Training and Convention Division

University of the Philippines College of Law

SUGGESTED ANSWERS TO THE

2022 MOCK BAR EXAMINATIONS IN
POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cycle 1)

The USS Guardian, an American naval vessel on its way to Indonesia from its base in Okinawa, Japan
ran aground in Tubbataha reef in the Sulu Sea causing extensive damage to our corrals there. Several
environmentalist groups and individuals filed a petition in the Supreme Court for the issuance of the
Writ of Kalikasan and demand for compensation for damages caused to our corrals there, naming the
Commander of the US Pacific fleet as respondent. Will the petition prosper? (5 points)

ANSWER: The petition will have to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because of the principle of
sovereign equality of all states as well as the doctrine of state immunity from suit. The suit, in effect,
is a suit against the United States since the USS Guardian, an American naval vessel, is considered an
extension of the territory of the US under customary international law. Besides, the respondent is the
Commander of the American Pacific Fleet. The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to
complaint filed against public officials in the performance of their duties.

The demand for compensation for damages had been rendered moot and academic in this case
because the US government, as expressed by the US embassy in the Philippines, already signified its
intention to pay damages, the only request, which is a reasonable one, is that a panel of experts made
up of scientists be constituted to assess the total damage caused to our corrals because of the incident.
(Most Rev. Pedro D. Arigo, et al. v. Scott H. Swift, et al., G.R. No. 206510, 735 SCRA 102, September
16, 2014, En Banc [Villarama, Jr.])

II

During the first visit of then US President Barack Obama to the Philippines in 2013, the Philippines
entered into an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the USA which, in effect,
will allow the US to preposition its troops and military equipment and facilities, on a rotational basis,
in Philippine military bases. The Senators then urged Malacañang to forward the EDCA to the Senate
for concurrence but the latter refused contending that the EDCA is merely an executive agreement
and, therefore, will not require concurrence by the Senate.

a. Whose contention should be upheld? Explain. (5 points)

ANSWER: Malacanang’s contention should be upheld following the ruling in Saguisag v. Ochoa.
The EDCA merely seeks to implement the earlier treaties the Philippines’ entered into with the US,
i.e., the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement, both treaties were duly
concurred in the Senate, thus, it is a mere executive agreement.

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Take note that under the EDCA, the US does not really want to establish in the Philippines permanent
military bases; what it merely want is to have access to Philippine military bases where it may
preposition its troops and other military facilities, on a rotational basis, so that in case of a crisis
situation in the South China Sea, it can respond immediately. (Rene A.V. Saguisag, et al. v. Executive
Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 212426, Jan. 12, 2016, En Banc [Sereno, CJ])

b. Is an executive agreement an equally binding international obligation? (5 points)

ANSWER: In international law, there is no difference between a treaty and an executive agreement
as to their binding effect upon the states concerned for as long as the functionaries have remained
within their powers. International law continues to make no distinction between a treaty and an
executive agreement: they are equally binding international obligations. (BAYAN [Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan] v. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, Oct. 10, 2000, En
Banc [Buena])

III

Senator Titillating is a well-known critic of a local official whom he claims to have amassed a fortune
which could only have been possible by indulging in corrupt practices. In a Senate sub-committee
hearing, the Senator claimed that a particular residence valued at several hundred million pesos
actually belongs to this local official although it appears in public documents that it is in the name of
a certain Facad, ostensibly a businessman. During a break in the hearings, Senator Titillating was
interviewed by members of the media, whereupon the Senator said that Facad is not the real owner,
he is just fronting for the politician – he is a mere dummy. Facad, claiming to have been maligned by
Senator Titillating, filed a libel case against the legislator. The Senator countered that his
parliamentary immunity shields him from such a case. Is the Senator correct? (5 points)

ANSWER: While it is true that members of Congress are shielded from liability for whatever they
may say in the discharge of their duties and responsibilities, this is only in regard to what they say
within the halls of the legislative body and its subcommittees. The parliamentary immunity does not
extend to what may have been said outside, such as in media interviews. (See Trillanes IV v. Castillo-
Marigomen,G.R. No. 223451, 14 March 2018)

IV

Because of the outbreak of acts of terrorism and violence which threatened the stability and the
physical integrity of the country, as well as authority of the national government to maintain peace
and security, the President declared martial law. The great majority of the members of both Houses
of Congress indicated that they were in agreement with what the Chief Executive had done. Each
House even came up with their separate resolutions in support of the President. Some members of
Congress who belong to the opposition called on the leaders of both Houses to convene in joint
session but this fell on deaf ears. They then went to the Supreme Court to have an authoritative
declaration that Congress must meet in joint session whenever the President proclaims martial law.
They argue that this is a constitutionally mandated obligation of Congress at such time, whether it is

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for the purpose of revoking the presidential act or simply for the purpose of deliberating on what the
Commander-in-Chief has done. Are the petitioners correct? (5 points)

ANSWER: No. The duty to convene in joint session is mandatory only if Congress does not agree
with the presidential act of declaring martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. The joint session is for the purpose of exercising the legislature’s prerogative to revoke what
the president has done. Here, majority of the members do not appear to be interested in revoking the
presidential act. Hence, it is not imperative for Congress to convene in joint session. (See Padilla v.
Congress of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 231671 and 231694, 25 July 2017)

Chinooski was born to a Filipino mother and a foreign father in 1970.His parents never got married.
In 2016, Chinooski won a seat in the House of Representatives. A quo warranto case was filed before
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) questioning his qualification, alleging that
he was not a natural-born citizen since he never elected Filipino citizenship pursuant to the
Constitution. Is there basis for the quo warranto petition? (5 points)

ANSWER: No. There was no need for Chinooski to elect Philippine citizenship since he was an
illegitimate child – his parents never got married. Under the 1935 Constitution, a Filipino woman lost
her citizenship if she got married to a foreigner. Here there was no marriage. Chinooski was born to
a Filipino mother, thus he was also a Filipino when he was born. Election of Philippine citizenship is
only required of children born to Filipino mothers married to foreign husbands.

VI

Briefly explain the “void-for-vagueness” doctrine and the “doctrine of overbreadth.” (5 points)

ANSWER: The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that the law should be declared void for being
vague as it lacks comprehensible standards that men of ordinary intelligence will probably have to
guess as to its meaning and differ in its application. Such vague law is repugnant to the Constitution
in two respects: first, it law violates due process as it fails to afford persons fair notice of the conduct
to avoid and second, it gives law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and, in
effect, it becomes an arbitrary flexing of the government’s muscle. However, for this doctrine to be
invoked, the act must be utterly vague on its face, i.e., that it cannot be clarified either by a saving
clause or by statutory construction.

The doctrine of overbreadth meanwhile states that a governmental purpose to regulate an activity
subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly thereby
invading the area of constitutionally protected freedoms like freedom of expression, freedom of
religion and other fundamental rights.

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 VII

The Ang Ladlad-LGBT Party filed a petition in the COMELEC for it to participate in Party-List
elections. The COMELEC disapproved its application holding that it is disqualified since its members
are “immoral,” citing verses from the Bible and the Koran. Rule on this decision of the COMELEC,
citing legal reason. (5 points)

ANSWER: The act of the COMELEC is tainted with grave abuse of discretion as it violated the non-
establishment clause of freedom of religion (Section 5, Article III, 1987 Constitution), and therefore,
should be nullified.

The COMELEC, as an agency of the government should not make use of, or be guided by, religious
standards in its decisions and actions. Under the non-establishment clause, when it comes to religious
differences, the State enjoys no banquet of options; neutrality alone is its fixed and immovable stance;
it should not establish any religion, and neither should it support one particular religion as against
another. (Ang LADLAD LGBT Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, 618 SCRA 32, April 8, 2010, En
Banc [Del Castillo])

VIII

A complaint was filed by Intelligence agents of the Bureau of Immigration (BI) against Wrench, a
British national, for his deportation as an undesirable alien. The Immigration Commissioner directed
the Special Board of Inquiry to conduct an Investigation. At the said Investigation, a lawyer from the
Legal Department of the BI presented as witnesses the three Intelligence agents who filed the
complaint. On the basis of the findings, report and recommendation of the Board of Special Inquiry,
the BI Commissioners decided to deport Wrench. Questioning the order, Wrench’s lawyer argued
that (a) his client was denied due process because the BI Commissioners who rendered the decision
were not the ones who received the evidence, in violation of the "He who decides must hear" rule and
that (b) that there was a violation of due process because the complainants, the prosecutor and the
hearing officers were all subordinates of the BI Commissioners who rendered the deportation
decision. Is there merit in the arguments of Wrench’s lawyer? (5 points)

ANSWER:

a. No, Wrench’s lawyer is not correct. Case law is consistent that administrative due process
does not require that the actual taking of testimony or the presentation of evidence before the
same officer who will decide the case. In American Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents, the
Supreme Court has ruled that so long as the actual decision on the merits of the cases is made
by the officer authorized by law to decide, the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which
his decision will be made can be delegated and is not offensive to due process.

b. Wrench is also not correct in arguing that he was denied due process simply because the
complainants, the prosecutor, and the hearing officers were all subordinates of the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration. In Erianger & Galinger, Inc. v. Court of
Industrial Relations, the Court ruled that the findings of the subordinates are not conclusive
upon the Commissioners, who have the discretion to accept or reject them. What is important

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 is that Wrench was not deprived of his rights under the Ang Tibay case which include the
rights to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, that the decision is
supported by substantial evidence, and the commissioners acted on their own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the case, and did not simply accept the views of their
subordinates in arriving at a decision.

IX

Mr. X is a member of Congress detained at the Manila City Jail while his conviction for statutory rape
on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. He filed a motion asking
that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative
sessions and committee meetings, despite his conviction.
Rule on Mr. X’s motion. (5 points)

ANSWER: The motion should be denied. As the Court ruled in People v. Jalosjos, membership in
Congress does not exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated
persons. To rule otherwise would amount to creation of a privileged class, in violation of the equal
protection clause. In this case, Mr. X was already convicted and thus he is validly incarcerated. An
appeal does not stay a criminal sentence. Thus, he cannot be allowed to fully discharge his duties by
attending legislative sessions and committee meetings.

What is International Humanitarian Law (IHL)? How is it distinguished from International Human
Rights Law? (5 points)

ANSWER: International humanitarian law (IHL) is the branch of public international law which
governs armed conflicts to the end that the use of violence is limited and that human suffering is
mitigated or reduced by regulating or limiting the means of military operations and by protecting
persons who do not or no longer participate in the hostilities. (Magallona, Fundamentals of Public
International Law, 2005 ed., p. 291)

Distinguished from human rights law, IHL applies only in times of armed conflict, whether national
or international; whereas human rights law applies both in times of war or in times of peace.

IHL permits of no derogation; whereas there are certain human rights treaties that allow governments
to derogate on certain rights in times of public emergency.

IHL protects civilians and persons who no longer participate in armed conflict (like prisoners of war
and persons hors de combat); whereas human rights law protects the individual from arbitrary acts
of governments at all times.

XI

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In connection with the May 2013 senatorial elections, the Diocese of Bacolod posted huge tarpaulins
in the premises of its Cathedral in Bacolod City categorizing candidates for Senator into either
belonging to “Team Buhay” (those who opposed the enactment of the Reproductive Health [RH]
Law), or “Team Patay” (those who supported it). In essence, the tarpaulins urged the Catholic faithful
to vote only for candidates belonging to “Team Buhay” in the election.

The COMELEC ordered the Diocese to remove those tarpaulins as they are considered unlawful
campaign propaganda materials prohibited under the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), otherwise
those responsible for their posting may be prosecuted for violation of election laws.

The Diocese argued that those tarpaulins are part of its religious speech and, therefore, protected by
the Constitution pursuant to the Separation of Church and State Doctrine.

a. Comment on the merit of the argument raised by the Diocese of Bacolod. (5 points)

ANSWER: The argument does not persuade. It was not a religious speech; it has nothing to do with
the creed, doctrine or beliefs of the church which can be considered “a purely ecclesiastical affair of
the church” that will prohibit the state from intruding into. It was a political speech by a religious
group that may be subject to the police power of the state. (The Diocese of Bacolod, Represented by
the Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra, et al. v. COMELEC, GR No. 205728, January 21, 2015, En
Banc [Leonen])

b. Will you uphold the order of the COMELEC under the circumstances? (5 points)

ANSWER: No. The power of the COMELEC is to regulate the use of political campaign propaganda
to insure equal opportunity among candidates and political parties during the elections. The
tarpaulin cannot be considered a campaign propaganda material which can be regulated by the
COMELEC under the police power; it was an opinion of a voter on an issue of national significance
which is beyond the power of the COMELEC to regulate as it is protected by the Constitution under
the freedom of expression clause. (The Diocese of Bacolod, Represented by the Most Rev. Bishop
Vicente M. Navarra, et al. v. COMELEC, GR No. 205728, January 21, 2015, En Banc [Leonen])

XII

Miro, an officer of the NDF, was arrested by policemen while about to board a passenger bus bound
for Butuan. Charged with rebellion, he pleaded not guilty when arraigned. Before trial, he was
granted absolute pardon by the President to allow him to participate in the peace talks between the
government and the communist rebels.

a. Is the pardon valid? Explain. (2 points)

b. Assuming that the pardon is valid, can Miro reject it? Explain. (3 points)

ANSWER:
a. The pardon is not valid. Under Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, pardon may be
granted only after conviction by final Judgment. In this case, Miro has only pleaded not guilty during
arraignment, and not yet convicted by final judgment.

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b. Yes, Lucas can reject the pardon. The case of De Leon v. Director of Prisons, citing US case law,
states that acceptance is essential to complete the pardon. In other words, Lucas may decide not to
accept the pardon or to reject it, particularly since he has the prerogative to decide whether to accept
its benefits or not.

XIII

Hostile and belligerent groups have opened and maintained armed conflicts on the Islands of XX and
YY. The groups declared a rebellion. Can the President place the islands of XX and YY under martial
law? Will that declaration be valid? What safeguards are provided in the Constitution to ensure that
the exercise of the President's power to proclaim martial law is not abused? (7.5 points)

ANSWER: The President can place XX and YY under martial law since there is an actual rebellion.
Under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President can place any part of the Philippines
under martial law in case of rebellion, when public safety requires it. If it is shown that the public
safety requires it, then the declaration would be valid provided that the following safeguards are
observed:

a. There must be actual invasion or rebellion;

b. The duration of the proclamation shall not exceed sixty days;
c. Within forty-eight hours, the President shall report his action to Congress. If Congress is not in
session, it must convene within twenty-four hours;
d. Congress may by majority vote of all its members voting Jointly revoke the proclamation, and the
President cannot set aside the revocation;
e. By the same vote and in the same manner, upon Initiative of the President, Congress may extend
the proclamation f the invasion or rebellion continues and public safety requires the extension; and
f. The Supreme Court may review the factual sufficiency of the proclamation, and the Supreme Court
must decide the case within thirty days from the time it was filed.

Lastly, these additional principles also safeguard against the abuse of the declaration of martial law:
a) Martial law does not automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the
operation of the Constitution; and (b) it does not supplant the functioning of the civil courts and of
Congress.

XIV

Congress passed a law providing for imprisonment of five (5) to ten (10) years for those found guilty
of cheating during exams. The legislature also stated that there shall be no plea bargaining allowed
in such offenses. Lazy Mind was charged with violating the law for having been caught consulting
his cell phone while taking the exam in Constitutional Law I. He then challenged the law, claiming
that it is not within the power of Congress to prohibit plea bargaining in criminal cases. It allegedly
violates the doctrine of separation of powers since the prerogative to regulate plea bargaining, a
procedural rule, belongs to the Supreme Court. Is Lazy Mind correct? (5 points)

ANSWER: Yes, Lazy Mind is correct.

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The 1987 Constitution does not retain the wording in previous constitutions allowing the legislature
to repeal, alter or supplement the rules of pleading, practice and procedure which may be
promulgated by the Supreme Court. Because of this, it is no longer within the province of the
Congress to come up with rules that are procedural in nature. Congress is now confined to
substantive rules. Plea bargaining is procedural in nature. Accordingly, it properly belongs to the
Supreme Court, not Congress. The prohibition, therefore, is unconstitutional. (See Estipona, Jr. v.
Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, 15 August 2017)

XV

Define and distinguish between jus cogens norms and obligations erga omnes. (5 points)

ANSWER: According to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, jus cogens norm
is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character.
Obligations erga omnes are obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole,
which are the concern of all States and for whose protection all States have a legal interest.
Jus cogens norms pertain to the non-derogability of a norm and the validity of rules and acts that
conflict with it. Obligations erga omnes pertain to the legal interest of a State in the violation of a
norm.

XVI

What is the underlying theory behind the State’s power to tax? (2.5 points)

ANSWER: The State’s power to tax is based on necessity. Every person who is able to must contribute
his share in the running of the government; and the government for its part, is expected to respond
in the form of tangible and intangible benefits intended to improve the lives of the people and enhance
their moral and material values. This symbiotic relationship is the rationale of taxation.
(Commissioner v. Algue, GR No. L-28896, 17 February 1988; 158 SCRA 9)
OR
The obligation to pay taxes rests not upon the privileges enjoyed by, or the protection afforded to, a
citizen by the government but upon the necessity of money for the support of the state. (Lorenzo v.
Posadas, GR o. 43082, 18 June 1937; 64 Phil 353)

XVII

Under Section 30 (E) of the NIRC, a non-stock corporation or association organized and operated
exclusively for charitable purposes, no part of the income of which shall belong to or enure to the
benefit of any member, organizer, officer or any specific person shall be exempt from income tax in
respect to income received as such.

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Likewise, Section 30 (H) of the NIRC provides that non-stock and non-profit educational institutions
are exempt from income tax. Caritas Manila, a charitable non-stock corporation, and the University
of Santo Tomas, a non-stock non-profit educational institution, keep their funds in Peso savings
accounts at the Bank of the Philippine Islands.

a. Is the interest income of Caritas Manila from the savings account exempt from income tax? Why or
why not. (2.5 points)

b. Is the interest income of the University of Santo Tomas from the savings account exempt from
income tax? Why or why not. (2.5 points)

ANSWER:
a. No, it is not exempt. The last paragraph of Section 30 of the NIRC provides that the income of
whatever kind and character of the organizations, including charitable organizations, from any of
their properties, real or personal, or from any of their activities conducted for profit regardless of the
disposition made of such income, shall be subject to tax imposed under the NIRC. Further, charitable
organizations do not enjoy income tax exemption under the Constitution.

b. Yes, the interest income is exempt provided the interest income of UST is used actually, directly,
and exclusively for its purpose as an educational institution. This is pursuant to Sec. 4(3), Art. XIV,
1987 Constitution of the 1987 Constitution.

XVIII

What is a special levy? Explain the limitation under the Constitution on the use of special levy. (5
points)

ANSWER: Special levy is a tax on the lands comprised within its territorial jurisdiction specially
benefited by public works projects or improvements funded by the local government unit concerned.
Under the Local Government Code, the special levy shall not exceed 60% of the actual cost of such
projects and improvements, including the costs of acquiring land and such other real property in
connection therewith.

Section 29(3) Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides all money collected on any tax levied for a
special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only.

XIX

Upon his retirement, Alfredo transferred his savings derived from his salary as a marketing assistant
to a time deposit with AAB Bank. The bank regularly deducted 20% final withholding tax on the
interest income from the time deposit. Alfredo contends that the 20% final tax on the interest income
constituted double taxation because his salary had been already subjected to withholding tax. Is
Alfredo’s contention correct? Explain your answer. (5 points)

ANSWER: Alfredo’s contention is wrong.

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Double taxation means taxing the same property twice when it should be taxed only once; that is,
taxing the same person twice by the same jurisdiction for the same thing. [Swedish Match Phils., Inc.
v. Treasurer, G.R. No. 181277 (2013)]. In this case, Alfredo’s salary was already subjected to income
tax; however, the 20% withholding tax is not on his salary but on his interest income from bank
deposit. The tax is imposed on a different income.

-NOTHING FOLLOWS-

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