Emmanuel Macron during his meeting with Vladimir Putin in Moscow in February 2022 

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BY 3.0

France and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict: an

analysis of Macron’s diplomatic efforts
 7. März 2022  Jean-Marie Reure 

Since December 2021, French President Emmanuel Macron and his Russian counterpart Vladimir
Putin have spoken fourteen times, including during the former’s visit to Moscow. Among western
leaders, Macron has been one of the few to keep diplomatic channels open with Russia, even after
the invasion of Ukraine. This not only shows France’s foreign policy activism but also hints at Paris’s
pivotal role in finding a negotiated solution to the current war. Analyzing Macron’s discourse during
his latest visit to Moscow can therefore yield some interesting insights on how he intends to deal
with Europe’s most reckless neighbor, Russia.

Since his election in 2017, Emmanuel Macron has adopted an ambitious foreign policy agenda both
at the global and European level. While he has portrayed himself as a proactive, iconoclast diplomat
in an attempt to reinvigorate France’s pivotal role in world affairs, during his five-years Macron has
had to face an increasingly hostile international environment. Not only has he had to confront
disruptive international actors such as Russia or China, but he has also had to deal with worsening
relations with old allies such as the US and the UK. Thus Paris has had to digest a number of hard-to-
swallow failures of which France’s withdrawal from Mali is only the latest to date.

At the European level, Macron has staunchly advocated for a new form of European sovereignty on
the ground, stating that “only Europe can grant a real sovereignty, that is our capacity to exist in
today’s world to defend our values and interests”. This declaration of intents, on a more practical
level, concretely implies reinforcing the EU international architecture by building a common defense
policy and industry that would constitute the initial step towards a European army. In sum, De
Gaulle’s objective of a strategic independence for France has been transplanted by Macron at the
European level. This in turn entails a certain independence from the US and the US-dominated NATO.
While Macron’s endeavor was understandable due to the Trump administration’s blatant disinterest
in European security matters, and still is in the light of US pivot to Asia, France’s efforts have
been met by criticism from other EU member states such as Poland and the Baltic states. Even in
the field of the defense industry France’s bid to further European integration has been hampered by
strategic differences among the member states, such as the deadlock of the MGCS (Main Ground
Combat System) and FCAS (Future Combat Air System) projects.

France’s effort for a European solution to the Russia-Ukraine conflict

From this perspective, before Russia’s decision to begin military operations, the Ukrainian crisis
seemed to be Macron’s last chance to create some momentum for European cohesion and affirm
the (relative) strategic independence of the EU. On this matter, the EU and US had differing interests
that practically legitimized a “European way” to resolve the crisis diplomatically. Since Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine and its wielding of the nuclear threat such differences are now almost
insignificant, as NATO countries appear to show a renewed unity, at least temporarily. One might
recall the blunt words used by Macron with reference to NATO in a 2019 interview with The
Economist. He not only declared NATO “brain-dead”, but also affirmed that Europe needed to think of
itself as a geopolitical power to remain in control of its destiny. While the reference has to be
understood in the light of Trump’s disregard of the Atlantic Alliance, France has been advocating for
a long time for the implementation of a strategic culture in Europe. Today, EU member states are
unanimously rallying behind NATO’s flag as the possibility of immediate negotiations with Russia
has faded away. It is however possible that in the future negotiations will again take place, since it is
doubtful that the current conflict can be solved only through military means and sanctions from the
West. Germany’s defense policy U-turn, together with EU’s decision to send military support to
Ukraine, might therefore constitute the basis of a new defense culture in Europe. In this context,
understanding French negotiation efforts through an analysis of Macron’s words could shed light on
possible future solutions to the ongoing conflict.

Macron’s speech during his latest visit to Moscow: a principled negotiation?

In 1981 Roger Fisher and William Ury published for the first time their seminal book “Getting to Yes:
Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In”. The two scholars of the Harvard Negotiation Project
presented four principles for effective negotiation. Comparing Macron’s speech at a press
conference in Moscow on 7 February 2022 and Fisher and Ury’s book, it appears that the French
President followed their advice closely.

First of all, Fisher and Ury insist that positional bargaining is largely ineffective: each party, opening
negotiations with their positions on an issue, engage in a sort of haggling that tend to produce
unsatisfying agreements. The outcome reached will lie somewhere half-way between the parties’
positions and will most probably neglect their interests. Principled-negotiation, on the other hand,
tends to focus on interests rather than positions, and tries to separate people from the issue. While
Putin started the press conference highlighting Russia’s positions and grievances towards the West,
US and their NATO allies, Macron adopted another stance. He firstly underlined how Russians are
“friends”, how they are an integral part of Europe, and that Russia is an essential element in Europe’s
security architecture. Only later he claimed that the two sides have different perspectives and
interpretations of facts. This is the book’s first principle: separating the people from the issue.
Macron went on to enumerate the common interests between Europe and Russia. He mentioned
economic interdependence, the security of the Old Continent, and the shared worries for the
humanitarian consequences of a war. Macron’s objective was clearly to elicite a reflection on the
diverging interests of the parties, while insisting on the existence of a common ground in
accordance with the second principle: focusing on interests rather than positions.

What options and formats might be seen at future negotiating tables?

After Russia’s declaration of war, the most relevant element of principled negotiation is perhaps the
Harvard scholars’ insistence on the third principle: generating a variety of options before entering
into concrete negotiations. It is not by chance that Macron mentioned Finland and Sweden. Both
countries are not part of NATO but have signed collaboration agreements with the security
organization. Despite France’s claim that the “Finlandization” of Ukraine was never suggested by
Macron, this reference was not casual, nor was that to Georgia and Moldova. Both countries are at
the intersection of western and Russian spheres of influence. Georgia even experienced a conflict
that brought South Ossetia and Abkhazia under Russia’s influence (Russian passports were
distributed in both regions, similarly to what has been done in the Donbas), and the Georgian state
has signed a partnership agreement with NATO. While another option, a revision of the Minsk
agreements has indeed sunk, the recognition of the Donbas separatist republics as well as the
annexation of Crimea into the Russian Federation still remains on the table, despite Russia’s
declaration of war.

The question of defining objective criteria on which to base an agreement (the book’s fourth
principle) is a primary concern in this context. When interests are directly opposed, as in the case of
the ongoing war, it is essential to agree on procedural criteria before addressing the core issues. It
seems unlikely that Russia will endlessly occupy the Ukrainian territory because at least a part of the
country is staunchly opposed to Russia’s influence. At some point Putin will need to resort to
diplomacy. While a dialogue with the US and NATO has been severely compromised by Russia’s
unprovoked invasion, the Format of Normandy (composed of Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine)
will possibly constitute a valuable platform for future negotiations again. On February 7th Macron
already mentioned the importance of such a format in the then ongoing negotiations.
The current crisis is evidently another failure of France’s diplomatic efforts. However, as Fisher and
Ury suggest, parties may engage in deliberate deception about their intentions. This clearly has been
the case of Russia. According to the Harvard scholars, when a party refuses to adopt principled
negotiation, the principled part should recur to “negotiation jujitsu”. The crucial element is to refuse
to respond in kind: when the other side attacks, the principled party should not counter-attack; nor
should it accommodate the other party’s request. The adoption of sanctions, and the suspension of
the Nord Stream II project should therefore signal Europe’s unwillingness to accept Russia’s terms.
The hope is now that Russia will eventually take its seat at the negotiating table again. When (and if)
it does, it may find a different Europe, possibly one that has embraced a common defense culture
and is ready to take its security more seriously.

War in Ukraine: France’s diplomatic action

On 24 February 2022, 8 years after the illegal annexation of Crimea and
the beginning of the conflict in eastern Ukraine in 2014, the Russian
Federation made the deliberate, unjustifiable choice to start a war against
Ukraine. From the very first day of the conflict, France and its European
Union partners chose to stand firmly alongside Ukraine and its people.

France and all its partners made the determined choice to help Ukraine

By waging a war against a sovereign country, Russia deliberately violated the principles enshrined in the
Charter of the United Nations. Supporting the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of
Ukraine does not simply mean helping a free people. It also means defending international law and the
security of the European continent. That is why, from the very first day of the war, France and its
partners have unwaveringly supported Ukraine and its people.

Determined political and diplomatic action to support Ukraine

On 23 and 24 June 2022, the Heads of State and Government meeting in the European Council decided
to grant candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova for EU membership, and recognized the European
perspective of Georgia.

That was a historic step, made possible in part by the visit to Kyiv by the President of the French
Republic, Emmanuel Macron, the German Federal Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, the Italian President of the
Council of Ministers, Mario Draghi, and the Romanian President, Klaus Iohannis. France and its European
partners will continue working to accompany Ukraine on its European path.

On 30 September 2022, France condemned President Putin’s announcement of the illegal annexation of
the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Luhansk and parts of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions by the
Russian Federation in the strongest terms.

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN M. EMMANUEL MACRON,

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, AND MR VOLODYMYR
ZELENSKYY, PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE

(Paris - January 24, 2023)

President Macron spoke on the telephone to Mr Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine,

today, Tuesday 24 January 2023.

The Head of State asked President Zelenskyy about the situation on the ground and Ukraine’s
needs, reiterating France’s full readiness to meet them. President Zelenskyy thanked France
once again for the deliveries of anti-aircraft defence systems and for sending AMX-10 RC battle
tanks.

The Ukrainian President also thanked France for the continued deliveries aimed at helping
Ukraine get through the winter, following the international support conference held in Paris on
13 December 2022.

The two leaders also talked about the prospects of peace returning to Europe. President
Macron reaffirmed his full support for Ukraine’s proposal for a 10-point peace plan, and his
determination to support the initiative in the international arena./.