It Takes A Village - Robert Sroka

It Takes a Village: An Inventory and Analysis of Athletes' Villages in the
United Kingdom
Robert Sroka (Canada)
Northumbria University, United Kingdom
Final report for
The IOC Olympic Studies Centre
PhD Students and Early Career Academics Research Grant Programme
2021 Award
December 31, 2021

Table of Contents
Abstract 2
Executive Summary 3
1. Introduction 8
2. Manchester 2002 Commonwealth Games 11
3. Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth Games 17
4. London 2012 Olympic Games 26
5. Discussion 41
6. Evaluating the Research Questions 43
7. Conclusions and Recommendations 47
Annex 1: Site Visit Observations 49
Annex 2: References 70
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ABSTRACT
This project compares athletes’ villages in three Olympic and Commonwealth Games in
the United Kingdom: Manchester 2002, Glasgow 2014, and London 2012. The
comparison is facilitated through data collection under three headings: financial, real
estate, and geography. This project focuses on the measurement of legacy value in an
athletes’ village context, the selection of sites, financial structures, and real estate uses,
as well as the design and location elements that contribute to a vibrant post-Games
village. In addition to comparing legacy outcomes of three villages in the same country,
this study aims to establish a data collection baseline for future analysis of athletes’
villages as a project class across the Olympics and similar regional events as well as
provide a referential body for prospective hosts that can enhance the value proposition
of future villages.
Keywords: athletes’ villages; legacy; finance; real estate; geography; design; land use;
London 2012; Manchester 2002; Glasgow 2014; Olympics; Commonwealth Games
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This study compares the athletes’ villages from three Commonwealth and Olympic
Games hosted by the United Kingdom in the past two decades: Manchester 2002,
Glasgow 2014, and London 2012. More precisely, this project establishes a series of
quantitative and qualitative measurements on village characteristics and outcomes to
allow for comparative analysis across the same country. From here, the project intends
to serve as a pilot and baseline for building a larger dataset of villages in all recent
Olympic and similar regional multisport mega-events.
Each of Manchester, Glasgow, and London utilised their respective mega-events to

generate redevelopment in their east ends that had experienced long periods of
disinvestment and poverty. Likewise, the bids for each event placed a new Games
village development at the core of their regeneration and legacy plans. However, after
winning the 2002 Commonwealth Games, Manchester changed courses and instead
used an existing student housing campus, whereas London and Glasgow completed
scaled down versions of their originally planned villages.
The objectives of this study can be summarised as follows:
1. To inventory attributes and compare legacy outcomes of three athletes villages in the
same country;
2. To establish a data collection baseline for future analysis of athletes villages as a

project class across the Olympics and similar regional events; and
3. To provide a referential body for prospective hosts that can enhance the value
proposition of future villages.
Beyond the academic literature on Olympic studies, this work is intended to function as
an opportunity for future hosts to both survey financial and development structures, as
well as their legacy outcomes over a medium term. As one of the largest sources of
capital expenditure and cost overrun risk for many multisport mega-events, there is
significant value to be found in comparative evaluation. This value is perhaps most
important for hosts of regional multisport competitions modelled on the Olympics, who
may still need to temporarily house thousands of athletes, but will struggle to cover
deficits with sponsorship and ticket revenue, thus having less capacity to absorb risk or
loss.
To facilitate the three primary objectives, the study has addressed five research
questions:
1. How should legacy value be measured in an athletes’ village context?
This project has identified three primary and interrelated headings of legacy value that
are of particular interest: physical transformation, development acceleration, and cost
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effectiveness. Underlying each of these elements is consideration of the potential
alternatives, such as a Games plan framed in different terms or no Games at all.
Physical transformation centres on the extent the geography containing the village is
positively changed from its pre-bid state. This includes remediation and upgrading of
land to a “best and highest use.” With development acceleration, the focus is on
whether and to what extent the village project can accelerate construction and provide
proof of market faster than the private sector absent the event. Finally, cost-
effectiveness concerns outcomes per subsidy unit relative to starting baselines, the
ability for local governments to draw central government funding, as well as the
avoidance of fiscal risk and stress that may adversely impact other government
services.
2. What components and structures of an athletes’ village project provide the best
legacy value for host cities?
The conception of best legacy value will correspond largely to how a host city prioritises
the three headings identified in Question 1. If cost-effectiveness is the focus, then
eliminating the major capital cost overrun risk of the village altogether may be
expedient. This can most feasibly be achieved through student housing campuses and
hotel clusters. However cost-effectiveness will underlie the framing of physical
transformation and development acceleration as well.
Where physical transformation is concerned, the pursuit of “best and highest” use of a
redevelopment area will be accompanied by ensuring that enforceable contractual
protections from cost overruns are possessed by the public sector. Although public-
private partnerships may be attractive to lessen the sticker price of village projects at
the bid stage, the experience of London and Glasgow demonstrates that host
governments will be at significant risk to fill the shortcomings of private partners.
If legacy objectives are centred on development acceleration, then components that will
make the area competitive in attracting developer interest relate to comparable
opportunities in the same regional or national market will be of importance. These
elements include site assembly and preparation beyond the village, infrastructure,
accelerated planning permission, and amenities that will likewise attract residents
considering a range of housing market options. Amenities of particular importance
include strong transport links, convenience retail, an attractive public realm, and access
to quality schools if target residents include families with children. Resident attraction
through amenities can have a compounding effect to drive pre-sales that will allow
developers to more quickly finance subsequent phases.
3. Can increased incremental revenue make up for potential capital losses on village
construction?
The results in Glasgow and London indicate that incremental council taxes and stamp
duty (transfer tax) are not a substantial offset for capital costs. In London, incremental
revenue from these taxes amounted to 1.6% of capital costs over the first six years of
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post-Games occupation. Likewise in Glasgow, the revenue was 1.2% of capital costs
from the first five years. Even if 30-year present values of future revenues are projected,
the high-end estimates are well under 10% of capital costs. However, these figures do
not take into account revenue generated from post-Games development phases, which
may further close the cost-offset gap.
Additionally, the results here may be limited to application the UK and countries with
similar systems of residential property taxation. Compared to North America where
there is often no cap to a flat tax on percentage of home value, council taxes are limited
to several thousand pounds for even the most expensive residential properties.
4. How and why were particular sites, financial structures, and real estate uses chosen?
In each host city, the villages planned at the bid stage were on sites in close proximity to
the main competition clusters that had been targeted as anchors for larger regeneration
projects by local governments. In London, leveraging the combination of the event and
physical transformation opportunity was valuable in extracting central government
funding.
Likewise the inability to secure clear national financial backing may have influenced the
shift in Manchester village scope to existing facilities. However, Manchester was
fortunate to have an existing single site student housing campus with more than
adequate beds that could easily be secured as a Games village – an analysis of student
housing options in London and Glasgow revealed that there was not a comparably well-
situated student housing campus in either city.
While in both London and Glasgow there a range of possible areas that could have
hosted a village development, there were few that could also provide the land
necessary for major venue clusters. Within these narrowed options, public land
assembly and proximity to transport connections were primary attributes driving site
selection.
At the bid stage, both London and Glasgow also framed their village projects as public-
private partnerships where private sector firms would possess the bulk of expenses and
risk. Along with significant social housing components that addressed practical local
needs, this framing made these projects appear more cost-effective and assisted in
building political and public opinion support for the respective Games. The provision of
major social housing elements also allowed for subtle cost shifting to other government
entities that would not be as directly linked to Games expenses.
In both cities, the finished product in terms of scale, uses, and form was strongly
influenced by the post-bid procurement process and the commercial considerations of
private sector bidders. This was complemented by long-term area planning processes
that situated village projects as anchor phases for much larger regeneration schemes
over subsequent decades.
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5. What use mix, design, and location elements contribute to a vibrant post-Games
village?
Site visits to the village and adjacent Games venues in London and Glasgow, as well as
the bid-proposed village site in Manchester, emphasised that vibrancy can be found
through a mix of uses that will bring a range of users and visitors to the same spaces.
Elements that can encourage vibrancy have some substantial overlay with previously
mentioned agents of development acceleration, including the presence of convenience
retail and walkable amenities, an attractive public realm, a critical mass of local
residents, and strong public transport connections.
The London village, home to several times the resident count of Glasgow, and adjacent
to much larger development schemes and major transport links, has a far more diverse
range and higher density of users. Conversely, the overwhelmingly low density and
residential nature of the Glasgow village, with few commercial or retail amenities in the
immediate area, has the feel of a quiet and affluent suburb. While the Manchester
student housing campus is obviously dominated by student users, the originally planned
bid village has an eclectic mix of residential, commercial, and industrial uses reflecting
its piecemeal development over the past two decades. Although the absence of master-
planning has left some unaddressed holes of blight and less than optimal use, there is a
wide range of visitors that provide vibrancy at different times.
Conclusions and recommendations
From the address of the research questions, there are five primary conclusions and
recommendations for future hosts of multisport mega-events:
1. While a village project at the centre of a larger physical transformation may have
significant legacy value on the surface, this value is mitigated by major risks of capital
cost overruns and subsequent fiscal stress that can deleteriously impact the ability of
host cities to fulfil basic service responsibilities. These risks can be best addressed
through cost certainty in procurement contracts and direct national government financial
commitment, although the latter only diffuses taxpayer risk across a broader base less
immediately connected to legacy benefits.
2. Hosts should consider avoiding the substantial capital cost and fiscal stress risks of a
village altogether through evaluating whether an existing student housing facility or hotel
cluster can meet event needs.
3. Where some new construction for a village is necessary, hosts should consider
partnerships with local universities where the finished product can be absorbed into
existing student on-campus housing demand, sold to private student housing operators,
or in expensive housing markets serve as staff rental or shared equity housing.
Alternatively, new convention hotel or resort facilities can likewise be the source of
appropriate village spaces.
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4. Although a significant social housing component can address substantial local
affordable housing needs, the reduced ability to recover costs from non-market
components adds further risk of net cost overruns and fiscal stress. Likewise,
incremental revenues from residential property taxes cannot be relied upon to
effectively plug financial holes.
5. A vibrant post-Games village may be best achieved through selecting a site that can
attract a wide breadth of users to the same spaces through a diverse use mix. Village
components that are conducive to this outcome include walkable amenities,
convenience retail, an attractive public realm, a strong mass of local residents, and
excellent public transit connections.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This study compares athletes’ villages in three Olympic and Commonwealth Games in
the United Kingdom: Manchester 2002, Glasgow 2014, and London 2012. The project
undertakes a comparative inventory of village characteristics and outcomes that can
serve as a baseline for a dataset expansion to other past villages, as well as reference
for future hosts in maximizing the value proposition of a village project. A Games village
is a constant and significant expense for prospective hosts. Ascertaining best practices
in the realm of village projects is crucial to delivering value for money and financially
sustainable Games for the Olympic movement.
The primary objectives of this study are three-fold: (1) to inventory attributes and
compare legacy outcomes of three athletes’ villages in the same country; (2)
establishing a data collection baseline for future analysis of villages as a project class
across the Olympics and similar regional events; and (3) provide a referential body for
prospective hosts that can enhance the value proposition of future villages.
1.1 Background and academic significance of project
The financial cost of hosting the Games is a frequently discussed and substantial
challenge for the Olympic movement. Host cities are expected to spend and risk billions
of dollars on stadia and infrastructure that may only have limited use after the brief
Games period, leaving a highly questionable value proposition for prospective bidders
(e.g., Baade & Matheson, 2016; Flyvbjerg et al., 2016; Hersh, 2018; Zimbalist, 2020).
Indeed, a relatively vibrant academic literature exists on Olympic infrastructure
investments, impacts, economics, and legacies (e.g., Andranovich & Burbank, 2011;
Fourie & Santana-Gallego, 2011; Preuss, 2015).
Common suggestions to address expense and value issues have included rotation
between several permanent host sites, using existing infrastructure, regional hosting
agreements, and risk shifting from host cities to IOC. This project offers a less
discussed option in one understudied aspect of the Games that provides a significant
opportunity to address the value-for-money gap – the athletes’ village.
Every Olympic Games and similar regional competition (e.g., Pan Am, Asian, or
Commonwealth Games) requires one or more villages to accommodate thousands of
athletes. In some Olympics, the village has come with a financial cost near $1 billion.
Even if there is sale of the units after the Games, several hosts have been left with
deficits in the range of hundreds of millions of dollars. While villages have been included
as line items in analyses of capital costs across multiple Games (Baade and Matheson,
2016; Flyvbjerg et al., 2016; Pruess et al., 2019), and there are numerous case studies
on certain villages or the village as a part of a cost-overrun in a particular Games (e.g.,
Muller, 2014; Patel et al., 2013; Scherer, 2011), there is a “missing middle” in the
literature. Although there is some work discussing planning outcomes over decades of
Games (e.g., de Moragas et al., 1996; Liao & Pitts, 2006; Munoz, 1997; Munoz, 2006),
there is no consistent and detailed inventory of village characteristics and comparison
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between villages, countries, and events in the post-2000 period. In large part, the
academic significance of this study aims to add depth and substance to address this
literature gap in the realm of athletes’ villages, as well as provide a baseline from which
others can assist in further measurement and evaluation in village projects past and
future.
1.2 Research questions
This project has five research questions. The basic rationale and background follow the
statement of each question.
Under this heading there are concepts such as financial value for money, capital costs,
and operating costs relative to alternatives. Similarly there are costs and benefits to
placing a village as an anchor for a new neighbourhood in either an urban or suburban
setting, as well as with who occupies the housing. A village represents both an
opportunity to transform a neighbourhood and a substantial financial risk that can be
mitigated through less ambitious schemes.
Hosts use different capital, operational, and real estate concepts for an athletes' village.
Within those headings there are a range of sub-elements that can similarly influence
outcomes. For instance, capital cost structures may use public-private partnerships or
traditional procurement as well as different tax revenue sources for funding such as
transfer payments or value capture schemes. Likewise, real estate concepts for villages
can include redevelopment of urban brownfields, suburban greenfield sites, university
campuses, as well as mixes of market or social housing and the mixing uses.
construction?
Value capture schemes, where additional revenue from development subsidizes a

project, provide an opportunity to directly offset capital costs. More broadly, to what
extent can new taxes from a major village development address and mitigate capital
financial impacts for host?
Decisions on various project components are not made in a vacuum. This question is
concerned with whether are there specific local factors that make a particular element
more sensible in that host city, or are there repeating themes that are instructive across
hosts? Likewise, are explanations in the literature for mega-events, mega-projects, and
stadiums or arenas applicable to villages as well?
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village?
Finally, beyond financial considerations, this question addresses what elements make a
village a vibrant destination and desired locale for living, working, or leisure.
1.3 Methods
There are three primary elements of the research design, collection, and analysis:
creation and population of the dataset, narrative synthesis, and observational site visits.
1.3.1 Dataset collection and population
For each city, data points under three headings have been collected: financial, real
estate, and geography. Financial data encompasses procurement model, public capital
cost, total capital cost, net public capital cost, public operating cost, incremental
revenue, and net public cost through 2020. Real estate variables consist of type of
village (e.g., brownfield redevelopment, greenfield site, student housing), land
acquisition method, number of units, legacy housing use (e.g., student, market, social,
mixed), legacy ancillary use, legacy use mix (e.g., residential, commercial, mixed),
property values and rents relative to comparable areas in same city. Geographic data
includes location within city (near central business district, suburban), number of
villages, rapid transit connections, as well as distance from central business district and
primary event clusters.
Data has been collected through document review. Documents include official Games
and legacy reports, government reports and documents, bond prospectuses, property
records, industry, media, and academic sources. This is complemented by a review of
Google imagery. Sources have been obtained using a combination of search terms on
search engines and databases. A snowball technique was used to find other related
sources. If there are contrasting numbers, the official source is used unless if there is a
detailed basis for an alternative calculation. Financial calculations have been completed
using present valuation and official inflation measures.
1.3.2 Narrative synthesis
In addition to populating the dataset, sources are analysed for public and expert
perception of village projects as well as insights on the planning, construction, finance
process, and legacy intent. A particular focus is placed on secondary review of
interviews with relevant actors and observers. This review attempts to address why a
particular site, procurement method, development type, or financial structure was or
was not selected, as well as how outcomes have corresponded to intent. Documents
are analysed for quotes from relevant actors and observers, and then sorted by
category: planning, construction, finance process, legacy intent, and legacy results.
Once a relevant actor is identified, snowballing search terms are combined to find other
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potential sources. Relevant key actors and observers include those related to bid and
organizing committees, elected officials, bureaucrats, urban planners, construction
company decision-makers, political commentators, financiers, and economists.
1.3.3 Observational site visits
Site visits and observation utilise a modified Gehl method, sometimes referred to as
Public Life Tools (Gehl Institute, n.d.). This project relies upon two primary elements to
measure vibrancy: pedestrian volume and feature/streetscape details. To comply with
space constraints and ensure that imagery can appear alongside text, this component
of the work primarily appears in Annex 1.
The measure of pedestrians has two components. The first entails counting moving
pedestrians and bicycles through a section of public realm for 15 minutes in the
afternoon and evening, with both weekday and weekend observations. The second
element of pedestrian measurement examines how pedestrians interact with the area.
Using the same 15 minute intervals, key anchor building facades were selected in the
defined development area and pedestrian activity was measured (entering and exiting
buildings, standing, pausing, leaning and sitting).
Feature measurement scored buildings, improvements, and streetscapes on a scale of

10 in four categories: activity and rhythm, materials and quality of build, maintenance,
and visual quality. Activity and rhythm measures the façade, width, and nature of the
building front or the improvement, as well as traffic flow. Materials and quality examines
the primary materials used in the building, as well as the streetscape. Maintenance
expands on how well buildings, improvements, and streetscape are kept-up in terms of
repair, visual attractiveness, and cleanliness. Finally, visual quality addresses the level
of engagement between buildings and streetscape and users, including detail and
texture, as well as the number and quality of openings in buildings (doors/windows and
their transparency).
2. MANCHESTER 2002 COMMONWEALTH GAMES
2.1 Financial summary
The Manchester Commonwealth Games relied upon a procurement model of

contracting out existing student housing halls at the University of Manchester. The event
was hosted in July and August, when student housing in the UK is typically either lightly
occupied or unoccupied. The site contract covered the June 1 through August 31 period
where undergraduate students would generally have little need to be on campus. In
addition to 3,340 bedrooms in six residence buildings, the contract encompassed a 30-
acre site that included some university conference and sporting facilities. The contract
also included 180 university staff who typically operated the site as student housing and
recreation, allowing for the Games to benefit from established operational expertise.
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As the village was procured through a temporary rental and operational contract of an
already existing facility, there were no capital costs attributed. The public operating cost
through the site contract was found to be £21.6 million in 2002. The 2020 net public cost
was pegged at £35.9 million.
Table 1. Manchester Athletes’ Village Summary

Type Existing student housing campus
Games beds 3,340
Legacy use Student housing
Organising Committee costs £21.6 m
Net public cost £21.6 m
Net public cost 2020 £35.9 m
2.2 Real estate and geographic summary
The residential and recreationally focused nature of the Fallowfield Campus site,
roughly 2.5 km from the main university campus, made it ideal for the Games to
completely take over for an extended period of time without substantial external
impacts. Although only 5 km from the core of Manchester’s central business district, the
area surrounding the Fallowfield Campus is residential and heavily populated by
students. The Fallowfield neighbourhood is bisected by the busy Oxford Road bus
route, which also serves as a student-oriented high street.
Using an existing student housing complex also removed the need to acquire and
assemble land, as well as the cost and risk of having to assemble land on a fixed
timeline. As the buildings reverted back to student housing, there was also no issue of
legacy use. Unlike with Glasgow and London, the tax-exempt university land and
housing units do not have readily identifiable market property values. Likewise, rents
are comparable to other university-owned student housing units and can serve as a
benchmark for market housing occupied by students in the neighbourhood. While the
demand from students in the neighbourhood may make market housing more valuable
than it would be absent the university’s presence, this is not an effect relatable to the
presence of the Commonwealth Games.
While relatively close to the city centre, the Fallowfield Campus was not adjacent to the
primary event clusters, as with many Games villages. The village was 6 km from the
SportCity complex constructed for the Games. SportCity included the then City of
Manchester Stadium (now Manchester City’s Etihad Stadium) for athletics and
ceremonies, as well as the cycling velodrome. The Fallowfield Campus is connected to
SportCity by the A6010 inner ring road.
The Manchester Aquatic Centre is 3.5 km north of the Fallowfield Campus along Oxford
Road and adjacent to the main University of Manchester academic campus. The third
significant cluster of events was at the Manchester Convention Complex, a further
kilometre up Oxford Road from the aquatics centre. A fourth significant venue in the
area was the 21,000 capacity Manchester Arena in the central business district, 5.5 km
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from Fallowfield. Although there are ample bus connections from the Fallowfield
Campus and it sits on the corner of two major road arteries, there is no service from
Manchester’s light rail system. Other venues were scattered throughout Greater
Manchester, with the exception of shooting, which was held at the Bisley Shooting
Centre in Surrey. As Surrey is several hours from Manchester, a satellite village was
required.
2.3 Narrative summary
Manchester’s Commonwealth Games bid is in many ways a legacy of the city’s

unsuccessful pursuit of the Summer Olympics in 1992, 1996, and 2000. These three
bids were broad attempts to leverage the Olympics as a means of funding physical and
reputational regeneration for a city that had experienced deprivation and urban blight
accompanying deindustrialisation throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Cook & Ward,
2011). Although the 1992 bid lost the British nomination to Birmingham, the 1996 and
2000 bids were finalists, respectively advancing to the second and third rounds of
voting. In each bid, the regeneration narrative was a crucial part of the proposed legacy.
While the 1996 Olympic bid focused on a very different concept on the west side of
Manchester, the 2000 Olympic bid bears a striking resemblance to the Commonwealth
Games bid document that followed two years later. Specifically, the primary cluster of
venues was in the same Eastlands location as proposed in the subsequent
Commonwealth Games bid, and what became Manchester Sportcity. Indeed the
Commonwealth Games bid was seen as a way to leverage and transplant an
accumulation of planning, expertise, and private sector interest, if on a smaller and less
visible scale than the Olympic Games (Cook & Ward, 2011).
The athletes’ village in the 2000 Olympic bid encompassed an ambitious plan linking the
Eastlands to the central business district and central train station (Manchester 2000,
1993). The proposed village would hug either side of a former industrial canal, and have
its core at a canal basin labelled the “International Zone”. At least 6,000 of the planned
14,700 beds in the “Residential Zone” adjacent were to be in close proximity to the
International Zone. The south end of the Village would also be bordered and served by
a proposed light rail extension connecting the central business district and Eastlands.
In the post-Games period, 3,000 beds were to become student housing, 4,900 beds
converted to office space, and the remainder apartments or other residential uses. The
2000 Olympic bid also included plans for a separate media village hosted in 10,000
already exiting student housing beds, mostly at the University of Manchester. Although
not specifically cited, the primary cluster of media village housing would likely have
been on the Fallowfield Campus.
Stemming from the broader renewal ambitions that fed into the Olympic bids that had
repeatedly failed by 1993, late 1990s Manchester was also undergoing some of the
most significant urban regeneration projects in Europe, further accelerated by
unplanned events. Just six months after the Commonwealth Games were awarded in
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1995, a truck bomb destroyed several blocks of the central business district while the
city participated in hosting another sporting mega-event, Euro 1996.
According to the Games-time leader of the Manchester City Council, [“t]he bomb gave
us an opportunity but we couldn't have taken it unless we had the capacity to act… the
council had to decide between effective management of a declining city or coming up
with something new” (Wainwright, 1999). The Olympic and Commonwealth Games bids
can be viewed as a significant part of the “something new,” which also included a tram
system, a major arena, and several major cultural venues. This was complemented by
£1.2 billion invested in the area immediately affected by the bombing.
2.3.1 Planning, procurement and finance
The Manchester 2002 bid document outlined that the athletes’ village would be the first
use of a new student accommodation campus for local universities in the city centre.
However the bid book went into no further detail other than noting that “[a]ctive
discussions have been taking place between the relevant parties to ensure that the
expanded campus will be located in the heart of the City Centre, a short walk away from
Piccadilly Station and the Eastlands Centre which will contain the new Stadium…”
The main University of Manchester academic campus extends to the southern edge of
the central business district near Piccadilly Station, so a new residential campus to the
north in what represented a largely blighted and underutilised area was not an
unrealistic vision. Indeed, the 2002 bid document cited future student residential
demand of up to 3,000 units, which dovetailed with previous plans from the 2000
Olympic bid to convert 3,000 beds into new student housing.
The original bid book plan would have seen about 4,250 beds in a mix of refurbished
Victorian structures and new construction. Beyond a map rendering of proposed
buildings, no further public design documents were found specific to the 2002 Games
bid. Comparing the 2002 bid to the 2000 bid reveals substantial overlap, with the 2002
version effectively shrunk to the canal basin area (see Figures 1 and 2). At the same
time, the bid document outlined that there was already more than sufficient pre-existing
student accommodation “in and adjacent to the City Centre.” The plurality of this already
existing supply of student housing was to be found several kilometres away at the
University’s Fallowfield Campus where the village eventually resided.
The research process has not isolated explicit reasons why the athletes’ village vision in
the bid document failed to materialise, although it appears that strategic options for the
village were reviewed in 1998. The most feasible reasons for the shift centre on a lack
of funding and absence of interest or capacity from prospective developers and
financiers. There were four main parties with the potential to fund the Games village: the
universities, private student housing developers, Manchester City Council, and the
national government.
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Figure 1. Manchester 2000 Olympic Games Candidature Proposed Village (1993, p. 11)
Figure 2. Manchester 2002 Commonwealth Games Bid Proposed Village (1995, p. 85)
With the universities, it may have been the case that none of the three universities near
the city centre had sufficient current means or need to undertake the construction of
student housing on the scale and timeframe needed, and location desired, for the
Games. Likewise, while there are multiple large developers of private student housing
near UK university campuses, the scale of the proposed village was likely beyond the
risk or capacity threshold of these parties.
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Although Manchester Commonwealth Games Ltd served as the effective organising
committee and was delegated power to this end by Manchester City Council, the final
responsibility for cost overruns lay with the City Council. By early 1999 there was
significant reporting on the potential for cost overruns that could pose a major risk of
fiscal stress for the Council, and a series of high profile appeals to the central
government for more funding (Hetherington, 1999; Select Committee on Culture, Media
and Sport, 1999). The Economist (1999) noted that all financial estimates showed an
operational loss, with a worst-case scenario produced in mid-1998 projecting a £30
million loss for the Council. By 2001, the 1998 worst-case had been exceeded,
revealing a £110 million funding gap that posed a major threat to local services
(Chaudhary, 2001).
While the National Lottery through Sport England represented the primary source of
venue funding, this source was not extended to the village. Although there were several
instances of direct appeals to the national government to cover revenue shortfalls, the
local council was most fiscally exposed. As it was, the national government provided
£30 million to address the shortfall, combined with a further £30 million, leaving £45
million to be covered by the Council (Chaudhary, 2001). Given the ever expanding fiscal
hole the Games faced, any prospects of a subsidised village requiring a complex and
expensive expropriation on lands that would likely need remediation were easy to
sacrifice when a feasible, ready-made and low cost village option already existed at
Fallowfield.
2.3.2 Legacy
Since the village consisted of an already existing student housing campus, there is little
direct physical legacy. However, there may be a direct fiscal legacy insofar as using an
easily convertible existing facility allowed a potential source of cost and overrun to be
eliminated. Specifically, the risk of capital cost overrun was eliminated and the
operational risk was managed through a contract with a provider already experienced in
running the facility. This in turn protected the Manchester City Council from further fiscal
stress as the guarantor of the Games.
Beyond the actual village used for the Games, there is potential for legacy to be viewed
through the lens of the alternative. In particular, we can evaluate what has happened in
the almost 20 years since the Games on the originally planned village site. As may have
been expected for an area with close walking proximity to the central business district,
there has been some significant development. Much of the form conceived in the 2000
and 2002 bids has come to fruition, with a mix of warehouse conversions, Victorian
restorations, and new constructions. The primary difference with the Games bid visions
of the village and reality is the lack of master planning and land assembly. Instead of a
coherent vision executed at once, the development has been sporadic and steady over
time. There is now a patchwork of restored properties, new construction including
towers, working industrial uses, surface parking lots, and some abandoned structures
still awaiting work.
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While a range of parties have undertaken projects in the proposed village area for the
Commonwealth Games, there has also been significant movement on aspects of the
larger vision found in the 2000 Olympic bid, which aimed to have the village link the city
centre to the Eastlands complex. In 2002, national funding was acquired through the
Millennium Village program to redevelop Cardroom Estate, a failed social housing
project adjacent to a canal and brownfield area (Black, 2019) overlaying the midsection
of what would have been the 2000 Olympics Athletes’ Village. This public-private
partnership has seen the transformation of the area into New Islington over 20 years,
and has included 400 residential units built by the developer (Urban Splash, 2020).
Additionally, the area plan has provided lots for others to infill (Deloitte, 2016). The most
significant has been the Manchester Life partnership between Manchester City Council
and the Abu Dhabi United Group (ADUG), owners of Manchester City Football Club.
The two parties had already partnered to oversee £400 million investment in the
Eastlands campus since 2011, and ADUG was interested in supporting development to
further connect the Eastlands to the central business district (Manchester City Council,
2019). As of 2020, just over 1,000 homes had been completed, concentrated in New
Islington and Ancoats, with future phases planned to extend further east along the canal
corridor identified in the 2000 Olympic bid. The partnership as announced in 2014 was
cited as potentially reaching 6,000 homes and a £1 billion value (Jupp, 2014). Arguably,
if Manchester City had not been accompanied by the converted Commonwealth Games
stadium and surrounding land potential, the Abu Dhabi owners may have selected
another club and city to invest billions in.
3. GLASGOW 2014 COMMONWEALTH GAMES
In Glasgow, the procurement model was a public-private partnership. The local Council
selected and assembled the site, then sought competitive bids for construction and
delivery. The successful bid was awarded to the City Legacy consortium (James &
Tolson, 2020). In addition to building the units to Games specifications and post-Games
conversion to housing, the consortium in partnership with the Organising Committee
was responsible for constructing roads, water, and sewage connections within the
development, landscaping, amenity spaces, security fencing, as well as installation and
removal of temporary Games infrastructure.
3.1.1 Public capital cost
The Glasgow village public capital cost is estimated at £222.4 million in 2008, which is
£303.4 million in 2020. The 2008 number consists of £140 million for the public share of
construction capital costs, £65.3 million for land assembly and the value of lands
provided by Council to the project, £8 million for remediation, and £9.1 million for
Organising Committee costs. A further £40 million in capital costs were provided by the
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private partner, City Legacy. Council was also to participate in an undisclosed share of
profits from the development.
However, there is some variance in reported costs, as well as multiple potential ways to
construct and estimate line item costs that were not directly ascertained through
document review. Costing data was also limited by the use of exceptions to freedom of
information law to protect third party commercial interests. While the presence of such
exceptions are not uncommon in a range of jurisdictions, they frequently have the effect
of obscuring the true public costs, intentionally or not.
Possible variance here comes from potential public coverage of the private capital
share. Specifically, the private partner could not obtain financing for a £35 million cash
flow provision, leading to direct financing from the Strathclyde Pension Fund. This was
the first instance of direct lending by the pension fund, indicating reasons beyond
investment return contributed to the loan (Menon, 2017). However, the Fund claimed an
11.1% return on investment (Strathclyde Pension Fund, 2015). Thus, there is no further
public contribution attributed to capital costs.
3.1.2 Land valuation
Land valuation provides a greater range for defensible costing. Although public bodies
held a combined approximately 25 out of 35 hectares of the planned village site at the
time of the bid (Glasgow 2014, 2017), the remainder had to be assembled through
negotiation and compulsory purchase order (CPO). Through this assembly process,
there were widely varying amounts paid directly and indirectly via land swaps. Indeed,
sometimes the amount paid was several times the price within 10 years prior.
The highest end of the prospective land cost range of £198.3 million was calculated
through extrapolating the financial value of the largest public acquisition to the entire
site. This largest sale was for 3 hectares at the centre of the planned village, sold in
2008 for £17 million (Glasgow City Council, 2008). However this 3 hectare site had itself
been assembled between 2002 and 2005 for between £4 million and £5 million (Gray &
Porter, 2015).
As opposed to its state at the time of acquisition, this almost £200 million valuation
reflects the value of potential future highest and best use of a riverfront site,
accompanied by publicly known government policy to realize this vision, and the fixed
event schedule. Without the Games catalyst however, the village would have been one
of many available areas for future brownfield redevelopment and thus its value would
have likely remained similar to those recorded prior to the Games bid. Thus, the land
value cost can arguably be best measured through the alternative market value of the
land had it not been used for the Games village. Using the largest site sale and
accounting for inflation between the purchase time and 2008, a £5.6 million valuation for
3 hectares translates to £65.3 million.
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3.1.3 Remediation
The village site was heavily contaminated former industrial land that required significant
remediation. Total remediation costs were cited by a Glasgow Council source as £8
million and this is the figure used in capital cost calculations. This £8 million amount
included £5.9 million for an on-site soil treatment plant. Given that UK industry
estimates average remediation costs in the range of £250,000 per acre, which equates
to roughly £21.5 million for a 35-hectare site, the on-site remediation seems to have
been achieved at good value for money through scale economy.
3.1.4 Organising Committee costs
Although perhaps more operational in nature, the village costs incurred by the
Organising Committee were classified by Audit Scotland (2015) as a capital cost, and
for this reason are included under capital costs. The £9.1 million in costs under this sub-
category are calculated as encompassing temporary structures, and amenities in the
village as well as £7 million for the post-Games conversion of units.
3.1.5 Total capital cost
The total capital cost of £262.4 million is reached by adding the £40 million City Legacy
contribution to the project to the public capital cost figure of £222.4 million in 2008.
Inflated to 2020 values, this becomes a total capital cost of £358 million.
3.1.6 Net public cost
There are three major potential headings that would alter the net 2020 public cost from
the total capital cost: operating costs, sale of capital assets, and incremental revenue.
Although there was a potential £9.1 million operating cost from the Organising
Committee, this was classified as a capital cost by Audit Scotland. After the Games,
units were either sold as market housing or transferred to housing associations which
pay for operating costs from rents. While rents do not cover the capital cost of social
housing, there is nothing to indicate additional net public operating costs.
With capital assets, 300 units have been sold at market rates. While Glasgow Council
participated in profit sharing, public revenues and percentage share from this profit
sharing have been kept confidential through commercial interest exemptions in freedom
of information law. With prices ranging from £75,000 to 200,000 (Graham, 2013), the
300 units sold are estimated to have been sold for an average of £140,000 each,
generating £42 million in 2015 revenue. The estimated average sale price is based
upon 3 bedroom terraced houses quoted at £135,000 in 2015 (McLuckie, 2015).
A 2015 base year is used as the village was handed back by the Organising Committee
in January 2015. The public share of revenue is estimated at one-third. Adjusted for
inflation from 2015 to 2020, the estimated public revenue from unit sales is £22.7
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million. Revenues may be further increased by Phase 2 of the development, which saw
plans submitted for 125 units in 2017 (Nicoll, 2017). However, as of October 2021 there
is no visible construction or preparation on the proposed Phase 2 lands.
The third element is incremental revenue from the new development. As UK VAT is not
charged on construction materials or labour for new units, the scope of incremental
revenue is limited to property taxes. In the UK, residential property is primarily taxed
through a transfer tax and a council tax. Starting with the transfer tax, in Scotland, the
Land and Buildings Transaction Tax (LBTT) replaced the stamp duty in April 2015. Both
taxes operate similarly with progressive taxation on property sales. The primary relevant
difference between the stamp duty and LBTT is the exempt threshold of £125,000 with
the former and £145,000 for the latter. Residential sales over these thresholds and
under £250,000 are taxed at 2%.
As it is unclear which regime applied to which sales, stamp duty is used to both illustrate
a potential upper range of incremental revenue and maintain consistency with London.
Applying the 2% Stamp Duty to the incremental £15,000 in sale price (the incremental
price between £125,000 and £140,000) for 300 units, creates an incremental revenue
gain of £90,000. Although this formula likely maximizes the range of transfer tax
revenue derived, even if the parameters are expanded to assume that 150 of the units
are sold at an average of £175,000, there would only be £150,000 in revenue
generated. In any scenario, land transfer tax is not a significant revenue offset.
Moving to the council tax, in Scotland this operates as a tax on residential property
where dwellings are classified into eight tax bands and then assessed a flat rate per
year paid to local authorities. Based upon representative sampling of postal codes and
streets within the Games village, most market properties would likely be assessed at
Band D. Using an upper range proxy figure of £1386 per unit per year for five years, the
300 market housing units are estimated to have generated £2.1 million through 2020.
As for social housing, these units are assumed to fall in Band B, which was the most
common council tax band in 2015 and has significant overlay with streets and postal
codes in the village. Using the proxy of £1078 per unit per year, the 400 units are
estimated to have generated £2.2 million in revenue through 2020. This makes for a
combined estimated total of council tax revenue of £4.3 million. If future revenues are
estimated in present values, then the 30-year revenue projection is roughly £14 million
in 2020.
3.1.7 Total public cost through 2020
With the addition of the modest estimated land transfer tax revenue, the total
incremental revenue between 2015 and 2020 is pegged at £4.4 million. This estimate
also does not account for the likely possibility that a considerable proportion of these
incremental transfer and council taxed would have otherwise been paid elsewhere in
the same taxing jurisdictions absent the village construction. Subsequently adding this
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£4.4 million in incremental revenue to £22.7 million in estimated asset sale revenue
reduces the net public cost through 2020 to £329.7 million.
Table 2. Glasgow Athletes’ Village Financial Cost Estimates (£ million)

Public capital cost 222.4
Public capital cost 2020 303.3
Land 65.3
Remediation 8.0
Organising Committee costs 9.1
Total capital cost 262.4
Total capital cost 2020 358.0
Council tax to 2020 4.3
Council tax 30 year 14.0
Stamp duty 0.15
Asset sale 22.7
Net public cost 329.7
The east-side Glasgow village is on an inner city brownfield site on the River Clyde. The
village includes terraced and semi-detached single and multi-family units that are low
rise in nature. 624 out of 700 homes are between 2 and 4 bedrooms. As noted, the
majority of the site was previously held by public authorities, with roughly 30% having to
be acquired through purchase agreements and expropriation. The 700 units were
divided into a 300-unit market housing component and 400 social rental units, with
market units closer to the riverfront. Additionally, the village complex includes a 120-bed
care home.
Table 3. Glasgow Athletes’ Village Summary

Type New construction residential
Games beds 6,500
Legacy use 700 housing units, 120 bed
care home
Residential unit mix 400 units social housing, 300
market housing
3.2.1 Property market values
Property values were compared using a UK property search site that aggregates sales
and rental values, using open source data to model property values by postcode. Two
postcodes (G404QT and G404RF) representing the bulk of market units in the village
had average property values estimated at £148,048. These valuations are higher than
one of the two comparable neighbour codes – G403JL had property values pegged at
£82,067, while G314PA was assessed at £152,837. However the latter is likely buoyed
by a greater proportion of single-family detached and semi-detached homes, and the
former is perhaps reduced in value through visibly older post-war housing stock.
However, differences are more pronounced in the rental market. As of May 2021, a 2
bedroom unit in the village rents out in the range of £900 per month, whereas nearby
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outside of the village a similarly sized unit can be had for £550 per month. Much of this
difference again can likely be accounted for by age and quality of housing stock.
The inner city location of the Games village is 4 km from Glasgow’s central business
district. The village also immediately borders a primary Glasgow 2014 event cluster.
This cluster includes Celtic Park, site of the opening ceremony, as well as the combined
arena and velodrome facility. A further 2.5 km east from the village was the primary
aquatics venue, while 2.3 km west of the village is the National Hockey Centre.
The other main event cluster was 6.5 km from the village on the city’s west side
riverfront at the Scottish Exhibition and Conference Centre (gymnastics, boxing, judo,
netball, wrestling, and weightlifting). The remaining venues were mostly scattered
throughout the city. Although the strong majority of athletes were housed at the
Glasgow village, there were two hotels that served as satellite villages for events in
Edinburgh and Dundee.
The primary event cluster is connected to the National Hockey Centre by the Glasgow
East End Regeneration Route, which represents part of a larger planned ring road.
While the first two phases were completed in 2011 and 2012, there has been no further
construction as of writing in 2021 despite future extensions planned after the Games.
The Games also prompted the modernisation of Dalmarnock rail station 300 metres
from the west edge of the village. From Dalmarnock, Glasgow Central can be reached
in 7 minutes (ScotRail, 2021).
3.3.1 Background
The Glasgow bid was linked strongly to a legacy of regeneration. After winning the bid,
then Deputy First Minister Nicola Sturgeon claimed that the Games “…will bring a host
of benefits to Glasgow and Scotland, including everything from regeneration, job
creation, inward investment and just a huge pride in being Scottish” (Stewart, 2007).
This objective of Games-based regeneration was focused on Glasgow’s East End.
Although the East End was once an industrial centre of the British Empire, it had largely
become an area of disinvestment, brownfields, and poverty (Gray, 2014; Matheson,
2010). The Dalmarnock district where the Games was centred had declined from a
population of over 50,000 in the 1950s to under 2,000 by 2014 (Wainwright, 2014a).
The Games became part of a larger regeneration initiative in the East End area under
the banner of the Clyde Gateway Project, which was designated the highest priority
regeneration area in Scotland in 2006 (Glasgow 2014, 2007). This project was formally
coordinated by the Clyde Gateway Urban Regeneration Company (CGURC), created
six weeks after the successful bid (James & Tolson, 2020). A partnership between the
overlaying Glasgow and South Lanarkshire councils, Scottish Enterprise, and the
Scottish Government,1 the CGURC is tasked with directing regeneration in a 840
1 Scottish Enterprise is the economic development public body of the Scottish Government.
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hectare area on both sides of the River Clyde over 20 years. Although the CGURC’s
brief lasts until 2028 and expands well beyond Dalmarnock, the Games village is at its
core (Glasgow 2014, 2007).
Alongside the enabling of the CGURC, major direct investments in the Games came
from the Scottish Government and Glasgow Council. Part of the appeal of the chosen
site in Dalmarnock came from its proximity to Celtic Park and land where other venues
could be clustered, as well as riverfront location where many other cities have
successfully targeted residential redevelopment projects, and significant pre-existing
land assembly by Council.
3.3.2 Planning and procurement
The athletes’ village was framed in the bid book as “the largest and most ambitious of
the new housing neighbourhood projects being developed in the city” (Glasgow 2014,
2007, p. 56). At the time of the bid, the village was planned to be 1,500 units and the bid
book renderings show a development much more dense than what was constructed.
As opposed to a tender, the procurement process was framed as a “competitive

dialogue,” which started in June 2008 (Glasgow City Council, 2009). Six expressions of
interest resulted in four groups being shortlisted. From here, three consortia proceeded
to the second stage of the process. The bids were evaluated in nine areas under four
primary weighted headings: commercial (33%), legacy (45%), community benefits
(10%), and Games delivery (12%). After weighting, the final score was 5.92 for City
Legacy, and 4.68 and 4.20 for its competitors. Despite the Games bid vision outlining
1,500 housing units for the Games period, the City Legacy proposal entailed 700
housing units for Games accommodation, with a further 765 units constructed after the
Games on land reserved for temporary Games structured. There was also a planned
35,000 square feet of commercial space for local format retail.
Even though the majority of the village site was already publicly owned, the land
acquisition process for the remainder became contentious. The land assembly process
was backed with powers of CPO, which is similar to expropriation or eminent domain in
other jurisdictions. In Scotland, a CPO generally requires a “public interest” in the
taking, and a public inquiry to establish such an interest. These general powers for local
authorities under planning laws were complemented by additional measures in the
legislative act accompanying the Games that when read together specifically enabled
the Glasgow City Council to “have power to acquire compulsorily any land in their area
which… is suitable for and required in order to facilitate the holding of the Glasgow
Games 2014 (Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act. 1997, s. 189; Glasgow
Commonwealth Games Act, 2008, s. 42).
As many governments do in similar expropriation circumstances, the Glasgow Council

also entered into negotiations for many properties prior to the CPO. Negotiated sale
agreements were concluded with local real estate developers holding the largest non-
Council owned parcels on the site (Gray & Porter, 2014). In at least three instances,
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developers were compensated well beyond acquisition costs. Especially controversial
were the parcels purchased by Springfield Properties in 2005 and 2006, when the
Dalmarnock area was being openly floated as the preferred Games site. These
properties were purchased for £3.37 million and sold to the Council for £17 million
(Glasgow City Council, 2008; Gray & Porter, 2014). Additionally Springfield was sold
another nearby Council property between the Games arena and Celtic Park for £3
million, which in the recommendation to Council was said to “facilitate the development
of a proposed hotel and office development” (Glasgow City Council, 2007, p. 1.). As of
writing in 2021, the arena adjacent parcel remains undeveloped. Among other
transactions, the Springfield purchase was scrutinised by a police investigation that did
not lead to charges (Turbett, 2014).
The inflated sale prices parcels purchased from local developers could be viewed as
being built upon the values of the properties after potential improvement (Gray & Porter,
2014). This can be contrasted with the CPO process, which bases compensation on
unimproved value absent the development project. For individual owners of homes and
smaller commercial units, the Council declined to enter similarly valued voluntary sale
agreements and proceeded with expropriation, leading to displacement. With one
homeowner who was later forcibly evicted following the CPO, the Council made a
£30,000 offer where the property was independently valued at £90,000.2
3.3.3 Finance
The Games bid proposal projected that the village would have a total capital cost of
£245 million (Glasgow 2014, 2007). Of this £245 million, £17 million would come from
the Organising Committee, with the remainder from the public-private partnership
delivering the village. A further £5.5 million in operational costs were also attributed to
the Organising Committee. The successful City Legacy bid for the village proposed an
initial £200 million budget for the Games period, with an additional £140 million
budgeted for the post-Games phase. Although at the bid stage the Village was
anticipated to have been primarily funded by the private sector, the public ended up
paying the strong majority of costs.
The failure of the private partner to secure market lending for a cash flow provision
reflected broader troubles triggered by the 2008 financial crisis. However the larger
impacts of the financial crisis were threefold: change in scope that saw the Games-
period phase of construction reduced in half, the proportion of social housing increased
from the bid proposal, and the share of public funding increasing significantly from what
was intended at the bid stage (Audit Scotland, 2012). The latter also resulted in the shift
of risk to a public pension fund when the private consortium could not obtain cash flow,
despite members of this consortium having substantial assets outside of City Legacy.
Additionally, the decrease in units created a lower density community with few of the
originally planned apartment blocks (Wainwright, 2014a). While pre-Games progress
2Five years after the initial 2006 offer, the Glasgow City Council offered anywhere from £71,000, to
£85,000, or £90,000 to this homeowner depending on the source (Calledonia, 2011; Carrell, 2011).
24
reports from Audit Scotland (2012) noted that the village represented one of most
significant cost and completion risks, the village was delivered on time for the Games –
the major risks had effectively been mitigated at the procurement stage through a
greater public contribution to a more modest project. This downsized project has seen
strong demand for the market component. Some 80% of the units were sold on the first
day of availability and all were sold within 18 months (James & Tolson, 2020;
Wainwright, 2014a).
3.3.4 Athletes’ village legacy
Despite strong sales for the market units and City Legacy’s 2017 planning permission
application for an additional 125 units on lands used for temporary Games structures
(Project Scotland, 2017), there is no visible construction progress or preparation as of
writing. The last available full financial statements for City Legacy in 2019 claim that the
second phase is still in the council planning process (City Legacy, 2019). No other
sources were found regarding progress after 2017 and the City Legacy website is not
active.
This still undeveloped land encompasses some of the small business expropriations in
a neighbourhood where the official Scottish Government legacy report identified the
absence of shops as “the most problematic local amenity” (Scottish Government, 2018,
p. 17). Although there is still no convenience format grocery store that may be expected
in similar urban UK developments, the village is a roughly 15-20 minute walk from a
Tesco Extra hypermarket just south of the river.
3.3.5 Legacy beyond the athletes’ village
The CGURC initially claimed that its efforts would support the creation of 21,000 new
jobs and 10,000 housing units (Gray, 2014). Even though “the figure of 10,000 homes
had been ‘made up’ to attract public subsidy” (2014), these targets remain among the
key performance indicator benchmarks referenced in the annual reports. As of the most
recent annual report with figures dated March 2019, over 5,900 jobs have been created
and almost 3,000 residential units have been constructed out of the 20-year targets
(Clyde Gateway, 2019). Other 20-year key performance indicators include 248 hectares
of land remediated out of a 350-hectare target and 105,000 square metres of business
floor space from a 400,000 square metre goal.
Beyond what has been already completed, there are multiple major developments
currently underway in close proximity to the village. Less than 200 metres from the
southern edge of the village is the Riverside Dalmarnock project, which will include over
550 homes on a 22 acre site that has been vacant since 1980 (Riverside Dalmarnock,
2021). The aforementioned Springfield Properties is also moving forward with 237 units
across from Dalmarnock Station on land that has been empty for roughly six decades
(Scottish Construction Now, 2020).
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Just as much as goals measured in jobs or construction, the CGURC sees its objective
as facilitating underlying conditions for development. In an interview, the CGURC chief
executive noted that “[w]e are derisking sites to make them more attractive to
business…Our primary role is land assembly, decontamination and providing essential
infrastructure, giving people the confidence to invest here” (Wainwright, 2014a). While
the CGURC seems on pace to meeting the 20-year land remediation objective, the
other major targets remain questionable.
To the extent the athletes’ village can be viewed as a proof of concept and market for
the larger Clyde Gateway area that a private developer would not have undertaken, it
has had a significant impact in bringing a more expedient revitalisation to the
Dalmarnock area. While the Glasgow Council and Scottish Government may have
undertaken similar schemes in a no Games, or no village development alternative, the
hard Games deadline pushed forward a project that could have otherwise been delayed
for any combination of public funding, risk appetite, or financing availability.
4. LONDON 2012 OLYMPIC GAMES
Finance for London 2012 was divided into two primary organisational elements. The
Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) was created in 2006 through parliamentary act as
part of national government obligations to the IOC upon London’s successful bid. The
ODA was tasked with delivering capital elements in preparation for the Games,
including venues, infrastructure, and legacy elements and its powers included planning
authority for the Olympic Park (Berman, 2010; LOCOG, 2012). The ODA complemented
the London Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (LOCOG), which was
created in 2005 after London’s successful bid and was responsible for the operational
execution of the Games. While the LOCOG budget was estimated in the range of £2
billion, the ODA budget was estimated at between £7 billion and £8 billion, representing
the bulk of Games-related expenses.
The village project, eventually dubbed the “East Village”, originally intended to use a
public-private partnership procurement model. The ODA undertook a competitive
bidding process which resulted in the selection of a consortium led by Lend Lease for
construction and financing (Inside the Games, 2009b). The initial finance structure was
intended to see a public contribution of £272 million for infrastructure and land
preparation, offset by a projected £250 million share of profit from sale of housing units
after the Games (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2012). This was to
be complemented by £250 million from Lend Lease itself, and a further £500 million in
lending obtained by Lend Lease (Inside the Games, 2009c). The Lend Lease equity of
£250 million was also contingent on successful securing of lending.
However, after the financial crisis, Lend Lease was unable to raise sufficient private
capital for the project, with the prospect of a funding shortage in the range of £250
26
million by April 2009 (Herman, 2009). The project became entirely publicly financed in
August 2009 based upon the difficulty of finding private finance representing value-for-
money (National Audit Office, 2011). The ODA was then tasked with the post-Games
conversion and sale of market units to recoup some costs. Lend Lease remained as the
contractor for design, development, and construction under a 2008 management
agreement and received a service fee (The West Australian, 2009).
In fiscal 2008-2009, the ODA created a series of subsidiary companies to deliver the
athletes’ village under the banner of the Stratford Village Developments Limited
Partnership (SVDP) (ODA, 2010). After the failure of the Lend Lease financing, the
intent of the structure was to facilitate the sale of units and future development plots to
new private parties. In 2011, part of the structure was consolidated under the SVDP to
facilitate the sale transaction to QDD, a joint venture between Qatari Diar and Delancey
which eventually purchased the market housing component.
The document review has revealed a range of potential costings. The most
comprehensive accounting likely comes from ODA annual statements. The 2013-14
accounts are particularly instructive as they represent the last full year of ODA operation
prior to wind-down.
4.1.1 Public and total capital cost
The ODA calculates the aggregate public investment in the East Village project from
2006 to 2014 as £1.597 billion (ODA, 2014). This includes land assembly, remediation,
and preparation, as well as extensive infrastructure, but does not reconcile the ODA’s
anticipated final cost with receipts from selling units. Instead, the ODA pegs the
anticipated final cost as £1.151 billion after receipts of £557 million from the QDD for
market housing, and £268 million from Triathlon Homes for a social housing component.
The ODA anticipated final cost does not account for the further £110 million public
contribution to the Triathlon purchase of 1,379 units from the ODA in the form of a grant
from the Homes and Communities Agency (ODA, 2009).3 Adding the proceeds from
both unit sales to the anticipated final cost, creates a gross public capital cost of £1.976
billion, which is £2.262 billion in 2020. Likewise, adding the £110 million grant to
Triathlon to the anticipated final public cost of £1.151 billion, brings an initial net public
capital cost of £1.261 billion, or £1.443 billion inflated to 2020.
This last figure is not far off of the £1.258 billion public cost cited by the Institute for
Government, which is inclusive of £324 million of the £557 million in QDD receipts
(Norris et al., 2013). Reporting from the National Audit Office in 2011 however found
that the forecasted net cost of the village was £898 million, which had increased from
£817 million in 2009 and £272 million in 2007 prior to the original finance structure
collapsing.
3The Homes and Communities Agency was a public body that funded affordable housing projects and
has since been replaced by Homes England.
27
Although ODA operating costs for the village project are assumed to be primarily
included in their anticipated final cost figures, there is no breakdown of operating costs
incurred during the Games period by LOCOG. A proxy for LOCOG operating costs in
the village may be a 5% share of the fiscal 18 months ending September 30, 2012,
three weeks after the closing of the Paralympic Games. The LOCOG accounts note
expenses in that 18 month period of a combined £2.16 billion for venues, Games time
contractors, technology, services, staff, catering, cleaning, waste, and Games
equipment. A 5% share of this aggregate operating spend is £108 million in 2012, which
equates to £130 million in 2020.
4.1.2 Future property related revenues
Using a representative sampling of East Village building postal codes on council tax
valuation list, most East Village properties fall into Bands B through D in the Newham
local authority. The sampling can be further sub-divided by building, as units sold to
Triathlon and QDD are found in different buildings and for the most part, different
sections of the village.
With the 1,379 units sold to Triathlon Homes, a proxy of Band B4 is applied for the 675
on social rents, and Band C for the 704 units on intermediate market rents and shared
equity ownership. Based upon street address sampling of the QDD buildings, the
remaining 1,439 units sold to the QDD joint venture are assumed to have been
assessed at Band D. Using the 2020 number for each band, multiplied by six years and
the units per band, the 675 social units from Triathlon are estimated as generating £4.3
million and the remaining 704 intermediate rents and shared ownership units are
pegged at £5.2 million. Based on the same formula, the original QDD buildings are
estimated as creating £11.9 million in revenues.
The QDD agreement with the ODA also included additional development plots. As of
2020, the No. 8 lot had been developed into an additional 482 rental units, which if
assessed at Band D, may have generated a one-year council tax return of £666,000.
From here the total council tax receipts are estimated at £22.1 million through 2020.
Further projecting the 30-year present value of council tax receipts at a 3% interest rate
provides estimated revenue of £86 million in 2020.
As for incremental stamp duty, since it appears that the QDD units were retained as
rental stock, the direct potential source of stamp duty from units used during the Games
is limited to the 269 shared ownership and 79 shared equity units offered by Triathlon
(Triathlon Homes, 2015). Assuming the entirety of stamp duty was paid upon unit sale,
and an average valuation of £400,000 per unit, just under £3.5 million5 would be
collected in 2014 (£4 million in 2020).
4Newham council tax rates information is drawn from Kinleigh Folkard & Hayward (2021).
5Where an average £400,000 valuation per unit is assumed, £0 would be paid on the first £125,000, then
2% on the next £125,000, and 5% on the remaining £150,000, with the total being £3.48 million.
28
The third prospective source of incremental revenue is profit sharing from six future
development lots sold to QDD (House of Commons, 2012). Written evidence from then
cabinet secretaries estimated an excess of £45 million in shared revenues would be
collected “in the longer term” (2012, p. 30). As no better source was found, and there is
no clear time horizon for realizing these shared revenues, the £45 million is added to
the net public cost without being adjusted for inflation. Accordingly, adding up the total
revenues from the three property related sources creates an estimated total of £71.1
million in 2020.
4.1.3 Net public cost through 2020
Taking the £1.443 billion 2020 anticipated final cost from the ODA, adding the proxy of
£130 million in LOCOG operating costs, as well as subtracting back £71 million in
projected public revenue receipts provides a final estimated net public cost through
2020 of £1.502 billion.
Table 4. London Athletes’ Village Financial Cost Estimates (£ million)

Public/total capital cost 1,976
Public/total capital cost 2020 2,262
Initial net ODA cost 1,261
Initial net ODA cost 2020 1,443
Organising Committee costs 130
Council tax to 2020 22.1
Council tax 30 year 86
Stamp duty 3.5
Asset sale 45
Net public cost 2020 1,502
4.2.1 Location and mix
The London Olympic Park and athletes’ village was situated on primarily industrial and
brownfield lands in the Stratford area of the Lower Lea Valley, part of London’s
historically industrialized and impoverished East End. Land was assembled through a
combination of voluntary agreements and CPO. The former London Development
Agency (LDA), which preceded the ODA in responsibility for assembling the Games
site, oversaw the dual track process, attempting to attain voluntary agreements with the
CPO process looming over, making offers to 284 businesses in the Olympic Park zone
through 2005 (Greater London Authority, 2005). By the time the CPO was confirmed in
2009, 93% of land had been acquired through private agreements (Inside the Games,
2009a).
Of the roughly 238 hectares (568 acres) of land assembled for the Olympic Park,
roughly 27 hectares (67 acres) were used by the village project (Wainwright, 2014b;
Delancey, 2021). The 17,320-bed Games time village transitioned to its legacy use of
29
2,818 units, which have been divided into 1,439 sold to QDD and 1,379 transferred to
Triathlon Homes. The QDD homes have been market rentals in their entirety, while the
Triathlon properties are divided into 675 for social rent, 356 for intermediate rent, 269 in
shared ownership, and 79 in shared equity (Triathlon Homes, 2015). On the lots
transferred as part of the QDD agreement for further post-Games development, there
have thus far been 482 new units already completed on the No. 8 lot, and a further 524
units under construction on the No. 6 lot (Mace, 2018; 2021).
This post-Games construction has brought the East Village to a size more in line with
the 3,600 apartment village proposed in the bid book, and the eventual 4,500 unit vision
planned by Lend Lease prior to their financing challenges (Bar-Hillel, 2008; Dovkants,
2012; LOCOG, 2012). As part of the village size reduction, athletes competing outside
of London were housed locally and temporary walls were placed in the constructed units
to expand capacity within a reduced footprint.
Table 5. London Athletes’ Village Summary

Type New construction residential
Games beds 17,320
Legacy use 2,818 units
Residential unit mix 1,439 market rental, 675
social rent, 356 intermediate
rent, 269 shared ownership,
79 shared equity
4.2.2 Property market values
Although there is limited supply from the East Village on the sale market, property
values in the village’s E20 postal code from post-Games developments are higher than
neighbouring postal codes. Reviewing data in May 2021, the estimated property value
for E20 was £605,000, while nearby postal codes with some new substantial
development had estimated average values of £424,000 (E15, directly east of the
village), £452,000 (E3, west of the Olympic Park), and £464,000 (E5, northwest of the
Olympic Park).
Property values in E20 also compare favourably to those in two other notable London
real estate developments ancillary to football stadiums. The N77FH post code which
encompasses the apartments attached to the Emirates Stadium development, has an
estimated average value of £580,000. Likewise, the HA9 postal code which represents
the significant real estate development around Wembley Stadium has an estimated
average property value of £401,000.
Much of the same price pattern follows with rentals. Using a sample of market data
again, a two bedroom apartment in E20 rents in the range of £1,900 per month, while
two bedroom properties let for £1,400 in E15, £1350 in E3, and £1,500 in E5. However,
two bedroom rents in the N7 and N5 postal codes around Emirates Stadium are in the
£2,000 range. Similarly, the HA9 code surrounding Wembley Stadium sees rents for
similar properties of around £1,700 per month.
30
4.2.3 Satellite villages
With the reduction of the originally planned total units in the main village, athletes
competing outside of London venues were housed at satellite villages. For instance,
1400 athletes were housed in student accommodations at the Olympic Rowing Village
at Royal Holloway (BBC, 2012a; London 2012, 2012). Additionally the Weymouth and
Portland Sailing Village in Dorset became 77 units of social and affordable housing
(BBC, 2012b).
4.2.4 Rapid transit connections
The East Village has excellent rapid transit connections. Immediately adjacent to the
East Village is the Stratford International Station, opened in 2009. Although originally
constructed with the intent of being served by Eurostar trains bypassing St Pancreas
Station, these services have not been realised. In addition to High Speed 1 service, a
separate station exists for the terminus of an extension to the Docklands Light Railway
(DLR), a light metro system serving East London.
A further 400 metres south across the Westfield Stratford City is Stratford Regional
Station, a major rail hub for East London. The station, which was heavily renovated and
refurbished for the Olympics, includes service for two Underground lines, Overground,
and DLR (Hawkins Brown, 2021). The station also serves as the eastern terminus for
the Jubilee Underground line and is planned to grow further with future service from
Crossrail. The ODA spent over £120 million on capacity and access at Stratford station,
in anticipation of heavy Games use (ODA, 2012a).
4.2.5 Distances from primary event clusters
The East Village is 7.5 km from the financial centre in the City of London, and 10.7 km
from Piccadilly Circus, representing the West End cultural centre. The Olympic Park
consisted of the Olympic Stadium for ceremonies and athletics, aquatics centre,
temporary basketball arena, BMX track, Lee Valley field hockey centre, Copper Box
arena, and two temporary arenas.
Other notable London event clusters included the “River Zone” and “Central Zone”. The
River Zone included four primary venues in the vicinity of the east Thames. These
facilities were the ExCel convention centre 6.1 km from the village, the O2 Arena for
gymnastics (6.5 km), Greenwich Park (8.8 km), and the Royal Artillery Barracks (11.1
km).
The Central Zone was a blanket classification for other facilities in Greater London.
Falling under this category were the All England Club (22.2 km from the village), the
Earls Court Exhibition Centre (15.9 km), the Horse Guards Parade (10.7 km), Hyde
Park (12.2 km), the Lord’s Cricket Ground (13.5 km), as well as Wembley Arena and
Stadium (22 km).
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4.3.1 Background on sites, financial structures, and real estate uses
There were three sites originally under consideration for the Olympic Park as the
London bid developed in the early 2000s. First was the land surrounding the new
Wembley Stadium. While the initial 1996 plans for the venue included capacity for
athletics and rugby league, the final permanent 1999 design made no accommodation
for an athletics track. There were also serious doubts as to whether the land around
Wembley would be sufficient for an Olympic Park and village. In 2003, these issues
were summed up by the then Minister for Sport:
The Olympics are the biggest sporting event in the world, and they could
not take place at Wembley, even if we wanted them to, simply because
the area could not accommodate the athletes…Anyone who thinks that we
can build an Olympic village in Wembley is wrong (House of Commons,
2003, vol. 397).
The track configuration issues at Wembley led to a search for a new site for an athletics
stadium to host the 2005 World Athletics Championships. The proposed new site was at
Picketts Lock, roughly 8 km north of Stratford. Although the UK was successful in its
bid, the government declined to build an athletics stadium and the event was moved to
an alternative host. While Picketts Lock was in the bid conversation based upon the
failed athletics stadium plans, it was not a favoured option because of its distance from
the city core, in addition to poor transport links and proximity to existing venues.
This left Stratford as the preferred location in terms of land assembly potential and
transportation access, as Stratford was an already existing rail hub. The status of
Stratford as part of a historically deprived area of London provided a strong rationale to
build the necessary national and local political coalition to back a successful bid.
Newham, the local authority encompassing Stratford, was the second most deprived
local authority in the UK (Power, 2013). Previous government coordinated mega-
regeneration efforts in East London focused on the Docklands area had been viewed as
an eventual success, epitomised by the skyline of a financial district in Canary Wharf
risen from abandoned ports.
Sharing his reasons for supporting London 2012, Ken Livingstone, the Mayor of London
during the bid, outlined that:
I didn't bid for the Olympics because I wanted three weeks of sport. I bid
for the Olympics because it's the only way to get the billions of pounds out
of the Government to develop the East End - to clean the soil, put in the
infrastructure and build the housing (Evening Standard, 2008).
32
Indeed the Mayor’s crucial support for the Games was contingent on the new Olympic
Park development being concentrated in East London, which helped focus bid plans on
the Stratford area (Poynter et al., 2015).
Establishing Stratford as the geographic core of a regenerated East London was at the
heart of the Games vision and proposed legacy (DCLG, 2015). Here the Games served
as a catalyst for regeneration in the so-called Thames Gateway, representing a 60 km
area along the Thames starting from East London. Alongside the bid, the national
government had created the London Thames Gateway Development Corporation with
the objective of supporting regeneration in East London and the Lower Lea Valley. The
Games-period Mayor, Boris Johnson, claimed the Olympics “…will be London’s single
most important regeneration project for the next 25 years” (DCLG, 2015, p. 20).
Likewise Sebastian Coe (2007), head of the bid and later LOCOG, claimed in a 2007
op-ed that “[t]he regeneration will create 30,000 to 40,000 new homes in the area. It will
be a catalyst for investment that will create new, quality housing - much of which will be
"affordable housing" available to key workers such as nurses or teachers.”
The potential for geographically based legacy in urban regeneration was also a useful
selling point in one of the most competitive recent Olympic bid cycles. Of the
candidates, the London bid may have represented the most significant visible
transformation of an underprivileged geography and thus a competitive advantage in
terms of legacy. Although the London bid was scored highly, it was scored behind bids
from Paris and Madrid (IOC, 2004). The LOCOG (2012) report on the bid highlighted
the commitment of the then national and local governments, signified by the deep
participation of key political figures, as well as opposition parties with the potential to
form government.
Once Stratford became the clearly preferred Games area, there were two locations
considered adjacent to either side of the proposed Olympic Park: Hackney Wick on
Waterden Road, and the Stratford Rail Lands near Temple Mills Lane. A final consultant
cost-benefit brief found that the main stadium and village should be in Stratford (Poynter
et al., 2015). Of the two sites, Temple Mills Lane had the advantage of more immediate
proximity to the transportation hub of Stratford Station. The alternative proposed site for
the village on Waterden Road became home to the International Broadcast Centre.
4.3.2 Planning
Prior to the successful bid, a major mixed-use redevelopment had been planned at
Stratford City with up to 5,000 residential units. The application was submitted by the
landowner, London and Continental Railways (LCR), and a partner eventually bought
out by Westfield Group (Bernstock, 2014). The Olympic Park and athletes’ village was
integrated with the earlier private sector plan to redevelop rail yards into Stratford City
(Luck & Dickinson, 2010). Although the village was not a new housing proposal for the
Olympics, the ODA argues that the Games sped up the construction and phasing
(Bernstock, 2014). Given the finance story continued below, the Games as an
accelerant for housing in Stratford City is a reasonable position.
33
Between 2005 and 2012, there were five major planning permissions for Stratford City
and section 106 agreements in 2007 and 2009 (Fisher, 2013). As a result, the Stratford
City development was divided into Zones 1-7. The athletes’ village and much of the
Olympic Park in Zones 2 to 7 were planned alongside the neighbouring Zone 1 outside
of the purview of the ODA (Around the Rings, 2007). Specifically, the athletes’ village
consisted of Zone 4 and 5. The Zone 1 core of Stratford City was developed by
Westfield as a joint venture with the LCR until its 2009 bankruptcy and nationalisation.
The result was the upscale Westfield Stratford City, one of the largest shopping centres
in the country, adjoined with offices and hotels (Jeynes, 2007).
Figure 3. Stratford City Zone Map (Google Maps, 2021)
After the Lend Lease financing collapse, the revised development plans for Zones 2 to 7
were governed by a 2009 section 106 agreement6 (ODA, 2009b). Reflecting the bid’s
commitment to affordable housing within mixed-use communities (Bernstock & Poynter,
2012) and the originally anticipated private sector delivery, the reinforced section 106
framework set out proportions of social and intermediate housing that had to be
constructed across Zones 2 to 7, as well as breakdowns of intermediate housing units
between shared equity/ownership, and discount market rentals (ODA, 2009b). The
agreement specified that social rental units should consist of 28.6% of units and 10.1%
intermediate units. Likewise the dwelling mix was similarly specified in floor space and
bedrooms.
The section 106 framework also provided ranges for each zone in which the combined
percentage of affordable and intermediate housing had to fall. Where the athletes’
6An agreement under section 106 of the Town & Country Planning Act 1990 is made between local
planning authorities and developers and binds future development of the land subject to the agreement.
34
village was concentrated in Zone 4 and 5, affordable housing unit ranges were 30-50%
and 25-35% respectively (ODA, 2009b). To ensure construction of affordable housing
was not later delayed, a condition was placed in the agreement that no more than 70%
of the permitted market housing units permitted for any zone could be occupied without
the affordable housing in the same zone completed. These requirements were generally
a holdover from previous section 106 agreements for Stratford City that anticipated
private sector firms taking a leading role. In addition to protections for affordable
housing, there was provision to provide a new school and health facilities that the ODA
had intended to be amenity contributions from the private partner.
Alongside the legacy planning for Stratford City undertaken by the ODA through section
106 agreements, governance structures were created to oversee the legacy execution
beyond the expected windup of the ODA. The first of these was the Olympic Park
Legacy Company (OPLC), created by the Mayor of London and national government in
2009 to oversee the sale and management of Olympic Park assets. However, the OPLC
was criticised as having an insufficiently broad scope of powers and objectives (such as
not having a formal position of control over the Olympic Village or a role beyond the
Olympic Park) leading to its succession in 2012 by the London Legacy Development
Corporation (LLDC) (London Assembly, 2010). The legacy intent and results are further
discussed later.
4.3.3 Finance
The London bid included £650 million of village budget to be funded privately at 2004
costs (Jennings, 2012; NAO, 2007). The use of a private partner allowed for the bid
costs to be significantly reduced beyond what a publicly delivered village would entail.
Some evidence indicates that private contribution estimates in the bid were not subject
to sufficient robustness checks (Jennings, 2012). However, there was significant private
interest in the open procurement competition for delivering the village, with three major
consortiums shortlisted from a list of credible candidates (Turnbull, 2006).
The eventual winner, Lend Lease, had a long history of delivering major residential and
mixed-use projects around the world, and has since overseen multiple other London
projects on a similar scale to the village. In normal credit markets, the private finance
component may well have been executed as contemplated by the bid. However the
“credit crunch” following the 2008 financial crisis made cost-effective financing
unattainable even for established developers and Lend Lease was unable to initially
raise £500 million from banks (The Sydney Morning Herald, 2008). For many
contemporaneous real estate projects around the world, the absence of feasible finance
simply led to delays or slower phasing, but the fixed Olympic timeline required that the
village be completed in its entirety on schedule.
Major real estate developments often use phasing to reduce the risks associated with
large scale projects for lenders, developers, and contractors alike. The inability to more
effectively use phasing in the Olympic context was a major flaw in the private
partnership. Although there have been subsequent phases to the East Village after the
35
Games, even the significantly reduced scope of the initial phase was still beyond the
credit market’s threshold of comfort on terms not onerous to the public. Despite the
major reduction in first phase units, as well as increase in athletes per unit, the initial
phase had to deliver some configuration of over 17,000 beds by 2012.
While Lend Lease eventually did provide financing options, these seemingly would have
been on unfavourable terms to the public, and have included provision for the ODA to
underwrite the projected profit on post-Games unit sales (Thomas, 2008). The
responsible cabinet minister advised that this offer was “not a good deal” and the
government decided in May 2009 to make the project entirely publicly financed
(Berman, 2010; Gibson, 2009).7 This decision added £350 million to the public capital
cost of the village (Norris et al., 2013).
However, a significantly increased public share of village costs may have been
anticipated by senior public servants. In 2011 committee testimony, the Permanent
Secretary8 of the then Department of Culture, Media, and Sport claimed that:
Government was always going to have to contribute to the cost of the

village, because if you were developing it normally, you would develop it
stage by stage and release flats on to the market stage by stage, but with
the village, we required all the flats to be available in 2012—all built, but
none occupied, as it were. There was always going to be an allowance for
the cost of that. We achieved more than the return that we had written into
the budget that was expected against the village (House of Commons,
2012, p. 18).
Indeed, the challenges posed by the village were compounded by the scale of the
Olympic Park project. According to the acting ODA chair in 2007, “[d]elivering a multi-
venue park on this scale within a fixed timetable [was] a task unprecedented in UK
construction” (Jeynes, 2007). Of all the components delivered by the ODA for London
2012, the village went the furthest off of the rails. In the words of the Director of Finance
& Build for the Government Olympic Executive, the athletes’ village represented “the big
crisis we had, budget wise” (Norris et al., 2013, p. 22). The collapse of financing for the
village represented the only source of meetings for the Olympic cabinet sub-committee.
The resulting structural financial change resulted in the largest tapping of the ODA’s
£1.97 billion contingencies, some £587 million. While the International Broadcast Centre
project faced similar finance issues from a planned private partnership and was
nationalised in January 2009, it only drew £135 million from contingencies (ODA, 2011).
Again, the village was made more immediately expensive to the public through section
106 agreement provisions requiring affordable housing and amenities which were
7 The Athletes’ Village project received £255 million loan offer for the village from the European
Investment Bank (EIB) in April 2009, although this finance was eventually not taken up. The EIB did
contribute a £95 million loan to the Triathlon Homes social housing component (Reuters, 2009).
8 The Permanent Secretary of a government department in the UK is the most senior civil servant in that
department.
36
designed to reflect the initial plans for privately-led development, as well as phased
development in a larger legacy area over future decades.
4.3.4 Deciding the athletes’ village legacy
The nationalisation of the project unintentionally led to a higher proportion of affordable

housing in the village zones (49%) than required because of the reduction in total units,
as well as the Triathlon agreement becoming the best available means at the time to
dispose of units and risk (see Bernstock, 2014). Although the affordable housing
component would be directly held by major affordable housing providers, the
prospective risks associated with the project led to the formation of the Triathlon
consortium.9 The use of the Triathlon structure allowed three major providers to pool
and limit risks in the new firm.
For the remaining 1,439 units and six development plots, the ODA undertook a request
for proposals for purchase and long term management. From a shortlist, three finalists
were selected: Delancey and Qatari Diar, Hutchison Whampoa, and the Wellcome
Trust. Of the finalists, the Wellcome Trust was seen as the most potentially
transformational (Bernstock, 2014; Birrell, 2011). Instead of only acquiring units and
land in the village, the Trust wanted to acquire the entire Olympic Park and create a
research and innovation centre. However, this bid was complicated by divided control
over the village and Olympic Park – the ODA controlled the village and the OPLC had
not yet tendered the rest of the Olympic Park. Additionally, the £1 billion bid for the
entirety of the village units, development plots, and other Olympic Park assets was seen
as a significant undervaluation.
Instead, the ODA selected the QDD bid. One of the appeals of QDD was its intent to
manage the existing and future units as rentals, signalling a long-term commitment to
the site. After a yearlong retrofit, the properties were handed over to QDD and Triathlon.
However, there was an agreed cap on unit release in consideration of the challenge
posed by the 2,800 apartments hitting a relatively new market (Bernstock, 2014).
At this time, the athletes’ village was also rebranded the East Village, with the intent of
creating a distinct brand (Bernstock, 2014). As the freehold owner, QDD was also
responsible for site management, common areas, and public realm. QDD’s commitment
to maintaining a high-quality public realm resulted in significant service charges for
residents, including those in social units.
4.3.5 Legacy beyond the athletes’ village
From its 2012 founding, the LLDC was tasked with the following broad brief:
To promote and deliver physical, social, economic and environmental

regeneration of the Olympic Park and its surrounding area, in particular by
9Triathlon Homes is a consortium that includes affordable housing providers East Thames, First Base,
and Southern Homes.
37
maximising the legacy of the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, by
securing high-quality sustainable development and investment, ensuring
the long-term success of the facilities and assets within its direct control
and supporting and promoting the aim of convergence (LLDC, 2016, p. 3).
In this capacity, the LLDC wears many hats: land owner, developer, local planning
authority, regeneration agency, venue manager, and employment facilitator. Relative to
its OPLC predecessor, the LLDC had a wider scope of responsibility while being a
creation of only one government as opposed to the national and locally owned OPLC.
The legacy can also be seen through infrastructure investments making the Olympic
Park site feasible and attractive to developers in the first place. As outlined by Bernwick
(2014), one councillor in a legacy borough commented:
We’ve had thirty years worth of infrastructure. You don’t get that
opportunity very often. Even building the new sewer through the Park, you
start with the discharge of raw sewage into the river Lea. The removal of
the overhead powerlines. We used to bring developers to this site and
they’d say ‘it’s really good but shame about the power-lines’…It was very
expensive, but it was only in the Olympic Games that we could do that.
They are the boring bits of infrastructure which aren’t sexy, aren’t
translated easily into housing numbers, or even jobs, but they make a site
useable (Bernwick, 2014, p. 109).
In addition to the Olympic Park, athletes’ village, and Westfield Stratford City, the LLDC
had oversight of five new neighbourhoods planned between 2013 and 2031 on the
periphery of existing Olympic-related construction: Chobham Manor, Marshgate Wharf,
Sweetwater, East Wick, and Pudding Mill. Up to 6,800 units will be constructed across
the five neighbourhoods. These neighbourhoods had been planned through a Legacy
Communities Scheme (LCS), created by the then OPLC in 2011 and approved by the
ODA after the LLDC had succeeded the OPLC in 2012. Just after the Games in
September 2012, the LCS was secured through a section 106 agreement (LLDC, 2016).
The LCS referenced 15 Planning Development Zones (PDZs) within and adjacent to the
Olympic Park, focusing on development on 64 hectares in seven PDZs.
38
Figure 4. Legacy Communities Scheme Planning Development Zones (PDZ) (Google
Maps, 2021)
Chobham Manor
The most quickly developed LCS area has been Chobham Manor, immediately north of
East Village in PDZ 6. The OPLC invited bids, selecting a joint venture proposal from
Taylor Wimpey and L&Q. Chobham Manor was pegged for 870 residential units
completed in 2014, 84% of which would be family housing across terraced, low and
mid-rise buildings (Bernstock, 2014). Roughly 35% of the units were classified as
affordable housing, facilitated by a £22 million grant from the LLDC (LLDC, 2021a).
As of 2021, 850 residential units have been constructed across four phases, with the
first units occupied in 2016 (LLDC, 2021a; Taylor Wimpey, 2021). The delays and
phasing changes relative to the original plans support reluctance on the part of some
parties to bid on Chobham Manor out of fears that too much supply would enter the
market at the same time (Bernstock, 2014). Unlike in the East Village, market
components have been built for sale as opposed to exclusively rentals.
Chobham Manor also attracted controversy because it is built on the site of the
demolished Clays Lane Co-operative housing project. Despite not actually overlaying
the athletes’ village, over 400 residents were evicted, dispersed, and relocated after its
2007 demolition (Hatcher, 2012).
39
East Wick, Sweetwater, and Pudding Mill
East Wick (PDZ 5) and Sweetwater (PDZ 4) neighbour the west edge of the Olympic
Park, between Here East10 and London Stadium. In 2015, the development bid was
awarded to a consortium of Balfour Beatty and Places for People. The neighbourhoods
are planned over seven phases, with roughly 31% of units qualifying as affordable
(LLDC, 2021b). Over the life of the development more than 1,800 homes are planned,
with 300 in the first phase immediately south of Here East.
Pudding Mill (PDZ 8 and 12) has two prospective development sites at the south edge
of the Olympic Park that are still in the master planning process as of 2021. Together,
the Pudding Mill Lane and Bridgewater Triangle sites are expected to deliver 1,500
residential units and office space for 2,000 workers (LLDC, 2021c).
Stratford Waterfront/East Bank
PDZ 1 and 2 will be developed into an institutional-dominant mix of uses as part of the
larger Stratford Waterfront and East Bank schemes. On PDZ 1, the Stratford Waterfront
north of the London Aquatics Centre, there will be four significant institutions: the
London College of Fashion, BBC Music Studios, Sadler’s Wells Theatre, and a branch
of the Victoria and Albert Museum. Additionally there will be in the range of 600
residential units and 2,220 metres of retail (LLDC, 2021d). Construction commenced on
this site in early 2020. The south portion of PDZ 1 and PDZ 2 will be home to the UCL
East campus, with the first phase under construction as of 2019 (UCL, 2021).
Although the initial conception of “Olympicopolis” was accompanied by national

government funding support, the project has more recently attracted major concern as
part of a larger budget exposure for the LLDC. In addition to the £8 million annual
operational burden of London Stadium, East Bank public costs increased by at least
£151 million between June 2018 and January 2021. The London Assembly Budget &
Performance Committee chair noted:
…that despite the significant annual capital spend on the Queen Elizabeth
Park, the LLDC has decreased in value by £381 million between 2014-15
and 2019-20. This is a ticking time bomb for the next Mayoralty… It seems
like everything with the LLDC was set up with good intentions, but
somewhere along the way things have been lost (London Assembly,
2021).
The Stratford Waterfront also connects to Stratford City Zone 2, which sits between the
north of PDZ 1 and Westfield Stratford City. Stratford City Zone 2 has been named the
International Quarter, and is being developed into a primarily office district with roughly
4 million square feet of space for an estimated 25,000 workers (LLDC, 2021e).
10The International Broadcast Centre was renamed Here East after the Games and serves as an
innovation and technology facility.
40
5. DISCUSSION
Manchester, Glasgow, and London all used primary or secondary multisport mega-
events to catalyse regeneration of east ends with similar histories of deindustrialisation,
deprivation, and blight. In all instances, villages in heavily blighted areas to facilitate
spatial transformation were central elements of Games legacies proposed in the bid.
The difference is that after winning its bid, Manchester shifted its village to a lower risk
existing student housing facility requiring no new capital investment.
Given the financial difficulties experienced with village projects in both Glasgow and
London, Manchester’s pivot may have avoided a major source of completion risk and
cost overrun. Despite representing Games of different scales and influence, the London
and Glasgow experiences share much in common: a public-private partnership model
with a private sector developer running into financing difficulties and the public sector
subsequently needing to take on more risk and cost. This has been complemented by
significant reductions in village size in response to questions about market demand for a
project that cannot be traditionally phased. A similar set of problems is not isolated to
Games hosted in the UK – the village for Vancouver 2010 had well-documented failings
of a private sector partner leading to increased public cost and risk (Bula, 2010).
This repeated suite of issues highlights the additional challenges associated with a fixed
mega-event beyond those traditionally identified with infrastructure mega-projects.
When problems arise in the course of a mega-project, the resolution options are often
some combination of more money, more time, and reductions in specifications. With a
fixed mega-event such as the Olympics that (absent war or pandemic) cannot be
delayed and can only be delivered with limited reductions in specifications, the answer
frequently becomes more money. As private partners can withdraw or become
insolvent, the governments guaranteeing the delivery of the event are left responsible
for cost overruns that are magnified by the need to fit a fixed timeline. The most viable
way out of this trap is to substitute in a suitable existing facility, but this option is
sometimes unavailable.
For national governments that have frequently pursued sporting mega-events as agents
of prestige, the threat of reputational risk pushes them to cover the financial gap and
deal with the domestic consequences later. A national government will also have
greater capacity to fill financial holes through a diversified tax base and sovereign debt.
However, a national government has far more visibly at stake with the Olympics than
with the Commonwealth Games and similar secondary multi-sport mega-events. For
instance, South Africa was willing to walk away from the Durban Commonwealth
Games but absorbed massive costs associated with hosting the World Cup.
Additionally the Commonwealth Games is often financially guaranteed by the host city
without necessarily having the same degree of explicit financial commitment from the
host country as a successful Olympic bid requires. At the same time, a local
government will have far less capacity to absorb cost overruns and issue debt at low
interest rates. Where Manchester was struggling to persuade the national government
41
to cover its spiralling operational cost overruns, the village ambitions from the bid were
easy to substitute with a less risky existing campus and the national government did not
view the change as a reputational liability. Despite the shift to an existing facility,
Manchester 2002 is widely viewed as a successful event.
The story was different in Glasgow and London. In Glasgow, the Commonwealth
Games were a high priority project for a devolved national government run by the
separatist Scottish National Party. The Games were an opportunity to demonstrate that
Scotland could function as a nation-state through a patriotic event concluding six weeks
prior to the 2014 independence referendum. Likewise, Glasgow did not have the
readymade university campus substitutes found in Manchester.11 With London, the
national government was the driving force behind the Olympics and willing to accept
substantial cost overruns, including on the village. There was also not a university
residential campus in reasonable proximity to the Olympic Park with capacity anywhere
near what even the reduced scale athletes’ village provided.12
The similar set of challenges faced by the three multisport mega-events evaluated may
have been influential in other events shifting from new development villages to using
student housing. Two of particular note are the 2028 Olympics in Los Angeles and the
Birmingham 2022 Commonwealth Games. With LA 2028, financial risk was cited in
moving from original plans for a new housing development to use student housing at the
University of California, Los Angeles for the athletes’ village, and the University of
Southern California for the media village (Sisson, 2018).
In Birmingham, a new village costing £500 million and consisting of 1,000 post-Games
homes was planned as a regenerative anchor and primary physical Games legacy in
the deprived area of Perry Barr (BBC, 2020; Rooke, 2020). This village project was
cited as the greatest financial risk in Birmingham 2022, with a projected £90 million cost
overrun by the time of its cancellation in August 2020. The housing development is still
planned to move ahead after the Games on a less confined schedule. In lieu of a new
single-site village, two university campuses and a cluster of hotels near a convention
centre are being used to house athletes. Speaking at the time of the shift, the CEO of
Birmingham 2022 explained:
…we are making this decision now, with two years to go, to de-risk the
project, ensure delivery for athletes and teams and secure the legacy of
new housing and transport infrastructure in Perry Barr. This is the sensible
and pragmatic thing to do...It enables Birmingham City Council to focus on
the delivery of the Perry Barr Regeneration Scheme and gives us enough
11 A 2021 review of residential bed counts found 1,358 beds at the University of Strathclyde and 2,956 at
the University of Glasgow. The University of Strathclyde’s east side campus was closest to the primary
Games area, but did not have enough beds to host the village alone. Similarly, the University of Glasgow
near the west side venue cluster has its residences scattered throughout residential neighborhoods and
likely could not be made into a cohesive secure area.
12 As of 2021, Queen Mary University London advertised 2,250 rooms on or near its Mile End Campus, 2
km from the Olympic Stadium. The main campus of the University of Greenwich, roughly 3 km from the
Olympic Stadium, does not have a concentration of halls that could be made into a secure area.
42
time to plan essential Games services like transport and security (Rooke,
2020).
Given the predictable suite of issues posed by a large housing development on a fixed
timeframe, future hosts of multisport mega-events are likely going to be posed with
similar cost-benefit decisions in operational execution and framing legacy.
6. EVALUATING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
A review of the villages in this project highlights three interrelated headings of legacy
value worth evaluating in particular: physical transformation, development acceleration,
and cost effectiveness. An important underlying element of all headings is consideration
of the alternative, whether this is a “no Games” scenario, or competing options where
the Games are still held.
With physical transformation, this entails the extent to which a geographical area
hosting the village is positively altered from its previous state. Sub-elements of this
heading can include the amount of land remediated and put to active use, as well as the
extent to which land use on an aggregate parcel level is upgraded to its assessed “best
and highest use.” In urban planning terms, “best and highest use” is often conceived as
maximising productivity within the scope of physical, legal, and financial feasibility.
This is complemented by the heading of development acceleration, which includes the

ability of a village to prove a new market and complete construction that the private
sector would not undertake on the same timeframe. While market absorption without
traditional phasing is a major challenge of village development, the hard event deadline
at the same time may ensure more is built more quickly. In turn, the village can in theory
serve an anchor function and accelerate potential plans of other private sector
developers if the new supply is absorbed. In addition to gross housing unit creation, the
ratio of public to private investment in the area over time (perhaps measured in five-year
increments) would be useful to evaluate in future studies.
The third heading of cost-effectiveness will underlie elements of the other themes in
addition to being an end in itself. More directly, it entails measures such as homes per
subsidy unit in geographical areas with comparable starting characteristics, subdivided
where possible by various forms of market and social housing. At the same time, this
category includes risk management and the ability to avoid fiscal stress for local and
national governments. In some instances, an inefficient project in real terms may be
cost effective for a local government to the extent it unlocks senior government funding
that would otherwise flow elsewhere. Likewise, there is interest in comparison between
what outcomes in a similar geography could have been obtained through subsidising
development in the absence of the event.
43
The conception of optimal legacy village value for a particular host city will likely match
closest to the legacy headings prioritised by that city. If cost-effectiveness alone is the
priority, then using student housing campuses for events outside of the academic year
may represent the best legacy value in taking a major overrun risk off of the table.
Where there are no sufficient student housing locations, hotel clusters may substitute,
such as those accustomed to hosting large conventions, international summits with
secure areas, or with recent experience as Covid bubble sites. Again, the legacy here is
ensuring that a new construction project does not become a long-term fiscal anchor for
a host city that threatens its ability to provide its normal services.
If a physical transformation of a defined geographic area is the desired outcome, then

measuring the elements of “best and highest” use of the target area may be
appropriate. However, cost-effectiveness is still inherent within this scope of a project
that will be more risky and costly than using existing facilities. Here the risk
management will shift to procurement considerations such as whether a public-private
partnership for the entire project or separate tenders for construction and sale of
completed units is most efficient in the particular circumstances. Contractual protections
for the public sector will also be paramount – are there remedies (such as insurance
and collateral) that can cover the shortfalls of private partners or exogenous events (e.g.
recession)? The reference class forecasting proposed by Flyvbjerg (2008) may also
provide a model for realistic cost projection. While a public-private partnership executed
as planned may provide the lowest upfront cost for the public, and make sense from the
perspective of gaining public support for a bid, the challenges faced in both London and
Glasgow show that the public sector will be responsible for filling any gaps in reality.
Similarly, if development acceleration is the focus legacy heading, then elements that
will serve to attract subsequent private developers to a site may be most important.
These components include remediation and preparation of development parcels beyond
the village, the construction of infrastructure (e.g. roads, rail links, lighting, sewer, and
utility burial), accelerated planning permissions, as well as amenities that will draw
occupants of initial and future units (such as grocery stores, parks, schools, and
hospitality). The provision of commercial or institutional space to make the location
more attractive to workers of resident employers, may also be worth strong
consideration if there is a potential market gap to fill. Amenities are likewise important in
generating pre-sale interest that will allow developers to move ahead with financing a
project more quickly. Each of these components should be viewed as influencing the
value proposition to prospective developers and residents relative to alternative
locations in the same or external markets.
44
construction?
Where incremental council tax and stamp duty were estimated for the villages in
Glasgow and London, neither amounted to substantial revenue offsets to the public
capital cost. In Glasgow, the incremental revenue for the first five years of post-Games
occupation was 1.2% of the capital cost. In London, this figure was 1.6% over the first
six years. Even if 30-year present values of future revenues are projected, the high-end
estimates are well under 10% of capital costs. While there is potential for more
significant revenues from profit sharing on subsequent development lots, public data
was not found specifying these revenues, leaving reliance on proxy estimates with more
range for variance.
The lacking impact of incremental revenue can be in part attributed to the UK system of
property taxation that may have a less significant scope for revenue generation. With
the council tax band system, even properties worth millions of pounds will be limited in
revenue to a few thousand pounds in the highest band, as opposed to the North
American system where property tax revenue will be assessed as a flat percentage of
property value. Thus, this finding may be limited to countries where the system of
property taxation will produce similar results to the UK.
In all three cities, the initially planned villages were on sites within walking distance to
the main competition clusters that were targeted for regeneration by local governments,
both in the sense of physical transformation and development acceleration. To varying
extents, the geographical regeneration aspect was useful in leveraging the event to
extract funding from the central government in the case of London, and devolved
government in Scotland with Glasgow. Although there were a range of prospective sites
where local governments would have had interest in directing funding to spur physical
transformation, there were fewer sites adjacent or near an area that could host the scale
required for a primary competition cluster as well as nearby potential for future
developers to accelerate the Games-period anchor. Within that limited subset of
prospective sites, land assembly and transport connections became primary
considerations.
With procurement, both Glasgow and London framed their projects as public-private
partnerships where the private sector would take the lead in terms of expenditure and
risk. This framing made the village project more palpable at the bid stage for public
opinion and governments alike. Similarly, the provision of social housing components
assisted political and public opinion coalition building through selling the Games as an
agent of accelerating affordable housing supply in addition to blunting counter-
narratives focused on gentrification and displacement. The need for sizeable social
housing components also allowed varying degrees of cost-shifting to government
bodies unrelated to the Games such as housing authorities. At the same time,
substantial social housing components reduced post-Games revenue ceilings, a
45
problem somewhat mitigated through tenant screening, which itself limited the scope of
social housing residents who benefitted directly.
The use mix and form was also influenced by the procurement process where bidders
proposed the specific form and extent of commercial space based upon their internal
commercial considerations. In Glasgow in particular, this may have contributed to
underbuilt retail capacity within the village as well as a lower density product that was
originally envisioned. The long term area planning process was also influential – both
the Glasgow and London villages were seen as initial anchors that would be followed by
subsequent phases that could serve to complete the communities in terms of amenities
and use mixes.
village?
Site visits to all three cities underlined that vibrancy is attained where a range of uses
entice a similarly broad cross-section of visitors to the same physical spaces. This can
include a variety of visitors during the same times, or over different periods in the same
day, or divergent uses on weekdays and weekends as well as seasonally. Key elements
that can incubate a vibrant location also have significant overlap with elements of
development acceleration. Specifically, these overlapping attributes include the
presence of convenience retail and walkable amenities, an attractive public realm,
excellent public and rapid transit connections, as well as a critical mass of local
residents.
In London, there is a far higher density and more diverse range of users compared to
Glasgow. Not coincidentally, the London village has a much higher concentration of
residents, exceptional access to retail, sporting, and transportation amenities, as well as
a far broader range of land uses. Conversely, the Glasgow village has the form and
character of an affluent residential suburb – low density, somewhat car dependent, and
not much reason for outsiders to venture in.
The Fallowfield Campus in Manchester maintains a student-centred atmosphere, which

has substantial overlap with the purpose and form of an athletes’ village intended to
temporarily house thousands of athletes of similar ages to students. Thus, a purpose
built student housing campus can require relatively little pre or post-Games conversion
outside of security perimeters. At the same time, the originally planned village area in
the bid has developed organically during the past two decades based upon proximity to
other amenities in central Manchester. While the development is piecemeal and
incomplete, there is diverse range of users encompassing residential, commercial,
industrial uses, as well as structures new and old.
46
7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
From the address of the research questions, there are five primary conclusions and
recommendations for future hosts of multisport mega-events:
1. Although a village anchoring a greater physical transformation may possess a

significant legacy value, this is offset by the capital cost overrun risks exacerbated by a
fixed event deadline. While most traditional mega-projects can be delayed, a Games
village without a viable alternative can only be scaled down to minimum specifications.
Accordingly the more ambitious the village project, the larger the prospective overrun
and completion risks. If these risks are carried by local governments, the fiscal
consequences can significantly impact future capacity to deliver basic services.
Alternatively, while national governments have more ability to bear cost overruns, this
will diffuse costs across a broader tax base less directly on the receiving end of Games
legacies.
The primary way of protecting against these risks in a scenario where a physically
transformative village project is pursued is through cost certainty protections in
procurement contracts. While public-private partnerships can formally shift cost and
risks on the surface, government parties in both London and Glasgow were effectively
responsible for covering their shortcomings to meet a fixed event deadline. Without
sufficient remedies for contractor or private partner failure, local governments should not
proceed with this type of project without equally unambiguous central government
financial backing.
2. Prior to embarking upon a new construction village project, host cities should
consider avoiding the major risks of capital cost overruns and subsequent fiscal stress
of a village in the first place through examining whether an existing alternative facility
can meet event needs. In particular, hosts should evaluate student housing campuses
and hotel or resort clusters that are already designed to house large numbers of
temporary residents with centralised food service and other amenities. For mega-events
held in periods where universities are not in session, as was the case in Manchester, a
student housing campus can be an especially pertinent option to de-risk a budget.
3. Where an initial assessment finds that at least some new village construction is
necessary, hosts should consider partnerships with local universities at the bid stage.
The new supply required for the Games village can potentially be absorbed into
university housing demand, be sold to private student housing operators, or used for
staff rentals or shared equity in stressed housing markets. If there are no feasible
university related partners, new or expanded convention hotel or resort facilities may
also be alternative sources of appropriate village spaces.
4. While bid proponents may see significant social housing components to a village as
being helpful in building political, public opinion, and funding coalitions for a Games, as
well as a means to drive legacy, the lessened potential to recover costs through market
sales or rentals entails greater risk of net cost overruns and resultant fiscal stress.
47
Similarly, incremental revenues from residential property taxes cannot be relied upon to
effectively fill financial gaps.
5. Village vibrancy in the post-Games period may be most expediently accomplished by

selecting a site that has the potential to facilitate a diverse mix of uses and users. Based
upon the London and Glasgow experiences, elements of a village that are particularly
supportive of a vibrant legacy village include access to walkable amenities (such as
convenience retail), an attractive public realm, excellent public transit connections, and
a critical mass of residents in the local area.
48
ANNEX 1. SITE VISIT OBSERVATIONS
This project relies upon two primary elements to measuring vibrancy: feature and
streetscape detail, and pedestrian volume. Manchester saw eleven locations used for
feature scoring, and three for volume measurement. In Glasgow, nine locations were
selected for feature scoring, and four for volume measurement. In London, there were
eight locations selected for feature measurement and scoring, and four of these
locations were also chosen for volume measurement.
Feature measurement scored (in parentheses) buildings, improvements, and

streetscapes on a scale of 10 in four categories: activity and rhythm; materials and
quality of build; maintenance; and visual quality. Activity and rhythm measures the
façade, width, and nature of the building front or the improvement, as well as traffic flow.
Materials and quality examines the primary materials used in the building and the
streetscape. Maintenance expands on how well buildings, improvements, and
streetscape are kept-up in terms of repair, visual attractiveness, and cleanliness.
Finally, visual quality addresses the level of engagement between buildings and
streetscape and users, including detail and texture, as well as the number and quality of
openings in buildings (doors/windows and their transparency).
Volume measurement entails counting moving pedestrians and wheeled personal

transport (bicycles, scooters, skateboards) through a section of public realm for 10
minutes in the afternoon and early evening, with both weekday and weekend
observations. The second element of pedestrian measurement examines how
pedestrians interact with the area. Using the same 10-minute intervals, key anchor
building facades were selected in the defined development area and pedestrian activity
was measured (entering and exiting buildings, standing, pausing, leaning and sitting).
49
A1.1 Manchester Piccadilly Basin
Figure A1. Piccadilly Basin measurement locations (Google Maps, 2021)
1. Store Street
2. Rochdale Canal
3. Tariff Street
4. Central Retail
Park
5. Pollard Street/
Ashton Canal
6. New Islington
1. Store Street (3, 4, 5, 3)
Figure A2. Store Street westbound
Starting under Piccadilly Station, Store

St is the main east-west road through
the Piccadilly Basin and directly
connecting with New Islington. While
new commercial and hotel
development has risen over the street
and connects to the station, the largest
parcel between the station and Ashton
Canal remains a surface parking lot.
However a major government building
has been constructed on the south
side, apartments have infilled to the
north and east, with industrial uses
remaining to the southeast. The area
remains a work in progress and is not a particularly attractive public realm.
50
2. Rochdale Canal (6, 8, 7, 8)
Figure A3. Westbound Rochdale Canal at Tariff Street
Infill on the west side of the Piccadilly

Basin has been concentrated at the
Rochdale Canal. A mix of new midrise
apartments, hotels, and offices abut a
pedestrianised and streetscaped canal
headed westbound at Tariff St. East
from Tariff St is a new construction
retail park anchored by Aldi, PureGym,
and an M&S Outlet. Dubbed Urban
Exchange, the retail space and parking
is vertically stacked. While not
particularly inviting for pedestrians,
especially with the below portion of
canal walk unfinished, the complex
does provide practical amenities to anchor current and future developments nearby.
Volume measurement:
Despite the visual attractiveness of the west side of the canal, there is relatively little
pedestrian traffic compared to similar canal sections in New Islington, likely because the
canal walking path becomes significantly less attractive and safe feeling at Tariff St
where there are no longer obvious eyes on the pathway. However, substantial traffic
does flow to the Urban Exchange from Tariff St, but mostly from the attached carparks.
Pedestrian traffic in the area does not linger.
3. Tariff Street (4, 1, 2, 2)
Figure A4. Tariff Street facing north

Tariff St wraps around to the north,
revealing a swath of surface parking.
While the south side of this stretch has
been developed into apartments
converted from warehouses and visible
new development is present at all
sides, the glut of underutilized space
substantially detracts from the public
realm. However, these parcels are in
the planning process for infill through
two projects with hundreds of housing
units.
51
4. Central Retail Park (1, 1, 1, 1)
Figure A5. Former Central Retail Park site facing north
Currently derelict, the 10.5 acre former

Central Retail Park site represents one
of the most significant development
opportunities in Manchester. With the
land owned by council, the vision calls
for roughly 1 million square feet in
office space complemented by limited
housing. Across from the south edge of
the site, substantial residential
construction is ongoing, punctuated by
the 32-story Oxygen project.
5. Pollard Street/Ashton Canal (7, 8, 7, 8)
Figure A6. Pollard Street facing north toward Ashton Canal
Significant housing development has

been seen immediately north of this
stretch of the Ashton Canal, including
a 19-story tower. The south side of
Pollard St has likewise seen major
conversion of warehouses into
apartments alongside a new build
hotel. These developments have left
the locally dubbed New Islington
Green as an informal and unfinished
park space between the two clusters,
bisected by the tram line and also
hosting a tram station. While the green
space seems unfinished, it is posed for
major infill with a major office project planned and 1.5 acres to be retained as park.
52
6. New Islington (9, 9, 10, 10)
Figure A7. New Islington Marina north toward Ancoats
At the heart of New Islington on the

east end of the marina is a range of
sleek midrise apartments with
commercial uses at ground level. In
addition to significant visual appeal and
contrast with converted warehouse
space north of the Ashton Canal, the
inviting streetscape and activation from
café seating provides vibrancy to the
area. While much of the west bank
awaits infill, what has been constructed
makes for a high quality urban
environment.
Volume measurement:
Significant pedestrian traffic flows north and south between Ancoats and the tram
station at New Islington Green, as well as the housing cluster south of Pollard St. In
addition to through traffic, many pedestrians linger to enjoy the space and view. There is
a mix of recreational, commuter, and meal delivery bicycle traffic.
53
A1.2 Manchester Fallowfield
Figure A8. Fallowfield Campus measurement locations (Google Maps, 2021)
1. Unsworth Park
2. Richmond Park
3. Oak House
4. Owens Park
5. Commonwealth Games Village Torch
54
1. Unsworth Park (7, 10, 10, 10)
Figure A9. Unsworth Park northbound

The newest of residences at Fallowfield,
Unsworth Park is labelled by the
University as its flagship residence.
Indeed, the six story blocks consisting of
over 1,110 beds are very attractively
designed and landscaped, and an
interesting walk through from a
pedestrian perspective. Building finishes
are high quality and facades have a mix
in materials to generate visual interest.
The residence is extremely well-
maintained. The complex still displays
as playing fields in satellite imagery.
Volume measurement:
Despite creating an excellent student housing complex home to over 1,000 residents
and a desirable public realm, there is limited pedestrian traffic in the complex. Although
the landscaping is of significant visual appeal, it may be suboptimal for student use. The
pathways provide excellent egress for pedestrians and cyclists, but again have limited
traffic.
2. Richmond Park (6, 7, 8, 7)
Figure A10. Richmond Park eastbound
Built in 1994, Richmond Park was the

newest of residences at the time of the
Games. The architecture and
maintenance of finishings have seen the
exteriors hold up well. Consisting of four
story buildings with a square courtyard
and common services building, the
residence is of a more conventional
layout than Unsworth Park. The
landscaping and pathways are well
maintained and make for an attractive
pedestrian experience.
55
3. Oak House (6, 6, 8, 7)
Figure A11. Oak House eastbound
Oak House consists of over 1,000 beds

and is reminiscent of post-war modernist
university housing construction in North
America. For its roughly 60-year age,
the exterior finishings are very well-
maintained. Although the buildings are
not particularly memorable, the
landscaping and mature trees make for
an attractive pedestrian experience.
Since Oak House exits to the south of
the complex away from bus routes and
adjacent services in Fallowfield, there is
low pedestrian traffic.
4. Owens Park (5, 6, 8, 6)
Figure A12. Owens Park westbound
Owens Park is another modernist post-

war student residence, consisting of four
story flat blocks and a 19-story tower
block in the UK public housing style of the
era. Abutted by some open field space
and a larger courtyard, the complex
evokes a garden apartments style.
Owens Park served as a primary
component of the Games village. The
exterior materials and design of the low
flat blocks have held up well over time,
although the tower block and interior
courtyards appear quite dated. The density and presence of Owens Park as a shortcut
through Fallowfield to bus routes mean that there is significant pedestrian traffic.
56
5. Commonwealth Games Village Torch
Figure A13. Commonwealth Games Village Torch (4, 4, 5, 5)
The most direct visual legacy of the Games is the

village torch at the centre of Fallowfield. Despite a
central location, it is at the side of a maintenance
parking lot, hidden from the main pedestrian
paths by shrubbery and enclosed in fencing.
Unless someone was specifically looking for the
torch, it is not immediately obvious. The torch
itself shows some signs of weathering. While
there is some visual appeal, there is lost legacy
potential in making the torch a focal point of the
Fallowfield complex.
57
A1.3 Glasgow
Figure A14. Glasgow measurement locations (Google Maps, 2021)
1. Legacy Hub
2. London Avenue
3. Clyde Gateway A-728
4. Sunnybank Street
5. Auckland Wynd
6. Sydney Crescent
7. Brisbane Lane
8. Cuningar Footbridge
9. Clyde Walkway
1, Legacy Hub (6, 8, 8, 7)
The Legacy Hub is

located on Springfield
Road at the edge of
village row housing and
beside the Emirates
Arena. The community
centre functions closed in
2019 after the governing
trust went into financial
administration. However,
street level medical
practice related
commercial outlets are
still open and provide
some vibrancy. Although
the architecture is
modern and has glass
ground level frontage, the
streetscape lacks trees.
Wide sidewalks are
reduced by cars partially
parked on the curbs. The
volume and speed of traffic detracts from pedestrian experience. As of October 2021,
the building was functioning as a Covid-19 test site.
58
Figure A15. The Legacy Hub from village
Volume measurement:
As a main connection between

neighbourhoods and the Dalmarnock
Station into central Glasgow, there
was steady pedestrian traffic on this
stretch of Springfield Road, making it
the most travelled site observed in
Glasgow. The high volume and speed
of traffic meant that this was not a
place where pedestrians lingered.
While the retail fronts saw some traffic,
the primary use of space was a quiet
Covid testing centre. Likewise,
although there was the most cycle traffic seen of all Glasgow observations sites, the
absence of a designated or protected bike lane likely kept volume low.
2. London Avenue (7, 9, 9, 9)
Figure A16. London Avenue eastbound
London Avenue has row homes on

one side and four story apartments on
the other. Street parking is available
on both sides and is protected by
landscaped indents adding visual
interest. The combination of housing
materials, landscaping, traffic calming,
and colour in the street paving
provides a far more visually attractive
and pedestrian streetscape than
neighbouring Springfield Road, despite
the same row home designs and
setbacks being found on both streets.
59
3. Clyde Gateway A-728 at Riverside Care Home (6, 8, 8, 7)
Figure A17. Riverside Care Home facing south

The two-story Riverside Care Home
is further setback from Springfield
Road, with a parking lot between a
landscaped area and the residence.
This is more consistent with
suburban, car-dependent
developments. The line of trees and
shrubbery between the road and care
home may be intended as a noise
break, but also serve to make the
street a faster thoroughfare for
vehicle traffic. The speed of vehicle
traffic detracts from pedestrian
experience. The modern building
combines material colours and
finishes for visual interest, with some consistency in materials with the neighbouring
school and the village row homes.
4. Sunnybank Street (4, 9, 7, 8)
Figure A18. Sunnybank Street southbound
Row homes on Sunnybank share

similar visually interesting design
elements as the rest of the
development. However, the
boulevard is poorly maintained and
the opposite side of the street is still
undeveloped and vacant, leaving an
incomplete and somewhat
abandoned feel. The row homes
themselves and accompanying front
gardens are well maintained.
5. Auckland Wynd (5, 9, 8, 10)
The single lane Auckland Wynd runs parallel to a well-landscaped canal. The row
homes on either side of the canal share some design consistency, with different brick
colours and finishings. Several pedestrian bridges cross the canal, connecting
60
pedestrian right of ways through the development. This is one of the most visually
appealing components of the village.
Figure A19. Auckland Wynd northbound
6. Sydney Crescent (5, 8, 9, 8)
Figure A20. Sydney Crescent eastbound
Sydney Crescent is a curvilinear road

leading from Auckland Wynd in a
three-quarter loop connecting to
Sunnybank St at the south end of the
village, and mirroring a pond at the
edge of the canal. The interior side
consists of four-story cube-style brick
apartment buildings, while the river
side is more row homes. Landscaped
pedestrian right-of-ways connect the
Crescent to the river walkway.
Although visually consistent with the
rest of the development, this portion
uses a row home brick colour not seen
at the north end. The landscaped indented parking and different surface types provide
visual interest that will expand as trees mature.
7. Brisbane Lane (4, 8, 5, 8)
Brisbane Lane is flanked by row homes on both sides of a dual pedestrian/cycle path,
with a landscaped boulevard in between. While the row homes are generally visually
attractive, some of the façade materials are becoming weathered. Likewise, the
landscape architecture is of high quality, but mediocre maintenance, with the grass
61
overgrown. However over time, the maturation of trees should add further visual quality
to the lane.
Figure A21. Brisbane Lane eastbound

Volume measurement:
With the second planned phase of

village development failing to
materialise, Brisbane Lane remains a
pedestrian right of way flanked by row
homes, leading to a series of vacant
lots. While the laneway may be a
direct route through to Dalmarnock
Station or toward the Tesco Extra
hypermarket across the river, a 10-
minute walk away, there was very
limited pedestrian traffic. Similarly,
there was minimal bicycle traffic at all
observation times, and little pedestrian interaction with the built environment.
8. Cuningar Footbridge (8, 7, 9, 7)
The Cuningar Footbridge connects the village to the Cuningar Loop park on a path
bisecting Riverbank Primary School and Riverside Care Home to form a most direct
route to Dalmarnock Station. The park is roughly the same footprint as the village. The
bridge lacks landmark appeal, but is functional, well kept, and efficient.
A22. Cuningar Footbridge from west bank facing north
Volume measurement:
Considering that the bridge leads to

no other destination besides the park,
there is substantial foot traffic and
some recreational bicycle traffic on
good weather days. The bridge is also
a common place to linger and enjoy
the view. This was the second most
trafficked of the four Glasgow volume
measurement points. The connection
serves as a significant amenity for the
village residents and adjacent school
most likely to use it.
62
9. Clyde Walkway/Vancouver Walk (6, 8, 7, 8)
The Clyde Walkway follows the riverfront toward central Glasgow and forms roughly a
third of the village perimeter. From the west edge of the village to the Cuningar Bridge,
the walkway is mostly mirrored by Vancouver Walk further up the embankment adjacent
to the village perimeter. Vancouver Walk also has street lighting and is separated by a
fence from the bank below.
Figure A23. Vancouver Walk eastbound
Volume measurement:
Both paths are roughly even in

pedestrian flows, with through traffic
generally continuing along the
riverfront Clyde Walkway and village
traffic found on the raised Vancouver
Walk. Recreational cyclists or
commuters dominate the Clyde
Walkway and meal delivery cycles
were most common on Vancouver
Walk. Pedestrian interaction on either
path was most frequently related to
dog walking.
63
A1.3 London
Figure A24. London East Village measurement locations (Google Maps, 2021)
1. Celebration Avenue
2. Get Living
3. Mirabelle Gardens
4. Sir Ludwig Guttmann
Health and Wellbeing
Centre
5. Chobham Academy
6. Victory Parade
7. Honour Lea Avenue
8. Victory Park
1. Celebration Ave (9, 10, 10, 8)
Figure A25. Celebration Avenue at Penny Brookes St facing north
The post-Games developed N17 lot

at Celebration Avenue and Penny
Brookes is home to an 18-story hotel
and an adjoining aparthotel. The
striking glass façade frames
Celebration Avenue north into the
core of the East Village from
Stratford International Station with
landmark-quality architecture. The
streetscape and building frontage on
both arterial roadways have been
constructed with high quality
materials, and are very well-
maintained and clean. However the
architecture does not immediately make clear the use or access points to pedestrians.
Beyond the hotel complex, there is a convenience sized Sainsburys, which serves as a
primary destination for pedestrian traffic.
64
2. Get Living (7, 8, 9, 8)
The East Village skyline is dominated by the left

bookend on Celebration Avenue developed on the N08
plot in the post-Games years. Two towers connected by
a podium form a 482 apartment complex. The tower
design evokes post-war British tower blocks combined
with a more modern podium with large windows
overlooking the adjacent streetscape and park. Good
quality materials interface with an attractive streetscape
with wide passage for pedestrian flow separated
through landscaping from the calmed roadway. The
tower heights create some shadowing issues.
Above: Figure A26. Get Living London from Victory Park

Below: Figure A27. Get Living London from Victory Parade
3. Mirabelle Gardens (9, 8, 9, 8)
Mirabelle Gardens is a roughly 100 metre by 20 metre park between four Games-period
housing blocks consisting of almost 1,000 units on lots N13, 14, 15, and 26. The well-
landscaped park has some vibrancy, is filled with trees and seating areas, and is
integrated into attractive traffic calmed surrounding streetscapes. Building fronts are
residential at street level with some town home units. Material finishes are high quality.
65
Figure A28. Mirabelle Gardens north side
Volume measurement:
Mirabelle Gardens consistently had

the lowest volumes across all
observation times, days, conditions,
and categories. Often this location
had roughly half the pedestrian counts
of the other three locations. This is
likely explained from the square being
off primary traffic routes through the
village as well as devoid of
commercial destinations. Traffic in this
area of the gardens is dominated by
residents of the surrounding
apartment blocks. The most vibrant times were shortly after school hours where the
park came to life with students from the nearby Chobham Academy. Bicycle and
scooter traffic was primarily from meal delivery services.
4. Sir Ludwig Guttmann Health and Wellbeing Centre (7, 7, 9, 8)
Figure A29. Eastbound Liberty Bridge Road
The Games time medical clinic for the

athletes’ village has been repurposed
into a community primary care centre
and one of the largest non-hospital
health buildings in the country.
Related medical retail frontage
occupies the street front. The building
is on a remainder parcel between two
rail lines and uses contrasting
materials to create visual interest.
The south end of the road is consists
of eight story housing units in the N13
block, with town homes at street level,
and balconies creating
texture. There are no trees or other greenery features outside of private patios and
there is limited street furniture. Although there are a range of finishing materials and
window sizes, colour and daylight exposure is somewhat lacking.
66
5. Chobham Academy (7, 7, 8, 7)
Figure A30. Chobham Academy from Cheering Lane
The Chobham Academy was the

required school created in the
athletes’ village under previous
section 106 agreements. Covering
much of the north-eastern edge of the
village, the school is bordered by
railways to the east. The circular four
story core of the academy connects to
more traditional two story wings.
Although upper floors are mostly glass
encased, at ground level black
brickwork does not allow much
interface for pedestrians, possibly by
intentional design considering the
educational use. The opposite sides consist of 10 story housing blocks, with a
combination of townhouses and retail units at street level. The more modest material
finishings provide some visual indication that these are social housing units from
Triathlon. The school side of the road has trees that appear to exceed the age of the
development, with traffic flowing one way and indented street parking.
6. Victory Parade (9, 9, 9, 10)
Figure A31. Victory Parade westbound
Victory Parade is park dedication and pedestrian

route running west-east from Olympic Park Avenue
to Chobham Academy through Victory Park. The
north side is occupied by 12 story housing blocks
from the Games-time village, with commercial units
at ground level. Commercial units are dominated by
food service establishments with café outdoor
seating. The western portion of the parade includes
lakes and berms, with ample street furniture and
trees. The well-maintained parade is of high visual
interest with quality materials used in buildings and
streetscape.
Volume measurement:
Pedestrian volume was consistently high during

daytime observations. Traffic was blended between
a mix of local residents going to and from transport
67
connections via Victory Park and frequenting the park space and many adjacent food
service offerings as destinations. The large playground was a consistent magnet for
families with young children. After dark, park traffic declined significantly and service
businesses became quieter. Bicycle and traffic was dominated by meal delivery
workers.
7. Honour Lea Avenue (8, 8, 8, 7)
Honour Lea Avenue is the north edge of the Games-time village, which has since seen
significant infill in Chobham Manor. While the original East Village blocks are 10 stories
on Honour Lea, the newer Chobham Manor blocks are six stories and have been
constructed with materials more reflective of late 2010s styles. Although both sides of
the avenue are well maintained, the two contrasting styles of architecture and scale
clearly define different development phases. Some corner ground units in Chobham
Manor are commercial spaces, whereas row homes are uniformly found at the ground
level of Games-time blocks on Honour Lea. The Chobham Manor side also has
separated bike lanes protected by indented street parking.
Figure A31. Honour Lea Avenue westbound
Volume measurement:
Despite its location at the perimeter of

the Games time village, the infill and
occupation of Chobham Manor has
provided two-sided activity to the
avenue. Pedestrians are usually in
transit north, east and west from
Victory Park, with a convenience
grocery store being a frequent
destination. The dedicated bike lanes
also made this the busiest site for
bicycle traffic, sometimes attracting
almost as many cyclists as pedestrians. At the same time, this was the observation site
where pedestrians interacted and lingered the least.
8. Victory Park (9, 9, 9, 9)
Victory Park is the focal point and primary public space in the East Village. Now
surrounded by housing on three sides (lots NO 2, 3, 4, 7, 8), there is a wide range of
food service commercial units at ground level which are oriented toward the park with
café seating. The well-landscaped park is overlooked by hundreds of housing units and
is visually interesting from multiple perspectives, with ample street furniture to
encourage occupation. Shadowing issues have been compounded by post-Games
tower developments. The park also serves as a natural funnel for southward pedestrian
68
traffic from most of the village and Chobham Manor towards Stratford City. Although
there are few shrubs and bushes, engineered elevation changes and trees limit
sightlines through the park.
Figure A32. Victory Park looking south from Victory Parade
Volume measurement:
This area was a consistent crossroads

for pedestrian and bicycle traffic in the
East Village, representing its location
at the focal point of the athletes’ village
development and the primary
north/south spines from the East
Village to the Westfield Stratford and
transit connections. In addition to being
a frequently travelled pedestrian
thoroughfare, Victory Parade is
surrounded by cafes and restaurants
with outdoor seating that is well
populated during good weather. Given the diversity of service outlets that are target
toward consumption at different times of day, there is steady traffic during operating
hours. Likewise, the park sees heavy use throughout the day.
69
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It Takes A Village - Robert Sroka

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It Takes a Village: An Inventory and Analysis of Athletes' Villages in the

Robert Sroka (Canada)

Northumbria University, United Kingdom

Final report for

The IOC Olympic Studies Centre

PhD Students and Early Career Academics Research Grant Programme

December 31, 2021

2. Manchester 2002 Commonwealth Games 11

3. Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth Games 17

4. London 2012 Olympic Games 26

6. Evaluating the Research Questions 43

7. Conclusions and Recommendations 47

Annex 1: Site Visit Observations 49

Each of Manchester, Glasgow, and London utilised their respective mega-events to

The objectives of this study can be summarised as follows:

2. To establish a data collection baseline for future analysis of athletes villages as a

1. How should legacy value be measured in an athletes’ village context?

Conclusions and recommendations

1.1 Background and academic significance of project

1.2 Research questions

1. How should legacy value be measured in an athletes’ village context?

Value capture schemes, where additional revenue from development subsidizes a

1.3.1 Dataset collection and population

1.3.2 Narrative synthesis

1.3.3 Observational site visits

Feature measurement scored buildings, improvements, and streetscapes on a scale of

2. MANCHESTER 2002 COMMONWEALTH GAMES

2.1 Financial summary

The Manchester Commonwealth Games relied upon a procurement model of

Table 1. Manchester Athletes’ Village Summary

2.2 Real estate and geographic summary

2.3 Narrative summary

Manchester’s Commonwealth Games bid is in many ways a legacy of the city’s

2.3.1 Planning, procurement and finance

3. GLASGOW 2014 COMMONWEALTH GAMES

3.1 Financial summary

3.1.1 Public capital cost

3.1.2 Land valuation

3.1.4 Organising Committee costs

3.1.5 Total capital cost

3.1.6 Net public cost

3.1.7 Total public cost through 2020

Table 2. Glasgow Athletes’ Village Financial Cost Estimates (£ million)

3.2 Real estate and geographic summary

Table 3. Glasgow Athletes’ Village Summary

3.2.1 Property market values

3.3 Narrative summary

3.3.2 Planning and procurement

As opposed to a tender, the procurement process was framed as a “competitive

As many governments do in similar expropriation circumstances, the Glasgow Council

3.3.4 Athletes’ village legacy

3.3.5 Legacy beyond the athletes’ village

4. LONDON 2012 OLYMPIC GAMES

4.1 Financial summary

4.1.1 Public and total capital cost

4.1.2 Future property related revenues

4.1.3 Net public cost through 2020

Table 4. London Athletes’ Village Financial Cost Estimates (£ million)

4.2 Real estate and geographic summary

4.2.1 Location and mix

Table 5. London Athletes’ Village Summary

4.2.2 Property market values