Reflection on Heidegger

Ontology of Da-sein in Heidegger and Indian tradition

Heidegger insists that the question of being should be given primary importance. For this, first
of all, questions concerning being should be properly formulated. And such questions can be
formulated only when we realize that it is of considerable importance to talk about being. In
fact, the inquiry "of" and "into" being is essential for having a clearer understanding of it. It can
also cure us of certain prejudices we hold regarding it. In the early section of the Introduction,
we find Heidegger discussing three such prejudices regarding the conception of being in ancient
philosophy. They are considering "being" to be: Universal, Undefinable, and Self-evident. He
maintains that revision in these concepts are necessary.

Heidegger seeks an elaboration on the meaning of being. He further clarifies why such an
inquiry should precede all other inquiries in natural and human sciences. Being is sometimes
understood in relation to a necessary and absolute Being but he is opposed to such theological
enterprises because he understands being in the concrete sense, grounded in the necessity, and
not chance or probability. Again, being must be conceptualized in its own terms and gained
access to. Heidegger clarifies why revision of concepts and setting up new foundations is
essential for making progress in any discipline by citing the example of sciences. He further
maintains that "ontological inquiry" is more basic than " ontic inquiry" of empirical sciences.
This is because beings studied under such sciences constitute only a part of the being in general.
Hence, being in general should be studied first.

Heidegger asserts that this being is Da-sein or being in the world. The principal characteristic of
Being is existence which it understands in relation to itself. All other forms of beings are only
modes of being of Da-sein. Da-sein is the most immediate kind of being and the most essential
feature of being is Da-sein. Further it is not being only in an objective way. Rather in its being,
Da-sein is concerned about its very being. This being is also related with the world and other
beings which are different from itself. Sciences and other disciplines study about this relation.
But we can have proper understanding of this relation and also ontologies of these objects only
when we do proper "existential analysis" of Da-sein. Da-sein thus occupies an important place
and all inquiry and interrogation should be directed towards it.

Giving primacy to ontological and existential anlaysis have been a recurrent theme in Indian
tradition. Also questions like " What is that by knowing which everything else can be known?"
etc were regularly posed in the Upanishads and this only hints to the fact that existential
analysis of the human condition was thought to precede other empirical inquiry. Later, as time
passed by, prioritizing "self-knowledge" over other types of knowledge became evident. This
was passed to the later generations as a part of tradition. Obviously, Indian tradition differs from
Heidegger in ascribing transcendental character to the subject such that being-in-the-world
became only a contingent fact arising from ignorance and which can be transcended to reach
absolute freedom or being-in-itself. But such formulations were possible only with a thorough
analysis of being-in-the-world. Advaitins, Buddhists and other philosophers in Indian tradition
found that being-in-the-world was limited and is affected with change, decay and death. The
desire for perfection and freedom led them to situate the meaning of being outside the world
totally free from the limitations of mundane existence. This may not go at par with
Heideggerian thinking but like Heidegger, and unlike empirical and positivistic approach, they
thought that human reality was necessary to inquire.

We can bring Heidegger in dialogue with classical Indian philosophy. Heidegger would object to
nirvana or moksa saying that such sort of being is not an immediate case of being. It is at best
an imagination or projection of being without any delimitation even though being is entangled
in the affairs of the world. As such it is a hypothetical case of being. Unlike Husserl, Heidegger is
opposed to the idea of bracketing the world. As such being should only be understood as being-
in-the-world. Indian philosophers would reply that even though being finds itself engrossed in
the world, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to hold that there can't be any case when being
is not in relation with the world. And what should be the case when such ontology of being is
only because of gross misapprehension of the reality? Shouldn't then be our understanding
completely revised and conceptual apparatus subjected to scrutiny in light of the new findings?
Advaitins frequently cite the examples of waking state, dream world and deep sleep to prove
their position. Such cases can be invoked here too. Our understanding of being in the dream
world and waking state is completely different and most often contradictory. Then, why should
waking state be prioritized over the dream state? Is it beacuse there is logical coherence and
consistency in the first and not in the latter? But isn't logical structure itself derived from the
world which in turn disproves Heidegger's claim of primacy of ontology of Da-sein ?

Should we limit ourselves only to description of human condition taking it to be given and
unalterable? Phenomenology then turns to be a study in descrpitive ontology. But did
Heidegger intend this to be the task of phenomenology? Should it not be open to the
possibilities which can inevitably emerge by altering the relation of being with respect to itself
and also with the world? Heidegger himself talks of "authenticity" and "inauthenticity". Such
themes too become irrelevant if one is concerned only with descriptive ontology. If we want to
draw further parallels between Heidegger and Indian thought then we should perhaps focus on
his notion of authenticity and see if it can be connected with aspiration for freedom. Freedom
should also be further grounded by reducing appeal to mysticism and transcendentalism. Even
then the differences between two traditions loom large to escape the attention of any serious
observer.
References:

1. Heidegger, M. (1996). Being and Time. (J. Stambaugh, trans.). New York: State University of
New York. (Original work published 1927)