CONSTI LAW FINALS

REVIEWER

NEAR V MINNESOTA

TOPIC: PRIOR RESTRAINT, PROTECTED SPEECH “PRIOR RESTRAINT”

IMPORTANT NOTE: NEWS PAPER “SATURDAY PRESS” OWNED BY

NEAR, ALLEGEDLY RELEASING A DEFAMATORY, SCANDALOUS AND
MALICIOUS ARTICLES.

DECISIONS OF THE LOWER COURT: Judgment was thereupon entered

adjudging that 'the newspaper, magazine and periodical known as The
Saturday Press,' as a public nuisance, 'be and is hereby abated.' The
judgment perpetually enjoined the defendants 'from producing, editing,
publishing, circulating, having in their possession, selling or giving away
any publication whatsoever which is a malicious, scandalous or defamatory
newspaper, as defined by law,' and also 'from further conducting said
nuisance under the name and title of said The Saturday Press or any other
name or title.

RULING: 1) It is apparent that under the statute the publication is to be

regarded as defamatory if it injures reputation, and that it is scandalous if it
circulates charges of reprehensible conduct, whether criminal or
otherwise, and the publication is thus deemed to invite public reprobation
and to constitute a public scandal.

'The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but
this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in
freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman
has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public;
to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes
what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequence of
his own temerity.' 

PRIOR RESTRAINT – WHERE THE GOV’T PROHIBITS PUBLISHING

CERTAIN TOPIC BEFORE THEY ARE PUBLISHED

FREEDMAN V MARYLAND

TOPIC: PRIOR RESTRAINT, PROTECTED SPEECH “3 STANDARDS”

IMPORTANT NOTE: Appellant was convicted of exhibiting a motion picture

without submitting it to the Maryland State Board of Censors for prior
approval, despite his contention that the motion picture censorship statute
unconstitutionally impaired freedom of expression.
Appellant sought to challenge the constitutionality of the Maryland motion
picture censorship statute, and exhibited the film "Revenge at Daybreak" at
his Baltimore theatre without first submitting the picture to the State Board
of Censors as required by 2 thereof.  The State concedes that the picture
does not violate the statutory standards and would have received a license if
properly submitted, but the appellant was convicted of a 2 violation despite
his contention that the statute in its entirety unconstitutionally impaired
freedom of expression. The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed, and we
noted probable jurisdiction. We reverse.

RULING: COURT ESTABLISHED 3 GUIDELINES AS ADEQUATE

GUIDELINES TO PROTECT AGAINST UNDUE INHIBITION OF
PROTECTED EXPRESSION, TO WIT;

1) THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE FILM IS UNPROTECTED

EXPRESSION MUST REST ON THE SENSOR

2) ONLY JUDICIAL DETERMINATION IN AN ADVERSARY

PROCEEDING ENSURES THE NECESSARY SENSITIVITY TO
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, ONLY A PROCEDURE REQUIRING A
JUDICIAL DETERMINATION SUFFICES TO IMPOSE A VALID FINAL
RESTRAINT.

3) REQUIRED PROPMT DETERMINATION WITHIN A SPECIFIED TIME

PERIOD

INC V CA

TOPIC: NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

IMPORTANT NOTE: Sometime in the months of September, October and

November 1992 petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for
Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos.
116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public
viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against
other religions which is expressly prohibited by law.

RULING: Religious Profession and Worship

The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz.,
freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's beliefs. The first is absolute
as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is
subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that
affect the public welfare.
The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be
regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger
of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e.,
serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public
morals, or public welfare.

Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any
religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious
dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their
followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of
religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion

In a State where there ought to be no difference between the appearance

and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is
better theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought
and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. When
the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas demands that speech
should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat
of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth.

Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified

by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and
imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.

It was Mr. Justice Holmes who formulated the test in Schenck v. US, 24 as
follows: ". . . the question in every case is whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent." Admittedly, the test was originally
designed to determine the latitude which should be given to speech that
espouses anti-government action. Bannered by Justices Holmes and
Brandeis, the test attained its full flowering in the decade of the forties,
when its umbrella was used to protect speech other than subversive
speech.25 Thus, for instance, the test was applied to annul a total ban on
labor picketing. 26 The use of the test took a downswing in the 1950's when
the US Supreme Court decided Dennis v. United States involving
communist conspiracy. 27 In Dennis, the components of the test were
altered as the High Court adopted Judge Learned Hand's formulation that
". . . in each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,'
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is
necessary to avoid the danger." The imminence requirement of the test was
thus diminished and to that extent, the protection of the rule was
weakened. In 1969, however, the strength of the test was reinstated in
Brandenburg v. Ohio,28 when the High Court restored in the test the
imminence requirement, and even added an intent requirement which
according to a noted commentator ensured that only speech directed at
inciting lawlessness could be punished. Presently in the United States, the
clear and present danger test is not applied to protect low value
speeches such as obscene speech, commercial speech and defamation. Be
that as it may, the test is still applied to four types of speech: speech that
advocates dangerous ideas, speech that provokes a hostile audience
reaction, out of court contempt and release of information that endangers a
fair trial.

the determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification,

exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries of
protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be
arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors.

PEOPLE V PEREZ

TOPIC: PROTECTED SPEECH, SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT

IMPORTANT NOTE: Isaac Perez, while holding a discussion with several

persons on political matters, did criminally, unlawfully and wilfully and
with knowledge that Honorable Leonard Wood was the Governor-General
of the Philippine Islands and in the discharge of his functions as such
authority, insult by word, without his presence, said Governor-General,
uttering in a loud voice and in the presence of many persons, and in a
public place, the following phrases: And the Filipinos, like myself, must
use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing
for the Philippines.

RULING: In criminal law, there are a variety of offenses which are not
directed primarily against individuals, but rather against the existence of
the State, the authority of the Government, or the general public peace. The
offenses created and defined in Act No. 292 are distinctly of this character.
Among them is sedition, which is the raising of commotions or
disturbances in the State. It is a revolt against legitimate authority. Though
the ultimate object of sedition is a violation of the public peace or at least
such a course of measures as evidently engenders it, yet it does not aim at
direct and open violence against the laws, or the subversion of the
Constitution.

It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292 must
not be interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress
of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of
Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the
Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of
speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious. But when the intention
and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of
speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive
measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the
supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State

Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the
Philippine Islands. His official position, like the Presidency of the United
States and other high offices, under a democratic form of government,
instead, of affording immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather
to invite abusive attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the Governor-
General passes the furthest bounds of free speech was intended. There is a
seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce
disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a
disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws.

The Governor-General is an executive official appointed by the President of

the United States by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the
United States, and holds in his office at the pleasure of the President. The
Organic Act vests supreme executive power in the Governor-General to be
exercised in accordance with law. The Governor-General is the
representative of executive civil authority in the Philippines and of the
sovereign power. A seditious attack on the Governor-General is an attack on
the rights of the Filipino people and on American sovereignty.

DENNIS V UNITED STATES

TOPIC: CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST

IMPORTANT NOTE: COMMUNIST ADVOCAY OF OVETHROW THE GOV’T.

The indictment charged the petitioners with wilfully and knowingly
conspiring (1) to organize as the Communist Party of the United States of
America a society, group and assembly of persons who teach and advocate
the overthrow and destruction of the Government of the United States by
force and violence, and (2) knowingly and wilfully to advocate and teach the
duty and necessity of overthrowing and destroying the Government of the
United States by force and violence. The indictment further alleged that § 2
of the Smith Act proscribes these acts and that any conspiracy to take such
action is a violation of § 3 of the Act.

RULING:  Overthrow of the Government by force and violence is certainly a

substantial enough interest for the Government to limit speech

CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE Government
may not act until the putsch is about to be executed, the plans have been
laid and the signal is awaited. If Government is aware that a group aiming
at its overthrow is attempting to indoctrinate its members and to commit
them to a course whereby they will strike when the leaders feel the
circumstances permit, action by the Government is required. The argument
that there is no need for Government to concern itself, for Government is
strong, it possesses ample powers to put down a rebellion, it may defeat the
revolution with ease needs no answer. For that is not the question.
Certainly an attempt to overthrow the Government by force, even though
doomed from the outset because of inadequate numbers or power of the
revolutionists, is a sufficient evil for Congress to prevent. The damage
which such attempts create both physically and politically to a nation makes
it impossible to measure the validity in terms of the probability of success,
or the immediacy of a successful attempt.

ABRAMS V UNITED STATES

TOPIC; CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST

IMPORTANT NOTE:   ABRAMS DISTRIBUTED PAMPHLETS NEAR THE

END OF WORLD WAR 1, IT CONTAINS PROTEST AGAINST THE ACTION
OF THE US IN THE WAR INCLUDING THE DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS IN
RUSSIA, THE PAMPHLETS ENCOURAGE WORKERS TO STRIKE TO
TWHART AMERICAN WAR EFFORT

RULING: JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES IN HIS DISSENTING

OPINION, SAID, PROTECTION OF SPEECH SHOULD NOT BE IMPAIRED
UNLESS THERE IS A PRESENT DANGER OF IMMEDIATE EVIL OR THE
INTEND TO CREATE SUCH DANGER, WHICH THE STATE OUGHT TO
PREVENT

US V O’BRIEN

TOPIC: SYMBOLIC SPEECH

IMPORTANT NOTE: KNOWINGLY BURNING OF DRAFT CARD. On the

morning of March 31, 1966, David Paul O'Brien and three companions
burned their Selective Service registration certificates on the steps of the
South Boston Courthouse. A sizable crowd, including several agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, witnessed the event.1 Immediately after
the burning, members of the crowd began attacking O'Brien and his
companions. An FBI agent ushered O'Brien to safety inside the courthouse.
After he was advised of his right to counsel and to silence, O'Brien stated to
FBI agents that he had burned his registration certificate because of his
beliefs, knowing that he was violating federal law. He produced the charred
remains of the certificate, which, with his consent, were photographed.

RULING: it does not necessarily follow that the destruction of a registration

certificate is constitutionally protected activity. This Court has held that when
'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element
can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. To characterize
the quality of the governmental interest which must appear, the Court has
employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating;
paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms,
we think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified

1) if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an

important or

2) If it is substantial governmental interest

3) if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free

expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.

SCHENK V US

TOPIC: CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST

IMPORTANT NOTE: SCHECNK A RUSSIAN DISTRIBUTED A PAMPHLET

OPPOSING THE MILITARY DRAFT, THE CONTAINS ENCOURAGEMENT
OF YOUNG AMERICANS TO RESIST THE DRAFT

RULING: The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a
man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not
even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may
have all the effect of force. The question in every case is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and
degree. When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of
peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be
endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as
protected by any constitutional right.

SCHENK IS NOT PROTESTING THE DRAFT; HE IS ENCOURAGING THE

YOUNG AMERICANS TO REFUSE THE DRAFT

TEXAS V JOHNSON

TOPIC: SYMBOLIC SPEECH

IMPORTANT NOTE: BURNING OF FLAG. During the 1984 Republican

National Convention in Dallas, Texas, respondent Johnson participated in a
political demonstration to protest the policies of the Reagan administration
and some Dallas-based corporations. After a march through the city streets,
Johnson burned an American flag while protesters chanted. No one was
physically injured or threatened with injury, although several witnesses
were seriously offended by the flag burning. Johnson was convicted of
desecration of a venerated object in violation of a Texas statute, and a State
Court of Appeals affirmed. However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
reversed, holding that the State, consistent with the First Amendment,
could not punish Johnson for burning the flag in these circumstances. The
court first found that Johnson's burning of the flag was expressive conduct
protected by the First Amendment. The court concluded that the State could
not criminally sanction flag desecration in order to preserve the flag as a
symbol of national unity. It also held that the statute did not meet the
State's goal of preventing breaches of the peace, since it was not drawn
narrowly enough to encompass only those flag burnings that would likely
result in a serious disturbance, and since the flag burning in this case did
not threaten such a reaction. Further, it stressed that another Texas statute
prohibited breaches of the peace and could be used to prevent disturbances
without punishing this flag desecration.

RULING: THE COURT HELD THAT THE BURNING OF FLAG IS

EXPRESSIVE CONDUCT, THUS, PROTECTED SYMBOLIC SPEECH,
BECAUSE JOHNSON IS INVOVLED IN A FORM OF POLITICAL PROTEST,
IT CONTAINS A SUFFICIENT LEVEL OF COMMUNICATION.
   COURT HELD THAT, THE BEDROCK OF PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION, is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.

IN TEXAS V JOHNSON THE PROTEST WAS TO PETITION THE GOV’T FOR

REDRESS OR GRIEVANCE, THE BURNING OF THE FLAG MADE BY
JOHNSON IS A SYMBOLIC SPEECH, THUS, IT IS A VALID EXERCISE OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, WHILE IN O’BRIEN, THE PROTESTER
BURNED THE DRAFT CARD CONTAINING THE DETAILS OF THE
REGISTRANT OF US MILITARY TRAINING

MILLER V CALIFORNIA

TOPIC: OBSCENITY

IMPORTANT NOTE:  Appellant conducted a mass mailing campaign to

advertise the sale of illustrated books, euphemistically called 'adult'
material. Appellant was convicted of mailing unsolicited sexually explicit
material in violation of a California statute that approximately
incorporated the obscenity test

RULING:  The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community
standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest.
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law.

(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. 

ROTH V US

TOPIC: OBSCENITY

IMPORTANT NOTE:  Roth conducted a business in New York in the

publication and sale of books, photographs and magazines. He used
circulars and advertising matter to solicit sales. He was convicted by a jury
in the District Court for the Southern District of New York upon 4 counts of
a 26-count indictment charging him with mailing obscene circulars and
advertising, and an obscene book, in violation of the federal obscenity
statute.

RULING: three elements must coalesce: it must be established that

(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a
prurient interest in sex

(b) the material is patently offensive sexual conduct

(c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.

ESTRADA V ESCRITOR

TOPIC: FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE, BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY

IMPORTANT NOTE: In a sworn-letter complaint dated July 27, 2000,

complainant Alejandro Estrada requested Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding
judge of Branch 253, Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, for an investigation of
respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said court, for living with a man
not her husband, and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement.
Estrada believes that Escritor is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the
image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as
it might appear that the court condones her act.2 Consequently, respondent was
charged with committing "disgraceful and immoral conduct" under Book V, Title I,
Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Code. 3
Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999,
she was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998.4 She admitted
that she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of
marriage more than twenty years ago when her husband was still alive but
living with another woman. She also admitted that she and Quilapio have a
son.5 But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, respondent
asserted that their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their
religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation.6 In fact, after ten
years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991, a "Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness."7

RULING: Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that

gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the
Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.

WISCONSIN V YODER

TOPIC: FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

IMPORTANT NOTE:  Respondents, members of the Old Order Amish

religion and the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, were convicted of
violating Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law (which requires a
child's school attendance until age 16) by declining to send their children to
public or private school after they had graduated from the eighth grade. The
evidence showed that the Amish provide continuing informal vocational
education to their children designed to prepare them for life in the rural
Amish community. The evidence also showed that respondents sincerely
believed that high school attendance was contrary to the Amish religion and
way of life and that they would endanger their own salvation and that of
their children by complying with the law. The State Supreme Court
sustained respondents' claim that application of the compulsory school-
attendance law to them violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment.

RULING: THE COURT HELD THAT, THE STATE’S INTEREST IN

EDUCATION CHILDREN SHOULD NOT TRUMP THE ABILITY OF AMISH
FAMILIES TO EXERCISE THEIR FREE RELIGION.

HOW EVER STRONG THE STATE INTEREST IN UNIVERSAL

COMPULSARY IN EDUCATION IT IS BY NO MEANS ABSOLUTE TO THE
EXCLUSION OR SUBORDINATION OF ALL OTHER INTEREST

The conclusion is inescapable that secondary schooling, by exposing Amish

children to worldly influences in terms of attitudes, goals, and values
contrary to beliefs, and by substantially interfering with the religious
development of the Amish child and his integration into the way of life of
the Amish faith community at the crucial adolescent stage of development,
contravenes the basic religious tenets and practice of the Amish faith, both
as to the parent and the child.

WELSH V US

TOPIC: FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR

IMPORTANT NOTE: CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR. On March 27, 1964,

Elliot Ashton Welsh II was ordered by the Selective Service to report for
physical examination after having been classified I-A and available for
military service. Walsh requested and filed application for conscientious
objector status. On his form, Welsh specifically indicated that his objection
was not rooted in religious belief; he responded "No" where the
questionnaire asked if he believed in a supreme being. An appeal board
rejected his application. Welsh refused to appear for induction and, on
June 1, 1966, was sentenced to three years imprisonment. The Court ruled
in United States v. Seeger (1965) that conscientious objector status was not
reserved to individuals of a traditional religious background. On appeal,
however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that
because Welsh denied any religious foundation for his beliefs, whereas
Seeger had characterized his pacifist beliefs as "religious," Welsh's
conviction was valid.

RULING: SC held that a person could be exempted from compulsory

military service based solely on moral or ethical beliefs against war.

" The Court therefore reasoned that conscientious objector status applies to
"all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or
religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed
themselves to become a part of an instrument of war."

DAVID V ARROYO

TOPIC: UNLAWFUL SEARCHES AND SEIZURE

IMPORTANT NOTE: In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo

members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate GMA
she declared PP 1017 and is to be implemented by GO 5. The said law was
aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring
down the government.

RULING: THE PRESIDENT HAS NO POWER TO DECLARE STATE OF

NATIONAL EMERGENCY, UNDER ART 6, SEC 23 PAR 2, THE CONGRESS
HAS ITS MANDATE TO DELEGATE POWER NECESSARY IN TIMES OF
WAR OR OTHER NATIONAL EMERGENCY, TO DECLARE NATIONAL
POLICY.
The plain import of the language of the Constitution is that searches,
seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a
validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental
protection given by this provision is that between person and police must
stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or
refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest

PAPA V MAGO

TOPIC: UNLAWFUL SEARCHES AND SEIZURE

IMPORTANT NOTE: On November 4, 1966, Martin Alagao, head of the

counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, together with his
group intercepted two trucks at the Agripina Circle, Ermita Manila, and the
two trucks were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. The
interception was based to the information the load of the said trucks was
misdeclared and undervalued and believed to be contrary to law.
Subsequently, the owner of the cargo, Remedios and Valentin B.
Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition “ for
preliminary injunction” on
the ground that the their trucks were seized without search warrant.
Forthwith, the order of exparte had been issued by Judge Hilarion which
prevented the bales from opening. However, when the restraining order
was received, some bales had already opened. Furthermore, upon hearing,
the lower court with respondent Judge Hilarion issued an order releasing
the goods to Remedios Mago upon filing her bond amounting of P40, 000.
The decision of Judge Hilarion prompted the petitioners to file a petition
for prohibition and certiorari citing that the court and Judge Hilarion has
no jurisdiction over the case.

RULING: The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa,

having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could,
for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect
searches, seizures, and arrests, 11 and it was his duty to make seizure,
among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable property when the
same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under
customs and tariff laws.

Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to

effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court.
The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant
case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section
2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any
land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house;
and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any
trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search
and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying
any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary
to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases.

SECURING FIRST A SEARCH WARRANT OR WARRANT OF ARREST IS

NOT APPLICABLE IN A MOVING VEHICLE SUSPECTED OF CONVEYING A
PROHIBITED ARTICLE.

TERRY V OHIO

TOPIC: UNLAWFUL SEARCHES AND SEIZURE

IMPORTANT NOTE: McFadden testified that while he was patrolling in

plain clothes in downtown Cleveland at approximately 2:30 in the
afternoon of October 31, 1963, his attention was attracted by two men,
Chilton and Terry, standing on the corner of Huron Road and Euclid
Avenue. He had never seen the two men before, and he was unable to say
precisely what first drew his eye to them. However, he testified that he had
been a policeman for 39 years and a detective for 35 and that he had been
assigned to patrol this vicinity of downtown Cleveland for shoplifters and
pickpockets for 30 years. He explained that he had developed routine habits
of observation over the years and that he would "stand and watch people or
walk and watch people at many intervals of the day." He added: "Now, in
this case when I looked over they didn't look right to me at the time.

RULING: We merely hold today that where a police officer observes

unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the
course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman
and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of
the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others'
safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in
an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.

THE COURT HELD THAT A POLICE OFFICER WHO SUSPECTED A

PERSON HAVING ENGAGE IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY WITH A SUFFICIENT
INITIAL INVESTIGATION BY OBSERVING A SUSPECT OF THEIR
BEHAVIOR, THROUGH HIS LONG EXPERIENCE IN A SERVICE MAY
EFFECT A FRISK FOR THE SAFETY OF THE CITIZEN PRESENT IN THE
AREA INCLUDING HIMSELF, PROVIDED, THAT HE INTRODUCE
HIMSELF AS A POLICE OFFICER AND THAT THE PAT DOWN IS ONLY IN
THE OUTER CLOTHES OF THE SUSPECT

ORTIGAS V FEATI
TOPIC: NON-IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATION OF CONTRACT

IMPORTANT NOTE: On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of

the Highway Hills Subdivision at Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles
and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred their rights in favour of
Emma Chavez, upon completion of payment a deed was executed with
stipulations, one of which is that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for
residential purposes only. This was annotated in the Transfer Certificate of
Titles No. 101509 and 101511. Feati then acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma
Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati started
construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for banking purposes
but could also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to stop
construction but Feati continued contending that the building was being
constructed according to the zoning regulations as stated in Municipal
Resolution 27 declaring the area along the West part of EDSA to be a
commercial and industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided
in favour of Feati.

RULING: Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section

3 of RA 2264 of the Local Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council to
adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the
Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied power of the
municipality should be “liberally construed in it’s favour”, “to give more
power to the local government in promoting economic conditions, social
welfare, and material progress in the community”. This is found in the
General Welfare Clause of the said act. Although non-impairment of
contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the power to
promote health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general
welfare of the people. Resolution No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of
police power to safeguard health, safety, peace and order and the general
welfare of the people in the locality as it would not be a conducive
residential area considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and noise
which results in the surrounding industrial and commercial
establishments.

SALUS POPULI EST SUPREMA LEX

KAISAHAN V GOTAMCO

TOPIC: INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE

IMPORTANT NOTE: THE KAISAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA NG KAHOY NG

PILIPINAS DECLARED A STRIKE AGAINST GOTAMCO SAWMILL,
BECAUSE THEIR REQUEST OF SALARY INCREASE WAS NOT
CONFORMED.
RULING: NO INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE, THE LAW IN QUESTIONED
DOES NOT OFFEND AGAINST THE CONSTITUTIONAL INHIBITION
PROSCRIBING INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE. THE LAW IN QUESTIONED
WAS IN HARMONY WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL INJUNCTION. THE
VOLUNTARINESS OF THE EMPLOYEES ENTERING INTO SUCH A
CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT, WITH SUCH AN IMPLIED CONDITION,
NEGATES THE POSSIBILITY OF INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.

THERE WAS NO INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE, BECAUSE THE EMPLOYEE

HAS THE OPTION TO WHETHER TO ENTER INTO A CONTRACT OR NOT,
THE VOLUNTARINESS OF THE EMPLOYEE TO ENTER INTO A CONTRACT
NEGATES INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE

US V NAVARRO

TOPIC: RIGHTS AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION

IMPORTANT NOTE: On appeal, counsel for the defendants argued that the
provision of the law has the effect of forcing a defendant to become a
witness in his own behalf or to take a much severer punishment. The
burden is put upon him of giving evidence if he desires to lessen the
penalty, or, in other words, of incriminating himself, for the very statement
of the whereabouts of the victim or the proof that the defendant set him at
liberty amounts to a confession that the defendant unlawfully detained the
person. So the evidence necessary to clear the defendant, under article 483
of the Penal Code, would have the effect of convincing him under article
481. It is claimed that such practice is illegal, since section 5 of the
Philippine Bill provides that ". . . no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.

RULING: SPANISH LAW WAS DEEMED UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE

IT IS IN THE LAW ITSELF THAT COMPELS A WITNESS AGAINST
HIMSELF, WHICH THE PHILIPPINE BILL PROSCRIBE, IN OTHER
WORDS, TESTIMONIAL COMPULSION IS INVALID, IT IS UPON THE
PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISHED EVIDENCE THAT WOULD PROVE THE
GUILT OF ANY PERSON BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, AND A
PRESSUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF ANY PERSON UNLESS OTHERWISE
PROVE, SHALL NOT BE IMPAIRED BY SELF-INCRIMINATION.

PEOPLE V VALLEJO

TOPIC: RIGHTS AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION

IMPORTANT NOTE: The Information charging accused-appellant Gerrico

Vallejo with the crime of Rape with Homicide. THE ACCUSED WAS
PRESENTED TO THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR AND LAW ENFORCERS THERE
HE ADMITTED THE CRIME CHARGES AGAINST HIM, THE MAYOR ASK
THE ACCUSED IF HE WANTS LAWYER THE LATTER SAID YES AND HE
ADMIT THE SAME TO SAID LAWYER.

RULING: COURT HELD THAT THE ADMISSION OF THE ACCUSED TO A

LAWYER WAS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE, COURT LAID DOWN TWO
KINDS OF INVOLUNTARY OR COERCED CONFESSION, ONE IS COERCED
CONFESSION BY MEANS OF VIOLENCE, FORCE OR INTIMIDATION, AND
THE OTHER IS UNCOUNSELED STATEMENTS, GIVEN WITHOUT THE
BENEFIT OF MIRANDA RIGHTS, HENCE, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE
ACCUSED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION
WAS NOT VIOLATED, SINCE HE WAS ASSISTED BY A COUNSEL.

CENTRAL BANK V MORFE

TOPIC: VALID SEARCH WARRANT

IMPORTANT NOTE: Hon. Roman Cancino, as Judge of the said municipal court,
issued the warrant above referred to,5 commanding the search of the aforesaid
premises at No. 2745 Rizal Avenue, Manila, and the seizure of the foregoing
articles, there being "good and sufficient reasons to believe" upon examination,
under oath, of a detective of the Manila Police Department and said intelligence
officer of the Bank — that the Organization has under its control, in the address
given, the aforementioned articles, which are the subject of the offense adverted to
above or intended to be used as means for the commission of said off offense.
Forthwith, or on the same date, the Organization commenced Civil Case No.
50409 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, an original action for
"certiorari, prohibition, with writ of preliminary injunction and/or writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction," against said municipal court, the
Sheriff of Manila, the Manila Police Department, and the Bank, to annul the
aforementioned search warrant, upon the ground that, in issuing the same,
the municipal court had acted "with grave abuse of discretion, without
jurisdiction and/or in excess of jurisdiction" because: (a) "said search
warrant is a roving commission general in its terms . . .;" (b) "the use of the
word 'and others' in the search warrant . . . permits the unreasonable
search and seizure of documents which have no relation whatsoever to any
specific criminal act . . .;" and (c) "no court in the Philippines has any
jurisdiction to try a criminal case against a corporation 

RULING: The records suggest clearly that the transactions objected by the
Bank constitute the general pattern of the business of the Organization.
Indeed, the main purpose thereof, according to its By-laws, is "to extend
financial assistance, in the form of loans, to its members," with funds
deposited by them. HENCE, THE PHRASE “AND OTHERS” WAS DEEMED
JUSTIFIED

THE ACTS IMPUTED TO THE ORGANZATION IS NOT ISOLATED

TRANSACTIONS, THE TRANSACTION OBJECTED BY THE BANK
CONSTITUTE GENERAL PATTERN, THUS, THE SEARCH WARRANT
ISSUED BY THE JUDGE WITH THE PHRASE “AND OTHERS” DEEMED
JUSTIFIED.

GARCIA V FACULTY ADMISSION

TOPIC: ACADEMIC FREEDOM

IMPORTANT NOTE: The specific issue posed by this mandamus proceeding

to compel the Faculty Admission Committee of the Loyola School of
Theology, represented by Father Antonio B. Lambino, to allow petitioner
Epicharis T. Garcia, to continue studying therein is whether she is deemed
possessed of such a right that has to be respected. That is denied not only on
general principle, but also in view of the character of the particular
educational institution involved. It is a seminary. It would appear therefore
that at most she can lay claim to a privilege, no duty being cast on
respondent school. Moreover, as a reinforcement to such an obvious
conclusion, there is the autonomy recognized by the Constitution in this
explicit language: "All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic
freedom."1 The petition must therefore fail.

Now, you will have to forgive me for going into a matter which is not too
pleasant. The faculty had a meeting after the summer session and several
members are strongly opposed to having you back with us at Loyola School
of Theology. In the spirit of honesty may I report this to you as their reason:
They felt that your frequent questions and difficulties were not always
pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the progress of the class; they
felt you could have tried to give the presentation a chance and exerted more
effort to understand the point made before immediately thinking of
difficulties and problems. The way things are, I would say that the
advisability of your completing a program (with all the course work and
thesis writing) with us is very questionable. That you have the requisite
intellectual ability is not to be doubted. But it would seem to be in your best
interests to work with a faculty that is more compatible with your
orientation. I regret to have to make this report, but I am only thinking of
your welfare.

RULING: THE SC CITING Justice Frankfurter, with his extensive

background in legal education as a former Professor of the Harvard Law
School, referred to what he called the business of a university and the four
essential freedoms in the following language: "It is the business of a
university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to
speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there
prevail "the four essential freedoms" of a university — to determine for
itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall
be taught, and who may be admitted to study."  Thus is reinforced the
conclusion reached by us that mandamus does not lie in this case.