CANON 11

IN RE SOTTO, 82 Phil. 595 (1949)

Facts:

♦ Atty. Vicente Sotto issued a written statement2in connection with the decision of this
Court in In re Angel Parazo the statement was published in the Manila Times and other daily
newspapers of the locality. The court required Atty. Sotto to show cause why he should not
be charged with contempt of court.
♦
Atty. Sotto does not deny having published the statement but he contends that under section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme Court the power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, "this Court has no power to
impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and that the Supreme Court can only impose
fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated by Congress with the
approval of the Chief Executive." And he also alleges in his answer that "in the exercise of the
freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in
the press with the utmost good faith and with no intention of offending any of the majority
of the honorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion, erroneously decided the
Parazo case; but he has not attacked, or intended to attack the honesty or integrity of any
one.' The other arguments set forth by the respondent in his defenses observe no
consideration.

Issue: WON Atty. Sotto can be punished for contempt of court?

Ruling:
Yes

Rules 64 of the rules promulgated by this court does not punish as for contempt of court an
act which was not punishable as such under the law and the inherent powers of the court to
punish for contempt

That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of superior statue, is a doctrine
or principle uniformly accepted and applied by the courts of last resort in the United States,
which is applicable in this jurisdiction since our Constitution and courts of justice are
patterned after those of that country.

Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of

the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if
well founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if
committed; but if it is not well taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence
the court in reversing or modifying its decision.

Atty. Sotto does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which
was then and still is pending reconsideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He
not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the
next Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and
reducing the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members of Justices
from eleven to seven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo
case, who according to
2 As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53.) interpreted by the Supreme
Court in the case of Angel
Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal
to divulge the source of a
news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously
interpreted said law, but that
it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency of narrow mindedness o the majority
of its members, In the wake of
so many mindedness of the majority deliberately committed during these last years, I believe
that the only remedy to put
an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To his effect, I
announce that one of the first
measures, which as its objects the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now
constituted, a constant
peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may
hear: the Supreme Court
very of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times
of Cayetano Arellano,
Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of
the Philippine Judiciary.
his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision
of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice.
♦
As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in
duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. An attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to
be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts, he may be removed from office
or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct.

Decision: Atty. Sotto guilty of contempt. Fine of 1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. He is also required to show cause why he should not be disbarred.
 SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION VS. CLORIBEL (31 SCRA 1 01/09/1970)
SANCHEZ, J.

FACTS:
First Contempt Case. The Supreme Court rendered a decision against MacArthur International
Minerals Corp and in their third Motion for Reconsideration, Attys. Vicente Santiago and John
Beltran Sotto made use of language that are disrespectful and contemptuous to the Court like
"it seems many of our judicial authorities believe they are chosen messengers of God",
"corrupt in its face" and insinuating favoritism and partisanship of the members of the Court,
notable Chief Justice Concepcion and Justice Castro due to alleged interest in the case
(Castro's brother works for one of the parties). Santiago and Castro wanted for the two
justices to inhibit themselves in the MR. The Court demanded for Santiago and Sotto to "show
cause" why they shouldn't be cited in contempt for the said statements. Santiago insisted that
the statements he made were inadvertently included in the copy sent to the Court, and was
just intended to be in the MR's rough draft.

Second Contempt Case. Counsel for MacArthur drafted a fourth motion for reconsideration,
this time with Atty. Juanito M. Caling as counsel, and again contained language which the
Court found disrespectful. The MR assailed the decision penned by CJ Concepcion since he
was out of town when the decision was written and included seeming threats of elevating the
issue to the World Court and allegations of rise of graft and corruption in the judiciary. The
Court demanded Caling to also "show cause" and he said that it the motion was already
prepared by Santiago when he took the case as was verified by Morton Meads, an employee
from MacArthur.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lawyers should be cited in contempt?

RULING:
First Contempt Case. Yes. The language employed by Santiago and Sotto degrades the
administration of justice which trangresses Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as
well as Sec. 20 (f) of Rule 138 of the RoC which states that "a lawyer's language should be
dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession". They are also expected to
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers but their
acts resulted in the contrary and are intended to create and atmosphere of distrust. The
inadvertence of Santiago's use of words can't be used as a shield to absolve him of any
misdeeds.
Second Contempt Case. Yes. Even if the idea of the language used in the 4th MR came from
Meads, both Santiago and Caling should've adhered to Canon 16 of the Code of Legal Ethics
wherein "a lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing
those things which a lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to their
conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in
such wrongdoing, the lawyer should terminated their relation". Santiago is also liable here
since Caling's represent didn't divest him of his capacity as counsel for MacArthur.
CANON 11
RULE 11.03

IN RE: ALMACEN (31 SCRA 562, 02/18/1970)

FACTS:
Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of
Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein
asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme
Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by
men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons
their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply
aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the
sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy."

He alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this

Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to
argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people
may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that
"whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must
never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that a resolution
issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the
undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that
at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and
confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest
profession.

The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y.
Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero, in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for
the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment
against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the
decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its
reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion,
but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion.
Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the
judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions.
To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion
for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second
motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return
card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered
withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of
Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had
already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection
to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case
to the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen must surrender his
Lawyer’s Certificate of Title.

RULING: It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a

respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the
judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. Well-
recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court
and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through
legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.

As a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to

exercise the right, but also to consider his duty to avail of such right. No
law may abridge this right, nor is he “professionally answerable for a
scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him
to legal animadversion as a citizen. Atty. Almacen is suspended from the
practice of law until further orders.
CANON 11
RULE 11.03
SANGALANG vs INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
177 SCRA 87 (1989)
SARMIENTO, J.
FACTS:
GR 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281 are efforts to enforce the “deed restrictions” against
specific residents of Jupiter Street and, with respect to GR 78182, Reposo Street. The
residents have allegedly converted their residences into commercial establishments (a
restaurant in GR 74376, a bakery and coffee shop in GR 76394, an advertising firm in GR
78182; and a construction company, apparently, in GR 82281) in violation of the said
restrictions. Their mother case, GR 71169 is, on the other hand, a petition to hold the vendor
itself, Ayala Corporation (formerly Makati Development Corporation), liable for tearing down
the perimeter wall along Jupiter Street that had theretofore closed its commercial section
from the residences of Bel-Air Village and ushering in, as a consequence, the full
“commercialization” of Jupiter Street, in violation of the very restrictions it had authored. The
Court of Appeals dismissed all 5 appeals on the basis primarily of its ruling in AC-GR 66649,
“Bel-Air Village, Inc. v. Hy-Land Realty Development Corporation, et al.,” in which the
appellate court explicitly rejected claims under the same “deed restrictions” as a result of
Ordinance 81 enacted by the Government of the Municipality of Makati, as well as
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance 8101 promulgated by the Metropolitan Manila
Commission, which two ordinances allegedly allowed the use of Jupiter Street both for
residential and commercial purposes. It was likewise held that these twin measures were valid
as a legitimate exercise of police power.

Issue: WON Makati Resolution No. 81 and MMC Ordinance 81-01 are unconstitutional as
violative of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.

RULING: No. Both are constitutional. All contracts are subject to the overriding demands,
needs, and interests of the greater number as the State may determine in the legitimate
exercise of police power. The Court guarantees sanctity of contract and is said to be the “law
between the contracting parties,” but while it is so, it cannot contravene “law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy.” Above all, it cannot be raised as a deterrent to police
power, designed precisely to promote health, safety, peace, and enhance the common good,
at the expense of contractual rights, whenever necessary. Police power is the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety
and general welfare of the people. Invariably described as “the most essential, insistent, and
illimitable of powers” and “in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of
government,” the exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if
it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process
or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee. Police power is elastic and
must be responsive to various social conditions; it is not confined within narrow
circumscriptions of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of
a democratic way of life. Public welfare, when clashing with the individual right to property,
should be made to prevail through the state’s exercise of its police power. Herein, the MMC
Ordinance represents a legitimate exercise of police power, as the ordinance is neither
capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable; but that it is based on compelling interests of general
welfare. The restrictive easements are similar to any other contract, and should not deter the
valid exercise of police power. The MMC has reclassified Jupiter Street into a “high density
commercial zone, pursuant to Ordinance 81-01. Sangalang, BAVA, et. al., thus have no cause
of action on the strength alone of said “deed restrictions.”
CANON 11
RULE 11.03

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY, ETC. A.M. NO. 10-10-4 SC MARCH 8, 2011

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:
This case is the disposition of the Court on the various submissions of the UP Law Faculty in
response to the Show Cause Resolution directing them to show cause why they should not be
disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of specific provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The violations stemmed from the letter submitted by the
respondent UP Law professors entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by The Faculty of
the University of the Philippines college of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court"calling upon the Supreme Court to act on their
Statement which they formally submitted, through
Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Dean Leonen), for the Court’s proper disposition.
Respondents invoked the defenses of freedom of speech and academic freedom upon their
response to the Show Cause Resolution. The factual antecedent of the letter stemmed from
allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court upon the promulgation
of the decision in Vinuya, et al.v. Executive Secretary penned by Associate Justice Mariano del
Castillo (Justice Del Castillo).
The decision ruled against Vinuya et al representing the “Malaya Lolas” or the comfort women
during the Japan occupation. The letter contained a statement that the Supreme Court
actually misrepresented the conclusions of the work of Professors Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-
Descent entitled "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens," the main source of the plagiarized text.
In this article they argue that the classification of the crimes of rape, torture, and sexual
slavery as crimes against humanity have attained the status of jus cogens, making it obligatory
upon the State to seek remedies on behalf of its aggrieved citizens. Yet, the Vinuya decision
uses partsof the same article to arrive at the contrary conclusion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents UP Law professors have crossed the line of decency and
acceptable professional conduct and speech and violated the Rules of Court through
improper intervention or interference as third parties to a pending case
RULING:
Yes, the Court finds that respondents UP Law professors, with the exception of one
respondent, have crossed the line of decency and acceptable professional conduct and
speech and violated the Rules of Court through improper intervention or interference as third
parties toa pending case. The Court held that the manner of the criticism and the
contumacious language by which respondents, who are not parties nor counsels in the Vinuya
case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said pending case for the
"proper disposition" and consideration of the Court that gave rise to said Show Cause
Resolution. The said Resolution enumerated the statements that the Court considered
excessive and uncalled for under the circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication and
later submission to this Court of the UP Law Faculty’s
Restoring Integrity Statement. The concerning remarks pointed out by the Court include the
opening sentence of the statement which contemplates an institutional attack. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who
had suffered abuse during a time of war. The first paragraph concludes with a reference to
the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land.