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Writing For Economics - Essay Writing
Writing For Economics - Essay Writing
Essay writing
The idea of setting essays is to offer you the chance to make a longer, more
complex argument. Nonetheless, in the model we recommend, the fundamentals
remain the same. In each paragraph, a flow of main idea (thesis) — explanation
/ reasoning (justification) — evidence / example (support) is an excellent
structure to use. If you read through academic writing, you will find this
structure over and over. The same is true for professional writing. There are of
course other structures, however this one always works and makes you sound
concise and clear.
In your essay, try to follow this structure for your essay sections.
Intro
Statement about the context of the question — explain why the question in
important (either in the 'real' world or for the discipline of economics)
Main body
Decide on the most logical order of your paragraphs — this might be
importance, chronology or causation, but the basic flow should be simple and
clear
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Follow the opening 'topic' sentence with your reasoning and evidence
for why this opening statement is valid. Be specific, not general. The
more detail you can bring in, the more expert you will sound and the
more persuasive your argument will be
Conclusion Summarise your argument again — as you did in the intro (different
words though!)
So what? — say what the significance of your answer is either in the 'real'
world or to the discipline of economics
Bibliography
List the books / articles you read while researching your answer
Below you'll find two essays written by students last year. Bearing the above in
mind, decide which one makes the clearer argument and which, therefore, got
the higher mark.
Essay 1
In the year 2000, there were auctions of spectrum rights for third
generation mobile telephones in several European countries. These
auctions generated very different amount of revenue in different
countries. How can this be explained?
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Strategy that United Kingdom had chosen was selling 5 licenses during
classical ascending auction. Auction resulted in huge revenues: 650 euros
per capita. Firstly it should be said that auctions as any normal business
activity should be competitive in order to be effective. UK spectrum auction
was relatively competitive attracting 13 participants. There are several
reasons why this action attracted so many participants. Firstly, UK was the
first country in the world to hold spectrum rights auction. Participants were
not completely aware of the usefulness of 3G cell phones, but were eager to
get competitive advantage in the new generation mobile communication
technology. Secondly, UK sold 5 licenses to the market with 4 major phone
operators. This fact attracted new entrants, since at least one of the licenses
can be potentially won by new entrants to the market. Both this facts
generated highly competitive auction environment and limited possible
collusions. Result of the auction was a huge success for UK government.
The next country to run spectrum rights auction in 2000 was Netherlands.
This auction raised 170 euros per capita. Reason of such flop, comparing to
the British result was lack of competition. When auction were run there were
5 major phone operators for 5 licenses to be sold. Few entrants decided to
participate in the auction, since everybody was sure that 5 licenses will be
distributed among market leaders. Another factor that made things even
worse was the fact that that was an ascending auction. In this case with few
participants there is a risk of collusion among market leaders. Netherlands
would have generated much more money if they would some how encourage
competition and change the action design in such a way that it would be
possible for participants other than market leaders to place bids
independently of each other to reduce collusion (sealed bid).
Italy generated 240 euros per capita and attracted 6 participants. Italy
intentionally reduced amount of participants by imposing a requirements
that participant of the auction must satisfy. Such situation combined with the
fact that Italian auction was ascending could result in possible collusions
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Swiss auction was a real flop. They generated only 20 euros per capita. Here
amount of participants was also artificially limited by allowing participants to
join into the groups. And the price that government accepts was also
reduced for some reason. Number of participants was sufficient to run
profitable auction, but combination of officially permitted collusions and low
reserve price resulted in absolutely insufficient revenues.
Of course there are several other reasons for difference in revenues, among
them there is a fact that UK as a country that run the first spectrum rights
auction in the world, might have enjoyed high revenues simply because
participants were new to the licenses and had no idea of their true value.
Overall economic situations in the counties as well as political might also
result in differences in revenues. But the main reason for difference in
profitability of the spectrum licenses auctions is difference in auction designs
which were effective in some countries and not in the others.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
A.K. Dixit and S. Skeath, Games of Strategy, 2nd edition, Norton, 2004
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Essay 2
In the year 2000, there were auctions of spectrum rights for third
generation mobile telephones in several European countries. These
auctions generated very different amount of revenue in different
countries. How can this be explained?
When it comes to auction design, the two crucial components are attracting
entry and preventing collusion. Ascending auctions encourage bidders to act
collusively and deter weaker potential bidders as they know that the
stronger bidder will always out bid him. On the other hand, (first-price)
sealed-bid auctions act in the opposite direction from ascending auctions. It
does not give bidders a chance to collude and encourages weaker bidders to
participate. However, the disadvantage of using a sealed-bid auction is that it
is more likely to lead to inefficient results than an ascending auction. The
reason for this is that sometimes bidders with a lower value may beat
opponents with a higher value. Hence, there is no perfect auction design and
they must be customized to suit different environments and targets.
United Kingdom was the first to hold the auctions and they are a good
example of how a well-planned auction design and good marketing
strategies can lead to a favourable outcome. As there were five licenses and
4 incumbents, they had an ascending auction. To prevent collusion, each
license could not be shared and each bidder was allowed no more than one
license. Also, the fact that at least one license was available to new entrants
lead to fierce competition from nine new entrants. To top it all off, UK had a
solid marketing strategy which was planned over three years (1997 - 2000).
All this helped contribute to UK raising 39 billion euros and being the most
successful out of all the countries that took part in the 3G auctions.
In the case of Netherlands, they had five licenses and five incumbents. This
deterred new entrants as well as facilitated collusion. For example, Deutsche
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Italy had their auction next but failed to learn from Netherlands and UK.
Their auction design was not robust and failed to adapt to the environment
in Italy. They adopted the UK design but had the additional rule that if
bidders did not exceed licenses, the number of licenses would be reduced.
They did not realize that having one more bidder than license does not
assure that the outcome will be competitive. Also, Italy had failed to
anticipate that firms would react differently to those in Netherlands and UK
as they now had more information. Hence, weaker bidders were discouraged
by previous auctions and did not bother to participate and since the
participation rate was low, it made it easier for the strong bidders to collude.
A bad auction design that was not tailored to the Italian environment and a
low reserve price resulted in Italy only earning less than 25 billion euros.
Switzerland was the most unsuccessful amongst all the countries that held
the auctions. It raised only 20 euros per capita in its ascending auction and
this can be attributed to an unfeasible auction design, badly formulated rules
and an absurdly low reserve price. Since the beginning, weaker bidders were
deterred by the auction form. They felt that they did not stand a chance
against the strong bidders and hence did not bother participating. This
resulted in little competition. Furthermore, The Swiss government committed
auction suicide when they permitted last-minute joint-bidding! This resulted
in nine bidders colluding to become just four. The last mistake that the Swiss
government made was to set a reserve price that was way too low. Since
there were four licenses and four bidders, bidders ended up paying only the
reserve price.
Austria, on the other hand, adopted Germany's auction design but was not
so lucky and only earned 100 euros per capita. The reason for this was that
there were 6 bidders competing for 12 blocks of spectrum and a very low
reserve price (one-eight of the reserve price in Germany). So instead of
trying to get three blocks of spectrum, the bidders divided the 12 blocks of
spectrum equally and paid the reserve price. This reason lead to Austria
earning less per capita revenue than UK and Germany.
The other factor that affected the amount of revenue earned by each country
was the sequence in which the auctions took place. Looking at the results of
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the 3G auctions held in 2000, it can be seen that the most successful
auctions were the first of their type (United Kingdom and Germany). The
reason for this is that between auctions, bidders learnt from previous
auctions, came up with new strategies and learnt more about their rivals.
However, the auction designs remained almost the same and were unable to
keep up with the new ideas the bidders had come up with. This resulted in
the later auctions not being as successful as the first.
In conclusion, the reason for the different revenues earned amongst the
countries that took part in the 3G auctions is due to the auction designs and
the sequence in which they took place. Revenues depend on how well the
auction design is able to attract entry and prevent collusion. Also, it has to
be able to adapt to new environments. For example, a good auction design
takes into account the information bidders have and the knowledge they
have gained from previous auctions. A sensible reserve price is of high
importance as well and should not be overlooked like in the case of
Switzerland and Germany. Lastly, auction design is not "one size fits all" and
the failure of the government to design an auction that suited the country's
environment lead to different revenues being earned.
References:
A.K. Dixit and S.Skeath, Games of Strategy, 2nd edition, Norton, 2004
Essay 1 Essay 2
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