The Municipality of Malabang, et al. vs. Pangandapun Benito, et al., GR No.

L-28113,
March 28, 1969

Facts:
This case involves an action for prohibition to nullify EO 386. This EO 386 created the
Municipality of Balabagan of the then President Carlos P. Garcia, out of barrios and sitios of the
Municipality of Malabang.

Petitioner’s Contention, etc. Respondent’s Contention, etc.

- Petitiner Amer Macaorao Balindong is
the Mayor of Malabang, Lanao del Sur
- Petitioner brought the action for
prohibition to nullify EO386 and to
restrain the respondent municipal
officials from performing the
functions of their respective offices,
relying on the ruling of Supreme
Court’s decision in Pelaez vs. Auditor
General and Municipality of San
Joaquin vs. Siva
- Respondent is the Mayor, and the rest
of the respondents are the councilors
of the Municipality of Balabagan,
Lanao del Sur
- Respondent argued that the Pelaez
ruling has no application in this case
because the municipality of
Balabagan is at least a de facto
corporation.
- This means that the Municipality of
Balabagan having been organized
under the color of a statute before this
declared unconstitutional, its officers
having been either elected or
appointed, and the municipality itself
having been discharge its corporate
function for the five years preceding
the institution of this action.

- Thus, as a de facto corporation, its

existence cannot be collaterally
attacked, although it may be inquired
into in an action for quo warranto at
the instance of the State and not of
an individual like Petitioner
Balindong.

Issues:
A. WON the municipality of Balabagan is a De Facto Corporation.
B. WON its legal existence can be collaterally attacked.
Ruling:

A. No, it is not a De Facto Corporation.

 As a Rule, “where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the
fact that the statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made
to rest on the consideration that there was some other valid law giving corporate vitality
to the organization.”

In the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when the
statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation, as,
independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other valid
statute to give color of authority to its creation.

B. Yes, it can be collaterally attacked.

Generally, an inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is reserved to the State in
a proceeding for quo warranto or other direct proceeding, and that only in a few
exceptions may a private person exercise this function of government. But the rule
disallowing collateral attacks applies only where the municipal corporation is at least a
de facto corporation. For where it is neither a corporation de jure nor de facto, but a
nullity, the rule is that its existence may be questioned collaterally or directly in any
action or proceeding by anyone whose rights or interests are affected thereby,
including the citizens of the territory incorporated unless they are estopped by their
conduct from doing so.

In the case at bar, Municipality of Balabagan is not even a De Facto Corporation.

Hence, it can be collaterally attacked.