government of India to go the extra mile in addressing Bangladesh’s concerns:
“... both countries are serious about opening a new chapter. But one ought not to
minimise the challenges that lie ahead. One test will be whether India is prepared to
allow Bangladeshi garment manufacturers preferential market access. Another will be its
willingness to craft agreements on the equitable sharing of all river waters. As the bigger
economy, India needs to go the extra mile in giving a boost to its neighbour’s economic
potential, especially considering that Sheikh Hasina has moved so far in addressing long
standing requests on transit.9
Within the overall momentum of increasing trust between the two countries, the Teesta
water-sharing agreement was listed as one of the major issues that needed to be resolved and
on which progress was being made. Initially, the reportage, based on background briefings, only
said that steps had been taken to work out an arrangement on sharing of the Teesta waters, that
gaps had been narrowed and that “more talks are needed”. These claims that the differences had
been narrowed and that further talks were needed are attributed to the Indian water resources
secretary, who briefed the media after talks with his Bangladeshi counterpart, Wahiduz Zaman,
as well as to sources in the Joint River Commission.
The Indian news magazines performed much better than the newspapers in explaining
the Teesta issue. Although using news agency copy (Press Trust of India), they explained how
under a 1983 understanding, Bangladesh was supposed to get 36 per cent of the share of the
flow and India 39 per cent, allowing the rest of the water to flow naturally in the river. They quoted
Bangladesh Foreign Minister Dipu Moni and Foreign Secretary Mohamed Mijarul Quayes as well
as sources from the Joint River Commission emphasising the effort that was being put in to get
an interim agreement on the sharing of the waters “if not a treaty”. The problematic lean season
was identified as February to March and it was claimed, quoting sources, that the flow in the
Teesta in these two months was less than 1,000 cusecs compared to 5,000 cusecs in December
and January. These reports also pointed out that the flow of water in the river had “weakened
significantly” in the last 24 years of the Gazaldoba barrage” and some dams in the upper reaches
of the river in India.10
By March 2010, the reports were more definite about an interim arrangement – this
was after the meeting of the Joint Rivers Commission in New Delhi. Two things happened at
this stage: One, the media started reporting that the water-sharing arrangement would be an
interim one for 15 years; and two, that India and Bangladesh had exchanged drafts of the interim
arrangement. Some reports even pointed out that while Bangladesh had submitted a “draft of
the interim arrangement” on sharing of the Teesta waters, India had presented a draft “statement
of principles” for sharing the water during the dry season. None of the reports explain why
the arrangement would be “interim” and not final and in a majority of the reports the differing
perspectives of the two sides were not explained.11
9 Seizing the Moment; Editorial Comment in The Hindu; January 13, 2010
10 India-Bangladesh to discuss Teesta river water-sharing; Outlook; Janaury4, 2010. And, India, Bangladesh narrow down
differences on Teesta water-sharing; India Today; January 5, 2010.
11 India, Bangladesh exchange draft accords on Teesta water-sharing; The Times of India; March 20, 2010. India, Bangla-
desh exchange drafts of Teesta arrangements; The Times of India; May 21, 2010.

Only a very few reports pointed to the problem that was to surface nearly one and a half years
later -- the importance of the point of view of the West Bengal state government.
One of the clearest enunciations of the issue was in a newspaper report which as early
as March 2010, pointed out:
“Sources in the Water Resources Ministry said while Bangladesh wants to have water-
sharing on 50-50 basis available at Gazaldoba -- the only release point of Teesta river
water to Bangladesh -- India is yet to take a final call on the issue as much will depend
on West Bengal Government.” And further: “’Water is a State subject. We want the State
Government to decide on the issue first,’ said an official.” This report also pointed out
that differences remained on the methodology to be adopted to decide on the actual
availability of water in the river, quoting officials as saying: “There are differences on
the modalities to find out the actual availability on a particular date. We have to have
convergence of views.”12
So for the first time the media acknowledged the important fact that water as a subject
belongs to the States’ List, in the division of competencies between the Union government
and the State governments in the Indian Constitution. Had the reporter gone a step further and
also explained that International Relations, by contrast, are a competency given to the Union
government in the Indian Constitution, much of the confusion that was to arise later would have
been clarified – namely, that in discussing sharing of river waters across international boundaries,
the degree of freedom enjoyed by the Union government in India is constitutionally limited.
In the subsequent quarter (April to June 2010), there is not much reportage on the
Teesta issue in Indian newspapers. Nor is there any significant news event – such as the two
countries exchanging high level visits – to warrant any reporting. There was only an occasional
report, however, suggesting that as a follow up of the exchange of drafts of the Teesta agreement
between the two countries, the respective water secretaries had been mandated to an early
conclusion of an agreement.
The next quarter (July to August 2010) saw the visit of the then Indian Finance Minister
Pranab Mukherjee to Dhaka (August7, 2010) to sign a US $ one billion credit line for Bangladesh.
During this period, the positive note about India-Bangladesh relationship continued. Mukherjee’s
visit was seen as an indicator of a change in India’s perspective on Bangladesh (e.g. consider
the headline – “With Pranab visit, India signals changed approach to Bangladesh”13). This report
attempted to link Pranab Mukherjee’s visit to a greater appreciation by India of Bangladeshi
perceptions that progress in improving bilateral relations was slow:
“Mukherjee’s personal appearance is deemed crucial because PM Manmohan Singh
wants to end an important message to its eastern neighbour, that Bangladesh is very
high on the priority list.
“This signal is important because there has been speculation lately that Bangladesh was
unhappy about the slow progress in bilateral matters after the visit of Bangladesh PM
Sheikh Hasina.”
12 India and Bangladesh to hold talks next week; The Hindu; March 14, 2010.
13 With Pranab visit, India signals hanged approach to Bangladesh; The Times of India; August 6, 2010.

The report also noted that “the joint river commission has even exchanged ideas on
Teesta water-sharing with Bangladesh giving a draft memorandum of understanding and India a
set of principles. Within both documents lie the contours of an agreement, said sources.”14
The report was positive and hopeful. While taking into account Bangladesh’s
apprehensions, it suggested that a compromise on water-sharing could be found in the
documents exchanged by the two sides.
The October to December 2010 quarter saw virtually no reportage on Teesta water-
sharing. During the first quarter of 2011 (January to March), the media started to note that the
issue of water-sharing was contentious even though the Water Resources secretaries of the
two countries had come to an agreement on water-sharing.15 This was also the period when
Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina visited India.
The impending agreement on Teesta was hailed as “a major development”. For the first
time an indication was given that the river water-sharing discussions were not limited to the
Teesta and Feni but also to five other common rivers – Dharla, Dudhkumar, Manu, Khowai, Gumti
and Muhuri – and more importantly, that the Teesta agreement would be signed during Indian
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Dhaka later in the year.16
The Indian Express also recognised that besides an impact on irrigation downstream, the
Teesta water-sharing issue was linked to domestic politics:
“Sharing the Teesta river water has been a contentious issue between India and
Bangladesh. While a large irrigation project in West Bengal has been stuck for many years
because of this, in Bangladesh it’s a domestic political issue because of apprehensions of
an adverse impact on irrigation downstream.”
However, it still ends on a hopeful note claiming: “the agreement worked out by both
sides reportedly takes care of both the viability of irrigation projects in West Bengal as well
as Bangladesh’s water needs.”17
The period from April to July 2011, was one of preparation for Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh’s visit to Dhaka. The issues raised in the media in this period, therefore, were
about the preparatory meetings between officials and ministers of the two sides and how they
were going well; that the two sides were preparing for the next generation agreements that
would cover all common rivers; that the Indian Foreign Secretary refused to go public with the
water-sharing percentages being discussed; and that India and Bangladesh would sign a deal for
exchange of adversely held enclaves.
In the media reports the sharing of the waters of the Teesta is situated in the larger
context of all common rivers. The agenda of the Indian officials, including the Indian External
Affairs Minister’s preparatory visit, was reported in one of the leading newspapers as follows:
“On top of the agenda is an agreement on the Teesta river for which the water resources
14 Ibid.
15 Ravish Tiwari; India, Bangla set to sign Teesta water-sharing pact; Indian Express; January 11, 2011. And, Haroon
Habib; India Bangladesh finalise deal on Teesta, Feni river waters; The Hindu; January 12, 2011.
16 Haroon Habib, op.cit.
17 Ravish Tiwari; op.cit.

secretary will be in Bangladesh on Monday. The aim is for a next generation comprehensive
agreement that will cover all the common rivers.”18
However, one starts to get the first hints of how sensitive the Teesta water-sharing issue is in the
reportage of the Indian Foreign Secretary’s visit to Dhaka. In her official briefing to the media,
the then Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao declined to disclose any details on the sharing of the
Teesta waters. The Times of India reported:
“On the water-sharing pact, she, however, would not disclose the percentage of the water
to be shared, saying the issue will be resolved at the highest level, meaning the two Prime
Ministers. “I won’t discuss the framework or percentage of the water share Bangladesh
will receive from the Teesta River. But I don’t think I am trying to hide something. This is a
very sensitive issue,” (Nirupama) Rao said.”19
The Indian foreign secretary defended her opaqueness because she clearly did not want a
premature public discussion of either the framework or the proportion of the Teesta waters that
each country would get. The reports originating from Dhaka in the Indian media were also positive
of the outcome though they also did not give any details of what had transpired:
“Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao and her Bangladesh counterpart Mijarul Quayes,
addressing a joint press conference here, indicated a positive outcome in the talks.
“Bangladesh has expressed the hope that an interim agreement on sharing waters of the
Teesta is expected to be signed as Gowhar Rizvi, international affairs adviser to the Prime
Minister, whom Ms. Rao met, said the two countries had agreed in principle to share the
waters of the river.
“It is learnt that the agreement, initially for 15 years, will be inked during Dr. Singh’s visit
to Bangladesh.”20
It was also apparent that pressure from Bangladesh on India to deliver was increasing:
“After decisively addressing India’s security and connectivity concerns by cracking down
hard on northeast militants and allowing limited trans-shipment of capital goods to India’s
northeast through the country’s territory, Hasina is now seeking major concessions from
India on river water-sharing, market access for Bangladeshi products, maritime and land
boundary delimitation and import of power, besides other lesser issues. The feeling in
Dhaka is that it is payback time and the Bangladesh foreign office is hoping for some
major agreements during Singh’s visit.”21
A strong notion of quid pro quo permeates this report. However, there is no apprehension
expressed as yet that Bangladesh might not get what it wants.
Even when the dates for the Indian Prime Minister’s Dhaka trip were being announced in
July 2011, there seemed to be no expectation of anything going wrong with the Teestawater-sharing
18 Indrani Bagchi; Rao to set stage for PM’s Dhaka visit; The Times of India; June 3, 2011.
19 PM might sign land accord with Bangladesh; The Times of India, June 9, 2011.
20 Haroon Habib; Dhaka-Delhi talks end on positive note; The Hindu; June 8, 2011
21 Subir Bhowmik; Is the Honeymoon over? The Times of India, June 14, 2011.

agreement.22 Indeed, a section of the media even suggested that the proposed agreement had
the “blessings” of West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee:
“Even more important is the political blessing from the new Chief Minister of West Bengal,
Mamata Banerjee. National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon was in Kolkata last
week briefing the Chief Minister on the agreements being worked out with Bangladesh.
... Mamata’s presence on the prime minister’s delegation to Dhaka would lend much
credibility to the visit.”23
The only comprehensive article which explained in detail what was going in the negotiating
process appeared not in the mainstream media but in an environmental magazine, Down to
Earth, in its July 14, 2011 issue. It noted:
“An official of the ministry, requesting not to be named, says both the countries have
agreed to keep 20 per cent of the water flowing in the river in the lean period. Of the rest
India wants to release 48 per cent for Bangladesh. Dhaka wants to share Teesta water on
a 50-50 basis. The information though could not be confirmed independently. ....
“The Bangladesh authorities are also preparing the details of another accord governing
the Feni River, which originates in Tripura. The treaty will allow India to realise 1.82 cusecs
of water from the Feni for a drinking water project at Olinagar in South Tripura district.”24
The report, exemplary for the amount of research that went into it, gives a history of the
issue between India and Bangladesh, recalls that an agreement on sharing the Teesta waters was
envisaged in the joint communiqué issued after Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit
to India in January 2010 and even gives details about the Teesta river and its flow:
“The Teesta, originating from Cholamo Lake at 5,330 metres above the sea level in
the Indian portion of the Himalayas, enters Bangladesh at Kaliganj village under Satnai
union of Nilphamari district. It courses 45 kilometres through Rangpur, Lalmonirhat and
Gaibandha before meeting the Brahmaputra in Kurigram. It is considered very important
for Bangladesh’s food security. Over 750,000 hectares of farmland in the food surplus
Rangpur region is dependent on the river for supplementary irrigation.
“The area faces severe water shortage every year during the leanest period of December
to March. Sometimes in December and January, water flow comes down to less than
1,000 cusec from 5,000 cusec, say Water Development Board (WDB) officials. Hence
the region is dependent on the Teesta for supplementary irrigation, which is the largest
in the country.
“But the flow of water in the Teesta has weakened significantly in past 24 years for
Gazaldoba barrage and some dams built by India in the river’s upper basin. In February
and March, it comes down to less than 1,000 cusec, from 5,000 cusec in December
and January. At times, it shrinks even further, say sources in the hydrology department
of WDB. For instance, they add, the amount of water dropped to 370 cusec in February
22 PM to go on ‘char Dhaka’ trip, India spotlights Bangla ties; The Times of India; July 4, 2011. Manmohan to visit Bangla-
desh on September6; The Hindu; July 4, 2011.
23 C Rajamohan; Natural Partners; Indian Express; July 8, 2011.
24 Pinaki Roy; Teesta Accord likely; Down to Earth; July 14, 2011.

2007. The water flow in the month used to be at least 4,000 cusec before India built
Gazaldoba barrage in 1985. This steep drop in the water flow of the river occurs as India
allegedly holds almost all water during the lean period for their hydro project. This trend,
continuing over the years, means sufferings to thousands of people living downstream
and affecting the ecology in the northern districts.
“Following Bangladeshi prime minister’s visit in India in January 2010, the 37th JRC
meeting began in 2010 after a gap of five years in New Delhi, Bangladesh delegation led
by Water Resource Minister of Bangladesh Ramesh Chandra Sen said in a press meet
that it expected to get more than 35,000 cusec of Teesta water in a cycle of 10 days
during March-May.
“During the talks, Bangladesh proposed a draft “interim agreement”, while India offered
a “statement of principles” on sharing of the waters of the Teesta. At the end of the
talks, India agreed to examine the draft submitted by the Bangladeshi side. The two
countries also agreed to identify 12 new bank protection sites in India and 22 new ones in
Bangladesh. They also agreed on sharing flood data to issue advance warning of floods.”
This is probably the most comprehensive report which appeared in the Indian media
listing the complexities of the Teesta water-sharing issue – the water-sharing formula being
negotiated, the dependence of Bangladesh on the Teesta for irrigation and food security; the
amount of land it irrigates, water flow in the Teesta before and after the construction of the
Gazaldoba barrage by India in 1985 and water scarcity due to weakening of the flow during lean
months. Most importantly, it is the only report which quotes experts, even though they happen to
be officials in the government of Bangladesh.
Sources Used and Gaps in Reportage

During this period the sources used in the reportage fell into four broad categories:
1. Official briefing by anonymous government officials;
2. Government officials and ministers on record;
3. Joint River Commission (JRC) officials; and
4. Hydrology experts
Most of the reports seemed based on official background briefings. They lack detailed
contextualisation of the issue giving the history of Teesta water-sharing with Bangladesh. They do
not even mention that there is no detailed data available of the flow of water in the Teesta during
the lean or even during the normal season. They do not mention the exact lean season for which
the interim arrangement was being sought and nor do they contain any comparative details of the
irrigation needs of India or Bangladesh from the Teesta. The only reference to experts within the
officialdom was to the “JRC” (Joint River Commission) sources” or hydrology experts from the
Water Development Board of Bangladesh.
The reportage lacked basic facts, did not contain information which could have been
easily available and either took background information on part of the readers for granted or did
not think it proper to provide such information to them. There is no reference to any published
research papers or reports from official, non-government or even political sources – perhaps
there is either a dearth of such reports or they simply do not exist. There was also no reference to
experts or researchers outside the officialdom. However, what is significant is that the reportage

in India was not acrimonious and the whole issue of Teesta water-sharing was reported in a
cooperative framework and without nationalistic sentiment overriding it.
BANGLADESH
The issues raised in the Bangladesh media during this period essentially were no different from
those raised in the Indian media. They could be broadly grouped into two areas: One, reports
which said that India and Bangladesh were about to sign the Teesta water-sharing agreement;
and two, those which provided information regarding various other treaties that the two countries
were scheduled to conclude.
Most Bangladesh media reported with enthusiasm that during Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh’s visit to Dhaka, he and his counterpart, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, would create history
by signing a series of accords which would finally fulfil what was envisioned in the Indira-Mujib
Accord of 1974. They could thereby resolve the issues that have plagued bilateral relations
between the two neighbours for decades.
The media also reported that the two countries had reached an agreement on the thorny
issue of sharing the waters of the Teesta and that this would be the high point of the Indian Prime
Minister’s visit to Dhaka. A trade deal was also understood to be under consideration of the two
governments.
Media reports suggested that several rounds of talks had been held to forge an interim
treaty on Teesta water-sharing and issues relating to sharing the waters of other common rivers.
The stage of the agreement, the media reports said, was set by the Water Resources Secretaries
of the two countries and the meeting of the ministerial level Joint River Commission. The reports
said that the Indian side was led at the Joint River Commission by Water Resources Minister
Pawan Kumar Bansal and the Bangladeshi side by his counterpart Ramesh Chandra Sen. As
if to emphasise the importance of these deliberations, the media noted that the Bangladesh
delegation included Mashiur Rahman, Adviser to Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and Mijarul
Quayes, the Foreign Secretary. The commission had last met five years ago in 2005.
In sharp contrast to Indian media reportage of this period, the Bangladeshi media
reported that India had made it clear to Bangladesh that the state of West Bengal would play a
crucial role on Teesta water-sharing as the river flows to Bangladesh from the Gazaldoba Barrage
which is situated in that state. The reports said that the Teesta Accord could be modelled on
the Ganges Waters-sharing Treaty signed in 1996 when the Awami League was in power in
Bangladesh. Under the treaty, it had been decided that if the water flow at Farakka was 70,000
cusecs, Bangladesh and India would share the water on a 50:50 basis. The principle of equal
sharing of water in the dry months, suggesting an equal sharing of adversity, therefore, was
modelled on the already existing Ganges Waters Treaty.
The daily New Age and the online newspaper bdnews24.com quoted the Kolkata daily
Ananda Bazaar Patrika to the effect that Mamata Banerjee had agreed to the Teesta draft
agreement. The newspaper, in a report published in its online version, claimed that Mamata
Banerjee had okayed the draft of the treaty when India’s National Security Adviser Shiv Shankar
Menon met her and succeeded in allaying her anxieties. The issue of water sharing was also
discussed in India’s Union cabinet meeting where Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Water

Resources minister Pawan Kumar Bansal, Home Minister P Chidambaram and Finance Minister
Pranab Mukherjee, among others, were present. Referring to the draft treaty, the Ananda Bazaar.
Patrika was reported that “India will take 52% and Bangladesh 48% after preserving 460 cusec
Teesta water.”25
Imtiaz Ahmed, diplomatic analyst and professor at Dhaka University’s Department of
International Relations, was quoted in the press as saying that many people had expressed
concern since nothing really had been finalized on a resolution of vital bilateral issues. He argued
that with regard to advancing the relationship with Bangladesh, Monmohan Singh’s visit held
great potential which ought to be utilised fully by Delhi. However, it was also pointed out that
the projected visit to Dhaka by Indian Water Resources Minister on September 3 had failed to
materialise. Predictably,, there were concerns about the Teesta water-sharing treaty being signed
even though it was certain that a treaty was likely on outstanding border issues and that India
would allow duty free entry of some Bangladeshi goods. However, the analyst suggested that
although one could not be optimistic about a resolution of all outstanding issues, there was
still hope that some positive developments would take placed at the last moment when Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh actually reached Dhaka.26

During the period most of the reports did not have any obvious gaps in terms of sourcing or quality
of information. They were written in a broadly co-operative framework. There was no jingoism
apparent in them. Most were based on official background briefings. There was the expectation
that the sensitive issues of water-sharing, trade imbalance between the two countries and India’s
concern about connectivity with its northeast and its internal security issues would be resolved
along with an agreement to exchange areas in adverse possession along the India-Bangladesh
border. That all this would be achieved during the visit of the Indian Prime Minister was taken for
granted. Hope was in the air.
However, there was no reference to any published research reports. Referencing -- if
any -- and sourcing, was limited to the Joint River Commission. A few reports quoting Joint
River Commission sources claimed that some specific ideas had been exchanged between the
two countries on sharing of the Teesta waters. Water Development Board sources were used in
some reports in order to suggest that there had been a weakening of the water flow in the Teesta
since the construction of the Gazaldoba Barrage in India. A particular flaw in such reports was a
noticeable absence of specifics and indeed facts.
The visit of Indian Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee, which resulted in a credit line of
US $ 1 billion being extended to Bangladesh, was seen as an indicator of Indo-Bangladesh ties
being on a steady and positive path.
25 http://www.google.com.bd/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0CCcQFjAA&url=http%3A
%2F%2F www.bdnews24.com%2Fdetails.php%3Fid%3D204828%26cid%3D2&ei=45YHUSWMmogHr9eBkAk&usg=A
FQjCNErKZeBEiiZ8ATv_VnIpGIUe2ZZxA&bvm=bv.41524429,d.aGc
26 http://www.amardeshonline.com/pages/details/2011/09/11/104656

TEESTA ISSUE IN THE MEDIA: AUGUST 2011 TO
OCTOBER 2011
INDIA
T
he three months from August1, 2011 to October 31, 2011 have been chosen for an intensive
media analysis as the Indian Prime Minister’s visit to Dhaka to sign the Teesta agreement falls
bang in the middle of this period.
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Dhaka on September 6 and 7 but was
unable to sign the much expected Teesta Accord because of last minute objections raised by the
Chief Minister of West Bengal, Ms. Mamata Banerjee. Although she was scheduled to join the
Prime Minister and witness the signing of the Teesta Accord, she chose to opt out indicating her
unhappiness with the pact which she claimed did not protect her state’s interests. That put paid
to any hopes of signing the agreement.
For the Indian media, while August 2011 was the month of hope, September was one of
disappointment and assessment of what had gone wrong. By October, however, the media had
moved on to other lessons to be learned from the debacle, such as whether the West Bengal
Chief Minister could ever be a reliable ally of the Congress party leading the United Progressive
Alliance in New Delhi.
In terms of the most frequently discussed issues in the media in the period between
August and September, the two that topped the charts were: reasons why the Teesta agreement
could not be reached; and the consequences of not signing the accord for India and Bangladesh.
The least adequately discussed issues were the need for the proposed Teesta agreement, details
of its contours, and the modalities of how the stalled agreement could be moved forward. Thus,
at the best of times readers would remain unclear about what was sought to be done, as well as
why and what obstacles came in the way of the agreement. As for moving the stalled process
forward, unless one knew what the objective was and the nature of the obstacles in the way, the
discussion was bound to be fruitless.
The feeling, a month before the Indian Prime Minister’s visit in August, was that anything
could go wrong on the Teesta Accord. This was amply evident from some of the media headlines
of August – “Teesta Accord on cards”27; “Border dispute likely to be solved during Manmohan’s
Dhaka visit”28; “Mamata can accompany Prime Minister to Dhaka”29; “PM’s historic trip to
Bangladesh – It is going to be a new beginning”30; “Mamata likely to accompany PM to Dhaka”31;
“Historic opportunity to be part of new future”32; “New Delhi, Dhaka to try to sew up pacts before
Manmohan Singh visit”33; and “Mamata to accompany Manmohan to Dhaka.”34
27 Teesta Accord on cards; The Telegraph; August22, 2012; Kolkata.

28 Border dispute likely to be solved during Manmohan’s Dhaka visit; Ananda Bazaar Patrika; August 19, 2011; Kolkata
29 Mamata can accompany Prime Minister to Dhaka; Bartaman; August 18, 2011; Kolkata.
30 PM’s historic trip to Bangladesh – It is going to be a new beginning; Bartaman; August 21, 2011; Kolkata.
31 Mamata likely to accompany PM to Dhaka; The Hindu; August 18, 2011; New Delhi.
32 Historic opportunity to be part of new future; The Hindu; August 30, 2011
33 New Delhi, Dhaka to try to sew up pacts before Manmohan Singh visit; The Hindu; August 28, 2011, New Delhi.
34 Mamata to accompany Manmohan to Dhaka; The Times of India; August 18, 2011, New Delhi.

West Bengal newspapers were gung-ho about the Teesta water-sharing agreement and
reported that it would be a 50:50 sharing of the waters. Mamata Banerjee herself went on record
to say, “On Prime Minister’s invitation, I am going to Dhaka. This trip is important for furthering
Indo-Bangladesh ties.”35
Up to the end of August, there was no indication in the Indian media of any differences
between the Union government and the State government of West Bengal over the sharing of the
Teesta waters. The only media report which barely hinted at differences over the issue appeared
in The Telegraph in Kolkata, which quoted a Bangladeshi water expert and chairman of the
International Farakka Committee, Atiqur R K Eusufzai, suggesting that 25 per cent of the water
should be left to flow freely in the Teesta and of the rest, 60 per cent should go to Bangladesh and
40 per cent to India. Former water minister of Bangladesh and vice-chairman of the opposition
Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Major (Retd.) Hafizuddin Ahmed, was reported proposing a 50-50
sharing of the Teesta waters, “The water should be shared evenly between Bangladesh and India
and we don’t want to see an unequal deal... The deal should be disclosed before the nation so
that people know what the government is doing for their welfare.”36
On September 1, 2011, the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister of India met
the West Bengal Chief Minister to brief her on the Prime Minister’s visit to Bangladesh in general
and the interim agreement on the sharing of the Teesta waters in particular. This was his second
such visit to Kolkata with the same objective.
Even on September 1, the media reported that Mamata Banerjee had agreed to Teesta
water-sharing37 and that leaving aside 460 cusecs of water to maintain the flow of the river, the
rest of the waters would be divided on a 52:48 ratio between India and Bangladesh. It was only
three or four days later that news came of Mamata’s not accompanying the Prime Minister to
Dhaka after all as she was unhappy that the Centre had decided to share the Teesta waters with
Bangladesh on a 50:50 basis.38
The West Bengal Chief Minister’s objections were two-fold: One, that the agreement
was against the interest of West Bengal; and two, that she had been misled – she had approved
a draft in which the Teesta waters were to be shared in the ratio of 52:48 between India and
Bangladesh but that had been replaced by another one – dividing the water on a 50:50 ratio --
which she was not agreeable to.
The issues raised by the Indian media on the Teesta Accord broadly fell into four categories:
1. Sharing the waters of the Teesta and other trans-boundary rivers
2. Reasons for India’s inability to reach an agreement
3. Implication of not reaching a pact on the Teesta
4. The way forward
Within each of these categories several other related issues were discussed in the media
– some adequately, others inadequately.
35 Mamata can accompany Prime Minister to Dhaka; Bartaman; op.cit.

36 Teesta Accord on cards; The Telegraph; August22, 2011; Kolkata
37 Treaty only after safeguarding the state’s interests: Mamata agrees to Teesta ; Ananda Bazaar Patrika; September 1, 2011;
Kolkata.
38 Mamata opts out of Dhaka visit; The Hindu; September 4, 2011; New Delhi; State opposes still more water t Dhaka;
Ananda Bazaar Patrika; September 5, 2011; Kolkata; and Unhappy with the water deal, Mamata not going to Bangla-
desh; Bartaman; Kolkata; among many other reports.

Sharing the waters of the Teesta: Within this broad category, the various issues that
found a mention in the media were:
a) Explaining the proposed accord on sharing the waters
b) Discussion of the water needs of Sikkim, North Bengal and Bangladesh
c) The proposed water-sharing formula
d) West Bengal’s ability to use the waters of the Teesta it wants
e) The place of Teesta in West Bengal’s cultural life
Once it was clear that the Teesta agreement was not going to be signed, a series of
media reports appeared on the controversy surrounding it. Some excellent reports appeared
which explained the background to the sharing of the waters of the Teesta and the Feni rivers,
but so did some biased reports.
It was in this period that one began to come by detailed reports on the background of
the Teesta – perhaps prepared by diligent journalists in the hope that they would get published
after the Teesta Accord was hopefully signed, but then published nevertheless even when it was
eventually not signed. The clearest exposition of the Teesta and Feni water-sharing agreements
appeared in The Hindu on September 6, the day the deal was to be signed but was not 39.
For the first time the readers were informed:
“The pacts on sharing the waters of the Teesta and the Feni are to be 15-year interim
agreements for lean periods between October and April, until firmed up data is collected
through joint hydrological observation. The setting up of observation stations is also part
of the pacts.
“Being a lower riparian, Bangladesh is keen on sharing waters of common rivers and,
after the Ganga Water Treaty of 1996, accorded the highest priority to the sharing of
Teesta waters. The other rivers earmarked for sharing in the first phase are the Manu, the
Khowai, the Gumti, the Muhuri, the Jaldhaka (Dharia) and the Torsa (Dudhkumar). The
Feni was included in 2005 at the 36th meeting of the Joint River Commission in Dhaka.”
And further:
“In July, 1983, both sides reached an understanding on an ad hoc sharing of the Teesta
flows during the lean period with an allocation of 36 per cent for Bangladesh and 39
per cent for India, leaving 25 per cent to be decided later. However, this has remained
unimplemented for differences over the data of water flows.
“Both sides are now striving to arrive at an agreement on catchment area flows in the lean
season, after taking into account changes due to climate, as well as an understanding
on water flow data.”
Besides clarifying that the agreement was an interim one for 15 years, this report also
identified the lean period for which the agreement would be valid – October to April. It noted that
agreed data on the river flow is not available; that the agreement would also agree to the setting
up of a joint hydrological observation stations for the collection of such data; and that six other
river agreements were pending with Bangladesh. Unfortunately, the report was not rewritten to
include the fact that both agreements – on the Teesta and the Feni – were now off!
39 The tale of two rivers; The Hindu; September 6, 2011.

It is unfortunate that such detailed contextualising of the water-sharing issue took place
in the media after the disagreement on the pact. One wonders, if the public and political mood
might have facilitated the agreement had such details been published in the weeks before the
agreement was to be signed. None the less, these media reports tried to educate its readers
about the need to share the waters of the Teesta and to make them aware of its long history .
One such excellently written report noted:
“India and Pakistan began talking about the Teesta’s waters soon after Independence.
The talks went nowhere. In 1961, India adopted unilateral plans to build a barrage on its
side of the border, raising concerns downstream.
“Following more years of failed talks, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
a consensus statement in 1976 which directed both countries to arrive at a “fair and
expeditious” agreement. Even though the India-Bangladesh joint rivers commission held
over a 100 meetings, a deal could not be hammered out.
“Bangladesh completed construction of the Dalia barrage, the country’s largest irrigation
project, in 1979. The Dalia project was intended to use the Teesta’s waters to irrigate
some 540,000 hectares of land in the country’s northern rice-growing heartlands. From
1985, the 4,500-km canal network meant to carry the Teesta’s waters to farmers opened
its gates.
“The farmers got the water they desperately needed — but then, just a few years later,
the canals ran dry.
“In 1993, farmers in West Bengal began to get water from the Gazaldoba barrage in
Jalpaiguri, which India had built on the Teesta. The Indian project supplied water for
228,000 hectares — farmers used their votes to ensure that their needs were met before
Bangladesh.”
From 1996, scholars Yoshiro Higano and Muhammad Fakrul Islam have noted, India’s
“exclusive control of the Teesta’s water in the dry season at Gazaldoba made the Dalia
barrage useless.”
The report went on to say:
“In 1997, though, a draft treaty on the Teesta was hammered out, a year after the former
West Bengal Chief Minister, Jyoti Basu, helped steward a landmark treaty on the Ganga.
“He was a great man,” the Prime Minister acknowledged today.
“Little progress was made in the decade and a half since, breeding bitterness in
desperately-poor Bangladesh where farmers are hit by crippling water shortages in low-
rainfall years.”40
This was a fairly unusual report in the Indian media because, besides situating the Teesta
water-sharing issue historically to point out that it pre-dates the formation of Bangladesh, it talked
of the water stress in Bangladesh, gave details of how unilateral action by India deprived the lower
riparian Bangladesh of the Teesta waters and quoted researchers to bolster this claim. The report
was clearly based on detailed briefing by some knowledgeable sources and quoted facts about
40 Praveen Swamy; Manmohan says Mamata assented to Teesta Accord; The Hindu; September 8, 2011.

the command area of the river in India and Bangladesh. However, except for the researchers, it
did not give any clue to the sources used – official or unofficial.
Yet another report underlined the unreasonableness of not agreeing to a 50-50 sharing
of the Teesta waters, noted:
“India has traditionally had the lion’s share of the river’s waters. During the dry season,
it has access to roughly 32,000 cusecs of water for an estimated eight million people,
while Bangladesh has access to around 5,000 cusecs for 20 million people. The new
formula would have seen an almost 50:50 split. Banerjee has every right to be concerned
about north Bengal. Yet, disagreement over a few thousand cusecs of river water could
have been ironed out amicably.
“There is indeed a strong case for India to be more generous vis-a-vis Bangladesh. As
the bigger partner in the bilateral equation the onus is on India to take the lead. Despite
having played a key role in the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, India has failed to
capitalise on the two countries’ shared history. In the past, it frittered away what should
have been the most vibrant bilateral relationship in South Asia.”41
It is remarkable that while some media reports provided a rationalisation for a 50:50
sharing of the Teesta waters, this remained unclear to the political class ruling West Bengal. The
Telegraph, a leading newspaper of Kolkata, explained how despite sharing only 25 per cent of
the water at Gazaldoba barrage in North Bengal how through regeneration by streams on its
lower course, the Teesta’s waters become equivalent to 50 per cent of the total as it travels to
Bangladesh.
“The technical component of the agreement that was to have been signed this week
would have converted 25 per cent of the Teesta’s waters into 50 per cent for Bangladesh
as if by the wave of a magician’s wand. This is because India measures the Teesta’s
waters for sharing purposes with Bangladesh at Gazaldoba in Jalpaiguri where it has
built a barrage for agricultural use of the water within Bengal. 75 per cent of the Teesta’s
waters will be available for the state, according to the agreement, and 25 per cent will be
earmarked for Bangladesh.
“However, as the river continues its travel to the border, its water component doubles
through regeneration. As a result, the agreement which provides for equal sharing
of water between India and Bangladesh at their border means that the 25 per cent
division in Gazaldoba actually graduates to 50 per cent of the Teesta’s waters for use
by each country. This happens at the point where the river crosses into Bangladesh. In
Lalmonirhat district of Rangpur division, the Bangladesh authorities have built the Dalia
barrage for purposes of harvesting this 50 per cent of Teesta waters for irrigation.” In a
sense, all this is moot because figures and percentages evaporate in a political context
over concerns about non-availability of water in the dry season.
“Any Teesta agreement can ultimately be accepted by Bengal only as a gesture in sharing
of sacrifice during the river’s lean season flows, and equally, sparing Bangladesh crop
damage from excessive water through Gazaldoba during the monsoon.
41 Rudroneel Ghosh; No looking back; The Times of India; September 12, 2011; New Delhi.

“Technical studies during the Teesta negotiations have concluded that Bengal is unlikely
to use anywhere near the 75 per cent of Teesta waters that it will receive through the
Gazaldoba barrage for decades to come.”42
Another report which explained the formula clearly went as follows:
“Mamata was learnt to have then demanded a specific cap of 25 per cent of water at
Gazaldoba barrage, which is 90 km inside Indian territory. With Mamata clarifying her
stance, Menon rushed to Dhaka for negotiations on this specific issue.
“Menon, in fact, got Dhaka to agree to a 50:50 agreement with a condition that not more
than 25 per cent of the water would be released at Gazaldoba to protect the interests of
West Bengal.
“However, Mamata then sought to reduce this 25 per cent cap at Gazaldoba down to 18
per cent leaving little space for government negotiators to work it out.”43
While some reports quoted officials as saying that the proposed sharing of the waters was
discussed in percentage terms rather than in absolute figures. A Delhi-based newspaper noted:
“A senior official said the arrangement for Teesta was worked out as an interim mechanism, in
percentages rather than absolute quantities. ‘Joint measurement of water flow has never been
conducted. The idea was to have an interim agreement, measure the water flow jointly and then
conclude a final agreement,’ he said.”44
However other media reports in India cited absolute numbers. One such report claimed
that Mamata Banerjee was willing to give Bangladesh 25,000 cusecs of water from the Teesta
but the agreement proposed by the Union government provided for 33,000 cusecs telling West
Bengal that the additional 8,000 cusecs would come from Sikkim’s share. However, since Sikkim
and West Bengal do not have an agreement for the Teesta, there were apprehensions in Kolkata
that Sikkim could deprive it of 8,000 cusecs. There was also a fear that the Opposition political
parties could exploit the issue for electoral purposes.45
Yet another report citing absolute numbers claimed that the West Bengal Chief Minister
had agreed to increase the lean period share of water for Bangladesh from 23,000 cusecs to
25,000 cusecs but “when the draft agreement reached Banerjee on the weekend of September3-4,
it promised to release water at the average of 33,000 cusecs to Bangladesh with the high limit of
60,000 cusecs. After reading the draft, Banerjee asked her chief secretary Samar Ghosh to write to
the PMO on September 4 that she would not be accompanying Prime Minister Singh to Dhaka.”46
What is remarkable is that these reports definitive in their tone and tenor and written with
absolute surety do not provide any sources for their claims.
Some Indian media reports are unabashedly biased with no attempt at balancing the
claims and counterclaims on the sharing of the Teesta waters. Thus the Irrigation Minister of West
Bengal is quoted without his comments being balanced by an equally weighty figure from Bangladesh.
42 K P Nayar; Apolitical PMO pays the price; The Telegraph; September 6, 2011. Kolkata.
43 Didi plays hardball as PM leaves for Dhaka; Indian Express; September 5, 2011.
44 Verghese K George; Water a thorny issue for Bangladesh government; Hindustan Times, September 7, 2011. New Delhi.
45 Pranay Sharma and Saleem Samad; Eddies in the Teesta; Outlook; September 19, 2011.
46 Priya Sahgal and Partha Dasgupta; CM pours cold water over PM; India Today; September 19, 2011.

If a bald statement such as one given by the minister is taken for gospel truth then there can never
be a Teesta agreement:
“Gautam Deb, the North Bengal development minister in the current government,
maintains this (not agreeing to the Teesta accord) is no blackmail ploy.” The pact would have
meant the death of agriculture in north Bengal as it would have dried up Teesta, the lifeline of the
region. There is no question of sharing so much water with Bangladesh,” he says.”47
Take the case of another report, one of the few datelined Darjeeling in North Bengal:
“Sharing of Teesta waters with Bangladesh is a fraught issue in Darjeeling, Jalpaiguri,
Cooch Behar, North and South Dinajpur and Malda districts. Not only do people depend on the
waters for irrigation, when the Teesta Barrage project was started in 1975, many farmers gave
their land for the project in the hope of more water.
“‘The Centre’s proposal to give 33,000 to 50,000 cusecs of water to Bangladesh would
keep the six districts dry in summer,’ says Prof. Jeta Sankrityayan of North Bengal University who
is also a member of the state planning board. ‘The Chief Minister made the right move keeping in
view the interests of lakhs of farmers, who since 1975, are waiting for Teesta waters’.”48
This report suggests as if the farmers of north Bengal had given up their lands for free to
build the Teesta Barrage at Gazaldoba and now it was payback time. The statement attributed
to the state planning board member ought to have been balanced with a contrarian view. No
attempt was made to visit the command area of the Teesta barrage and talk to the beneficiary
farmers or their organisations.
An interesting report in The Telegraph suggests that if Delhi had agreed to share half the
waters of Teesta with Bangladesh, then the very purpose of the Teesta Barrage project aimed at
providing irrigation water to North Bengal and generating electricity would have been defeated.
Environmentalists and river experts have pointed out that if Bengal had to share the Teesta’s
waters with Bangladesh on a 50:50 basis, there would not have been enough water to irrigate
the fields of north Bengal in the dry months from December to April.49
The report quoted a Kolkata-based river expert Kalyan Rudra to say, ““If half the Teesta
waters had been given to Bangladesh, there would not have been enough water to irrigate the
fields of north Bengal when the Boro crop is cultivated in the dry months…It is in these dry
months that both Bengal and Bangladesh depend most heavily on irrigation.” Yet another expert,
Subir Sarkar of the North Bengal University, who is a researcher and a geographer who has
conducted many studies on the Teesta argued that the flow of the river had gone down over time:
“We conducted a study between 1990 and 2008 and found an annual decline of 0.9 per cent in
the mean water level of the river. The rate of silt deposit has increased, the volume of water has
reduced and the flow has become erratic. Global warming and environmental degradation have
contributed to major changes in the flow of the Teesta.”50 This report is one of the very few which
quotes experts but then they speak only from the Indian perspective.
47 Ibid.
48 Mamata wins over North Bengal; Hindustan Times; September 6, 2011.
49 Dam spared death knell; The Telegraph; September 6, 2011. The Teesta Barrage Project was commissioned in 1976 at a
cost of Rs 69.7 crore with the target of irrigating 9.22 lakh hectares in the six north Bengal districts. The plan included
generating 67.5MW of hydropower. But after 35 years and Rs 1,200 crore in expenses, even the first sub-phase of the
project’s Phase I has not been completed.
50 Ibid.

However, there are other reports that suggested that this is not the complete picture.
One report argued that even if West Bengal got the amount of water it was asking for, it would
not be in a position to use it as the Teesta project for reviving the agricultural economy of North
Bengal was nowhere near to being implemented even after 35 years after it was initiated. “For
West Bengal to fight with Bangladesh over sharing of Teesta water is like a man quarrelling with
his friend for an terminally ill woman who is beautiful but suffering from multiple organ failure and
with little chance of revival.” 51
It claimed that:
“The Teesta Barrage Project that had been conceived way back in 1975-76 had a grand
plan for revival of the agricultural economy of six North Bengal districts - Cooch Behar, Jalpaiguri,
Darjeeling, North Dinajpur, South Dinajpur and Malda - which did not have any industrial base.
More than 35 years down the line, it remains far from complete, even though the needs may have
changed and there is little chance that that the entire project, as originally conceived, would ever
be executed.”
According to this article, the original plan was that the completed project would irrigate
922,000 hectares but not even the first stage of the project had been completed. The former
irrigation minister of West Bengal was quoted as saying,
“It may not be feasible now to extend the project beyond this stage which comprises
the construction of three barrages - the main Teesta barrage and two pick-up barrages on the
Mah and Dauk rivers - and four main canal systems, the Teesta-Mah main canal, the Mah main
canal, the Dauk Nagar main canal and the Nagar Tangon main canal. Besides, some of the
agricultural fields which were initially supposed to benefit from the project have since converted
to tea gardens.”
“According to an irrigation department status report, while the three barrages and two of
the main canals have been completed, the distribution system comprising ‘minor and sub-minor’
canals, which would actually carry the water to the paddy fields, are largely incomplete. Naskar
says that there are problems, even with the main canals, which make them dysfunctional. The
issue that is being raised is, with the distribution system in the command area not yet ready, the
water that flows down the Teesta would be wasted even if it is not shared with Bangladesh.”52
The report also made the startling claim, quoting the former irrigation minister, that
“neither India nor Bangladesh has any clear idea how much water is really required to irrigate
the command areas of the Teesta project in the two countries. For, according to him, at the 25th
meeting of the Joint Rivers Commission between the two countries in 1983 it had been agreed
upon that an expert committee would be set up which would make an on-the-spot survey of the
command areas of the Teesta project in the two countries to make an assessment how much
water was actually needed by West Bengal and Bangladesh to irrigate the command areas, but
the committee never really got off the ground.”
The minister then went on to say that “the water requirement of Bangladesh from Teesta
should not be as high as that of West Bengal as the command area of the barrage that Bangladesh
has built at Dalia on the river is about 110,000 hectares.” The report noted that this figure was
51 Nirmalya Banerjee; Shadow boxing over Teesta Project: The Times of India: September 12, 2011.
52 Ibid.

supported by a research paper titled, “Teesta River Water-sharing: A Case Study in Teesta Barrage
Project,” authored by Bangladeshi scholars Mohammad Nurul Islam, Mohammad Ashfaqe Azam
and Dr Q R Islam – although it mentioned the area as only the first-phase target for irrigation.
The report also disputed the thought that the people of North Bengal were eager to
partake of the irrigation benefits of the Teesta project. In fact, he found “there was little enthusiasm
among the farmers in North Bengal - who would have been the major beneficiaries - over the
project” Indeed, he was quoted as saying, “Farmers were largely indifferent. There were numerous
disputes and court cases over acquisition of land for setting up the project infrastructure. During
surveys, too, there was resistance. The local-level mobilization of farmers in support of the project
that was necessary was largely absent.”53
Here one finds an unusual report which questions the basic presumptions of water
utilisation in both India and Bangladesh and this is what sets this report apart from the others and
even suggests that some of the area which was to benefit from the irrigations projects associated with
the Teesta barrage had in fact by now been converted into tea gardens which do not require irrigation!
Very few of these reports are datelined North Bengal. It would seem that most of the
journalists were writing either from New Delhi or Kolkata (in one case, from Washington DC!) and
were only relying on facts supplied by their named or unnamed sources and had not bothered to
visit the area or the farmers on whose behalf the Teesta water-sharing agreement was scuttled
by the state’s Chief Minister. Rarely does one find any detailed interaction of the media with
researchers and river experts. Where research findings are used they are used by and large for
bolstering national positions.
Although there was some discussion in the media about how The Teesta River had
inspired “life and culture in North Bengal for ages”; that the river is mentioned in Anandmath and
Debi Choudharani – two novels by Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyaya; and that the Rajbangshis
worship the Teesta as an elderly mother-like figure – Teesta Buri (Buri, meaning old woman)54 – it
was never clear what prompted such reporting. Except saying that in the plains rice, jute and
vegetables are grown on the banks of the Teesta – which might conceivably require irrigation -- it
seems as if the Teesta must be claimed for West Bengal culturally and civilisationally and that the
river has little to do with the culture of Bangladesh.
Reasons for India’s inability to reach an agreement: The media identified four basic reasons
for India and Bangladesh not reaching an agreement on the Teesta:
a) Perceptions that West Bengal’s interests were being compromised
b) West Bengal Chief Minister being misled by Delhi
c) Inadequate consultation with West Bengal government
d) That the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) rather than the relevant ministries of External
Affairs and Water Resources had conducted the negotiations with West Bengal.
The media seemed quite polarised over the West Bengal Chief Minister throwing a
spanner in the works – with the Bengali media supporting her unquestioningly and the English
language media being relatively more balanced. Although the focus of the Indian Prime Minister’s
visit to Dhaka should have been on Indo-Bangladesh relations, for the West Bengal papers it
seemed to be Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee.
53 Ibid.
54 Avijit Sinha; Life to prose, north’s muse; The Telegraph; September 6, 2011.

The Ananda Bazaar Patrika, for example, in an editorial entitled “Idiotic self-pride,”
praised Mamata Banerjee and criticised the Centre and accused the latter of not consulting the
West Bengal Chief Minister properly. It argued that the Chief Minister had taken the right stand on
the issue as the amount of water promised to Bangladesh would have left the districts of North
Bengal dry. It claimed that “Delhi’s handling of the issue was one-sided as it did not pay much
attention to the state which would be affected by the deal.”55 The editorial in the newspaper seemed
heavily biased towards West Bengal and suggested that the interests of Union government in
Delhi and of Bangladesh were contrary to those of West Bengal.
Two days later, in another editorial comment – “Do whatever you are supposed to...” --
the Ananda Bazaar Patrika, once again lambasted the Indian Prime Minister:
“The Teesta Agreement could not be signed and it’s the Centre that needs to be blamed.
All the initiative was taken by the ministry of foreign affairs and PMO, though the issue
of water-sharing should have involved other people or ministries( for instance ministry of
water resource) .” The editorial questioned why Mr. Shiv Shankar Menon had played such
a pivotal role on a matter related to water-sharing. It argued that how much water should
be shared between the two countries, should have been decided by West Bengal and
Sikkim as these are the states through which the Teesta flows and which are the worst
hit during the summer. That Manmohan Singh, in his spree to appease Bangladesh was
willing to sacrifice the interest of West Bengal, which was completely unacceptable. It
argued that the draft of the treaty should have been decided by Sikkim and West Bengal
on one hand and Bangladesh on the other.56
Not only is the editorial comment pro-State and anti-Centre, it also makes the preposterous
claim that international treaties between nations should be formulated by states – ignoring that
conducting relations with other countries falls exclusively within the purview of the Central or the
Union government under the Indian Constitution. What it could have argued, more reasonably,
was that on the sharing of trans-boundary resources, the Union government must consult the
states which are directly affected because they happen to be on the international boundary.
The partisan attitude of the newspaper was evident in the headline such as “Stubborn
on the question of State’s interest: Check-mate by the CM”57 and another editorial which blamed the
Centre for seeking the trust of the neighbour but not giving importance to unity at home. The editorial
argued: “While it is important to keep the neighbours happy, it is equally important in a federation that
the states are given due importance. In today’s age of coalition politics, one cannot ignore partners.
It is important that the Centre assures West Bengal that its interests will not be hampered.”58
West Bengal newspapers by and large supported the Chief Minister’s stand and carried
pro-Mamata articles and reports. Consider, for example, the following headlines: “Mamata has
done the right thing by opposing the Teesta Accord”59; “Mamata has protected the interests of
the state;”60 “State’s sole spokesperson rides Teesta tide;”61 and “Mamata does not want to rush
through the Teesta Accord.”62 They are all partisan.
55 Ananda Bazaar Patrika; September 6, 2011.

59 Bartaman; September 7, 2011.
60 Editorial in Bartaman; September 7, 2011.
61 The Telegraph; September 6, 2011.

However, the Sikkim and the North Bengal media managed to somehow maintain an
objective stance. This is especially remarkable for North Bengal as this is the area whose interests
the Chief Minister supposedly was protecting – yet what you get in Uttar Banga Sambad is fairly
objective reporting. The same is true of Sikkim Express. They have neutral headlines and neutral
reportage.
The media in Delhi on the other hand, criticised Mamata for putting last minute hurdles
in the way of an agreement on Teesta water-sharing. They wondered why her decision to not
accompany the prime minister to Dhaka came so late and wondered whether her behaviour
was “just a case of political posturing, a pressure tactic that goes beyond the anxieties over the
quantum of Teesta waters to be shared and one which did not pay off?”63
The attitude of the West Bengal Chief Minister was seen as unreasonable in some media reports:
“The Union water resources ministry points out that the upper riparian state will be at an
advantage because four-fifths of the Teesta flows in West Bengal and Sikkim. This is apart from
the bumped-up power supply to West Bengal from dams that will be built in Sikkim to deliver
water to Bangladesh. Mrs. Banerjee isn’t convinced, she also wants to withhold the share of
water Bangladesh will need to keep the river alive.”64
Another report headlined “Mamata botched up water deal” suggested that Mamata had
not protected the interests of the state in any manner. It argued that at present West Bengal used
only 25 per cent of the waters of the Teesta and rest in any case flowed through Bangladesh to
the sea. It quoted a government official suggesting that all the demands of the West Bengal Chief
Minister had been met including language reflecting the fact that only 25 per cent of the water
at the Teesta barrage at Gazaldoba would be shared with Bangladesh and that the rest 25 per
cent will come from regeneration between Gazaldoba and Dalia barrages. The report quoted a
government official as saying:
“‘The nitty-gritty of how we manage the final water flow are not reflected in the text of any
international agreement. In this case, there was a last-minute tweaking to get it reflected in the
agreement because of Banerjee’s demand,’ he said. Still, Mamata chose not to go with the Prime
Minister, halting the agreement altogether.”
“Nothing could outweigh Mamata’s position carved in political consideration of North
Bengal besides her unhappiness with the Centre.”65
Yet another report had exasperated unnamed Water Resources Ministry officials and
political observers in Dhaka slamming the West Bengal Chief Minister for her behaviour:
“‘Frankly, what the West Bengal Chief Minister is saying makes no sense to me. This has
been discussed for years now, and every concern of theirs has been addressed,’ said
a senior Water Resources Ministry official. .... In Dhaka, officials and political observers
slammed Ms. Banerjee’s theatrics as ‘abrupt, inappropriate and unfortunate,’ saying the
48-52 apportionment of the disposable flow of the Teesta was finalised after a series of
confabulations of which she was aware.”66
63 The Dhaka visit that was not to be; The Hindu; September6, 2011.
64 The Hindustan Times; September 8, 2011.
65 Jayant Jacob; Mamata botched up water deal?; Hindustan Times; September 10, 2011.
66 Praveen Swamy and Haroon Habib; Mamata’s objections threaten to unravel PM visit; The Hindu; September 5, 2011.

The Delhi media reports – especially in the newspapers --by and large seemed to be
based on the briefings of Union government officials and were critical of the West Bengal Chief
Minister. There seemed to be a clear divide, therefore, between the Delhi and West Bengal
newspapers – the former biased in favour of the Union government and the latter, in favour of the
West Bengal Chief Minister. However the magazines explained the West Bengal Chief Minister’s
point of view sympathetically.67
A number of media reports have also suggested that the West Bengal Chief Minister was
misled – she was shown one draft to which she agreed and then that was changed. They explain
this as the reason for her anger and the consequent inability of the Union government to reach an
agreement with Bangladesh on sharing of the Teesta waters.68 Some even suggested that false
data had been provided to West Bengal on sharing of the Teesta waters.69
Yet another reason ascribed for the inability of the Union government to sign the Teesta
agreement by the Indian media was lack of adequate consultation. While recognising that “water”
was a state subject in the Indian constitution while “international relations” is the sole responsibility
of the Union government, media reports suggested that for trans-boundary resource sharing
there was need to consult the affected states adequately. Indeed, this is what the Indian Prime
Minister emphasised after it was known that the Teesta Accord would not go through. He told
the media, “Technically, international treaties are in the domain of the Centre. But we have to be
realistic and cannot wish away regional sentiments.”70
Newspapers argued for more discussions.71 One newspaper noted: “There can be no
quarrel with the position that States bordering India’s neighbours must be consulted in framing
bilateral policies with those countries, especially when it comes to sharing crucial natural
resources. New Delhi’s proposed agreement with Bangladesh on a formula to share the waters
of the river Teesta needed to take West Bengal along.”72
Some others claimed the Teesta mishap was the inadequacy of “political communication”
by the Centre:
“A senior Congress leader said, “This is entirely a result of lack of political communication.
Mamata Banerjee is a tough negotiator but she is also, ultimately, reasonable. One has to be very
patient with her and respect her genuine concerns about the fallout of a major agreement on the
people of her state. The government did not bother to invest the time and patience to bring her
on board till the last minute.”73
Lastly, some articles in the media blamed the Centre for not handling the Teesta
negotiations with West Bengal sensitively. Some talked of the West Bengal Chief Minister being
miffed because only an official (National Security Advisor – NSA-- to the Prime Minister) and not a
67 Pranay Sharma and Saleem Samad; Eddies in the Teesta; Outlook; September 19, 2011; and Priya Sahgal and Partha
Dasgupta; CM pours cold water over PM; India Today; September 19, 2011.
68 Mamata Banerjee refuses to go to Dhaka with PM; The Times of India; September 5, 2011; Teesta water agreement
hits choppy waters; Sikkim Express; September 5, 2011; The State opposes still more water for Dhaka; Ananda Bazaar
Patrika; September 5, 2011;Unhappy with the water deal Mamata not going to Bangladesh; Bartaman; September 5,
2011.
69 Unhappy with the water deal Mamata not going to Bangladesh; Bartaman; September 5, 2011.
70 The Hindustan Times; September 6, 2011.
71 More discussions on required: Biman; The Hindu; September 8, 2011.
72 Mamata plays spoiler; Editorial comment; The Hindu; September 6, 2011.
73 Didi dam bursts on Delhi; The Telegraph; September 5, 2011.

senior politician was sent to brief her,74 and that while the foreign ministry should have had a role
in drafting the treaty, that task was taken over by the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO):
“This treaty was not drafted by the foreign ministry; the Prime Minister’s Office took
ownership of the process, with National Security Adviser Shiv Shankar Menon in charge of detail.
He went to Calcutta twice in the last two months solely to brief Mamata on the sharing of Teesta
water. And there lay the problem. It was not a conversation between equals. Menon was adequate
when there was agreement; but when Dhaka wanted more, Calcutta was, inexplicably, kept out of
the loop. Perhaps Menon thought that the pressure of a deadline in high-stakes diplomacy would
persuade Mamata to be more flexible, always a risky manoeuvre. But negotiating with a mercurial
CM were above Menon’s pay grade. A bureaucrat can brief. Only an equal can persuade.”75
“One-upmanship” of the PMO was also a cited by at least one West Bengal newspaper
as the reason for the stalemate on the Teesta agreement. It commented:
“A decision by the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) last year to unseat the ministry of external
affairs (MEA) as the “lead negotiator” in talks with Bangladesh and put itself in the driving seat led
to the stalemate over the Teesta river agreement casting a long shadow over the Prime Minister’s
visit to Dhaka.”76
However, considering that in the recent years it is the PMO which has been in the driving
seat of formulating major foreign policy initiatives, there was no explanation of why one arm of the
government taking a lead over the other had led to a stalemate. What was the guarantee that the
MEA would have been able to convince the West Bengal Chief Minister or that a senior politician
would have done a better job? It would seem that West Bengal Chief Minister’s concerns were
related more to her local political concerns than anything else.
Implication of not reaching a pact on the Teesta: There was considerable discussion
in the Indian media on the impact that the lack of agreement on the sharing of Teesta waters
would have in India and abroad.
The areas of Indian which would suffer as a consequence of not signing the Teesta
agreement were identified by the Indian media as follows:
a) Impact on other India-Bangladesh river water treaties which are yet to be negotiated
b) Impact on India seeking access to Bangladesh ports and transit through Bangladesh
to India’s North-eastern states
c) Impact on India’s international image
d) Impact on India’s claims on rivers originating in China
e) Impact on the basic template that India-Bangladesh relations would have provided for
India’s relationship with its other friendly neighbours
It was argued by various newspapers that the Teesta treaty would have provided a
template to share the waters of the remaining 53 common rivers between India and Bangladesh
– especially the immediate agreement on the sharing of the waters of the Feni River which was to
74 Priya Sahgal and Partha Dasgupta; op.cit.

75 M J Akbar; For a few cusecs more; India Today; September 19, 2011.
76 K P Nayar, op.cit.

be signed along with the one on Teesta.77 It was also argued that India’s attempt to establish basic
principles for negotiating on rivers common between China and India would be adversely affected.78
The media noted how after the failure to come to sign the Teesta Accord, India could not
push Bangladesh on the transit treaty and that as consequence of the Teesta fiasco, India also
did not get permission to use Bangladesh’s southern ports of Chittagong and Mongla.79
Some news reports also noted how India’s image abroad was likely to take a hit after the
Teesta fiasco. Forging closer links with Bangladesh was meant to be a game changer for India’s
attempt at forming a larger Bay of Bengal grouping and closer integration giving its neighbour
greater stake in India’s rise as a global power. Indeed, a newspaper from West Bengal quoted a
senior Indian official saying,” The Dhaka visit is our message to our smaller South Asian neighbours
that India will not be niggardly or tight-fisted in its dealing with them but play a role that behoves
its large size and strong economy.” However, he also noted, “The Bangladeshis are obviously
disappointed. But the delay in the treaty’s signing has its positive side. The common Bangladeshi
will understand how difficult it has been for India to deliver whatever we did. And the treaty, when
it comes about, will taste so much sweeter.”80 There can be little doubt, however, that the mishap
with the Teesta agreement was seen as set back to the larger diplomatic message that India
wanted to send to its neighbours.81
Significantly, some reports in the Indian media also discussed the negative domestic fall-
out of not signing the Teesta Accord on the government in Dhaka, with the Opposition making use
of the fiasco to target the incumbent prime minister82 and the general unhappiness in Bangladesh
over the issue.83
The daily Ittefaque of Dhaka, in a report on 6 September 2011, quoted Rashed Khan
Menon, President of the Bangladesh Workers Party, as saying that the Indian bureaucracy as well
as West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee were responsible for the debacle over the Teesta
waters. He made it clear that had Jyoti Basu, the late chief minister of West Bengal, been around,
Bangladesh’s interests would have been looked at in a deeper way. Khan noted the importance
of strong and stable links between Dhaka and Delhi even as he was clear in his view that the
Manmohan Singh mission to Dhaka had been derailed by Mamata Banerjee.
77 Praveen Swamy and Haroon Habib; Mamata’s objections threaten to unravel PM’s visit; The Hindu; September 5, 2011;
A turbulent tale of two rivers; The Hindu; September 7, 2011;and, Praveen Swamy; Manmohan says Mamata assented
to Teesta Accord: The Hindu; September 8, 2011. Interestingly, even in Bangladesh some observers also saw the Teesta
agreement as something that could be taken forward to reach agreements on the Feni and other common rivers. See, for
example, Gleeful BNP grabs Didi card; The Telegraph; September6, 2011.
78 Praveen Swamy; op.cit.
79 Tiptoe after Teesta dive – River fallout on transit deal; The Telegraph; September 7, 2011; and Some relief comes due to
Manmohan’s hard efforts: Ananda Bazaar Patrika; September 7, 2011.
80 ‘Large-hearted’ message from visit – Delhi sees Dhaka template for ties with other neighbours; The Telegraph; Septem-
ber 9, 2011.
81 Mamata’s decision has hurt nation’s image – CPI(M); The Hindu; September 6, 2011; N Chandramohan,; A river called
Teesta; Hindustan Times; September 8, 2011; and Idiotic self-pride; editorial comment in Ananda Bazaar Patrika;
September 6, 2011.
82 Priya Sahgal and Partha Dasgupta; op.cit.; Zia hard on Hasina, not so on India; The Telegraph; September 8, 2011.
83 Teesta hold-up: ‘Unhappy’ Bangladesh summons Indian envoy; Indian Express; September 6, 2011; and Non-signing of
treaty escalates uneasiness of Dhaka; Ananda Bazaar Patrika; September 6, 2011.

Moving forward on Teesta: The inability to reach an accord on the Teesta was followed
by statements of intent to reach an agreement soon by the leadership of the two countries.84
Bangladesh’s media and commentators felt that India had failed to deliver on its promise of an
interim arrangement to share the Teesta waters. Bangladesh foreign secretary Mijarul Quayes
was quoted by the Indian media as saying as much. In his view, “The answer is very simple.
India informed us that it was no longer prepared to make the deal. If a country backs away from
an agreement due to some unanticipated development, then that country has to shoulder the
responsibility,” said Quayes. However, he also added, “Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina expects to
strike a deal in three months.”85 In other words, hope of a deal in the near future had not been lost.
Even Mamata Banerjee did not rule out the Teesta deal altogether. The media reported
that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had deputed two ministers – minister for rural development
Jairam Ramesh and water resources minister Pawan Kumar Bansa -l to negotiate with Mamata
Banerjee and wanted Mamata and Bansal to go to Dhaka to seal the Teesta Accord. Indeed,
the West Bengal Chief Minister herself said that the deal could be worked out after calculating
the flow of water in the Teesta.86 Even political leaders in Bangladesh such as former President
Hussain Muhammad Ershad were reportedly hopeful of the deal coming through.87
By October, the media was reporting that the Indian Prime Minister’s emissary for the
Teesta negotiations with Mamata Banerjee would be the External Affairs Minister S M Krishna and
that the PM himself was talking to Sikkim Chief Minister Pawan Kumar Chamling on the issue.88
The hopeful mood on the Teesta Accord continued throughout the month of October and when
in the third week of that month, the Bangladesh PM Sheikh Hasina visited the Tin Bigha area,
she told the media, “I am hopeful that the agreement on Teesta water-sharing between India and
Bangladesh will be signed soon. Taratari hoye jabe (It will be signed soon).”89
What is remarkable is that there is no lingering rancour in the media reports after the
Indian prime minister’s visit to Bangladesh and his inability to sign the Teesta agreement. The
hope was that more discussions and consultations with the various stakeholders in India and
some forward planning by West Bengal to finish the Teesta barrage project which would allow
it to utilise the river waters would eventually lead to the deal and that this was only a matter of
time. The Indian prime minister met Mamata and apparently decided to be in constant touch with
her on the Teesta issue and she in turn informed him that she had set up an expert committee
headed by water expert Kalyan Rudra to look into the issue.90
84 PM’s Teesta dismay flows; The Telegraph; September 8, 2011.

85 Teesta text frozen: Bangla; The Telegraph; September 9, 2011.
86 Treaty after measuring Teesta water: CM. Political messenger to convince Mamata; Ananda Bazaar Patrika; September
9, 2011.
87 Treaty inevitable: The Bangladesh maker of Teesta project won’t extinguish hope; Ananda Bazaar Patrika; September
10, 2011.
88 To solve the Teesta deadlock, PM’s messenger is Krishna: Ananda Bazaar Patrika; October 1, 2011.
89 Hasina positive about Teesta pact. Bangladesh PM and team in Tin Bigha; The Telegraph; October 20, 2011.
90 Manmohan meets Mamata on the Bangladesh issue; Ananda Bazaar Patrika; October 23, 2011.

BANGLADESH
During this period, the four major issues that were reflected in media reportage in Bangladesh
were:
• Manmohan’s visit, Bangladesh’s worries
• Expectations from the Indian PM’s visit
• Delay in coming to an agreement on the Teesta Accord
• Dhaka, Delhi to exchange Teesta water-flow data
• No Transit treaty without the Teesta treaty
During this period of analysis one finds that the media, by and large, tried to put the
Teesta water sharing issue in perspective. It noted that India and Bangladesh had been trying to
resolve the question of sharing the waters of the River Teesta for nearly two decades and that the
problem was particularly acute for Bangladesh as it was dependent on water from the Teesta,
especially during the dry season between December and March.
The daily Amar Desh, reporting on the forthcoming visit to Dhaka by the Indian prime
minister, took a rather cynical view of the trip and its possible results. In its view, no one knew
what would transpire from the visit. The newspaper lived up to its anti-government reputation by
describing the role of the Awami League-led administration as mysterious. Besides raising the
Teesta issue, the newspaper drew attention to border incidents and trade imbalance between the
two countries, among other matters. The newspaper was emphatic in its view that a mere river
water sharing deal would not be enough for Bangladesh. A larger approach, especially in terms
of a river basin management deal, was in order.
** http://www.amardeshonline.com/pages/details/2011/09/04/103085
Media reports explained that at times in December and January, the water-flow went
down from 141 cubic meters per second to less than 28 cubic meters per second – they attributed
this to withdrawals by India. They noted the need for a formal arrangement for sharing the river’s
waters and that the talks between the Bangladesh and Indian Foreign Secretaries earlier in June
appeared constructive, with both sides expressing optimism about the progress made. The draft
interim sharing arrangement was to be for a period of 15 years.
The media reports noted that while the issue was virtually settled and was slated to
be signed during Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Dhaka in September, 2011,
some differences remained over the question of the ratio in which the water was to be shared.
Bangladesh apparently was in favour of a 50:50 sharing arrangement, whereas India, it was
reported, had proposed a 45:55 Bangladesh-India split. It had, however, been stressed by both
Bangladesh and Indian officials that this difference in positions of the two countries would not
prevent a resolution of the deal – it was likely to be resolved in high level negotiations in the run
up to Prime Minister Singh’s visit.
There were some reports, however, which suggested that Bangladesh’s interests had
not been protected in the framework agreement reached. Amar Desh reported Professor Sadrul
Amin, Dean of Dhaka University, as saying that “our country’s interest has not been protected
at all in the framework agreement. Looking at the agreement, it seems that it has not been
accomplished between two independent countries.” He said, the Foreign (Policy) Adviser to the

Prime Minister also acknowledged that there had not been any discussion on the framework
even in the Cabinet. Nothing of the agreed framework, he claimed, had been shared with the
people. Therefore, he argued, it would not be acceptable to the people. Expressing concern over
the transit and Teesta water treaties, he was reported as saying that while Bangladesh wanted
friendship with India, it must get its due share of the Teesta waters. While that remained in doubt,
he claimed that there were indications that transit rights would be given to India in any case91.
However, the overall atmosphere of confidence about resolving the Teesta issue was
reflected in the media which saw in the potential agreement a new beginning – setting the
stage for comprehensive water sharing agreements covering all 54 common rivers. An equitable
sharing of the Teesta waters, it was explained in media reports, would also contribute to future
water security in Bangladesh.
The Bangladesh media noted that the Chief Minister of West Bengal, Mamata Banerjee,
had made the prospect of an agreement on the sharing of the Teesta waters somewhat uncertain.
The Teesta Accord, the media reported, might not be signed during the visit of the Indian Prime
Minister to Dhaka in the first week of September 2011 as the Government of India had not been
able to resolve the differences over the sharing of the waters of the Teesta with Ms. Banerjee. She
had in fact opted out of the Prime Minister’s entourage to Dhaka because she did not agree with
the two countries sharing the waters of the Teesta equally during the lean season.
The media reflected the disappointment in Bangladesh on the inability of the two
countries to sign the Teesta Accord. After all, when the two Prime Ministers had met in Delhi, the
deal was very much on the cards. The Teesta Accord was of critical importance to Bangladesh.
Not signing the agreement because of his domestic compulsions punctured the hype associated
with the Indian Prime Minister’s visit to Dhaka. The Indian press was quoted to say that Ms.
Banerjee had decided to oppose the accord as she believed that it did not serve the interests of
her state. Even the Indian Prime Minister had expressed his frustration to the press at not being
able to sign the Teesta Accord because of Ms. Banerjee’s opposition.92 Disappointed government
officials in Dhaka were quoted in news reports as claiming that the accord would be signed within
three months or at the latest by March 2012.
The imminent arrival of the Indian Prime Minister, once the Teesta water-sharing treaty
became uncertain, failed to evoke much enthusiasm in Bangladesh. Indeed, people seemed
apprehensive and worried. This was evident in the headline of daily Amar Desh – “Indian Prime
Minister Monmohan Singh Visits Dhaka Soon, Bangladesh Looks Worried”. The news report
claimed that nobody knew what was going to happen and that the Bangladesh government’s
role remained “mysterious” in settling bilateral issues. The newspaper claimed that everybody
was in the dark about the future of the Teesta water sharing treaty, the issues relating to the
India-Bangladesh border, including the killings on the border, minimizing the Indo-Bangla trade
imbalance, and the other issues which protect the interest of Bangladesh, that last bit including
transit. Expressing apprehension, the newspaper quoted experts in its criticism of the hesitant
way in which India was moving on bilateral issues and predicted that the consequences would
not be very good for Bangladesh. Indeed, the newspaper went to the extent of insinuating that
92 The embarrassment of the visit; The Daily Star, September 9, 2011; and Mamata was never ignored; The Daily Star,
September 24, 2011. www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=203721

the two persons deputed to look after these issues by the government in Dhaka were not public
representatives – in effect, questioning their credibility and accountability.93
The blame game then began in earnest. Expressing concern, security expert Major
General (Retired) Syed Muhammad Ibrahim told Amar Desh that not only the people of
Bangladesh, but also a major section of the party in power had been kept in the dark about the
details of the ensuing Dhaka visit of Dr. Manmohan Singh and the different treaties that were
to be signed. He was reported as saying that the people of Bangladesh were waiting to see
what India did with regard to sharing of the Teesta waters, stopping of drug trafficking, resolving
other border problems and minimizing the trade imbalance. He expressed the apprehension that
Bangladesh would be “cheated” in all these areas and demanded that the prime minister provide
details of these treaties to the public before they were signed with India. He used the fact of the
Prime Minister of India being accompanied by the chief ministers of the Indian states bordering
Bangladesh to claim that while the Indian side was preparing for the visit in an inclusive manner
by trying to take all stakeholders on board, that was not the case in Bangladesh. He alleged that
Dr. Moshiur Rahman, Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister, Dr. Gaohor Rizvi, Foreign Affairs
Adviser to the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister herself were doing whatever pleased them
– making the process of engaging with India non-inclusive.94
Eminent intellectual and political analyst Farhad Mazhar was reported as saying that the
visit of Manmohan Singh would not achieve much. He was of the view that no treaty in the interest
of Bangladesh would be signed during the visit. And even if a treaty were signed, he argued that
it would not be wise to expect that Bangladesh was getting much. He also pointed out that India
had signed many treaties with Bangladesh in the past, but they were not implemented.95
The English language daily New Age reported on 8 September that India might put off
a Teesta deal for a long period of time. Quoting experts, it claimed that India, which had kept
the decision on sharing the waters of the Teesta River pending for about six decades, might
now take several years more to sign the deal. The research director of the Bangladesh Institute
of Development Studies, K A S Murshid, was quoted as saying that keeping the signing of
the Teesta agreement pending ‘is a setback’, from which Bangladesh might have to suffer for
several years more. Professor Delwar Hossain of the Department of International Relations in
Dhaka University said in the same report that the decision to not sign the Teesta agreement was
a “drama” enacted by India that ‘will cast a shadow’ on bilateral relations and that “signing the
Teesta agreement is a big challenge for the governments as relations between the two countries
generally remain strained.” Hossain said that “officially linking” the decision of not signing
the Teesta deal and the decision on the transit deal “is dangerous in diplomatic culture”. He
demanded that the government explain why the two issues had been linked. He held that it was
the Indian government’s responsibility to make things clear as its trustworthiness had come under
question.96
96 http://www.google.com.bd/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0CCoQFjAA&url=http%3A
%2F%2Fnewagebd.com%2Fnewspaper1%2Farchive_details.php%3Fdate%3D2011-0907%26nid%3D32437&ei=uKUH
UdLYBI2wiQfF24HYAw&usg=AFQjCNHZVJr8lHo_H3MFUvgGf3RcDtJRsg&bvm=bv.41524429,d.aGc

The main opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), expressed its
frustration at the failure to reach a Teesta accord as well as agreements on water-sharing in the
other common rivers. The BNP chairperson, former prime minister Khaleda Zia, demanded a
solution to all the problems related to water sharing in the common rivers. Stating that this problem
had not been solved since long, Zia expressed the hope that the solution to the problem related
to a sharing of the waters of the common rivers would be resolved through discussion. In reply,
Manmohan Singh informed Begum Zia that he would take measures to resolve the problem of
sharing of water of the common rivers soon.97
However, this was to become a major political issue in the days to come. This was
evident in the political speeches of the Opposition leaders. Addressing a large rally at Lalmonirhat,
Begum Khaleda Zia , the leader of the opposition in parliament, said the government had failed
to realise a single drop of water from Teesta and the Indians said bluntly they would not give
water. “If they [India] refuse to give Bangladesh its share of Teesta water, let them know that they
would not enjoy transit. Nothing can go on unilaterally,” she told the government. She, in effect,
demanded that all trade and transit to India should be stopped if India did not give Bangladesh
its share of Teesta waters.98
In the daily Ittefaq, the President of Bangladesh Workers Party Rashed Khan bemoaned
the lack of neighbourly feeling towards Bangladesh in the Indian bureaucracy and in the political
leadership of West Bengal. He squarely blamed India’s National Security Advisor, Shiv shankar
Menon and the Chief Minister of West Bengal Ms. Mamata Benarjee for scuttling the Teesta
treaty. He told journalists that the mentality of the bureaucracy of India was of not allowing any
concession with regard to sharing of water of the common rivers and that this had become an
obstacle in sharing of the waters of the Teesta. Ms. Mamata Benarjee, he claimed, had also
failed to appreciate the interests of Bangladesh. He lamented the absence of the late Comrade
Joti Basu, the former chief minister of West Bengal, from the scene – saying that he certainly
would have appreciated the interests of Bangaldesh and the necessity of sharing the Teesta
waters in a fair manner. It was necessary, he argued, to feel neighbourly relationship between
the two countries. But because of the bureaucracy of India and Mamata Banerjee, that had not
happened. As a result, the success of the visit of Manmohan has fizzled out, he claimed.99
The media also reported that although Ms. Mamata Banerjee met Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh after his return from Dhaka, her stance on sharing the Teesta waters remained
unchanged. Reports suggested that despite the pressure tactics of the West Bengal government,
India was still keen on pushing the Teesta Accord and to this end was making continuous efforts
to build domestic political consensus. The media reported the assurance of Indian External
Affairs Minister S M Krishna who assured Bangladesh that India remained committed to an early
resolution of the Teesta water-sharing issue.
There was considerable reporting of the meeting between Bangladesh Foreign Minister
Dipu Moni and Ms. Mamata Banerjee in Kolkata. The media reported that while the discussions
98 http://www.google.com.bd/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0CCoQFjA
A&url=http%3A%2F%2Fnewagebd.com%2Fnewspaper1%2Farchive_details.php%3Fdate%3D2012-02-
27%26nid%3D51783&ei=ZagHUejwF_CjiAfK3oHwDQ&usg=AFQjCNE5aff3IwY0_jJ2zkrRUkkz2vxW7g&bvm=bv.41
524429,d.aGc
99 Daily Ittefaq, September 6, 2011

in Kolkata had cleared the ‘misunderstanding’ to some extent, the uncertainties about the
prospect of the signing the Teesta Accord soon seemed bleak. This was because, the media
noted, although the West Bengal Chief Minister spoke eloquently about the need to improve
Indo-Bangladesh ties, she
Media reports noted that continuing his efforts to get the West Bengal Chief Minister
on board for the Teesta Accord, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh sent Foreign Secretary
Ranjan Mathai to meet her. However, it was reported that Banerjee continued to hold on to her
hard-line position, although the Foreign Secretary described the meeting as having been “fruitful”.
Two news sites -- banglanews24 com and bdnews24.com -- reported on that, Mamata Banerjee
wanted 75 per cent of the Teesta waters for West Bengal and that she pulled out of the Indian
prime minister’s official visit at the eleventh hour. These two online media sites also quoted what
foreign secretary Mr. Mijarul Quayes had made very clear—that “it was Delhi’s duty to tackle
Mamata not Dhaka’s.”
The daily Amar Desh quoted Kolkata daily Ganoshokti saying that it was not possible
to give more than 25 per cent of the Teesta waters to Bangladesh. She was quoted as saying
that although she had good relations with Sheikh Hasina, the prime minister of Bangladesh, she
could not act in favour of Bangladesh by denying the interests of West Bengal. International
river expert and professor of law at Dhaka University, Asif Nazrul said in Amar Desh: “We are
being told about the treaty on sharing of water of Teesta. According to the statement given by
our Water Development Board, historically it has been found that during the dry season, 14,000
cusecs of water are available in the Teesta. We should get half the water. That means, our due
share is 7,000 cusecs of water. If, following the treaty, we get water less than 7,000 cusecs, then
the interest of Bangladesh will not be protected”. He argued that it would not be wise at all to
allow transit to India unless the issues related to Bangladesh’s interest -- i.e. getting its due share
of water, resolution of the border problems including stoppage of border killing, minimizing trade
imbalance etc. are resolved”.100
Some other reports said that the West Bengal Chief Minister felt that the friendship with
Bangladesh could not be “at the expense of water or land” – implying that she had reservation on
both the Teesta Accord as well as the exchange of enclaves in adverse possession on the border.
The media also reported that India and Bangladesh would exchange data on water-flow
and water availability in the Teesta. The Daily Star reported that Dhaka would ask Delhi for 15
years’ data on water availability on the Teesta and that Delhi had also asked for similar data. There
were reports that the two countries were likely to exchange the river-flow data before the next
Joint River Commission meeting. 101
There was a general sense of despondency that now that an important opportunity had
been missed, the Teesta deal may not be signed for a long time to come. This was reflected in
the headline which appeared eight months after the Indian Prime Minister’s visit in the New Age
proclaiming -- “Teesta water sharing deal not on the horizon”. It argued that as more time went
by it became clearer that the Teesta accord was being put on the backburner and that it may
101 What happened to Teesta water? The New Age, October 5, 2011; and Dhaka-Delhi to assess waters, The Daily Star,
September 30, 2011.

eventually slide into oblivion irrespective of the fact that the issue was pressing and of immense
consequence for Bangladesh.102
The New Age also reported that in an exchange of views with newspaper editors, Pranab
Mukherjee, a top minister and policymaker of the ruling Congress party, blamed “ground realities”
such as lack of absolute majority of the ruling party for the failure of the Indian government to
seal the Teesta water-sharing deal. “In a democracy such as ours,” he said, “this process often
becomes time consuming.” Pranab termed the issue “sensitive” . Similarly, Indian water resources
minister Pawan Kumar Bansal, emerging from a meeting with Bangladesh foreign minister in New
Delhi in early May, said that India was putting in efforts to reach an internal consensus on sharing
Teesta water with Bangladesh and he was optimistic about positive results.103
Bangladesh, however, kept up the pressure for an agreement on the Tessta issue.
The media reported that Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina had requested her Indian
counterpart, Manmohan Singh, on November10, 2011, to expedite the signing of an agreement
on equitable sharing of the Teesta waters. She voiced the request at a meeting with Singh on
the sidelines of the 17th SAARC Summit in the Maldives, a senior official at the Prime Minister’s
Office told the New Age.104 However, a general sense of disappointment and despondency was
all pervading at not having achieved what at one point seemed within easy grasp.

During the period under consideration, the major reportage in Bangladeshi media covered the
factual position on the Teesta water-sharing issue and the need for Delhi to take urgent steps to
seal the Teesta Accord. The reportage also underlined that while Delhi and Dhaka were on the
same page on Teesta Accord, West Bengal was intent on reading a different text.
The media reportage was largely based on facts and on information provided by experts
and the concerned political leaders – all emphasising the importance of sharing the waters of
Teesta for Bangladesh as well as India. While a few of the reports quoted environmentalists, most
of them did not bother to consult Bangladeshi river experts and did not situate Teesta water-
sharing in the broader context of the environmental crisis being faced by Bangladesh.
Some reports such as one in The Daily Star105 quoted an expert, Dr. Fakhrul Islam of
Rajashahi University saying at a conference on “Framework for Cooperation on South Asian
Trans-boundary Water” that 21 million people in Bangladesh depended on the waters of the
Teesta while the number was only eight million in India. And yet, he was quoted as saying that,
India kept around 85 per cent of the Teesta waters during the lean period. He also claimed that
the flow in the Teesta had not crossed 6,000 cusecs in the lean period between 1993 and 1999
at Dalia Barrage in Bangladesh and because of this the lives of the people of Rangpur area in
Bangladesh where 70 per cent of them live below the poverty line, were seriously affected.
Most of the sources used, however, were identified and the reports were by and large
fact- based. Although some of the reports and comments in the media suggested that India had
failed to deliver on its promise of signing the Teesta water-sharing agreement and reflected the
disappointment in Bangladesh, the framework of reporting, however, remained co-operative and
never became confrontational.
102 Teesta water sharing deal not on the horizon, The New Age, May 16, 2012
103 http://www.newagebd.com/detail.php?date=2012-05-16&nid=10373#.URuCy_JaeSo
104 http://newagebd.com/newspaper1/archive_details.php?date=2011-11-10&nid=39601
105 Teesta Water-Bangladesh must get its due share, The Daily Star, October 12, 2012.

TEESTA REPORTAGE: NOVEMBER 2011 TO AUGUST 2012
INDIA
The media reportage in India in this period focused mainly on five issues:
1. India’s attempt to hasten the Teesta pact
2. Bangladesh pressure on India to finalise the Teesta pact
3. Defence of West Bengal’s position on the sharing of the Teesta waters
4. Fallout of not signing the Teesta pact in Bangladesh
5. Lessons learnt by Delhi after its inability to sign the Teesta pact
There seemed to be a broad consensus in Delhi that India’s inability to sign the Teesta Accord had
become a stumbling block in taking the relationship with Bangladesh forward. This led to a flurry of
visits to West Bengal by officials and ministers from Delhi as well as exchanges of diplomatic visits
with Bangladesh in a bid to somehow help hasten the deal. There was also diplomatic pressure
from Bangladesh to somehow seal the pact as early as possible. This was amply reflected in the
media reportage – both in the Delhi-based as well as the Kolkata-based newspapers.
What was remarkable was that during this period there was hardly any note of
confrontation evident in the media reportage except the occasional opinion piece or editorial
comment blaming either the Union government or the West Bengal Chief Minister for the positions
taken. The reportage also reflected a relatively greater understanding than in the earlier period of
the importance of consulting Border States on trans-boundary resource sharing. However, there
seemed to be no resolution in the media of how to balance the need of taking bold foreign policy
initiatives – a subject in the domain of the Union government – and the international sharing of
those resources which fall within the purview of state governments in the Indian Constitution.
It is perhaps a bit unfair to expect the media to resolve this contentious issue. It is still an
emerging issue in Indian polity and a Constitutional resolution has not been attempted as yet.
However, sooner or later the Indian state will have to deal with it as more such issues
might arise – e.g. with the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly tentatively questioning the
Indus Water Treaty with Pakistan in which the state government had no role to play at all. These
could involve rationalising international boundaries by exchanging or giving away land from a Border
State or with international sharing of natural resources – such as natural gas and minerals where
underground deposits might exist in a continuous reservoir or seams across international boundaries.
Pushing the Teesta process forward: The intention to push the process of finalising
the Teesta pact was evident in the statements emanating from both India and Bangladesh.
Several emissaries went from Delhi to Kolkata to brief Mamata Banerjee on the Teesta Accord
– ranging from officials of the Ministry of Water Resources, the Prime Minister’s Office, and the
Indian Foreign Secretary to the Water Resources minister himself.106
106 Delhi official meets Bengal chief secretary, talks Teesta: The Times of India; May4, 2012; PMO team to visit Kolkata, dis-
cuss Teesta water-sharing; The Times of India; April 30, 2012;Mathai meets Mamata, discusses ties with neighbours; The
Hindu; February 19, 2012;Foreign Secretary meets Mamata; Ananda Bazaar Patrika; February 19, 2012;Centre eager
to get Mamata’s approval in the Teesta issue; Ananda Bazaar Patrika; May 5, 2012; Before Bangladesh sets for election,
Centre is eager to take Mamata into confidence and sign the Teesta treaty; Bartaman; May 5, 2012.

Diplomatic visits were also exchanged between India and Bangladesh. A meeting of
the Joint Rivers Commission was held in February 2012 in Kolkata taking on board some West
Bengal government officials107; the first Indo-Bangladesh joint consultative commission was held
in May 2012108 ; the Foreign minister of Bangladesh Dipu Moni visited Kolkata and New Delhi and
was reportedly upbeat about the Teesta Accord after her meetings;109 Indian Finance Minister
Pranab Mukherjee visited Dhaka “to inject a new dynamism” in to the relationship;110 Indian
Rural Development Minister Jairam Ramesh visited Dhaka and assured his hosts that the Teesta
Accord would become a reality soon111. In each instance, assurances were given to Dhaka that
the Teesta Accord will be hastened.
After nearly a year of trying to hasten the process, even former Bangladesh president
and now the leader of an Opposition party, Hussain Muhammad Ershad went on record to say
that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had told him that the Teesta Accord would happen soon.
“There is no doubt that it will help the Bangladesh government to see the deal on paper. I am
hopeful something will happen before our general election and your general election in 2014,”
he told an Indian newspaper.112 Some hopeful Indian and Bangladeshi newspapers thought the
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton might be able to convince the West Bengal Chief Minister to
share the Teesta waters with Bangladesh.113
The media also kept the Teesta accord in the news through editorial comments and
opinion pieces on the edit page. Newspapers advised the government for the “expeditious
ratification of the land boundary agreement and settlement of the important Teesta issue”114 and
declared in a direct reference to West Bengal’s objections that “while federalism is indeed a
fundamental pillar of the Constitution, it shouldn’t be misused for scoring political points.”115
Another editorial squarely blamed the West Bengal Chief Minister for torpedoing an
improvement of relations with Bangladesh, saying:
“Banerjee’s refusal then did kill a splendid opportunity for India to bring bilateral ties to
the next logical level. That treaty is politically and economically important not only for Hasina —
who has been outspokenly friendly with India — but also for India to secure transit rights through
Bangladesh, which would cut time and distance from the Indian mainland to the Northeast.”116
The same newspaper, a month later, again criticised the Union Indian government for not
pushing the Teesta Accord towards conclusion despite West Bengal’s objections:
“Banerjee deserves much blame for wrecking one of India’s most consequential foreign
policy initiatives; but not all. Last September, Singh had the option of signing the Teesta waters
107 Sandeep Dikshit; India, Bangladesh to resume talks on Teesta treaty; The Hindu; February 10, 2012.
108 India, Bangladesh to hold first joint consultative commission; The Times of India; May 6, 2012.
109 Dipu Moni upbeat on inking of Teesta pact; The Hindu; April 30, 2012. Teesta accord to be signed, hopes Moni , bang
lanews24.com.
110 Haroon Habib; Pranab’s Bangladesh visit to inject new dynamism to talks; The Hindu; May 1, 2012.
111 India committed to Teesta treaty, land accord with Bangladesh; The Hindu; August 10, 2012.
112 Rudroneel Ghosh; Hussain Muhammad Ershad: There’s been no large migration from Bangladesh to India; The Times
of India; August 20, 2012.
113 Teesta pact may be on agenda at Hillary-Mamata meeting; The Times of India; May 7, 2012. Hillary to raise Teesta water
issue with Mamata, May 7, 2012, BDNews24
114 Moving closer; Editorial comment; The Times of India; February 27, 2012
115 Federal fetish; The Times of India; February 24, 2012.
116 Undo Dhaka damage; Editorial comment; The Indian Express; February 6, 2012.

treaty, disprove Banerjee’s false arguments, and explain the larger stakes in improving relations
with Bangladesh to the people of India, including those in West Bengal and the north-eastern
states. Instead, Singh pulled back, citing India’s federalism and coalition politics. By law, Delhi has
absolute monopoly over the conduct of foreign policy and the negotiation of treaties, including
those on sharing waters that flow across the borders. What it lacks today is the courage of
conviction and the political will to lead. Signing the Teesta accord and defending India’s national
interests vis-a-vis Dhaka might improve the Congress’s leverage with Banerjee a lot more than
Delhi’s unending appeasement of Kolkata.”117
Newspaper columnists advised the government to make use of the “opportune phase”
in India-Bangladesh relations and not hide behind seeking consensus to sign the Teesta pact
going to the extent of suggesting that “the Centre’s insistence on building consensus with states
like West Bengal t implement treaties with Bangladesh needs to be tempered. For, there is
already a perception in Dhaka that New Delhi’s overtures are self-serving.”118 A former Indian
High Commissioner to Bangladesh warned in an interview that “the failure to do so has spun an
unfortunate India assured to fulfil promise rash of conspiracy theories in Bangladesh...it’s essential
experts from both sides quickly get back to the drawing board and work towards finalising the
agreement.” 119
The broad point is the Indian media was not taking a so-called nationalist line, or a
regional line, to argue that the Teesta pact should not be signed. In fact, it seemed to define
“national interest” as taking the relationship with Bangladesh to the next higher level by quickly
signing the Teesta Accord.
Bangladesh pressure to finalise Teesta Accord: While recognising the difficulties of
New Delhi, Dhaka’s continuous pressure for to seal the Teesta Accord was another major issue
reported by the media in the aftermath of the Indian Prime Minister’s visit to Bangladesh. In the
national media, especially the English language media in New Delhi, this was never reported in
a confrontationist manner. It was almost always done in a neutral manner – that there was an
unfinished agenda item of India-Bangladesh relations which needed to be addressed.120 Only
rarely does one find a confrontational framework in reporting on the Teesta issue in this period.121
Indeed, the media in India noted that not signing the Teesta accord remained a sore point
in India-Bangladesh relations. In fact, it quoted the Bangladesh foreign minister sympathetically:
“‘It is a fact that Bangladesh was looking forward to the Teesta water treaty, and people
were disappointed. All the other achievements, and there were many, were overshadowed during
that visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Bangladesh has taken the initiative of making itself
a hub of connectivity, everybody will benefit from it, Nepal, Bhutan, along with India... and also
117 Engaging Dhaka; The Indian Express; May 7, 2012

118 Rudroneel Ghosh; Goodwill on the line; The Times of India; February 15, 2012.
119 “No agreement with Dhaka ca succeed without West Bengal”, Interview with Veena Sikri, Former High Commissioner
to Bangladesh; The Times of India; May 4, 2012.
120 Bangla willing to give India time to seal Teesta, land boundary pacts: The Times of India; July 25, 2012. India, Bangladesh
to hold first joint consultative commission; The Times of India; May 6, 2012. India, Bangladesh to resume talks on Teesta
today; The Hindu; February 10, 2012. Sandeep Dikshit; Revive liberation spirit, Bangladesh tells West Bengal; The Hindu;
February 13, 2012. Dipu Moni upbeat on inking of Teesta pact; The Hindu; April 30, 2012. Pranay Sharma; Just water in
the works; Outlook; May 21, 2012. Dhaka increasing pressure on Delhi over Teesta Accord; Ananda Bazaar Patrika; May
8, 2012. Dipu again puts pressure over the enclaves and Teesta treaty; Ananda Bazaar Patrika; May 9, 2012.
121 Dipu Moni will meet Mamata to discuss Teesta; Ananda Bazaar Patrika; November 16, 2011.

Myanmar. I believe these things do not happen overnight. We do new agreements, but we have
to build on those. I would not say that it is an issue (Teesta) but when you are satisfied and happy
you move better,’ Bangladeshi foreign minister Dipu Moni said on Sunday.”122
It was often clear that the eagerness of Bangladesh to seal the Teesta agreement was
not seen so much as pressure but a genuine attempt to boost the relationship. This is remarkable
as in the context of the other neighbours of India nationalism often overtakes neutral reporting:
“Bangladesh has asked India to invoke the spirit of cooperation and friendship witnessed during
its war of liberation in 1971 with respect to the stalled Teesta water-sharing treaty, in order to
move forward on all other fronts such as transit from mainland India to its northeast States.”123
And again:
“Returning to the theme of the Teesta Treaty and reaching out to Ms. Banerjee, Dr. Moni
referred to the several commonalities between Bangladesh and West Bengal.
“Whatever we do, we would like to see the bond of 1971 in all our exchanges. There are
obvious expectations and we are very happy to see a woman at the helm in West Bengal. At the
same time we have many, many issues [that are pending]. We are sure we will do them [resolve]
in the same spirit.”124
One can see that this is empathetic reportage and a fair representation of Bangladesh’s
point of view. This is also evident in the following excerpt from a report of the Bangladesh prime
minister meeting an Indian delegation in Dhaka:
“Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has voiced her strong resolve to work
together with India for mutual development but insisted that the neighbour needs to quickly move
forward on some issues. .....
“‘India needs to move forward quickly on some pending issues so that the two countries
can work to implement the agreed decisions,’ said the Premier. She made the remarks when a
16-member delegation comprising Chief Minister of Meghalaya Mukul Sangma and Chief Minister
of Arunachal Nabam Tuki met her on Thursday. She also told the delegation that there is a high
expectation about the Teesta water-sharing deal to be signed soon. Cooperation is the only way
to tap the potentials of both the countries for mutual benefit in this globalised world, said the
Bangladesh leader.”125
Yet another example of this came from the reporting in a prominent magazine:
“‘Bilateral relations will take a huge hit if India fails to deliver on the Teesta agreement,’
says Bangladesh foreign minister Dipu Moni. Similar concerns are raised by others in both
capitals, some even questioning if India has begun to lose the plot in Bangladesh.
“Altamash Kabir, editor of Sangbad, Bangladesh’s oldest Bengali daily, says relations
between the two countries have never been warmer than what they are now. “But non-delivery of
the Teesta agreement has raised questions about the willingness or ability of India to deliver
122 Mohua Chatterjee; Teesta accord remains sore point in Indo-Bangla ties; February 13, 2012.
123 Sandeep Dikshit; Revive liberation spirit, Bangladesh tells West Bengal; The Hindu; February 13, 2012.
124 Ibid.
125 Haroon Habib; Hasina expresses resolve to work together with India on pending issue; The Hindu; June 1, 2012.

on promises and the extent to which it is committed to ensure an equal and mutually beneficial
relationship with Bangladesh,” he told Outlook.”126
That Bangladesh was upset at West Bengal for a throwing a spanner in the works was
also hinted at by the Indian media when Prime Minister Hasina declined an invitation to attend
the convocation of Calcutta University. However, here too Dhaka’s version was presented which
claimed that nothing much should be read into this:
“Experts within the political circles believe the reason for her cancelling the visit is because
of the West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee’s last minute backing out of the Indo-Bangla
Teesta Water Treaty.
“The Bangladesh PM visited Tripura last month and refused to come to our state now.
This is a clear indication as to how the new government has failed to keep a cordial relationship
with Bangladesh,” said a senior CPI(M) leader.
“Meanwhile, the Urban Development Minister Firhaad Hakim, defended the government
saying, “She is unable to make it due to time constraint and nothing else should be speculated.
And it will definitely not affect the relationship between the two countries.”127
The pressure that the Sheikh Hasina government faced was also appreciated in the
media, while alleging that Mamata Banerjee was up to nothing more than sheer blackmail and
political opportunism – one cannot get a more pro-Dhaka view than that. Here is a sample:
“Mamata Banerjee’s intervention, seemingly driven by a dual desire to blackmail New
Delhi for funds and weaken the Congress Party’s hold on North Bengal, has left Indian officials in
cold sweat. With Bangladesh going to the polls, all that has been negotiated is at risk. Bangladeshi
foreign minister Dipu Moni is privately believed to have pushed for deep-sixing the entire India
policy, but Sheikh Hasina continues to hold the line.”128
In short, if there was pressure from Bangladesh on India to do something about pushing
the Teesta Accord forward, it was not seen by the Indian media as illegitimate and it was reported
sympathetically.
Defence of West Bengal’s position on the sharing of the Teesta waters: During
this period one does not find a very vocal defence of the West Bengal Chief Minister’s position
in the media, except for an occasional article advocating hard-line position on water with all
neighbours of India. This kind of ultra-nationalist point of view appeared in The Times of India.129
It argued:
“India’s 1996 Ganges treaty with Bangladesh guarantees minimum cross-border flows
in the dry season - a new principle in international water law. In fact, the treaty almost equally
divides the downstream Ganges flows between the two countries. Because of that precedent,
India seems now ready to reserve almost half of the Teesta River waters for Bangladesh in what
will be the world’s first treaty of the 21st century.”
126 Pranay Sharma; Just water in the works; Outlook; May 21, 2012.
127 Hasina turns down CU invitation; The Indian Express; February 13, 2012.
128 Jayanth Jacob and Pramit Pal Chaudhuri; Stuck at a turn; Hindustan Times; April 19, 2012.
129 Brahma Chellaney; Misplaced water diplomacy; The Times of India; July 3, 2012.

The article even suggested that despite Water being a state-subject and not a federal
issue in the Indian Constitution, “Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has sought to strong-arm West
Bengal into accepting a Teesta rover treaty on terms dictated by New Delhi”. The article argued
that India ought not to expect China to follow the principle of sharing river waters equally with
India, a downstream country from many rivers originating in China, as Beijing believed in unilateral
action! It concluded:
“Generosity in diplomacy can yield rich dividends if it is part of a strategically geared
outreach designed to ameliorate the regional security situation so that India can play a larger
global role. But if it is not anchored in the fundamentals of international relations - including
reciprocity and leverage building - India risks accentuating its tyranny of geography, even as it is
left holding the bag.”
This hard-line advice to the government suggested that its water diplomacy with
Bangladesh was neither strategically sound -- without actually demonstrating this proposition –
nor was it anchored in the fundamentals of internationals relations.
The West Bengal Chief Minister defended her position on Teesta claiming that she had
received a mandate from the people and that she would not betray them.130 This was clearly not
true as Teesta was not an election issue when she won a majority in the state legislature.
Fallout of not signing the Teesta pact in Bangladesh: The Indian media seemed
deeply aware of the domestic consequences of India’s inability to seal the Teesta pact for
Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. Media reports argued that India was keen “to arrest
the slide in Awami League’s popularity” and that signing the Teesta agreement would have gone
“a long way in correcting the perception in Bangladesh that Hasina has not managed any major
concessions from India”.131 It also reported that Bangladesh would have been able to move forward
on several other bilateral issues as the Teesta pact would have changed the perception of the people
of that country,132 as a sizeable population of Bangladesh remained sceptical of India’s intentions.133
Primarily two distinct fallouts were seen in Bangladesh of not signing the Teesta pact:
One, strengthening of the anti-India rhetoric in that country and putting a question mark over
India’s trustworthiness;134 and strengthening the political adversaries of Sheikh Hasina’s Awami
League government.135 One such report noted in unequivocal terms:
“For Bangladesh, the issue still rankles. And it is now becoming a major stumbling block
in strengthening India-Bangladesh ties. In the process, it has also allowed Hasina’s political
detractors to unite against a top priority of her foreign policy agenda—reaching out and improving
ties with New Delhi.”136
Yet another commentator said: “The current dispensation in Bangladesh is on friendly
terms with India. But if the issue remains unresolved, the Opposition parties could rally around
130 Outlook, May 28 2012.

131 Possible regime change in Bangladesh triggers terror worries for Northeast; The Times of India; August 30, 2012.
132 Mohua Chatterjee; Teesta accord remains sore point in Indo-Bangla ties; The Times of India; February 13, 2012
133 Joyeeta Bhattacharjee; op.cit. Coup bid by fanatics foiled: Bangla Army. Mastermind with anti-India history; The Tel-
egraph; January 20, 2012.
134 Joyeeta Bhattacharjee; Pouring cold water on neighbourly ties; Hindustan Times; February 24, 2012.
135 Haroon Habib; Putting down the burden of borders; The Hindu; February 10, 2012. Haroon Habib; No alternative to bold
steps; The Hindu; May 17, 2012.
136 Pranay Sharma; Just water in the works; Outlook; May 21, 2012.

the anti-‘big brother’ sentiment and return to power.”137 This sentiment was echoed by others too
who argued that the failure of New Delhi to keep succumbing to Kolkata’s pressure on Teesta will
help the political opponents of the Awami League in the 2013 general elections in Bangladesh
when the race was expected to be close.138 It was argued that for this reason New Delhi was
keen to conclude the Teesta pact before the next General Election in Bangladesh.139
Some commentators pointed out the consequences of the internal changes in
Bangladesh on India. They suggested that should the Teesta pact be a moth-eaten one rather
than a generous one, the next government in Dhaka may not uphold whatever else had been
agreed to with the present government.140
Lessons learnt by Delhi after its inability to sign the Teesta pact: The two lessons learnt in
the aftermath of the inability of India to sign the Teesta agreement were: One, the Chief Minister
of West Bengal seemed to have realised that she has to develop a factual data base to support
her state’s claims on its share of Teesta waters; and two, the Union government decided that it
should think of ways to avoid the recurrence of such an embarrassment in the future by giving
the states affected by trans-boundary sharing of rivers a consultative role before negotiating an
international agreement.
Mamata Banerjee, therefore, appointed a panel of experts headed by Kalyan Rudra to
advise her on the flow of water in the river and said that she would go by the advice she received.
The chairman of the panel of experts appointed by her said that the solution lay in a solution
based on science. He is reported to have said: “I have been appointed by the Chief Minister
to advise her on the issue and I am working on a solution based on science which should be
mutually acceptable and I hope it will satisfy both the countries.”141 Although the expert panel
was expected to submit its report by the end of December 2011, there is were some report in
the media whether this deadline was met and that the report was to be submitted by the end
of January 2012142. However, although the report is believed to have been submitted, there has
been total silence in the media about its contents and recommendations.
The other outcome of her intransigence on sharing of Teesta waters was that the Draft
Water Policy formulated by the government envisaged “consultative association with riparian
states” while negotiating deals in the case of trans-boundary rivers. The draft policy document
said: “Negotiations over sharing and management of water of international rivers should be
done on a bilateral basis in consultative association with riparian states, keeping paramount
national interest in mind” and asked the government to establish appropriate mechanism for such
consultation.143 This could be considered an institutional solution to the intransigence adopted by
Mamata Banerjee – i.e. that as the Chief Minister of one of the upper riparian states she had not
been consulted adequately.
137 Avlok Langer; Swimming with the enemy; Tehelka; April 7, 2012.
138 Vikram Sood; Let’s think smart; Hindustan Times; August 14, 2012.
139 Before Bangladesh sets for election, Centre is eager to take Mamata into confidence and sign the Teesta treaty; Bartaman;
May 5, 2012.
140 Jayanth Jacob and Pramit Pal Chaudhuri; op. cit.
141 Mamata-appointed panel to submit report by December end; The Indian Express; December 12, 2011.
142 Teesta water-sharing: Expert panel meets CM, The Statesman, and January 18, 2012. Available at http://thestatesman.
co.in/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=397315&catid=42&show=archive&year=2012&month=1&day
=19&Itemid=66
143 States must have a say in river deals: water policy draft: The Indian Express; February 2, 2012.

BANGLADESH
In this period, following the inability of the two countries to sign the Teesta Accord, the media in
Bangladesh focussed on the following four issues, reflecting the mood in the country:
• Dhaka presses Delhi for expediting Teesta Accord
• Teesta Accord soon
• Need for consensus on Teesta water-sharing
• New Delhi firm on implementing treaties with Bangladesh
There was a widespread realisation in the media that the fate of the Teesta Accord had
become uncertain. BBC Bangla radio reported as much, quoting a highly placed official in the
Government of India. The Indian government also informed Bangladesh Foreign Minister Dr. Dipu
Moni that signing the treaty had been put off for the time being.144
However, the media also reported that after a two day meeting of the Bangladesh
and India Joint River Commission, a joint statement was issued claiming that the two sides
had “removed differences” on the framework of an interim agreement on sharing the waters of
the Teesta and Feni rivers after their meeting. The reports said, “The two sides have removed
differences and improved understanding towards the framework of an agreement.” This meeting
took place in February 2012 in Dhaka.
Newspaper reports recalled that even though the Teesta pact had been finalised between
Dhaka and Delhi and was to be signed during the Indian Prime Minister’s visit in September 2011,
it had been put off after the objections raised by the West Bengal Chief Minister Ms. Mamata
Banerjee. After she had thrown a spanner in the works, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
had apologised for putting off the pact and openly expressed his frustration over his government’s
inability to sign the Teesta Accord as scheduled. The issue was put on hold and the media reported
that since then the two governments have held regular talks over how the untangle the Teesta issue.
The Teesta issue also came up for discussion at the foreign minister level talks during
Dipu Moni’s recent visit to India. While her Indian counterpart S M Krishna assured that the Indian
central government was working towards finalising the pact, Dr Dipu Moni told the Indian media
that the relations between Bangladesh and India would be adversely affected if an agreement on
Teesta was not reached. She, therefore, urged India to take urgent steps to signing the Teesta
treaty and also take measures to ratify the land boundary agreement. She also said that while
the Teesta pact was important for Bangladesh, it also wanted to give India space to finish its
internal consultations on the Teesta issue. The Bangladesh foreign minister made three visits
within a period of six months (December 2011, March 2012 and May 2012)pressing each time
to hasten the completion of the Teesta agreement. This pressure was kept up by Dhaka at every
opportunity that presented itself.145
144 This government to sign Teesta deal: Dr. Gawhar Rizvi, The Daily Star, February 8, 2012. This govt to sign Teesta deal:
Rizvi - The Daily Star ; February 8, 2012 www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=221546 on.
145 PM pushes for Teesta water deal, The Daily Star, March 19, 2012; India assured to fulfil promise; The Daily Star, May 9,
2012; Government hopeful of signing Teesta deal, The Daily Star, June 29, 2012; and Dhaka looks for early Teesta deal -
Dr. Dipu Moni; The Daily Star, August 7, 2012.

As for a fixed timeline for the Teesta agreement, Indian External Affairs Minister S M
Krishna, was quoted by the media as saying, “It is not right to ask when the agreement will be
signed. I’m not talking about any timeline”. 146
In reply to the same question by the media, Mijarul Quayes, the foreign secretary of
Bangladesh, claimed that “substantial advancement” had been made towards the Teesta water-
sharing deal. He expressed the hope that India was trying to develop a political consensus to
conclude the much-awaited agreement.
The media also reported that signaling a positive movement forward on contentious
issues, India and Bangladesh said they had inched ahead towards signing of the Teesta river
accord and a long overdue extradition treaty.147
The media claimed that India’s External Affairs Minister S. M. Krishna and his Bangladesh
counterpart Dipu Moni had a “very useful and productive” first joint consultative commission meeting,
after which they sounded positive over several bilateral issues, including the delayed Teesta Accord.
“We look forward to making progress and finishing the agreement on Teesta water-sharing
at the earliest,” Krishna told reporters after his talks with Bangladesh Foreign Minister, Dr. Dipu Moni.
“We are trying to develop a political consensus in India. It is important that the views
of all those who are dependent on its waters are taken into account and the burden is shared
equitably,” he said, referring to the Teesta agreement.148
Noting that the Teesta accord is being discussed since 2009, Krishna said there was no
change in the ground situation, though the two sides shared data during a technical meeting held
in Kolkata in February. He also assured Dr. Dipu Moni that India remained committed to an early
solution of the Teesta issue.
“Since water is a sensitive issue, in accordance with the traditions of consensual decision-
making in India’s democratic polity, internal consultations are on amongst stake-holders,” he was
reported as saying.149
Dipu Moni, who addressed the joint press conference with Krishna, noted that the Indian
side had reassured her that “there will be no unilateral undertaking of linking the Himalayan rivers
without consultations with Bangladesh and we are sure the agreement will materialize. The people
of Bangladesh are also optimistic about it. Water is a very important issue. People of Bangladesh
also want this agreement to be signed. Bilateral relation between India and Bangladesh is a deep-
rooted one. Teesta agreement will be signed soon.” She said that both the countries were forging
ahead to strengthen their bilateral relations and fulfilling the agreements signed between the two
countries during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Dhaka last year and Sheikh Hasina’s
trip to Delhi in January 2010.150
146 Teesta water deal soon – Indian envoy to President Zillur, The Daily Star, October 29, 2011; and More time needed to
reach a deal, The Daily Star, October 29, 2011.
147 Dhaka seeks a quick Teesta resolution, The Daily Star, November 10, 2012; and Teesta water deal round the corner, The
Daily Star, November 16, 2011.
148 India committed to early solution of Teesta water issue, The Daily Star, May 7, 2012.
149 Mamata’s wall of silence stalemating all efforts to ink Teesta treaty, The Daily Star, May 24, 2011; and India yet to tackle
Mamata factor, The Daily Star, February 26, 2011.
150 Sheikh Hasina’s New Delhi visit, The Daily Star, January 9, 2012.

Most importantly, she told the media, India should address the interests of the common
people of Bangladesh and keep its promises and India is supposed to expedite the conclusion of
the Teesta agreement. India assured that it would implement all agreements signed earlier with
Bangladesh in the greater interest of the two neighboring countries.
When Indian Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee visited Dhaka, he tried to assuage the
feelings of Bangladesh. When he called on Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, he was quoted by
the media as saying, “We are firmly committed to implementing all deals signed earlier with
Bangladesh.” He also assured the Prime Minister that despite the apparent delay, all the pending
agreements would also materialize soon.151 Had told the Prime Minister that a sub-committee
would be formed comprising experts of both the countries under the Joint River Commission to
conduct a study and analyze all aspects of the proposed cross-border Tipaimukh Dam. “It would
help remove confusions about the project from the minds of the people of both countries,” he
apparently said.152
About the water-sharing of the common rivers including Teesta, the media reported
Parnab Mukherjee saying that everyone had a legitimate share in the waters of the common
rivers and that neither country would be adversely affected due to any water-sharing agreement.
“All countries will get due share of water of the rivers coming down from the Himalayas,” he said.

Reports and articles, trying to give the Bangladesh perspective and also portraying the urgency
of reaching an accord on the sharing of the Teesta waters were weighed down by nationalistic
sentiments. The media seemed to place the onus on the Indian government to reach out to
Bangladesh and sort out the Teesta issue.
The Bangladeshi media seemed to argue that Bangladesh had already given some more
time to the Indian government to reach domestic consensus on the Teesta water-sharing issue
and overcome whatever internal opposition was there on the treaty. However, the media noted
that despite the pressure from Bangladesh, the Teesta treaty remained on a slow burner as India
continued its efforts at domestic political consensus building. However, through media articles, an
assurance also came through that India remained committed to an early solution to the issue of
sharing the Teesta waters and that senior bureaucrats had succeeded in ironing out differences
on the joint use of Teesta and Feni rivers.153
151 Pranab’s visit proves forward looking, The Daily Star, May 8, 2012.
152 This appeared in almost all Bangladesh newspapers like The Daily Star, Prothom Alo, Samakal, Jugantar, Ittefaq) and
online sites (e.g. BDnews24.com).
153 India trying to solve Teesta water issue, The Daily Star, February 26, 2012. www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.
php?nid=223897. More work to do for Teesta: Manmohan tells Sahara- The Daily star, February 25, 2012. Steep decline
in Teesta water flow, The Daily Star, February 23, 2012. www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=223577.
Teesta ‘on agenda’, The Daily Star, February 19, 2012, www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=223001.
India yet to tackle Mamata factor, The Daily Star, February 14, 2012. www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.
php?nid=222358. Teesta deal anytime soon : Says Rizvi; September 15, 2012. www.bangladeshnews24.com/.../teesta-deal-
anytime-soon-says-rizvi-... This govt to sign Teesta deal:Rizvi, The Daily Star, February 8, 2012. PM pushes for Teesta
water deal, The Daily Star, March 19, 2012. www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=226857. BD,India
near Teesta water deal, November 8, 2012. www.banglanews24.com

Overall gaps in Indian and Bangladesh media reportage
The general gaps in the media reportage in India have been analysed in terms of:
1. Sources used
2. Facts used
3. Availability of information
4. Research-media interface/ Reliance on experts
5. Balancing contrary views
6. Framework used – confrontational or co-operative?
8. Influence of nationalistic sentiments
Sources: The most remarkable aspect of Indian media reportage on the Teesta deal is
the reliance of the media on unidentified sources. There are three kinds of unidentified sources:
a) Background briefings by officials of the Foreign Office, the Prime Minister’s Office, Chief
Minister’s Office or the Water Resources ministry
b) Unidentified sources from political parties
c) Unidentified retired diplomats, irrigation department engineers, politically inclined
analysts, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and newspaper editors
The sources on record are normally government officials, members of political parties, political
activists and water experts and researchers. What is disconcerting is that the unidentified sources
– whether official or unofficial -- are given equal weight compared to the identified sources or
sources on record.
It is normal journalistic practice not to cite sources in editorials or opinion pieces published
on the edit and op-ed pages. This is generally not acceptable in news reports. However, even in
news reports it is acceptable to rely on deep background briefings by senior government officials.
And nobody takes exception to them. However, it is also customary to refer to the sources
in background briefings as “informed sources”, “highly placed sources”, “highly placed official
sources” or even “highly placed sources in the Prime Minister’s Office”. But it will not do to present
positions and facts as revelations with no attribution of any kind. That is what one finds in a large
number of Indian reports on the Teesta agreement.
One can understand that government officials do not want to come on record and often
want to hide behind the anonymity granted to sources by the media in greater public interest.
Hence an irrigation department official or a serving diplomat with a strong point of view may
choose to speak anonymously to prevent any harm coming to him for talking to a reporter. Such
sources can gain further legitimacy when they are whistle-blowers or are giving views that are
contrary to that of the policy makers. However, such legitimacy requires that the contrary view
be also presented in the same report. When political activists speak anonymously to the press, it
should be clear even to a cub-reporter that they are pushing a partisan agenda.
Lack of attribution immediately suggests that the reporter or media commentator has not
taken a distance from the subject and is therefore incapable of reporting objectively. There is a fair
amount of partisan and unattributed reporting in the Indian media.
In some cases the partisan nature of the reports is so blatant that one would think
that the reporter does not read his or her own newspapers – in one instance a report datelined

Kolkata in a national newspaper claimed that the Union government had not consulted the West
Bengal Chief Minister and that demands for consultation were “not unreasonable” since the
border state will be impacted directly. It went on to claim: “That the Centre ignored Mamata and
avoided consulting her before firming up the treaty is surprising.”154 Yet another report in the
same newspaper appearing a day earlier made similar claims:
“The Centre’s move to go ahead with treaties with Bangladesh without consulting the
West Bengal government has irked Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee.
“Since most of the border and water settlements that India and Bangladesh are preparing
to resolve impacts West Bengal directly, it is important that the state’s Chief Minister is taken into
confidence while striking a deal with Dhaka.
“When the Ganga water treaty was signed with Bangladesh, the then Chief Minister Jyoti
Basu was consulted while working out the details.”155
Neither report attributes these charges to any source – they seem to be conclusions of
the reporter. After all, the same newspaper had reported earlier that the National Security Adviser
Shivshankar Menon had gone to Kolkata to discuss the Bangladesh visit of the Indian prime
minister and discussed the impact of the Teesta and Feni water-sharing treaties on Bengal and
claimed: “India and Bangladesh will be signing an agreement sharing the waters of the Teesta
and Feni rivers during (Manmohan) Singh’s visit and for that (Shivshankar) Menon discussed the
possible impact on Bengal.”156 This suggests that sometimes reporters do not even read their
own newspapers leave alone familiarising themselves with the issue at hand before attempting to
write on them.
Un-sourced reports of this kind create public disaffection through misinformation and
end up giving advice which seems reasonable even though it is based on completely wrong facts.
An anonymous source even when they are put on a pedestal by partially identifying Him only as
a “professor” tends to suggest that such a source ought to be taken more seriously than the run-
of-the-mill anonymous source. Here is a sample:
“Another professor, on condition of anonymity, said: “It was the Centre’s fault not to
consult the state government while preparing the draft.”
“It was also “unfair” on the Centre’s part to agree to give a large part of Teesta waters to
Bangladesh when it had taken up the Teesta Barrage project as a national project in 2008, she
said.”157
In such an instance one might wonder that if a source wants to remain anonymous
then where is the need to exalt the source with the honorific of “professor”? And what is she a
professor of – water resources engineering, English literature or what? And how does the writer
agree with her that West Bengal was not consulted while preparing the draft of the Teesta treaty
when the West Bengal Chief Minister herself had claimed that she was shown the draft as well as
the final version and that her objection was to differences in the two? One is also tempted to ask
154 Teesta treaty row marks new low in TMC-Congress ties: The Times of India; September 6, 2011.
155 Mamata Banerjee refuses to go to Dhaka with PM; The Times of India; September 5, 2011.
156 CM meets security adviser over Bangla visit: The Times of India, September 1, 2011.
157 Pramod Giri; Mamata wins over North Bengal; The Times of India; September 6, 2011.

– how “large” is large when the reporter claims that “a large part” of the waters of the Teesta were
being given to Bangladesh? Does the reporter himself know what this comment means except
suggesting that something “unfair” was being done without defining what fair might have meant
under the circumstances?
The point is that un-sourced reportage can not only mislead but when there are no
checks and balances within it of also providing a contrary view, it can also fuel public disaffection
with certain government policies.
That when sources speak on record, they tend to make balanced statements is evident
in those reports which are sourced to the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary or other identified
officials of the two governments. It is remarkable that there was never any direct statement from
the West Bengal Chief Minister herself of what precisely she found objectionable in the Teesta
treaty draft, what was discussed between her and the National Security Adviser and at which
point she felt that she was being misled. Her unhappiness is surmised from the letter which the
state’s chief secretary Samar Ghosh wrote to the Prime Minister’s Office saying that she would
not be accompanying him to Dhaka. It is unthinkable that not one reporter in the state of West
Bengal could get her on record to explain her objections. They were always couched in general
terms like “West Bengal’s interests” and almost always defined by anonymous sources.
Even when the Chief Minister of West Bengal is being criticised, the sources remain
anonymous: “‘Frankly, what West Bengal is saying makes no sense to me. This has been
discussed for years now, and every concern of theirs has been addressed,’ said a senior Water
Resources Ministry official in Delhi.” Some such officials are again quoted anonymously in the
same report further down to say: “Water Resources Ministry officials were perplexed by Ms.
Banerjee’s position, and argued that West Bengal would in fact gain substantially from the power
generated from dams that will be built in Sikkim to deliver Bangladesh’s share of water.”158
Clearly, anonymity is being used to criticise positions without anyone, including the reporter,
taking responsibility for it. Here the reporter has internalised and accepted the criticism of the
“senior” (how senior for the reader to accept his views uncritically?) Water Resources Ministry
official uncritically.
Compared to Indian reportage, most of the Bangladeshi reportage did identify its sources
of information – although some of it was also based on background briefings. The predominant
sources used were government officials, representatives of political parties, members of civil
society and Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), MPs, academics, water and climate
experts, researchers and media professionals. However, there were many reports which began
with the promise of explaining the Teesta water-sharing issue but ended up confusing the readers.
Since many of these reports were written by senior journalists, it is unlikely that they were not
based on background briefings by the Water Development Board or by government officials.
Could it then be that the officials did not provide a clear and honest picture of the negotiations?
Neither the Water Development Board nor the Water Resources Ministry prepare a fact-sheet of
any kind on the sharing of Teesta waters
Most of the reports lacked detailed contextualisation and provided no detailed data.
Since most of the sources used were government officials, it is quite possible that they did not
158 Praveen Swamy and Haroon Habib; Mamata’s objections threaten to unravel PM visit; The Hindu; September 5, 2011

want to give out too many details. What is remarkable is that there were never any direct quotes
the minister in-charge. There is hardly any clearly informative report which sources facts to an
official document or to an identifiable person. There were some occasional reports though which
claimed that drafts of the Teesta water sharing agreement had been exchanged by the two sides.
In some cases the partisan nature of the reports was all too evident by their one-sided headlines.159
Facts: Gaps in facts are linked to gaps in sourcing a story. Facts were another casualty
in the Teesta reportage in India. This was so on two counts: facts about the river and about the
contours of the proposed agreement between India and Bangladesh.
It is inconceivable that however good a journalist, (s)he will ab initio have knowledge
of the distance that the Teesta traverses through Sikkim and West Bengal in India and then in
Bangladesh; the number of hydroelectric dams being planned on the Teesta in Sikkim and West
Bengal; the area the Teesta irrigates in India and Bangladesh; the respective capacities of the two
countries to utilise the Teesta waters in terms having an adequate network of canals and sub-
canals, etc.
There was very little factual reporting about the data relating to Teesta and its waters,
in the first place. When there was such reporting, it remained un-sourced. Surely, when a report
says that the “river drains 12,729 sq. Km up to its confluence with the Brahmaputra, of which 83
per cent of the catchment lies on the Indian side and 17 per cent in Bangladesh”160 , this must be
sourced and the significance, if any, of these facts explained.
There is utter confusion about the irrigation needs or even irrigation potential of the Teesta.
Some hard facts on irrigation could easily be sourced to some official department in Bangladesh
and India, an official report or an article available on the internet. Yet even in otherwise informative
reports, there is no sourcing of the facts to a document or to a person.
In yet another instance, a fairly detailed report on the Teesta Barrage Project at Gazaldoba,
claimed that the construction of the project had been delayed and that the requisite infrastructure
for utilising the barrage water for irrigation did not exist. The report provides a lot of data but
without sourcing it clearly.161
One does not know from where these facts have been culled. Only when one reads on,
does one begin to suspect that they have probably been provided by a political party opposed to
the present Chief Minister of West Bengal who was also the former irrigation minister of the state!
Or the source could be a government report, because a report is quoted to justify the claims of
the Opposition politician:
“But RSP leader Subhas Naskar, who till recently was the irrigation minister of the previous
Left Front government of West Bengal, says there is little chance of the project progressing
beyond the first sub-stage of Stage-I of the first phase and the final target area to be benefited
from the whole project may be just 342,000 hectares. ....
159 It’s total failure: BNP on Indian PM’s visit, The Daily Naya Diganta, September 7, 2011; Teesta Water sharing deal: India’s
withdrawal not unexpected, The Daily Star, September 7, 2011; and People along Teesta river disappointed, The New Age,
September 8, 2011
160 The tale of two rivers: The Hindu; September 6, 2011
161 Nirmalya Banerjee; Shadow boxing over Teesta Project; The Times of India; September 12; 2011.

“According to an irrigation department status report, while the three barrages and two of
the main canals have been completed, the distribution system comprising “minor and sub-minor”
canals, which would actually carry the water to the paddy fields, are largely incomplete.”162
Either way, the report – an excellent report otherwise -- could have improved tremendously
in terms of bringing out the shallow basis on which West Bengal was basing its claims of the
waters of the Teesta if sourcing of facts had been clearer and more upfront.
Another major gap in reporting on facts is that hardly any reports are from what one
might call “Ground Zero” – talking to the farmers whose irrigation needs are to be met by the
waters of the Teesta in North Bengal and Sikkim. People who are advocating their interests are
quoted but not the potential beneficiaries themselves. In stray reports which are date-lined North
Bengal, professors or Industry association representatives are quoted to say how the interests
of the farmers of the region would be impacted – that too in very general terms – and not the
farmers.163
Only in one instance the opposition to land acquisition for the Teesta Barrage Project is
reported from the farmers of the area and secretary of the Sarkar Adhigrihita Jamidata Samannoy
Samiti -- an association of those whose land was being acquired by the government – was cited
to provide some facts from the ground.
As there is no jointly agreed data available on the seasonal water flow in the Teesta, one
can understand that such data cannot be sourced easily. However, media reports have cited
experts but only to support the claims of West Bengal. As far as “facts” about the treaty – the
amount of water to be shared in the lean months is concerned; confusion abounds in the media.
The media talks variously of a 52:48 apportionment of the waters of the Teesta between India and
Bangladesh at Gazaldoba; a 50:50 sharing; only 25 per cent of the water of the Teesta Barrage
at Gazaldoba being given to Bangladesh and the rest coming from regeneration from rivulets
going it not he Teesta in the stretch from Gazaldoba to Dalia; Mamata Banerjee insisting that
West Bengal could not afford to give even 25 per cent of the water at Gazaldoba and wanting to
bring down Bangladesh’s share to only 18 per cent and then there are reports that go into details
purportedly giving the data in absolute numbers.
Consider the following excerpt from an un-sourced report published in an investigative
magazine in India:
“... Mamata opted out, protesting against any agreement giving Bangladesh 25 per cent
more water than what was promised to Bengal.”
“West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee too wants to share Teesta waters with
Bangladesh, but she revolted on seeing a bungled draft of the deal by the Centre committing 50
per cent share to Bangladesh.”
“The draft was being reworked Monday night to allow only 25 per cent release of water
from the dam on the river, after Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee intervened and showed to the
Prime Minister the error.”
162 Ibid.
163 Pramod Giri; Mamata wins over North Bengal; Hindustan Times; September 6, 2011. And, North Bengal curious about
the treaty, anxious too; Ananda Bazaar Patrika; September 5, 2011.

“The state officials, who participated in three meetings, were told that 25 per cent water
will go to Bangladesh from the river dam and 25 per cent to the West Bengal districts for irrigation
while 50 per cent shall be retained to ensure there is enough water in the river round-the-year to
run the hydro-electric power house.”
“Mamata was game for such a deal. The dam is 80 km from the border with Bangladesh
and as such water from many rivulets falls into the river past the dam that is almost equal to the
proposed release from the dam and as such the total quantity of water reaching the neighbour is
practically 50 per cent.”
“The West Bengal Chief Minister had no problem with the rivulets’ water going to
Bangladesh but an agreement that calculates the water supply at 50 per cent was not acceptable
to her as it would immediately give a handle to the defeated Left Parties to claim surrender of
West Bengal’s interests. Inquiries show that the Water Resources Ministry officials fell for the
Bangladesh argument that it is going to get 50 per cent water in any case and hence why not put
that figure in the agreement.”164
This is a classic example of unclear reportage – one might be prompted to ask the
following questions after reading it: If Bangladesh was being given “25 per cent more water
than what was promised to Bengal”, how much was Bengal promised? Why was the draft of
the treaty which promised a 50 per cent share to Bangladesh “a bungled draft?” Who called it
by that epithet? How does the writer know what the state government officials were told? Were
Indians really fooled into incorporating a 50:50 sharing of the Teesta waters into the agreement
by Bangladeshis?
There are many media reports which purport to explain the sharing of the Teesta waters
but actually end up confusing the reader.
Considering that government officials were also reported as saying that one could only
talk in terms of sharing of the waters in percentage terms as no agreed water flow data was
available for the Teesta, some reports nonetheless, quoting “South Block” (the Indian Foreign
Office) sources, suggested that West Bengal was not willing to give more than 25,000 cusecs of
water to Bangladesh and certainly not 33,000 cusecs which the Union government wanted to
part with; also explaining that the “extra” 8,000 cusecs would come from Sikkim’s share of the
waters of the Teesta.165 Yet another report also mentions the 25,000 cusecs that West Bengal
was willing to part with. But then it quotes unnamed sources to say that although Mamata had
initially wanted to part with only 23,000 cusecs she had agreed to the higher figure suggested
by the National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon after giving him a lecture on Centre-State
relations. Imagine her horror then, the report suggested, when she was told that the Centre was
planning to part with “upwards of 30,000 cusecs to Dhaka”.166
Considering that both the reports have been written by fairly senior journalists in India,
it is unlikely that they would not have been briefed by the Ministry of External Affairs, an official
of the PMO or someone close to the West Bengal government. Clearly both ratios and absolute
numbers must have been in play in the negotiations. However, as nothing is clearly sourced,
these “facts” instead of throwing light on the negotiations fog them further.
164 On eve of trip, PM drops Teesta after Mamata’s burst; Tehelka; September 5, 2011.
165 Pranay Sharma and Saleem Samad; Eddies in the Teesta; Outlook; September 19, 2011.
166 Priya Sahagal and Partha Dasgupta; CM pours cold water over PM; India Today; September 19, 2011.

Facts were a casualty even in Bangladesh reportage on the Teesta. There was very little
reporting of the facts relating to the Teesta and its waters in the media and the rare occasion when
some facts were provided, they remained un-sourced. Anonymity was often used to criticise
the government’s handling of the Teesta accord. While some of the Bangladeshi journalists and
commentators wrote that India had failed to deliver on the promise of sharing the waters of the
Teesta, there was never a direct statement to support such criticism from the prime minister
herself. It would seem that while critical statements can be made without identifying a source,
when sources in the government are indeed identified only balanced and sober comments are
reported for public consumption.
Availability of information: The Teesta reports are by and large based on information
supplied by interested parties – in this instance, the Union government as well as the West Bengal
government. However, there is no way of knowing whether they give a clear and honest picture of
the negotiations – the two points of view are rarely, if at all, presented together in a single report
or analysis.
The Delhi-based newspapers and magazines tended to give the point of view of the
Ministry of External Affairs and the Prime Minister’s Office while the Kolkata-based media gave
the version of the West Bengal government. And even these differing versions were unattributed.
It would not be an exaggeration, therefore, to claim that there is no single report or article which
encapsulates what precisely went wrong in the Teesta negotiations between New Delhi and
Kolkata, why and at what stage. In the public domain no clear information was available on who
said what to whom, when and why. Therefore, reports which claimed that West Bengal’s interests
were being harmed could not define what precisely those interests were; those which said the
West Bengal Chief Minister had been misled could not elaborate on how she had been misled;
those which said not enough consultations were held were unable to state what had been the
extent of consultations before West Bengal asserted itself; and those which said that the Prime
Minister’s Office should not have taken the lead in the negotiations which ought to have been left
to the Ministry of External Affairs were unable to argue how the latter could have done a better job.
There was also no information in the media about the position of the state of Sikkim
on water-sharing – after all, the Teesta originates there and also serves the water and electricity
needs of that state. It would seem that the mandarins negotiating the Teesta water-sharing treaty
with Bangladesh decided to take Sikkim for granted and concentrated only on West Bengal
because it was ruled by a difficult ally. According to some reports the National Security Adviser
(NSA) to the Prime Minister was willing to give away an extra 8,000 cusecs from “Sikkim’s share”
to Bangladesh.167 But how much was Sikkim’s share, nobody seems to know or mention in
media reportage. It is also not clear how the NSA could of his own volition decide what should
be done with Sikkim’s share of the waters of the Teesta since “Water” is a state subject in the
Indian Constitution and only Sikkim can decide what to do with its share of river waters. Also, as
it turns out there is no treaty on the Teesta between Sikkim and West Bengal, so there is no way
of deciding what Sikkim’s share of the waters might be. So there is a big information gap there.
Only in a magazine focussing on the environment does one get information from the
Water Development Board (WDB) of Bangladesh on the weakening of the flow of the Teesta
167 Pranay Sharma and Saleem Samad; op.cit.

since the construction of the barrage at Gazaldoba in India and how it weakens further in the lean
months.168 However, no specific report is quoted – only sources in the WDB are relied on.
There clearly was no fact-sheet of any kind on the Teesta for the media prepared either
by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, the Prime Minister’s Office or even the Water Resources
Ministry. Nor did any Indian foreign policy think tanks or NGOs have any such data or attempted to
collect and publicise it for a more informed debate and discussion on the subject. The reportage
which presented some facts about the Teesta presented them as revelations rather than attributing
them to published or unpublished official or unofficial sources. It was lazy journalism at best.
It was not surprising, therefore, that the entire reportage on the Teesta agreement was
foggy, unclear and partisan at best – the reader could take his pick of what to believe and what
not to believe depending on individual predilections.
This was also the case in Bangladesh. There was utter confusion in the Bangladeshi
media about the amount of water that flows in the Teesta and yet some figures were quoted without
any sourcing. This could easily lead the readers to believe that some of this information to create
confusion is being provided either by the Opposition parties or someone in the government itself.
Most of the Bangladeshi reports on Teesta water sharing reports were based on
government information. In most of these reports different government ministry, official press
releases, government spokespersons, government press advisors were quoted. On the other
hand, there was no reference to information available with NGOs, Think Tanks and researchers.
This was a significant gap considering that in Bangladesh there are a number of NGOs, civil
society organizations and Think Tanks which have conducted significant amount of research
on water, environment and climate change issues. They have produced a number of research
documents, policy briefs and have regular publications on these issues. However, one did not
see their research, the information they possess, the data they produce or even their opinions as
quotes and comments in the media reportage on the Teesta.
The virtual dependence of even the major newspapers on government sources alone is
evident from most of the reports which appeared on September 7 and 8 2011 in the Bangladeshi media.
Research-media interface/Reliance on experts: There was very little research-
media interface evident in the Indian reportage. This may well be because not much research
had been done on the Teesta basin and its irrigation potential, because journalists did not have
easy access to it or even if they had access they could not make use of it because they could not
understand it.
The only clear references to published research studies on the Teesta in the Indian media
were to a study on Teesta by M Fakhrul Islam and Yoshiro Higano169 ; and “Teesta river : A case
study in Teesta Barrage Project” by Md. Nurul Islam, Md. Ashfaqe Azam and Dr. Q R Qasim170.
However, there were references in various other reports to river experts.
Except in the case of the report quoting Fakhrul Islam and Yoshiro Higano – where the
study is quoted to support a legitimate share of the waters in the lean season for Bangladesh –
the other reports use researchers to argue partisan positions.
168 Pinaki Roy; Teesta Accord likely; Down to Earth; July 15, 2011.
169 Parveen Swamy; Manmohan says Mamata assented to Teesta Accord; The Hindu; September 8, 2011.
170 Nirmalya Banerjee; Shadow boxing over Teesta Project: The Times of India; September 12, 2011

Research interface is used by the West Bengal newspapers to rationalise the position
taken by the Chief Minister of the state. Thus, for example, river experts are quoted by a Kolkata-
based newspaper to suggest that if Bangladesh had been given half the waters of the Teesta,
there would not be enough water left to irrigate the fields of North Bengal in the lean months of
December to April.
A professor of geography at the North Bengal University, Subir Sarkar, who conducted
studies on the Teesta between 1990 and 2008 is used to support the argument of there not being
enough water to share in the following manner:
“Subir Sarkar said, ‘We conducted a study between 1990 and 2008 and found an
annual decline of 0.9 per cent in the mean water level of the river. The rate of silt deposit has
increased, the volume of water has reduced and the flow has become erratic. Global warming
and environmental degradation have contributed to major changes in the flow of the Teesta.’”
And a Kolkata-based river expert, who was to be later appointed by the state government
on a Teesta panel171 after the disagreement on, used in the same report to bolster the state
government’s position:
“‘If half the Teesta waters had been given to Bangladesh, there would not have been
enough water to irrigate the fields of north Bengal when the Boro crop is cultivated in the dry
months…It is in these dry months that both Bengal and Bangladesh depend most heavily on
irrigation,’ said Rudra.”172
It is remarkable that research studies or opinions of researchers/river experts were
not used to balance a report or to question the claims being made by politicians. Hardly any
newspaper or magazine thought it proper to invite river experts to write op-ed columns for them
in a bid to foster an informed discussion on the issue.
The lack of research-media interface was equally evident in the Bangladeshi media also.
It is quite possible that either there is not much research available on the Teesta or that whatever
research has been conducted by some university researchers or NGOs is not easily available
to journalists. Even when such reports or research papers are available, they are not media-
friendly and cannot be understood easily by journalists. Hence they are unable to glean any useful
information from these research products.
Most of the Bangladeshi media reports give no indication that they had any benefit of
interaction with environment and water experts. This is particularly galling because a number of
internationally renowned environmentalists and water experts are available in Bangladesh.
Balancing contrary views: The attempt to balance contrary views was absent in
a large number of media reports. With minor exceptions, there was a clear division between
Delhi-based media supporting the point of view of the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of
External Affairs of the need to sign the Teesta treaty and painting the West Bengal Chief Minister
black for being an obstacle and the Kolkata-based media which came across as partisan of what
were perceived to be West Bengal’s interests.
171 Mamata appointed panel to submit report by December; Indian Express; December 7, 2011. And, Manmohan meets
Mamata on the Bangladesh issue; Ananda Bazaar Patrika; October 23, 2011.
172 Dam spared death knell; The Telegraph; September 6, 2011.

One way of balancing international reportage – especially about contentious issues such
as sharing of trans-boundary resources is to have joint-by-line reports – i.e. reports which are
jointly written by correspondents from the two countries. This was indeed attempted. However,
even then, the Delhi media when giving the Bangladeshi point of view cited it to criticise Mamata
Banerjee. For example, one such report claimed:
“In Dhaka, officials and political observers slammed Ms. Banerjee’s theatrics as abrupt,
inappropriate and unfortunate,” saying the 48-52 apportionment of the disposable flow of the
Teesta was finalised after a series of confabulations, of which she was aware.”173
However, at least one jointly written report stands out for balancing of contrary views
while also admitting that there are aspects of the negotiations which remain unknown. It frankly
admitted as much:
“Given the multiplicity of versions about talks between the Centre and Mamata, it’s
impossible to tell who’s at fault. But they point to the confusion prevailing before Manmohan’s
departure.”
Further, balancing all the charges and counter-charges, the report goes on:
“Former Bangladesh foreign secretary Mohiuddin Ahmed says, ‘All the goodwill suffered
a serious setback following India’s inability and unwillingness to sign the Teesta agreement. It will
take time for trust and confidence to return.’ Nazmul Ahsan Kalimullah of Dhaka University was
even harsher: ‘India gave too little, too late.’
“West Bengal CM Mamata Banerjee has been blamed for scuppering the Teesta
agreement by pulling out from the prime minister’s delegation to Dhaka at the last minute. Mamata
is said to have told the Centre that she was opposed to the quantum of Teesta water being
assigned to Bangladesh, as it would be at West Bengal’s expense. New Delhi, however, claims
the agreement adhered strictly to the redline Mamata had drawn. This was at least the line most
people in Dhaka bought, obvious from what Kalimullah told Outlook, ‘Bangladesh was denied an
agreement on the Teesta because of Mamata’s arrogance.”174
This is an exemplary report in terms of providing a layered and complex picture of how
the Teesta agreement could not be reached. The Indian perspective is provided by an Indian
journalist and the Bangladeshi one by a local journalist in Dhaka. This co-operative effort marks
this report out as one of the most comprehensive and coherent accounts of the negotiations and
their failure on the Teesta. It does not pretend to provide all the facts and points out where gaps exist.
The balancing of views is much more evident in reports written after the disagreement
on the Teesta and once the Indian prime minister’s fateful visit to Dhaka had taken place. In the
post-mortem of the deal as it were, a larger number of Bangladeshi voices are quoted than in the
run up to the visit. These come from independent political analysts, analysts from Dhaka-based
think tanks and eminent editors from Bangladesh. While praising the West Bengal Chief Minister
for protecting the interests of the state, the disappointment in Bangladesh was also a subject
of reportage in the state – citing cartoons published in newspapers as well as their editorial
comment:
173 Praveen Swamy and Haroon Habib; Mamata’s objections threaten to unravel PM visit; The Hindu; September 5, 2011.
174 Pranay Sharma and Saleem Samad; op. cit.

“An English daily in Dhaka today carried a cartoon of Mamata Banerjee holding a balloon
in one hand and a needle in the other.
“The sketch in Daily Star, the leading English daily in Bangladesh, mirrored the sentiments
of both the people and the government of Bangladesh after the Teesta Accord no-show yesterday.
“Today, the paper said the people of Bangladesh who had welcomed Mamata’s electoral
victory felt betrayed. The happiness over her victory was not ‘more than equally matched by our
disappointment at her impetuous behaviour’, it wrote.
“A Bengali daily labelled Mamata a ‘drama queen’.
“The highest selling newspaper in Dhaka, Prothom Alo, also squarely blamed Mamata for
the Teesta fiasco and said her last minute decision would cast a shadow even on other deals.
“Experts who participated in TV channel discussions also pointed fingers at the Bengal
Chief Minister. They said that because of ‘her arm-twisting ways’ India had to face an awkward
situation in Dhaka.”175
This is a fair attempt at balancing the views in India or at least West Bengal with the
sentiment in Bangladesh. There were other reports too of the feeling of disappointment in
Bangladesh even in the Opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party.176 It was also reported
that Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was not angry with Mamata and had in fact said
that since the treaty was essentially a tripartite one involving the state of West Bengal, Mamata
Banerjee should have been given due importance.177
The moot point, however, is that most attempts at giving the Bangladeshi point of view
come after the Teesta Accord was not signed. If an attempt had been made to give a balanced
perspective on the issue, say, by sending reporters to the areas which are water-starved during
the winter months then such reportage might have had a different impact on the public and the
politicians in India.
Just as in the Indian media, in the Bangladeshi media also the contrary view was invariably
absent. A number of reports focussed on the opinion and sentiments of the Bangladeshi people
and all blame was put on India, without Indian voices being present in the reports. One such
report published on September 10, 2011 in The Daily Star, for example, suggested that it would
take a long time for trust and confidence to return between the two countries but reported the
opinion of only one retired official, former diplomat Mohiuddin Ahmed, who said,, “All the goodwill
suffered a serious setback following India’s inability and unwillingness to sign the Teesta water
sharing agreement. It will take time for trust and confidence to return.” Nazmul Ahsan Kalimullah
of Dhaka University was even harsher, saying, “India gave too little, too late.”178 Similarly, a
presidium member of the Jatiyo Party and former Foreign Minister Anisul Islam Mahmud said,
“We are frustrated at not being able to sign Teesta treaty. This has not been possible as it was
objected to by Mamata Banerjee. Manmohan Singh also stated that due to shortage of time, they
could not solve the problem. However, we hope that it will be done in future.”179
175 Dhaka blames Didi; The Telegraph; September 7, 2011.

176 PM’s Teesta dismay flows: I don’t want to comment on Mamataji, says Singh; The Telegraph; September 8, 2011.
177 Why not give importance to Mamata, questions Hasina; Ananda Bazaar Patrika; September 14, 2011.
178 In ‘Outlook India’ September 10, 2011. (blog).

Reporting framework – confrontational or co-operative? The broad framework
of reportage in the Indian media from January1, 2010 to July 31, 2011 -- and this went on till
the end of August 2011-- was one of following a co-operative approach. From the first week of
September 2011 to October 2011, the reporting framework became confrontational – with the
West Bengal newspapers painting New Delhi as the villain out to marginalise the interests of the
state for the benefit of Bangladesh. Here too the confrontation portrayed was mostly between
New Delhi and Kolkata and not between India and Bangladesh. However, in their Delhi-bashing
attempts some of the media also portrayed the interests of West Bengal vs. Bangladesh as a
zero-sum game. The period from November 2011 to August 2012 saw reporting which was
sometimes confrontational and only occasionally confrontational.
The watershed which marked a shift from a co-operative approach in reportage to one
of confrontation is marked by the sudden decision of the West Bengal Chief Minister Ms. Mamata
Banerjee to oppose the Teesta agreement as she believed that it was against the interests of her
state. She seemed to have hit a populist chord with her posturing on the Teesta and the local
media supported and even promoted it without going deep into what these interests were and
how they compared with Bangladesh’s interests. The media did not bother or found it difficult to
dig deeper – perhaps for want of information, easy availability of facts and access to river experts
into the issue – to also project the rights of the lower riparian.
When there is no conflict of interest, it is easy to adopt a co-operative framework of
reportage. However, a greater onus devolves on the media when there are clearly differing
interests. It is the job of journalists to list these interests clearly without taking a partisan position.
Once the question of West Bengal’s interests in the Teesta waters came to the fore – all Indian
media became partisan with the Delhi media supporting the deal and the pushing the positions
taken by the Ministry of External Affairs and the Prime Minister’s Office while the West Bengal
media promoted what they believed were their state’s interests. These positions could easily have
been balanced by taking on board a wide spectrum of expert opinion. Use of a broad-spectrum
of opinion – some supporting a particular position and others being critical of it – would have led
to layered and complex reportage. This would have enriched the understanding of the people of
West Bengal as well as in the rest of India. In such an eventuality, either there would be no regional
bias in the reportage or all biases would have been equally reflected and the reader could be left
to make up his or her own mind. Instead one witnessed a section of the media promoting the
belief that the West Bengal Chief Minister had done the right thing and another painting her as a
spoil sport who for her narrow political ends threw a spanner in the works.
At the official level, however, the framework remained co-operative in both the countries
with the Indian prime minister saying clearly, “I repeat India will not take any steps that will adversely
affect Bangladesh”180 . Even the mercurial Mamata Banerjee after meeting Bangladesh foreign
minister Dipu Moni effusively declared, “We love Bangladesh. They love us just as much. We used
to be one country once. Their demand is legitimate and we respect that. But we can give the water
they need only after ensuring that North Bengal gets its due.”181 Although the Teesta agreement
remains to see the light of the day, there was little rancour in the reportage that ensured after its
180 PM’s Teesta dismay flows – I don’t want to comment on Mamataji, says Singh: The Telegraph; September 8, 2011.
181 Mamata shared love and Teesta line; The Telegraph; November 17, 2011.

failure in September 2011. Indeed, even while pressing for concluding the Teesta agreement, Dhaka
recognised the political differences in India and said that it “will give India the space it needs.” 182
That the national media was for a rapid conclusion of the Teesta Accord was evident
from editorial comments which urged that “while federalism is indeed a fundamental pillar of
the Constitution, it shouldn’t be misused for scoring political points”183. They also noted that
Bangladesh and India were moving closer, “irritants remained in the form of water-sharing and
border firing incidents. It is welcome that New Delhi has reassured Dhaka on improving their joint
border management. But this must be followed by expeditious ratification of the land boundary
agreement and settlement of the important Teesta issue.”184
The co-operative spirit was evident in several media reports. Consider the following, for
example, which urged the government to move forward by grabbing the opportunity of improving
ties with Bangladesh:
“The biggest villain in the India-Bangladesh story has been West Bengal Chief Minister
Mamata Banerjee. The mercurial UPA ally first embarrassed the PM by refusing to accompany
him on his Dhaka visit to protest the Teesta river agreement. The waters of the Teesta are a vital
source of sustenance for north Bengal and Bangladesh. Even if Mamata wasn’t satisfied with the
proposed formula, there was room for further negotiations. By pulling out at the last moment not
only did she put the PM in an awkward position but also left the Sheikh Hasina government in
Dhaka red-faced.
“It won’t be a stretch to say that the current phase is the most opportune in India-
Bangladesh relations. But time is running out. Both governments have about two years of their
tenure left. And the odds of them coming back to power aren’t really safe. By all accounts,
the UPA dispensation in New Delhi will be in for a tough fight. Similarly, in the highly polarised
Bangladeshi polity, the Awami League will certainly have its task cut out to hold on to its 3% vote
share advantage over the BNP.
“Considering this, the Centre’s insistence on building consensus with states like West
Bengal to implement important treaties with Bangladesh needs to be tempered. For, there is
already a perception in Dhaka that New Delhi’s overtures are self-serving. Unless results are seen
on the ground, no amount of bonhomie between the leaderships of the two countries will do any
good.”185
Here one sees and Indian newspaper trying to see the disagreement over the Teesta
from the perspective of Bangladesh. There were other equally strong reports which argued that
the Indian prime minister had erred in not signing the Teesta Accord:
“Banerjee deserves much blame for wrecking one of India’s most consequential foreign
policy initiatives; but not all. Last September, Singh had the option of signing the Teesta waters
treaty, disprove Banerjee’s false arguments, and explain the larger stakes in improving relations
with Bangladesh to the people of India, including those in West Bengal and the north-eastern
states. Instead, Singh pulled back, citing India’s federalism and coalition politics. By law, Delhi has
absolute monopoly over the conduct of foreign policy and the negotiation of treaties, including
182 Bangla willing to give India time to seal Teesta, land boundary pacts; The Times of India; July 25, 2012.
183 Federal fetish; Editorial comment; The Times of India; February 24, 2012.
184 Moving closer; Editorial comment; The Times of India; February 27, 2012.
185 Rudroneel Ghosh; Goodwill on the line: The Times of India; February 15, 2012.

those on sharing waters that flow across the borders. What it lacks today is the courage of
conviction and the political will to lead. Signing the Teesta accord and defending India’s national
interests vis-a-vis Dhaka might improve the Congress’s leverage with Banerjee a lot more than
Delhi’s unending appeasement of Kolkata.”186
Indeed, media commentators urged the Indian prime minister to strike a deal with the
West Bengal Chief Minister to hasten the Teesta Accord, claiming, “There should be no doubt
as to how big this would have been for India – a foreign policy coup on the scale of the Indo-US
nuclear deal.”187 One can, therefore, see that the push for a co-operative framework was all too
evident in the national media in India. Even Mamata Banerjee, in an interview, took to blaming the
media for creating unnecessary confusion:
“Observing that efforts had been made by some quarters ‘to create controversy and
confusion,’ over the issue, she said, “I will appeal to the media not to write anything that may
adversely affect relations between the two countries. Remember, this is not a political battle. This
is a question of strengthening bonds between two countries.”188
As for Bangladesh, in general the reports published in Bangladesh between January
2010 and August 2011 were in a cooperative framework but those published during the last
quarter were confrontational. When, however, it became quite clear that the Teesta treaty was
not being signed, several Bangladeshi newspapers published a number of reports showing a
confrontational approach. This was evident from the headlines given to these news items as well
as their content.189
Influence of nationalistic sentiments: The influence of nationalistic sentiment in the
Teesta reportage in the Indian media comes in two forms:
1. National interests impelling the signing of a treaty with Bangladesh
2. Regional sentiments masquerading as national sentiments opposing the Teesta
agreement
The media reportage originating from Delhi before the Indian Prime Minister’s visit, during
the visit which did not deliver on the Teesta treaty, and in the period following the visit, mostly
argued in favour of the agreement arguing that it was in India’s national interest. Indeed, in an
year-end round up of India’s foreign policy initiatives in 2011, a leading newspaper wrote:
“This year’s Bangladesh initiative was probably the most important foreign policy accomplishment
of 2011. As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh noted during his September visit there, “India will
never be able to realise its full development potential if other countries in South Asia are not working
in harmony with each other and this applies to Bangladesh, more than to any other country.”
“Of course, there’s a hitch. The last piece to the Bangladesh jigsaw is still missing. The
Teesta water agreement is being held at gunpoint by West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee.
If it can be freed, New Delhi will have ushered in a golden age of good neighbourliness.”190
186 Engaging Dhaka; Editorial comment; Indian Express; May 7, 2012.

187 Jayanth Jacob and Pramit Pal Choudhuri; Stuck at a turn; Hindustan Times; April 19, 2012.
188 Hindustan Times; November 16, 2011.
189 The embarrassment of a visit, The Daily Star, September 9, 2011; People along Teesta river disappointed, The New Age,
September8, 2011; and Teesta water agreement failure: blaming the wrong person, The Daily Star, January 15, 2012.
190 Pramit Pal Choudhuri; At home in the world; Hindustan Times; December 26, 2011.

The Teesta agreement was seen to serve India’s interests in more ways than just
ushering in “good neighbourliness” – it was projected as a template for sharing the waters of
other common rivers; laying down the principles for India’s claims on the waters of common rivers
originating in China; persuading Bangladesh to grant India transit access through its territory to
its north-eastern states and to the Mongla and Chittagong ports in Bangladesh; and a significant
movement towards the economic integration of South Asia by using the India-Bangladesh
template for India’s relations with its other neighbours.
Some reports even argued that it was in India’s national interest to do everything it could
to support a friendly government in Dhaka – meaning that forging good relations would help the
Awami League in the next elections and that this would be in India’s national interest:
“The race to the top will be a close one. Since 1991, the BNP (Bangladesh Nationalist
Party) and AL (Awami League) have alternated in power, but the important thing is that the two
had won roughly the same percentage of votes till the 2008 elections: the AL collected 49.2 %
of the votes for its 230 seats while the BNP had 32.7% for its 30 seats. Can the AL repeat its
victory? If so, what does it have to do retain its hold and what should the opposition do to defeat
the AL? The answers will probably become clearer in the next few months. ......
“Some recent developments also do not help Sheikh Hasina’s cause: the Teesta water-
sharing agreement has not taken off and if New Delhi keeps succumbing to Kolkata’s pressures,
it may never come through. This failure will be exploited by the opposition. The Indian government
has to be more assertive as the gains to India would also be immense.”191
That the lack of Indian ability to sign the Teesta agreement would have far reaching impact
on India’s connectivity with Southeast Asia was also highlighted in the media. A media report
argued that with Myanmar opening up, India would lose the golden opportunity of connecting
South Asia with South East Asia bypassing China because “as long as Teesta pact is not signed
the transit agreement between New Delhi and Dhaka will not come through.” And that it was quite
possible that “connecting India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand or even up to Vietnam” could
have run into the tussle with Bangladesh. This was presented as how the US might view of the
inability to sign the Teesta pact but clearly the analysis was steeped in a larger understanding of
India’s interests in the region.192
The predominance of regional sentiment in Kolkata newspapers can be rationalised on
various grounds.
It could have something to do with their geographical location. Being published from
West Bengal, they were perhaps better acquainted with the irrigation needs of their state and
its interests. If that were so, they do not provide sufficient evidence of this understanding in their
reportage which seems more driven by sentiments, emotions and populism. It could also be
argued that the Kolkata newspapers were playing up something that would go down well with
their readers. However, there is no indication to suggest that their readers would not have liked
more complex and layered reports which made an attempt to balance the claims of West Bengal
with that of Bangladesh. It could also be that being regional newspapers, they understood the
191 Vikram Sood; Let’s think smart; Hindustan Times; August 14, 2012.
192 Jayanth Jacob;Teesta: US sees China angle, for early resolution; Hindustan Times; May 7, 2012.

importance of “Water” being a State-subject in the Indian Constitutional scheme and therefore
wanted the State’s point of view to be taken into account while signing treaties on trans-boundary
resources. However, not many of them made this point which supports regional interests but
situates them in the larger context of the Union government entering international treaties which
impact the states geographically situated on the international border. Whichever way one looks
at their reportage, it would seem that they were steeped in regional sentiment which fed into
the broader “national” sentiment that Indian interests were being done down by the Union
government.
The influence of nationalistic sentiment was also clearly seen in Bangladeshi reportage.
It focussed only in what was in Bangladesh’s national interest and on nothing else. Bangladesh
somehow wanted the Teesta Water Sharing Agreement and this sentiment was reflected across
political divides – with the government and the Opposition both arguing for it193 - and this was
amply reflected in the media.
193 For example, Expedite Teesta deal – Hasina asks Manmohan, The New Age, November 11, 2011; Ershad to lead Teesta
long march in Jan, The Daily Star, December 12, 2011; Push for a fair deal, The Daily Star, September 9, 2011; and Teesta
failure overshadows achievements, The Daily Star, September 9, 2011, among many others.

RECOMMENDATIONS
A lthough it would be difficult to answer it one could still ask whether there have been ideal
reportage which might have saved the Teesta Accord. It would be patently wrong to blame
the media for the inability of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to sign the Teesta water-sharing
agreement with Bangladesh.
What the Indian media could have done, however, is to have taken a distance from
both the Union government and the West Bengal government and shown how complex the
agreement was and that despite its complexity, it was doable and in the interests of the people of
both countries. This even the Bangladesh media could have attempted by explaining the rationale
– and there was one even if others thought it was faulty – behind the opposition of the Indian state
of West Bengal to the water-sharing agreement.
In retrospect, the “ideal media report” -- which does not exist anywhere in real life but
is instructive to imagine -- in the run up to the scheduled signing of the Teesta water-sharing
agreement should have given some space to the point of view of the government of the Indian
state of West Bengal – a factor that was to derail the agreement only months later.
The Indian media could have emphasised that “Water” is a subject which is completely
under the jurisdiction of a state government in the Indian Constitutional scheme and that unless
the government of a border state is fully on board, the Union government cannot give away
what the state considers its legitimate share to another country. Instead it chose to give only
the point of view of the Ministry of External Affairs and the Prime Minister’s Office. It could have
also explained what the equal sharing of water at the Teesta Barrage or the Gazaldoba Barrage
meant – now it is in the public domain that Bangladesh was actually getting only 25 per cent of
the stored water during the lean season at Gazaldoba and the rest 25 per cent was to come from
regeneration of the river water while it courses from Gazaldoba to the Bangladesh border. Yet this
is hardly to be read in any report of this period.
In the subsequent period, when the agreement was to be signed, there is hardly any
balanced report explaining why the agreement could not be signed – blame was ascribed and the
consequences of not signing the agreement listed but the details were missing. An “ideal report”
during this period could have emphasised why both India and Bangladesh would benefit from the
water-sharing agreement, what the detailed contours of such an agreement could be and once
the agreement had been stalled, the media could have played the role of educating/informing the
people on either side of the border, how this process could be completed and why it needed to
be completed. Such a report would have explained in comprehensively what was sought to be,
why it was sought to be done, who would have benefitted, why the process got stalled and why
it needs to be restarted.
The “ideal report” of the period that has followed the inability of India and Bangladesh to
ink the Teesta water-sharing agreement is yet to appear. Such a report could take stock of the
time lost and the opportunity cost of India not getting transit rights and Bangladesh not getting
what it considers to be its legitimate share of the Teesta waters. Such a report would also explain
why the West Bengal government did not make the Kalyan Rudra expert committee report on

water availability in the Teesta public even a year after it was submitted. In the absence of our
dream “ideal report” we will never know the details or at least not know till there is a change of
government in that state.
However, in view of the gaps in the Indian and Bangladesh media’s understanding of
the lack of success in reaching a Teesta water-sharing agreement, the following steps could be
considered to enable the media to present a fair and objective reportage of the issue in future:
1. Prepare an easily accessible dossier on the nature of international water disputes
over common rivers listing internationally accepted law and practices on the rights
of the Upper Riparian and the rights of the Lower Riparian country. As of now there
is no understanding in the India and Bangladesh media about what such rights are
and the prevailing international norms. Such a dossier must list the possible reasons
for differing perspectives on sharing trans-boundary river waters documenting the
possible causes – conflict over water usage (e.g. hydroelectric dams vs. irrigation,
irrigation vs. environmental concerns, etc); equity and access; pollution and water
quality for downstream users; inter-basin diversion of rivers within the upper riparian
country like the proposed river linking project in India; water augmentation vs. danger
of flooding downstream in peak season and drought in the lean season). Reading
such a dossier is likely to help attenuate nationalistic sentiment which ignores the
rights of the neighbouring country on trans-boundary rivers.
2. Prepare ready to use media briefs on why some trans-boundary resource
cooperation agreements have worked and why others haven’t. In the South Asian
context, the success of the Indus Water Treaty and the Ganga Water Treaty can be
examined as success stories and the Mahakali Treaty between India and Nepal as a
case of failure. Appropriate lessons must be drawn about trans-boundary resource
sharing treaties citing other trans-boundary resource sharing and management
agreements relating to resources such as fishing, mangroves, coastline protection,
wildlife preservation, etc.
3. Make available fact-sheets on common rivers giving details of their origin, water-
flow, catchment area and command area, water usage projects on them, different and
conflicting water usage and their impact on the livelihood and ecology of the people.
4. One reason why the media tends to give a one-sided picture of trans-boundary
resource sharing issues is because often it does not know where to get a contrary
point of view – domestic experts giving nationalistic point of view are easily accessible
but there is nobody to provide the other country’s point of view. To overcome this
hurdle to balanced reportage, there is a need to collate a list of public resources
-- resource persons, relevant research institutions in both the countries, internet
sites, government departments dealing with that particular resource, university
departments, quasi-government institutions and NGOs active in the area. Such a
list should provide email addresses and telephone numbers of the individual experts
and institutions. Given modern communication technology, it should not be difficult
then for the journalists in one country to get the views of experts from the other
country.
5. Prepare special media briefs on each common river or groups of common rivers

giving the history and context of the claims and counter-claims of the two countries
on water usage projects, water sharing, its environmental impact, the diplomatic
efforts made thus far and the major hurdles in resolving the conflict.
6. In the case of each trans-boundary resource, prepare short briefs for use by the
media on the rights of border-states within a country. In the case of India, some of
these resources are controlled by these states (such a water and fishery in territorial
waters) while others are controlled by the federal or central government (as in the
case of natural gas and petroleum). The availability of such short briefs would help
remove confusion about the need for domestic political consensus before any
international treaties on sharing trans-boundary resources are signed.
7. All these briefs/fact-sheets for journalists should be made available on the
Ecosystems For Life page of the IUCN site on the internet.
8. Organise joint India-Bangladesh training workshops and dialogues among media
practitioners to (a) build capacity and a knowledge-base among them about the
best-practices in sharing of trans-boundary resources; and (b) to create a network
of media professionals who can be used as resource persons by the media in each
other’s country to get balanced reportage.
9. Encourage field visits to each other’s country to study the livelihood and ecological
impact of the trans-boundary resource sharing conflict. If Indian media persons visit
Rangpur, meet the farmers there and talk to Bangladeshi water experts and their
Bangladeshi counterparts reciprocally visit North Bengal for the same purpose,
there would be a greater appreciation of the water needs of the other country. The
issue of water-sharing then would be seen in a human context rather than in terms
of cusecs of water-flow or in dry percentages of water being shared and focus
needs to be towards the broader context of transboundary water management.
While a vibrant media is the strength of any democracy, its vibrancy can sometimes
verge on cacophony which adds to the noise without conveying any information. If it is a partisan
media, it can fan jingoism – both national as well as regional.
The printed word carries a far greater significance in societies rapidly transforming from
large-scale illiteracy to literacy – and India and Bangladesh are prime examples of this phenomenon.
The media in these societies not only informs but also educates the people, helping them form
opinions which then get reflected in the social, political and economic choices they make. It can
rouse passions and make people confrontational on issues of trans-boundary resources or it can
calm passions and push them towards a co-operative framework of sharing these resources.
That is why it is important to analyse the reporting experience of India and Bangladesh in the run
up to the signing of a trans-boundary resource sharing treaty like the Teesta Accord.

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An Analytical Review of Media Reports

Context of Trans-boundary Aspects of the Teesta River

Research and Text

Ecosystems for Life: A Bangladesh-India Initiative

The initiative centres around five broad thematic areas:

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What is Teesta Water Sharing all About?

1 Rivers in Sikkim; http://sikkim.nic.in/sws/glim_riv.htm

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Sources Used and Gaps in Reportage

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Sources Used and Gaps in Reportage

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27 Teesta Accord on cards; The Telegraph; August22, 2012; Kolkata.

Ecosystems for Life • An Analytical Review of Media Reports 27

35 Mamata can accompany Prime Minister to Dhaka; Bartaman; op.cit.

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39 The tale of two rivers; The Hindu; September 6, 2011.

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55 Ananda Bazaar Patrika; September 6, 2011.

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74 Priya Sahgal and Partha Dasgupta; op.cit.

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84 PM’s Teesta dismay flows; The Telegraph; September 8, 2011.

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Sources Used and Gaps in Reportage

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117 Engaging Dhaka; The Indian Express; May 7, 2012

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