UNIT IV

HUMAN ACTS
In this chapter, we are going to discuss the definition of human acts, classification of
human acts, voluntariness of human acts, and the morality of human acts.

Learning Outcomes:

At the end of the lesson, the students will be able to;

1. Discuss the broader perspective of human actions.

2. Differentiate the three-fold element of human acts.
3. Compare human acts in relation to the will and reason.
4. Articulate the modifiers of human acts.
5. Explain the roles of norms of human actions.
6. Discuss the importance of morality human acts.
7. Execute a good moral decision.

Lesson 1
Definition
Human acts are actions that proceed from the deliberate free will of man. In a broader
perspective, the term human acts refer to any activity performed by man. This activity
could either be physical, spiritual, internal, or external. Moral philosophy, however,
treats the term human acts not in its broader but in its stricter meaning. Moral
philosophy, therefore, understands human acts as actions that are proper only to man.
These actions are those which man does not share with the brutes for human acts are
rational and willed acts. We could perhaps, defend the backbone of this argument
through the maxim: Agere sequitur esse (a thing acts according to its nature or action
follows being).
In our discussion of morality in relation to human existence, we made mention
that man by nature is a rational animal —of course we do recognize that we owe this idea
from Aristotle. In view of this understanding, we said that it is his being what he is that
makes man moral; or it is his being rational that makes man perform actions that are
proper only to his nature. What is embedded in this-claim is that human acts are
grounded in the very nature of man.
While there are actions that indispensably require man’s rationality (human acts),
there are also actions that do not require man’s rationality. These actions are called acts
of man. Although acts of man are not the concern of ethics, however, it is necessary —
for the sake of a definitive understanding between human acts and acts of man — for us
to know what they mean. Accordingly, acts of man are man’s actions which man shares
with the brutes. These are the acts of perception (sensation), the beating of the heart,
blood circulation in the body, digestion of food in the stomach, and the like. All these
activities do not need man’s freedom and will. This is why actions that happen within the
body are not human acts because they occur without the control of the will and the
consciousness of the human mind.
Nevertheless, acts of man do not only mean actions that happen inside the body
but also those that occur outside the body that are done without man’s consciousness,
knowledge, and free will. For example, actions done by infants, insane, imbecile, morons,
among others. Actions that are done when one is asleep (somnambulism) are also acts of
man.
The crux of the matter is whether acts of man can also become human acts; or do
they always remain acts of man no matter what? Our answer to the former question is
yes and no to the latter. In principle, acts of man can become human acts. For instance,
spitting. Spitting is an act of man. But it can become human act if one deliberately spits,
for example, the face of a person.
In contrast to human acts, acts of man do not make man responsible for his
actions. We have to make it clear that man is responsible only for his action if he does
the act out of knowledge, freedom, and voluntariness. These are human acts. On the
contrary, actions that are done without knowledge, freedom, and voluntariness do not
make man responsible. These are human acts of man.

Three-fold Elements of Human Acts

There are three constituents or substantial elements of human acts. They are:
knowledge, freedom, and voluntariness.

1. Knowledge
A human act is an act done with knowledge. Doing an act with knowledge makes the
act deliberate. This means that the agent (the one who performs the act) has intellectual
knowledge of the act. Further, in performing an act with knowledge, the agent has
awareness about the means to employ as he performs an act. And the agent has also the
awareness of the end to achieve in his actions.

2. Freedom
A human act is an act done with freedom. An act done with freedom means that the
agent does an act under the control of his will. This suggests that when the agent
performs an act with freedom, his will is not affected or influenced by any constraint
either within himself or outside himself. In simple terms, the agent (in doing a free act)
is not forced to do or not do a particular action. Therefore, a human act is an act which is
determined solely by the will.

3. Voluntariness
Of the three constituents of human acts, it is voluntariness that requires the
presence of the two other constituents (knowledge and freedom). This means that the
voluntary act is synonymous with human act. For the purpose of clarification, it must be
always remembered that an action can only be qualified a human act if it has the three
constituents.
Voluntariness requires the presence of knowledge and freedom in the agent because
for the agent to will (in doing the act) the act, he must have knowledge of what the act
is and he must also have freedom to perform or not to perform the act. Thus, a
voluntary act is a willful act. Perhaps, an illustration could help us understand better the
interrelation and distinction of the constituents of human acts.
A student of Holy Name University is aware of the rules and regulations of the
institution. One of these rules and regulations is the wearing of uniform (knowledge). He
‘is free to come to school in uniform or to wear casual clothes (freedom). He comes to
school in uniform (voluntariness).

Classification of Human Acts

Human acts can be classified under two main heads, namely: (1) in relation to the
will; and (2) in relation to reason.
Human acts in relation to the will refer to those actions which are started,
performed, and completed by the will either by the will alone or through other faculties
which are under the control of the will. Human acts in relation to reason refer to those
actions that are either in agreement or in disagreement with reason.Now, let us treat
each of the headings.

1. Human Acts in Relation to the Will

There are two kinds of human acts under this, to wit: Elicited acts and commanded
acts, Elicited acts are those which are started by the will, performed by the will, and are
completed by the will as the sole agent. Commanded acts are those which begun in the
will, performed by the will, but are completed by the will through another medium which
is under the control of the will.
There are seven elements involved in the completion of Elicited Acts. They are
wish, intention, counsel, consent, choice, command, and fruition.

i. Wish refers to the primordial desire, like, or inclination of the will to a thing conceived
by the will as good and is known by the intellect. Embedded in the inclination of the will is
its wish to act. This is where all human acts start: the wish to act. Thus, we find
ourselves saying: “I wish I could have a vacation in Boracay, come summer”; or “J wish I
could go to America this Christmas”; or “I wish I could geta perfect score during the
examination.”

ii. Intention refers to /’the purposive tendency of the will towards a thing regarded as
realizable, whether the thing is actually done or not.”? This means that through
intention the will is assured that the object of its inclination is attainable.
iii. Counsel refers to the series of thoughts and judgments concerning the most suitable
means towards the attainment of the desired good or end. Here the will is preoccupied in
determining the best and the most appropriate means it should employ.

iv. Consent refers to a definite decision as to what means should be used. This means
that the will (having seen the manifold means) and intellect (having known these means)
are in the process of picking or choosing rightly the should-be-used means.

v. Choice refers to the active commitment of the agent to follow what means the
intellect has finally opted as the “right pick” so much so that the will shows acceptance
of the choice of the intellect in order to achieve the desired good.

vi. Command refers to the active interplay between intellect and will. Here, we should
be able to establish a point of convergence between this discussion and our previous
discussion on Man as Rational where we cited the purpose, function, goal, and highest
goal of intellect and will. To show this interplay, in the context of “command” the
intellect, having known (purpose of the intellect) and having thought of (function of
intellect) the best means for the acquisition of the end of good (intended object),
commands the will to act (function of the will) in order to get the intended object. As a
consequence, the will is enjoying because it possesses satisfaction since it has achieved
what it willed.
vii. Fruition refers to the actual attainment of the desired good.’ This pertains to the
will’s actual possession and enjoyment of the desired good. So, in fruition, one is
consummated by delight as one has gotten a vacation in Boracay last summer, has taken
Christmas break in America, and has gotten a perfect score during exam.

Now, let us deal with Commanded Acts. Accordingly, there are three kinds of
commanded acts,’ viz.: Internal, external, and mixed.

i. Internal acts refer to the actions done by man by way of his internal mental powers
under the command of the will. To borrow the example of Glenn, he cites the act of
remembering, the act of conscious reasoning, the act of nerving oneself to meet an
issue, the act of controlling anger, and the act of deliberate use of imagination in
visualizing a science. All these are internal commanded acts.

ii. Extemal acts refer to those that are affected by bodily powers of man under the
command of the will. Examples of this could be that of deliberate writing, walking,
eating, spitting, and others

iii. Mixed acts refer to actions that include the use of bodily and mental powers.
Example: are: painting, (here, the artist uses the power of his intellect through
imagination and the power of his hands in sketching the contents of his imagination);
Studying (here the on, who studies uses his intellect in understanding the object of his
Study and his eyes in reading the materials of his study).
Having discussed thoroughly the first main heading of the classification of human
acts in relation to the will, we are now ready to discuss the second main heading of the
classification of human acts, i.e., human acts in relation to reason.

2. Human Acts in Relation to Reason

There are three kinds of human acts under this heading, to wit: good, evil, and
indifferent.

i. Good acts are those actions done by man in harmony with the dictates of right
reason.
ii. Evil acts are those actions done by man in contradiction to the dictates of right
reason.
iii. Indifferent acts are those that are neither good nor evil. Indifferent acts bear no
positive relation to the dictates of reason. It must be mentioned, however, for
clarity’s sake, that indifferent acts exist only in theory and not in the actual
situation. They are true only on the abstract sense, but not in the concrete
advertence of actions; actions being executed are only either good or bad; there are
no indifferent acts in praxis. However, we have to make it clear that actions can
become either good or bad only in the context on the circumstances that affect the
performance of an act.
For example, dropping a bomb and killing are both theoretically indifferent acts.
These acts can only become good or evil depending upon their accompanying
circumstances. In analyzing our example, we have to ask: Where is the bomb being
dropped, in the forest or in the heart of the city? If it is dropped in the forest
(provided that no human beings are affected) then nobody gets killed, therefore the
act of bombing is not bad. What about the act of killing? The obvious query we have
to pose is: “What is being killed?” Is it a mosquito, a pig, or a cow? If these are the
objects of killing then the act is not bad, because it does not involve the killing of a
human being.

D. Voluntariness of Human Acts

As earlier cited, a voluntary act is synonymous with a human act. Earlier we also
made mention that a voluntary act requires three things on the part of the agent which
are knowledge, freedom, and voluntariness. “Voluntariness comes the Latin word
voluntas referring to the will - voluntariness is essential to an act. Without it, an act is a
mere act of man.” This is the reason why a human act is synonymous with a voluntary
act since human act is essentially the product of the will acted upon in the light of
freedom and intellectual knowledge.
 By order of sequence, let us now talk of the kind: or degrees of voluntariness.
Comprehensively, there are thirteen (13) kinds or degrees of voluntariness. They are
perfect, imperfect, simple, conditional, actual) virtual, habitual, interpretative, explicit,
direct, indirect: positive, and negative.

1. Perfect voluntariness is defined as “the act performed with complete knowledge

and full consent” on the part of the agent. This means that in perfect voluntariness
the agent has full knowledge and full consent in performing an act.
2. Imperfect voluntariness is just the opposite of perfect voluntariness. It is present
when there is some defect in the agent’s knowledge, intention, or in both knowledge
and intention.”
3. Simple voluntariness refers to a degree of voluntariness which “is present in a
human act performed, whether the agent likes or dislikes doing it.”
4. Conditional voluntariness refers to a degree of voluntariness “which is present in
the agent’s will to do something other than that which he is actually doing, but doing
with repugnance or dislike.”
5. Actual voluntariness is a degree of voluntariness “which is present” here and now
“before the mind while performing an action.”
6. Virtual voluntariness is a degree of voluntariness “which was made at some former
time and still influences the act which is now being performed.”
7. Habitual voluntariness “is the intention in the unconscious mind of an agent made
at some former time and which, although actually forgotten, has never been
replaced.”
8. Interpretative voluntariness is a degree of voluntariness which “is the result of
interpreting the intention of one who is not present or of one who does not have the
power of judgment to make a decision of himself.”
9. Explicit voluntariness refers to the degree of voluntariness that happens when the
consent (which is tacitly done in silence or a nod or shake of one’s head) to an action
is externally manifested by words or by signs.”
10. Direct voluntariness (voluntary in itself) is that degree of voluntariness of an act
willed as an end in itself.
11. Indirect voluntariness (voluntary in cause or voluntary in causa) “is an act which is
desired not as an end in itself but as a foreseen effect or sequence of an act.””
12. Positive voluntariness refers to a kind of voluntariness which is present in a human
act of doing or performing an act.”
13. Negative voluntariness refers to a kind of voluntariness which is present in a
human act of omitting or refraining from doing.”Of all these degrees of voluntariness
of human acts, it is the indirect voluntariness that we should give more attention
since it involves double-effect acts.
E. Indirect Voluntary Act

As mentioned earlier, indirect voluntariness refers to an act which is desired not

as an end in itself but as a foreseen effect or consequence of an act. Expressed
differently, indirect voluntariness refers to an act which is the foreseen consequence of
another act directly intended. Indirect voluntariness is by nature intricate. What makes
it such is the fact that it is pregnant with two queries. The first query can be formulated
as to when “the agent is responsible for the evil effect of a cause directly willed.” The
second can be formulated as to when may one (agent) perform an act not evil in itself,
which has two effects, one good, the other is evil.”
Let us consider now the two queries. The first query: When is the agent
responsible for the evil effect of a cause (act) directly willed? Glenn cites three
conditions that make the agent responsible for the evil effect of an act directly willed.
These conditions are as follows:

1. If the agent foresees the evil effect, at least in a general way;

2. If the ‘agent is free to refrain from doing that which is the cause of the evil effect;
and
3. If the agent knows that he is morally bound not to do that which is the cause of the
evil effect.

In his own line of thinking, Panizo says that q person is held morally responsible
for: any evil effect which flows from the action itself directly ang necessarily as a
natural consequence, though the evil) effect is not directly willed or intended.”
Whether we follow Glenn’s conditions or Panizo’s the evil effect of an act which is
not directly intended is always, in principle, ascribed or attributed to the agent as long as
the agent foresees the evil effect of the act. Now, let us try to cite an example. A
person committed suicide by throwing himself down from the 14th floor of a building.
However, instead of falling on the ground he fell on an old man; and the old man died
instantly. Is the person who wanted to commit suicide responsible for the death of the
old man?
Let us try to evaluate. If we will use Glenn’s three conditions, then the person who
wanted to commit suicide is morally responsible for the death of the old man. Did he
directly intend to kill the old man? Of course not! However, did he foresee the evil effect
of the act (suicide) in this case, the death of the old man? No, it is illogical for the one
who wants to commit suicide to foresee whether he is going to hit somebody in the
course of the act. Can the person refrain from committing suicide - which is the cause
of the evil effect i.e. the death of the old man? Yes. Lastly, is the person morally
responsible for the evil effect (death of the old man) of his act (suicide)?
If indirect voluntariness involves the act of foreseeing the evil effect of an act
which is directly intended by the agent, then the person is not morally responsible for
the death of the old man. Therefore, our example does not fit into the first question of
indirect voluntariness. In fact, the death of the old man due to the person who
committed suicide is not a human act, but an act of man. Hence, it is not voluntary.
Let us make another try. A woman who is pregnant of her three-month old fetus
suffered from severe cough due to tuberculosis. She knows that if she takes medicine
her fetus would be aborted. Nevertheless, to free herself from the illness she takes
considerable dosages of medicine — enough to kill her child. Is the woman morally
responsible of the death of the fetus? Yes, because she foresees the evil effect of her
intake of medicine.
Let us consider now the second query: When may a person perform an act which
is not evil per se but bears two effects, one is good and the other is evil? This query
formally qualifies indirect voluntariness to become the double-effect act. According to
Panizo, “a human act from which two effects may result, one good and one evil, is
morally permissible under four conditions.”” These four conditions® (which must all be
present) are as follows:

1. The action must be morally good in itself, or at least morally different.

2. The good effect of the act must precede the evil. effect. The evil effect is
morally allowed to happen as a regrettable consequence.
3. There must be a grave or sufficient reason in doing the act.
4. The evil effect should not outweigh the good effect, or at least the good effect
has a tantamount Importance of the evil effect.

Now the next concern that we will pay advertence to Is on the modifiers of human
acts.
Name: ___________________________________________________________ Date: ___________________

Course: ____________________ Year and Section: __________________ Major: ____________________

Activity 1

Define the following terms according to your understanding.

1. Perfect voluntariness
2. Negative voluntariness
3. Acts of perception
4. Moral act
5. Man, as a rational being
6. Reason
7. Emotions
8. Command
9. Will
10. Commitments

Activity 2

Answer comprehensively according to your understanding.

1. How do you define human acts?

2. Are human acts the same as acts of human? Why?
3. How do you perform the act of freedom? Should freedom take precedence over
knowledge of human actions? Why?
4. Explain the meaning of the following;
a. Elicited Acts
b. Commanded Acts
5. Discuss the first problem of indirect voluntary acts.

Activity 3

Compare the following;

1. Actual voluntariness and Virtual voluntariness

2. Wish and intention
3. Counsel and consent

Activity 4

Critique

“Anything that hinders humanity is immoral.”

References:

1. Babor, Eddie R., PhD., LL.B. (2006) Ehtics, The Philosophical Discipline of Action
2. Leaño, Roman Jr. D.,(2018), Ethics for College Students
 Lesson 2
Modifiers of Human Acts

Modifiers of human acts are the factors that affect the essential elements of
human acts, namely: Knowledge, freedom, and voluntariness. The modifiers of human
acts affect the essential elements of human acts in the sense that if the agent has
greater knowledge, freedom, and voluntariness, the agent has greater responsibility of
the consequences of the act. On the contrary, if the agent has lesser knowledge,
freedom, and voluntariness, the agent has lesser responsibility of the act.
Moralists in the school of thought in Scholasticism maintain that there are five (5)
modifiers of human acts. They are ignorance, concupiscence, fear, violence, and habit.

1. Ignorance
One cannot be excused of innocence out of ignorance. First of all, for a better
understanding of ignorance we will compare it to innocence. Usually, ignorance and
innocence get compared by way of age. So, we often say that a child is innocent while a
mature person is ignorant. This is confusing. A child and an adult as well can be both
ignorant and innocent. What is our ground in this contention?
Ignorance, accordingly, is defined as the absence of knowledge in a person who is
required to know what he does not know. On the other hand, innocence means absence
of knowledge in a person who is not required to know what he does not know. This is the
reason why a child or a mature person can be both ignorant and innocent.

There are three (3) standpoints that could help us understand ignorance. First,
from the standpoint of the object; second, from the standpoint of the subject; and
third, from the standpoint of the consequence. Let us treat each of these standpoints.

1. Ignorance from the standpoint of the object. This refers to the thing of which a
person may be ignorant.” By the thing of which a person lacks the required knowledge
can mean three things, viz.: law, fact, and penalty.
Ignorance of the law is the ignorance of the existence of the duty, rule, or
regulation. Ignorance of the fact refers to an ignorance of the nature or circumstances
of an act as forbidden. This also means the lack of knowledge that what one is actually
doing comes under the prohibition of a known law. Ignorance of penalty refers to the
lack of knowledge of the precise sanction... affixed to the law.

2. Ignorance from the standpoint of the subject refers to that ignorance on the part
of the person by whom ignorance exists. From this standpoint, ignorance can be divided
into two (2), namely vincible and invincible.

Vincible ignorance is a conquerable ignorance and therefore a vincibly ignorant

person is culpable of his actions (that proceed from this ignorance). Hence, if vincible
ignorance is a conquerable ignorance, then it is a kind of ignorance that can be removed
by the agent from himself in terms of ordinary efforts. However, if the agent, thus,
lacks due diligence, he is | necessarily deemed at fault.

The three (3) types of Vincible ignorance. They are crass or supine, simple, and
affected.

i. Crass vincible ignorance happens when it is the result of total, or nearly total,
lack of effort to dispel it.

ii. Simple vincible ignorance proceeds when the agent attempts to exert effort,
but fails to dispel his ignorance.

iii. Affected vincible ignorance occurs when a person positively wants to be

ignorant in order to plead innocent to a charge of guilt. Thus, affected vincible ignorance
exists in the agent when the agent exerts effort to retain his ignorance as a pretext of
guilt or remorse.

Our present concern now is to examine the meaning and kinds of invincible
ignorance. In itself, invincible ignorance is an unconquerable ignorance hence, it is also
called inculpable ignorance. The agent, therefore, who does an under this kind of
ignorance is not responsible of his action by virtue of the fact that either the agent does
not realize his own state of ignorance, or because it is almost impossible for him to
acquire the proper knowledge of the matter.” Two grounds support why the agent is not
responsible for his actions that proceed in invincible ignorance. First, because he does
not know that he is ignorant. Second, because he exerts effort (presupposing that he
knows he does not know what he must or ought to know) but his efforts are ineffective
in removing his ignorance.

There are two (2) types of invincible ignorance namely physically invincible
ignorance and morally invincible ignorance.

i. Physically invincible ignorance occurs if no human effort can dispel it.

ii. Morally invincible ignorance happens if ignorance cannot be overcome by

ordinary diligence and reasonable efforts.

3. Ignorance from the standpoint of the act refers to the consideration of ignorance
with reference to the acts that are performed in ignorance. There are three (3) kinds of
ignorance under this standpoint, namely antecedent, concomitant, and consequent.

i. Antecedent ignorance is one “which precedes all consent of the will.”

According to Glenn, “antecedent ignorance does not differ from invincible ignorance.”

ii. Concomitant ignorance, however, does not make the agent culpable of his
action because concomitant ignorance is involuntary. Therefore, an action done in
concomitant ignorance is not a human act, but an act of man. Concomitant ignorance is
 that ignorance which, so to speak, accompanies an act that would have been performed
even if the ignorance did not exist.

iii. Consequent ignorance is an ignorance “which follows upon an act of the will.
Thus, the agent has already a knowledge of his ignorance. The role of the will in this kind
of ignorance is rather crucial, because it may either directly affect it or crassly neglect
to remove it. In this case, consequent ignorance appears to be conquerable. This means
that consequent ignorance is not different from vincible ignorance. Therefore, a
consequent ignorance can become affected vincible ignorance if the agent deliberately
wants to be ignorant.

After our thorough investigation of the meaning, standpoints, and kinds of ignorance
let us now deal with the principles of ignorance in their relation to human acts.
Accordingly, there are four (4) principles through which ignorance affects the agent's
culpability or inculpability of his acts. The principles are as follows:

i. Invincible ignorance makes an act involuntary.

ii. Vincible ignorance does not destroy voluntariness.
iii. Simple vincible ignorance lessens the voluntariness of an act.
iv. Crass and affected vincible ignorance do not excuse a person from his bad actions; on
the contrary they increase the voluntariness of responsibility of the agent.

The first principle lucidly states that actions that proceed involuntarily due to invincible
ignorance are not human acts, but acts of man. The basic premise is: Nothing can be willed
unless it is known. How can a person will for that which he does not know, anyway? Since in
invincible ignorance the agent is either unaware of his ignorance or the agent’s efforts to dispel
his ignorance is a dead failure. In this regard, the agent does an act involuntarily.

The second principle so states that actions that proceed from vincible ignorance are
human acts. They are qualified as human acts since the agent is capacitated to remove his
ignorance. The agent therefore has knowledge which bears indirectly upon the act which he
performs in ignorance, and the act has, in consequence, at least indirect voluntariness, and is a
human act imputable to the agent.

When can invincible ignorance alleviate the voluntariness of an act? Scholastic

philosophers are quick to answer thus: When the agent lacks perfect and direct knowledge of
the act _ itself which is performed in ignorance. True, vincible ignorance in this sphere has an
element of voluntariness, however, it is not direct and perfect but impaired. The third principle
therefore states that the vincible ignorance lessens the voluntariness of an act.

The fourth principle obviously means that the agent, in affected ignorance, is not
excused from his bad action since he does it in ignorance. However, since affected ignorance is
in itself a pretended ignorance by virtue of the agent's voluntary retention of his ignorance,
hence, the agent is culpable of his action.

Having discussed the first modifier of human acts, we are now ready to examine the
second modifier.
 2. Concupiscence

Since emotions and feelings belong to man’s sensory appetites, they are in themselves
irrational. This is why concupiscence is interchangeably used with passions. In themselves,
passions (of concupiscence) are defined as appetites towards the possession of good and
avoidance of evil. Strictly speaking, concupiscence is the archaic term of feelings or emotions.

Generally, passions are divided into two. They are concupiscible and irascible. Concupiscible
passions are broadly referred to those passions that are inclined to favor good as their objects.
However, the good objects in concupiscible passions are paralleled by their evil objects. Along
this division, we can speak of five passions, viz: love, desire, joy, hope, and bravery. On the
other hand, irascible passions are broadly referred to those passions that are perceived by
sensation as evil and also to those that offer hardship to the acquisition of its object. They are
the counterpart or parallel of concupiscible passions. They are hatred, horror, sorrow, despair
fear, and anger. Summing up all these kinds of passion, there are eleven chief ones, to wit:
love, desire, joy, hope, bravery, hatred, horror, sorrow, despair, fear, and anger.

A diagram may help us appreciate better the tandem of passions:

CONCUPISCIBLE IRASCIBLE PASIONS

Love Hatred Sorrow Horror
Joy Despair Fear
Hope Anger (has. no corresponding concupiscible passion because the
Bravery Scholastics claim that anger has affirmative and negative
aspects. Affirmatively, anger is good because it allows one to
express his mood. Negatively, it becomes bad if one gets angry
without any valid or justifiable reason at all of expressing one’s
anger.)

Now, the impending question that we have to raise is: When can we speak of the
morality of concupiscence?

In themselves, concupiscence or passions are morally indifferent. Passions are neither

morally evil nor morally good, because they are movements of the sensitive or irrational
appetite of man. However, passions can become good when ordered by the rational will to help
man in the practice of virtue or in the attainment of that which is morally good. Passions can
become bad when they are used by the rational will to accomplish morally evil actions. Passions,
therefore, can enter into the sphere of morality by way of their linkage with reason and will.

As passions affect man’s acts, two (2) kinds of moral passions now have to be attended
to, namely Antecedent and Consequent.

i. Antecedent passions are those which spring into action unstimulated by any act of
the will, that is, when they arise antecedently to the will-act.
 ii. Consequent passions are those that arise when the will, directly or indirectly, stirs
them up or fosters them.

Anger that occurs due to unjust treatment of another; the desire for revenge due to an
act of cruelty done by another; the feeling of hatred to an enemy; all these are examples of
antecedent passions. However, they can become, consequent passions when they receive the
approval of the. rational will.

Now, let us consider the acts that proceed from concupiscence by treating their ethical
principles. In general, there are three (3) principles behind concupiscence. They are as follows:

a. Antecedent concupiscence lessens the voluntariness of an act;

b. Antecedent concupiscence does not destroy the voluntariness of an act; and
c. Consequent concupiscence, however great, does not lessen the voluntariness of an
act
The first principle means that antecedent concupiscence impairs the knowledge
which is necessary for perfect voluntariness. Hence, antecedent - concupiscence lessens
the full and prompt control which the will must exercise in every perfect voluntary act.
This means that antecedent concupiscence impairs freedom. Therefore, considering the
impairment of both knowledge and freedom in antecedent concupiscence, the
voluntariness is lessened. Consequently, the agent has a lesser responsibility of his
action that proceeds from antecedent concupiscence.
The second principle means that albeit knowledge and freedom are lessened by
antecedent concupiscence, yet, they are not destroyed. Despite the alleviated
responsibility of the agent, this responsibility is not abrogated; it is still there because
antecedent concupiscence does not destroy the voluntariness of an act.
The third principle means that actions that proceed from consequent
concupiscence are always imputed to the agent. Consequent concupiscence is willed
either directly or indirectly. This means that actions that proceed from consequent
concupiscence are done voluntarily either directly or indirectly.

3. Fear
Fear could be a coward’s most unwanted, companion. Earlier we cited fear as one
of the irascible passions. Per se, fear induces the will to do what it would not do
otherwise. It is defined as “the disturbance of the mind of a person who is confronted by
an impending danger or harm to himself or loved ones.” Since fear desires to
evade an impending evil its goal is nothing else but to safeguard the self from the
anticipated evil.
It is but indispensable, however, to underscore actions that proceed from fear and
with fear. Actions that proceed from fear are those that are performed because of or
through fear. It is fear that causes or moves the agent to perform them. Actions that
proceed with fear are those that are performed with fear accompanying element. In
other words, the agent does an act voluntarily in spite of fear.

The following are the ethical principles of fear:

i. Acts done with fear are voluntary, although they are unpleasant to the individual;
ii. Acts done from fear are voluntary; but in certain instances, acts done from fear may
be involuntary;
iii. Fear as a disturbance of the mind lessens, but does not destroy voluntariness; and
iv. Fear considered as an ordinary passion may augment or diminish voluntariness.

4. Violence
Violence, force, or compulsion, is defined in ethics as the application or use of
physical power or external force on a person by another for the purpose of compelling
him to do something against his will. By definition, violence is not tantamount to a
threat. Otherwise, if violence appears as a threat, then it is not violence at all but fear.
When an agent does an act due to threat. or violence the responsibility of the agent
should be judged according to the criteria of fear and not of violence.
Now, since violence means the actual application of force to someone, the
intriguing question is whether violence can destroy the freedom and the intrinsic power
of choice in the agent, or can violence reach the will directly? Ethicists say that violence
cannot reach the will directly since violence cannot, so to speak, touch the act of the will.
Thus, no matter how violently a person may be treated, his will always remain free, for
physical force can never reach the intrinsic act of the will. “Physical force can compel a
person to do something, but such cannot compel a person to will something.”
The following is the sole principle governing violence: “Physical actions resulting
from violence are involuntary by themselves.” This means that the act by which the
agent is forced to do is involuntary inasmuch as he does not will it. In other words, the
agent who is a victim of force has no responsibility if the agent does not consent. So, to
reiterate it, the agent may by the use of force be forced to do something, but the force
applied to him cannot force his will to will what he does not like to will. Otherwise, if the
agent consents to do an act that proceeds from the use of force, . then, the act
becomes voluntary; hence, the agent is responsible for it.

Now, comes the fifth modifier of human acts:

5. Habit
Habit is defined as “a constant and easy way of doing things acquired by the
repetition of the same act.” Literally, the term means “a having,” and in this light, all
that we have is habit. However, in the evolution of hermeneutics and semantics the
literal meaning of the term changed. Modern language today clarifies the meaning of the
term via a distinction between entitative habits and operative habits. Entitative habits
are habits of being. They refer to our connatural “qualities as health, or strength or
beauty, which we hardly call habits today.” Operative habits mean habits of acting.
They refer to the “tendencies we have developed in ourselves from repeated acts.” It is
in this latter type of habits where our attention be focused.
 Once operative habits are acquired it would be very difficult to eradicate them,
because they can make the agent act spontaneously and even automatically. So, is the
agent responsible of actions that flow out of habit? To answer this let us consider the
ethical principles of habits:

i. Habits do not destroy voluntariness, and actions performed by “the force of

habit” are imputable to man.
ii. If a habit has been acquired involuntarily, (like the habit of using profane language
during childhood), the existence of the habit and the acts which proceed
unintentionally from the habit will lack voluntariness and responsibility so long as
the agent remains ignorant of the existence of the habit.
iii. If an evil habit has been acquired voluntarily, but a positive and constant effort is
being made to dispel it, the acts that proceed from the habit are involuntary;
hence, they are not to be imputed to the agent.
Name: ___________________________________________________________ Date: ___________________

Course: ____________________ Year and Section: __________________ Major: ____________________

Activity 1

Answer comprehensively according to your understanding.

1. What is meant by modifiers of human acts?

2. How is ignorance differentiated from innocence?
3. Can one be excused of innocence out of ignorance? Why?
4. Are actions that proceed from ignorance voluntarily or not? Why?
5. What do you understand by ignorance from the standpoint of the object?
6. Explain the meaning of concupiscence?
7. Are passions by themselves moral? When do passions become moral? Why?

Activity 2

Compare the following:

1. Ignorance of the Law and Ignorance of the Fact

2. Vincible Ignorance and Invincible Ignorance
3. Simple Ignorance and Concomitant Ignorance

Activity 3

Critique

“Judgment is an act of justice.”

References:

3. Babor, Eddie R., PhD., LL.B. (2006) Ehtics, The Philosophical Discipline of Action
4. Leaño, Roman Jr. D.,(2018), Ethics for College Students
 Lesson 3
Norms of Human Acts

Basically, there are two (2) norms of human acts, viz.: law and conscience.

Human acts are properly directed to their authentic end through the law,
particularly the natural law. And through his conscience, man is made conscious of the
law. The authentic realization of the true end of human acts is founded on man’s
obedience to the law through the aid of his conscience.

1. Law

1.1 Meaning
It has been mentioned that ethics is founded on law, and that we, who are capable
of knowing and doing what the law requires, should act in accordance with it.
Law is defined as rule of action or a principle of conduct which directs things
towards a definite goal. Generally, the goal of law is the common good. And this is
applicable when law concerns human beings. This means that law as the rule or principle
is actually the guiding principle of man’s reason, and only then can it direct human
actions toward their proper goal. Law, however, cannot be of use and cannot be obeyed
unless it is known. It must be made known or promulgated to the persons who are
subjects to it.
The best classical definition of law which is still widely used today is given by St.
Thomas Aquinas. For Aquinas, “Law is an ordinance of reason promulgated for the
common good by one who is in-charge of community or society.” Let us consider now
the key words of this definition.

i. Law is an ordinance. This means that law is not just a mere advice, counsel, or
suggestion, but an order, a command, a mandate imposing the legislator’s will on
the citizens and binding them with moral necessity.
ii. Law is an ordinance of reason. This means that a law is not an “arbitrary
whim but an intelligent direction, composed by the superior’s will, but planned and
formulated by right reason.” For a law to be reasonable, it must be a true law. A
true law has the following essential qualities, namely: it is just, honest, possible,
useful, relatively permanent, promulgated, and imposes due sanction for
disobedience.
iii. Law is promulgated. This means that for a law to be useful and obeyed, it
must be made known to those who are subjects to it. It must be published so that
it can be known readily by those whom it is made binding.

iv. Law is promulgated for the common good. This means that the end
(purpose) of law, as we cited earlier, is the common good. A law is for the welfare
of the community as a whole, and not for the benefit of individuals as such.
 v. Law must come from one who has charge or care of community or
society. This means that the one - be this a human, person, as a king or a
monarch, or a group of human persons — who is tasked to make laws, as_ the
congressmen in the Philippine government, is responsible for the drafting of laws
for the common good. The “one” here is being referred to the legislator of the
lawgiver. As the legislator, the “one” has the legal title of a jurisdiction (the
authority to say what is right). It follows that the “one” who has the just
authority on ‘saying what is right’ in the community empowered to enact and
promulgate true laws.”

1.2 Classification

Laws can be systematically classified from four standpoints,”! namely: (1) from
the standpoint of the legislator; (2) from the standpoint of duration; (3) from the
standpoint of the mode of promulgation; and (4) from the standpoint of prescription.

i. From the Standpoint of the Legislator

There are two kinds of law under this classification. They are the Divine and
Human Laws. Divine Laws are. laws authored by God while human laws are those
authored by man. There are two kinds of human laws, namely civil and
ecclesiastical laws. Laws are qualified as civil if they are enacted by the state.
They are considered to be ecclesiastical if they are enacted by the Church

ii. From the Standpoint of Duration

In this standpoint, laws are classified as eternal and temporal. Eternal law,
as we discussed earlier under Thomistic Ethics, refers to God’s divine plan for all
things and to God's direction in all things for their proper order, purpose, or end.
It, however, extends to all acts and movements in the universe. Thus, bodies obey
the tendencies of their nature and follow the laws of cohesion, gravity, inertia,
etc. Plants grow; animals follow the guidance of their instinct; the earth turns
upon its axis; the heavenly spheres swing through their mighty orbits; all in
accordance with the Eterna] Law, powerless to reject its influence or to disobey.”
The Eternal Law is promulgated by God in the whole of his creation; and God
promulgated this eternally. This means that the validity of Eternal Law is forever,
i.e., endless or without its being subjected to time.

Temporal laws are those which are promulgated by man, since accordingly, all
human laws, particularly the civil laws, are temporal in nature. It follows that temporal
laws are subject to time. Nevertheless, there are some human laws that bear a speck of
divine laws, specifically the ecclesiastical laws.
iii. From the Standpoint of the Mode of Promulgation
In this standpoint, laws are classified as natural and positive. Natural law is
defined as the Eternal Law as apprehended by human reason. It is made known to men
directly through his reason. Through his reason man possesses a connatural ability to
understand things in their proper perspective. In this vein, man knows that there are
acts that are ontologically good and that there acts that are ontologically bad. Man
knows that honesty is good, cheating is evil, murder is evil, abortion is evil, and the like.
Thus, the foundational expression -of the Natural Law: “Do good and avoid evil.” This,
undeniably, refers to man’s conscience. The Natural Law, therefore, being the Eternal
Law as apprehended by man through his reason, is promulgated by God in man’s
conscience.
The Natural Law, however, includes the Natural Moral Law. The validity of the
latter is anchored in the former which is in itself anchored in the Eternal Law. So, there
can be no Natural Moral Law without Eternal Law. Hence, it is practically impossible to
talk to autonomy of human reason — as argued by Kant when he said that it is human
reason that makes and obeys the law - by virtue of the fact that both Natural Moral Law
and Natural Law are dependent on the Eternal Law.
By definition, the Moral Law refers to that which is concerned with directing
man’s actions, and gives rules of right and wrong, of what man should do and what man
should not do in view of his final goal - eternal happiness. Earlier we cited that for
Aquinas, the Natural Moral Law is the application of the Natural Law to man in terms of
man’s actions. The Natural Moral Law is the natural order of man as a being of action,
as a rational being, and as a free being.
Positive Laws. The term “positive” should not be construed as the correlative of
the term “negative.” By its etymological definition “positive” is derived from the Latin
word “ponere” which means “to put” or “to place an object down somewhere.” Putting or
placing an object down somewhere could also mean to publish or to put down into
writing. In this sense, positive laws are defined as laws that are made known or
promulgated in terms of writing. Positive laws are, therefore, laws that are
promulgated either by God or by man. When a law is promulgated by God it is called
Divine Positive Law. When it is promulgated by man it is called Human Positive
Law.
In our previous examination of law from the standpoint of the legislator we
mentioned Divine Laws and Human Laws. To understand these laws from the standpoint
of the mode of their promulgation Human Laws become Human Positive Laws and the
Divine Laws become Divine Positive Laws.

Human Positive Laws are defined as “an ordinance of reason, derived from the
natural law, or making a determinate application of the natural law, promulgated for the
common good by a human agency in charge of society.” In other words, human positive
laws are reasonable rules of action directly made known by a competent human authority
towards the common good that usually imposes sanction in cases of disobedience.
 Divine Positive Laws are those laws which are promulgated by special command
of God. Divine Laws are given to man by God to supplement the observance of the
natural law and to direct human life to the supernatural order.”

Human Positive Laws are divided into two (2), namely: (1) ecclesiastical, and (2)
civil. In a generic sense, the Decalogue or the Ten Commandments are: examples of
Divine Positive laws; the commandments of the Catholic Church (e.g. Canon Law) are
examples of Ecclesiastical Human Positive Laws; and the Congressional Statutes and
Presidential Decrees are examples of Civil Human Positive Laws.

iv. From the Standpoint of Prescription

In this standpoint, laws are classified into two. They are affirmative and negative.
Affirmative laws are also called permissive or suppletory laws. On the other hand,
negative laws are also called mandatory or prohibited laws. Affirmative laws are defined
as those laws that bind always, but not at every moment, while negative laws are defined
as laws that bind always and at every moment.”” The Catholic Church’s law on fasting
and the prohibition of eating meat during Holy Week is an example of an affirmative law
while the law: “Thou shall not steal,” or “Thou shall not kill” are examples of negative
laws.

2. Conscience

2.1 Meaning
Conscience is derived from the Latin phrase cum alia scientia which means the
individual man’s application of knowledge or “acting with knowledge.”
It is the conviction of moral philosophers. that conscience is the connecting link
between law and individual acts. This is the reason why conscience is properly called the
means by which law is applied to the acts of the individual persons.
Conscience is applicable both to the act per se and the consequence of the act. In
itself, it is referred to as the judgment of the | morality - goodness or badness — or acts
— done or about to be done. This is why conscience is properly defined as an act of the
practical judgment of reason deciding upon an individual action as good and to be
performed or as evil and to be avoided.

The definition clearly indicates that conscience is akin to man’s intellect. In fact,
as we mentioned a while ago, it is an act of judgment. As a judgment, conscience is not a
judgment of facts (e.g. that table is brown) or a judgment of value (e.g. that painting is
intricate, but beautiful), but it is a judgment of moral values. It is, therefore, a
judgment of the goodness and the badness of acts. And when it finds the act good it
imposes to the agent to do it, if bad, it imposes to the agent to avoid doing it.
If conscience is a practical judgment of reason, the question is: Is conscience
really that rational (intellectual) or is it intuitive? Does the judgment of conscience
undergo an intellectual reasonable explanation? or does its judgment employ a direct
intuitive reasoning process? There are varied answers to the question.

2.1.1 Russell’s Contention

Bertrand Russell, a celebrated British philosopher, claims that conscience is not a

domain of the intellectual faculty of man. In his view, the “voice of conscience” is
neither founded on moral intuitions from God nor on the rational faculty of man.
Conscience, maintains Russell, covers several different feelings which man acquires from
his experience and childhood training. Hence, for Russell, conscience is not a product of
moral faculty but of infantile conditioning.

21.2. Butler’s Contention

Thwarted by the contention of Russell is Butler’s — an 18th century exponent of

conscience and a Protestant Bishop - claim that conscience is a principle of reflection in
men. Says Butler:
This principle in man, by which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper, and
actions is conscience; for this is the strict sense of the word though sometimes it is used
so as to take in more. And that this faculty tends to refrain men from doing mischief to
each other, and leads them to do good, is to manifest to need being insisted upon. Thus,
a parent has the reflection of love to his children: thus, leads him to take care of, to
educate, to make due provisions for them. The natural affection leads to this; but the
reflection that it is his proper business; it belongs to him; that it is right and
commendable to do this, added to the affection, becomes a much-settled principle and
carries him or through more labor and difficulties for the sake of his children, than he
would undergo from affections alone. It cannot be possibly denied that there is this
principle or reflection or conscience in human nature.
Butler contends further that there are two aspects of conscience. They are
cognitive (or reflective) and imperative (or authoritative). All these aspects are regarded
by Butler as intellectual facts. Its cognitive aspect enables conscience to consider
intentions, character, and motives with the goal of finding their goodness and badness.
Aside from this, conscience also judges that pain is fitted to wrong-doing while
happiness is fitted to right-doing. Its imperative aspect enables conscience to command
its beholder to do what is right and good and avoid what is wrong and evil. In this way
conscience plays an executive function; it checks actions.
It is often claimed by moralists that conscience is treated more freely with the
negative dimension of morality than with the positive dimension. True, it is _ general
truth that conscience is often associated with the what-ought-not-to be-done
injunction of conscience. This eventually drives moralists to underscore the pains of
conscience as the categorical basis for avoiding wrong actions.
But why are we bothered by our conscience when we do wrong act? Why are we
pricked by our conscience when we lie, when we cheat, and the like? And why do we say
that there are people who have “no conscience”? Does this simply mean that not all men
are bothered or pricked by their conscience? What do people mean when they say “they
are acting according to the dictates of their conscience? Is this “acting” in line with what
is morally right?
Does God have something to do with our conscience so that metaphorically we say
that conscience is the “voice of God”? Undeniably, many philosophers deny the inherent
nexus of God with our conscience. However, if conscience is a rational judgment of
reason, then, it follows that it is part of our nature. And since there is the Eternal Law
and Natural Law, it appears clearer that through our conscience God establishes His laws.
If rationality is intrinsic in man, then conscience, as a rational judgment of reason,
serves as the bridge that connects God’s Laws and our actions.
Perhaps, it is correct to contend that conscience is rooted in our relatedness to
ourselves and to our fellowmen. Since conscience is that connecting link between God’s
laws and our actions it follows that our relatedness to ourselves and to others could
serve as the root of conscience.
Our conscience grows ‘out of our appreciation of ourselves and of other persons
as valuable, intrinsically worthwhile, and important just because we are all persons. This
might be the reason why some people developed a distorted form of conscience
considering that they have not established a harmonious relatedness to themselves and
to others.
While it is true that conscience executes a good act, it is also true that the good
act it executes may not jibe with what is morally good. Our common observation tells us
that conscience often gives decisions which are incongruent to the accepted moral norms
and even incongruent to what conscience itself dictates at a later stage in its beholder’s
mental development. When this happens, we become individuals who have “no
conscience.” To do away from this, we have to educate our conscience the right way.
Doing it is possible through our Christian treatment of ourselves and others as persons.

2.2 Kinds of Conscience

Moralists maintain that there are eight (8) kinds of conscience, to wit:
antecedent, consequent, right or true, erroneous, certain, doubtful, scrupulous, and lax.

2.2.1 Antecedent conscience is a judgment before an action is done. Its main functions
are to command, to advise, to forbid, and to permit. This kind of conscience “advises”
the moral agent of the morbidity of an evil act and the graciousness of a good. In this
vein, this type of conscience forbids the agent to perform an act which is evil. But it
commands and permits the moral agent to execute the act if it is downright good.

22.2 Consequent conscience is a judgment after an act is done. It bears the following
effects: inner peace and remorse. Inner peace is the reward a moral agent gets upon
doing a good deed, but remorse is the biting penalty to a moral agent who executes an
evil act.
2.2.3 True conscience is a conscience which judges things truly as they are. Knowledge
and the sense of responsibility for one’s actions are great aids in forming a correct
conscience. If true or right or correct conscience judges things as they are then it judges
what is really good as good and what is really evil as evil from the authentic principles of
ethics.

2.2.4 Erroneous conscience is also called false conscience. It judges things in a

distorted or slanted manner since it considers bad acts as good and good acts as bad.
This distorted judgment in erroneous conscience is brought about by false interpretation
of the moral principles. There are two kinds of erroneous conscience, namely: invincible
or inculpable and vincible or culpable. The former means that the agent is without fault
or knowledge while the latter means that the conscience is erroneous through the
agent's fault.

2.2.5 Certain conscience is a subjective certainty of the legality of particular actions to

be done or to be omitted. This is the kind of conscience that moralists recommend to be
always followed by man.

2.2.6 Doubtful conscience happens when a person is not certain about a moral
judgment. The moralists recommend that this kind of conscience should not be followed
unless the person has resolved the doubt. In order to dispel doubt the doubter has to
consult the experts in morality or those who have dependable knowledge of the moral
law.

2.2.7 Scrupulous conscience is one which sees wrong where there is none. It is a
conscience which is extremely austere. A person who suffers from this kind of
conscience is always scared to commit evil.

2.2.8 Lax conscience is the opposite of scrupulous conscience. It is a kind of conscience

which fails to see wrong where there is wrong. This conscience categorically needs a
right education. But arrogance and false pride are blatant obstacles that surely impede
the rectification of this kind of conscience. Thus, to a moral agent who suffers from this
kind of conscience he must be open and humble enough to accept his predicament.

2.3 Education of Conscience

As we cited earlier, it is indispensable for man to educate his conscience. The term
“educate” is derived from the Latin word “educare” meaning “to guide.” To educate one’s
conscience, therefore, means to guide one’s conscience to the right way since man’s
destiny is dependent on the kind of conscience he has developed and nurtured in his
existence in the world.
 There are at least two steps to be followed in order to educate one’s conscience
the right way.
The first step is to overcome ignorance and error by applying ourselves the study
of our moral, civil, and Church jaws and regulations. This explicitly suggests that the
safest and the best way to guide our conscience is to make it always in conformity with
the laws. Our actions can be properly guided by our conscience if our conscience obeys
and follows the laws. Hence, there will be order in our very selves and others. By way of
our obedience to the Jaws, we prove that others as persons are intrinsically of value to
us because our conscience is rooted in our treatment of ourselves and others.
The second step in the education of conscience “is to overcome doubts in moral
matters by forming good habits or reasoning or by consulting prudent and virtuous
persons.” These prudent and virtuous persons can be considered as wellspring of well-
founded moral opinions. In this sense, they can be called authorities for conscience
clarification.
If our conscience would be properly formed or educated, then we believe there will
be peace and harmony within ourselves and others. It is indeed categorically necessary
that we have to educate our conscience since it is the rudder of our actions. Besides,
conscience plays like “the umpire who calls the play in our moral life, and the decision of
conscience is final. There is no appeal above conscience.”

2.4 Heidegger’s Concept of Conscience

Martin Heidegger, a German philosopher (1889–1976). His ontological analysis of

conscience deserves to be treated here, though briefly. This modern philosopher says
that conscience and guilt precede morality or ethics. This means that conscience is
independent of preexisting norms, because it is primordial than them. Heidegger
contends that why-be-good statement is more fundamental than the qualifications and
classifications of what should man do in order to be good.
For Heidegger, conscience means a voice or a call of the self-addressed to the self
who needs to hear the call in order for it to be the person whom that self can be, but is
not yet. Heidegger’s understanding of conscience clearly states that our struggle to be
what we are as persons cannot be dissociated from conscience. It is the voice of
conscience that calls us to exist authentically.

We should be guilty of our existence if we are not existing truly as we are (as
Filipinos). To be authentic means to be true to ourselves. To be true to ourselves means
to follow the inherent law of God in our basic constitution, our nature as human beings
(human nature). God has implanted in our hearts to be true, to be good. And most often
we do the contrary, that is why we suffer from the pricks of our conscience. And we
become guilty of our existence, Guilt is in itself the result of our failure to be truly who
we are.
A guilty existence, Heidegger maintains, is an inauthentic existence. Au
inauthentic existence is an existence which is founded on what-others-say-mentality. |!
one does things because it is what others want him and expect him to be, this lead» man
to be untrue to him Now, if conscience is rooted in our relatedness to our very selves
and to others then our conscience should lead us to respect the personhood of others. In
this light, Heidegger is admonishing us that once we attain authenticity, we are called to
help others realize that to be authentic means to be attuned with the dictates of our
well-educated conscience.
Name: ___________________________________________________________ Date: ___________________

Course: ____________________ Year and Section: __________________ Major: ____________________

Activity 1

Answer comprehensively according to your understanding.

1. What is meant by norms and morality?

2. Explain the meaning of the following;
a. Law
b. Promulgation
3. Does law limit freedom? Why?
4. What is the difference between Divine Laws and Human Laws?
5. How can a person educate his/her conscience?

Activity 2

Compare the following:

1. Law and Conscience
2. Antecedent and Consequent Conscience

Activity 3
Critique
“Conscience reflects our integration of moral sentiments and principles.”

References:

1. Babor, Eddie R., PhD., LL.B. (2006) Ehtics, The Philosophical Discipline of Action
2. Leaño, Roman Jr. D.,(2018), Ethics for College Students
 Lesson 4

The Morality of Human Acts

As had been presented, morality refers to the goodness and the badness of an
act. Formally, morality “may be defined as the quality of things [or acts] manifesting
their conformity or non-conformity with the norm or criteria.”
To treat the morality of human acts requires a presentation of the norms and
determinants or sources of morality. Let us deal with the norms first then the
determinants.

1. The Norms of Morality

There are two (2) norms of morality, namely Eternal Law of God; and human
reason in the context of conscience. The Eternal law “is the ultimate norm of morality,”
while conscience [is] “the proximate norm of morality.” In a stricter analysis, we can say
that there are no two norms of morality but only one. This is because conscience is the
judgment of human reason that recognizes and applies the Eternal Law in individual
human conduct or behavior, The one norm appears as though it were two since it is
human reason in the context of conscience which is available to man’s proximate use in
recognizing good or evil acts while God’s Eternal Law appears remote yet ultimate.

2. The Determinants of Morality

By the determinants of morality is meant the factors that link human acts with
their norms. As the link, determinants serve as the measure of the good and evil in the
human act. In simple terms, they refer to the sources of the goodness or badness
(morality) of human acts.

There are three (3) determinants of morality viz.: the object, the end, and the
circumstances. These determinants; are properly qualified as the three elements
composing the morality of a particular action done by a free agent. Let us examine them
individually.

2.1 Object of Morality

The object of morality refers to the object of the will-act, that which the will
chooses to do, and this is nothing else but the act itself, which is deliberately willed.”
Scholars consider the object of morality as the substance of the moral act. Indeed, the
object of morality is the essence of the act Since it refers to the human act itself as
performed.
 From the standpoint of its object, morality can be objective and intrinsic. “If an
act as object [i.e., in itself] is good or evil, we say... that it has objective morality. If an
act, considered abstractly, is indifferent [i.e., neither good nor bad], by the
circumstances which affect it.” Morality is intrinsic when it resides in the act
independently of positive law prescribing or forbidding the act.
Objectively, there are good and bad actions. murder, rape, robbery, cheating,
abortion, and the like are in themselves (or objectively) bad while honesty, respect,
prudence among others are in themselves good acts. This is objective morality.
As a summary, the object of human act is an ontological appraisal of the act itself.
It is the intrinsic morality-intrinsic goodness, i.e., the act is good per se, and intrinsic
badness, i.e., the act is evil in itself. Hence, the object of human act is independent of
any subjective advertence. With this in mind, we have ascertained that by studying the
object of human acts we are trying to determine whether the human act is good or evil.
The act itself is said to be good, first, if it is in conformity with reason since as we
studied previously, reason is the proximate norm of morality; second, if it is in
conformity with its nature or the purpose for which it is done. On the contrary, an act is
said to be evil if it is not in conformity with its nature. In other words, if it violates the
principle: “Agere sequitur esse.” However, aside from good or evil intrinsic acts there are
also indifferent acts which are, in the abstract sense, neither good nor evil. This is the
reason why in our earlier inquiry of human acts we stated that there are three kinds of
human acts, namely good, bad, and indifferent. These kinds of human acts are, however,
taken from the standpoint of the object of human act.
Now, since an intrinsic evil act is morally forbidden for it can never be
transformed to become good and an intrinsic good act is morally required to be done, the
question is whether it can become less good or it came even become evil. To answer this,
we need to study the end of the act and the circumstances of the act.

2.2 End of Morality

Intrinsically (or ontologically) good, evil, and indifferent acts are by their very
nature independent of any law, regulation, or command. The morally good acts are not
good because the law requires that they should be observed. Instead, the law prescribes
them because they are good. In the same fashion, morally evil acts are not evil because
the law forbids them, instead the law forbids them because they are evil. Now, human
acts, whether they are good of evil, are always conditioned by the intention (which
pertains to the question: “Why is the act done?”) of the agent in performing such acts.
This is why we have to study the end of human acts. By end is meant the purpose,
motive, or reason by which the agent intends to achieve by his act.
If end is the purpose or motive (from the Latin word movere which means “to
move”) of the agent in performing the act, how does an end affect the morality of the
act? The end of the agent as he performs the act is very important since an end affects
the morality of the objectivity of the act. The end of the agent in performing the act can
make an intrinsically good act, evil, better or less evil. However, an intrinsically evil act
cannot be altered to become good by an end. At this juncture, let us now consider the
principles of the intentionality of human acts.

There are four principles to be considered. They areas follows:

i. An indifferent bet can become morally good or morally evil depending upon the
intention of the agent. For example, drinking is an indifferent act. It becomes
good when you drink water, milk or anything nutritious. It becomes bad when you
drink poison because it is tantamount to suicide,

ii. An objectively good act can become morally evil. For example, visiting a sick
person is good. It becomes evil if the intention behind the visit is to terrorize or
horrify the sick person making him sicker.

iii. An intrinsically (objectively) good act can receive added goodness. For example,
hearing mass is objectively good. It receives added goodness if it is done out of
honest intention, i.e., to worship God.

iv. An intrinsically evil act can never become good even when it is done with good
intention. For example, robbery is intrinsically evil. It can never become good even
if the intention of the robber is to give the loot to the indigent. In this fourth
principle moralists eagerly dish out their moral maxim: “The end does not justify
the means.”

2.3 Circumstances

Circumstances are defined as conditions that affect human acts by increasing or

decreasing the responsibility of the agent. It must be properly noted that circumstances

are only conditions. Hence, they are not part of the essence of the act whether it is
good or evil. Thus, acts per se can exist even without circumstances. However, when
acts are performed circumstances affect the morality of the act.
Generally, moralists consider seven (7) kinds” of circumstances. They are who,
what, where, by what means, how, when, and why.

i. Who is called the circumstance of the agent. It refers to the person or the one whom
the act is ascribed. This circumstance can increase or diminish the responsibility of the
agent depending upon who the agent is and what is the object of the act. This
circumstance therefore is based on the anthropological coordinates of man, like sex,
education, profession, status, and the like. For example, to slap a criminal is lighter
offense while to slap one’s mother or father is a graver offense. A priest has graver
moral liability if he is charged with rape compared to the moral liability of janitor who is
also charged of the same offense.
ii. What is called the circumstance of the object or the act itself. It refers to the quality
or quantity of the object of the act. For example, the agent has graver responsibility if
he steals P500.00 from the farmer while the same has lighter responsibility if he steals
the same amount from a businessman.

iii. Where is called the circumstance of the place where the act is performed. For
example, if the agent steals inside the Church, he has graver responsibility, however, if
he steals inside a supermarket, he has lighter responsibility.

iv. By what means is called the circumstance of the means employed by the agent. For
example, to get a perfect score during examination through cheating is evil while to get
the same through serious studies is good.

v. How is called the circumstance of the manner or mode when the act is done. This
points as to how the agent performs the act. How involves manifold conditions (or
modifiers) when the act is performed, viz.: consent, voluntariness, fear, ignorance, and
violence. For example, an insane person killed somebody; the agent, in this case, is not
responsible. However, if this insane person kills somebody during lucid interval, then he
is responsible for the act.

vi. When is called the circumstance of time. This points as to how long does the agent
keep evil intentions or thoughts. To keep anger with someone forever calls a graver
responsibility for ‘the agent while to be angry with someone in passing calls a lighter
responsibility for the same.

vii. Why is called the circumstance of end or intention. This refers to the motive that
prompts the agent to perform the act. We have already discussed this thoroughly.

Let us discuss now the principals involved in circumstances. They are as follows:

a. An indifferent act can become good or evil through circumstances.

e.g. Eating meat: indifferent.
Eating meat on Good Friday intentionally: evil (circumstance of time)

b. A good act can become evil through circumstances.

e.g. Giving money to indigents: good
Giving money to indigents for votes: evil

c. An intrinsically good act can become better or an intrinsically evil act can become
worse through circumstances.
e.g. Visiting a sick person for earlier recovery: good
Not visiting one’s sick father in a hospital out of hatred: worse (circumstance of
 end)

d. An evil act can never become good through circumstance.

e. g. Stealing money in order to buy food cannot make stealing good (circumstance of
object).

e. A good act done with evil means destroys the entire objective goodness of the act.
e.g. Giving money to the poor: good
Giving money to the poor through robbery: evil (circumstance of means)

Steps in Moral Reasoning Model

Ethical reasoning is how to think about issues of right or wrong. Processes of

reasoning can be taught, and the college or university is an appropriate place to teach
these processes because so often it is taught no place else, and because it is essential
for a successful adulthood. Although parents and especially religious institutions may
teach ethics, they do not always teach ethical reasoning. Academic courses are the
logical place to teach the cognitive process of reasoning especially as ethical issues relate
to the content of a particular discipline. No matter how knowledgeable one is, about
his/her profession, if the knowledge is not backed by ethical reasoning, long-term
success in the career is likely to be severely compromised.
Ethical reasoning is hard because there are so many ways to fail. Ethical behavior
is far harder to display than one would expect simply on the basis of what we learn from
our parents, from school, and from our religious training (Sternberg, 2009). To
intervene, individuals must go through a series of steps, and unless all of the steps are
completed, they are not likely to behave in an ethical way, regardless of the amount of
training they have received in ethics, and regardless of their levels of other types of
skills.
Given the fact that ethical dilemmas may not always be readily resolved through
the use of codes of ethics, it might be useful to have a framework in which to analyze
and make ethical decisions. The following ethical decision-making model comes from the
work of Corey et. al. (1998).

Step 1: Identify the problem. What facts make this an ethical situation?
Step 2: Identify the potential issues involved. What level of ethical issues are we
dealing with: systemic, corporate, or individual?

Step 3: Review relevant ethical guidelines. Given the facts and the ethical issues,
what alternative actions are possible in this situation?
Step 4: Know relevant laws and regulations. Who will be affected by the
alternatives and to what degree?
Step 5: Obtain Consultation. Use ethical principles to decide on the best
alternative. The ethics of each of the most plausible alternatives is
 assessed using ethical principles or rules.
Step 6: Consider possible and probable courses of action. Can the best alternative
be put into effect? Having decided on one alternative, we need to see
whether there are any practical constraints which might prevent that
alternative from being acted upon.
Step 7: List the consequences of the probable courses of action.
Step 8: Decide on what appears to be the best course of action. Implementing the
best alternative. Having selected the best alternative which is | not ruled
out by practical constraints, we need to decide on the steps necessary to
carry it out.

It is extremely important that you keep your immediate supervisor and all involved
parties informed during this process. After you have made your decision, take some
time to reflect on the process and to review what you have learned with a trusted
supervisor or colleague.
Name: ___________________________________________________________ Date: ___________________

Course: ____________________ Year and Section: __________________ Major: ____________________

Activity 1

Answer comprehensively according to your understanding.

1. How did Heidegger understand conscience?

2. Is conscience infused or acquired? What are the views of Russel and Butler concerning
this problem> whose contention do you favor? Why?
3. What is meant by the morality of human acts?
4. Discuss the meaning of the following;
a. Object of Morality
b. Circumstances of Morality

Activity 2

Critique

“Our daily lives are full of moral decisions.”

References:

1. Babor, Eddie R., PhD., LL.B. (2006) Ehtics, The Philosophical Discipline of Action
2. Leaño, Roman Jr. D.,(2018), Ethics for College Students

Prepared by:

ADRIAN B. TALEON
Part-time Instructor