Kuhn vs. Popper vs. Lakatos vs.

Feyerabend:
Contested Terrain or Fruitful Collaboration?
John Darwin

In this paper we examine the alleged war between Kuhn and Popper, extending the discussion
to incorporate two of their lesser known, but important, protagonists, Lakatos and Feyerabend.
The argument presented here is that the four can fruitfully be considered together, and that it
is possible to go beyond the surface tensions and clashes between them to fashion an approach
which takes advantage of the insights of all. The implications of this approach for management
are then considered, using the concept of co-creation in two different contexts to illustrate this.

Overview: a Philosophy War?

‘Nearly every course on the scientific method today makes reference to “Kuhn vs. Popper”
as a watershed, in which Kuhn’s supposedly pluralistic vision of science triumphed over
Popper’s more monolithic one.’ 1 There can be little doubt that Kuhn’s book The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions ‘ caused a storm of controversy which still persists today’ 2, and the
introduction of the concept of the ‘paradigm’ has had a major effect on subsequent debate
in many social sciences, not least the field of management. A search of the EBSCO database
generates more than 12,500 articles referencing the term. Kuhn’s conception of science,
with his contrast between the normal and revolutionary phases, and his emphasis on the
social dimensions of scientific activity, has been equally influential and has been set in
sharp contrast to the falsificationist strictures of Popper – someone who, as Fuller suggests,
has often received a harsh press.

1 Fuller, S. (2003) Kuhn vs. Popper Cambridge: Icon Books.

2 Johnson, P. and Duberley, J. (2000) Understanding Management Research London:Sage p 68.

PHILOSOPHY OF MANAG EM EN T, VO LUM E 9, NUM B ER 1, 2010 39

 KUHN VS. POPPER VS . L AK ATOS VS . FE Y E R A B E N D: C O N T E S T E D TE R R A I N OR FRUITFUL
COLL ABOR ATION?

But the debate in the philosophy of science which raged in the 1960s and 70s had two
other important protagonists – Lakatos and Feyerabend. In this paper it will be argued
that the four should be considered together, and that it is possible to go beyond the surface
tensions and clashes between them (often finely documented3) to fashion an approach which
takes advantage of the insights of all.

Four Philosophers, Four Truths

The theoretical positions of these four philosophers are well known – the emphasis in this
brief review is therefore on the implications for the concept of truth, as this is central to the
following argument.
Popper’s concern was with the testing of a theory by the empirical application of the
conclusions derived from it, leading either to corroboration or falsity – in the latter case,
leading to a quest for a better theory. His primary interest was therefore in the correspond-
ence between theory and evidence. As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Science argues4, he was
initially uneasy with the concept of truth, avoiding the assertion that a theory which is
corroborated is true – for clearly if every theory is an open-ended hypothesis, as he main-
tains, then it has to be at least potentially false. Ultimately however Popper accepted Tarski’s
reformulation of the correspondence theory of truth, integrating the concepts of truth and
content to frame the concept of ‘truthlikeness’ or ‘verisimilitude’. A ‘good’ scientific theory,
Popper thus argued, has a higher level of verisimilitude than its rivals, and he explicated
this concept by reference to the logical consequences of theories. A theory’s content is the
totality of its logical consequences, which can be divided into two classes: there is the ‘truth-
content’ of a theory, which is the class of true propositions which may be derived from it, on
the one hand, and the ‘falsity-content’ of a theory, on the other hand, which is the class of
the theory’s false consequences (this latter class may of course be empty, and in the case of a
theory which is true is necessarily empty). 5
Kuhn focused on normal science – ‘research firmly based upon one or more past scien-
tific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges
for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice’6 – and the occasional outbreak
of revolutionary science. His interest therefore was in the consensus between members of
the scientific community which holds them together – and which, when lost, breaks them
apart lead to revolutionary phases of paradigm change.
This leads to a view of truth which contrasts sharply with Popper’s. ‘I think that the real
difference between Popper and Kuhn is not about the possibility of falsification or the exist-

3 See for example the splendid exchange of letters between Feyerabend and Lakatos to be found in Motterlini, M.
(Ed.) (1999) For And Against Method Chicago: University of Chicago Press pp 119–373.
4 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Science.
5 ibid.
6 Kuhn, T. (1996). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 3rd Ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

40 PHILOSOPHY OF MANAG EM EN T, VO LUM E 9, NUM B ER 1, 2010

 JOHN DARWIN

ence of normal science. It is about the role of truth, the value of criticism, and the nature of
the bond that unites scientists into a community. Popper and positivists also placed partic-
ular emphasis on community… It is this very emphasis that fuels Kuhn’s conception of
science as a social institution, and his attempt to define scientific knowledge, if not truth
itself, in terms of the consensus of belief that is forged among its members.’ 7
For Feyerabend, of course, ‘anything goes’. For him, ‘...one of the most striking features
of recent discussions in the history and philosophy of science is the realization that events
and developments ... occurred only because some thinkers either decided not to be bound
by certain ‘obvious’ methodological rules, or because they unwittingly broke them. This
liberal practice, I repeat, is not just a fact of the history of science. It is both reasonable
and absolutely necessary for the growth of knowledge. More specifically, one can show the
following: given any rule, however ‘fundamental’ or ‘necessary’ for science, there are always
circumstances when it is advisable not only to ignore the rule, but to adopt its opposite.’ 8
We should therefore be quite happy to ‘invent and elaborate theories which are inconsistent
with the accepted point of view, even if the latter should happen to be highly confirmed and
generally accepted.’ 9
Lakatos rejects Popper’s distinction between the logic of falsifiability and its applied
methodology. When encountering one or more anomalies, the working scientist will
usually, and necessarily, assume that the auxiliary hypotheses which are associated with
the theory can be modified to incorporate, and explain, such anomalies. He rejects also the
‘mob psychology’ of Kuhn and the anarchism of Feyerabend. He seeks instead a pragmatic
approach to scientific progressive, characterised by heuristics (positive and negative) and
the distinction between progressive and degenerating problem shifts. He does this by taking
Popper’s idea of verisimilitude, which he took as ‘truth-content minus falsity-content’10, and
adding to it:

We have to recognize progress. This can be done easily by an inductive principle

which connects realist metaphysics with methodological appraisals, verisimilitude
with corroboration, which reinterprets the rules of the ‘scientific game’ as a – conjec-
tural – theory about the signs of the growth of knowledge, that is, about the signs of
growing verisimilitude of our scientific theories.11

This leads Lakatos to an approach – sophisticated falsificationism – which explicitly

incorporates pragmatism. ‘It does not matter whether we stress the ‘instrumental’ aspect
of imaginative research programmes for finding novel facts and for making trustworthy
predictions, or whether we stress the putative growing Popperian ‘verisimilitude’ (that is,

7 Gattei, S. (2003) A Plea for Criticism in Matters Epistemological Social Epistemology Volume 17 Nos. 2&3 163.
8 Feyerabend, P.K. (1975) Against Method New Left Books.
9 Feyerabend, P.K. (1965) Reply to Criticism in Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 2 pp 223–4.
10 Lakatos, I. (1978) The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes Volume 1 CUPress: Cambridge p 156.
11 ibid. p 156.

PHILOSOPHY OF MANAG EM EN T, VO LUM E 9, NUM B ER 1, 2010 41

 KUHN VS. POPPER VS . L AK ATOS VS . FE Y E R A B E N D: C O N T E S T E D TE R R A I N OR FRUITFUL
COLL ABOR ATION?

the estimated difference between the truth-content and falsity-content) of their successive
versions. Sophisticated falsificationism thus combines the best elements of voluntarism,
pragmatism and of the realist theories of empirical growth.’12
Leading from this brief outline, it may be argued that each of these four philosophers
takes a different standpoint in relation to truth. For Popper it is the classical correspond-
ence theory, as refined by Tarski. For Kuhn it is consensus. Lakatos begins like Popper with
correspondence, but moves toward a standpoint which embraces pragmatism.
Feyerabend is less easy to characterise. He rejects consensus, and embraces inconsist-
ency – but this is inconsistency with the status quo, rather than inconsistency within the
work undertaken by the individual. Further, he argues that

Taste, not argument, guides our choice of science; taste, not argument, makes us carry
out certain moves within science (which does not mean that decisions on the basis of
taste are not surrounded by and entirely covered by arguments…). There is no reason
to be depressed by this result. Science, after all, is our creature, not our sovereign;
ergo, it should be the slave of our whims, and not the tyrant of our wishes.13

This resonates with an important dimension of coherence, as described by Putnam:

I urge that we have cognitive values, for example, coherence. My examples often come
from big scientific theories. Last week, at a meeting of the American Philosophical
Society in Philadelphia at which I lectured about this, the scientists in the audience,
who were mostly Nobel Prize winners, included a number of people who were enthu-
siastic about this claim; they said, ‘Of course we judge theories on the basis of things
like beauty.’ Gerald Holton has produced a series of examples, all connected with the
Special Theory of Relativity, starting with Planck’s answer to the criticism, ‘Why did
you accept Einstein’s theory? We have Lorentz transformations, and we have Poincaré.
Why Einstein?’ And Planck replied, ‘Es ist mir einfach sympathischer.’ It’s just more
simpatico. And when I reminded Holton of this story, he produced two other scien-
tists who were originally opponents of the Special Theory until after it was formulated
by Minkowski in a way that really brought out its elegance, and were won over. One
of them said that the theory is so beautiful that it has to be true.14

Rather than debating the relative merits of each standpoint, the approach here is to
suggest that all have their relevance. In doing this, we are building upon and developing the
insights of alethic pluralism.

12 ibid. p 100.
13 Feyerabend, P.K. Theses on Anarchism in Motterlini op. cit. pp 117–18.
14 To Think with Integrity Hilary Putnam’s Farewell Lecture , available at: http://spazioinwind.libero.it/albgaz/
putnam/puteng.html#Testi%20di%20Putnam.

42 PHILOSOPHY OF MANAG EM EN T, VO LUM E 9, NUM B ER 1, 2010

 JOHN DARWIN

One approach to this is to employ Wilber’s Four Quadrants15. Wilber developed this
conceptualisation after examining many different systems developed over the centuries in
both Western and Eastern thinking, concluding that they fell into four general classes. ‘It
eventually became apparent that these four classes represented the interior and the exterior
of the individual and the collective.’16 The Coherence theory of truth is relevant to the inte-
rior-individual, the Correspondence theory to exterior-individual, the Consensus theory to
interior-collective, and the Pragmatic theory to the exterior-collective.

RADICAL CHANGE

RADICAL HUMANIST RADICAL STRUCTURALIST

Goal: To describe and critique and to
understand
Concern: Social construction of reality,
overcoming distortion
Theory of Truth: Coherence
Goal: Identify sources of domination,
politicization and guidance for action
Concern: Domination and alienation
Theory of Truth: Pragmatic
“The Transformer”

EXTERIOR
INTERIOR

“The Visionary”

INTERPRETIVE FUNCTIONALIST
Goal: Describe, explain and diagnose Goal: Analyse organisations to find regu-
Concern: Social construction of reality, larities, to facilitate control and functional
interpretation development
Theory of Truth: Consensus Concern: Relationship, causality,
“The Enabler” functionality
Theory of Truth: Correspondence
“The Designer”
INCREMENTAL CHANGE

Table 1: Truth and Change

Source: Developed from Burrell and Morgan17

An alternative (and ultimately complementary) approach starts from a framework more

familiar to management students, that of Burrell and Morgan. This is illustrated in Table 1.
The Designer operates through analysis and causality – seeking correspondence between
evidence and action. The Transformer seeks major change through a focus on the exterior,
and this leads to a pragmatic approach to what will work. The Visionary seeks major change
through a focus on the interior, and this is done by creating a coherent [alternative] view of
reality to that currently held by those involved in the change. [The contrast between these

15 Darwin, J (2005) Alethic Pluralism And The Development Of Management Thinking And Practice Proceedings of
Philosophy of Management Conference.
16 Wilber, K. (2000) Integral Psychology Boston:Shambhala p 62.
17 Burrell, G. and Morgan, G. (1979) Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis London: Heinmann.

PHILOSOPHY OF MANAG EM EN T, VO LUM E 9, NUM B ER 1, 2010 43

 KUHN VS. POPPER VS . L AK ATOS VS . FE Y E R A B E N D: C O N T E S T E D TE R R A I N OR FRUITFUL
COLL ABOR ATION?

two radical stances can be illustrated by comparing the Visionary Martin Luther King,
with his vision of internal transformation to tackle racism, and the Transformer John F
Kennedy, with his commitment to putting a man on the moon by the end of the decade.]
Finally the Enabler is interested in the way people collectively construct reality – and hence
has a strong interest in consensus. These are not seen as ‘exclusive’ interests – and it follows
that incommensurability is not being suggested. The argument of alethic pluralism is that
all arenas have their relevance and that an integrated approach can be effective.
These ideas can be brought together through an extension of Lakatos’s idea of the
Scientific Research Programme (SRP), the overall framework within which researchers can
operate. To develop this idea Lakatos made use of several important concepts: the hard
core, the protective belt, the positive and negative heuristics, and fallibilism. The ‘hard core’
of theory is central to the SRP, and the researcher will therefore be concerned to protect
it. This is done through the ‘protective belt’ surrounding the hard core, which consists of
auxiliary theories and hypotheses. In the course of their work – the development of their
SRP – researchers are counselled by Lakatos to adopt two types of methodological rules.
The first he styles the ‘negative heuristic’. This tells us what paths of research to avoid. In
particular it forbids us to direct the modus tollens at the ‘hard core’. That is to say, we do
not reject the hard core when counter-evidence arises. Instead, we should use our inge-
nuity to develop other explanations which protect the core, re-examining the evidence,
or rejecting or modifying one of the less important hypotheses. It is in this sense that the
auxiliary hypotheses form a protective belt surrounding the hard core, and we should redi-
rect the modus tollens to this protective belt, and make appropriate modifications so that
our SRP as a whole explains the evidence. The second type of methodological rule is the
‘positive heuristic’. The positive heuristic is derived primarily from the hard core of the SRP,
and tells us what paths to pursue so that we can develop and enrich our SRP. It ‘sets out a
programme which lists a chain of ever more complicated models simulating reality: the
scientist’s attention is riveted on building his (sic) models following instructions which are
laid down in the positive part of his programme.’ The positive heuristic ‘defines problems,
outlines the construction of a belt of auxiliary hypotheses, foresees anomalies and turns
them victoriously into examples, all according to a preconceived plan.’18 It therefore links
together the hard core, the auxiliary hypotheses, and the experience which will be sought
or examined by the researcher19.
The extension proposed here incorporates alethic pluralism, and leads a conception of
Scientific Research Programme which has advantages over the more familiar use of para-
digms; the two are compared in Table 2, and this will be further developed later in the
paper when we look at Post-normal Science.

18 Lakatos op. cit.:110–111.

19 For greater discussion of this, including Lakatos’s view of fallibilism, see Darwin (2005) op. cit.

44 PHILOSOPHY OF MANAG EM EN T, VO LUM E 9, NUM B ER 1, 2010

 JOHN DARWIN

Kuhnian [Paradigms] Post-Lakatosian [Scientific

Research Programmes]
Paradigm /SRP Single Paradigm Multiple SRPs
Attitude to Paradigm/SRP Commitment Commitment and Challenge
– a Sceptical Approach
Theory of Truth Consensus Alethic Pluralism
Arena of Power Unitary / Control Open / Pluralist
Community of Interest Single Multiple

Table 2: Paradigms and Scientific Research Programmes compared

Utilising alethic pluralism, the positive heuristic may be set out as a series of questions:
Coherence
• Is the theory consistent?
• Does the theory relate coherently to other personal theories, values and
assumptions?
• Is it elegant (beautiful / well-structured / authentic)?
• Is it more elegant than rivals?

Correspondence
• Does it provide validated explanations?
• Does it provide predictions?
• Are these predictions corroborated?
• If not, can the theory be extended to explain this?
• Does it do the above better than rivals?

Pragmatism
• Is the theory useful?
• Does it work?
• Does it provide useful interpretations of the system?
• Does it provide useful new ways of considering the system?
• Is it more useful than rivals?

Consensus
• Does the theory find support in the community of practice?
• Is the language shared and enriched?

PHILOSOPHY OF MANAG EM EN T, VO LUM E 9, NUM B ER 1, 2010 45

 KUHN VS. POPPER VS . L AK ATOS VS . FE Y E R A B E N D: C O N T E S T E D TE R R A I N OR FRUITFUL
COLL ABOR ATION?

• Does it fit with the shared theories, values and assumptions of the community of
practice?
• Does it provide interpretations which fit with the shared theories, values and
assumptions of the community of practice?
• Does it do the above better than rivals?
The remainder of this paper illustrates this approach in three ways. First, two brief examples
of its use are given. Second, this approach is compared with Post-normal Science, and it is argued
that there are complementary features. And third, the concept of co-creation is examined.

Example 1: Never Mind the Evidence, Tell the Story

For good or ill, Taylor’s scientific management remains a powerful influence on thinking
about organisations. The positive viewpoint has been put by Drucker:

On Taylor’s ‘scientific management’ rests, above all, the tremendous surge of affluence
in the last seventy-five years which has lifted the working masses in the developed
countries well above any level recorded, even for the well-to-do. Taylor, though the
Isaac Newton (or perhaps the Archimedes) of the science of work, laid only the first
foundations, however. Not much has been added to them since – even though he has
been dead all of sixty years.20

However Waller gives a rather different take on the scientific foundations laid by Taylor.
He argues that the latter’s writings were based on the work of Gillespie and Wolfe, who
were assigned to observe the loaders being studied. Taylor referred to ‘the scientific selec-
tion of the workmen’: ‘A careful study was then made of each of these men. We looked up
their history as far back as practicable and thorough inquiries were made as to the char-
acter, habits, and the ambition of each of them.’ However the pig-iron studies at Bethlehem
Iron Co. never involved attempts at scientific selection – all were volunteers. Seven volun-
teered, five turned up, then three, then one – Henry Noll (the character ‘Schmidt’ in Taylor’s
account). Only two aspects of their report directly support Taylor’s later claims. First, an
attempt to introduce piece-rates was a central issue, and second the efforts of one particular
worker were crucial to their ultimate success. … Almost everything said in relation to him
and his colleagues by Taylor is however false. Taylor’s colourful descriptions of the key
role personnel selection played are entirely fictional. From the beginning to the end of the
experiment, not a single man was turned away by Gillespie and Wolfe.21

20 Drucker, P. Management : Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices, 1973, quoted in Waller, J (2002) Fabulous Science
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
21 Waller,J. (2002) Fabulous Science Oxford: Oxford University Press 69–75 Based on Wrege, C. and Perroni, A.
Taylor’s Pig-Tale Work Study and Management Services (Vol 9 pp 564–9, 1974).

46 PHILOSOPHY OF MANAG EM EN T, VO LUM E 9, NUM B ER 1, 2010

 JOHN DARWIN

A second key influence on organisational thinking – seen by many as the counterweight

to Taylor – was the work known as the Hawthorne experiments. ‘These investigations
started out inauspiciously, as ordinary fieldwork, consistent in most respects with the Taylor
tradition. They were just intended to be a bunch of straightforward studies of industrial
hygiene factors … But a surprising series of events intruded on the theoretical background
… the main point seems to be that the simple act of paying positive attention to people has
a great deal to do with productivity.’22
Again, Waller provides a different perspective. In the first Relay Assembly Group studied,
two of the five assemblers were replaced just under half way through the experiment after
being repeatedly told off for being ’moody’, ‘inattentive’, ‘uncooperative’, and having inap-
propriate ‘mental attitudes’. The father of one of the replacements had recently lost his job
and she had become the family’s sole breadwinner. Her determination to increase output,
combined with her forceful personality, soon made her the informal leader of the group.
‘The 30% increase in productivity of which the researchers later boasted was mostly the
achievement of replacement workers 1 and 2. This is crucial because the study records prove
that their output was already very high before they could have benefited from the new
supervisory regime.’23
The counter-argument to this is that a good story should prevail:

Frederick Taylor’s purpose was to make a fundamental change in how work was
organized. Since change is ‘a communication-based and communication-driven
phenomenon’ (Ford & Ford, 1995, p. 541), communication theory can be used to help
understand why Taylor created the ‘pig-tale’ rather than precisely recounting the facts
of the pig-iron experiments. Change agents use rhetoric to convince followers that a
management technique is both rational and at the forefront of organization science.
Rather than use linear argumentation, change agents use persuasive communication
to convince managers to adopt innovations and to explain why such actions should be
undertaken. Effective persuasion is dependent on the communicator’s ability to estab-
lish expertise in the area, identify the benefits of change, reinforce the benefits using
vivid language and compelling evidence, and adjust arguments to the audience.24

This standpoint is also taken in relation to more contemporary work – Built to Last. The
arguments of Collins and Porras25 have been widely read and admired, yet a recent study
comments:

22 Peters, T. and Waterman In Search of Excellence 1982, quoted in Waller op.cit.

23 Waller op. cit. pp 86–90.
24 Hough and White Using Stories To Create Change: The Object Lesson Of Frederick Taylor’s Pig-tale Journal of
Management.2001; 27: 585–601.
25 Collins J C & Porras J I (2000) Built to last: Successful habits of visionary companies (3rd Edition) London:
Century Press.

PHILOSOPHY OF MANAG EM EN T, VO LUM E 9, NUM B ER 1, 2010 47

 KUHN VS. POPPER VS . L AK ATOS VS . FE Y E R A B E N D: C O N T E S T E D TE R R A I N OR FRUITFUL
COLL ABOR ATION?

Ten years on, almost half of the visionary companies on the list have slipped dramati-
cally in performance and reputation, and their vision currently seems more blurred
than clairvoyant.26

But the suggestion in the article is that the response of the original authors to this is, in
effect, never mind the evidence, it’s the principles that count:

Collins goes so far as to say that to focus on the companies at all shows a lack of
understanding of the book. ‘BTL is not about these companies,’ Collins says, his voice
rising. ‘For the most part, my experience has been that people haven’t gotten hung up
on the list of companies. At least intelligent, practicing leaders haven’t gotten hung
up on it.’ It is the principles, he says, that are critical, while the companies are simply
a conduit for those ideas. If they had conducted the CEO survey at a different time,
they very well could have had different companies. Simple as that.27

Stories have become increasingly popular in strategy making in recent years, a reflection of
the move from an overly analytical approach. They are an important feature of whole systems
approaches, as we shall discuss later. They are also significant in the ‘airport lounge’ school of
management – thus the home website of Johnson’s fable Who Moved My Cheese? claims that over
five million copies have been sold.28 Other academics have recently moved into this territory29.
Gabriel has argued that

The storyteller is not concerned with ‘facts-as-information’ but with ‘facts as experi-
ence’. The response invited by a story is then not to challenge the ‘facts’, but to engage
with its meaning…Faced with such narratives, researchers have certain choices. They
can dismiss them as trifles of organizational life, which do not affect the basic organi-
zational realities of management… Alternatively, the researcher may become a fellow
traveller.30

Approaching these stories, and discredited (or at the least, strongly challenged) theories,
from the perspective of alethic pluralism allows us to recognise their role, which lies in partic-
ular in the domains of coherence and consensus. Stories bind organisations, or subgroups
within organisations, together – they are an important component of the cultural web. At
other times, by contrast, they help to invent and elaborate theories which are inconsistent

26 Reingold, J and Underwood, R (2004) Was Built to Last Built to Last? at http://www.fastcompany.com/
magazine/88/built-to-last.html.
27 ibid.
28 http://www.whomovedmycheese.com/whomovedmycheese/ Johnson, S. (2002) Who Moved My Cheese?
Vermilion.
29 For example, see Kotter, J. and Rathgeber, H. (2006) Our Iceberg Is Melting Pan.
30 Gabriel, Yiannis (1998) ‘Same Old Story or Changing Stories? Folkloric, Modern and Postmodern Mutations’ in
D. Grant, T. Keenoy and C. Oswick (eds) Discourse and Organization. London: Sage 41.

48 PHILOSOPHY OF MANAG EM EN T, VO LUM E 9, NUM B ER 1, 2010

 JOHN DARWIN

with the accepted point of view, thus challenging orthodoxy in the way Feyerabend advo-
cates, and potentially stimulating theoretical or practical change. It is thus possible to put the
discreditation in context, to recognise the limitations without having to reject the ideas. Their
failure to meet the test of correspondence does not necessarily render them worthless.

Example 2: Crime Scene Investigation

The second brief example draws on the world of popular culture. One of the most successful
TV franchises in recent years has been CSI, currently featuring in three settings – Las Vegas,
Miami and New York. In each episode, a team of forensic investigators solves one – often
two – crimes through the ingenious appliance of science. This has led to the ‘CSI effect’
– ‘the perception of the near-infallibility of forensic science in response to the TV show.’31
For some, this is a positive: ‘I think it raises the expectation for the police officers, so
they do better investigations. Or they should, because if not, they’re going to lose cases.’32
But for others this is a cause for concern: ‘We’re hearing stories where people, jurors will
come back and say: ‘There was no DNA test. I expected that. And without that I’m not
convinced,’‘ says District Attorney Marquis. Baltimore prosecutors blamed the ‘CSI Effect’
when jurors acquitted a man of murder, even though there were two eyewitnesses.’33
The CSI effect has been discussed at the annual meeting of the American Association
for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), where Houck commented: ‘Prosecutors fear the
CSI effect with juries because, for example, they wonder: ‘why wasn’t everything tested?’
Well, in fact, not everything needs to be tested. Defence attorneys also worry about the CSI
effect because they think that jurors come in and have this view of science as a juggernaut;
this objective method that’s always accurate.’34
This emphasis on correspondence provides an interesting contrast to the findings of
Garfinkel:

Garfinkel notes that jurors commonly provide retrospective justifications for deci-
sions which they have already made. They look backward in producing a quasi-legal
rereading of the available evidence after having already decided upon a person’s guilt
or innocence.....They reorder their understandings so as to suggest that ‘fair delibera-
tions’ were guided by the same logic from the beginning – logic which was, in fact,
after the fact. 35

31 Max Houck, who runs a forensic science graduate course at West Virginia University, US, quoted at http://news.
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/4284335.stm.
32 Klatsop County Circuit Judge Paula Brownhill,quoted at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/02/10/
eveningnews/main673060.shtml.
33 ibid.
34 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/4284335.stm.
35 Pfohl, 1985:295.

PHILOSOPHY OF MANAG EM EN T, VO LUM E 9, NUM B ER 1, 2010 49

 KUHN VS. POPPER VS . L AK ATOS VS . FE Y E R A B E N D: C O N T E S T E D TE R R A I N OR FRUITFUL
COLL ABOR ATION?

Here we have an approach to decision-making which is much more strongly motivated

by coherence. The implications may be that jurors need to be advised to take an approach
to their task which takes account of all four approaches to truth which we have outlined
– seeking correspondence with individual items of evidence, a pragmatic overview which
takes account of the ‘big picture’, coherence of their judgement with values and ethics, and
ultimately consensus with the other 11 members of the jury. Such a balanced, pluralist,
approach might help prevent the extremes of excessive expectations of science and retro-
spective decision-justification.
While the focus here has been on decision-making by juries, the same implications apply
to organisational decision-making. Here the dangers of groupthink on the one hand, and of
‘paralysis by analysis’ on the other, suggest that the same balanced approach may help, with
decision makers considering the situation from the viewpoints of correspondence, coher-
ence, pragmatism and consensus.

Post-normal Science
Reference was made at the start of this paper to the substantial influence of Kuhn’s concep-
tion of science, and one alternative has already been outlined here. Another approach
which has sought to move beyond the limitations of Kuhn is that of Post-normal Science,
formulated in particular by Ravetz, and with its roots in the work of earlier thinkers such
as Bateson36 . He looks to the many areas where science comes into contact with public
affairs and policy issues, and argues that the traditional focus on ‘the facts’, expressed in
quantitative form, is now under question because ‘policy-makers increasingly need to make
‘hard’ decisions, choosing between conflicting options, using scientific information which
is irremediably ‘soft’.’37
The focus of Ravetz is on environmental debates, where ‘typically facts are uncertain,
values in dispute, stakes high, and decisions urgent. Some might say that such problems
should not be called ‘science’; but the answer could be that such problems are everywhere,
and when science is (as it must be) applied to them, the conditions are anything but ‘normal’.
For the previous distinction between ‘hard’, objective scientific facts and ‘soft’, subjective
value-judgements is now inverted. All too often, we must make hard policy decisions where
our only scientific inputs are irremediably soft. In such contexts of policy making, there is a
new role for natural science.’38
This insight leads to his characterisation of post-normal science, in which ‘quality becomes
crucial, and quality refers to process as much as to product. It is increasingly realised in policy
circles that in complex environment issues, lacking neat solutions and requiring support

36 Sylvia S. Tognetti, S.S. (1999) ‘Science in a double-bind: Gregory Bateson and the origins of post-normal Science’
Futures 31 689–703.
37 Funtowicz, S. and Ravetz, J.R. (1990) Uncertainty and Quality in Science for Policy.
38 Ravetz J.R. What is Post-Normal Science Futures 31 (1999) 647–653.

50 PHILOSOPHY OF MANAG EM EN T, VO LUM E 9, NUM B ER 1, 2010

 JOHN DARWIN

from all stakeholders, the quality of the decision-making process is absolutely critical for the
achievement of an effective product in the decision. This new understanding applies to the
scientific aspect of decision-making as much as to any other.’39
Ravetz develops this argument by identifying three types of activity, referenced against the
degree of ‘systems uncertainties’ and ‘decision stakes’. ‘When both of these are small, we are in
the realm of ‘normal’, science, where expertise is fully effective. When either is medium, then
the application of routine techniques it not enough; skill, judgement, sometimes even courage
are required. We call this ‘professional consultancy’, with the examples of the surgeon or the
senior engineer in mind. Our modern society has depended on armies of ‘applied scientists’
pushing forward the frontiers of knowledge and technique, with the professionals performing
tasks requiring greater personal responsibility.’40 The third activity is post-normal science,
where both systems uncertainties and decision stakes are high.
The contrast between normal and post-normal science is summarised in Table 3. Like
Kuhn, Ravetz focuses primarily on the natural sciences. But as with normal science, the
concept of post-normal science can readily be extended into the social sciences, and indeed
it can be argued that it provides a stronger fit, with its recognition of multiple paradigms
and of free debate. As an example, the three types of activity outlined in the previous
paragraph accord closely to Schein’s three models of consultation41, each with differing
underlying assumptions:
• The Purchase of Information or Expertise, when the assumption is that the client(s)
have themselves identified the problem, what consultancy services they require
and who might provide them. They have determined that information or expertise
is required which either does not currently exist within the organization, or is not
considered to be currently available.
The Doctor–Patient Model, which assumes that the client experiences ‘pain’, or ‘symp-
toms’ without knowing the cause or ‘illness’. The consultant is brought in to ‘diagnose’ the
client organization and to ‘prescribe’ a solution. At the core of this model is the delegation
by the client of not only the solution to a problem, but also its identification. The client is
therefore initially dependent on the consultant until an intervention is suggested.
• Process Consultation, which involves ‘a set of activities on the part of the consultant
that help the client to perceive, understand, and act upon the process events
that occur in the client’s environment.’42 It is this third model – which connects
well with Ravetz’ post-normal science, that will be developed further in the final
section of this paper, when we consider a number of approaches to organisation
development which have developed in recent years, and which involve multiple
perspectives, stress, doubt and uncertainty.

39 ibid.
40 ibid.
41 Schein, E. (1987) Process Consultation (s): Lessons for Managers and Consultants Reading, Mass: Addison
Wesley.
42 Schein op. cit.

PHILOSOPHY OF MANAG EM EN T, VO LUM E 9, NUM B ER 1, 2010 51

 KUHN VS. POPPER VS . L AK ATOS VS . FE Y E R A B E N D: C O N T E S T E D TE R R A I N OR FRUITFUL
COLL ABOR ATION?

Normal Science Post-normal Science

Single Paradigm Multiple Paradigms
Delivery of Truth Assuring Quality as ‘Fitness for Purpose’
Peer Review Review by Extended Peer Communities
Focus on Facts Deals With ‘Extended’ Facts, Uncertainties and Value Loadings
Rigid Certainty Reasoned Doubt
Enforced Consensus Free Debate
Brittle Response to Challenge Resilience Under Stress
Myopia and Denial of Problems Acceptance of Error
Fragmentation and Collapse Learning Through Inner Struggle

Table 3: Normal and Post-normal Science43

Taking a number of these insights we can enhance the earlier characterisation of Scientific
Research Programmes (SRPs) to create an integrated approach as illustrated in Table 4.

Kuhnian (Paradigms) Scientific Research Programmes + Post

Normal Science
Paradigm /SRP Single Paradigm Multiple SRPs
Attitude to Commitment Commitment and Challenge – a Sceptical
Paradigm/SRP Approach
Theory of Truth Consensus Alethic Pluralism
Arena of Power Unitary / Control Open / Pluralist
Community of Single Multiple
Interest
Peer Review Review by Extended Peer Communities

General Approach Myopia and Denial of Problems Acceptance of Error

Rigid Certainty Reasoned Doubt

Evidence Focus on Facts Deals With ‘Extended’ Facts,
Uncertainties and Value Loadings

Table 4: An Integrated Approach44

43 Based on Post-Normal Science – Beyond simplistic belief systems Jerry Ravetz http://www.postnormaltimes.
net/blog/archives/2005/05/postnormal_scie_1.html.
44 For discussion of the concept of Arena of Power see Darwin, J (2003) Preventing Premature Agreement Reason
In Practice: The Journal of Philosophy of Management.

52 PHILOSOPHY OF MANAG EM EN T, VO LUM E 9, NUM B ER 1, 2010

 JOHN DARWIN

Co-creation

Over the past two decades a number of novel approaches to organisation development have
emerged, including whole systems interventions 45, open space46, storytelling47 and appre-
ciative inquiry48. While different in their detailed methodologies, they share a focus on the
future, and on the belief that the members of an organisation can co-create their future.
They share both these aspects also with strategic approaches that have a longer history,
such as scenario planning and action research, but they have brought new insights, particu-
larly in the area of co-creation. At the same time, this emphasis on the future has been
emerging in more general analyses of the changing nature of industry, as in the advocacy of
blue ocean strategies49, the experience economy50, or co-creation with customers51.
The argument that the most successful companies are those which can create the future
was popularised in the 1990s by Hamel and Prahalad52, amongst others, but has recently
gained new momentum in the arguments of Chan Kim and Mauborgne. They contrast the
red oceans, representing all the industries in existence today, and the focus of competi-
tion-based strategy work over the past 25 years, with the blue oceans, which denote all the
industries not in existence today. In blue oceans the focus is upon creation – of demand, of
products and services, of customer bases, in some cases of completely new industries.
For Pine and Gilmore the focus is upon the emergence of the experience economy.
Experiences, whether at Disney, Starbuck or the British Museum, whether in education,
entertainment or tourism, are personal, and need to be memorable. Consequently they are
co-created through an interaction between the provider and the customer (or as they would
put it, between the stager and the guest). Prahalad and Ramaswamy 53 have characterised

45 Marvin Weisbord and Sandra Janoff (2000) Future search : an action guide to finding common ground in
organizations and communities San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler; Robert W. Jacobs (1997) Real time strategic
change : how to involve an entire organization in fast and far-reaching change San Francisco :Berrett-Koehler.
46 Harrison Owen (1997) Open space technology : a user’s guide San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers.
47 Stephen Denning (2001) The springboard : how storytelling ignites action in knowledge-era organizations Boston
: Oxford : Butterworth-Heinemann;
Gabriel, Yiannis (1998) Same Old Story or Changing Stories? Folkloric, Modern and Postmodern Mutations. In D.
Grant, T. Keenoy and C. Oswick (eds) Discourse and Organization London: Sage.
48 Ludema, J.D., Cooperrider, D.L. and Barrett, F.J. (2006) Appreciative inquiry : the power of the unconditional
positive question in Peter Reason and Hilary Bradbury (Ed.) Handbook of action research : the concise paperback
edition London : SAGE.
49 Chan Kim, W. and Mauborgne, R. (2005) Blue ocean strategy : how to create uncontested market space and make
the competition irrelevant Boston: Harvard Business School.
50 Pine, B.J. and Gilmore, J.H. (1999) The experience economy : work is theatre and every business a stage Boston:
Harvard Business School Press.
51 Prahalad C. K. and Ramaswamy V. (2004) The Future of Competition: Co-creating Unique Value with Customers
Boston: Harvard Business School.
52 Hamel, G. and Prahalad, C.K. (1994) Competing for the Future Harvard Business School Press: Boston.
53 Prahalad C. K. and Ramaswamy V. Co-creating unique value with customers Strategy and Leadership Vol 32 No
3 2004 4–9.

PHILOSOPHY OF MANAG EM EN T, VO LUM E 9, NUM B ER 1, 2010 53

 KUHN VS. POPPER VS . L AK ATOS VS . FE Y E R A B E N D: C O N T E S T E D TE R R A I N OR FRUITFUL
COLL ABOR ATION?

the consumers in the experience economy as connected, informed and active. They have
access to unprecedented amounts of information on firms, products, technologies, prices
and consumer actions and reactions from around the world, allowing them to make more
informed decisions. They can network in ‘thematic consumer communities’, through which
individuals can share ideas and feelings without regard for geographic or social barriers.
They can use the Internet to experiment with and develop products, especially digital ones.
And ‘as they learn, they can better discriminate when making choices; and as they network,
they embolden each other to act and speak out’54.
The new approaches to organisation development continue the focus that strategy has long
had on the ‘exterior’ – the environment, resources, capability – but add a much stronger stress
on the ‘interior’ – how people think, interact, communicate, and create. All share the view
that members of an organisation can co-create their future. Thus in Appreciative Inquiry one
of the four core processes is ‘dream’ – create shared images for a preferred future

The work of this fourth core process of AI is to engage as many organisation members as
possible in co-creating a shared image or vision of a preferred future. … The construc-
tionist principle holds that it is through our conversations that we create the images and
frameworks that will guide the actions that create our future. … To expand, enhance, or
change an organisation, its image must be reconstructed through conversations among
key stakeholders. The heliotropic hypothesis suggests that people and organisations,
like plants, will move in the direction of that which is most life-giving.55

As the creator of appreciative inquiry puts it:

The power of positive imagery is not just some popular illusion or wish but is argu-
ably a key factor in every action. … To the extent that organisations’ imaginative
projections are the key to their current conduct, organisations are free to seek trans-
formations in conventional practice by replacing conventional images with images of
a new and better future. 56

In similar vein Weisbord, pioneer of Future Search Conferencing, cites seven ‘core
values’ proposed by Angus, Frank and Rehm57 one of which is that ‘we believe people can
create their own future’.
The danger here is that we move into the realm of ‘I imagine, therefore it will be’. A recent
manifestation of this is The Secret, a publishing phenomenon which has sold 1.75 million

54 ibid pp 4.5.
55 Watkins, J.M. (2001) Appreciative Inquiry: Change at the Speed of Imagination San Francisco: Jossey-Bass/Pfeiffer
133–5.
56 Srivastva, S. and Cooperrider, D.L. (1999) Appreciative Management and Leadership Eucild, Ohio: Williams
Custom Publishing 97, 116–17.
57 Quoted in Weisbord, N. (1992) Discovering Common Ground San Francisco:Berret-Koehler p 13.

54 PHILOSOPHY OF MANAG EM EN T, VO LUM E 9, NUM B ER 1, 2010

 JOHN DARWIN

copies worldwide, with a movie version on DVD which has sold 1.5 million. Oprah Winfrey,
Larry King and Ellen de Generes have all dedicated one or more shows to it, and Newsweek
has dedicated a cover. The Secret is the Law of Attraction, which states that our feelings and
thoughts attract real events in the world into our lives; from the workings of the cosmos to
interactions among individuals in their physical, emotional, and professional affairs. People
mentioned in the film as ‘past secret teachers’ of this wisdom include Aristotle, Plato, Isaac
Newton, Martin Luther King, Jung, Victor Hugo, Henry Ford, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Edison,
Einstein, Churchill, Carnegie, Alexander Graham Bell, and Beethoven. With such an impres-
sive list [and there are many more] it becomes a wonder how anyone has failed to spot the
Law, but the film suggests that there has been a strong tendency by those in positions of power
to keep this central principle hidden from the public.
The counterview to the above is neatly put by Burkeman:

The Secret echoes the New Age ideas promoted by that other major historical figure,
Noel Edmonds, but in ultra-distilled form, stripped of all vestiges of common sense.
Focusing intently on what you want in life isn’t just helpful, it claims: it’s all you need
to do.58

Organisational development processes which focus on co-creation are in danger of

receiving a similar reaction. One personal example will illustrate. When planning a whole
systems event with a local authority, which would involve its fifty senior councillors and
officers, I had outlined the intended process to the immediate client – a senior officer in the
council. On the morning of the event, when I arrived early to check the facilities were as
requested, he took me to one side and explained that the previous evening he had outlined
the process – involving ‘getting the whole system in the room’ and working through phases
of individual, group and plenary activities – to the council leader. He had responded that
‘this is not the way we do things around here’, and sure enough my proposed layout had
been replaced with a single large table around which all participants would sit, and a
number of breakout rooms. After initially working in this context, it became possible to
change it during the morning, and the subsequent activity proved successful – but it illus-
trated the doubts engendered by these non-standard approaches.
Given the number and diversity of arguments for co-creation in organisations, there
seems little doubt that this will be an important dimension of strategic thinking in coming
years. To date it has been employed in very different contexts and with different stresses
– in industry and market analysis, the focus has been on the external, while in organisa-
tional development the focus has been on the internal. The argument here is that its full
potential emerges when its use incorporates the external and the internal, allowing free
rein to the imagination, but ensuring a ‘reality check’. To this end, a healthy mix of whole
systems methodology with more familiar and traditional methods – such as SWOT/TOWS,

58 Burkeman, O. The Anti-Secret The Guardian Saturday April 21, 2007.

PHILOSOPHY OF MANAG EM EN T, VO LUM E 9, NUM B ER 1, 2010 55

 KUHN VS. POPPER VS . L AK ATOS VS . FE Y E R A B E N D: C O N T E S T E D TE R R A I N OR FRUITFUL
COLL ABOR ATION?

PESTEL, Force Field and Stakeholder Analysis – can prove an effective way of ensuring that
correspondence, coherence, pragmatism and consensus all play their part.

Conclusions and Reflections

This proposal for an alethic pluralist approach to management practice resonates with the
argument that we should cultivate ‘five minds for the future’59, and that there are five mana-
gerial mindsets60, through which managers interpret and deal with the world around them.
Notwithstanding Gardner’s counsel against excessive ‘lumping’, which he characterises as
‘everything connects to everything else’, a connection can be made between these argu-
ments and the four approaches to truth outlined earlier.
• The Designer, whose focus is on analysis of organisations to find regularities,
to facilitate control and functional development. This links well with Gardner’s
Disciplined mind61, and with the Analytic mindset62 of Gosling and Mintzberg. The
related theory of truth is Correspondence.
• The Transformer seeks radical change with an exterior focus. The link here is
with Gardner’s Synthesizing mind63, and the Worldly mindset64 of Gosling and
Mintzberg. The related theory of truth is Pragmatism.
• The Visionary, whose focus is on describing, critiquing and understanding. The
link is with Gardner’s Creating mind65, and the Reflective mindset66 of Gosling and
Mintzberg. The related theory of truth is Coherence.

59 Gardner, H. (2006) Five Minds for the Future Boston:Harvard Business School Press.
60 Gosling, J and Mintzberg, H. (2003) Five Minds of a Manager Harvard Business Review, November.
61 ‘A discipline constitutes a distinctive way of thinking about the world. Scientists observe the world; come up
with tentative classifications, concepts and theories; design experiments in order to test those tentative theories;
revise the theories in the light of the findings; and then return, newly informed, to make further observations,
redo classifications, and devise experiments.’ op.cit. 27.
62 ‘Analysis loosens up complex phenomena by breaking them into component parts – by decomposing them. …
The key to analysing effectively, in our view, is to get beyond conventional approaches in order to appreciate how
analysis works and what effect it has on the organisation.’ op. cit.
63 ‘I would expect that a worthy ‘synthesis on synthesis’ should be clear, at least minimally original, reasonably
convincing, and potentially useful.’ op. cit. 70.
64 ‘Far from being uniform, this world is made up of all kinds of worlds. Should we not, then, be encouraging
our managers to be more worldly, more experienced in life, in both sophisticated and practical ways? … To
paraphrase T.S. Eliot’s famous words, should we not explore ceaselessly in order to return home and know the
place for the first time.’ op. cit.
65 ‘By virtue of its anchoring in territory that is not yet rule-governed, the creating mind seeks to remain at least
one step ahead of even the most sophisticated computers and robots. … ‘The creator … strikes out in unfamiliar
directions and enjoys – or at least accepts – being different from the pack. When an anomaly arises … she does
not shrink from that unexpected wrinkle.’ op. cit. 3,83.
66 ‘Organisations… need managers who see both ways – in a sense, ones who look out the window at dawn, to see
through their own reflections to the awakening world outside.’ op. cit.

56 PHILOSOPHY OF MANAG EM EN T, VO LUM E 9, NUM B ER 1, 2010

 JOHN DARWIN

• The Enabler, whose concern is to describe, explain and diagnose the social
construction of reality. The link is with Gardner’s Respecting mind 67, and with two
of the mindsets proposed by Gosling and Mintzberg – the Collaborative68 and the
Action69. The related theory of truth is Consensus.
The only link not made here is with Gardner’s Ethical mind. Gardner comments on
‘the relationship between respect and ethics. I intend no sharp divide, no gulf, between
these two spheres of virtue. … And yet, it is misleading to collapse these spheres…. Respect
… remains fundamentally an issue of how an individual thinks of and behaves toward
those persons whom he or she encounters each day. …. Ethics involves an additional step of
abstraction.’70. There is therefore some relationship to the Enabler, but respecting Gardner’s
counsel against collapsing it is not directly linked.
As is apparent, these connections are not exact, but they are suggestive, and provide a
heuristic case for adding alethic pluralism to the capability of the effective change agent.
Treating the work of our four philosophers not as contradictory, but rather as complemen-
tary in several important dimensions, allows therefore a richer approach to their varied
insights.
J o h n Da rw i n

John Darwin has worked at Sheffield Hallam University since 1992, teaching and researching primarily
in the fields of strategy, organisation development, the management of change and the philosophy of
knowledge. Prior to this he worked for Sheffield City Council, latterly as Director of Employment
and Economic Development, and before that Newcastle upon Tyne City Council, Trade Union Studies
Information Unit, Universities of Durham and Newcastle, and Swansea Council of Social Services. His
consultancy work has been primarily in local government and the health service, whilst his publications
have covered housing, economic development, local government, strategic alliances and complexity
theory. These include Developing Strategies for Change (with P. Johnson and J. McAuley) 2002 FT: Prentice
Hall. John is currently exploring the role of mindfulness in organisational change.

67 ‘The respectful mind notes and welcomes differences between human individuals and between human groups,
tries to understand these ‘others’, and seeks to work effectively with them.’ op. cit. 3.
68 ‘Getting into a truly collaborative mind-set means getting beyond empowerment and into commitment. It also
means getting away from the currently popular heroic style of managing and moving toward a more engaging
style.’ op. cit.
69 ‘An action mind-set is about developing a sensitive awareness of the terrain and of what the team is capable of
doing in it and thereby helping to set and maintain direction, coaxing everyone along.’ op. cit.
70 op. cit. 143.

PHILOSOPHY OF MANAG EM EN T, VO LUM E 9, NUM B ER 1, 2010 57