Learnings from completing Risk

based assessments on 8
ammonia plants and downstream
urea, nitric acid and fertilizer
plants.
As owners of plant, risk management of assets is something we do as part of our day-to-day business,
regardless of whether you are the Manager, plant engineer or a maintenance technician. A RBI (risk
based inspection) approach to management of assets systematizes this thinking and doing action into
a formal, logical and auditable process.

Risk based management is as much about managing people and processes as managing assets. A
RBI program should be the starting point in setting up a management program for all critical and
non-critical equipment on ammonia and downstream plants.

Asset types found to be most at risk of failure and the damage mechanisms applicable to these were:

• Primary Reformer outlet manifolds: creep-fatigue, creep cracking in Inconel 182 welds

• Mixed Feed Coils (part of Reformer waste heat recovery section): creep damage

• Reformed Gas Waste Heat Boilers: Localised overheating of tubes, crevice corrosion

• HT Shifts, Methanators and other hydrogen equipment fabricated from C 0.5Mo steel:
H2 assisted cracking and Hydrogen damage

• Ammonia Converters / Syn-loop boilers and exchangers: H2 assisted cracking and

Hydrogen damage

• Stainless steel vessels: chloride induced stress corrosion cracking beneath lagging

• Carbon steel equipment in CO2 removal section: carbonic acid attack

• Cooling water exchangers: pitting corrosion from inadequate water treatment

• Inconel 600 bellows: hydrogen damage, cracking

RBI should be harnessed to provide opportunities for significant improvement in business

performance by improving equipment reliability and integrity. An important outcome of these
improvements is the safety performance of the business.

D.J. Keen, D. M. Firth, C.W. Thomas

MPT Solutions, PO Box 4551, Eight Mile Plains, Queensland, Australia, 4113

2005 255 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

 Introduction
A s owners of plant, risk management of
assets is something we do as part of
our day-to-day business, regardless of
whether you are the Manager, an
engineer or a technician. A risk-based approach
to management of assets, systematizes this
thinking and doing action into a formal, logical
and auditable process.
Risk based management is as much about
managing people and processes as managing
assets.
An RBI (Risk Based Inspection) program
should be the starting point in setting up a
management program for all critical and non-
critical equipment on ammonia and
downstream plants. Answers to the following
questions were derived from completing RBI
assessments on 8 ammonia plants as well as
their downstream production facilities include:
• What asset types are more at risk of
failure?
• What are the key damage mechanisms
to look out for?
• What failures were prevented through
the application of a risk based
assessment process?
• What are the primary factors which
contribute to the likelihood of
equipment failures?
• RBI is only one process in the effective
management of pressure equipment;
what are the others and where does RBI
fit?
• What pressure equipment management
processes are important and how did
the 8 facilities shape up?
• How to establish a schedule for
inspection and condition monitoring
tasks?
• What funds, resources, expertise and
information are required to implement
a successful RBI program?
• Improved management of available
maintenance funds; will a RBI program
reduce inspection/maintenance spend?
• What are the real drivers for
implementing an RBI program?
AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
What asset types are more at risk?
What are the key damage
mechanisms to look out for? What
failures have been prevented
through the application of a RBI
approach?
The RBI programs conducted on the eight
ammonia plants revealed that the following
asset types were most at risk of suffering a
failure event.
• Primary Reformer outlet manifolds –
creep fatigue cracking from system
generated bending loads
• Primary Reformer outlet manifolds -
accelerated creep damage to Inconel
182 weld metal.
• Primary Reformer Effluent Duct coils –
end of creep life / localised hot areas.
• Reformed Gas Waste Heat Boilers –
Crevice corrosion (tube to tubesheet).
• Reformed Gas Waste Heat Boilers –
Long term / short term overheating
resulting from excessive waterside
deposition leading to tube failures from
hydrogen damage, creep and tensile
overload.
• C 0.5 Mo steel manufactured vessels
and piping systems in pre 1980 plants –
HTHA from operation above CS
Nelson Curve.
• C 0.5 Mo steel manufactured vessels in
pre 1970 plants – H2 Assisted Cracking
of excessively hard welds (PWHT soak
temperature too low).
• Synloop alloy steel (P22 CrMo)
vessels/exchangers in hydrogen service
– Cracking of incorrectly post weld
heat treated welds.
• Ammonia Converters – H2 assisted
thermal fatigue cracking (material
properties, poor welding, cyclic
operation and start-up procedure).
• Low temperature vessels in back end of
plant – risk of brittle fracture in the
event of a low temperature excursion
followed by sudden re-pressure.
• Stainless Steel vessels and exchangers
– Chloride Induced Stress Corrosion
Cracking; external surface (under
lagging) and internal surface (chloride
levels concentrate over many years
service).
256 2005
 • Carbon steel equipment in CO2
removal section (KO Pots, Stripper,
Absorber) where there is a risk of ‘wet
CO2’ pitting attack.
• Cooling water heat exchangers – tube
failures resulting from poorly managed
water treatment program or excessively
low water velocities (Under-deposit
Corrosion, Microbial Induced
Corrosion).
• Cracking of non-annealed Inconel 600
expansion bellows and exchanger tubes
in hydrogen service.
The damage mechanisms varied
considerably with pitting corrosion, creep,
localised corrosion, general corrosion,
hydrogen damage mechanisms, fatigue and
stress corrosion cracking being the more
common problems found.
A random sample of 3000 plant items was
selected from the eight facilities assessed. As
shown below, nearly 80% of this equipment
was assessed to have no noteworthy damage
mechanisms acting on them; i.e. 80% of the
static plant assessed has a very low likelihood
of failing from service induced problems.
Case 1
The RBI assessment indicated that there
was a high potential for cracking in a ‘closing
seam’ weld in a syn-loop boiler feedwater
heater exchanger. The primary contributing
factor was considered to be the application of
an inadequate localised post weld heat
treatment procedure which promoted high
residual tensile stresses and a crack susceptible
microstructure. Other key factors were the close
proximity of inlet/outlet nozzles, location of the
thick walled tubesheet and the operating
temperature and service environment.
Inspection of the exchanger during the
following shutdown found six significant
cracks; five of which had propagated entirely
through the 108mm wall thickness channel
after only 4 years service. An ‘Engineering
Criticality Assessment’ confirmed that a
catastrophic failure was highly unlikely (leak
before break). As this exchanger was one of
three identical units in series it could be
removed from service with minimal impact on
plant performance.

Out of 3000 items assessed:

Pitting corrosion: 5.0%

Creep, creep-fatigue: 4.0%
Localised corrosion: 3.7%
General corrosion: 3.0%
Hydrogen related mechanisms.: 1.7%
Fatigue: 1.6%
Stress corrosion cracking: 1.2%
Other mechanisms: 1.0%
No degradation mechanisms: 78.8%
Figure 1: Through wall cracking in a syn-loop
boiler feedwater exchanger. Location of cracks
Many equipment failures have been is depicted by the arrows.
prevented through the application of risk based
assessment programs, as detailed in Table 1.
The following is a brief summary of how two
potentially serious failure events were avoided.
In both cases an on-stream failure would have
had significant business ramifications from
both a personnel safety and property damage
perspective.
2005 257 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
 Case 2 What are the primary factors which
contribute to the likelihood of
The RBI assessment indicated that there equipment failures?
was a high potential for high temperature
hydrogen attack (HTHA) of the piping system
between the ammonia converter and the When establishing the likelihood (LoF)
downstream heat exchanger. The pipeline had several factors need to be taken in to
been fabricated from a ‘C 0.5Mo steel’ and had consideration, namely
been in service for about 30 years. Plotting the
operating conditions on to the latest edition of Damage Factor
API941 (Nelson Curves) placed this pipeline at
150F below the redundant C 0.5Mo curve. A The potential mode(s) of degradation and
planned outage was taken to assess this pipeline failure mechanisms; corrosion, elevated
as well as other C 0.5Mo steel vessels and temperature, mechanical.
pipelines highlighted in the risk assessment.
Condition assessment findings confirmed the Inspection Factor
following:
The effectiveness, frequency and method of
• Very advanced HTHA in this ammonia inspection / condition assessment; the static
converter exit pipeline, plant management process.
• Advanced HTHA in one heat
exchanger, Process Factor
• Early stages to moderately advanced
Operating factors which may contribute to
HTHA in the Methanator plus one
promoting equipment damage.
other heat exchanger,
• Early stages to moderately advanced
Maintenance Factor
HTHA in 33% of the pipes assessed.
Maintenance factors (or absence of) which may
The ammonia converter exit pipeline was
contribute to promoting equipment damage.
replaced and one heat exchanger was subjected
to major repairs prior to returning to service.
Design / Construction
The plant was off-line for approximately 3
weeks. The Methanator, two heat exchangers
Factors arising during design and construction
and all C0.5Mo steel piping systems were
which may have contributed to promoting
replaced during the following shutdown.
equipment damage

Each of these factors is assessed and

weighted for an individual component. They
are then combined in an additive manner to
give an overall likelihood factor.

Figure 2: Hydrogen fissuring (HTHA) in a

converter exit pipeline. Fissuring was 50%
through the wall of the pipe.
AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 258 2005

Failure Likelihood
Total LoF
LoF End of life failures
Event driven failures
Fabrication error failures
Equipment Life Cycle
Figure 3: The LoF is often a summation of
many factors.
Equipment on the 8 ammonia plants which
was assessed to have moderate to high LoFs
invariably had one or more of the following
shortfalls.
Damage factor
Clearly all equipment assessed to have a
moderate to high LoF either suffered from or
had a high potential to suffer from a known
active damage mechanism. However, the
primary issue was that in many cases, the ‘plant
owner’ was either not aware that a damage
mechanism existed or the mode of degradation
was not well understood. None of the plants
assessed had a ‘materials specialist’ on staff;
they either relied on external consultants or did
not routinely seek materials advice.
Inspection factor
There was an alarmingly high population of
equipment which was assessed to have not been
effectively inspected. In most cases, the
inspection method was not aligned with the
damage mechanism, eg magnetic particle
examination is not an appropriate inspection
method for HTHA. The inspection frequencies
varied from too short to too long; most of the
plants were considered to be over-inspecting
equipment; a sign of conservatism! The process
for managing pressure equipment in some cases
was very poor however in all 8 cases
considerable effort was being put in to
2005
improving this deficiency. Inspection records
were often scattered around the plant, hidden in
engineer’s filing cabinets. Too many plants
relied on ‘organisation memory’ rather than
formalised ‘equipment life plans’. In the
modern generation plants some equipment in
the high pressure synthesis loop area had
restricted or in some cases no access for
internal inspection. Therefore it is difficult to
establish the condition of this equipment with
any degree of certainty. A key shortfall in some
of the plants was the presence of a formal
‘remnant life program’ for aged plant.
In summary, inspection effectiveness was
frequently a cause for concern. The disturbing
conclusion is that many plant owners really do
not have a good understanding of the condition
of their plant.
Process factor
Two critical processes in ammonia plants
are boiler water management and cooling water
management. Most of the plants had suffered
cooling water related failures and roughly half
the plants had suffered boiler water related
failures. Most of these failures were related to
the presence of ‘deposits’, i.e. there were
shortfalls with the equipment cleaning
programs. Although most plants had fairly
robust systems in place for managing both
processes there was a distinct lack of basic
‘process condition monitoring’ practices
throughout. All plants occasionally experienced
abnormal operating conditions; some of these
were considered detrimental to the health of the
equipment. In some cases, process alarm and
trip settings were found to be incorrect. Process
Operator competence varied from poor to
excellent; despite this there were only a few
major failures which had occurred as a result of
operator error.
Maintenance factor
In most cases the maintenance factor did
not contribute significantly to the LoF. Pressure
equipment generally does not require much on-
going maintenance per se; the exception here is
pressure safety devices. These were generally
well managed.
259 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
 Design and Construction factor way that the maintenance management system
(CMMS) provides planning and scheduling
The key deficiencies here were: discipline.

• Material inadequate for service How did the eight plants shape up? Table 3
• No post weld heat treatment / incorrect summarises how each plant ranked in some of
post weld heat treatment the key performance areas of manufacturing.
• Welding process not optimal Two of the plants failed to achieve a 50%
• Quality control during fabrication was score. Key shortfalls were found in the areas of:
inadequate
• Information management
• Human Resource Development (skills,
training, competence)
Where does RBI fit in the overall • Data analysis and reporting
management of pressure • Corrective actioning
equipment? What pressure • Non Conformance management
equipment management processes • Root cause analysis
are important and how did the eight
facilities shape up? Less notable shortfalls were in the areas of:

• Risk assessment; LoF, CoF

Let’s consider eight key plant • Condition monitoring tasking and
manufacturing processes; i.e. the things we frequency setting
have to do well, namely: • Remnant life management; defect size
• Maintenance Systems and Practices analysis, remaining life assessment and
• Risk Based Management of Assets life cycle planning.
• Condition Assessment of Process and
Plant
• Remnant Life Management of Aged
Plant
• Production and Process Control
• Engineering and Process Design
• Root Cause Analysis of Lost
Production and Failure
• Shutdown / Turnaround Management

Where does RBI fit in? RBI is a critical

tool used either directly or indirectly in many of
these processes, in particular risk based
management, condition assessment and
remnant life management. This is illustrated in
table 2.
Figure 4: Risk profile change with inspection
For an RBI process to be effective, it must with/without RBI
be managed as an integral component of the
pressure equipment management program. It
needs to become an on-going process and
should not be regarded as a one-of project. It
needs to become ‘a way of doing business’.

The pressure equipment management

system must be designed in such a way that it
provides the discipline for integrity
management of pressure equipment in the same
AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 260 2005
 How to establish a schedule for
inspection and condition monitoring
tasks?
Inspection tasks and schedules should be
prepared at the completion of each risk
assessment. These inspection tasks and
schedules should be aligned with and reflect:
• The mode of failure, the damage
mechanism(s)
• The damage mechanism life cycle
(creep life, crack growth rate, corrosion
rate, pit growth rate, etc)
• The Risk Exposure, RE
• The Likelihood of Failure, LoF
• The Consequence of Failure, CoF
What funds, resources, expertise
and information are required to
implement a successful RBI
program?
The data discussed in section 2.0 showed
that only about 20% of the static plant in the
eight ammonia plants assessed had a notable
probability of failure. This being the case then
two simple rules can be applied to improve the
management of time, funds and resources
allocated to static plant, namely:
• 80% of time, resources and funds
should be allocated to the 20% of plant
which has a moderate to high
likelihood of failure.
• 20% of time, resources and funds
should be allocated to the other 80% of
plant which has a very low likelihood
of failure.
In simplistic terms, the 80:20 rule applies.
The cost of implementing an RBI program
will vary from plant to plant however the
following can be used as a general guide:
• 5 pressure vessels / heat exchangers
should be able to be completed on
average per day. The more complicated
ones such as primary reformers may
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take a day or two each whereas the
basic low risk items can be done much
more quickly.
• Allow roughly US$225-250 average
per each item of plant for a full
qualitative assessment and
establishment of inspection programs.
Additional funds should be allowed for
quantitative analysis of remnant life
where required.
Implementing an RBI program for piping
systems is notably more complicated and time
consuming as compared with pressure vessels.
Time and funds could be as much as 50%
higher than that allocated for the pressure
vessels on a particular plant.
As with most reliability improvement
processes the success of an RBI program is
largely dependant on the level of expertise
utilised. In most cases the most effective team
consists of a blend of 1-2 key industry expert
consultants to facilitate the program working
closely with key plant inspection, operations
and maintenance personnel. In all cases,
utilisation of an ammonia industry expert is a
very wise investment. The benefits will be:
• good blend of industry/materials
experience and local knowledge
• very good in-house and cross learning
• good return on investment dollars
• getting it right the first time
What information and data is needed? The
old adage ‘rubbish in rubbish out’ is very true
for RBI programs. Access to and utilisation of
historical data which is accurate and valid is
imperative to establishing a clear understanding
of the condition of each item of plant, what
damage mechanisms are applicable and
if/when/how it is likely to fail. A list of key
information and data required is as follows:
• All inspection reports /records from
plant commissioning to present
• All maintenance reports / records from
plant commissioning to present
• All process incident reports of
abnormal condition operation
261 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
 • Process flow diagrams, P and IDs
• Manufacturers data reports
• Drawings of each item of plant
assessed
• Equipment modifications and upgrades
• Plant shutdown/turnaround reports
• Future operating philosophies; timing
of next two shutdowns
• Business impact guidance; cost of
equipment failure
Improved management of available
maintenance funds; will a RBI
program reduce inspection /
maintenance spend? What are the
real drivers for implementing an RBI
program?
Reduction in inspection / maintenance
expenditure was achieved in only one of the
eight plants. The primary reason for this was
that this particular plant was basically over-
inspecting their pressure equipment. Plants
which were under-inspecting went through a
period of increased expenditure for a few years
until a suitable level of confidence in
equipment condition was achieved.
AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
In the majority of plant, risk is concentrated
in a relatively small percentage of the
equipment items. These potential high-risk
items may require greater attention, generally
through a revised inspection test plan. The cost
of the increased inspection effort can
sometimes be offset by reducing excessive
inspection efforts in the areas identified as
having lower risk.
Having ‘reduced expenditure’ as a key
objective of an RBI program is thwart with
danger. A more appropriate objective would be
to ‘optimise’ expenditure and resources through
fine tuning the inspection program.
RBI should be harnessed to provide
opportunities for significant improvement in
business performance by improving
equipment reliability and integrity. An
important outcome of these improvements is
the safety performance of the business.
‘These are the real drivers for
implementing an RBI program.’
262 2005
2005
Table 1: Summary of problems found on 8 ammonia and downstream plants through a risk based assessment analysis.

Plant Process type Age Equipment type Damage mechanism highlighted On-stream failure prevented
(yrs)
A1 Ammonia 35 Reformer outlet Creep fatigue cracking – bending moments Leaking reformed gas to atmosphere, risk of fire and
manifold tee-cone in manifold arms personnel injury; 2-3 weeks lost production
Mixed feed coil Creep - localised damage due to coil design Potential for equipment damage, 2-3 weeks lost
(reformer effluent) (hot spots) production
Reformed Gas Hydrogen damage / creep – long term Potential for tube failures, 1-2 weeks to plug failed
WHB localised overheating of tubes tubes / 6 weeks to re-tube boiler
HT Shift Converter H2 Assisted Cracking – Post weld heat Leaking process gas to atmosphere, risk of fire and
treatment soak temperature too low, HAZ personnel injury; 2-3 weeks lost production
too hard

263
Mixed Feed Stress corrosion cracking of expansion Leaking process gas to atmosphere, risk of fire and
Preheater bellows – low level chlorides in steam personnel injury; 2-3 weeks lost production
Sulfinol Cooler Microbial Induced Corrosion – cooling Tube failure; 2-3 days to plug failed tubes / 6 weeks to
water velocities too low re-tube exchanger.
Methanator H2 Assisted Cracking – PWHT soak Leaking process gas to atmosphere, risk of fire and
temperature too low, HAZ too hard personnel injury; 2-3 weeks lost production
Ammonia H2 Assisted Thermal Fatigue Cracking – Leaking process gas to atmosphere, risk of fire,
Converters S/up procedure and material properties explosion and personnel injury; >3 weeks lost
production
A2 Urea 35 Urea Reactor Localised corrosion of liner – operational Corrosion damage to shell; plant off line for 2-3
problems with purge water weeks to repair.

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

 Plant Process type Age Equipment type Damage mechanism highlighted On-stream failure prevented
(yrs)
Ammonia Collector Potential for brittle fracture during low Potential for catastrophic failure of pressure vessel,
temperature/re-pressure excursion severe property damage, high personnel safety and
environment risk.
MEA Coolers Localised corrosion adjacent baffles – Perforation of shell; cooler off line for 1-2 days to
stainless steel baffles, steel shell repair.

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

B1 Ammonia 35 HT S/H Steam Coil Carbon steel sections - end of creep life, Potential for equipment damage, 2-3 weeks lost
- Reformer CrMo sections - OK production
Reformer Outlet Localised creep fatigue damage due to Leaking reformed gas to atmosphere, risk of fire and
Manifold manifold design. personnel injury; 2-3 weeks lost production
Reformed Gas Hydrogen damage / creep – long term Potential for tube failures, 1-2 weeks to plug failed

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WHB localised overheating of tubes tubes / 6 weeks to re-tube boiler
Purge Gas Potential for brittle fracture during low Potential for catastrophic failure of pressure vessel,
Separator temperature/re-pressure excursion severe property damage, high personnel safety and
environment risk.
Auxiliary Boiler Creep - localised damage due to coil design Potential for equipment damage, 2-3 weeks lost
(hot spots) production
Methanator Hydrogen damage of C 0.5Mo steel Potential for catastrophic failure of pressure vessel,
operating above CS Nelson Curve. severe property damage, high personnel safety and
environment risk.

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2005
Plant Process type Age Equipment type Damage mechanism highlighted On-stream failure prevented
(yrs)
NH3 Converter Hydrogen damage of C 0.5Mo steel Potential for catastrophic failure of pressure vessel,
Effluent Exch. operating above CS Nelson Curve. severe property damage, high personnel safety and
environment risk.
NH3 Converter Hydrogen damage of C 0.5Mo steel Potential for catastrophic failure of pressure system,
Effluent piping operating above CS Nelson Curve. severe property damage, high personnel safety and
environment risk.
CO2 Stripper Gas Chloride induced stress corrosion cracking Leaking process gas to atmosphere, risk of fire and
Re-boiler beneath lagging personnel injury; 2-3 weeks lost production
Shift Effluent BFW Chloride induced stress corrosion cracking Leaking process gas to atmosphere, risk of fire and
Heater beneath lagging personnel injury; 2-3 weeks lost production

265
Transition section – Potential for hydrogen damage due to on- Potential for catastrophic failure of pressure system,
Sec Reformer going refractory problems severe property damage, high personnel safety and
environment risk.
Steam Drum Thermal fatigue cracking due to fast start-up Leaking HP steam to atmosphere; >3 weeks lost
procedure (heavy wall drum) production, potential for personnel injury
B2 Nitric Acid 35 Cooler Condenser Localised corrosion from poor cooling Tube failure; 2-3 days to plug failed tubes / 10 weeks
water treatment (scaling leading to high to re-tube exchanger.
tube wall temperatures).
Waste Heat Boiler Tubes at end of life due to prolonged Tube failure; 2-3 days to plug failed tubes / 6 weeks to
operation 450 embrittlement range. re-tube boiler.

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

 Plant Process type Age Equipment type Damage mechanism highlighted On-stream failure prevented
(yrs)
C Ammonia 30 Reformer Outlet Localised creep fatigue damage due to Leaking reformed gas to atmosphere, risk of fire and
Manifold manifold sag. personnel injury; 2-3 weeks lost production
Primary to Sec Localised creep fatigue damage of Inconel Leaking reformed gas to atmosphere, risk of fire and
Reformer Pipe 182 welds personnel injury; 2-3 weeks lost production
Reformed Gas Localised corrosion of tubes in tube to Tube failure; 1 week to plug failed tubes / 4 weeks to

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

WHB tubesheet crevice re-tube boiler.
Reformed Gas Hydrogen damage / creep – long term Potential for tube failures, 1-2 weeks to plug failed
WHB localised overheating of tubes tubes / 6 weeks to re-tube boiler
D Ammonia 35 HT Shift HTHA of C 0.5Mo steel operating above Potential for catastrophic failure of pressure vessel,
CS Nelson Curve. severe property damage, high personnel safety and

266
environment risk.
Reformed Gas Localised corrosion of tubes in tube to Tube failure; 1 week to plug failed tubes / 4 weeks to
WHB tubesheet crevice re-tube boiler.
Reformed Gas Hydrogen damage / creep – long term Potential for tube failures, 1-2 weeks to plug failed
WHB localised overheating of tubes tubes / 6 weeks to re-tube boiler
Sec Process Steam Coils approaching end of creep life Potential for equipment damage, 2-3 weeks lost
S/H production
Knock-out Pot Localised pitting from carbonic acid attack Perforation of shell, process gas to atmosphere; 1
in high impingement areas week lost production to repair, potential fire risk

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2005
Plant Process type Age Equipment type Damage mechanism highlighted On-stream failure prevented
(yrs)
Syn Loop Piping HTHA of C 0.5Mo steel operating above Potential for catastrophic failure of pressure system,
CS Nelson Curve. severe property damage, high personnel safety and
environment risk.
E Ammonia 20 Reformer Outlet Localised creep fatigue damage due to Leaking reformed gas to atmosphere, risk of fire and
Manifold manifold sag. personnel injury; 2-3 weeks lost production
Ref Product / Feed Hydrogen embrittlement of Inconel 600 Leaking reformed gas to atmosphere, risk of fire and
Gas Exch bellows. personnel injury; 2-3 weeks lost production
F Ammonia 2 Syn Loop BFW Hydrogen assisted cracking of channel to Leaking reformed gas to atmosphere, risk of fire and
Pre-heater tubesheet weld (PWHT inadequate) personnel injury; 2-3 weeks lost production
Syn Loop WHB Risk of tube to tubesheet weld cracking – Tube failure; 2 weeks to repair/plug cracked welds / 6

267
weld procedure inadequate weeks to re-tube boiler.
Reformed Gas Hydrogen damage / creep – long term Potential for tube failures, 1-2 weeks to plug failed
WHB localised overheating of tubes tubes / 6 weeks to re-tube boiler
Sec Reformer Creep fatigue cracking at dissimilar metal Burner failure; plant off line for 1-2 weeks to repair
Burner weld existing / install new burner
Purge Gas Potential for brittle fracture during low Potential for catastrophic failure of pressure vessel,
Separator temperature/re-pressure excursion severe property damage, high personnel safety and
environment risk.
Separator Vessel Localised pitting corrosion from carbonic Potential for perforation of pressure containing shell
acid attack of carbon steel vessel leading to plant shutdown to repair

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

 Plant Process type Age Equipment type Damage mechanism highlighted On-stream failure prevented
(yrs)
Steam Pre Super- Cracking of non annealed Inconel 600 Tube failure; 2 weeks to plug failed tubes / 6 weeks to
heater exchanger tube return bends re-tube boiler.
G Ammonia 2 MP Reformed Gas Stress Corrosion Cracking of tube to Tube failure; 2 weeks to repair/plug cracked welds / 6
Cooler tubesheet welds – caustic wash during weeks to re-tube boiler.
commission

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

Reformed Gas Hydrogen damage / creep – long term Potential for tube failures, 1-2 weeks to plug failed
WHB localised overheating of tubes tubes / 6 weeks to re-tube boiler
Reformer Creep fatigue cracking of outlet manifold Leaking reformed gas to atmosphere, risk of fire and
tee to cone weld personnel injury; 2-3 weeks lost production
MP Flash Drum Potential for brittle fracture during low Potential for catastrophic failure of pressure vessel,

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temperature/re-pressure excursion severe property damage, high personnel safety and
environment risk.
H1 Ammonia 2 Reformer Creep fatigue cracking of outlet manifold Leaking reformed gas to atmosphere, risk of fire and
tee to cone weld personnel injury; 2-3 weeks lost production
Reformed Gas Hydrogen damage / creep – long term Potential for tube failures, 1-2 weeks to plug failed
WHB localised overheating of tubes tubes / 6 weeks to re-tube boiler
Reformed Gas H2 assisted cracking of inlet nozzle to Leaking reformed gas to atmosphere, risk of fire and
WHB channel weld; inadequate post weld heat personnel injury; 2-3 weeks lost production
treatment
Syn Loop Microbial Induced Corrosion – cooling Tube failure; 2-3 days to plug failed tubes / 4 weeks to
Intercoolers water velocities too low re-tube exchanger.

2005
2005
Plant Process type Age Equipment type Damage mechanism highlighted On-stream failure prevented
(yrs)
MP Flash Drum Potential for brittle fracture during low Potential for catastrophic failure of pressure vessel,
temperature/re-pressure excursion severe property damage, high personnel safety and
environment risk.
H2 Nitric Acid 2 Cooler Condenser Stress corrosion cracking of stainless steel Plant off line for 5-7 days to repair.
inlet nozzle in cooling water jacket
Economiser Potential for localised pitting corrosion - Tube failure; 2-3 days to plug failed tubes / 6 weeks to
condensing droplets of nitric acid re-tube exchanger.
H3 Ammonium 2 Pipe Reactor Localised corrosion (3mm/yr); material Plant off line for 1-2 days, potential for personnel
Nitrate Separator inadequate for duty injury.

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AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
 Table 2: Reliability management of production facilities through the application of critical manufacturing processes.

Primary Process Key Performance Areas Asset Group

Static Plant Rotating Plant Inst / Elect. Infrastructure
Maintenance Systems Planning and Scheduling CMMS (SAP) CMMS (SAP) CMMS (SAP) CMMS (SAP)
and Practices Information Management CMMS / RMS CMMS (SAP) CMMS (SAP) CMMS (SAP)
Maintenance Methods – PMs, PDM, RBI (RMS) RCM RCM RCM
Proactive maint.

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

Maintenance procedures CMMS / RMS CMMS (SAP) CMMS (SAP) CMMS (SAP)
Maintenance standards CMMS / RMS CMMS (SAP) CMMS (SAP) CMMS (SAP)
Spares / Materials Mgt CMMS (SAP) CMMS (SAP) CMMS (SAP) CMMS (SAP)
Human Resource Development HR Plan HR Plan HR Plan HR Plan
Risk based management Qualitative risk assessment RBI (RMS) RCM RCM RCM
Likelihood of Failure (LoF) RBI (RMS) RCM RCM RCM
Consequence of Failure (CoF) RBI (RMS) RCM RCM RCM
Condition assessment of Condition monitoring tasking RBI (RMS) RCM RCM RCM

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process and plant CM task frequency RBI (RMS) RCM RCM RCM
Data Analysis and Reporting RBI (RMS) CMMS (SAP) CMMS (SAP) CMMS (SAP)
Corrective actioning RBI (RMS) CMMS (SAP) CMMS (SAP) CMMS (SAP)
Non Conformance Mgt RBI (RMS) CMMS (SAP) CMMS (SAP) CMMS (SAP)
Remnant Life Quantitative risk assessment RBI (RMS) RCM N/A N/A
management Critical defect size analysis Fracture Mech. Fracture Mech. N/A N/A
Remaining Life Assess FM/life model FM/life model N/A N/A
Life Cycle Planning CMMS (SAP) CMMS (SAP) CMMS (SAP) CMMS (SAP)
Production and Process Process management (production / Process Mgt PMS PMS N/A
Control efficiency) System (PMS)
Information management PMS PMS PMS N/A
Critical Alarm/Trip Systems PMS PMS PMS N/A
Process Procedures PMS PMS PMS N/A
Abnormal Condition Mgt PMS PMS PMS N/A
Human Resource Development HR Plan HR Plan HR Plan HR Plan
Engineering and Process Engineering standards Codes of practice Codes of practice Codes of practice Codes of practice
Design Engineering specifications Process design OEM specs OEM specs Man. Spec.

2005
2005
Primary Process Key Performance Areas Asset Group
Static Plant Rotating Plant Inst / Elect. Infrastructure
Root Cause Analysis of RCA lost production PMS PMS PMS N/A
lost production and
failure RCA lost efficiency PMS PMS PMS N/A

RCA equipment failure RCA / FMEA RCA / FMEA RCA / FMEA RCA / FMEA
Shutdown / Turnaround Work scoping RBI (RMS) CMMS (SAP) CMMS (SAP) CMMS (SAP)
management Planning and Scheduling Planning system Planning system Planning system Planning system
Project Mgt Project Mgt Project Mgt Project Mgt Project Mgt

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AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
 Table 3: Summary of findings of an audit completed on the eight ammonia facilities based on ‘best practice management of pressure equipment’.

Primary Process Key Performance Areas Plant ID / Static Plant Management Rating
A B C D E F G H Your facility
Maintenance Planning and Scheduling 9 7 5 5 7 9 8 8
Systems and Information Management 5 7 3 3 8 8 8 8
Practices Maint Methods – PMs, PDM, Proactive 8 8 5 7 8 8 9 8
Maintenance procedures 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Maintenance standards 6 6 6 6 6 8 8 8
Spares / Materials Mgt 6 6 6 6 6 8 8 8

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

Human Resource Development 3 3 3 3 7 7 7 7
Risk based Risk / criticality assessment 9 8 5 6 9 7 8 9
management Likelihood of Failure (LoF) 9 8 4 4 9 7 8 9
Consequence of Failure (CoF) 9 8 4 4 9 7 8 9
Condition Condition monitoring tasking 10 8 5 4 10 9 9 10
assessment of CM task frequency 10 8 4 4 10 8 8 8
process and plant Data Analysis and Reporting 5 6 4 5 8 9 5 9
Corrective actioning 5 6 5 4 8 9 7 9

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Non Conformance Mgt 2 5 2 2 7 7 7 7
Remnant Life Critical defect size analysis 9 9 6 3 5 9 9 9
management Remaining Life Assess 9 9 4 3 5 9 9 9
Life Cycle Planning 7 7 4 3 7 7 7 8
Eng / Process Engineering standards 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8
Design Engineering specifications 7 8 7 8 8 8 8 8
RCA of lost RCA lost production 7 7 4 4 7 7 7 7
production and RCA lost efficiency 7 7 4 4 7 7 7 7
failure RCA equipment failure 6 6 5 5 6 6 6 6
Shutdown / Work scoping 9 9 5 7 8 9 8 9
Turnaround Planning and Scheduling 9 9 6 7 8 9 8 9
management Project Mgt 8 9 7 7 8 9 8 9
Totals Max possible score = 270 187 187 126 128 195 205 209 212

2005
2005
Definitions:

RE = Risk exposure
LoF = Likelihood of failure
CoF = Consequence of failure
RBI = Risk based inspection
RMS = Reliability management system
RCM = Reliability centred maintenance
RCA = Root cause analysis
PMS = Process management system
CMMS = computerised maintenance system
SAP = a brand of CMMS
FMEA = Failure modes and effects analysis

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