A COMPENDIUM OF

PROVISIONAL REMEDY AND

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION CASES
In Bar Question and Answer Format

COMPILED BY CLASS 7036

FIRST SEMESTER A.Y. 2019 - 2020
TUESDAY 6:00 - 8:00 PM
 COMPILED BY CLASS 7036
FIRST SEMESTER A.Y. 2019 - 2020
TUESDAY 6:00 - 8:00 PM

ABAD, Nikki Norren A.

ABANGAN, Stephanie V.
ANOR, Jennifer L.
ARTIGAS, Choystel Mae S.
CALIBUGAN, Rudeza Sheena A.
CAPUTE, Charlene C.
DECENA, Leona Mae G.
ECARMA, Kim D.
ELESTERIO, Dessa Marie V.
GABOR, Jlayda Carmel Y.
KE-E, Aive B.
MALINAO, Deborah D.
MELENDRES, Ma. Rebecca Fe G.
MONTALLANA, Kessey N.
MONTECILLO, Maria Mae Florence A.
MONTEJO, Ronilyn C.
PANARES, Ma. Baby P.
PAPELLERAS, Jannica Nina G.
PLAZA, Charlene S.
ROQUE, Pamela A.
SABAL, Hannah C.
SESANTE, Monyeen Marie T.
SILVOSA, Ashiel G.
YU VEGA, Christi Marie V.
ADRIANO, Jake Zhan C.
BALISADO, Jan Michael A.
BASANEZ, James Marvin C.
BELARMINO, Alphonse Louie E.
CUADRA, Arthchris T.
DELA PENA, Jefferson A.
DELA TORRE, Harvey D.
ELUMBARING, Jeric M.
ENERLAN, Edwin A.
GUBALANE, Rafael B.
JURADO, Ralph E.
LIBRANDO, Ronald Anthony A.
MAGANDIA, Abdul Jomar P.
MARUHOM, Datu Esma Mikee P.
MENIL, Mario Josshua C.
OROPEL, Oliver John R.
RAMIREZ, Gerald S.
RESIT, Yves M.
SAW, Virgil Gilbert D.
SILVELA, Carl Lindl L.
TIEMPO, Christian Philip A.
TRONCO, Cyrus Vincent L.
VIDAD, Darryl M
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES.............................................................................................................................16

CALO AND SAN JOSE v. ROLDAN..................................................................................................16

RULE 57: PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT...............................................................................................16

LIM v. SPOUSES LAZARO.............................................................................................................. 16

LIGON v. RTC................................................................................................................................ 16

BORJA v. PLATON......................................................................................................................... 16

PROFESSIONAL VIDEO INC. v. TESDA........................................................................................... 17

OLSEN v. OLSEN............................................................................................................................17

NG WEE v. TANKIANSEE............................................................................................................... 17

LIBERTY INSURANCE v. CA............................................................................................................18

FCY CONSTRUCTION v. CA............................................................................................................18

METRO INC. v. LARA’S GIFTS........................................................................................................18

REPUBLIC v. ESTATE OF LIM.........................................................................................................19

FOUNDATION SPECIALIST INC. v. BETONVAL...............................................................................19

ABOITIZ v. COTABATO.................................................................................................................. 19

MIALILHE v. DE LENCQUESAING.................................................................................................. 20

TOLEDO v. BURGOS......................................................................................................................20

PHIL. BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS v. CA....................................................................................20

REPUBLIC v. GARCIA.....................................................................................................................21

SPOUSES TIU v. VILLAR.................................................................................................................21

SABERON v. VENTANILLA............................................................................................................. 22

G.B. INC. v. SANCHEZ................................................................................................................... 22

INSULAR SAVINGS BANK v. CA..................................................................................................... 22

UNITED PULP AND PAPER CORP. v. AEROPOLIS.......................................................................... 23

RURAL BANK OF STA. BARBARA v. MANILA MISSION OF CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST................. 24

STRONGHOLD INSURANCE v. CUENCA........................................................................................ 24

EQUITABLE BANKING CORP v. SPECIAL STEEL............................................................................. 25

RULE 58: PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION................................................................................................. 26

LIMITLESS POTENTIALS v. CA....................................................................................................... 26

NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE VIRGILIO ALMARIO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY...................26

LUKANG v. PAGBILAO ..................................................................................................................26

VINUYA v. ROMULO..................................................................................................................... 27

SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF BAGUIO v. JADEWELL........................................................... 27

SEMIRARA COAL v. HGL DEVELOPMENT......................................................................................28

CHINA BANKING CORP. v. CO.......................................................................................................28

BPI v. HONG..................................................................................................................................29

DEVESA v. ARBES..........................................................................................................................29

PREYSLER v. CA.............................................................................................................................29

AREVALO v. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK............................................................................. 30

MANTILE v. CAJUCOM..................................................................................................................30

FELICIANO v. ALIPIO..................................................................................................................... 30

BARAYUGA v. ADVENTIST UNIVERSITY........................................................................................ 31

AUSTRALIAN PROFESSIONAL REALTY v. MUNICIPALITY OF PADRE GARCIA...............................31

DELOS SANTOS v. METROPOLITAN BANK....................................................................................31

TML GASKET v. BPI....................................................................................................................... 32

REPUBLIC v. CAGUIOA..................................................................................................................32

PNB v. RJ VENTURES.....................................................................................................................33

SOLID BUILDERS v. CHINA BANKING............................................................................................ 33

AUSTRALIAN PROFESSIONAL REALTY, INC v. MUNICIPALITY OF PADRE GARCIA BATANGAS..... 34

ERMITA v. ALDECOA-DELORINO.................................................................................................. 34

OWWA REPRESENTED BY ADMINISTRATOR MARIANITO D. ROQUE v. ATTY. CESAR L. CHAVEZ34

FELIPE SY DUNGOG v. COURT OF APPEALS..................................................................................35

MARTIN LAHM III and JAMES P. CONCEPCION v. LABOR ARBITER JOVENCIO Ll. MAYOR, JR..... 36

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS....................................................36

GARCIA v. DRILON........................................................................................................................ 36

MABAYO FARMS v. CA................................................................................................................. 37

SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE V. MAJUDUCON..................................................................37

 SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT V. PHILIPPINE CEMENT MANUFACTURERS.................................... 37

DELTA VENTURES v. CABATO....................................................................................................... 38

BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS v. ANTONIO VELANZUELA....................................................... 38

TRADERS ROYAL BANK v. IAC....................................................................................................... 39

THE HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES LAURA YADNO AND PUGSONG MAT-AN v. THE HEIRS OF THE
LATE SPOUSES MAURO AND ELISA ANCHALES............................................................................39

RCBC CAPITAL CORPORATION v. BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC............................................... 40

CITY OF LAPU-LAPU v. PEZA......................................................................................................... 40

HERMANO OIL MANUFACTURING & SUGAR CORP. v. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD.................... 41

MEDINA v. CANOY........................................................................................................................41

REPUBLIC v. NOLASCO................................................................................................................. 41

HERNANDEZ v. NAPOCOR............................................................................................................ 42

DFA v. FALCON............................................................................................................................. 42

NERWIN INDUSTRIES CORP. v. PNOC ENERGY............................................................................ 42

BAGUIO REGREENERING v. MASWENG....................................................................................... 43

REPUBLIC v. EVANGELISTA...........................................................................................................43

LANDBANK v. CONTINENTAL WATCHMAN..................................................................................43

SPOUSES YAP v. INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE BANK................................................................... 44

RULE 59: RECEIVERSHIP.......................................................................................................................45

COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS v. GAUZON.......................................................................... 45

VILLAMOR v. UMALE....................................................................................................................45

BELGIAN CATHOLIC MISSIONARIES v. MAGALLANES PRESS........................................................46

PO PAUCO v. SIGUENZA............................................................................................................... 46

BERG v. TEUS................................................................................................................................47

TANTANO v. ESPINA-CABOVERDE................................................................................................47

VIVARES V. REYES.........................................................................................................................47

CHAVEZ V. CA............................................................................................................................... 48

DESCALLAR v. CA.......................................................................................................................... 48

MAKING ENTERPRISES v. MARFORI............................................................................................. 48

 BONAPLATA v. AMBER................................................................................................................. 49

HARDEN v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS.............................................................................................. 49

COMMODITIES STORAGE ICE PLANT v. CA.................................................................................. 50

YLARDE v. ENRIQUEZ....................................................................................................................51

ROCHA CO. v. CROSSFIELD........................................................................................................... 51

PARANETE v. TAN.........................................................................................................................52

TANTANO v. CABOVERDE.............................................................................................................52

CITIBANK v. CA............................................................................................................................. 53

VIVARES v. REYES......................................................................................................................... 53

MARTINEZ v. GRANO....................................................................................................................53

PLATON v. SANDOVAL..................................................................................................................54

ORENDAIN v BF HOMES............................................................................................................... 54

TRADERS ROYAL BANK v IAC........................................................................................................ 54

CHAS REALTY CORP. v. TALAVERA............................................................................................... 55

RULE 60: REPLEVIN.............................................................................................................................. 56

BA FINANCE CORPORATION v. CA................................................................................................56

SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY............. 56

SERVICEWIDE SPECIALIST INC. v. CA............................................................................................ 56

AGNER v. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS....................................................................................................57

CITIBANK v. CA............................................................................................................................. 57

FACTORAN v. CA...........................................................................................................................58

ADVENT CAPITAL v. YOUNG.........................................................................................................58

SERG’S PRODUCTS, INC. v. PCI LEASING...................................................................................... 59

RIVERA v. VARGAS........................................................................................................................59

SPOUSES BAUTISTA v. SULA.........................................................................................................60

FERNANDEZ v. THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK............................................................ 60

VISAYAN SURETY v. CA................................................................................................................. 61

RULE 61: SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE.................................................................................................... 62

CALDERON v. ROXAS.................................................................................................................... 62
 FRANCISCO v. ZANDUETA............................................................................................................ 62

YANGCO v. RHODE....................................................................................................................... 62

COQUIA v. BALTAZAR...................................................................................................................63

VILLANUEVA v. VILLANUEVA.......................................................................................................63

GLICERIO MAGOMA v. HON. HIGINIO MACADAEG..................................................................... 63

LUIS RAMOS v. COURT OF APPEALS.............................................................................................64

SPOUSES LIM v. LIM..................................................................................................................... 64

GOTARDO v. BULING....................................................................................................................65

BAYOT v. CA..................................................................................................................................65

NEPOMUCENO v. LOPEZ.............................................................................................................. 65

MANGONON v. CA....................................................................................................................... 66

ROXAS v. CA..................................................................................................................................66

CALDERON v. ROXAS.................................................................................................................... 66

LUA v. LUA....................................................................................................................................67

SAAVEDRA v. YBAŇEZ ESTRADA...................................................................................................67

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS............................................................................................................................... 68

RULE 62: INTERPLEADER..................................................................................................................... 68

VIUDA DE CAMILO v. ARANIO...................................................................................................... 68

WACK-WACK GOLF v. LEE WON ..................................................................................................68

RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION v. METRO CONTAINER CORPORATION............. 68

BANK OF COMMERCE v. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK......................................................... 69

OCAMPO v. TIRONA..................................................................................................................... 69

PASRICHA v. DON LUIS REALTY.................................................................................................... 69

MAGLINTE v. HON. BALTAZAR-PADILLA...................................................................................... 69

RULE 63: DECLARATORY RELIEF & SIMILAR REMEDIES.......................................................................71

IMBONG v. OCHOA...................................................................................................................... 71

MALANA v. TAPPA........................................................................................................................71

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. IBAY......................................................................................... 71

DELA LLANA v. ALBA.....................................................................................................................72

 ALMEDA v. BATHALA MARKETING...............................................................................................72

EDDADES v. EDDADES.................................................................................................................. 72

TOLENTINO v. BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY...................................................................................73

RULE 64: REVIEW OF COMELEC & COA JUDGMENTS.........................................................................74

MACABAGO v. COMELEC............................................................................................................. 74

CAGAS v. COMELEC...................................................................................................................... 74

REYNA v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT.............................................................................................. 74

IBRAHIM v. COMELEC...................................................................................................................74

REBLORA v. ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES.......................................................................75

SAHALI v. COMELEC..................................................................................................................... 75

PATES v. COMELEC....................................................................................................................... 76

OSMEŇA v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT.......................................................................................... 76

OPTIONAL READINGS FOR RULE 64.................................................................................................... 77

LIMKAICHONG v. COMELEC......................................................................................................... 77

TESDA v. COA............................................................................................................................... 77

CAUSING VS. COMELEC................................................................................................................78

EJERCITO VS. COMELEC, 742 SCRA 210....................................................................................... 78

RULE 65: CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION & MANDAMUS........................................................................80

ARAULLO v. AQUINO....................................................................................................................80

TRIPLEX ENTERPRISES v. PNB-REPUBLIC BANK............................................................................80

DAVID v. RIVERA...........................................................................................................................81

ESQUIVEL v. OMBUDSMAN..........................................................................................................81

MILITANTE v. CA...........................................................................................................................81

ENRIQUEZ v. MACADAEG.............................................................................................................82

MADRIGAL TRANSPORT v. LAPANDAY HOLDINGS.......................................................................83

TOPACIO v. ONG.......................................................................................................................... 83

MORABE v. BROWN..................................................................................................................... 83

HERRERA v. BARRETO.................................................................................................................. 84

MICROSOFT CORP v. BEST DEAL COMPUTER.............................................................................. 84

 CAMPOS v. WISLIZENUS...............................................................................................................85

ABAD SANTOS v. PROVINCE OF TARLAC...................................................................................... 85

LEUNG BEN v. O’BRIEN.................................................................................................................85

NAPA v. WEISSENHAGEN............................................................................................................. 86

SAN PEDRO v. HON. ASDALA........................................................................................................86

CAMUTIN v. SPOUSES POTENTE.................................................................................................. 86

SIM v. NLRC.................................................................................................................................. 87

ALCANTARA v. ERMITA................................................................................................................ 87

SPECIAL AUDIT TEAM – COA v. CA............................................................................................... 88

PEFIANCO v. MORAL.................................................................................................................... 88

PIMENTEL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY........................................................................................... 88

HIPOS SR. v. JUDGE BAY...............................................................................................................89

COMELEC v. JUDGE QUIJANO-PADILLA........................................................................................89

MMDA v. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY................................................................... 90

DOLOT v. PAJE.............................................................................................................................. 90

MANALO v. PAIC SAVINGS BANK................................................................................................. 91

UP BOARD OF REGENTS v. CA...................................................................................................... 91

LAGUNA METTS CORP. v. CAALAM..............................................................................................91

LAPID v. LAUREA.......................................................................................................................... 92

CONCEPCION JR. v. COMELEC......................................................................................................92

GOLANGCO v. FUNG.................................................................................................................... 93

ALCARAZ v. GONZALEZ.................................................................................................................93

DAGAN v. OMBUDSMAN............................................................................................................. 93

OPTIONAL READINGS FOR RULE 65.................................................................................................... 94

HEIRS OF JULIO SOBREMONTE v. COURT OF APPEALS................................................................94

VILLAREAL v. ALIGA...................................................................................................................... 94

INC SHIPMANAGEMENT, INC v. MORADAS................................................................................. 95

A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC. v. MONDEJAR..................................................................................... 95

REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN.................................................................................................... 96
BANK OF COMMERCE v. RADIO PHILIPPINES NETWORK INC......................................................96

SARA LEE PHILIPPINES, INC. v. EMILINDA D. MACATLANG..........................................................97

MADARANG v. MORALES 725 SCRA 480......................................................................................98

MENDEZ v. PEOPLE...................................................................................................................... 98

TRAJANO v. UNIWIDE SALES WAREHOUSE CLUB........................................................................ 98

THENAMARIS PHILIPPINES INC. v. CA........................................................................................ 100

PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC. v. PHILTRANCO WORKERS UNION-ASSOCIATION OF

GENUINE LABOR ORGANIZATION.............................................................................................. 100

CRISOLOGO v. JEWM AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION.........................................................101

TESORO v. METRO MANILA RETREADERS ET AL........................................................................102

LANIER v. PEOPLE.......................................................................................................................102

TORRES v. SATSATIN.................................................................................................................. 103

REPUBLIC v. LAZO.......................................................................................................................103

PASCUAL v. DAQUIOAG, 720 SCRA 230..................................................................................... 104

PEOPLE v. ESPINOSA.................................................................................................................. 104

TENAZAS v. R. VILLEGAS TAXI TRANSPORT................................................................................105

MACAPAGAL v. PEOPLE..............................................................................................................105

NAVAL v. COMMISSION ON ELECTION...................................................................................... 106

PLDT v. OCAMPO........................................................................................................................106

JAY CANDELARIA and ERIC BASIT v. RTC, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO...........................................107

JOSE TAPALES VILLAROSA v. ROMULO DE MESA FESTIN and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS... 107

ABOITIZ EQUITY VENTURES, INC. v. VICTOR S. CHIONGBIAN, BENJAMIN D. GOTHONG, and

CARLOS A. GOTHONG LINES, INC. (CAGLI).................................................................................108

RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR. v. RICARDO S. SILVERIO................................................................... 109

ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORPORATION v. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY.109

OLONGAPO CITY v. SUBIC WATER AND SEWERAGE CO., INC....................................................110

OSG SHIPMANAGEMENT MANILA, INC., v. PELLAZAR...............................................................110

VINUYA v. ROMULO................................................................................................................... 111

FERNANDEZ v. CLAUDIO............................................................................................................ 111

JARDELEZA v. SERENO................................................................................................................112

JIMENEZ JR. v. PEOPLE............................................................................................................... 112

OLSEN v. OLSEN..........................................................................................................................112

DUNGOG v. Court of Appeals.....................................................................................................113

MORAN JR. v. OFFICE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES................................................ 113

REPUBLIC v. LAZO.......................................................................................................................113

680 HOME APPLIANCES v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS................................................... 114

TZE SUN WONG v. WONG..........................................................................................................115

MACAPAGAL v. PEOPLE..............................................................................................................115

AYUNGO v. BEAMKO SHIPMANAGEMENT CORPORATION....................................................... 116

TESDA v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT.............................................................................................116

LANIER v. PEOPLE.......................................................................................................................117

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY v. OLAIREZ.........................................................................................118

PASCUAL V. DAQUIOAG............................................................................................................. 118

TENAZAS v. R. VILLEGAS TAXI TRANSPORT................................................................................ 118

PEOPLE v. ESPINOSA.................................................................................................................. 119

REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN.................................................................................................. 119

MENDEZ v. PEOPLE.................................................................................................................... 120

MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO et al v. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III................................. 120

ANGEL G. NAVAL v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NELSON B. JULIA................................. 121

ABOITIZ EQUITY VENTURES, INC. v. VICTOR S. CHIONGBIAN, BENJAMIN D. GOTHONG, and

CARLOS A. GOTHONG LINES, INC.(CAGLI)..................................................................................122

JAY CANDELARIA and ERIC BASIT v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT...................................................122

RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR. v. RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR.............................................................. 123

KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP, INC. v. JESSIE ROBREDO, G.R. No. 200903, July 22,
2014............................................................................................................................................123

ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORPORATION v. METROPOLITAN AND TRUST COMPANY...........124

VILLAROSA v. FESTIN..................................................................................................................124

OSG SHIPMANAGEMENT MANILA, INC. v. PELLAZAR................................................................124

 ARAULLO v. AQUINO III..............................................................................................................125

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ATLANTA INDUSTRIES, INC................................................126

CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES' UNION (CAAP-EU) FORMERLY

AIR TRANSPORTATION EMPLOYEES' UNION (ATEU), v. CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES (CAAP..................................................................................................................... 127

STAR SPECIAL WATCHMAN AND DETECTIVE AGENCY, INC. v. PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, G.R. No.
181792, April 21, 2014...............................................................................................................128

KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP, INC. v. JESSIE ROBREDO......................................... 128

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA v. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO................................ 128

CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO v. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN............................................... 129

RULE 66: QUO WARRANTO...............................................................................................................130

DE CASTRO v. CARLOS................................................................................................................130

VILANDO v. HRET....................................................................................................................... 130

TOPACIO v. ONG........................................................................................................................ 130

MENDOZA v. ALLAS....................................................................................................................131

DAMASEN v. TUMAMAO........................................................................................................... 131

CALLEJA v. PANDAY.................................................................................................................... 131

MADRIGAL v. LECAROZ.............................................................................................................. 132

PARDO DE TAVERA v. PHIL. TUBERCULOSIS SOCIETY................................................................ 132

PPSTA v. APOSTOL......................................................................................................................133

LIBAN v. GORDON...................................................................................................................... 133

SANTIAGO v. GUINGONA........................................................................................................... 134

CAMID v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT.........................................................................................134

YAP v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION...........................................................................................134

DIVINAGRACIA v. CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING.................................................................. 135

FELICIANO v. VILLASIN............................................................................................................... 135

RULE 67: EXPROPRIATION.................................................................................................................136

NPC v. CO................................................................................................................................... 136

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK v. BCDA....................................................................................... 136

REPUBLIC v. GINGOYON (2005)................................................................................................. 136

 REPUBLIC v. GINGOYON (2006)................................................................................................. 137

ASIA’s EMERGING DRAGON v. DOTC......................................................................................... 137

LANDBANK v. WYCOCO..............................................................................................................138

NPC v. ANGAS.............................................................................................................................138

CITY OF MANILA v. SERRANO.....................................................................................................139

MCWD v. J. KING AND SONS...................................................................................................... 139

REPUBLIC v. TAGLE.....................................................................................................................140

CITY OF CEBU v. SPOUSES DEDAMO.......................................................................................... 140

SPOUSES ORTEGA v. CITY OF CEBU............................................................................................140

BPI v. COURT OF APPEALS..........................................................................................................141

BARDILLON v. BARANGAY MASILI..............................................................................................141

REPUBLIC v. CA...........................................................................................................................141

EUSEBIO v. LUIS..........................................................................................................................142

LANDBANK v. SANTIAGO............................................................................................................143

LANDBANK v. ARANETA............................................................................................................. 143

LANDBANK v. PERALTA.............................................................................................................. 143

RULE 68: FORECLOSURE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE......................................................................... 145

MONZON v. RELOVA.................................................................................................................. 145

LOOYUKO v. CA.......................................................................................................................... 145

HUERTA ALBA RESORT v. CA...................................................................................................... 146

SPOUSES SUICO v. PNB.............................................................................................................. 146

SPOUSES ROSALES v. SPOUSES SUBA........................................................................................ 147

SUICO RATTAN v. COURT OF APPEALS.......................................................................................147

OPTIONAL READINGS FOR RULE 68.................................................................................................. 148

LSK HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. v.. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK.....................148

MARQUEZ v. ALINDOG...............................................................................................................148

QUINTOS v. DARAB.................................................................................................................... 149

SOMBILON v. GARAY..................................................................................................................149

CABLING v. LUMAPAS................................................................................................................ 150

 BEROT v. SIAPNAO..................................................................................................................... 151

GOPIAO v. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO.................................................................... 151

OKABE v. SATURNINO................................................................................................................ 152

ARAMBULO v. GUNGAB............................................................................................................. 153

RULE 70: FORCIBLE ENTRY & UNLAWFUL DETAINER....................................................................... 154

ARAMBULO v. GUNGAB............................................................................................................. 154

SPOUSES BARNACHEA v. CA...................................................................................................... 154

FERNANDO v. SPOUSES LIM.......................................................................................................155

SPOUSES SAMONTE v. CENTURY SAVINGS BANK...................................................................... 155

SPOUSES REFUGIA v. CA.............................................................................................................155

ENCARNACION v. AMIGO...........................................................................................................156

SPOUSES MENDOZA v. CORONEL.............................................................................................. 156

PAJUYO v. CA..............................................................................................................................156

SPOUSES BENITEZ v. CA............................................................................................................. 157

MALABANAN v. RURAL BANK OF CABUYAO.............................................................................. 157

OPTIONAL READINGS FOR RULE 70.................................................................................................. 158

ACBANG v. LUCZON................................................................................................................... 158

ALCONERAv. PALLANAN.............................................................................................................158

TEODORO v. ESPINO.................................................................................................................. 159

OCAMPO v. HEIRS OF BERNARDINO.......................................................................................... 159

QUIJANO v. AMANTE................................................................................................................. 160

ABADILLA, Jr. v. OBRERO............................................................................................................160

PENTA PACIFIC v. LEVY CONSTRUCTION....................................................................................160

RULE 71: CONTEMPT......................................................................................................................... 162

MARANTAN v. DIOKNO.............................................................................................................. 162

CITY GOV’T OF BAGUIO v. MASWENG....................................................................................... 162

CAPITOL HILLS GOLF v. SANCHEZ...............................................................................................162

CAGAS v. COMELEC.................................................................................................................... 163

LIGON v. RTC.............................................................................................................................. 163

RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF AMA LAND AGAINST CA JUSTICES BUESER,
VILLON & ROSARIO.................................................................................................................... 163

REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN.................................................................................................. 164

SILVERIO v. SILVERIO..................................................................................................................164

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY v. OLAIREZ.........................................................................................165

PAGCOR v. THUNDERBIRD PILIPINAS HOTELS........................................................................... 165

ANGELES v. COURT OF APPEALS................................................................................................ 166

CAUSING v. COMELEC................................................................................................................ 167

REPUBLIC v. LAZO.......................................................................................................................167

RIVULET AGRO-INDUSTRIAL v. PARUNGAO...............................................................................168

DIGITAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS v. CANTOS............................................................................169

LIM-LUA v. LUA...........................................................................................................................169

FORTUN v. QUINSAYAS.............................................................................................................. 170

BELEN v. COMILANG.................................................................................................................. 170

LOZADA v. ZERRUDO..................................................................................................................171

RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF TOMAS MERDEGIA AGAINST CA JUSTICE VELOSO.....................171

 PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
Introduction:
CALO AND SAN JOSE v. ROLDAN
A alleges that they are owners of a parcel of land and are
in actual possession of it. Before the lower court under
Judge Y they filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or for the appointment of
receiver of the properties to prevent B to work or harvest
before the said property. B opposed the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that they are
the owners of the land and have been in actual
possession thereof. The judge granted the petition of the
writ of preliminary injunction filed by A without the latter
specifying the purpose of the said writ.
Was the act of the judge in granting the issuance of the
said writ proper?
ANSWER:
No, the judge acted improperly. The provisional remedies
denominated attachment, preliminary injunction,
receivership, and delivery of personal property provided
in the Rules of Court, respectively are remedies to which
the parties litigant may resort for the preservation and
protection of their rights and interest, and for no other
purpose, during the pendency of the principal action. If an
action, by its nature, does not require such protection or
preservation said remedies cannot be applied for and
granted.
RULE 57: PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
LIM v. SPOUSES LAZARO
X filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment before the
RTC for the recovery of the amounts stated in several
dishonored checks issued by Sps. Z amounting to
P2,160,000.00. RTC granted the the writ and 3 parcels of
land registered in the names of Sps. Lazaro were levied
upon. The parties agreed to enter into a Compromise
Agreement whereby Sps. Z agreed to pay X the amount
of P2, 351,064.80 on an installment basis. The RTC
approved the compromise agreement and later on
granted the Omnibus Motion filed by Sps. Z to lift the writ
of preliminary attachment annotated on the subject
parcels of land considering that the case had already
been closed and terminated on the basis of the
compromise agreement.
Was the writ of preliminary attachment properly lifted by
the RTC?
ANSWER:
No. Rule 57 of the Rules of Court is silent as to the length
of time within which an attachment lien continues to
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subsist after the rendition of the final judgment. However,
jurisprudence dictates that said lien continues until the
debt is paid, or the sale had under execution issued on
the judgment or until the judgment is satisfied, or the
attachment discharged or vacated in the same manner
provided by law.
Records show that while the parties have entered into a
compromise agreement which had already been
approved by the RTC, the obligations thereunder have
yet to be fully complied with particularly the total
compromise amount of P2, 351,061.80.
LIGON v. RTC
Y’s property was levied upon by virtue of a writ of
preliminary attachment in connection of action involving a
collection for sum of money filed by X. Z filed a similar
complaint in another court involving the same property.
The latter court rendered a decision in favor of Z and
ordered the Registry of Deeds to issue a new TCT free
from any lien and encumbrances after the property was
sold to the highest bidder. In effect, the earlier attachment
was not carried over to the new TCT named to the
highest bidder. Thereafter, the first court rendered a
decision in favor or X who found out of the deletion of the
earlier attachment by virtue of the second court’s order.
Did the second court commit an error?
ANSWER:
Yes. In one case (Ligon v. RTC), the Supreme Court
established that attachment is a proceeding in rem, and
hence, is against the particular property, enforceable
against the whole world. Accordingly, the attaching
creditor requires a specific lien on the attached property,
which nothing can subsequently destroy except the very
dissolution of the attachment or levy itself. Thus, a prior
registration of an attachment lien creates a preference,
such that when an attachment has been duly levied upon
a property, a purchaser thereof subsequent to the
attachment takes the property subject to the said
attachment. As provided under PD1529, said registration
operates as a form of constructive notice to all persons.
Hence, when the second court issued the said order, it
disregarded the preference of X and the order negates
the efficacy of the preliminary attachment lien and defies
the legal characterization of attachment proceedings.
BORJA v. PLATON
Petitioner Jose de Borja filed a civil case against his
parents, Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, along
with Hermogena Romero and Crisanto de Borja, seeking
to annul a second sale between Francisco and
Hermogena of a large estate. Defendants de Borja filed
an answer with five (5) counterclaims, while amending
their answers with Hermogena and Crisanto consisting of
16
counterclaims and cross-complaints. Defendants de Borja
filed their petition for preliminary attachment to cover their
third, fourth, and fifth grounds for cross-complaint without
including the first and second grounds.
Whether or not no writ of attachment can be issued in
favor of a defendant who presents a counterclaim
Whether or not an affidavit attached to the petition for a
writ of preliminary attachment is fatally defective for
failure to allege that the aggregate counterclaims do not
exceed the claims on the complaint as required in section
426, Code of Civil Procedure and Section 3 Rule 59,
Rules of Court.
ANSWER:
YES. A writ of preliminary attachment may be issued in
favor of a defendant who sets up a counterclaim. For the
purpose of the protection afforded by suc attachment, it is
immaterial whether the defendants Borja and wife simply
presented a counterclaim or brought a separate civil
action against Jose de Borja.
No. The counterclaim of Francisco de Borja and wife
exceed those of the petitioner Jose de Borja, which
amounted to P869,000, exceeding petitioner's
counterclaim by P769,000. Moreover, as the trial court
had before it the evidence adduced by both sides, the
petition for a writ of preliminary attachment having been
filed four years after the trial had begun, it is presumed
that the lower court, having in mind such evidence,
ordered the attachment accordingly.
PROFESSIONAL VIDEO INC. v. TESDA
X Technologies Inc. entered into a negotiated contract
with Y Corporation, a government agency, on which X
technologies obliged itself to deliver electronic equipment
to Y Corporation for a certain amount. Upon due date, Y
only paid 10 percent of the total contract price. After
demands went unheeded, X sued Y for sum of money
with a prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary
attachment. Y filed a motion to discharge on the ground
that public funds cannot be subject of garnishment.
Is the motion to discharge proper?
ANSWER:
Yes. The motion to discharge was proper.
Under Rule 57, Sec.1, at the commencement of the
action or at any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff
or any proper party may have the property of the adverse
party attached as security for the satisfaction of any
judgment that may be recovered in the following cases:
(a) In an action for the recovery of a specified amount
of money or damages, other than moral and
exemplary, on a cause of action arising from law,
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contract, quasi-contract, delict or quasi-delict against
a party who is about to depart from the Philippines
which intent to defraud his creditors.
In a case decided by the Supreme Court, it was
established that public funds cannot be the object of
garnishment proceedings even if the consent to be sued
had been previously granted by the State. In the present
case, the fund of Y Corporation is a fund public in nature
and cannot be subject to a writ of preliminary attachment
which is a garnishment proceeding. Thus, the motion to
discharge was proper.
OLSEN v. OLSEN
A was president treasurer of the P corporation. A while
occupying the said position appropriated funds to his own
without authority nor any loans or security, which resulted
to him owning a house. It was then held by the lower
court that A’s unlawful spending and appropriation of
funds to his account without any loans or security even if
approved is unjust. In result thereof, A’s house was
attached by virtue of a writ of preliminary attachment.
Was the attachment proper?
ANSWER:
Yes, the attachment is proper.
Sec. 1 (b) of Rule 57 provides that, a writ of preliminary
attachment may issue in an action for money or property
embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to his
own use by a public officer, or an officer of a corporation
or an attorney, factor, broker, agent or clerk in the course
of his employment as such, or by any other person in a
fiduciary capacity, or for willful violation of duty.
In the present case A has almost an exclusive control
over the function of the corporation and its funds on
account of his triple capacity as president, treasurer and
general manager must be very scrupulous in the
application of the funds of said corporation to his own use.
The act of taking money of the corporation for his
personal use without being duly authorized therefor
constitutes such an irregularity that, while it does not
amount to a criminal fraud, is undoubtedly a fraud of a
civil character, because it is an abuse of confidence and
constitutes a ground for the issuance of a preliminary
attachment.
NG WEE v. TANKIANSEE
X invested in a financial company. Upon the discovery of
the financial condition of the company, X instituted a civil
case for damages before RTC and impleaded Y, who
works as vice – chairman and director of the company,
and other parties as defendant. Trial court ordered the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the
properties of the defendants on the basis of the
17
allegations in the complaint and Affidavit of petitioner. Y
and other defendants moved for discharge of the writ but
it was denied until it reach finality of judgment. CA, on a
petition filed by Y, reversed the decision of RTC and lifted
the writ to the extent of the properties of Y based on the
grounds that general and sweeping allegation of fraud is
not sufficient basis for the issuance of writ.
Was the CA correct in lifting the writ?
ANSWER:
Yes.
Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. -
At the commencement of the action or at any time before
entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may
have the property of the adverse party attached as
security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be
recovered in the following cases:
xxx
(d) In an action against a party who has been
guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or incurring
the obligation upon which the action is brought, or
in the performance thereof.
For a writ of attachment to issue under this rule, the
applicant must sufficiently show the factual circumstances
of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be
inferred from the debtor's mere non-payment of the debt
or failure to comply with his obligation. The applicant
must then be able to demonstrate that the debtor has
intended to defraud the creditor.
In the instant case, X’s Affidavit is bereft of any factual
statement that respondent committed a fraud. It has not
shown any specific act or deed to support the allegation
that respondent is guilty of fraud. The affidavit, being the
foundation of the writ, must contain such particulars as to
how the fraud imputed to respondent was committed for
the court to decide whether or not to issue the writ.
Absent any statement of other factual circumstances to
show that respondent, at the time of contracting the
obligation, had a preconceived plan or intention not to
pay, or without any showing of how respondent
committed the alleged fraud, the general averment in the
affidavit that respondent is an officer and director of the
company who allegedly connived with the other
defendants to commit a fraud, is insufficient to support
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
LIBERTY INSURANCE v. CA
FCY CONSTRUCTION v. CA
Y filed a complaint for collection of sum of money with
preliminary attachment against X. The former alleged that
the latter were guilty of fraud in their joint venture
agreement over the Tandang Sora Commonwealth
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Flyover government project, for which Y had provided
funds and construction materials. Y was asking for its half
share in the collections received as well as those yet to
be received. The lower court issued an Order for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
Subsequently, X moved for the lifting thereof and argued
that Y’s principal witness admitted that it was the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) that
induced it to deliver materials and cash for the Tandang
Sora Commonwealth Flyover project.
Is the writ of preliminary attachment irregularly issued
inasmuch as there was no evidence of fraud in incurring
the obligations sued upon?
ANSWER:
No. As anchored upon Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the
Revised Rules of Court, " A plaintiff or any proper party
may, at the commencement of the action or at any time
thereafter, have the property of the adverse party
attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment
that may be recovered in the following cases: . . . (d) In
an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in
contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon
which the action is brought, or in concealing or disposing
of the property for the taking, detention or conversion of
which the action is brought..." Moreover, case law
instructs that, to sustain an attachment on this ground, it
must be shown that the debtor in contracting the debt or
incurring the obligation intended to defraud the creditor.
The fraud must relate to the execution of the agreement
and must have been the reason which induced the other
party into giving consent which he would not have
otherwise given. The fraud should be committed upon
contracting the obligation sued upon.
In the case at bar, it readily shows that said reassurance
from the DPWH officials came, not at the inception of the
obligation or contract, but during its performance.
Furthermore, “the inducement was the mouth-watering
temptation of a DPWH promise of a 'new project after the
Tandang Sora Flyover project will be finished"' is clearly
off-tangent as such inducement, if any, came not at the
inception of the obligation. On the other hand, the fraud of
which Y are accused of and which was the basis for the
issuance of the questioned attachment, is fraud alleged to
have been committed upon contracting the obligation
sued upon.
Thus, the writ was regularly issued since evidence of
fraud in incurring the obligations sued upon was properly
established.
METRO INC. v. LARA’S GIFTS
After X enticed Y to help them in their export business, a
contract was made wherein Y agreed to sell exclusively
through X for their US buyers. However, when orders
increased, X ceased remitting Y’s shares and transacted
business directly with their foreign buyers.
18
Y filed a complaint for a sum of money with prayer for
preliminary attachment against X on the ground of fraud.
Should the court grant the writ of preliminary attachment?
ANSWER:
Yes.
Under Section 1, Rule 57, at the commencement of the
action or at any time before the entry of judgment, the
plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of the
adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of
any judgment the may be recovered in the following
cases:
xxxxx
d. In an action against a party guilty of fraud in
contracting the debt or incurring the obligation, upon
which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof;
In this case, X induced Y to do business with it.
Eventually, when sales increased, X abandoned their
contractual obligations by stopping its remittances and
eventually selling directly to its US buyers, to the damage
of Y. X is therefore guilty of fraud in incurring the
obligation.
Therefore, the court should grant the writ of preliminary
attachment.
REPUBLIC v. ESTATE OF LIM
Republic X filed a case against Y and Z. before the
Sandiganbayan a suit to recover ill-gotten wealth.
Republic X alleged that Y and Z were in unlawful
collusion with V in unjustly enriching themselves at the
expense of the Republic and the Filipino people. When Y
passed away, his estate filed a motion to lift sequestration
over certain properties contending that Y secured title
over almost all his real properties long before V came to
power.
Sandiganbayan lifted the sequestration order in question.
Subsequently, Republic X filed a Motion for the issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment against the estate of
Y in the amount of its claim. Republic X alleged that Y
and Z were guilty of fraud in incurring various legal
obligations which the present action has been brought.
The Sandiganbayan, however, denied the said motion
stating that bare allegations of the commission of fraud by
Y and Z in incurring said obligations are not sufficient for
the granting of the writ of preliminary attachment.
Was the denial of the writ of preliminary attachment
proper?
ANSWER:
No. Section 1[d], Rule 57provides:
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SECTION 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue.
A plaintiff or any proper party may, at the commencement
of the action or at any time thereafter, have the property
of the adverse party attached as security for the
satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the
following cases:
x x x
(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of
fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation
upon which the action is brought, or in concealing or
disposing of the property for the taking, detention or
conversion of which the action is brought;
For a writ of attachment to issue under the above-quoted
rule, the applicant must sufficiently show the factual
circumstances of the alleged fraud.
In the case at bar, the Republic X has sufficiently
discharged the burden of demonstrating the commission
of fraud committed by Y et. al. as a condition sine qua
non for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
The main supporting proving document is the Republic's
Exhibit "B" which the Sandiganbayan unqualifiedly
admitted in evidence. And the fraud or fraudulent scheme
principally came in the form of Y et. al. holding and/or
operating logging concessions which far exceeded the
allowable area prescribed under the 1973 Constitution.
Hence, such denial was improper.
FOUNDATION SPECIALIST INC. v. BETONVAL
ABOITIZ v. COTABATO
X Bus Company owed Y a sum of money, which X
defaulted in payment. Y filed a collection of money and
asked for a writ of preliminary attachment. A writ of
attachment was issued ex-parte by the Court. By virtue of
the writ, the sheriff attached the personal properties of the
X bus company consisting of buses, machinery and
equipment. The several buses attached are nearly junks.
However, upon permission by the sheriff, five of them
were repaired, but they were substituted with five buses
which were also in the same condition as the five
repaired ones before the repair. The ground for the
issuance of the writ is alleged in the complaint which
states that X company has removed or disposed its
properties or assets, or is about to do so, with intent to
defraud Y.
Is the issuance of the writ on the ground of insolvency
proper?
ANSWER:
No, the issuance of the writ is not proper.
19

Sec. 1(e) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court provides for the
grounds upon which attachment may be issued, at the
commencement of the action or at any time before entry
of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the
property of the adverse party attached as security for the
satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in an
action against a party who has removed or disposed of
his property, or is about to do so, with intent to defraud
his creditor.
In the case at bar, the removal of the buses was for repair
and it was substituted by another buses. This cannot be
the removal intended as ground for the issuance of a writ
of attachment under section 1 (e), Rule 57, of the Rules
of Court. The repair of the five buses was evidently
motivated by a desire to serve the interest of the riding
public, clearly not to defraud Y Company. Hence, the
issuance of the writ is not proper.
MIALILHE v. DE LENCQUESAING
X filed a criminal complaint for estafa against Y, a consul
of the Philippines, in relation to an alleged
misappropriation of an amount by Y as the Administrator
of their co-owned properties. 2 days after filing the
complaint, X flew back to Paris, the City of her residence.
An extensive news item about it appeared in the
newspaper stating that Y, a consul of the Philippines had
been charged with Estafa by X. Y then filed a complaint
against X for damages sustained by him by reason of the
filing by X of a criminal complaint of estafa, alleging that
such complaint is solely for the purpose of embarrassing
Y thereby damaging his reputation. Y likewise prayed for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment of the
real properties of X on the ground that "X is a non-
resident of the Philippines", pursuant to paragraph (f),
Section 1, Rule 57.
If you were the judge, will you grant the writ of preliminary
attachment?
ANSWER:
No. I will not grant the writ of preliminary attachment.
Under the Rules of Court, specifically Paragraph F of
Rule 57 section 1 states that attachment may be issued:
(f) In an action against a party who resides out of the
Philippines, or on whom summons may be served by
publication.
However, Sec 3 of Rule 57 provides: An order of
attachment shall be granted only when it appears by the
affidavit of the applicant, or of some other person who
personally knows the facts, that a sufficient cause of
action exists, that the case is one of those mentioned in
section 1 hereof, that there is no other sufficient security
for the claim sought to be enforced by the action, and that
the amount due to the applicant, or the value of the
property the possession of which he is entitled to recover,
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is as much as the sum for which the order is granted
above all legal counterclaims.
In this case, while X resides out of the Philippines, the
action for damages by Y arose from a delict and quasi
delict the amount of which is uncertain. Because of the
uncertainty of the amount of Y's claim for damages, it
cannot be said that said claim is over and above all legal
counterclaims that X may have against Y. This is one of
the indispensable requirements for the issuance of a writ
of attachment which should be stated in the affidavit of
applicant as required in Sec. 3 of Rule 57.
Therefore, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment should be denied.
TOLEDO v. BURGOS
An action for delivery of personal property was filed by A
against B but was subsequently denied. A, subsequently
applied for a writ of attachment alleging that B has
removed and has disposed or is about dispose of her
property within intent to defraud A. To support the
allegation, an affidavit of C was attached to the
application stating that B offered to sell to him 2 motor
vehicles. The Trial Court Judge denied the application
without prior hearing and notice.
Is the denial proper?
ANSWER:
Yes. Rule 57, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
Sec. 2. Issuance and contents of order. – An order of
attachment may be issued either ex-parte or upon motion
with notice and hearing by the court in which the action is
pending, or by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court xxx
The judge before whom the application is made has full
discretion in considering the supporting evidence
proffered by the applicant. And in dealing with the
affidavit of petitioner, the respondent judge was
empowered to decide whether or not such should be
given credit.
The judge acted correctly in denying A’s application for
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
PHIL. BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS v. CA
X filed for collection of sum of money with prayer for the
issuance of writ of preliminary attachment against Y on
which the writ was granted by the judge. The Motion for
Attachment on which the judge solely relied upon states
that the case is based on the failure of defendant to remit
the proceeds, that such failure is a violation of trust
receipt law which constitutes estafa (fraud), that there
20
exist valid ground for embezzlement or fraudulent
misapplication of money, that the issuance is urgent
because there exists no sufficient security for the
satisfaction of any judgement, and that the plaintiff is
willing to post a bond as required by the Rules of Court.
Is the issuance proper?
ANSWER:
No, as provided for by the Rules of Court, an order of
attachment shall be granted only when it appears by the
affidavit of the applicant that a sufficient cause of action
exists. In one case (PBCOM v. CA), the SC held that a
mere reproduction of the rules, without more, cannot
serve as good ground for issuing a writ of attachment. An
order of attachment cannot be issued on a general
averments, such as one ceremoniously quoting from a
pertinent rule. Furthermore, it is well-established that
fraud cannot be presumed.
Here, the judge only relied on the motion that is just filled
with general averments. The contents are mere
reproduction of provisions of law. There are no
substantiation or factual allegations on the acts that
constitute the alleged fraud. Since, fraud cannot be
presumed and there is the absence of substantiation, the
judge committed an error.
REPUBLIC v. GARCIA
The Republic of the Philippines applied for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary attachment against Major X before
the Sandiganbayan. The Republic said that it being a
sovereign political entity, it was exempt from filing the
said attachment bond. Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan
still required the posting of the required bond invoking
there was nothing in the Rules of Court that said the
Republic was exempted.
Did the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion when it rejected the Republic's claim of
exemption?
A: Yes, the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion.
Section 3. Affidavit and bond required. — An order of
attachment shall be granted only when it appears by the
affidavit of the applicant, or of some other person who
personally knows the facts, that a sufficient cause of
action exists, that the case is one of those mentioned in
section 1 hereof, that there is no other sufficient security
for the claim sought to be enforced by the action, and that
the amount due to the applicant, or the value of the
property the possession of which he is entitled to recover,
is as much as the sum for which the order is granted
above all legal counterclaims. The affidavit, and the bond
required by the next succeeding section, must be duly
filed with the court before the order issues. (3a)
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Section 4. Condition of applicant's bond. — The party
applying for the order must thereafter give a bond
executed to the adverse party in the amount fixed by the
court in its order granting the issuance of the writ,
conditioned that the latter will pay all the costs which may
be adjudged to the adverse party and all damages which
he may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court
shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled
thereto.
Under Secs. 3 and 4 of Rule 57 of Rules of Court, before
a writ of attachment may issue, a bond must first be filed
to answer for all costs which may be adjudged to the
adverse party and for the damages he may sustain by
reason of the attachment. However, this rule does not
cover the State. Jurisprudence dictates the State as
represented by the government is exempt from filing an
attachment bond on the theory that it is always solvent.
(Meaning, the State is always able to carry out its
obligations)
The Sandiganbayan did not apply well-established
principle laid down by jurisprudence. The State timely
invoked the exemption because it knows it can invoke
based on the established principles. It is true, as provided
for by the rules, that the bond is made to answer to the
cost and damages which the defendant may sustain by
reason of attachment. Nonetheless, the State is always
solvent. Thus, it could always pay the cost and damages
if warranted.
SPOUSES TIU v. VILLAR
X filed a complaint for Sum of Money and Damages with
prayer for preliminary attachment (PA) against Y before
Pasay RTC. RTC granted the prayer and ordered
issuance of writ of PA. Such writ was addressed to Sheriff
Z. Sherriff Z served it and attached the properties of Y. Y
moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of
improper venue.
RTC granted the motion and ordered the release of the
attached properties of Y. RTC directed Sherriff Z to
immediately return to Y the seized items. Sheriff Z
submitted his sheriff’s report with urgent prayer for the
issuance of Clarificatory Order whether to await for the
court’s order to attain finality before returning the
properties. Y filed an administrative complaint against
Sheriff Z for his alleged act of not immediately returning
the attached properties.
Is the sheriff administratively liable?
ANSWER:
Sec. 19: Disposition of attached property where
judgment is for party against whom attachment was
issued. – if judgment be rendered against the attaching
party, all the proceeds of sales and money collected or
received by the sheriff, under the order of attachment,
and all property attached remaining in any such officers
21
hands, shall be delivered to the party against whom
attachment was issued, and the order of attachment
discharged.
In the instant case, the sheriff had no discretion to wait for
the finality of the court’s order of dismissal before
discharging the order of attachment. Nevertheless, the
sheriff showed no deliberate defiance of, or disobedience
to the court’s order of release. The filing of a clarificatory
order does not constitute or amount to administrative
liability because the sheriff merely consulted with the
court before taking action.
SABERON v. VENTANILLA
Y entered into a contract to sell of a parcel of land with A,
which Y paid a partial amount of the purchase price to A.
A however sold the same subject land to B without the
knowledge of Y. When Y discovered the fictitious
transaction he filed for an annulment of sale for the
subject land between A & B.
The court decided in favor of Y, thus Y moved for the
issuance of writ of execution. The writ was issued on May
3, 1991 and served upon A on May 9, 1991 and a notice
of levy was annotated in the title of A on May 31, 1991.
However the subject land was sold to X and the sale was
registered on May 21, 1991, 10 days before the notice of
levy. X then resold the land to Z. Z claims he found no
encumbrances or annotations on the title, thus he is a
purchaser in good faith and for value.
Whether or not the registration of the notice of levy had
produced constructive notice that would bind the 3rd
persons despite the failure of RD to annotate the same in
the certificates of title?
ANSWER:
Yes, the levy of a judgment debtor creates a lien, which
nothing can subsequently destroy except the very
dissolution of the attachment of the levy itself.
Prior registration of the lien creates a preference, since
the act of registration is the operative act to convey and
affect the land. Said lien continues until the debt is paid or
the sale is had under an execution issued on the
judgment or until the judgment is satisfied or the
attachment is discharged or vacated in the same manner
provided by law.
Under no law is it stated that an attachment shall be
discharge upon sale of the property other than under
execution.
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G.B. INC. v. SANCHEZ
X secured a loan from Y and promised, under an
“agreement to sell”, to transfer to Y his land. Instead of
conveying the land, X sold the same to Z in order to pay
his wife’s gambling debt.
Y filed a complaint against X for the collection of his
indebtedness with a prayer asking for the issuance ex
parte of a writ of preliminary attachment. The court
granted it.
Before the issues have been joined (X not having as yet
filed his answer to the complaint), X filed a motion to
discharge attachment on the ground that the attachment
was improperly issued.
Rule on the motion to discharge.
ANSWER:
The motion to discharge attachment should not be
granted.
Under Sec. 12 of Rule 57, After a writ of attachment has
been enforced, the party whose property has been
attached, or the person appearing on his behalf, may
move for the discharge of the attachment wholly or in part
on the security given. The court shall, after due notice
and hearing, order the discharge of the attachment if the
movant makes a cash deposit, or files a counter-bond
executed to the attaching party with the clerk of the court
where the application is made, in an amount equal to that
fixed by the court in the order of attachment, exclusive of
costs.
In the case at bar, the hearings of motion to discharge
attachment were held before the issues have been joined
(X not having yet filed his answer to the complaint), and
the order issued thereby discharging the attachment
would have the effect of deciding or prejudicing the main
action.
The merits of the main action are not triable in a motion to
discharge an attachment, otherwise an applicant for the
dissolution could force a trial of the merits of the case on
this motion.
INSULAR SAVINGS BANK v. CA
X instituted an Arbitration Case against Y. The dispute
between the parties involved three [unfunded] checks
with a total value of P25,200,000.00. X instituted a Civil
Case in RTC Makati and prayed for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment. RTC Makati issued an Order
granting the application.
During the hearing before the Arbitration Committee X
and Y agreed to temporarily divide between them the
disputed amount of P25,200,000.00 while the dispute has
22
not yet been resolved. As a result, the sum of
P12,600,000.00 is in the possession of X.
Y filed a motion to discharge attachment by counter-bond
in the amount of P12,600,000.00. The judge denied the
motion and issued an Order that the counter-bond should
be in the amount of P27,237,700.00.
Is the denial of the motion to discharge attachment over
secured portion proper?
ANSWER:
No. The denial of the motion to discharge attachment
over secured portion was not proper.
Under Sec. 12 of Rule 57, After a writ of attachment has
been enforced, the party whose property has been
attached, or the person appearing on his behalf, may
move for the discharge of the attachment wholly or in part
on the security given. The court shall, after due notice
and hearing, order the discharge of the attachment if the
movant makes a cash deposit, or files a counter-bond
executed to the attaching party with the clerk of the court
where the application is made, in an amount equal to that
fixed by the court in the order of attachment, exclusive of
costs.
In the case at bar, X’s principal claim against Y
immediately prior to the filing of the motion to discharge
attachment has effectively been pruned down to
P12,600,000.00 from the P25,200,000.00 originally
granted and fixed by the court. Accordingly, it should
have allowed a total discharge of the attachment on a
counter-bond based on the reduced claim of X. If a
portion of the claim is already secured, there is no
justifiable reason why such portion should still be subject
of counter-bond. Thus, the denial of the motion to
discharge was not proper.
UNITED PULP AND PAPER CORP. v. AEROPOLIS
X Company filed a case for collection of sum of some
money against A and B. X Company then prayed for the
writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of A
and B. A and B later filed a Motion for the Discharge of
Attachment and be allowed to post counter-bond. Y
Company (Surety) then issued the Defendant’s Bond for
the dissolution of attachment in favor of A and B.
Thereafter, X Company, A and B executed a
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT wherein the latter
acknowledged their obligation to pay a certain amount to
the former. However, A and B failed to pay the entire
obligation which caused X Company to move for the
execution for the remaining balance. Unfortunately for X
Company, A and B had no longer any funds available for
garnishment as their assets were already exhausted by
their creditors. Because of such fact X Company filed a
motion to order Y Company, the Surety, to pay the
amount of the counter-bond, RTC granted the motion. Y
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
Company refused to pay were it reasoned that its
obligation had been discharged by virtue of the novation
of its obligation pursuant to the compromise agreement
executed by X Company with A and B.
Is Y Company Correct in not paying the counter-bond?
ANSWER:
No. Sec. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving
counterbond.
After a writ of attachment has been enforced, the party
whose property has been attached, or the person
appearing on his behalf, may move for the discharge of
the attachment wholly or in part on the security given.
The court shall, after due notice and hearing, order the
discharge of the attachment if the movant makes a cash
deposit, or files a counter-bond executed to the attaching
party with the clerk of the court where the application is
made, in an amount equal to that fixed by the court in the
order of attachment, exclusive of costs.
But if the attachment is sought to be discharged with
respect to a particular property, the counter-bond shall be
equal to the value of that property as determined by the
court. In either case, the cash deposit or the counter-
bond shall secure the payment of any judgment that the
attaching party may recover in the action. A notice of the
deposit shall forth with be served on the attaching party.
Upon the discharge of an attachment in accordance with
the provisions of this section, the property attached, or
the proceeds of any sale thereof, shall be delivered to the
party making the deposit or giving the counter-bond, or to
the person appearing on his behalf, the deposit or
counter-bond aforesaid standing in place of the property
so released. Should such counter-bond for any reason to
be found to be or become insufficient, and the party
furnishing the same fail to file an additional counter-bond,
the attaching party may apply for a new order of
attachment.
In the case at bar, whether the judgment be rendered
after trial on the merits or upon compromise, such
judgment undoubtedly may be made effective upon the
property released; and since the counter bond merely
stands in the place of such property, there is no reason
why the judgment should not be made effective against
the counter bond regardless of the manner how the
judgment was obtained. The liability of the sureties was
fixed and conditioned on the finality of the judgment
rendered regardless of whether the decision was based
on the consent of the parties or on the merits.
A judgment entered on a stipulation is nonetheless a
judgment of the court because consented to by the
parties.
23
 RURAL BANK OF STA. BARBARA v. MANILA
MISSION OF CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST
Spouses S sold a parcel of land to the Church Christ,
meanwhile Bank X filed a complaint for sum of money
against spouses S. However, the transfer of certificate of
title between the transaction of Spouses S and the
Church of Christ was not automatically issued in favor of
the latter, which would later cause Bank X to file a petition
for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment,
which was granted, over the property of Spouses S which
was already sold to the Church of Christ. Church of Christ
executed an affidavit claiming title and ownership over
the subject property, and requested the Ex-Officio
Provincial and City Sheriff to release the said property
from attachment.
However, the Sheriff, advised the Church of Christ to file
a motion directly with the RTC which was later filed as a
MOTION TO RELEASE PROPERTY FROM
ATTACHMENT. RTC granted the release of the property
from attachment. Bank X argues the release was
improper such that it was not the proper remedy under
Section 14, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, such that the
remedy of a third person claiming to be the owner of an
attached property are limited to the following: 1.) filing
with the Sheriff a third-party claim, in the form of an
affidavit, per the first paragraph of Section 14; 2.)
intervening in the main action, with prior leave of court,
per second paragraph of Section 14 3.) filing an
independent action, per second paragraph of Section 14,
which allows a third person to vindicate his/her claim to
the attached property in a separate action.
Is Bank X Correct?
ANSWER:
No, Bank X is not correct.
In the case at bar, The filing of the MOTION TO
RELEASE THE PROPERTY FROM ATTACHMENT in
question can be deemed as a mere continuation of the
third-party claim of respondent, in the form of its Affidavit
of Title and Ownership, served upon the Sheriff, in accord
with the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 57 of the
Rules of Court.
Sec. 14. Proceedings where property claimed by third
person.
If the property attached is claimed by any person other
than the party against whom attachment had been issued
or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his
title thereto, or right to the possession thereof, stating the
grounds of such right or title, and serves such affidavit
upon the sheriff while the latter has possession of the
attached party, and a copy thereof upon the attaching
party, the sheriff shall not be bound to keep the property
under attachment, unless the attaching party or his agent,
on demand of the sheriff, shall file a bond approved by
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum
not less than the value of the property levied upon.
Further, The Court also considered the MOTION TO
RELEASE PROPERTY FROM ATTACHMENT, filed by
the Church of Christ Motion for Intervention in Civil
pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 14, Rule 57.
Respondent has the personality to intervene, as it "is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court or
of an officer thereof".
The sheriff shall not be liable for damages for the taking
or keeping of such property, to any such third-party
claimant, if such bond shall be filed. Nothing herein
contained such prevent such claimant or any third person
from vindicating his claim to the property, or prevent the
attaching party from claiming damages against a third-
party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious
claim, in the same or a separate action.
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE v. CUENCA
X filed a case against A and B for collection of sum of
money with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment. X posted an applicant’s bond.
The sheriff then levied upon the equipment, supplies,
materials and various other personal property belonging
to Z Inc. that were found in the leased corporate office-
cum-commissary or kitchen of the corporation where A
and B are stockholders. A and B filed motion to Dismiss
and to Quash Writ of Preliminary Attachment, which was
granted by the Court. However the properties attached
that were safety kept in the warehouse was damaged. A
and B then claimed for damages for the damaged
properties of Z Inc.
Will the claim for damages by A and B prosper.
ANSWER:
No, the claim for damages will not prosper.
Section 20 of Rule 57 provides for the claim for damages
on account of improper, irregular or excessive attachment
may be claimed by the party against whom the
attachment was issued. However this must be filed in
accordance to Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court that
requires a real party in interest, one who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or one
who is entitled to the avails of the suit. A person , to be a
real party in interest in whose name an action must be
prosecuted, should appear to be the present real owner
of the right sought to be enforced, that is, his interest
must be a present substantial interest, not a mere
expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest. Rule on real party in interest
ensures, that the party with the legal right to sue brings
the action, and this interest ends when a judgment
24
involving the nominal plaintiff will protect the defendant
from a subsequent identical action

There is no dispute that the properties subject to the levy

on attachment belonged to Z Inc. alone, not to A and B in
their own right. They were only stockholders of Z Inc.,
which had a personality distinct and separate from that of
any or all of them. The damages occasioned to the
properties by the levy on attachment, wrongful or not,
prejudiced Z Inc., not them. As such, only Z Inc. had the
right under the substantive law to claim and recover such
damages. Therefore, A and B cannot claim for damages.

EQUITABLE BANKING CORP v. SPECIAL STEEL

Company A sold to company B welding electrodes,

company B issued 3 checks as payment through its
employee, X who did not give the payment to company A.
A demanded for the payment but B countered that they
already paid.

A case was filed and B was ordered to pay, which B paid

but without including the interest for they argued that the
default was not due to their fault. Company A filed a case
for damages and asked for a writ of preliminary
attachment, which was granted by the court. Despite the
uncertainty with respect to company B’s participation with
their employee’s fraud, company A obtained a preliminary
attachment of B’s properties on the ground of fraud.
Company B filed a motion and it was sustained by the
court, B then claimed for damage for its goodwill and
good credit for the wrongful preliminary attachment.

Should the claim for damages by B be granted?

ANSWER:

No, the claim for damages by should not be granted.

Sec. 20 of Rule 57 provides that the party against whom

the attachment was issued may claim for damages on
account of improper, irregular or excessive attachment.
However, one is only entitled to such damages as its
evidence would allow. The wrongfulness of an
attachment does not automatically warrant the award of
damages.

In the case at bar the company B still has the burden of

proving the nature and extent of the injury that is suffered
by reason of the wrongful preliminary attachment.
Company B failed to prove that it sustained damage to its
“goodwill and business credit” in consequence of the
alleged wrongful attachment. There was no proof of B’s
contention that A’s actions caused it public
embarrassment. Hence, B cannot claim for damages.

UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS

SCHOOL OF LAW 25
 RULE 58: PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
LIMITLESS POTENTIALS v. CA
XYZ Company filed a case against ABC Company at
MeTC of Makati City. On the other hand, ABC Company
filed a Third-Party Complaint against E corporation, F,
and G at the same court. The latter filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the Third-Party Complaint, but it was denied
by the MeTC of Makati City.
Thereafter, E,F, and G filed a Petition for Certiorari with
Prayer for preliminary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction before the RTC of Makati City
assailing the denial of the motion to dismiss. The RTC
granted the writ of preliminary injunction, conditioned
upon the posting of an injunction bond, but it dismissed
the said writ of the E, F and G.
ABC company then filed a Motion for Judgment Against
the Bond, arguing that the attorney's fees, litigation costs,
and cost of delay by reason of the injunction are proper
and valid items of damages which can be claimed against
the injunction bond but was denied by the RTC for the
preliminary injunction was not wrongfully obtained. Hence,
the claim for damages on the bond is untenable.
Can ABC Company recover damages from the injunction
bond?
ANSWER:
Yes. Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure provides:
Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the
court where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond
executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to
be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will
pay to such party or person all damages which he may
sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary
restraining order if the court should finally decide that the
applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the
requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be
issued.
The aforesaid provision of law clearly provides that the
injunction bond is answerable for all damages.
NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE VIRGILIO
ALMARIO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
A and B decided to team up and nominated 3 persons for
an award, which was recommended to P. C filed a
petition for prohibition, certiorari and injunction against
the awarding of the 3 persons, alleging that P committed
grave abuse of discretion for it was not within her power
to award such persons.
Is the remedy taken proper?
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
ANSWER:
No, it is not proper.
Section 1 of Rule 58 provides that a preliminary injunction
is an order granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a
party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a
particular act or acts. It may also require the performance
of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known
as a preliminary mandatory injunction. It has been held
that the remedies of prohibition and injunction are
preventive, and such, cannot be availed of to restrain an
act that is already fait accompli. This will already be moot.
In this case, this remedy is not proper for the act of
awarding the persons have already been committed.
Hence, the remedy is not proper for it has become moot.
LUKANG v. PAGBILAO
A and B are husband and wife with three children. A
cohabited with C whom he had ten children. During their
cohabitation, A and C acquired several real properties.
When A died, his thirteen children, B, and C executed a
settlement which they agreed to adjudicate and transfer
among themselves the rights, interest, and ownership of
the real properties.
Many transactions transpired until X Development
Corporation purchased from C some properties.
Annotations were carried over in X Development
Corporation’s title. Upon learning the sale of the
properties to X, the other heirs filed a motion to require C
to explain why they sold the properties without permission
from the court. The other heirs also filed an application for
a writ of preliminary injunction with ex-parte prayer for
temporary restraining order (TRO).
They alleged that they were in actual and physical
possession of the properties sold, and that X
Development Corporation entered into the properties
without their consent. The Regional Trial Court granted
the application for writ of preliminary injunction and
granted the issuance of the TRO by which it restrained
from wresting possession of the subject properties. The
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court.
Was the ruling of the Court of Appeals proper?
ANSWER:
No, the ruling of the Court of Appeals is not proper.
Under Section 3 of Rule 58, a preliminary injunction may
be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded,
and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining
the commission or continuance of the act or acts
26
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act
or acts either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-
performance of the act or acts complained of during the
litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing,
threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done some act or acts probably in violation
of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the
action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual. (3a)
While a clear showing of the right is necessary, its
existence need not be conclusively established. Hence,
to be entitled to the writ, it is sufficient that the
complainant shows that he has an ostensible right to the
final relief. In the present case, the grant of injunction by
the RTC is in order. The other heirs were able to
convince the RTC that they had a right over the
properties which should be protected while being litigated.
Convinced, the RTC made a preliminary determination
that their right should be protected by a writ of preliminary
injunction. Their claimed ownership and actual
possession were then being violated by X Development
Corporation which had started entering the premises and
preparing the property for the construction of a power
plant for liquefied natural gas.
Unless legally stopped, such act would indeed cause
irreparable damage to the petitioner and other claimants.
As claimed co-owners, the B and the other heirs have the
right to remain in possession of the subject properties
pendente lite. The legal or practical remedy of X
Development Corp. who gambled its lot in purchasing the
properties despite the annotations, is to await the final
outcome of the cases or to amicably settle its problems
with all the co-owners, co-heirs or claimants.
VINUYA v. ROMULO
A, et al. are all members of an organization established
for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by
Japanese military forces in the PH during the 2nd World
War. A, et al. claim that they have approached the
Executive Department requesting assistance in filing a
claim against Japanese officials who ordered the
establishment of the “comfort women” stations in the PH.
However, officials of the Executive Department declined
to assist A, et al.
A, et al. asked the courts to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction against the Executive Department to conduct
foreign relations with Japan in a certain manner. The
court ruled in the negative.
Was the court correct?
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
ANSWER:
Yes, A and company were not entitled to injunction.
In pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 58, a preliminary
injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded,
and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining
the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act
or acts either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-
performance of the act or acts complained of during the
litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing,
threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done some act or acts probably in violation
of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the
action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual. (3a)
It is basic that the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court, conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive
right of the applicant which should be protected. It is an
extraordinary, peremptory remedy available only on the
grounds expressly provided by law, specifically Section 3,
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
Here, the Constitution has entrusted to the Executive
Department the conduct of foreign relations for the
Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners' claim
against the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive
determination and judgment of the Executive Department.
The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of
the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive
Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive
Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to
conduct our foreign relations with Japan in a certain
manner.
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF BAGUIO v.
JADEWELL
City B and Company J entered into an agreement
whereby the latter would provide and install parking
system around the city. A disagreement between the
parties occured which resulted to the rescinding of the
MOA. City B also issued a resolution banning J from
operating in the city. J filed several cases against B,
including a petition for Certiorari and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. The RTC granted the Writ of Injunction and
was upheld by the CA.
Was the issuance of the writ proper?
27
ANSWER:
Yes. Sec. 3, Rule 58 of the ROC provides the grounds
for issuance of Preliminary Injunction, which are: (a)the
applicant is entitled to the relief demanded and the whole
or part of such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the act or acts complained
of, or requiring the performance of an act or acts either for
a limited period or perpetually; (b) the commission,
continuance or non-performance of the act or acts
complained od6 during the litigation would probably work
injustice to the applicant.
In the present case, since there is still a pending case
between the parties with regards to their MOA. The
granting of the Preliminary Injunction is only proper since
J is entitled to the relief because he might continue to
suffer from the act of City B and the continuance or non-
performance of the act complained of would work
injustice to J.
SEMIRARA COAL v. HGL DEVELOPMENT
P was granted by the Department of Energy (DOE) of a
Coal Operating Contract. PR was granted a Forest Land
Grazing Lease Agreement over the entire Island of
Semirara, Antique. P requested an access for its trucks
and other equipment to pass through the property
covered by the FLGLA. PR granted the access with the
condition that P would not violate the Forest Land
Grazing Lease agreement. P however violated the
condition which prompted PR to file a complaint with writ
of preliminary injunction against PR, which the lower
court granted.
Was the lower court correct in granting the writ?
ANSWER:
Yes, the lower court was correct in granting the Writ.
The law provides that A writ of mandatory injunction is
granted upon a showing that:
1. The invasion of the right is material and substantial;
2. The right of complainant is clear and unmistakable;
and
3. There is an urgent and permanent necessity for the
writ to prevent serious damage
In the present case, PR, who was granted the FLGLA,
has a clear and unmistakable right to the possession of
the subject property. Thus, being the lawful possessor,
PR is entitled to protection of its possession of the subject
property and any disturbance of its possession is a valid
ground for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction in its favor. The issuance of a writ of mandatory
injunction is necessary for PR stands to suffer material
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
and substantial injury as a result of petitioner's continuous
intrusion into the subject property.
CHINA BANKING CORP. v. CO
Petitioner spouses bought a lot from Petitioner
Corporation which was commonly bounded by the lot of
respondent. Subsequently respondent entered into a joint
venture with Respondent Corporation wherein they
constructed a perimeter wall, which was opposed by
petitioners via written demand alleging that such was a
road lot thus the wall is blocking their ingress and egress.
Petitioner was remained unheeded which prompted them
to file for an injunction with a prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction which was later on changed to writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction alleging that the
perimeter wall was almost finished, which was denied
since upon ocular the court found out that such was
impossible to be a road lot with the surrounding
circumstances.
Is the court correct in denying the writ?
ANSWER:
Yes, the court is correct.
The law so provides that for an injunction to issue it must
be established that:
(a) Applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the
whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the act or acts complained
of (PRELIMINARY), or in requiring the performance of an
act or acts (MANDATORY);
(b) The commission, continuance or non-performance of
the act or acts complained of during the litigation would
probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) A party, court, agency or a person is doing,
threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in
violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render
the judgment ineffectual.
In the present case, the applicant was not able to
establish that such was a road lot, that such would
deprive them in accessing their ingress and egress thus
not being able to access their residence. Absence of the
showing that applicant have urgent and paramount need
for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to prevent
irreparable damage, they are not entitled to such writ.
28
 BPI v. HONG
E group of Companies filed a petition for suspension of
payments and rehabilitation before the Securities and
Exchange Commission, while the case was still pending
with the Court of Appeals, P filed with the RTC of Cebu
City, a petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of real
properties mortgaged to it by E. H an unsecured creditor
of one of the companies of E filed an action for injunction
and damages against P. The said action was grounded
on the allegation that the said proceeding was illegal.
Is the remedy of injunction proper?
ANSWER:
Yes, the remedy of injunction is proper.
The law so provides that a preliminary injunction is an
order granted at any stage of an action or proceedings
prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a
court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act
or acts.
In the present case, the complaint principally seeks to
enjoin the foreclosure proceedings. An action for
injunction is proper for its purpose is to enjoin the
defendant, perpetually or for a particular time, from the
commission or the continuance of a specific act or his
compulsion to continue performance of a particular act. It
has an independent existence and is distinct from the
ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction which cannot
exist except only as a part or an incident of an
independent action or proceeding. In action for injunction,
the auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, prohibitory
or mandatory may issue.
DEVESA v. ARBES
X filed a complaint against Y, the acting as administrator
of the estate of A, deceased, had unlawfully taken
possession of certain rice lands and coconut groves, and
the property of X. X contends that the property in
question was assigned to X’s deceased husband under
the terms of an extrajudicial partition contract by the heirs
of A, X's husband's first wife. Additionally, X alleged they
had continued in the quiet, peaceable, and exclusive
possession thereof not until Y took possession of the
property. Moreover, X applied for an injunction to restrain
Y from continuing in possession and enjoying the fruits of
the land in question. The Trial court granted the
preliminary injunction conditioned upon the execution of a
bond for costs and damages.
Is the application for injunction the proper remedy?
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
ANSWER:
No. Case law instructs that an injunction is a special
remedy contained in the new Code of Civil Procedure and
adopted from American and English law of procedure,
and the accepted American doctrine limiting its use to
cases where there is no other adequate remedy, and
otherwise controlling the issue thereof, must be deemed
to limit its use in like manner in this jurisdiction. Moreover,
Injunctions, as a rule, will not be granted to take property
out of the possession or control of one party and place it
into that of another whose title has not clearly been
established by law.
In the case at bar, the evidence of record establishes X’s
right of possession in and to the lands in question which
points out that X and her husband having been in
exclusive possession of this land, under a claim based on
the partition agreement, for more than fifteen years.
Furthermore, Y, in his capacity of administrator, had no
lawful authority to take possession thereof without X’s
consent, because of failure to prove that the estate of
which he is administrator is the true owner of all or any
part of the land in question.
Thus, the remedy by injunction sought by the plaintiff and
allowed by the trial court was not the proper remedy for
the cause of action set out in the pleadings and
established by the evidence.
PREYSLER v. CA
Y owns Tali Beach Subdivision which X owned lots
therein and also two parcels of land adjacent to the
subdivision. These two parcels were bounded on the
North and West by the China Sea and on the East and
South by the subdivision. In order to gain access to the
two parcels X has to pass through private Y subdivision.
X offered to pay for the easement of right of way but Y
refused it for being grossly inadequate. Y then barricaded
the front gate of X property to prevent from using the
subdivision roads to access said parcels.
Subsequently, X filed, with the Regional Trial Court, a
Complaint for Right of Way with prayer for preliminary
prohibitive injunction against Y. RTC issued the
preliminary injunction allowing entrance of Y free passage.
However, X used the subdivision road to transport heavy
equipment and construction materials to develop his
property. Y moved to dissolve the writ for violation of its
right to peaceful possession and occupation. Petitioner
also moved to clarify the writ. RTC thereafter amended
the writ allowing contractors, guests and visitors to pass.
Was the amendment of the original preliminary injunction
proper?
29
ANSWER:
No. As provided by jurisprudence, the objective of a writ
of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until
the merits of the case can be fully heard. Status quo is
the last actual, peaceable and uncontested situation
which precedes a controversy.
In the case at hand, the last actual, peaceful and
uncontested situation that preceded the controversy was
solely the access of petitioner and his household to his
property outside the subdivision for visits and inspections.
At the time the original writ was applied for, there was still
no construction going on in the property. It was merely
raw land. The use of the subdivision roads for ingress
and egress of construction workers, heavy equipment,
delivery of construction materials, and installation of
power lines, are clearly not part of the status quo in the
original writ.
Along this line, the amended writ is not proper, thus, the
original writ must be reinstated.
AREVALO v. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK
The conflict between the parties arose from a Loan
Agreement petitioner A executed with respondent bank B
secured by a mortgage on their property situated in
Muntinlupa. Due to their failure to pay the loaned amount,
B undertook to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage.
A thereafter filed the First Complaint wherein he asked for
the nullification of interests, penalties and other charges,
as well as for specific performance with an application for
a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the then
impending auction sale of the Muntinlupa property.
During the hearing of A’s application for preliminary
injunction, the trial court ruled that, as a precondition for
the issuance of the writ and pursuant to the Procedure on
Foreclosure, A was directed to pay 12% per annum
interest on the principal obligation as stated in the
application for foreclosure sale. A moved for
reconsideration, but the motion was denied.
Consequently, he did not pay the required interest; thus,
no writ of preliminary injunction was issued in his favor.
Meanwhile, proceedings for the First Complaint ensued at
the trial court. Acting on the Motion to Dismiss filed by
respondent B, the trial court granted the motion and
dismissed the First Complaint for lack of cause of action.
Is the non-issuance by the trial court of the injunctive writ
correct?
ANSWER:
Yes. The trial court has already dismissed the First
Complaint upon which A’s application for the provisional
remedy of preliminary injunction was based.
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A writ of preliminary injunction is auxiliary to, an adjunct
of, and subject to the outcome of the main case, thus, a
writ of preliminary injunction is deemed lifted upon
dismissal of the main case, any appeal therefrom
notwithstanding.
MANTILE v. CAJUCOM
Defendant X contends that the writ issued by the court
contained no order instructing him to raise or remove the
obstructions that prevented the water from flowing
through the said canal or ditch. The canal was obstructed
and closed on June 1, and when the persons who closed
it were notified on July 3 that they should abstain from
performing any act whatever tending to obstruct and
prevent the flow of water, the canal or ditch still remained
closed, and the record shows no proof that it was
afterwards opened to the passage of water, nor that, after
X had been notified of the injunction, they again closed it.
By petition, the counsel for plaintiff Y set forth under oath
that, according to information he had received, X was
continuing to obstruct and hinder the passage of the
water, in disobedience to the judicial order, and prayed
that said defendant be notified to appear and state his
reasons, if any, why he should not be punished for
contempt of court for disobedience to the writ of
preliminary injunction issued.
Is defendant X liable for contempt of court?
ANSWER:
No. Section 162 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in
defining a preliminary injunction states: That it is the order
of the writ which prohibits a particular person from
performing a particular act, and therefore, if a preliminary
injunction has been issued against a particular person,
enjoining him, for example, from performing any act
whatever that may tend to close and obstruct an irrigation
ditch by preventing the passage of the water, when the
said ditch was already closed, it cannot be understood
that the person, against whom the prohibitory order was
issued, willfully disregarded and disobeyed the said
judicial writ by not removing the obstacle that prevented
the flow of water, because this last operation is not
covered by the writ of injunction.
Hence, the fact that X failed to remove the obstruction he
had placed in the said canal or estero for the purpose of
preventing the passage of the water, since they were not
ordered to do so by the judicial writ, is not sufficient to
make him liable for contempt of court.
FELICIANO v. ALIPIO
The Director of Public Schools issued a circular to require
all pupils and students in public schools to salute the flag,
on pain of being barred from admission to, or expelled
from, such schools. X filed before the court a petition for
30
declaratory relief and mandatory injunction to have the
circular declared null and void and that a permanent
preliminary injunction be issued prohibiting the teachers
of ABC Elementary School and the Director of Public
Schools from carrying out the provisions of said circular.
The petition was dismissed by the court.
Is the dismissal proper?
ANSWER:
No. Rule 58, Sec 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage
of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final
order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to
refrain from a particular act or acts. Xxx
Although the petition filed against public Officers is for
declaratory relief, yet if it prays also for the issuance of a
permanent injunction from carrying out the provisions of a
Department Circular on grounds of unconstitutionality, the
same is equivalent to an action for prohibition and the
court should not dismiss the petition but should proceed
with the case considering the action as one for prohibition.
The dismissal was not proper
BARAYUGA v. ADVENTIST UNIVERSITY
ABC, a non-stock and non-profit domestic educational
institution incorporated under Philippine laws, was directly
under the North Philippine Union Mission (NPUM) of the
Southern Asia Pacific Division of the Seventh Day
Adventists, which elected X as the secretary of for the
NPUM, and subsequently appointed him as President of
ABC. During his tenure as President, the audit revealed X
committed several anomalies and serious violations. The
NPUM Executive Committee then called for a special
meeting and by secret ballot voted X to be removed from
his Presidency, and to appoint an interim committee to
assume the powers of the President. X brought his suit
for injunction and damages in the RTC, with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)
alleging that he was removed as President without valid
grounds, despite his five (5) year term as President of
ABC as provided for in the latter’s Constitution and by-
laws. RTC issued the injunction and ruled in petitioner’s
favor, however the CA reversed the RTC’s decision,
hence the petition.
Whether the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the TRO and a writ of Injunction?
ANSWER:
Yes. Rule 58, Sec 3 (c) provides:
A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is
established:
xxx
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(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing,
threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in
violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render
the judgment ineffectual.
The injunctive relief protects only a right in esse. Where
the plaintiff does not demonstrate that he has an existing
right to be protected by injunction, his suit for injunction
must be dismissed for lack of a cause of action. In the
case at bar, X rested his claim for injunction mainly upon
his representation that he was entitled to serve for 5
years as President.
The RTC gravely abused its discretion when in issuing
the TRO and writ of injunction.
AUSTRALIAN PROFESSIONAL REALTY v.
MUNICIPALITY OF PADRE GARCIA
A Memorandum of agreement between X and Y has been
executed where X shall rebuild the public market and
construct a shopping center. After some time, Y moved to
declare such MOA null and void in the RTC where is was
granted. There having been no timely appeal made, Y
then filed for the motion for execution of judgment,
however, X applied for temporary restraining order saying
his P30,000,000 investment will be forfeited by such
execution without due process of law.
Will X application for temporary restraining order prosper?
ANSWER:
No, it will not prosper.
Under Section 5 of Rule 58 of the Rule of Court, a TRO
may be issued only if it appears from the facts shown by
affidavits or by the verified application that great or
irreparable injury would be inflicted on the applicant
before the writ of preliminary injunction could be heard.
In the present case, the injuries alleged by petitioners are
capable of pecuniary estimation. Any loss petitioners may
suffer is easily subject to mathematical computation and,
if proven, is fully compensable by damages.
DELOS SANTOS v. METROPOLITAN BANK
From December 9 ,1996 until March 20, 1998, X took out
several loans totaling P12,000,000 from Y bank which the
same was secured with parcel of lands belonging to X.
The loan agreements further stipulated that the entire
amount of the loans would become due and demandable
upon default of any installment. X defaulted in the
payment of installments, now, Y bank sought the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. X
31
then applied for a writ of injunction in RTC to stop the
foreclosure.
Will it prosper?
ANSWER:
No, it will not prosper.
One of the grounds provided in Section 3 of Rule 58 of
the Rules of Court is that a preliminary injunction may be
granted when it is established that the commission,
continuance or non-performance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would probably work
injustice to the applicant.
In the present case, the foreclosure of a mortgage is but
a necessary consequence of the non-payment of an
obligation secured by the mortgage. Where X and Y bank
stipulated in their agreement, that the Y bank is
authorized to foreclose the mortgage upon the X’s default,
Y bank has a clear right to the foreclose the same.
Thereby, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
upon the application of the X will be not prosper.
TML GASKET v. BPI
X obtained a loan from the W, which former can avail via
a credit facility of P85M. As security for the loan, X
executed a real estate mortgage over commercial and
industrial lots. W required X to execute a promissory note
for each availment from the credit facility. During the
period of the loan, W changed its corporate name -
merged with Y. X defaulted in the payment of its loan so
Y extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgaged properties. X's
indebtedness to Y increased. The Sheriff of RTC issued a
Notice of Extra-judicial Foreclosure Sale so X filed a
"Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Plus Damages, with
Prayer for the Issuance of (TRO) and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction" against Y. X's arguments against
Y: Y imposed a higher interest rate contrary to their
agreement; and that X demanded an independent
accounting and liquidation of its loan account, which went
unheeded, hence it cannot be considered in default of its
obligation, rendering the foreclosure arbitrary. After
gaining favor in their motion for reconsideration, the CA
set aside the order of the trial court granting the
application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction.
Was the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is
proper?
ANSWER:
No. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court lists the
grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
x x x As such, a writ of preliminary injunction may be
issued only upon clear showing of an actual existing right
to be protected during the pendency of the principal
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action. The requisites of a valid injunction are the
existence of a right and its actual or threatened violations.
Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be
protected and the violation against that right must be
shown.
Here, X's failure to comply with the terms and conditions
of its credit agreement with Y, as embodied in the real
estate mortgage and the promissory notes it issued in
favor of the latter, entitles Y to extrajudicially foreclose the
mortgaged properties. X do not have any clear right to be
protected; they failed to substantiate their allegations that
their right to due process had been violated and the
maturity of their obligation forestalled. Since they
indisputably failed to meet their obligations in spite of
repeated demands, there is no legal justification to enjoin
respondent from enforcing its undeniable right to
foreclose the mortgaged properties.
REPUBLIC v. CAGUIOA
X (Congress) enacted a law which created the Subic
Special Economic and Freeport Zone (SBF) and the
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). Said law
provides that no taxes, local and national, shall be
imposed within the Subic Special Economic Zone.
Pursuant to the law, Y and his company, which are all
domestic corporations doing business at the SBF, applied
for and were granted Certificates of Registration and Tax
Exemption by the SBMA. X subsequently passed another
law, which provides that all applicable taxes, duties,
charges, including excise taxes due thereon shall be
applied to cigars and cigarettes, distilled spirits,
fermented liquors and wines brought directly into the duly
chartered or legislated freeports of the Subic Economic
Freeport Zone.
On the basis of said latter law, SBMA issued a
Memorandum declaring that the tax exemptions granted
by the former law are now revoked. X et.al. filed a special
civil action for declaratory relief to have certain provisions
of R.A. No. 9334 declared as unconstitutional. They
prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
The same was subsequently granted by Z (Judge). The
injunction bond was approved at One Million pesos
(P1,000,000).
Was the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
proper?
ANSWER:
No. Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction.
– A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is
established.
32
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded,
and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining
the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act
or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-
performance of the act or acts complained of during the
litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing,
threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in
violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render
the judgment ineffectual.
For a writ of preliminary injunction to issue, the plaintiff
must be able to establish that (1) there is a clear and
unmistakable right to be protected, (2) the invasion of the
right sought to be protected is material and substantial,
and (3) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage.
One such case of grave abuse obtained in this case
when Z granted the Writ of Preliminary Injunction despite
the absence of a clear and unquestioned legal right of
private respondents. In holding that the presumption of
constitutionality and validity of the law granting the tax
exemption on the basis of Y et. al's arguments, he
disregarded the fact that as a condition sine qua non to
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, private
respondents needed also to show a clear legal right that
ought to be protected. That requirement is not satisfied in
this case. To stress, the possibility of irreparable damage
without proof of an actual existing right would not justify
an injunctive relief.
PNB v. RJ VENTURES
X Corporation received an invitation to bid from Y Bank of
a property and was subsequently awarded thereof. The
former assigned the property to ABC Corporation while
also assuming to purchase said property. ABC
Corporation was required by Y Bank to raise additional
amount for the purchase price and offered to lend DEF
Corporation the required amount, its affiliate company,
which will be available for relending to ABC Corporation.
To secure the loan, DEF Corporation assigned in favor of
Y Bank all its rights and interest over radio and television
frequencies issued by the NTC. DEF and ABC
Corporation failed to fulfil their respective obligations in
the contract of land and of sale, respectively, despite
demands of Y Bank. As a consequence, the property was
extrajudicially sold at public auction. Meanwhile, DEF
Corporation received a notice of such sale from Y Bank,
specifying therein that its facilities in Baguio will be
foreclosed and taken over by PNB. In support of its
application for the issuance of a TRO and writ of
preliminary attachment, respondents allege that DEF and
ABC Corporation would suffer great and irreparable injury
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by the foreclosure of the property. Thereafter, the WPI
was granted but was later lifted and rectified.
Is the issuance of a WPI proper?
ANSWER:
Yes. Under the Rules of Court, for a writ of preliminary
injunction to issue, the following requisites must be
present, to wit: (1) the existence of a clear and
unmistakable right that must be protected, and (2) an
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage. The very foundation of the jurisdiction to
issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence of a cause
of action and in the probability of irreparable injury,
inadequacy or pecuniary estimation and the prevention of
multiplicity of suits. In this case, respondents were able to
establish a clear and unmistakable right to possession of
the subject collaterals.
As owner of the subject collaterals that stand to be
extrajudicially foreclosed, respondents are entitled to the
possession and protection thereof.
SOLID BUILDERS v. CHINA BANKING
X Bank granted several loans to S Corporation. To
secure the loans, M Corporation executed in X Bank’s
favor several surety agreements and contracts of real
estate mortgage over parcels of land. Subsequently, S
Corporation proposed to X Bank a scheme through which
S Corporation would sell the mortgaged properties and
share the proceeds with X Bank on a 50-50 basis until
such time that the whole obligation would be fully paid. X
Bank also proposed that there be partial releases of the
certificates of title of the mortgaged properties without the
burden of updating interest on all loans. S Corp
requested the restructuring of its loans, a reduction of
interest and penalties. X Bank agreed, since interest
payment has not been made, no re-pricing is possible. X
Bank demanded S Corp to settle its outstanding account.
S Corp filed a complaint claiming that the interest,
penalties and charges were iniquitous and
unconscionable and to enjoin X Bank from initiating
foreclosure proceedings.
Is the filing of the WPI proper?
ANSWER:
No. A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary
event which must be granted only in the face of actual
and existing substantial rights. The duty of the court
taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction is to determine whether the requisites
necessary for the grant of an injunction are present in the
case before it. A WPI is issued to preserve the status
quo ante, upon the applicant’s showing of two important
requisite conditions, namely:
(1) the right to be protected existed prima facie, and
33
(2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that
right.
In this case, the basis of the right claimed by S Corp
remains to be controversial or disputable as there is still a
need to determine whether or not, upon consideration of
the various circumstances surrounding the agreement of
the parties, the interest rates and penalty charges are
unconscionable. Therefore, such claimed right cannot be
considered clear, actual and subsisting. In the absence of
clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
AUSTRALIAN PROFESSIONAL REALTY, INC v.
MUNICIPALITY OF PADRE GARCIA BATANGAS
A Memorandum of agreement was executed between X
and Y where X shall rebuild the public market and
construct a shopping center. X likewise acquired through
the MOA the exclusive right to operate, manage, and
lease stall spaces in the said shopping center. Y later on
filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of MOA, which
was granted. Subsequently, a writ of execution was
issued pursuant to Y's motion for execution of judgment.
X then filed a motion for the issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
alleging that the loss of the public market entails costs of
about ₱30,000,000 in investments, ₱100,000 monthly
revenue in rentals.
If you were the judge, will you grant X's motion for the
issuance of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction?
ANSWER:
No. Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a
TRO may be issued only if it appears from the facts
shown by affidavits or by the verified application that
great or irreparable injury would be inflicted on the
applicant before the writ of preliminary injunction could be
heard. It has been established by jurisprudence that
damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule
relative to the issuance of injunction where there is no
standard by which their amount can be measured with
reasonable accuracy.
In this case, petitioners have alleged that the loss of the
public market entails costs of about ₱30,000,000 in
investments, ₱100,000 monthly revenue in rentals.
Clearly, the injuries alleged by X are capable of pecuniary
estimation. Any loss X may suffer is easily subject to
mathematical computation and, if proven, is fully
compensable by damages. Thus, a preliminary injunction
is not warranted.
ERMITA v. ALDECOA-DELORINO
X, an organization composed of manufacturers of
petrochemical and resin products, opposed the
implementation of E.O. 486 which in effect reduces tariff
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rates from 10% to 5% on certain inexpensive products. X
alleges that such implementation will result in the local
market being flooded with lower-priced imported goods
which will, consequently, affect their sales profits. While
the question on the validity of E.O. 486 is pending in court,
X prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin its implementation.
If you were the judge, will you grant the prayer of X for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction?
ANSWER:
No. Following jurisprudence, these requisites must be
proved before a writ of preliminary injunction will issue:
(1) The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable
right to be protected, that is a right in esse;
(2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such
right;
(3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent
irreparable injury to the applicant; and
(4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy
exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.
Jurisprudence teaches an injury is considered irreparable
if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no
fair and reasonable redress can be had therefore in a
court of law, or where there is no standard by which their
amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy, that
is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. It is
considered irreparable injury when it cannot be
adequately compensated in damages due to the nature of
the injury itself or the nature of the right or property
injured or when there exists no certain pecuniary
standard for the measurement of damages.
In the present case, X’s allegations that the reduced tariff
rates will adversely affect its business does not show an
irreparable injury. X was only seeking protection over
"future economic benefits" which, at best, it had an
inchoate right to. There is no showing what "irreparable
injury" it stood to suffer with the implementation of E.O.
486. The injury sought to be protected is prospective in
nature, hence, the injunctive relief should not be granted.
OWWA REPRESENTED BY ADMINISTRATOR
MARIANITO D. ROQUE v. ATTY. CESAR L.
CHAVEZ
OWWA is a government agency tasked primarily to
protect the interest and promote the welfare of overseas
Filipino workers (OFWs).
Based from its records, OWWA has no formal structure
duly approved by DBM and CSC. Hence, OWWA Board
of trustees passed Resolution 110 depicting the
34
organizational structure and staffing pattern of the
OWWA. DBM approved the said resolution.
Advisory No. 01 announced that a Placement Committee
will be created to evaluate and recommend placement of
all regular/permanent incumbents of OWWA in the new
organizational chart and staffing pattern.
X filed with the RTC, a Complaint for Annulment of the
Organizational Structure of the OWWA, as approved by
OWWA Board Resolution No. 001 with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. X challenged
the validity of the new organizational structure of the
OWWA contending that the same is null and void; hence,
its implementation should be prohibited.
RTC granted X’s prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
Was the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
proper?
ANSWER:
No. Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, defines a
preliminary injunction as an order granted at any stage of
an action prior to the judgment or final order requiring a
party or a court, an agency or a person to refrain from a
particular act or acts. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court, enumerates the grounds for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction as follows:
Sec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. A
preliminary injunction may be granted when it is
established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded,
and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining
the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act
or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-
performance of the act or acts complained of during the
litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing,
threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in
violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render
the judgment ineffectual.
Moreover, in a case, the Supreme Court held that a clear
and positive right especially calling for judicial protection
must be established
However, in the case at bar, the grounds for the issuance
of the said writ is absent in this case. X was not able to
show a clear and unmistakable legal right to warrant his
entitlement to the writ. Thus, RTC’s issuance of the said
writ was improper.
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FELIPE SY DUNGOG v. COURT OF APPEALS
ABC filed a complaint for specific performance, damages
with Writ of Preliminary Injunction against CCC to enforce
the contract of sale of the parcel of land owned by various
individuals.
ABC faulted CCC for non-delivery of some parcels of land.
ABC claimed that it overpayment in the amount paid.
CCC, however, contended that it was ABC that breached
the contract by stopping payment on the last four checks
intended as the last instalments for the land. CCC
opposed ABC’s application for the writ of preliminary
injunction on the ground that the latter violated the terms
of the contract and the other contemporaneous
agreements between them.
However, trial court granted the prayer for injunction
Was the issuance of the writ for preliminary injunction
proper?
ANSWER:
Yes. Under Section 3[a], Rule 58, a preliminary
injunction is proper when the plaintiff appears entitled to
the relief demanded in the complaint.
The trial court found that ABC had already paid
P51,248,348.26 out of the total consideration of
P65,520,475.00. ABC also consigned with the court an
additional P4,048,950.00 leaving a balance of
P10,223,176.74. The trial court likewise found that 78%
of the properties were already in the possession of ABC.
Moreover, the status quo, which is the last actual
peaceable uncontested status that preceded the
controversy, was that ABC had access to the lots subject
of the Contract through the entrance gate in Lot 1031-F.
That is why ABC commenced construction of its pier and
the development of the roads within the parcels of land
covered by the Contract. The issuance of the Writ would
no doubt preserve the status quo between CCC and ABC
that existed prior to the filing of the case.Thus, the status
quo should be maintained until the issue on the parties’
respective rights and obligations under the Contract is
determined after the trial.
Hence, the issuance of the writ was proper.
35
 MARTIN LAHM III and JAMES P. CONCEPCION v.
LABOR ARBITER JOVENCIO Ll. MAYOR, JR
A filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC against the members of
the Board of Trustees of the International School, Manila.
Impleaded as among the party-respondents is the
complainant, B. A then filed a Verified Motion for the
Issuance of a TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction against
B. Thereafter, the respondent issued an Order that
directed the parties in the said case to maintain the status
quo ante.
The respondent argues that the instant case should be
dismissed for being premature since the aforementioned
illegal dismissal case is still pending before the Labor
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. The Investigating
Commissioner concluded that the grounds cited by the
respondent to justify his issuance of the status quo ante
order lacks factual basis and is speculative; the
respondent does not have the authority to issue a
temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary
injunction.
Did the Labor Arbiter have the authority to issue writs of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining orders?
ANSWER:
No. Rule 58, Sec 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage
of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final
order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to
refrain from a particular act or acts.
Under the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the
labor arbiters no longer have the authority to issue writs
of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
orders. The role of the labor arbiters, with regard to the
issuance of writs of preliminary injunctions and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, at present, is limited to reception of
evidence as may be delegated by the NLRC.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY v. THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS
Even before the law (The Omnibus Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 RA 8042) took effect, A Inc.
filed a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court with the RTC to declare as
unconstitutional sections of the law, with a plea for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the respondents therein
from enforcing the assailed provisions of the law.
A Inc. claims that great majority of the duly licensed
recruitment agencies have stopped or suspended their
operations for fear of being prosecuted under the
provisions of a law that are unjust and unconstitutional.
RTC decided to issued a temporary restraining order
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
enjoining the respondents from enforcing the assailed
order and writ of preliminary injunction.
Did the appellate court err in affirming the trial court's
order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by it?
ANSWER:
No. Section 2 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
Section 2. Parties. — All persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected by the declaration shall
be made parties; and no declaration shall, except as
otherwise provided in these Rules, prejudice the rights of
persons not parties to the action.
The respondent has locus standi to file the petition in the
RTC in Representation of the Eleven Licensed and
Registered Recruitment Agencies Impleaded in the
Amended Petition. However, the respondent has no locus
standi to file the petition for and in behalf of unskilled
workers. The Supreme Court noted that it even failed to
implead any unskilled workers in its petition. Furthermore,
in failing to implead, as parties-petitioners, the eleven
licensed and registered recruitment agencies it claimed to
represent, the respondent failed to comply with Section 2
of Rule 6320 of the Rules of Court.
GARCIA v. DRILON
After a series of violence against his wife and children, X
was ordered by the court, through a TPO, to refrain from
committing the said violent acts. X filed a petition for
prohibition with prayer for injunction and temporary
restraining order against the TPO issued by the trial court.
Rule on the petition of X.
ANSWER:
X’s petition will not prosper.
Under Section 3, Rule 58, a preliminary injunction may be
granted when it is established:
a. That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded,
and the whole or part of such relief consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the
acts complained of, or in requiring the performance
of an act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually;
It has been held that since protection orders are granted
ex parte to protect women and children from acts of
violence, an injuction against such orders will defeat the
very purpose of the law.
In this case, X cannot be granted a writ of preliminary
injunction because the protection order granted by the
court to his wife and issued against him cannot be
restrained by the said writ.
Therefore, X’s petition will not prosper.
36

MABAYO FARMS v. CA
A group of occupants entered the land bought by X and
caused destruction. X filed a complaint for injunction with
damages with prayer for TRO. The court issued the writ
of preliminary injunction but the same was also served to
Y, an innocent purchaser of a portion of the same land.
Was the court correct in enforcing the writ of preliminary
injunction against Y?
ANSWER:
No. Under Section 5, Rule 58, no preliminary injunction
shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the
party or persons sought to be enjoined. It has been held
that since a preliminary injunction is an ancillary or
preventive remedy, a person who is not a party to the
main case cannot be bound by it.
In this case, because Y was not granted notice and prior
hearing and because he was not even a party to the main
case, the writ of preliminary injunction cannot be enforced
against him.
Therefore, the court was not correct.
SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE V.
MAJUDUCON
During the public hearings conducted by the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee (hereafter called the Committee), it
appeared that the Z purchased a lot in General Santos
City, for P10,500.00 per square meter from private
respondent Atty. X However, the deed of sale filed with
the Register of Deeds indicated that the purchase price of
the lot was only P3,000.00 per square meter.
The Committee thereafter caused the service of a
subpoena to respondent Atty. X directing him to appear
and testify before it. Atty X refused to appear at the
hearing. Instead, he filed a petition for prohibition and
preliminary injunction with prayer for temporary
restraining order with the Regional Trial Court of General
Santos City.
The trial court issued a Temporary Restraining Order
directing the Committee "to CEASE and DESIST from
proceeding with the inquiry. The trial court denied the
Committee’s motion to dismiss and granted the writ of
preliminary injunction. Thus a petition for certiorari was
filed with the SC.
Did the Judge commit grave abuse of discretion when he
dismissed petitioner’s motion to dismiss the petition for
prohibition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
ANSWER:
Yes. There is grave abuse of discretion.
Under Rule 58, it provides: Section 1. Preliminary
injunction defined; classes. — A preliminary injunction is
an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding
prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a
court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act
or acts. It may also require the performance of a
particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a
preliminary mandatory injunction.
Under Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution :
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected.
In this case, When the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
served subpoena on respondent Flaviano to appear and
testify before it in connection with its investigation of the
alleged misuse and mismanagement of Z’s funds, it did
so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation.
Hence, the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City,
or any court for that matter, had no authority to prohibit
the Committee from requiring respondent to appear and
testify before it.
SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT V. PHILIPPINE
CEMENT MANUFACTURERS
Department of Trade and Industry ("DTI") accepted an
application by Company XX alleging that the importation
of gray Portland cement in increased quantities has
caused declines in domestic production, capacity
utilization, market share, sales and employment; as well
as caused depressed local prices. Company XX sought
the imposition at first of provisional, then later, definitive
safeguard measures on the import of cement pursuant to
the SMA. Company ZZ filed the application in behalf of
twelve (12) of its member-companies. DTI denied the
application.
Company XX likewise applied for a Temporary
Restraining Order/Injunction to enjoin the DTI and the
BOC from implementing the questioned Decision and
Report. It prayed that the CA direct the DTI Secretary to
disregard the Report and to render judgment
independently of the Report. Company XX argued that
the DTI Secretary, vested as he is under the law with the
power of review, is not bound to adopt the
recommendations of the Tariff Commission; and, that the
Report is void.
CA granted the writ. Company XX filed with the Court a
"Very Urgent Application for a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or A Writ of Preliminary Injunction" ("TRO
37
Application"), seeking to enjoin the DTI Secretary from
enforcing his Decision in view of the pending petition
before this Court. Company ZZ filed an opposition,
claiming, among others, that it is not this Court but the
CTA that has jurisdiction over the application under the
law.
Was a Temporary Restraining Order warranted?
ANSWER:
No, it is not warranted.
Under Rule 58, it provides: Section 1. Preliminary
injunction defined; classes. — A preliminary injunction is
an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding
prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a
court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act
or acts. It may also require the performance of a
particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a
preliminary mandatory injunction.
Furthermore, under the law, Section 218 of the Tax
Reform Act of 1997 prohibits any court from granting an
injunction to restrain the collection of any national internal
revenue tax, fee or charge imposed by the internal
revenue code.
In this case, The Court did not grant the provisional relief
for it would be tantamount to enjoining the collection of
taxes, a peremptory judicial act which is traditionally
frowned upon, unless there is a clear statutory basis for it.
Hence, the TRO was not warranted.
DELTA VENTURES v. CABATO
The Labor Arbiter declared GMF, X and Y guilty of illegal
dismissal and unfair labor practice and a writ of execution
was subsequently issued. Sheriff V then proceeded to
enforce the writ. Finding that the judgment debtors do not
have sufficient personal properties, the sheriff proceeded
to levy upon a real property of X. A month before
scheduled auction sale, D filed before the Commission a
third-party claim asserting ownership over the property
levied upon. An order directing the suspension of the
auction sale until the merits of the claim has been
resolved has been issued. D, however, filed with the RTC
a complaint for injunction and damages against the sheriff.
May the trial court take cognizance of the complaint and
provide the injunction relief sought?
ANSWER:
No. Sec. 2, Rule 58 under ROC provides that a
preliminary injunction may be granted by:
1. the court where the action or proceeding is pending
2. it may be issued by the CA, or the SC if the action or
proceeding is pending therein.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
In the case at bar, ostensibly the complaint before the
trial court was for the recovery of possession and
injunction, but in essence it was an action challenging the
legality or propriety of the levy vis-a-vis the alias writ of
execution, including the acts performed by the Labor
Arbiter and the Deputy Sheriff implementing the writ. The
complaint was in effect a motion to quash the writ of
execution of a decision rendered on a case properly
within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
Cases involving labor dispute, the RTC being co-equal
body of the NLRC, has no jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order or injunction to enjoin the execution of
any decision of the NLRC. Therefore, a writ of attachment
shall not issue against labor disputes.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS v. ANTONIO
VELANZUELA
The Supervision and Examination Dept. (SED) of BSP
conducted examinations of the books of the respondent
banks and deficiencies were discovered. The banks
claimed they made the necessary capital infusion but C
(OIC of SED) informed the banks that they failed to carry
out the remedial measures that are required for them to
undertake. They stated that none of them received the
ROE (Report of Examination) which finalizes the audit
findings. The banks filed a complaint for nullification of
ROE against BSP with TRO and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. RTC granted the WPI and the CA affirmed the
RTC’s decision.
Did the RTC violated Sec. 25 of the New Central Bank
Act and effectively handcuffed the BSP from discharging
its functions to the great and irreparable damage of the
country’s banking system?
ANSWER:
Yes. The requisites for preliminary injunctive relief are:
b. the invasion of right sought to be protected is
material and substantial;
c. the right of the complainant is clear and
unmistakable; and
d. there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the
writ to prevent serious damage.
As such, a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued
only upon clear showing of an actual existing right to be
protected during the pendency of the principal action. The
twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence
of a right and its actual or threatened violations. Thus, to
be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected
and the violation against that right must be shown. These
requirements are absent in the present case. Thus, the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction must have
basis in and be in accordance with law.
38

The issuance by the RTC of writs of preliminary injunction
is an unwarranted interference with the powers of the MB.
Secs. 29 and 30 of RA 7653 [refer to the appointment of
a conservator or a receiver for a bank, which is a power
of the MB for which they need the ROEs done by the
supervising or examining department]. The writs of
preliminary injunction issued by the trial court hinder the
MB from fulfilling its function under the law. All told, while
the grant or denial of an injunction generally rests on the
sound discretion of the lower court, this Court may and
should intervene in a clear case of abuse. (submission of
ROEs)
TRADERS ROYAL BANK v. IAC
X was able to obtain a writ of preliminary attachment
against A pursuant to said writ; the sheriff levied 4600
barrels of alcohol. B filed a complaint in intervention
alleging the attached property are owned by B the case
was filed in RTC Pasay , where it rendered unfavourable
decision against B.
B instituted before RTC Bulacan its claim of ownership
over the properties attached & prayed for issuance of writ
of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction. The
RTC Bulacan granted the application for injunctive relief?
Should the RTC issue the injunctive relief?
ANSWER:
Yes, generally, the rule that no court has the power to
interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a
concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power
to grant the injunctive relief sought by injunction, is
applied in cases where no third-party claimant is involved,
in order to prevent one court from nullifying the judgment
or process of another court of the same rank or category,
a power which devolves upon the proper appellate court.
Intervention as a means of protecting the third-party
claimant's right in an attachment proceeding is not
exclusive but cumulative and suppletory to the right to
bring an independent suit. The denial or dismissal of a
third-party claim to property levied upon cannot operate
to bar a subsequent independent action by the claimant
to establish his right to the property even if he failed to
appeal from the order denying his original third-party
claim.
In this case the remedy resorted by B as a third part
claimant was it filed a separate and independent action to
indicate his claim.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES LAURA
YADNO AND PUGSONG MAT-AN v. THE HEIRS
OF THE LATE SPOUSES MAURO AND ELISA
ANCHALES
Spouses Y filed a complaint in RTC Urdaneta for
ownership, delivery of possession over a parcel of
land, damages with preliminary injunction and
attachment against W, spouses X & spouses Z. The court
rendered the decision in favour of Y which became final &
executory, to which a writ of execution was issued ad a
public auction was made.
Spouses Z filed in RTC Baguio an action for injunction &
damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction
against spouses X, spouses Y & sheriff. Z claimed the
sheriff has without any authority from trial court,
indiscriminately levied and conducted a public auction
sale of the property under the name of W. Z argued that
W died before the decision was rendered thus W’s
property covered became the estate of her legal heir and
cannot be subject to levy.
Subsequently spouses Y filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the RTC Baguio had no jurisdiction to
enjoined RTC Urdaneta since the later court is a court of
coordinate jurisdiction.
If you were the Judge will you grant the Motion to Dismiss
filed?
ANSWER:
Yes, I will grant the Motion to Dismiss.
Under the principle of Judicial Stability or the long
standing doctrine is that no court has the power to
interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a
court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. The various
trial courts of a province or city, having the same or equal
authority, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to
interfere with their respective cases, much less with their
orders or judgments. A contrary rule would obviously lead
to confusion and seriously hamper the administration of
justice.
In this case RTC Baguio having the same or equal
authority with RTC Urdaneta, should not, cannot, and are
not permitted to interfere with their respective cases,
much less with their orders or judgments. A contrary rule
would obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper
the administration of justice.
39
 RCBC CAPITAL CORPORATION v. BANCO DE
ORO UNIBANK, INC.
X Corp. entered into a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA)
with Y Corp., Mr. A, and individual shareholders of B Inc.
There was a dispute between the parties when X Corp.
informed Y Corp. and the other selling shareholders of an
overpayment of the subject shares claiming there was an
overstatement of valuation of accounts amounting to
P478 million and that the sellers violated their warranty
under the SPA. An aribitration proceeding was conducted
wherein the Arbitration rendered two partial awards which
were confirmed by the RTC.
Y Corp. filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion to resolve the
application for a stay order and/or TRO/writ of preliminary
injunction, and to quash the Writ of Execution and lift the
Notices of Garnishment. Y Corp., to avert the sale of the
shares and prevent further disruption in the operations of
Y Corp. and BPBI, paid under protest by tendering a
Manager's Check in the amount of P637,941,185.55,
which was accepted by X Corp. as full and complete
satisfaction of the writ of execution. Y Corp. manifested
before Branch 148 that such payment was made without
prejudice to its appeal before the CA.
Is Y Corp. entitled to injunctive relief in correction with the
Executive Proceedings?
ANSWER:
No, Y Corp. is not entitled to injunctive relief. Injunctive
reliefs are preservative remedies for the protection of
substantive rights and interests. Injunction is not a cause
of action in itself, but merely a provisional remedy, an
adjunct to a main suit. When the act sought to be
enjoined has become fait accompli (a thing already done),
the prayer for provisional remedy should be denied.
Before an injunctive writ can be issued, it is essential that
the following requisites are present: (a). there must be a
right inesse or the existence of a right to be protected;
and (b). the act against which injunction to be directed is
a violation of such right. The burden of proof is on movant
to show that there exists a right to be protected, which is
directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined.
Further, there must be a showing that the invasion of the
right is material and substantial and that there is an
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent a
serious damage.
CITY OF LAPU-LAPU v. PEZA
Z filed a petition for declaratory relief with the Regional
Trial Court praying that the trial court declare it exempt
from payment of real property taxes. Z filed a petition for
injunction with prayer for issuance of temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
before the RTC, arguing that it is exempt from payment of
real property taxes. It added that the notice of sale issued
by the province was void because it was not published in
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
a newspaper of general circulation. The trial court denied
Z’s petition for injunction. The trial court ruled that Z is not
exempt from the payment of real property taxes. As to the
tax exemptions under the Special Economic Zone Act of
1995, the trial court that the provision only applies to
businesses operating within the economic zones, not to
the Z. Then filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari with prayer of a issuance of a temporary
restraining order.
a. Does the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear,
try, and decide the petition for declaratory relief?
b. Is the petition for injunction filed before the Regional
Trial Court a local tax appealable to the Court of Appeals?
ANSWERS:
a. No. In the present case, the PEZA did not avail itself
of any of the remedies against a notice of assessment. A
petition for declaratory relief is not the proper remedy
once a notice of assessment was already issued. Instead
of a petition for declaratory relief, the PEZA should have
directly resorted to a judicial action. The PEZA should
have filed a complaint for injunction, the "appropriate
ordinary civil action" to enjoin the City from enforcing its
demand and collecting the assessed taxes from the
PEZA. After all, a declaratory judgment as to the PEZA's
tax-exempt status is useless unless the City is enjoined
from enforcing its demand. Injunction "is a judicial writ,
process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do
or refrain from doing a certain act." "It may be the main
action or merely a provisional remedy for and as incident
in the main action." The essential requisites of a writ of
injunction are: "(1) there must be a right in esse or the
existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act
against which the injunction is directed to constitute a
violation of such right."
b. No. In this case, the petition for injunction filed before
the Regional Trial Court was a local tax case originally
decided by the trial court in its original jurisdiction. Since
the PEZA assailed a judgment, not an interlocutory order,
of the Regional Trial Court, the PEZA's proper remedy
was an appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals. Considering
that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals
is to the exclusion of all other courts, the Court of Appeals
had no jurisdiction to take. cognizance of the PEZA's
petition. The Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction in
rendering its decision. Its decision is void. The filing of
appeal in the wrong court does not toll the period to
appeal. Consequently, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court became final and executory after the lapse
of the 15th day from the PEZA's receipt of the trial court's
decision The denial of the petition for injunction became
final and executory.
40
 HERMANO OIL MANUFACTURING & SUGAR
CORP. v. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD
Petitioner X Corp. owned a parcel of land located at the
right side of Sta. Rita Exit of the NLEX, a limited access
facility bounded by an access fence which was put up
pursuant to R.A. No. 2000 (Limited Access Highway Act)
along the NLEX. X Corp. requested TRB (an
unincorporated government agency), et. al., to grant an
easement of right of way because the access fence had
barred its entry from the NLEX, but it was not granted.
Subsequently, X Corp. filed a complaint for specific
performance to grant an easement of right of way against
TRB, et. al, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or TRO. The OSG, in behalf of
TRB, et. al., filed a motion to dismiss with opposition to
the above prayer which was subsequently granted.
Was the grant of the Motion to Dismiss proper?
ANSWER:
Yes, the grant of the Motion to Dismiss was proper.
PD 1818, as amended by RA 8975, proscribes the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in any case
involving an infrastructure project of the government. No
court except the Supreme Court could issue an injunction
against an infrastructure project of the government. The
aim of the prohibition is to prevent delay in the
implementation or execution of government infrastructure
projects (particularly through the use of provisional
remedies) to the detriment of the greater good since it
disrupts the pursuit of essential government projects and
frustrates the economic development effort of the nation.
It appears that the petitioner’s complaint principally
sought to restrain the respondent from implementing an
access fence on its property, and to direct them to grant it
a right of way to the NLEX. Clearly, the reliefs being
sought by the petitioner were beyond the jurisdiction of
the TRC because no court except the Supreme Court
could issue an injunction against an infrastructure project
of the government.
Therefore, the grant of the Motion to Dismiss was proper.
MEDINA v. CANOY
In a Civil Case filed before the sala of respondent Judge
C, the petitioner therein filed a Petition for Injunction with
prayer for issuance of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against the
respondent spouses therein which were granted. The
TRO was implemented resulting in the transfer of
possession of the properties (duly-licensed primary and
elementary school and church) of the respondent
spouses to the petitioner, and the preliminary injuction
was also granted without a need of bond.
Was the grant of preliminary injunction proper?
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
ANSWER:
No, the grant of the preliminary injunction was not proper.
Well-settled is the rule that an injunction cannot be issued
to transfer possession or control of a property to another
when the legal title is in dispute between the parties and
the legal title has not been clearly established.
In this case, respondent Judge evidently disregarded this
established doctrine applied in numerous cases when it
granted the preliminary injunction of the petitioner of the
civil case before his sala whose legal title is disputed.
Therefore, the grant of the preliminary injunction was not
proper.
REPUBLIC v. NOLASCO
X, as a taxpayer, filed a petition for a temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction in the RTC
to prevent the awarding of a national government project
to Y, a prospective winning bidder. After an ex parte
hearing, the RTC granted a TRO with a period of 20 days,
preventing the DPWH and its BAC from awarding said
project to Y and any of its bidders. DPWH filed a motion
to dismiss the petition and for the dissolution of the TRO,
citing that only the Supreme Court can issue any TRO or
preliminary injunction which restrains or prohibits the
bidding for or awarding of a contract/project of the
national government.
Was the issuance of the TRO proper?
ANSWER:
No. Section 3 of RA 8975 and SC AC 11-2000 enjoins all
courts, except the Supreme Court, from issuing any
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or
preliminary mandatory injunction against the government,
or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity
to restrain, prohibit or compel the bidding or awarding of a
contract or project of the national government. The only
exception would be if the matter is of extreme urgency
involving a constitutional issue, such that unless the
temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and
irreparable injury will arise. Lower courts, however, are
not precluded from assuming jurisdiction over complaints
or petitions that seek as ultimate relief the nullification or
implementation of a national government infrastructure
project. What is expressly prohibited is the issuance of
the provisional reliefs of temporary restraining orders,
preliminary injunctions, and preliminary mandatory
injunctions.
In case at bar, the RTC failed to take account such law
when it issued the TRO and none of the exceptions were
cited as valid ground/s for its issuance.
41
 HERNANDEZ v. NAPOCOR
NAPOCOR is constructing steel poles for a national
power transmission project, with said transmission lines
passing through the homes of residents of Village X.
Village X residents, afraid of the hazardous effects to
their health for being near said transmission lines, sent
their concerns against the project to NAPOCOR and
some government officials. Both sides failed to reach an
agreement, hence Village X residents filed a complaint
with prayer for issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary
injunction against NAPOCOR. The RTC granted the TRO,
but the CA reversed the RTC citing PD 1818 which
prohibits judges from issuing restraining orders against
government infrastructure projects.
Was the CA correct in reversing the RTC’s grant of TRO?
ANSWER:
No. Although PD 1818 prohibits any court from issuing
injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the
prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or
restraining orders against administrative acts in
controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion
in technical cases. However, PD 1818 is not meant to be
a blanket prohibition so as to disregard the fundamental
right to health, safety and well-being of a community
guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land.
In the case at bar, petitioners sought the issuance of a
preliminary injunction on the ground that the NAPOCOR
Project impinged on their right to health as enshrined in
Article II, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution.
Furthermore, for a writ of preliminary injunction to be
issued, the Rules do not require that the act complained
of be in violation of the rights of the applicant but the act
complained of be probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant.
DFA v. FALCON
X, a government agency and Y entered into an
agreement for the implementation of machine readable
passport and visa project. Dispute arose between X and
Y due to alleged breaches by both parties. X terminated
its contract with Y as it is under their contract which
allows him to terminate even without fault subject to the
payment of the actual expenses. X filed for arbitration
with PDRCI. During the pendency of the Request for
Arbitration, X and Y entered into an agreement for the
latter to provide passports compliant with international
standards (E-Passports). X thereafter filed for a Petition
for Interim Relief with the RTC of Pasig. TRO and
thereafter a writ of preliminary injunction were issued by
RTC directed against X.
Will the writ of preliminary injunction prosper?
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
ANSWER:
No. Time and again, this Court has held that to be entitled
to injunctive relief the party seeking such relief must be
able to show grave, irreparable injury that is not capable
of compensation.
In this case, whether this is a termination by the X alone
without fault on the part of Y or a termination due to
default on the part of either party, the contract lay down
the measure of compensation to be paid under the
appropriate circumstances.
NERWIN INDUSTRIES CORP. v. PNOC ENERGY
Y published an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for a
contract. X was one of the bidders. The contract was
awarded to X being the lowest bidder.
Subsequently, A Corp, under the government’s direction,
issued an invitation to pre-qualify and bid for another
project. X filed a civil action in RTC alleging that it was an
attempt to subject portions of the first contract to a
different bidding. He prayed for TRO to enjoin A Corp to
the proposed bidding. A Corp averred that this is in
violation of a rule that government infrastructure are not
subject to TROs.
Will the TRO prosper?
ANSWER:
No. Under Sec 3 of RA 8975 clearly prohibits issuance of
TRO, preliminary injunctions, and preliminary mandatory
injunctions against gov’t. It says:
No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory injunction against the government,
or any of its subdivisions, officials, or any person or entity,
whether public or private, acting under the government’s
direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national
government as defined under Section 2 hereof;
In the present case, it is beyond dispute the propriety of
RTC Judge’s issuance of a preliminary injunction, or the
earlier TRO, for that matter because A Corp it is acting
under the government’s direction.
42
 BAGUIO REGREENERING v. MASWENG
X, claiming that their parents inherited from their
ancestors several parcels of land in what is now known
as the Busol Watershed Reservation (Busol), filed before
the NCIP a Petition for Injunction, with an application for a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), and thereafter a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin Y
government entity from fencing the Busol. The fencing
project would allegedly impede X’s access to and from
their residences, farmlands and water sources, and
dispossess them of their yard where tribal rituals and
ceremonies are usually held. Y then contends that the
NCIP cannot issue such orders because they are
prohibited by RA 8975 them being a government entity.
Is Y correct?
ANSWER:
No. Y is not correct because NCIP is not a court thus not
subject to RA 8975.
Under Sec 3 of RA 8975, no court, except the Supreme
Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction
against the government, or any of its subdivisions,
officials, or any person or entity, whether public or private,
acting under the government’s direction.
In the case at bar, it is clear from the foregoing that the
prohibition covers only judges/courts, and does not apply
to the NCIP or its hearing officers.
REPUBLIC v. EVANGELISTA
X filed a complaint for damages with a prayer for the
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction against Y. X
alleged that he is the owner of the subject land and that Y
illegally entered therein and conducted treasure hunting
activities without his permission. X alleged further that Y
started, digging, tunneling and blasting works on the said
land of X and even assigned about 80 military personnel
to guard the area and encamp thereon to intimidate X
and other occupants of the area from going near the
subject land.
Based on the alleged facts, if you are the judge, will you
grant the prayer for injunction?
ANSWER:
YES. Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that a writ of preliminary injunction
may be issued when it is established x x x x (c) that a
party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or
is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done,
some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or
proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual. Thus, an applicant for a writ is required only to
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show that he has an ostensible right to the final relief
prayed for in his complaint.
In the case at bar, it was established, prima facie, that X,
as the owner of the lot, has a right to peaceful possession
of his land, pendente lite. It was likewise established that
the diggings were conducted by Y in the enclosed area of
X's land.
Thus, it is necessary to issue the writ of preliminary
injunction during the pendency of the main case for
damages in order to preserve the rights and interests of X.
LANDBANK v. CONTINENTAL WATCHMAN
AB agency participated in XY Bank’s Public bidding for
security guard services in their different offices
nationwide. After the evaluation of the bids, it turned out
that AB Agency was the lowest bidder but XY Bank
disqualified the former. AB Agency asked for
reconsideration but was denied so it filed a petition for
injunction and damages with a prayer for a preliminary
mandatory injunction against XY Bank. RTC set for
hearing the application for Preliminary Injunction and
thereafter issued an order granting the same which was
opposed by XY Bank alleging grave abuse of discretion.
Is XY Bank correct?
ANSWER:
No. Section 4. Verified application and bond for
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. — A
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order may
be granted only when:
(a) The application in the action or proceeding is verified,
and shows facts entitling the applicant to the relief
demanded; and
(b) Unless exempted by the court the applicant files with
the court where the action or proceeding is pending, a
bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an
amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the
applicant will pay to such party or person all damages
which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or
temporary restraining order if the court should finally
decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon
approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary
injunction shall be issued.
(c) xxx
(d) The application for a temporary restraining order shall
thereafter be acted upon only after all parties are heard in
a summary hearing which shall be conducted within
twenty-four (24) hours after the sheriff's return of service
and/or the records are received by the branch selected by
raffle and to which the records shall be transmitted
immediately.
43
Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without
notice; exception. — No preliminary injunction shall be
granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or
person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts
shown by affidavits or by the verified application that
great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant
before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to
which the application for preliminary injunction was made,
may issue a temporary restraining order to be effective
only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the
party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein
provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the court
must order said party or person to show cause, at a
specified time and place, why the injunction should not be
granted, determine within the same period whether or not
the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and
accordingly issue the corresponding order.
Doctrine: The rule is well-entrenched that the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction rests upon the sound
discretion of the trial court. It bears reiterating that
Section 4 of Rule 58 gives generous latitude to the trial
courts in this regard for the reason that conflicting claims
in an application for a provisional writ more often than not
involve a factual determination which is not the function of
the appellate courts. Hence, the exercise of sound judicial
discretion by the trial court in injunctive matters must not
be interfered with except when there is manifest abuse,
which is wanting in the present case.
In the given case there is no grave abuse of discretion in
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction where a
party was not deprived of its day in court, as it was heard
and was able to present all its arguments and defenses.
Hence, when contending parties were both given ample
time and opportunity to present their respective evidence
and arguments in support of their opposing contentions,
no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the trial
court which issued the writ of preliminary injunction, as it
is given a generous latitude in this regard, pursuant to
Section 4, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended.
SPOUSES YAP v. INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE
BANK
Spouses AA filed a Complaint for Injunction with prayer
for TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction with the RTC of
Pasig city. They sought to stop the auction sale of the
properties owned by B, for they already owned such by
virtue of Deeds of Absolute sale. However, it was denied.
An auction sale occurred with the properties sold to
respondent Y Bank. Spouses AA filed a complaint for the
issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
On July 18, 2001, it was granted, and on August 13, 2001,
the writ was issued. Y bank filed an appeal, but both CA
and SC denied the appeal for it was not tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. Y bank filed with the RTC of
Pasig City an Omnibus Motion dated January 31, 2006
praying that their pending MR dated Feb. 26, 2001, which
seeks for the dismissal of the case be resolved and/or tbe
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Writ of Preliminary Injunction previously issued be
dissolved. On April 29, 2006, the trial court recalled and
dissolved the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August
13, 2001.
May the trial court recall and dissolve the preliminary
injunction it issued despite the rulings of the Court of
Appeals and by this Court that its issuance was not
tainted with grave abuse of discretion?
ANSWER:
YES. Section 6 of Rule 58 states: Section 6. Grounds for
objection to, or for motion of dissolution of, injunction or
restraining order. – The application for injunction or
restraining order may be denied, upon a showing of its
insufficiency. The injunction or restraining order may also
be denied, or, if granted, may be dissolved, on other
grounds upon affidavits of the party or person enjoined,
which may be opposed by the applicant also by affidavits.
It may further be denied, or, if granted, may be dissolved,
if it appears after hearing that although the applicant is
entitled to the injunction or restraining order, the issuance
or continuance thereof, as the case may be, would cause
irreparable damage to the party or person enjoined while
the applicant can be fully compensated for such damages
as he may suffer, and the former files a bond in an
amount fixed by the court conditioned that he will pay all
damages which the applicant may suffer by the denial or
the dissolution of the injunction or restraining order. If it
appears that the extent of the preliminary injunction or
restraining order granted is too great, it may be modified.
In the case at bar, the trial court, after hearing, found that
respondents duly showed that they would suffer great
and irreparable injury if the injunction shall continue to
exist. As to the second condition, the trial court likewise
found that respondents were willing to post a counter-
bond which could cover the damages that petitioners may
suffer in case the judgment turns out to be adverse to
them. The Order of the trial court to recall and dissolve
the preliminary injunction is subject to the filing and
approval of the counter-bond that it ordered.
44
 RULE 59: RECEIVERSHIP
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS v. GAUZON
Y executed and delivered to X a mortgage upon an
hacienda. Upon failure of Y to pay the mortgage, X
commenced an action for the foreclosure of said
mortgage, and asked a receiver be appointed for the
foreclosure of said mortgage. The court appointed C as
the receiver of the property. After the termination of the
receivership, it appeared that C acted as though his only
responsibility was to the plaintiff.
Who is a receiver?
According to Jurisprudence, the receiver is generally
defined to be "an indifferent person between the parties
litigant, appointed by the court and on behalf of all the
parties, and not of the plaintiff or defendant only.
Sec. 6 of Rule 59 provides that subject to the control of
the court in which the action or proceeding is pending, a
receiver shall have the power to bring and defend, in
such capacity, actions in his own name; to take and keep
possession of the property in controversy; to receive
rents; to collect debts due to himself as receiver or to the
fund, property, estate, person, or corporation of which he
is the receiver; to compound for and compromise the
same; to make transfers; to pay outstanding debts; to
divide the money and other property that shall remain
among the persons legally entitled to receive the same;
and generally to do such acts respecting the property as
the court may authorize. However, funds in the hands of
a receiver may be invested only by order of the court
upon the written consent of all the parties to the action.
No action may be filed by or against a receiver without
leave of the court which appointed him.
VILLAMOR v. UMALE
Company A, represented by X, entered into a MOA with
B which allowed the latter to occupy the area as A’s
sublessee for 4 years. In compliance with the MOA, B
issued 20 post-dated checks, which were given to X, who
did not turn these or over to PPC upon encashment. Y, a
stockholder and director of A, informed the directors that
X should be made to deliver to A and account for B’s
checks or their equivalent. Due to inaction of the directors
of A, Y filed with the RTC an intra-corporate controversy.
He also prayed that a receiver be appointed from his list
of nominees. RTC denied his prayer for appointment of a
receiver or the creation of a management committee. Y
filed with the CA a petition for ceritiorari and the same
was granted. It issued a new order placing A under
receivership and creating an interim management
committee.
Is the act of the CA correct when it placed A under
receivership?
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SCHOOL OF LAW
ANSWER:
No. Jurisprudence dictates that the Court of Appeals has
no power to appoint a receiver or management committee.
The Regional Trial Court has original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide intra-corporate
controversies, including incidents of such controversies.
These incidents include applications for the appointment
of receivers or management committees.
The receiver and members of the management
committee . . . are considered officers of the court and
shall be under its control and supervision." They are
required to report to the court on the status of the
corporation within sixty (60) days from their appointment
and every three (3) months after.
When respondent Y filed his petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals, there was still a pending action in the
trial court. No less than the Court of Appeals stated that it
allowed respondent Y's petition under Rule 65 because
the order or resolution in question was an interlocutory
one. This means that jurisdiction over the main case was
still lodged with the trial court.
The court making the appointment controls and
supervises the appointed receiver or management
committee. Thus, the Court of Appeals' appointment of a
management committee would result in an absurd
scenario wherein while the main case is still pending
before the trial court, the receiver or management
committee reports' to the Court of Appeals.
Is the CA correct in and creating an interim management
committee?
ANSWER:
No. Sec 1 of Rule 58 provides that Upon a verified
application, one or more receivers of the property subject
of the action or proceeding may be appointed by the court
where the action is pending, or by the Court of Appeals or
by the Supreme Court, or a member thereof, in the
following cases:
(a) When it appears from the verified application, and
such other proof as the court may require, that the party
applying for the appointment of a receiver has an interest
in the property or fund which is the subject of the action
or proceeding, and that such property or fund is in danger
of being lost, removed, or materially injured unless a
receiver be appointed to administer and preserve it;
(b) When it appears in an action by the mortgagee for the
foreclosure of a mortgage that the property is in danger of
being wasted or dissipated or materially injured, and that
its value is probably insufficient to discharge the
mortgage debt, or that the parties have so stipulated in
the contract of mortgage;
(c) After judgment, to preserve the property during the
pendency of an appeal, or to dispose of it according to
45
the judgment, or to aid execution when the execution has
been returned unsatisfied or the judgment obligor refuses
to apply his property in satisfaction of the judgment, or
otherwise to carry the judgment into effect;
(d) Whenever in other cases it appears that the
appointment of a receiver is the most convenient and
feasible means of preserving, administering, or disposing
of the property in litigation.
During the pendency of an appeal, the appellate court
may allow an application for the appointment of a receiver
to be filed in and decided by the court of origin and the
receiver appointed to be subject to the control of said
court. Respondent Y, however, failed to show that there
was an imminent danger of paralysis of PPC's business
operations. Apparently, A was- earning substantial
amounts from its other sub-lessees. Respondent
Balmores did not prove otherwise. He, therefore, failed to
show at least one of the requisites for appointment of a
receiver or management committee.
BELGIAN CATHOLIC MISSIONARIES v.
MAGALLANES PRESS
B obtained two loans: 1st loan Php140K from XYZ Inc.
evidenced by Promissory Notes and secured by chattel
mortgage on all printing machinery and its accessories of
B. 2ND loan Php30.5K from A, secured by a chattel
mortgage on the same printing machinery and its
accessories of B it had previously mortgaged to XYZ Inc.
All the Promissory Notes executed by B in favor of XYZ
Inc. having been overdue for non-payment of installments,
XYZ Inc. transferred all of its mortgage credit against B to
C for Php8,280 the balance of mortgage credit.
B obtained an additional loan of Php5,900 from C, and
executed a deed in favor of C, by virtue of which, the
original chattel mortgage covering the first loan was made
to cover for the additional loan as well.
B’s building caught fire. Some of the printing machinery,
its accessories and other personal property of B were
destroyed. Since the property was insured, C sought to
claim from the insurance company and also sought to
foreclose the properties subject of the mortgage.
However, A filed a petition for a writ of injunction to stop
award of the proceeds of the insurance to C, with an
action to nullify the transfer of mortgage credit to C and
the extension of mortgage for the additional loan.
CFI: transfer of mortgage credit to C and the extension of
mortgage for the additional loan is null and void in so far
as it prejudice rights of A. Preliminary injunction against
C is made final and absolute.
Did the trial court erred in giving the plaintiff corporation
possession of the property mortgaged to this appellant
without following the necessary proceedings or complying
with the provisions of the law?
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ANSWER:
No. The writ of preliminary injunction having been issued,
upon the filing of a bond in the sum of Php15K, and there
being no person more interested in the conservation and
custody of the property covered by the mortgage than C,
being the largest creditor, it applied and obtained from the
court the possession of the same.
This case is not one of a replevin, but simply a
proceeding instituted by C for the deposit of the property
in litigation, upon the filing of a bond, wherein C, acting as
a receiver by authority of the court, being the person most
interested in the conservation and care of the same.
PO PAUCO v. SIGUENZA
Case 1: X obtained final judgment in his favor against
defendants Y and Z, both parties agreeing to deduct
therefrom the sum of which is the net value of the sugar
cane belonging to said defendants and attached by the
plaintiff and manufactured by PNB, the receiver of the
said product.
Case 2: A had obtained judgment against X, execution of
said judgment having been ordered in those proceedings,
which has not yet, even partially been paid.
A intervened in Case 1, for the satisfaction of judgment in
its favor in Case 2, against property in the hands of PNB,
the receiver.
Is the property in the hands of the receiver within the
reach of processes of different courts?
ANSWER:
No. The sum mentioned is in the custody of a receiver
and not of a sheriff.
The sheriff is a court officer of a general character who is
not appointed for certain judicial case; the sheriff is an
officer who exercises or can exercise his functions within
the limits of his jurisdiction. A receiver, on the other hand,
is a special officer, appointed in relation to and within a
certain case or action, and whose duties are limited to his
sphere of action, and do not extend further than the case
in which he was appointed.
For this reason, while the funds in the custody of a sheriff
may be within the reach of processed coming from other
judicial proceeding, such is not the case with respect to
those under the custody of a depositary. From which it
follows that those who, as in the discharges his duties,
and there, by motion or petition, allege and prove their
claims.
46
 BERG v. TEUS
X brought the action against Y to foreclose a real estate
and chattel mortgage executed in November, 1944, to
secure six promissory notes of the aggregate value of
P80,000 and payable on demand two years after
declaration of armistice between the United States and
Japan. Mortgagor had undertaken, among other things,
to insure and pay the taxes on the mortgaged properties;
not to alienate, sell, lease, encumber or in any manner
dispose thereof; and to keep and maintain the said
properties in good order and repair. Y had failed to keep
taxes fully paid; had made material alterations on the
premises, and had sold and conveyed them to ABC. The
mortgage shall be deemed to be automatically foreclosed
and the mortgagee may forthwith proceed to foreclose
this mortgage either extra-judicially, even after the death
of the mortgagor, in pursuance of the provisions of Act No.
3135, as amended.
On basis of this agreement it was prayed that the
mortgage be declared automatically foreclosed and X
entitled to immediate possession of the properties in
question. X's attorney also asked for the appointment of a
receiver.
Y having moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the
grounds that X’s cause of action had not accrued by
reason of the executive orders, and having opposed the
motion for receivership, Judge H entered an order holding
that as to the collection of the six notes the suit had been
prematurely brought, setting the cause for trial on the
merits because, the reasons alleged in the motion to
dismiss were not "indubitable" with reference to the
appointment of a receiver sought by X. The moratorium
ought not to interfere with X’s motion for appointment of
receiver.
Y filed a new motion to dismiss; Judge O, replaced Judge
H, ignoring the latter's order entered the order now on
appeal by which the entire action was quashed on the
theory advanced in the motion to dismiss.
The new order was silent on both the application for
receivership and the prayer that X be adjudged
authorized by the terms of the mortgage to foreclose it
extra-judicially and seize the properties.
Should the case be dismissed?
ANSWER:
No. The fact that the appointment of receiver is an
ancillary remedy is precisely one powerful reason why the
case should not be dismissed; dismissal of the main
action would eliminate the only basis for the appointment
of a receiver and thus completely bar the door to any
relief from mischiefs.
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TANTANO v. ESPINA-CABOVERDE
Couple X and Y allegedly sold to Z a parcel of land which
was disputed by W, however upon the death of X all other
parties to the case agreed to a Partial Settlement
Agreement. Partial Settlement agreement was
conditioned that Y shall be given a portion of the net
income of the disputed property for sustenance and
medication but such property will still be placed in the
position of Z. However, Y fearing that the whole of the
property will be appropriated by Z to herself filed a case
for receivership alleging that it is the most appropriate
remedy as she is fearing that she being of old age might
not see the end of the case which was then granted by
the court relying on Sec. 1 (a) of Rule 59.
Was the court correct in granting Z’s petition for
receivership?
ANSWER:
No. Sec. 1 (a) so provides that when it appears from the
verified application and such other proof as the court may
require, that the party applying for the appointment of a
receiver has an interest in the property or fund which is
the subject of the action or proceeding, and that such
property or fund is in danger of being lost or removed, or
materially injured unless a receiver be appointed to
administer and preserve it.
In the present case, there is no clear showing that the
disputed properties are in danger of being lost or
materially impaired and that placing them under
receivership is the most convenient and feasible means
to preserve and administer or dispose them. It merely
appears that Y instituted receivership to ensure that she
would receive her share in the income of the disputed
properties. It is worthy to note that appointment should
only be made in extreme cases and on a clear showing of
necessity in order to save the plaintiff from grave and
irremediable loss or damage.
VIVARES V. REYES
J and P agreed to partition the properties they inherited
but when J died his appointed Executor and Administrator
instituted an action against P alleging that J was not able
to claim his just share of the inheritance. This then led to
the filing of a case in court and having the properties
annotated with a notice of lis pendens. Subsequent
thereof, Executor and Administrator applied for the
appointment of a receiver alleging that P transferred
several common properties to the prejudice of the former
and without court approval and that he has been enjoying
constantly the fruits and income of the properties without
rendering proper accounting. The said application was
granted by the court.
Was the court correct in granting the petition?
47
ANSWER:
No. Section 1 of Rule 59 provides for exclusive grounds
to grant receivership. Further, jurisprudence provides that
receivership is only granted in extreme situations.
In the present case, the petitioner was not able to prove
any fraud and that there was no sufficient cause or
reason to justify placing the disputed properties under
receivership. Further the grounds upon which the said
receivership application was not one of those exclusively
enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 59.
CHAVEZ V. CA
X was the owner of a five-hectare land while Y occupied
a portion thereof. While X was preoccupied on another
thing Y offered to take care of the said land subject to a
profit-sharing agreement.
Subsequently X filed a case against Y coupled with an
application for receivership alleging that Y was not able to
remit profit several times. The said receivership was
denied by the RTC, thus, the case was elevated to the
Court of Appeals.
Should the Court of Appeals grant the application for
receivership?
ANSWER:
No. Section 1 (a) of Rule 59 provides that when it
appears in the verified application, and such other proof
as the court may require, that the party applying for the
appointment of a receiver has an interest in the property
or fund which is the subject of the action or proceeding,
and that such property or fund is in danger of being lost,
removed or materially injured unless a receiver be
appointed to administer and preserve it;
In the case at bar, X’s main gripe is that Y deprived her of
her share of the land’s produce. She does not claim that
the land or its productive capacity would disappear or be
wasted if not entrusted to a receiver. Nor does X claim
that the land has been materially injured, necessitating its
protection and preservation. Because receivership is a
harsh remedy that can be granted only in extreme
situations.
X has not proven a clear right to its issuance, thus,
receivership should not be granted.
DESCALLAR v. CA
X, a realtor, alleges that he bought 3 parcels of land from
Y, an Austrian national and a former lover of Z, a Filipina.
Based on the deed of sale which the Austrian made in his
favor, X filed an action to recover the ownership and
possession of the house and lots from Z and asked for
the issuance of new transfer certificates of title in his
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name; and petitioned for the appointment of a receiver on
grounds that Z is attempting to dispose of the property. It
is noted that in the TCT, it appears that Z is the named
owner, and possessor, of the disputed land. The RTC
granted the appointment of the receiver; which order was
sustained by the CA.
Is the appointment of receiver proper?
ANSWER:
No. Relief by way of receivership is equitable in nature,
and a court of equity will not ordinarily appoint a receiver
where the rights of the parties depend on the
determination of adverse claims of legal title to real
property and one party is in possession. (Calo, et al. v.
Roldan)
In this case, there is no showing that grave or
irremediable damage may result to X unless a receiver is
appointed. The property in question is real property,
hence, it is neither perishable or consummable. Even
though it is mortgaged to a third person, there is no
evidence that payment of the mortgage obligation is
being neglected. In any event, X's rights and interests,
may be adequately protected during the pendency of the
case by causing his adverse claim to be annotated on the
Z's certificates of title.
MAKING ENTERPRISES v. MARFORI
A acquired a B Building from C Bank. The building stood
on the land owned by the Philippine Ports Authority(PPA)
prompting A to lease the said lot for 25 years, renewable
for a similar period and subject to the condition that upon
expiration of the lease, the building and all other
improvements found thereon shall become PPA’s sole
property. A few years later, A executed a dacion en pago
assignment of rights transferring the ownership of B
Building to D Inc. on the condition that the latter would
assume all of A’s obligations.
A’s wife, W, alleged that the building is part of their
conjugal property and that she did not consent to the
transfer. She sought, among others, to annul the dacion
en pago and assignment of rights and prayed for the
appointment of a receiver to preserve the rentals of the
building. RTC denied the prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction and the application for
receivership. CA granted the petition and appointed a
receiver. The CA found that unless a receiver is
appointed, there is a danger of loss or material injury
considering that petitioners possess absolute control of
the building.
Did the CA erred in granting the application for
appointment of a receiver?
48
ANSWER:
Yes. An application for the appointment of a receiver
under Section 1(a), Rule 59 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, requires that the property or
fund subject of the action is in danger of being lost,
removed, or materially injured, necessitating its protection
or preservation. Section 1 provides:
SECTION 1. Appointment of receiver.--Upon a verified
application, one or more receivers of the property subject
of the action or proceeding may be appointed by the court
where the action is pending, or by the Court of Appeals or
by the Supreme Court, or a member thereof, in the
following cases: (a) When it appears from the verified
application, and such other proof as the court may require,
that the party applying for the appointment of a receiver
has an interest in the property or fund which is the subject
of the action or proceeding, and that such property or
fund is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially
injured unless a receiver be appointed to administer and
preserve it;
Respondents failed to show how the building as well as
the income thereof would disappear or be wasted if not
entrusted to a receiver. They were not able to prove that
the property has been materially injured, necessitating its
protection and preservation. Because receivership is a
harsh remedy that can be granted only in extreme
situations, respondents must prove a clear right to its
issuance. This they failed to do.
Respondents failed to show how the building as well as
the income thereof would disappear or be wasted if not
entrusted to a receiver. They were not able to prove that
the property has been materially injured, necessitating its
protection and preservation. Because receivership is a
harsh remedy that can be granted only in extreme
situations, respondents must prove a clear right to its
issuance. This they failed to do.
BONAPLATA v. AMBER
In an action for the recovery of a debt the plaintiff A, after
stating a cause of action, alleged that the defendant B
was insolvent and asked for the appointment of a receiver
to take charge of defendant’s business and manage it,
under the control of the court, for the benefit of creditors.
A receiver was appointed for that purpose and all persons
were enjoined from interfering with the property in his
hands. After appointment of the receiver, C, another
creditor, recovered a judgment in the same court against
the defendant, but the clerk of the court, by direction of
the judge, refused to issue execution thereon.
Is the creditor bound by the order appointing a receiver?
ANSWER:
No. As a general rule the appointment of a receiver is an
equitable remedy and before such remedy is resorted to,
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except in certain prescribed cases, the legal remedy must
be exhausted.
Hence, B (the creditor) is entitled to a writ of mandamus
to compel the issuance of execution on his judgment.
HARDEN v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
Spouses X and Y are in a civil case against one another
involving their conjugal partnership, with a receiver
appointed for the said case. While the civil case was
ongoing and without the knowledge of Mrs. Y, Mr. X
caused the transfer of certain properties to various
entities and persons through a bank in Hong Kong. Mrs.
Y filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court for
the return of the transferred properties, which the latter
ruled in her favour and ordered the return of said
amounts to the DEF Bank – Manila Branch. Along with
the Supreme Court’s decision is the order to return the
ABC Corporation stock certificates owned by the spouses
and deposit the same to the DEF Bank – Manila Branch,
in accordance to the demands of the receiver in the
principal civil case. After repeated failure to comply with
the return of said stock certificates, citing registration
procedures pursuant to a new law, Mr. X was cited for
contempt of court and was incarcerated in the New Bilibid
Prisons.
Considering that the subject property is situated abroad,
does the court have jurisdiction to effect the receivership
on the party holding the said property?
ANSWER:
Yes. While a court cannot give its receiver authority to act
in another state without the assistance of the courts
thereof, yet it may act directly upon the parties before it
with respect to property beyond the territorial limits of its
jurisdiction, and hold them in contempt if they resist the
court's orders with reference to its custody or disposition.
In Sercomb v. Catlin, 21 N. E., 606-608, the Supreme
Court of Illinois said:
It is true that the property attached is beyond the
jurisdiction of the courts of this state, but the appellant,
who caused it to be attached, is in this state, and within
the jurisdiction of its courts. If the superior court had no
power to reach the goods in Newton's hands, it had the
power to reach appellant, who sought to prevent its
receiver from getting possession of the goods. It makes
no difference that the property was in a foreign
jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the punishment meted out to the petitioner
is not excessive. It is suitable and adapted to its objective;
and it accords with section 7, Rule 64, of the Rules of
Court which provides that "when the contempt consists in
the omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the
accused to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of a
superior court until he performs it. The failure of the order
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of commitment to state that the acts which the contemner
fails to do are still in his power to perform, does not void
the order of imprisonment.
COMMODITIES STORAGE ICE PLANT v. CA
Spouses Z obtained a loan from the Iron Bank to
purchase DEF Plant, with the latter used as a mortgage
to secure the said loan. After Spouses Z failed to pay the
loan, Iron Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage
and sold the DEF Plant through a bidding with Iron Bank
as the highest bidder.
Spouses Z filed a case against Iron Bank for the
reformation of the loan contract and the annulment of the
foreclosure sale but the RTC dismissed the case. Another
case for damages, accounting and fixing of the
‘redemption’ period was filed by Spouses Z, accompanied
with an ‘Urgent Petition for Receivership’ citing that DEF
Plant was in danger of being lost, removed and materially
injured under Section 1(b), Rule 59 of the Rules of Court,
because of the following "imminent perils:”
a. Danger to the lives, health and peace of mind of the
inhabitants living near the DEF Plant;
b. Drastic action or sanctions that could be brought
against Spouses Z by affected third persons, including
workers who have claims against Spouses Z but could
not be paid due to the numbing manner by which the
defendant took the DEF Plant;
c. The rapid reduction of DEF Plant into a scrap heap
because of evident incompetence, neglect and vandalism.
Should the petition for receivership be granted?
ANSWER:
No. A petition for receivership under Section 1 (b) of Rule
59 requires that the property or fund which is the subject
of the action must be in danger of loss, removal or
material injury which necessitates protection or
preservation. The guiding principle is the prevention of
imminent danger to the property. If an action by its nature,
does not require such protection or reservation, said
remedy cannot be applied for and granted.
Spouses Z have not sufficiently shown that the DEF Plant
is in danger of disappearing or being wasted and reduced
to a "scrap heap." Neither have they proven that the
property has been materially injured which necessitates
its protection and preservation.
 CALO v. ROLDAN
Sansa and Arya Stark, owners and possessors of a
parcel of land in Winterfell, filed a case against Cersei
Lannister who intends or is intending to enter, use and
harvest fruits of said parcel of land through the use of
force, stealth, strategy and intimidation. With the
complaint filed by the Stark sisters is a prayer for the
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issuance of a preliminary injunction ex parte, to restrain
Cersei from entering, interfering and harvesting fruits
from the said land. Cersei opposed the issuance of a
preliminary injunction contending that she is the owner of
the land and is in actual possession thereof. The RTC
denied the petition for preliminary injunction, hence the
Stark sisters filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Pending
the resolution of the said MR, the Stark sisters filed an
‘urgent petition ex parte’ urging that the MR be decided in
their favour and that a receiver must be appointed on the
ground that:
(a) the plaintiffs have an interest in the properties in
question, and the fruits thereof were in danger of being
lost unless a receiver was appointed; and
(b) the appointment of a receiver was the most
convenient and feasible means of preserving,
administering and or disposing of the properties in
litigation which included their fruits.
Should a receiver be appointed?
ANSWER:
No. Attachment may be issued only in the case or actions
specifically stated in section 1, Rule 59, in order that the
defendant may not dispose of his property attached, and
thus secure the satisfaction of any judgment that may be
recovered by plaintiff from defendant. For that reason a
property subject of litigation between the parties, or
claimed by plaintiff as his, cannot be attached upon
motion of the same plaintiff.
A receiver may be appointed to take charge of personal
or real property which is the subject of an ordinary civil
action, when it appears that the party applying for the
appointment of a receiver has an interest in the property
or fund which is the subject of the action or litigation, and
that such property or fund is in danger of being lost,
removed or materially injured unless a receiver is
appointed to guard and preserve it (section 1 [b], Rule 61);
or when it appears that the appointment of a receiver is
the most convenient and feasible means of preserving,
administering or disposing of the property in litigation
(section 1 [e] of said Rule). The property or fund must,
therefore be in litigation according to the allegations of
the complaint, and the object of appointing a receiver is to
secure and preserve the property or thing in controversy
pending the litigation. Of course, if it is not in litigation and
is in actual possession of the plaintiff, the latter cannot
apply for and obtain the appointment of a receiver thereof,
for there would be no reason for such appointment.
Appointment of a receiver is not proper or does not lie in
an action of injunction such as the one filed by the plaintiff.
The petition for appointment of a receiver filed by the
plaintiffs is based on the ground that it is the most
convenient and feasible means of preserving,
administering and disposing of the properties in litigation;
and according to plaintiffs' theory or allegations in their
complaint, neither the lands nor the fruits harvested
therein, are in litigation. The litigation or issue raised by
50
plaintiffs in their complaint is not the ownership or
possession of the lands and their fruits. It is whether or
not defendants intend or were intending to enter or work
or harvest whatever existing fruits could then be found in
the lands described in the complaint, alleged to be the
exclusive property and in the actual possession of the
plaintiffs. It is a matter not only of law but of plain
common sense that a plaintiff will not and legally cannot
ask for the appointment or receiver of property which he
alleges to belong to him and to be actually in his
possession. For the owner and possessor of a property is
more interested than persons in preserving and
administering it.
Relief by way of receivership is equitable in nature, and a
court of equity will not ordinarily appoint a receiver where
the rights of the parties depend on the determination of
adverse claims of legal title to real property and one party
is in possession.
YLARDE v. ENRIQUEZ
X was the legal or common law wife of Y, now deceased.
In Y’s life time and during their marriage or cohabitation,
he granted X a free patent to a homestead measuring
fifteen hectares. After Y died, an extrajudicial partition
was executed by X wherein she falsely declared under
oath that she was the sole heiress of the estate in
question. Following that so-called extrajudicial partition a
transfer certificate of title was issued in X’s name
cancelling the original document.
Z, X’s collateral relatives, brought the action against her
for the ownership of a part of the property including the
harvested or standing crops therein and thereafter
applied for the remedy of receivership.
Was the remedy of Receivership proper in this case?
ANSWER:
No. Under Rule 59, Sec.1 of the Rules of Court, Section 1.
Appointment of receiver. — Upon a verified application,
one or more receivers of the property subject of the
action or proceeding may be appointed by the court
where the action is pending or by the Court of Appeals or
by the Supreme Court, or a member thereof, in the
following cases:
(a) When it appears from the verified application, and
such other proof as the court may require, that the party
applying for the appointment of a receiver has an interest
in the property or fund which is the subject of the action
or proceeding, and that such property or fund is in danger
of being lost, removed, or materially injured unless a
receiver be appointed to administer and preserve it;
In the present case, the land which is the subject matter
of the suit here is not in any danger of disappearing or
being wasted. There is no pretense that it has any
permanent improvements or fixtures which produce
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income, rents or profits to be collected or preserved. Also,
Z have no interest or title to the crops planted on or
harvested from the property, or to any part of the
proceeds of the crops, or to the management of the
enterprise. Their title to the crops is contingent upon their
success in proving their asserted title to the soil, which is
still to be decided. And even if they should ultimately
succeed in that, their rights to the products would still be
dependent upon many factors yet undetermined.
ROCHA CO. v. CROSSFIELD
X commenced an action against Y Co. in which he
alleged that a limited partnership had been formed
between him and Y Co. and that he was a general
partner thereof. He withdrew from the partnership and
sought to receive his proportionate part of the reserve
fund and of the sinking fund in accordance with the terms
of the articles of partnership. Thereafter, X made an
application to the court for the appointment of a receiver.
Is there a valid ground for the appointment of a receiver
in this case?
ANSWER:
No. Under Rule 59, Sec.1 of the Rules of Court,
Section 1. Appointment of receiver. — Upon a verified
application, one or more receivers of the property subject
of the action or proceeding may be appointed by the court
where the action is pending or by the Court of Appeals or
by the Supreme Court, or a member thereof, in the
following cases:
(a) When it appears from the verified application, and
such other proof as the court may require, that the party
applying for the appointment of a receiver has an interest
in the property or fund which is the subject of the action
or proceeding, and that such property or fund is in danger
of being lost, removed, or materially injured unless a
receiver be appointed to administer and preserve it;
(b) When it appears in an action by the mortgagee for the
foreclosure of a mortgage that the property is in danger of
being wasted or dissipated or materially injured, and that
its value is probably insufficient to discharge the
mortgage debt, or that the parties have so stipulated in
the contract of mortgage;
(c) After judgment, to preserve the property during the
pendency of an appeal, or to dispose of it according to
the judgment, or to aid execution when the execution has
been returned unsatisfied or the judgment obligor refuses
to apply his property in satisfaction of the judgment, or
otherwise to carry the judgment into effect;
(d) Whenever in other cases it appears that the
appointment of a receiver is the most convenient and
feasible means of preserving, administering, or disposing
of the property in litigation.
51
The case at bar does not fall within any of the provisions
of this section. There is no allegation in the complaint that
the plaintiff is the owner of any of the property of Y Co.,
nor is there any allegation that he has any lien thereon,
nor are there any facts alleged from which it could be
inferred that he was owner of such property or had any
lien thereon. Therefore, the appointment of a receiver is
not proper.
PARANETE v. TAN
X filed a case for the recovery of five parcels of the land
against Y. X filled a petition for a writ of preliminary
injunction for the purpose of ousting Y from the lands in
litigation and of having themselves placed in possession
thereof. The petition was heard ex parte and as a result Z,
the judge, granted the writ of injunction requested. Y
moved for the reconsideration of the order granting the
writ, to which X objected, and after due hearing, Z
reconsidered his order, but required Y to render an
accounting of the harvest, as well as all future harvests,
and if the harvest had already been sold, to deposit the
proceeds of the sale with the clerk of court, allowing the X
to be present during each harvest.
Was the order of the judge proper? Explain.
ANSWER:
No. Under Under Rule 59, Sec.1 of the Rules of Court,
Section 1. Appointment of receiver. — Upon a verified
application, one or more receivers of the property subject
of the action or proceeding may be appointed by the court
where the action is pending or by the Court of Appeals or
by the Supreme Court, or a member thereof, in the
following cases:
When it appears from the verified application, and such
other proof as the court may require, that the party
applying for the appointment of a receiver has an interest
in the property or fund which is the subject of the action
or proceeding, and that such property or fund is in danger
of being lost, removed, or materially injured unless a
receiver be appointed to administer and preserve it;
In the case at bar, the order, in effect, made the clerk of
court a sort of a receiver charged with the duty of
receiving the proceeds of sale and the harvest of every
year during the pendency of the case with the
disadvantage that the clerk of court has not filed any
bond to guarantee the faithful discharge of his duties as
depositary; And considering that in actions involving title
to real property, the appointment of a receiver cannot be
entertained because its effect would be to take the
property out of the possession of the defendant, except in
extreme cases when there is clear proof of its necessity
to save the plaintiff from grave and irremediable loss or
damage, which is not present in this case. It is evident
that the action of the respondent judge is unwarranted
and unfair to Y.
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TANTANO v. CABOVERDE
A, B and C, D are children of X and Y. C and D allegedly,
are registered owners and in possession of Lots 2, 3 and
4 after having bought this from their parents. C and D
filed a complaint and prayed for annulment of the Deed of
Sale which transferred Lots 2, 3 and 4 from their parents
to A and B. Y, the father, died and was substituted by his
children and wife. X filed a motion to intervene separately
in the case, claiming that there never was a sale of the
three (3) contested parcels of land in favor of C and D. X
thereafter filed for receivership claiming that she had a
legal interest in the controverted properties and their
produce, she could not enjoy them, since the income
derived was solely appropriated by C and D; and that she
also needs the income of the lots for her daily sustenance
and medical expenses.
Is the remedy of receivership proper in this case?
ANSWER:
No. Under Rule 59, Sec.1 of the Rules of Court, Section 1.
Appointment of receiver. — Upon a verified application,
one or more receivers of the property subject of the
action or proceeding may be appointed by the court
where the action is pending or by the Court of Appeals or
by the Supreme Court, or a member thereof, in the
following cases:
(b) When it appears from the verified application, and
such other proof as the court may require, that the party
applying for the appointment of a receiver has an interest
in the property or fund which is the subject of the action
or proceeding, and that such property or fund is in danger
of being lost, removed, or materially injured unless a
receiver be appointed to administer and preserve it;
(d) Whenever in other cases it appears that the
appointment of a receiver is the most convenient and
feasible means of preserving, administering, or disposing
of the property in litigation.
In the present case, X’s alleged need for income to defray
her medical expeses and support is not a valid
justification for the appointment of a receiver. While Rule
59, Sec.1 (d) is couched in general terms and broad in
scope however, even in cases falling under such
provision, it is essential that there is a clear showing that
there is imminent danger that the properties sought to be
placed under receivership will be lost, wasted or injured
and that the appointment of a receiver was the most
convenient and feasible means to preserve their integrity.
However, in this case, such was imminent danger was
not presented and proved therefore, receivership is not
proper in this case.
52
 CITIBANK v. CA
X due to a loan agreement with Y issued a promissory
note and a loan agreement to the latter. Subsequent
thereof, Y instituted a case with the provisional remedy of
replevin against X due to the latter’s delay which was
contended by X that Y was not able to release the loaned
amount. Despite the strong opposition of X, replevin was
granted but the properties were never seized since they
were encouraged by the court to come into an amicable
settlement, to which both parties agreed that after a joint
management Y will be the receiver of X’s company.
For failure to agree, the case was decided on the merits
and properties were then seized in favour of Y which then
was appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals reversed the ruling of the RTC finding that Y was
not able to comply with the requisites of oath and bond.
Was the Court of Appeals correct?
ANSWER:
Yes. Sec. 4 of Rule 59 provides that “before entering
upon his duties, the receiver must be sworn to perform
them faithfully and shall file a bond, executed to such
person and in such sum as the court may direct, to the
effect that he will faithfully discharge his duties in the
action or proceeding and obey the orders of the court.
Y in the present case by virtue of the mortgage contract
was not required to file a bond in case of receivership.
However, it is worthy to note that Y was not able to fulfil
the requirement of taking an oath. Thus, the trial court
erred in allowing the petitioner to assume receivership
over the company of X without requiring the appointed
receiver to take an oath.
VIVARES v. REYES
Z and Y inherited properties which they subsequently
agreed to partition, after the death of Z, X was appointed
as Executor and Administrator who then instituted and
action against P and applied for receivership alleging that
pending litigation and to the prejudice of the latter, without
the permission of the Court, Y sold common properties.
The said application was subsequently granted, Y then
offered to file a counterbond to discharge the receiver but
to no avail.
Was the court correct in denying the counterbond?
ANSWER:
No. Sec. 3 Denial of application or discharge of
receiver – The application may be denied, or the receiver
discharged, when the adverse party files a bond executed
to the applicant, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to
the effect that such party will pay the applicant all
damages he may suffer by reason of the acts, omissions,
or other matter specified in the application as ground for
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such appointment. The receiver may also be discharged
if it is shown that his appointment was obtained without
sufficient cause.
Anchored on this rule, the trial court should have
dispensed with the services of the receiver, more so
considering that the alleged fraud put forward to justify
the receivership was not at all established. However, it
may be stressed that the rule uses the word may, thus it
is to be construed as permissive such that the court has
to consider the posting of the counterbond in addition to
other reasons presented by the offeror why the
receivership has to be set aside.
MARTINEZ v. GRANO
A (Estanislao Reyes) was appointed as receiver and
entered into possession the property in controversy in
January 1921. During this period, the property did not
produce enough income to meet the expenses and pay
the sum due to the first mortgage, El Hogar Filipino. Thus,
he recommended to the court that the property be sold.
The court made an order authorizing the receiver to sell
the land with the condition that the proceeds of the sale
must be deposited to the clerk’s office. Meanwhile,
receiver reported that there is no purchaser of the
property and he himself came forward making an offer to
take the property with an understanding that he would
assume all obligations encumbering it. B (Grano),
opposed the sale because it included the three parcels of
property belonged to her. Thus, the court rendered
decision excluding the three parcels of land which
belongs to B. When the decision was returned to the
lower court, A submitted a motion asking the court to
declare him as owner of the property.
In response, Judge X instead declared that the approved
sale was a nullity on the ground that Reyes violated the
condition imposed upon by the court. Thus, Judge X
revoked his appointment as receiver and ordered him to
rendered an account and deliver the property immediately.
Should the receiver-appellant be removed as a receiver
for not having complied with the conditions imposed?
ANSWER:
Yes. There cannot be the slightest doubt of the power of
the lower court to remove a receiver and terminate a
receivership under Section 180 of the Code of Civil
Procedure; and in view of the attitude of the appellant, the
impropriety of his longer remaining in office is apparent.
Under the rules, a receiver who asserts ownership over
the property in his hands as receiver and refuses to
submit any account of the financial status of said property
should be removed by the court having charge of the
receivership.
53
In the case at bar, A still pretended to be the owner of the
property by virtue of the purchase and still refused to
submit any account of his receivership in the subsequent
years. Thus, A’s noncompliance of the conditions
imposed in line to his appointment as receiver results to
his removal and ordered him to rendered an account and
deliver the property immediately to the parties in interest
all the properties on its present condition.
PLATON v. SANDOVAL
A (platon) was appointed as a receiver pending the
litigation of the main case for the annulment of sale made
by spouses X (Roman) and Y (Servanda) in favor of B
brother of X. D (Ines, one of the heirs of the deceased Y)
who instituted the civil case to annul the sale and move
for the discharge of the receiver on the ground that there
no longer necessity of the continuation of a receiver since
the B had renounce his claim over the property and that
the heirs of the deceased had agreed upon the partition
of the said property as approved by the probate court.
Should the receiver be discharged?
ANSWER:
Yes. Under the rules, a receiver may be discharged when
the court, upon motion or motu prorprio, determines that
the necessity for a receiver no longer exist. Furthermore,
the receiver, being an officer of the court and not the
agent or representative of either party to the action, has
no legal interest or standing to question the court's
determination that the necessity for the continuation of
the receivership has ceased to exist.
In the case at hand, we find no excess of jurisdiction nor
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent
judge. The property in litigation and under receivership
belongs to the intestate estate of the Y, deceased wife of
the X. B, who is not a heir of said deceased, does not
claim ownership of said property and has signed his
conformity to the discharge of the receiver. And the heirs
of said deceased have agreed upon the partition of said
property with the approval of the probate court.
Thus, it seems clear, that the declaration of the
respondent judge that there was no longer any necessity
for the continuation of the receivership was well founded.
ORENDAIN v BF HOMES
Y, a domestic corporation involved in developing and
selling residential lots filed a petition for rehabilitation and
suspension of payments due to its liabilities. SEC ordered
the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver with herein X
as Chairman. Y represented by petitioner X sold a parcel
of land to the Local Superior of the Franciscan Sisters of
the Immaculate Phils. Inc (LSFSIPI). SEC ordered a new
committee of receivers and relieved X of its duties. Y then
filed before the court an action for reconveyance of the
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property sold to LSFSIPI alleging X acted in its individual
capacity and therefore had no title over the property. X
argues RTC had no jurisdiction over the case since Y's
suit was instituted against him as its former receiver.
Does the reconveyance suit involve a intracorporate
dispute cognizable by SEC?
ANSWER:
No. The SC once held that jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred by law. The nature of an action, as
well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
determined based on the allegations contained in the
complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein. The LSFSIPI is neither an officer
nor a stockholder of Y, and this case does not involve
intra-corporate proceedings. In addition, the seller, X, is
being sued in his individual capacity for the unauthorized
sale of the property in controversy.
Hence, there is no cogent reason to sustain petitioner’s
manifestation that the resolution of the instant
controversy depends on the ratification by the SEC of the
acts of its agent or the receiver because the act of X was
allegedly not within the scope of his authority as receiver.
TRADERS ROYAL BANK v IAC
X filed a case against Y before the RTC Pasay for the
recovery of the sum of money obtaining therein a writ of
preliminary attachment directed against the assets and
properties of Y. Pursuant to the writ of attachment,
Deputy Sheriff Santiago levied barrels of aged or rectified
alcohol found within the premises of Y. A third party claim
was filed with the Deputy Sheriff by herein respondent Z
claiming ownership over said attached property.
Z instituted before RTC Bulacan asserting its claim of
ownership over the properties attached with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of Preliminary Mandatory and
Prohibitory Injunction. Z was to be the owner of the
disputed alcohol and his application for injunctive relief
was granted. X filed with the IAC a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with application for writ of preliminary
injunction to annul and set aside the Order of RTC
Bulacan to dissolve the writ of p.i.; to prohibit respondent
judge from taking cognizance of and assuming
jurisdiction and to compel Z and Provincial Sheriff of
Bulacan to return the disputed alcohol to their original
location at Y's warehouse in Bulacan.
Does the RTC have the authority to issue, at the instance
of a third-party claimant, an injunction enjoining the sale
of property previously levied upon by the sheriff pursuant
to a writ of attachment issued by another RTC?
54
Answer:
Yes. Generally, the rule that no court has the power to
interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a
concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power
to grant the injunctive relief sought by injunction, is
applied in cases where no third party claimant is involved,
in order to prevent one court from nullifying the judgment
or process of another court of the same rank or category,
a power which devolves upon the proper appellate court.
the directors and the affirmative votes of stockholders
representing at least two-thirds (2/3) of the outstanding
capital stock of the corporation. Where no such
extraordinary corporate acts (or one that under the law
would call for a two-thirds (2/3) vote) are contemplated to
be done in carrying out the proposed rehabilitation plan,
then the approval of stockholders would only be by a
majority, not necessarily a two-thirds (2/3), vote, as long
as, of course, there is a quorum 5 a fact which is not here
being disputed.

The purpose of the rule is to avoid conflict of power
between different courts of coordinate jurisdiction and to
bring about a harmonious and smooth functioning of their
proceedings.
CHAS REALTY CORP. v. TALAVERA
X Corp built a megamall but due to some unforeseen
circumstances it was not able to pay its dues it owed to
its creditors. Thus, X Corp file a Petition for Rehabilitation
under Par. 2(k), Sec. 2, Rule 4 of the Interim Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation.
In the case at hand, the rehabilitation plan submitted by
petitioner merely consists of a repayment or re-structuring
scheme of CRDC’s bank loans to Land Bank of the
Philippines and Equitable-PCI Bank and of leasing out
most of the available spaces in the Megacenter, including
the completion of the construction of the fourth floor, to
increase rental revenues. None of the proposed
corporate actions would require a vote of approval by the
stockholders representing at least two-thirds (2/3) of the
outstanding capital stock.
Since the vote needed was only majority, not 2/3, which X
Corp acquired. The motion to dismiss should be denied.

Y moved to dismiss and/or deny the petition on the

ground that a petition for Rehabilitation was not approve
by 2/3 votes of the stockholders of the company.

If you were the judge would you grant the motion to

dismiss?

ANSWER:

No. Rule 4, sec. 2(k) of the Interim Rules of Procedure

provides that The petition filed by the debtor must be
verified and must set forth with sufficient particularity all
the following material facts:

(a) the name and business of the debtor;

(b) the nature of the business of the debtor;

(c) the history of the debtor;

(d) the cause of its inability to pay its debts;

(e) all the pending actions or proceedings known to the

debtor and the courts or tribunals where they are pending;

(f) threats or demands to enforce claims or liens against

the debtor; and

(g) the manner by which the debtor may be rehabilitated

and how such rehabilitation may benefit the general body
of creditors, employees, and stockholders.

Thus, if any extraordinary corporate action (mentioned in

Rule 4, Section 2(k), of the Interim Rules on Corporate
Rehabilitation) are to be done under the proposed
rehabilitation plan, the petitioner would be bound to make
it known that it has received the approval of a majority of

UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS

SCHOOL OF LAW 55
 RULE 60: REPLEVIN
BA FINANCE CORPORATION v. CA
Spouses A executed a promissory note to pay in
instalments to B Corporation. To secure payment,
Spouses A executed a deed of chattel mortgage over a
motor vehicle. Subsequently, B assigned the promissory
note and the chattel mortgage to C with conformity of
spouses A.
Spouses A failed to pay due instalments. Thus, C sent
demand letters. When spouses A did not heed to the
demand letters, C filed a complaint for replevin with
damages against spouses A as well as against X, praying
for the recovery of the vehicle.
C insists that a mortgagee can maintain an action for
replevin against any possessor of the object of the chattel
mortgage even if the latter were not a party to the
mortgage
Was the complaint for replevin proper
ANSWER:
Yes. In a suit for replevin, a clear right of possession
must be established. A foreclosure under a chattel
mortgage may properly be commenced only once there is
default on the part of the mortgagor of his obligation
secured by the mortgage. The replevin in the instant case
has been sought to pave the way for the foreclosure of
the object covered by the chattel mortgage. The
conditions essential for that foreclosure would be to show,
firstly, the existence of the chattel mortgage and,
secondly, the default of the mortgagor.
In the case at bar, the two essential conditions are met:
first, that spouses A have defaulted in their obligation;
and second, that there is an existing chattel mortgage.
SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION v. PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
One of X’s bus crushed into the radioroom of Y.
Subsequently, an investigation was conducted. However,
because of lack of adequate space, it was requested that
the bus be towed by Y’s patrol to it compound.
X made several requests for the release of the bus but Yl
refused. Instead, Y demanded the sum of P40,000.00 or
a collateral with the same value for the reconstruction of
the damaged radio room. X filed a replevin suit with
damages against Y.
Was the suit for replevin proper?
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
ANSWER:
Yes. In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must
convincingly show that he is either the owner or clearly
entitled to the possession of the object sought to be
recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual or
legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the same.
(Section 2, Rule 60[a][b])
In this case, it was clearly shown and was also admitted
by Y that X is the owner of the bus. As to whether the bus
was wrongfully detained, the bus was towed by Y in
violation of constitutional right against unreasonable
seizures. The seizure and impounding of X‘s bus, were
unquestionably violative of “the right to be let alone” by
the authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution. Hence,
the suit of replevin was proper.
SERVICEWIDE SPECIALIST INC. v. CA
Ms. A bought a car from FM Corporation executing a
promissory note to pay the whole amount of the car to be
paid in 48 months. As a security for the promissory note a
chattel mortgage was constituted over the vehicle in favor
of FM Corporation. The chattel mortgage credit was later
assigned to SS INC. Ms. A defaulted in the payment and
at the same time failed to surrender the property which
was demanded. SS inc then filed a complaint for replevin
impleading Mr. B in which claimed that he was the
absolute owner of the property to the suit but the debtor-
mortgagor, Ms. A, was not included in the complaint
because she was able to abscond.
Can a case for replevin be pursued against the owner,
Mr.B, without impleading the absconding debtor-
mortgagor,Ms. A?
ANSWER:
No. The case for replevin cannot be pursued without
impleading in the complaint the absconding debtor-
mortgagor.
Under the Rules of Court,
Section 1. Application. — A party praying for the recovery
of possession of personal property may, at the
commencement of the action or at any time before
answer, apply for an order for the delivery of such
property to him, in the manner hereinafter provided. (1a)
Section 2. Affidavit and bond. — The applicant must
show by his own affidavit or that of some other person
who personally knows the facts:
(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed,
particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession
thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the
adverse party, alleging the cause of detention thereof
according to the best of his knowledge, information, and
belief ;
56
Therefore, since the application for the issuance of the
writ of preliminary attachment did not state that the
property is wrongfully detained by the adverse part, which
is Ms.A then it cannot be pursued against Mr. B.
AGNER v. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS
Spouses A bought a Mitsubishi Adventure Sport from C
Motors Corporation. A promissory note with Chattel
Mortgage was made executed in favor of C Motors which
they later assigned to B Bank. Spouses A then defaulted
with their payment despite several demands made and
thereafter an issuance for the writ of replevin was applied
for B Bank. Spouses A contends that a writ of replevin
should not be issued because they were unable to
receive the the demand letters by B Bank.
Can a writ of replevin be issued without a demand letter
included for its application?
ANSWER:
Yes. No demand letter is needed for the application for
the issuance of a writ of replevin
Under the Rules of Court,
Section 2. Affidavit and bond. — The applicant must
show by his own affidavit or that of some other person
who personally knows the facts:
(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed,
particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession
thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the
adverse party, alleging the cause of detention thereof
according to the best of his knowledge, information, and
belief ;
(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for
a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized
under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or
otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so seized,
that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; and
(d) The actual market value of the property.
The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the
adverse party in double the value of the property as
stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the
property to the adverse party if such return be adjudged,
and for the payment to the adverse party of such sum as
he may recover from the applicant in the action.
Therefore, since the rules does not provide that a
demand must be made before a writ of replevin may be
issued then an application of which may proceed in the
absence of it.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
CITIBANK v. CA
Bank C and Mr. D executed a loan agreement which
contained a promissory note and at the same time with
machineries and equipment as a form of security or a
chattel mortgage. The debt fell due and Mr D refused to
pay. Bank C then availed of replevin as a remedy but Mr.
D contends that remedy was improper contending among
others that the application for the writ of replevin alleged
that the value of subject properties at a "probable value”
of more or less 200,000 pesos.
Is the contention of Mr. D that the remedy of replevin did
not comply with the requirements set forth under the
Rules of Court?
ANSWER:
Yes, Mr. D is correct that the remedy did not comply with
the law.
Under the Rules of Court,
Section 2. Affidavit and bond. — The applicant must
show by his own affidavit or that of some other person
who personally knows the facts:
(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed,
particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession
thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the
adverse party, alleging the cause of detention thereof
according to the best of his knowledge, information, and
belief ;
(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for
a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized
under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or
otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so seized,
that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; and
(d) The actual market value of the property.
Further, actual value (or actual market value) means "the
price which an article would command in the ordinary
course of business, that is to say, when offered for sale
by one willing to sell, but not under compulsion to sell and
purchased by another who is willing to buy, but under no
obligation to purchase it.
Therefore, when the petitioner failed to declare the actual
value of the machineries and equipment subject of the
replevin suit, there was non-compliance with Section 2,
Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court.
57
 FACTORAN v. CA
Two police officers intercepted a six-wheeler truck
carrying 4,000 board feet of narra lumber as it was
cruising along Marcos Highway. They apprehended the
truck driver, A, and brought the truck and its cargo to the
Authorities where discovered that there were
discrepancies in the documentation of the narra lumber in
violation of Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD)
Circular No. 10 and punishable under the Revised
Forestry Code.
Petitioner B, then Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources issued an order for the confiscation of the
narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck and were
consequently forfeited in favor of the government and
were later on advertised to be sold at a public auction.
Private respondent A filed and Ex-Parte motion for
Release and Return of Goods and Documents (Replevin)
supported by an Affidavit for Issuance of Writ of Replevin
and Preliminary Injunction and a Replevin Bond in the
amount of P180,000.00.
The trial court granted the writ of replevin on the same
day and directed the petitioners "to deliver the xxx [n]arra
lumber, original documents and truck with plate no. NJT
881 to the custody of the plaintiffs and/or their
representatives x x x".
Was the Regional Trial Court correct in issuing the Writ of
Replevin?
ANSWER:
No. A writ of replevin does not issue as a matter of
course upon the applicant's filing of a bond and affidavit.
The mere filing of an affidavit, sans allegations therein
that satisfy the requirements of Section 2 Rule 60 of the
Revised Rules of Court, cannot justify the issuance of a
writ of replevin. Wrongful detention of the properties
sought in an action for replevin must be satisfactory
established. If only mechanistic averment thereof is
offered, the writ should not be issued.
In the case at bar, the taking of the subject property was
within the administrative authority of the Secretary as
provided by Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705. Thus, it is not
wrongful and does not warrant the issuance of a writ of
replevin prayed for by the private respondents. By virtue
of the confiscation order by petitioner Secretary, the
subject properties of private respondents were held in
custodia legis and hence, beyond the reach of replevin.
Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is
deemed to be in custodia legis. So basic is this doctrine
that it found inclusion in the 1997 amendments
introduced to the Rules of Civil Procedure.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
ADVENT CAPITAL v. YOUNG
Advent filed for corporate rehabilitation with the RTC
where it an order which states that "the enforcement of all
claims whether such enforcement is by court action or
otherwise, against A, its guarantors and sureties not
solidarily liable with it, is stayed." B filed a petition for
rehabilitation, claiming that several employee benefits
allegedly due him as A’s former president and chief
executive officer.
Rehabilitation court approved the rehab plan, included in
the inventory of A's assets was the subject car which is in
the possession of B. B refused to return the car, hence
the replevin case. A posted a 3M replevin bond and the
trial court issued a writ of replevin. B filed an answer,
stating that as a former employee of A, he had the option
to purchase the subject car and to offset the value of the
car with the proceeds of his retirement pay and stock
option plan. Trial court ordered the dismissal of the
replevin case for A's failure to prosecute while upon
appeal, the CA order the trial court to set a hearing for the
determination of damages against the replevin.
Can A retain possession of the subject car considering
that it was not adjudged as the prevailing party entitled to
the remedy of replevin?
ANSWER:
No. Upon the dismissal of the replevin case for failure to
prosecute, the writ of seizure, which is merely ancillary in
nature, became functus officio and should have been
lifted. There was no adjudication on the merits, which
means that there was no determination of the issue who
has the better right to possess the subject car. A cannot
therefore retain possession of the subject car considering
that it was not adjudged as the prevailing party entitled to
the remedy of replevin.
The dismissal of the replevin case for failure to prosecute
results in the restoration of the parties status prior to
litigation, as if no complaint was filed at all. To let the writ
of seizure stand after the dismissal of the complaint
would be adjudging A as the prevailing party, when
precisely no decision on the merits had been rendered.
Accordingly, the parties must be reverted to their status
quo ante. Since B possessed the subject car before the
filing of the replevin case, the same must be returned to
him, as if no complaint was filed at all.
Was the order of the appellate court proper?
ANSWER:
No. Sec 10, Rule 60 of the ROC, provides that in replevin
cases, the damages to be awarded upon the bond "shall
be claimed, ascertained and granted" in accordance with
Sec.20, Rule 57, which allows the application to be filed
at any time before the judgment becomes executory. It
should be filed in the same casethat is the main action
58
and with the court having jurisdiction over the case at the
time of the application.
In this case, there was no application for damages
against Stronghold resulting from the issuance of the writ
of seizure before the finality of the dismissal of the
complaint for failure to prosecute. It appears that Young
filed his omnibus motion claiming damages against
Stronghold after the dismissal order issued by trial court
had attained finality. Thus, B is barred from claiming
damages against the replevin bond. With this the CA
erred in ordering the trial court to set a hearing for the
determination of damages against the replevin bond.
SERG’S PRODUCTS, INC. v. PCI LEASING
X filed a complaint for sum of money, with an application
for a writ of replevin. Judge issued a writ of replevin
directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries
and equipment to X after 5 days and upon the payment of
the necessary expenses. The sheriff proceeded to
petitioner Y's factory, seized one machinery, with word
that he would return for other machineries.
Y filed a motion for special protective order to defer
enforcement of the writ of replevin. X opposed the motion
on the ground that the properties were still personal and
therefore can still be subjected to seizure and writ of
replevin. Y asserted that the properties sought to be
seized were immovable as defined in Article 415 of the
Civil Code. Sheriff was still able to take possession of two
more machineries. In its decision on the original action for
certiorari filed by the Y, the appellate court, citing the
Agreement of the parties, held that the subject machines
were personal property, and that they had only been
leased, not owned, by petitioners; and ruled that the
"words of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon
the true intention of the contracting parties."
Did the machineries became real property by virtue of
immobilization?
ANSWER:
Yes. Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that writs of
replevin are issued for the recovery of personal property
only. Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code provides that
machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements
intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or
works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece
of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the
said industry or works.
In the present case, the machines that were the subjects
of the Writ of Seizure were placed by petitioners in the
factory built on their own land. They were essential and
principal elements of their chocolate-making industry.
Hence, although each of them was movable or personal
property on its own, all of them have become
“immobilized by destination because they are essential
and principal elements in the industry.” However,
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real
property be considered as personal. After agreeing to
such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from
claiming otherwise.
Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is
ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material
fact found therein. Section 12.1 of the Agreement
between the parties provides “The PROPERTY is, and
shall at all times be and remain, personal property
notwithstanding that the PROPERTY or any part thereof
may now be, or hereafter become, in any manner affixed
or attached to or embedded in, or permanently resting
upon, real property or any building thereon, or attached in
any manner to what is permanent.” The machines are
personal property and they are proper subjects of the Writ
of Replevin.
RIVERA v. VARGAS
A claims ownership of an equipment, having purchased
and imported the same directly from Korea in 1993. The
equipment was allegedly entrusted to B's husband, C,
who died 2002, as caretaker of respondent's construction
aggregates business. According to A, B failed to return
the said equipment after her husband's death despite his
repeated demands, thus forcing him to resort to court
action. The complaint was accompanied by a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of replevin and the necessary bond.
Summons was served upon B through her personal
secretary at her residence in Parañaque. Interestingly,
however, the writ of replevin was served upon and signed
by a certain D, the security guard on duty in B's crushing
plant in Quezon, contrary to the sheriff's return stating
that the writ was served upon Rivera.
Was the writ of replevin that is improperly served?
ANSWER:
Yes. Sec. 4 of the Rules of Court provides that,
Section 4. Duty of the sheriff. — Upon receiving such
order, the sheriff must serve a copy thereof on the
adverse party, together with a copy of the application,
affidavit and bond, and must forthwith take the property, if
it be in the possession of the adverse party, or his agent,
and retain it in his custody. If the property or any part
thereof be concealed in a building or enclosure, the
sheriff must demand its delivery, and if it be not delivered,
he must cause the building or enclosure to be broken
open and take the property into his possession. After the
sheriff has take possession of the property as herein
provided, he must keep it in a secure place and shall be
responsible for its delivery to the party entitled thereto
upon receiving his fees and necessary expenses for
taking and keeping the same.
Replevin is one of the most ancient actions known to law,
taking its name from the object of its process. It originated
in common law as a remedy against the wrongful
exercise of the right of distress for rent and, according to
59
some authorities, could only be maintained in such a
case. But by the weight of authority, the remedy is not
and never was restricted to cases of wrongful distress in
the absence of any statutes relating to the subject, but is
a proper remedy for any unlawful taking. "Replevied,"
used in its technical sense, means delivered to the owner,
while the words "to replevy" means to recover possession
by an action of replevin.
SPOUSES BAUTISTA v. SULA
A borrowed huge amount of money from B over which
she executed a chattel mortgage over her car. A failed to
repay her debt or surrender the vehicle. Hence, B filed a
civil cause of judicial foreclosure of chattel mortgage with
prayer for the issuance of replevin. The court issued a
writ of replevin directing the sheriff to take possession of
the car and keep it in his custody for 5 days.
Later on, the Court found that respondent erred when he
released the vehicle to B without waiting for the trial
court’s instructions on who had a better right over the
vehicle.
Did sheriff erred when he delivered the vehicle to B
without waiting for the trial court’s instructions on the
matter?
ANSWER:
Yes. Sec. 4 of the Rules of Court provides that,
Section 4. Duty of the sheriff. — Upon receiving such
order, the sheriff must serve a copy thereof on the
adverse party, together with a copy of the application,
affidavit and bond, and must forthwith take the property, if
it be in the possession of the adverse party, or his agent,
and retain it in his custody. If the property or any part
thereof be concealed in a building or enclosure, the
sheriff must demand its delivery, and if it be not delivered,
he must cause the building or enclosure to be broken
open and take the property into his possession. After the
sheriff has take possession of the property as herein
provided, he must keep it in a secure place and shall be
responsible for its delivery to the party entitled thereto
upon receiving his fees and necessary expenses for
taking and keeping the same.
The property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be
delivered immediately to the plaintiff. The sheriff must
retain it in his custody for five days and he shall return it
to the defendant, if the latter, as in the instant case,
requires its return and files a counter-bond.
It must be stressed that the prerogatives of Sheriffs do
not give them any discretion to determine who among the
parties is entitled to possession of the subject property.
The appropriate course of action should have been for
respondent to wait for the instructions of the court as to
whom he will release the property since he had already
asked for its guidance through his Manifestation which
was submitted to the court virtually. Yet the following
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
morning, he suddenly decided to release the car to the
plaintiff without waiting for any court order on the matter.
FERNANDEZ v. THE INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATE BANK
A purchased a car through a financing scheme of the B,
the International Corporate Bank, now Union Bank of the
Philippines, and the chattel mortgage was executed in
favor of the financing institution. The cash purchase price
was P492,000.00, minus the downpayment of
P147,500.00, leaving the amount of P344,500.00 to be
financed. The total amount to be paid for 48 monthly
installments would amount to P553,944.00.
A added that due to the bank's "greedy desire" to unjustly
enrich itself at the expense of the A, A filed an unfounded
complaint for a sum of money with replevin before the
MTC, considering that the principal amount involved was
P553,944.00,
The Court of Appeals ruled that A has a period of 5 days
to post a re-delivery bond, in order to secure the return of
the subject vehicle and to post a counter bond double the
amount of the chattel. In this respect, A failed to exercise
his right.
Did the Court of Appeals grievously erred?
ANSWER:.
No. A failed to comply with the requisites for the
redelivery of the vehicle seized. A careful perusal of the
records shows that petitioners failed to comply with the
requirements prescribed by Rule 60 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 5. Return of Property. — If the defendant objects to
the sufficiency of the plaintiff's bond, or of the surety or
sureties thereon, he cannot require the return of the
property as in this section provided; but if he does not so
object, he may, at any time before the delivery of the
property to the plaintiff, require the return thereof, by filing
with the clerk or judge of the court a bond executed to the
plaintiff, in double the value of the property as stated in
the plaintiff's affidavit, for the delivery of the property to
the plaintiff, if such delivery be adjudged, and for the
payment of such sum to him as may be recovered
against the defendant, and by serving a copy of such
bond on the plaintiff or his attorney.
Sec. 6. Disposition of property by officer. — If within five
(5) days after the taking of the property by the officer, the
defendant does not object to the sufficiency of the bond,
or of the surety or sureties thereon; or require the return
of the property as provided in the last preceding section;
or if the defendant so objects, and the plaintiff's first or
new bond is approved; or if the defendant so requires,
and his bond is objected to and found insufficient and he
does not forthwith file an approved bond, the property
shall be delivered to the plaintiff. If for any reason the
property is not delivered to the plaintiff, the officer must
return it to the defendant.
60
 limited to the defendants specified in the contract of
A plainly admit that they issued a check for only P69,168 surety.
for the purpose of covering the advance payments plus
the redelivery bond. Clearly, that amount was insufficient
to cover even just the required redelivery bond alone,
which should be in an amount double that of the chattel.
Hence, the MTC's refusal to grant petitioners' Motion for
redelivery was correct, and the Court of Appeals did not
err in upholding it.

VISAYAN SURETY v. CA

Spouses AB, through X Surety and Insurance

Corporation, filed a replevin bond in the RTC of Laguna
to recover from Spouses CD the possession of an Isuzu
jeepney which was allegedly taken by the latter. The RTC
granted the replevin bond. Spouses CD filed a motion to
quash the writ of replevin and to order the return of the
jeepney to them. E, father of spouse B, filed a motion for
leave of court to intervene, stating that he has a right
superior to the Spouses AB over the ownership and
possession of the jeepney.

The RTC granted the motion to intervene. The RTC then

issued an order granting the motion to quash the writ of
replevin and ordered spouses AB to return the jeepney to
E. The court also granted the E’s motion for judgement
against spouses AB’s bond.

Is X Corporation liable to an intervenor on a replevin bond

posted?

ANSWER:

No. Under Sec. 9 of Rule 60, after trial of the issues the
court shall determine who has the right of possession to
and the value of the property and shall render judgment
in the alternative for the delivery thereof to the party
entitled the same, or for its value in case delivery cannot
be made, and also for such damages as either party may
prove, with costs.

In the case at bar, an intervenor is a person, not originally

impleaded in a proceeding, who has legal interest in the
matter in litigation or in the success of either of the parties,
or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof.

Suretyship is a contractual relation resulting from an

agreement whereby one person, the surety, engages to
be answerable for the debt, default or miscarriage of
another, known as the principal. The obligation of a
surety cannot be extended by implication beyond its
specified limits. The extent of a surety’s liability is
determined only by the clause of the contract of
suretyship.

Thus, the surety cannot be held liable to the intervenor

when the relationship and obligation of the surety is

UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS

SCHOOL OF LAW 61
 RULE 61: SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE
CALDERON v. ROXAS
Petitioner A and private respondent B are married, and
their union produced four children. A filed a complaint for
the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines.
The court declared the marriage null and void, awarding
the custody of the parties’ minor children to their mother,
ordering B to provide support to the children, and
dissolving the community property or conjugal partnership
of the parties. B filed a motion to reduce support. The
Court granted the motion to reduce support and denying
the A’s motion for spousal support, increase of the
children’s monthly support pendente lite and support-in-
arrears.
A assailed the order of support pendente lite that support
pendente lite ceased to be provisional due to the
rearranges incurred by B. Was it correct?
ANSWER:
No. Sec. 1 of Rule 61 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the provisional remedy of support pendente
lite which may be availed of at the commencement of the
proper action or proceeding, or at any time prior to the
judgment or final order. Under this provision, a court may
temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the
rendition of judgment or final order. Provisional remedies
are writs and processes available during the pendency of
the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to
preserve and protect certain rights and interest therein
pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects,
of a final judgment in the case. They are provisional
because they constitute temporary measures availed of
during the pendency of the action, and they are ancillary
because they are mere incidents in and are dependent
upon the result of the main action.
The subject orders on the matter of support pendete lite
are but an incident to the main action for declaration of
nullity of marriage. When B refused to comply with his
obligation to give monthly support, B was cited contempt
in court and arrested him. A few years later, B filed a
motion to reduce support while A filed her own motion to
increase the same. This fact underscores the provisional
character of the order granting support pendente lite.
Thus, it did not cease to be provisional due to the
rearranges incurred by B.
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FRANCISCO v. ZANDUETA
Y, aged two years, through his natural mother and
guardian ad litem, instituted an action for support against
X in court. It is alleged that Y is the acknowledged on of X
and as such is entitled to support. X denied the allegation
and as a special defense alleged that he never
acknowledged and could not have acknowledged Y as
his son; that he was not present at the baptism of Y and
that he was married at the time it is alleged that Y was
born. The respondent judge Z decided in favor of Y.
Was the judge correct in granting support pendente lite
without first establishing Y’s status as X’s son?
ANSWER:
No. Jurisprudence dictates that the fact of the civil status
must be proven first before a right of support can be
derived. It is necessary for Y to prove, through his
guardian ad litem, his civil status as the X’s son. As such,
no right of support can be given because the very civil
status of sonship, from which the right is derived, is in
question.
There is no law or reason which authorizes the granting
of support to a person who claims to be a son in the
same manner as to a person who establishes by legal
proof that he is such a son. In the latter case, the legal
evidence raises a presumption of law, while on the former
there is no presumption, there is nothing but a mere
allegation, a fact in issue, and a simple fact in issue must
not be confounded with a established right recognized by
a final judgment. The Civil Code grants the right of
support to a son. This status not appearing by a final
judgment, the respondent judge Z was without jurisdiction
to order X to pay Y the sum of P30, or any other amount
as monthly support pendente lite.
YANGCO v. RHODE
X filed for divorce against Y with prayer for alimony; Y
alleged that there is no grounds for divorce because they
were not married in the first place. The fact of an existing
marriage was not proved conclusively, yet Judge Z
granted the alimony pendente lite without any bond from
X.
Is the granting of the alimony pendente lite proper?
ANSWER:
No. Albeit, a Spouse is subject to the remedy of Support
pendente lite per the New Civil Code, to wit:
“Art. 195, Subject to the provisions of the succeeding
articles, the following are obliged to support each other to
the whole extent set forth in the preceding article:
1. To spouses;
2. Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
62
3. To parents and their legitimate children and the
legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;
4. To parents and their illegitimate children and the
legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and
5. To legitimate brothers and sisters whether half or full
blood.”
Such fact must be conclusively proven, most especially if
the action is bought by the Spouse.
COQUIA v. BALTAZAR
A case was filed by X, et. al. against Sps. Y, sister-in-law
and brother-in-law of Z, for recovery of a parcel of land. X
alleges that the land in question was owned by Z, and
they are the illegitimate children of Z. During the course
of the trial X, et. al. filed for alimony pendente lite which
was granted by the RTC, on the fact of their equitable
rights to the land in question.
Is the granting of alimony pendente lite proper?
ANSWER:
No. According to the Sec. 1 of Rule 61 of the Rules of
Court, scilicet:
“At the commencement of the proper action or
proceeding, or at any time prior to the judgment or final
order, a verified application for support pendente lite may
be filed by any party stating the grounds for the claim and
the financial conditions of both parties, and accompanied
by affidavits, depositions or other authentic documents in
support thereof.”
Verily, the grounds of herein petitioner is that they are co-
owners of the land, which is not one of the aforestated in
the New Civil Code, to wit:
“Art. 195, Subject to the provisions of the succeeding
articles, the following are obliged to support each other to
the whole extent set forth in the preceding article:
6. To spouses;
7. Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
8. To parents and their legitimate children and the
legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;
9. To parents and their illegitimate children and the
legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and
10. To legitimate brothers and sisters whether half or full
blood.”
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VILLANUEVA v. VILLANUEVA
X the wife of Y her husband, filed for Support Pendente
Lite and the custody of their two (2) minor children.
Grounds relied upon by X is the infidelity and cruelty of Y.
Is the granting of Support Pendente Lite proper in
instances of infidelity?
ANSWER:.
Yes. The Civil Code so provides, scilicet:
“Art. 195, Subject to the provisions of the succeeding
articles, the following are obliged to support each other to
the whole extent set forth in the preceding article:
1. To spouses;
2. Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
3. To parents and their legitimate children and the
legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;
4. To parents and their illegitimate children and the
legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and
5. To legitimate brothers and sisters whether half or full
blood.”
Verily, X being a legal wife of Y are entitled to support
from Y. This has been enunciated in a case decided by
the Supreme Court, to wit:
“As was said by Justice Moreland in Goitia v. Campos
Rueda (35 Phil., 252, 262), a husband cannot, by his own
wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to support his
wife imposed by law; and where a husband by wrongful,
illegal, and unbearable conduct, drives his wife from the
domicile fixed by him, he cannot take advantage of her
departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital
relations and repudiate his duties thereunder.”
GLICERIO MAGOMA v. HON. HIGINIO MACADAEG
X filed an action against Y seeking the separation of their
property and the consequent dissolution and liquidation of
their conjugal partnership. Months thereafter, prior to the
trial on the merits, X prayed the court that pending the
determination of the case, she and her daughter Z be
given support pendente lite and that Y be ordered to act
accordingly.
Respondent judge authorized his deputy clerk to receive
the evidence on the motion for support pende lite, and
accordingly several trials were held. But before Y had the
chance to present his evidence on his special defense,
respondent judge issued an order granting the motion
and ordering Y to give support pendente lite to X and
daughter Z.
Is the granting of the support pendente lite proper?
63
ANSWER:
No. Section 1 of Rule 61 provides that at the
commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at
any time prior to the judgment or final order, a verified
application for support pendete lite may be filed by any
party stating the grounds for the claim and the financial
conditions of both parties, and accompanied by affidavits,
depositions or other authentic documents in support
thereof.
Y has not been given an opportunity to adduce evidence
of the defenses he has set up against the motion for
support pendente lite, among which is adultery. After X
had presented her evidence and before the hearing on
the motion was completed, the trial judge ordered
payment of alimony pendente lite. There is nothing to
show that the husband has resorted to dilatory tactics in
the presentation of his evidence. There is no other
alternative than to remand this case to the lower court in
order that immediate steps may be taken relative to the
reception of husband’s evidence in support of his
opposition to the grant of support pendente lite.
LUIS RAMOS v. COURT OF APPEALS
Minors A and B assisted by their mother C filed a
complaint against X for support and damages on the
ground that C bore said children in consequence of an
illicit relations with X, who failed and refused to support
said minors, notwithstanding repeated demands. Case
proceeded to trial and said court rendered judgment
sentencing X to pay each minors.
X having appealed the Court of Appeals was ordered by
the court of appeals to deposit with the clerk the amount
due under the appealed decision. X alleged that the Court
of Appeals had abused its discretion in issuing the
aforementioned resolution: (a) "there having been neither
a recognition of paternity by the petitioner nor its
establishment by final judgment"; (b) his motion for
reconsideration having been denied without an oral
argument requested by him.
Is the order granting the support pendente lite by the
appellate court proper?
ANSWER:
Yes. Section 1 of Rule 61 provides that at the
commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at
any time prior to the judgment or final order, a verified
application for support pendete lite may be filed by any
party stating the grounds for the claim and the financial
conditions of both parties, and accompanied by affidavits,
depositions or other authentic documents in support
thereof.
Needless to say, the refusal of the trial court to grant, said
alimony pendente lite did not and cannot deprive the
appellate court of said authority, or even dent the wisdom
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of the action taken by the latter, considering that the
former did not give any plausible reason for its
aforementioned refusal and that the same may have, in
fact, been due to the appeal taken by the defendant,
whose record on appeal had already been approved.
Neither did the failure of the Court of Appeals to hear X
herein on oral argument before denying his motion for
reconsideration or to grant him "a 10-day abeyance in the
implementation" of said resolution constitute a grave
abuse of discretion, for X is not entitled as a matter of
right to said oral argument, which was discretionary for
said appellate court, as was its authority to grant or deny
the aforementioned period of ten (10) days. Furthermore,
X has not shown that he could have adduced substantial
reasons to warrant a reversal of the contested resolution
had this period been granted or said oral argument taken
place.
SPOUSES LIM v. LIM
X married Y the son of Z and bore three chidren, A,B and
C. X and Y together with their children resided at the
house of L and M. X abandoned the residence bringing
with her the children after a violent confrontation with Y
whom she cought with the in-house midwife in a very
compromising situation. X sued Y for support and the trial
court ordered Y to provide monthly support pendente lite.
Y appealed on the ground that his income is insuffient.
Court held the parents of Y liable with him to support the
children.
Are the parents of Y, L and M concurrently laible with him
to provide support?
ANSWER:
Yes. L and M are liable to provide support but only to
their grandchildren.
Grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their
grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of nearest
degree) who are capable of supporting them. This is so
because we have to follow the order of support under Art.
199.
Here, the persons entitled to receive support are L and
M’s grandchildren and daughter-in-law. Granting L and M
the option in Article 204 will secure to the grandchildren a
well-provided future; however, it will also force X to return
to the house which, for her, is the scene of her husband’s
infidelity. While not rising to the level of a legal obstacle,
as indeed, X’s charge against Y for concubinage did not
prosper for insufficient evidence, her steadfast insistence
on its occurrence amounts to a moral impediment
bringing the case within the ambit of the exception clause
of Article 204, precluding its application.
64
 GOTARDO v. BULING
X sent Y a letter demanding recognition of and support of
their child. When Y did not answer for the demand, X filed
a complaint with the RTC for compulsory recognition and
support pendente lite against Y. X testified for herself and
presented a witness along with evidences showing that
she accepted his offer of love on a certain date, and
started intimate sexual relations several months
thereafter.
The court established prima facie evidence that Y is the
putative father of X's child through X's testimony that she
had been sexually involved only with one man, Y, at the
time of her conception. Y did not deny this fact and failed
to substantiate his allegation that X had several
relationships with other men.
Should Y give support to X's child?
ANSWER:
Yes. It has been established in one case that when
filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of
obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of
everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,
clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of
the family.
In this case, since X was declared by the court to be the
putative father of X's child, he then is obliged to give
support to the child.
BAYOT v. CA
X, an American citizen, and Y, a Filipino, were married in
the Philippines and begot a child. X and Y's relationship
turned sour eventually leading X to initiate divorce
proceedings in the Dominican Republic wherein a divorce
decree was rendered. Subsequently, X filed in the
Philippines a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage with application for support pendente lite for her
and their child. Y filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by
the prior judgment of divorce.
Will the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage with application for support pendente lite
prosper?
ANSWER:
No. It has been established by law and jurisprudence that
a foreign divorce can be recognized here in the
Philippines, provided the divorce decree is proven as a
fact and as valid under the national law of the alien
spouse. Furthermore, to sustain a motion to dismiss for
lack of cause of action, the movant must show that the
claim for relief does not exist.
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In this case, since there was a valid foreign divorce
decree secured by X, there is no more marital tie binding
X to Y. There is no more marriage to be dissolved or
nullified. X's petition lacks a cause of action for the
declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which
presupposes the existence of marriage. X does not have
the right to support pendente lite since this support
hinges on the tenability of the petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, which should be dismissed.
But Y has the obligation to support their child, which is
best litigated in a separate civil action to know the actual
amount that Y should give for support.
NEPOMUCENO v. LOPEZ
X, represented by her mother, filed a complaint against Y
for recognition and support. X claimed that she was born
out of an extramarital affair of Y and her mother. The
Certificate of Birth did not bear Y's signature.
Nevertheless, by a handwritten note, Y obligated himself
to give X financial support in the amount of 3k a month. Y
contends that nowhere in that note is an explicit
statement made by him that he is the father of X; that
absent recognition or acknowledgment, illegitimate
children are not entitled to support from the putative
parent.
Is X entitled to support?
ANSWER:
No. The Family Code provides that an obligation to
support exists between parents and their illegitimate
children. The law further provides that the filiation of
illegitimate children may be established by an admission
of illegitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In a case decided by the Supreme Court, a notarial
agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted
by the putative father was considered acceptable
evidence for filiation.
In this case, X's demand for support is based on her
claim of filiation to Y as his illegitimate daughter, but X
only relies on the handwritten note to support her, and
this note does not contain any statement whatsoever
about X's filiation to Y. Furthermore, it is not even
notarized. Since the sole reliance of the handwritten note
which is not notarized and is without admission fails to
establish the claim of filiation, X is not entitled for support.
65
 MANGONON v. CA
X filed, in behalf of her then two minor children against Y,
a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with
application for support pendente lite which was granted
by the RTC Makati. Respondent Y on the other hand
argued that it is essential that their legitimacy be first
established as "there is no basis to claim support until a
final and executory judicial declaration has been made as
to the civil status of the children.
Was Y’s contention is correct.
ANSWER:
No. SEC. 4 of Rule 65 provides that the court shall
determine provisionally the pertinent facts, and shall
render such orders as justice and equity may require,
having due regard to the probable outcome of the case
and such other circumstances as may aid in the proper
resolution of the question involved. If the application is
granted, the court shall fix the amount of money to be
provisionally paid or such other forms of support as
should be provided, taking into account the necessities of
the applicant and the resources or means of the adverse
party, and the terms of payment or mode for providing the
support. If the application is denied, the principal case
shall be tried and decided as early as possible.
In this case, a court may temporarily grant support
pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final
order. Because of its provisional nature, a court does not
need to delve fully into the merits of the case before it can
settle an application for this relief. All that a court is
tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of
evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve
the application. It is enough that the facts be established
by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in
the record.
ROXAS v. CA
X filed action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage
with Y, with a prayer for support pendente lite, which was
granted by the RTC. On appeal by defendant Y the
appellate court nullified the Orders and the proceedings
of the trial court for the reason that the certificate of non-
forum shopping of the petitioner did not mention the prior
filing of Civil Case before the sala of RTC Judge.
Did the Honorable Court of Appeals err in its decision.
ANSWER:
Yes. The Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction when it
granted the petition for certiorari filed by herein private
respondent
For a party to be adjudged guilty of forum shopping in the
trial courts a motion to dismiss on the ground of either litis
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pendencia or res judicata must be filed before the proper
trial court and a hearing conducted thereon in accordance
with Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. The same ground cannot be raised in a
petition for certiorari before the appellate court while the
main action in the trial court is still pending for the reason
that such ground for a motion to dismiss can be raised
before the trial court any time during the proceedings and
is not barred by the filing of the answer to the complaint.
In this case the proceedings and orders issued by RTC in
the application for support pendente lite (and the main
complaint for annulment of marriage) in the re-filed case,
that is, in Civil Case No. 97-0608 were not rendered null
and void by the omission of a statement in the certificate
of non-forum shopping regarding the prior filing and
dismissal without prejudice of Civil Case No. 97-0523
which involves the same parties and issues. Therefore
Re-filing to another branch for support is not a valid
ground to declare said complainant guilty of forum
shopping.
CALDERON v. ROXAS
X filed action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage
with Y, with a prayer for support pendente lite, which was
granted by the RTC. On October 11, 2002, RTC directing
respondent Y to give support in the amount of P42,
292.50 per month. On February 11, 2003, private
respondent filed a Motion to Reduce Support citing,
among other grounds, that the P42,292.50 monthly
support for the children as fixed by the court was even
higher than his then P20,800.00 monthly salary as city
councillor of which RTC grant the motion on March 7,
2005.
Hence On June 14, 2005, X through counsel filed a
Notice of Appeal from the Orders dated March 7, 2005 of
which the CA denied the appeal.
Did the Honorable Court of Appeals commits a grave
abuse of discretion when it ruled that the RTC orders
dated March 7, 2005 are merely interlocutory.
ANSWER:
No. The Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in its decision.
Under Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, appeal from interlocutory
orders is not allowed.
In this case the assailed orders relative to the incident of
support pendente lite and support in arrears, as the term
suggests, were issued pending the rendition of the
decision on the main action for declaration of nullity of
marriage, and are therefore interlocutory. Furthermore
the Rules of Court provide for the provisional remedy of
support pendent lite which may be availed of at the
commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at
any time prior to the judgment or final order. These
66
include orders for spousal support, child support, child
custody, visitation rights, hold departure, protection and
administration of common property.
LUA v. LUA
On September 2003, X filed an action for the declaration
of nullity of her marriage with Y, with a prayer for support
pendente lite, which granted by the RTC in the amount of
P250,000, primarily for food, household expenses, and
also medical expenses. Y filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA. On April 2005, the CA allowed the petition and
granted X support in the amount of P 115,000 per month
from September 2003 to March 2005. Following this
decision, Y issued a check to X and their two children in
the amount of P162, 651, having deducted certain
expenses from the total amount of support in arrears (P
2,482,348.16). These expenses were found to be car
maintenance, medical/dental expenses, travel expenses,
credit card purchases, school expenses, and cash.
May Y deduct the expenses incurred by him from the total
amount of support in arrears?
ANSWER:
No. Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage or for annulment, or for
legal separation, and at any time during the proceeding,
the court, motu proprio or upon verified application of any
of the parties, guardian or designated custodian, may
temporarily grant support pendent lite prior to the
rendition of judgment or final order. Because of its
provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully
into the merits of the case before it can settle an
application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is
determine the kind and amount of evidence which may
suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is
enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other
documentary evidence appearing in the record. There is
no controversy as to the sufficiency an reasonableness of
monthly support pendent lite as it was not appealed by
either party.
The general rule is that when a father is required by a
divorce decree to pay to the mother money for the
support of their dependent children and the unpaid and
accrued installments become judgments in her favor, he
cannot, as a matter of law, claim credit on account of
payments voluntarily made directly to the children.
However, special considerations of an equitable nature
may justify a court in crediting such payments on his
indebtedness to the mother.
Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses
incurred by respondent to be credited against the accrued
support pendente lite. Since the monthly support
pendente lite granted by the trial court was intended
primarily for basic expenses, and considering his vast
financial resources, Y should give the full amount in
monthly support.
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SAAVEDRA v. YBAŇEZ ESTRADA
X and Y, wife and husband respectively, married in 1904
and had children. In the course of their marriage, a large
amount of land has been acquired consisting of 400
hectares of land – all property of the conjugal partnership.
While pregnant, X was treated by Y with personal
violence and the former was compelled to remove herself
from contact with Y. In 1920, X presented a civil action
seeking an order requiring Y to supply maintenance for
herself and children but in 1926, Y prevailed upon her to
dismiss the action upon his promise to supply her needs.
The promise, however, was not kept for more than a
decade and X struggled alone maintaining her family by
obtaining credit from strangers and sacrificing
paraphernal property of her own.
X instituted an action against Y, the purpose of which is
to secure a judgment for maintenance and to obtain an
order requiring the latter to pay such maintenance not
only in the future but for a period in the past, beginning in
1920, during which Y has contributed nothing for the
support of his family.
What is the effect of the dismissal of the action to the
order for support pendent lite?
ANSWER:
An order pendente lite is in its very nature contingent, and
the dismissal of the action had the effect of abrogating
the order.
An action was brought by X against Y for maintenance of
herself and children, and in this action an order was
made for the payment of a fixed monthly stipend
pendente lite, but the action was subsequently dismissed
voluntarily by X. Held that, in a subsequent action brought
for the same purpose as the first, the husband could not
be held liable for non-payment of the maintenance
provided in the order pendente lite, as an adjudicated
right.
X is entitled to recover from Y compensation for
paraphernal property which she has applied to the
support of herself and children, during the period when
their maintenance was not paid out of the conjugal
property by the husband.
In an action for maintenance the court refused to grant an
injunction against the husband to prevent him from
alienating the conjugal property without the consent of the
court; but there being an appreciable danger that an
attempt to alienate the same might be made in fraud of
the wife and her children, the court directed that the
obligation to pay maintenance should be annotated in the
property register as a lien upon such property.
67
 SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS Is Z barred to file an interpleader suit?

ANSWER:
RULE 62: INTERPLEADER
Yes. Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides —
VIUDA DE CAMILO v. ARANIO
When interpleader proper. — Whenever conflicting claims
upon the same subject matter are or may be made
A and B are both owners of different foreshore lands and
against a person, who claims no interest whatever in the
commercial buildings wherein C was a lessee of one of
subject-matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is
the apartments in one of the commercial buildings. The
not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action
two buildings were burned down. Two weeks later, C built
against the conflicting claimants to compel them to
a building of his own which encroached upon the lands
interplead and litigate their several claims among
owned by A and B. A case for forcibly entry against C
themselves.
was filed by A and B separately with the Justice of Peace
of Malangas. Pending trial of the two cases, C filed a
There is no question that the subject matter of the
complaint for interpleader against A and B alleging that
present controversy, the membership fee certificate 201,
the defendants (in the interpleader) had conflicting
is proper for an interpleader suit. What is disputed here is
interests since both of them claim to be entitled to the
the propriety and timeliness of the remedy in the light of
possession of the lot in question and he could not
the facts and circumstances obtaining.
determine without hazard to himself who of the
defendants were entitled to possession.
The instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because Z
had already been made independently liable in the
Does the complaint for interpleader state a cause of
previous civil case wherein X had established his rights to
action?
the certificate and, therefore, its present application for
interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the
ANSWER:
final judgment in the civil case. Being so, this interpleader
suit, if granted, would compel X to establish his rights
No. Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides —
anew, and thereby increase instead of diminish litigations,
which is one of the purposes of an interpleader suit.
When interpleader proper. — Whenever conflicting claims
upon the same subject matter are or may be made
And because Z allowed itself to be sued to final judgment
against a person, who claims no interest whatever in the
in the said case, its action of interpleader was filed
subject-matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is
inexcusably late, for which reason it is barred by laches
not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action
or unreasonable delay.
against the conflicting claimants to compel them to
interplead and litigate their several claims among
themselves.
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION v.
A and B did not have conflicting claims against C METRO CONTAINER CORPORATION
because their claims were separate and distinct from the
other. A only wanted C to vacate that portion of her A Corporation failed to settle its loan obligations, thus, B
property which was encroached upon by him when he Corporation instituted an extrajudicial foreclosure against
erected the building. The same is true with B. They it. B Co. was adjudged the highest bidder and accordingly
claimed possession of two different parcels of land of consolidated its ownership over the property due to A
different areas, adjoining each other. It is, therefore, Co.'s failure to redeem the mortgaged property within the
evident that the requirements for a complaint of 12-month redemption period. By virtue thereof, B Co.
Interpleader do not exist. demanded rental payments from Y Corporation which
was leasing the mortgaged property from A Co. Y Co.
filed a complaint for Interpleader against A Co. and B Co.
before the RTC to compel them to interplead and litigate
WACK-WACK GOLF v. LEE WON
their several claims among themselves and to determine
which among them shall rightfully receive the payment of
X claims ownership of a membership fee certificate at Z
monthly rentals on the subject property.
Golf & Country Club. By virtue of a civil case, he was
issued such certificate. But Y also claims ownership over
Is the filing for a suit of interpleader by Y proper?
such certificate pursuant to an assignment made by the
alleged true owner of the same certificate. Thus, Z filed a
ANSWER:
complaint to interplead X and Y to litigate their conflicting
claims. Trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground
Yes. Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides —
of res judicata by reason of the previous civil case that
issued X the right to the certificate.
When interpleader proper. — Whenever conflicting claims
upon the same subject matter are or may be made

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against a person, who claims no interest whatever in the
subject-matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is
not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action
against the conflicting claimants to compel them to
interplead and litigate their several claims among
themselves.
In the case before us, it is undisputed that Y Co. filed the
interpleader action because it was unsure which between
A Co. and B Co. was entitled to receive the payment of
monthly rentals on the subject property. A Co. was
claiming payment of the rentals as lessor of the property
while B Co. was making a demand by virtue of the
consolidation of the title of the property in its name.
BANK OF COMMERCE v. PLANTERS
DEVELOPMENT BANK
BSP issues Central Bank Bills and pays their value upon
presentment at maturity date. After some dispute with Y
over ownership of the Bills, X filed a petition for
mandamus and injunction against Y and the BSP. The
BSP filed a counterclaim with motion to interplead, to
determine who has a better right over the Bills. The court
granted the motion.
Is the court correct in doing so?
ANSWER:
Yes. Under Sec. 1, Rule 62, whenever conflicting claims
upon the same subject matter are or may be made
against a person who claims no interest whatever in the
same subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in
part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an
action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to
interplead and litigate their several claims among
themselves. It has been held that through the remedy of
interpleader, the stakeholder can join all competing
claimants in a single proceeding to determine conflicting
claims without exposing the stakeholder to the possibility
of having to pay more than once on a single liability.
In this case, BSP, correctly filed a motion for interpleader
in order to compel all claimants, particularly X and Y, to
interplead and litigate their respective claims as to the
ownership of the subject Bills.
This is so in order for BSP to pay to the correct person
and prevent unnecessary litigations which could possibly
arise from an incorrect payment.
OCAMPO v. TIRONA
X, an owner and lessor of a parcel of land, filed an
ejectment case against Y after she stopped paying rent
for many months. Y argues that only Z, the rightful owner,
has the right to eject her. Because of this, Y filed a
complaint for interpleader, to determine who she should
pay her rent to.
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As judge, would you grant the interpleader?
ANSWER:
No. Under Sec. 1, Rule 62, whenever conflicting claims
upon the same subject matter are or may be made
against a person who claims no interest whatever in the
same subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in
part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an
action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to
interplead and litigate their several claims among
themselves. It has been held that an action for
interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the
person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims
on the property.
In this case, Y was not in good faith when she filed the
motion to interplead. Before the complaint for ejectment,
she had already been paying X the rent due to him and
that she only moved to interplead after a complaint for
ejectment was filed against her. It cannot be said,
therefore, that Y, as lessee, did not know the person to
whom to pay the rentals.
PASRICHA v. DON LUIS REALTY
X, lessor, filed an ejectment case against Y after the latter
stopped paying rent. Y contends that he was justified in
doing so because there was a conflict as to who is
authorized to receive the payments.
Will Y’s defense prosper?
ANSWER:
No. Under Sec. 1, Rule 62, whenever conflicting claims
upon the same subject matter are or may be made
against a person who claims no interest whatever in the
same subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in
part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an
action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to
interplead and litigate their several claims among
themselves. It has been held that an action for
interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know to
whom payment of rentals should be made due to
conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to
collect).
In this case, instead of filing a complaint for interpleader,
Y merely refused to pay the rentals. A complaint for
interpleader should have been proper in this case
because Y alleged that there is conflict as to who is
authorized to receive payment for the rentals.
MAGLINTE v. HON. BALTAZAR-PADILLA
M is a lessee, who was granted with a right of first refusal
to buy after a three year term, of a parcel of land owned
by PRC. The lease contract was with a condition that it
should not be subleased to another, but M subleased it to
G. When the lease contract was about to expire, PRC
offered to sell the leased property to M, and the latter
69
agreed to purchase it. However, about two years later, G
sent a letter to PRC expressing the interest to purchase
the same property, and, because of that, PRC filed a
complaint for interpleader against M and G to determine
who had the right to purchase it.

The trial court ruled in favor of M and issued a writ of

execution directing PRC to execute the contract of
sale/contract to sell, but denied M’s motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession as the interpleader case
did not declare M as the owner entitled to possession.

Does the trial court’s writ of execution in the interpleader

case carry with it the corollary right to a writ of possession?

ANSWER:

No. The trial court’s writ of execution in the interpleader

case does not carry with it the corollary right to a writ of
possession.

A writ of possession complements the writ of execution

only when the right of possession or ownership has been
validly determined in a case directly relating to either. The
interpleader case obviously did not delve into that issue.
A writ of possession shall issue only in the following
instances:
1. Land registration proceedings;

2. Extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real property;

3. Judicial foreclosure of property provided that the

mortgagor has possession and no third party has
intervened; and

4. Execution of sales.

The trial court’s decision in the interpleader case merely

resolved the question of who, between M and G, had the
right to purchase PRC’s property. The directive was only
for PRC to execute the necessary contract in favor of M
as the winning party, nothing else. Here, M seeks the writ
as a consequence of the trial court’s decision ordering the
execution of a contract of sale/contract to sell in her favor.
The writ does not lie in such a case.

Therefore, the trial court’s writ of execution in the

interpleader case does not carry with it the corollary right
to a writ of possession.

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 RULE 63: DECLARATORY RELIEF & SIMILAR
REMEDIES
IMBONG v. OCHOA
Shortly after the President’s approval of RA 10354,
otherwise known as Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Act of 2012 (RH Law), several petitioners
filed, before the Supreme Court, several petitions for
certiorari and prohibition mostly with prayers for
injunctive reliefs to challenge the constitutionality of the
said law. Petitioners argue that the said law is
unconstitutional for allegedly violating the right to life,
right to health, right to religious freedom, equal protection
clause, among others. Respondents argue that the
petitions should be dismissed on procedural ground for
they are essentially petitions for declaratory reliefs over
which the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction.
Are the petitions dismissible on the ground that they are
essentially petitions for declaratory reliefs which the SC
has no original jurisdiction?
ANSWER:
No, the petitions are not dismissible on the ground that
they are essentially petitions for declaratory reliefs which
the SC has no original jurisdiction.
It is well-entrenched in jurisprudence that “where the case
has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive
reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65”.
Here, most of the petitions are praying for injunctive
reliefs and the case has far-reaching implications. So, the
Supreme Court may consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65. Therefore, the petitions are not
dismissible on the ground that they are essentially
petitions for declaratory relief which the SC has no
original jurisdiction.
MALANA v. TAPPA
M filed a complaint for reivindicacion, quieting of title and
damages against T on the allegation that she is the
owner of a parcel of land occupied by T. Their case was
referred to the Lupon Tagapamayapa for conciliation of
which T asserted their ownership over the subject
property and presented documents supporting the same.
M claimed that the documents were falsified and
incapable of proving the latter’s claim of ownership over
the subject property; nevertheless, they created a cloud
upon the petitioner’s title to the property.
She filed a complaint before the RTC to remove such
cloud and sought for damages resulting from the
baseless claim over the property. However, the RTC
dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
due to the new law reorganizing the jurisdiction of courts.
M filed for a reconsideration stating the actions should not
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have been dismissed since it was an action to quiet title,
an action which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Was the dismissal proper?
ANSWER:
No. Petitioners' Complaint contained sufficient allegations
for an accion reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction over such an
action would depend on the value of the property involved.
Given that the subject property herein is valued only at
P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction
over an action to recover the same.
The RTC, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing, without prejudice, petitioners'
Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868 for lack of jurisdiction.
The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules
of Court specifically refers to (1) an action for the
reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles
1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code; (2) an action to quiet title,
authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3)
an action to consolidate ownership required by Article
1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right to repurchase.
These three remedies are considered similar to
declaratory relief because they also result in the
adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often
without the need of execution to carry the judgment into
effect.22
To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions
identified in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63
of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read
together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, as amended.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. IBAY
O’s office conducted an investigation on the alleged
anomaly committed through the issuance of checks which
were deposited in financial institutions. It directed U Bank
to produce the documents which will be inspected and
examined “in camera” to identify the specific bank records
prior to the issuance of the required information without
bringing the documents outside the bank premises. The
bank was not able to comply due to their failure to identify
the whereabouts of the documents.
O cited them in contempt and for willful obstruction of
their lawful exercise of their functions. U bank, instead of
complying with the order, filed a petition for declaratory
relief with application for TRO and PI in the RTC. O
moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that such
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, which
was denied.
Was the grant of TRO and PI proper?
71
ANSWER:
Yes. The special civil action of declaratory relief falls
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
It is not among the actions within the original jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court even if only questions of law are
involved. Sec. 1, Rule 63 of the ROC provides that – any
persons interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulations, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate RTC to
determine any question of construction or validity arising,
and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are: (1)
there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) must be
between persons whose interest are adverse; (3) that the
party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial
determination.
DELA LLANA v. ALBA
B assailed the constitutionality of B.P. 129 as being
contrary to the security of tenure provision of the
Constitution as it separates from the judiciary Justices
and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to
municipal circuit courts except the occupants of the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless
appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act.
They likewise impute lack of good faith in its enactment
and characterize as undue delegation of legislative power
to the President his authority to fix the compensation and
allowance of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed
and determination of the date when the reorganization
shall be deemed completed.
The Solicitor General maintains that there is no valid
justification for the attack on the constitutionality of the
statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the power vested
in the BP to reorganize the judiciary, the allegations of
absence of good faith as well as the attack on the
independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and
devoid of any support in law.
Should the law be declared unconstitutional?
ANSWER:
No. The court held that there was good faith in
reorganizing the judiciary. The court maintains that the
passage of BP 129 was in good faith seeing as its
purpose was for the fulfilment of what was considered a
great public need by the legislative department, not
intended to adversely affect the tenure of judges of any
particular judge.
While it is possible that the legislature could deliberately
abuse the power to reorganize the judiciary, thus lacking
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good faith, the Court is unconvinced that such was the
case in this situation. Thus, where the Court holds that
the reorganization of the judiciary by virtue of BP 129 was
done in good faith, the “separation” of the petitioner due
to the abolition of his office is valid and constitutional.
ALMEDA v. BATHALA MARKETING
Spouses XX mortgaged their properties with ABC bank
and was subsequently foreclosed. The former claim that
the foreclosed properties command a market price of P
50,000,000.00 at the time of the foreclosure sale.
However no evidence appears on record to prove this
allegation. According to the Spouses XX, the mortgaged
properties were sold during the auction for an amount
which is way below the their market price and thus such
places the spouses XX at a disadvantage.
Is the contention of spouses XX correct?
ANSWER:
No. The fact that the properties were sold at an amount
less than its actual market value should not militate
against the right to such recovery. On the contrary, a
mortgagor stands to gain with a reduced price because
he possess the right to redemption. When there is a right
to redeem, the inadequacy of the price should not be
material because the judgement debtor may reacquire his
property or sell his right to redeem and thus recover the
loss he claims to have suffered by reason of the price
obtained at the auction sale.
EDDADES v. EDDADES
Mr. E brought this action before the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan seeking a declaratory judgment
on his hereditary rights in the property of his alleged
father and incidentally the recognition of his status as an
illegitimate son of Mr. F.
Mr. E alleges that he is an illegitimate son of Mr. F with
Mrs. M, and that he had always enjoyed the continuous
and uninterrupted possession of the status of illegitimate
child by direct and positive acts of his father and of the
legitimate children of the latter as such illegitimate child
he is entitled to share in the inheritance of his father
under the law.
Is the action for declaratory relief proper?
Answer:
No. The present case does not come within the purview
of the law authorizing an action for declaratory relief for it
neither concerns a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, nor does it affect a statute or ordinance, the
construction or validity of which is involved. Under the law,
an action for declaratory relief is proper when any person
is interested “under a deed, will, contract or other written
72
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute or
ordinance” in order to determine any question of
construction or validity arising under the instrument or
statute, or to declare his rights or duties thereunder
(section 1, Rule 63).

TOLENTINO v. BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY

Mr.T a Filipino citizen and a certified public accountant

Filed an action for declaratory relief in the Court of First
Instance of Manila for the purpose of testing the
constitutionality of section 16-A of Commonwealth Act No.
3105, otherwise known as the Philippine Accountancy
Law, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 342. The
ground advanced for the claim of unconstitutionality is
that "it is a class legislation since by its terms it excludes
persons engaged in other callings or professions from
adopting, acquiring or using a trade name in connection
with the practice of such callings or professions." The
action is addressed against the Board of Accountancy.

Will the action for declaratory relief proper?

Answer:

No. This case does not properly come under rule 63 of

the Rules of Court which authorizes the institution of an
action for declaratory relief.

The authorities are unanimous that in order that an action

for declaratory relief may be entertained, it must be
predicated on the following requisite facts or conditions:

(1) there must be a justiciable controversy;

(2) the controversy must be between persons whose
interests are adverse;
(3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal
interest in the controversy; and
(4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial
determination. These requisite facts are wanting and,
therefore, the complaint must fail for lack of sufficient
cause of action.

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 RULE 64: REVIEW OF COMELEC & COA
JUDGMENTS
MACABAGO v. COMELEC
A was proclaimed Mayor of X City in the 2001 Elections.
B, the losing candidate filed a petition with the COMELEC
alleging fraud and irregulatrities perpetrated the election
which was then granted. A contends that COMELEC
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdtiction when it issued the order that is not
a pre-proclamation controversy but a regular election
contest through Rule 65.
Is A correct?
ANSWER:
Yes. Pursuant to Rule 64 of ROC, this rule shall govern
the review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of
the Commission on Elections and the Commission on
Audit. Moreover, when the COMELEC acts capriciously
or whimsically, with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing such an order,
the aggrieved party may seek redress from this Court via
a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules.
In this case, A is correct in saying that the attending fraud
and irregularities does not warrant a pre-proclamation
controversy, hence, the COMELEC in granting the
petition has acted with GAD amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction which is a proper remedy under Rule 64 via
Rule 65.
CAGAS v. COMELEC
X filed an electoral protest with the COMELEC 1st
Division when he lost to Y in the recent 2010 elections. Y
raised special affirmative defenses but the COMELEC
denied the same. Hence, Y moved to reconsider the
ground for the protest and be elevated to the COMELEC
en banc. X countered that being merely interlocutory
order could be elevated to the COMELEC en banc which
was upheld by the COMELEC 1st Division. As a result, Y
commenced a special civil action.
Will it prosper?
ANSWER:
No. Pursuant to Rule 64 of ROC, this rule shall govern
the review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of
the Commission on Elections and the Commission on
Audit. Additionally, Section 7, Article IX of the 1987
Constitution grants SC the power to review any decision,
order or ruling of COMELEC, this however is limited only
to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc,
and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a
Division of the COMELEC.
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In the case at bar, there was never a final order that can
be reviewed through the special civil action as the order
never reached the COMELEC en banc. The instant case
involving merely an interlocutory order will not prosper.
REYNA v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
X bank was engaged in a cattle-financing program
wherein loans were granted to various cooperatives. X
bank granted six loans to four cooperative borrowers.
Three checks were issued by X bank to Y Corp to serve
as prepayment for the cattle. Y Corp did not fulfill its part
of the obligation. Hence, a complaint was filed against but
contended that prepayment is not allowed.
Will the petition for certiorari be granted?
ANSWER:
No. In the absence of grave abuse of discretion,
questions of fact cannot be raised in a petition for
certiorari, under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. The office
of the petition for certiorari is not to correct simple errors
of judgment; any resort to the said petition under Rule 64,
in relation to Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is limited to the resolution of jurisdictional
issues. Accordingly, since the validity of the prepayment
scheme is inherently a question of fact, the same should
no longer be looked into by this Court.
IBRAHIM v. COMELEC
X filed his certificate of candidacy to run as municipal
Vice-Mayor. Thereafter, Y, then Acting Election Officer in
the said municipality declared that the Resolution was
anchored on the certification, which was issued by Y
stating that X was not a registered voter of the
municipality where he seeks to be elected. However, X
obtained the highest number cast for the Vice-Mayoralty
race while the resolution is not yet final. COMELEC,
which was then chaired by Y, suspended X’s
proclamation. Resolution now being final, X questions
COMELEC’s order by way of certiorari.
Is he correct?
ANSWER:
Yes. Under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, a judgment or
final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections
and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the
aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under
Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided. In the present
case, resolution is now final which is well-within the mode
of review under Rule 64 via Rule 65.
74
 REBLORA v. ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES
X, a retired Philippine Navy, questioned the judgment or
decision made by COA with regards to his retirement
benefit computation. Instead of 34 years length of service
as X’s alleged, COA discern that X has only 31 years
length of active service reckoned at the beginning of
petitioner’s active service in the military from his stint as
civilian worker at the DILG. X filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 to question said decision of
COA.
Can the COA’s decision/judgment be reviewed by
Supreme Court via Rule 45.
ANSWER:
No. The Court dismissed the instant petition on account
of it being the wrong remedy. Decisions and resolutions
of the COA are reviewable by Supreme Court, not via an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, as is the present
petition, but thru a special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Section 2. Mode of Review.—A judgment or final order or
resolution of the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved
party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65,
except as hereinafter provided.
The distinction between an appeal under Rule 45 and a
special civil action under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 is
the difference of one to the other with respect to the
permissible scope of inquiry in each. Indeed, by
restricting the review of judgments or resolutions of the
COA only thru a special civil action for certiorari, the
Constitution and the Rules of Court precisely limits the
permissible scope of inquiry in such cases only to errors
of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Hence, unless
tainted with grave abuse of discretion, simple errors of
judgment committed by the COA cannot be reviewed—
even by Supreme Court.
SAHALI v. COMELEC
During the 2010 elections, S and M were two of the four
candidates who ran for the position of governor in the
Province of Tawi-Tawi while R and U ran for the position
of Vice-Governor. The Provincial Board of Canvassers
(PBOC) proclaimed petitioners S and R as the duly
elected governor and vice-governor, respectively.
M and U filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam with the
COMELEC. The COMELEC First Division directed its
Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD) to
conduct a technical examination of the said election
paraphernalia by comparing the signature and
thumbmarks appearing on the EDCVL as against those
appearing on the VRRs and the Book of Voters. S and R
jointly filed with the COMELEC First Division a Strong
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Manifestation of Grave Concern and Motion for
Reconsideration.
The COMELEC First Division issued the herein assailed
Order which denied the said motion for reconsideration
filed by S and R. S and R filed the instant petition
asserting that the COMELEC First Division committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Does the SC have the power to review election cases as
to the judgments, or final orders of the COMELEC First
Division
ANSWER:
No. The Rules provide: Mode of Review.—A judgment or
final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections
and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the
aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under
Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.
On the question of Jurisdiction, the power of the Supreme
Court to review election cases falling within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC only extends to
final decisions or resolutions of the COMELEC en banc,
not to interlocutory orders issued by a Division thereof.
In Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC, Supreme Court elucidated on
the import of Section 7, Art IX of the Constitution in this
wise: We have interpreted this provision to mean final
orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered
in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
This decision must be a final decision or resolution of the
Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not an
interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme Court has
no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or
even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on
Elections.
Here, the Orders issued by the First Division of the
COMELEC were merely interlocutory orders since they
only disposed of an incident in the main case i.e. the
propriety of the technical examination of the said election
paraphernalia. Thus, the proper recourse for S and R is
to await the decision of the COMELEC First Division in
the election protests filed by Matba and Usman, and
should they be aggrieved thereby, to appeal the same to
the COMELEC en banc by filing a motion for
reconsideration.
75
 PATES v. COMELEC
The following material antecedents:
a. February 1, 2008 – The COMELEC First Division
issued its Resolution (assailed in the petition);
b. February 4, 2008 – The counsel for petitioner Nilo T.
Pates (petitioner) received a copy of the February 1, 2008
Resolution;
c. February 8, 2008 – The petitioner filed his motion for
reconsideration (MR) of the February 1, 2008 Resolution
(4 days from receipt of the February 1, 2008 Resolution)
d. September 18, 2008 – The COMELEC en banc issued
a Resolution denying the petitioner’s MR (also assailed in
the petition).
e. September 22, 2008 – The petitioner received the
COMELEC en banc Resolution of September 18, 2008
Petitioner filed his petition for certiorari on the final
COMELEC Resolution on October 22, 2008 or two days
late which must be filed 30 days from such notice
however it fell on a Saturday (October 18, 2008), as the
petitioner only had the remaining period of 26 days to file
his petition, after using up 4 days in preparing and filing
his Motion for Reconsideration.
His petition was dismissed. He insists that the fresh
period rule applicable to a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 should likewise apply to petitions for certiorari of
COMELEC rulings filed under Rule 64. He asks for
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
Should the motion for reconsideration should be granted?
ANSWER:
No. Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court which
provides:
SEC. 3. Time to file petition.—The petition shall be filed
within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final
order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a
motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or
final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural
rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the
period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved
party may file the petition within the remaining period, but
which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event,
reckoned from notice of denial.
As a Matter of Law: Section 7, Article IX-A of the
Constitution provides that unless otherwise provided by
the Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of
each Commission may be brought to the Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from
receipt of a copy thereof. For this reason, the Rules of
Court provide for a separate rule (Rule 64) specifically
applicable only to decisions of the COMELEC and the
Commission on Audit. This Rule expressly refers to the
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application of Rule 65 in the filing of a petition for
certiorari, subject to the exception clause except as
hereinafter provided. Rule 64, however, cannot simply be
equated to Rule 65 even if it expressly refers to the latter
rule.
Rule 64, however, cannot simply be equated to Rule 65
even if it expressly refers to the latter rule. Procedurally,
the most patent difference between the two – i.e., the
exception that Section 2, Rule 64 refers to – is Section 3
which provides for a special period for the filing of
petitions for certiorari from decisions or rulings of the
COMELEC en banc. The period is 30 days from notice of
the decision or ruling (instead of the 60 days that Rule 65
provides), with the intervening period used for the filing of
any motion for reconsideration deductible from the
originally granted 30 days (instead of the fresh period of
60 days that Rule 65 provides).
Significantly, the petitioner presented no exceptional
circumstance or any compelling reason to warrant the
non-application of Section 3, Rule 64 to his petition. He
failed to explain why his filing was late. Other than his
appeal to history, uniformity, and convenience, he did not
explain why we should adopt and apply the fresh period
rule to an election case.
OSMEŇA v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Osmeña and the members of the Sanggunian sought
reconsideration of the disallowance with the COA
Regional Office which, modified the City Auditor’s
Decision by absolving the members of the Sanggunian
from any liability. The COA Regional Office’s Decision
was sustained by the COA’s National Director for Legal
and Adjudication. Osmeña filed an appeal against this
Decision. the COA issued the assailed Decision which
affirmed the notices of disallowance. Eighteen days after
or on June 10, 2008, Osmeña filed a motion for
reconsideration
The COA denied Osmeña’s motion via a Resolution
dated June 8, 2009. The Office of the Mayor of Cebu City
received the June 8, 2009 Resolution of the COA on June
29, 2009. A day before, however, Osmeña left for the
United States of America for his check-up after his cancer
surgery in April 2009 and returned to his office only on
July 15, 2009. Thus, it was only on July 27, 2009 that
Osmeña filed the present petition for certiorari under Rule
64 to assail the COA’s Decision of May 6, 2008 and
Resolution of June 8, 2009.
Osmeña filed his motion for reconsideration, of the COA’s
May 6, 2008 Decision, 18 days from his receipt thereof,
leaving him with 12 days to file a Rule 64 petition against
the COA ruling. He argues that the remaining period
should be counted not from the receipt of the COA’s June
8, 2009 Resolution by the Office of the Mayor of Cebu
City on June 29, 2009, but from the time he officially
reported back to his office on July 15, 2009, after his trip
abroad. Since he is being made liable in his personal
76
capacity, he reasons that the remaining period should be
counted from his actual knowledge of the denial of his
motion for reconsideration. Corollary, he needed time to
hire a private counsel who would review his case and
prepare the petition.
May the rules be relaxed to give effect to a party’s right of
appeal?
Thus, the reckoning date to count the remaining 12 days
to file his Rule 64 petition should be counted from July 15,
2009, the date Osmeña had actual knowledge of the
denial of his motion for reconsideration of the Decision of
the COA and given the opportunity to competently file an
appeal thereto before the Court. The present petition,
filed on July 27, 2009, was filed within the reglementary
period.

ANSWER:
OPTIONAL READINGS FOR RULE 64
Yes. Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 3. Time to file petition.—The petition shall be filed
LIMKAICHONG v. COMELEC
within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final
order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a
X ran for a public office which upon Proclamation,
motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or
taking oath and office a petition for disqualification
final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural
was filed by Y in the COMELEC. The COMELEC
rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the
subsequently disqualified X for failing to satisfy the
period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved
Citizenship requirement after 10 days but before 30
party may file the petition within the remaining period, but
days X appealed the case by virtue of Rule 64 in the
which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event,
Court of Appeals.
reckoned from notice of denial.
Was the appeal proper?
Several times in the past, we emphasized that procedural
rules should be treated with utmost respect and due
ANSWER:
regard, since they are designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of
Yes, the appeal is proper.
delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the
administration of justice. From time to time, however, we
Sec. 2 Rule 64 in Relation to Rule 65 – Mode of
have recognized exceptions to the Rules but only for the
Review – A Judgment or Final order or resolution of
most compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to
the Commission on Elections and the Commission on
the Rules would defeat rather than serve the ends of
Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the
justice. Every plea for a liberal construction of the Rules
Supreme Court on Certiorari under Rule 65, except as
must at least be accompanied by an explanation of why
hereinafter provided.
the party-litigant failed to comply with the Rules and by a
justification for the requested liberal construction.
The appeal was in accordance with the constitutional
mandate which prescribes the power of the court to
Where strong considerations of substantive justice are
review decisions of the COMELEC, which was in the
manifest in the petition, this Court may relax the strict
present case properly appealed before the expiration
application of the rules of procedure in the exercise of its
of the 30-day period.
legal jurisdiction Osmeña cites the mandatory medical
check-ups he had to undergo in Houston, Texas after his
Hence, the petition should be dismissed.
cancer surgery in April 2009 as reason for the delay in
filing his petition for certiorari. Due to his weakened state
of health, he claims that he could not very well be
expected to be bothered by the affairs of his office and TESDA v. COA
had to focus only on his medical treatment. He could not X an instrumentality of the Government distributed
require his office to attend to the case as he was being and issued healthcare allowances to government
charged in his personal capacity. employees. Such order was done by virtue of the
Administrative order promulgated by DOLE, to grant
We find Osmeña’s reasons sufficient to justify a healthcare allowances to government employees.
relaxation of the Rules. Although the service of the June This was subsequently stopped due to the
8, 2009 Resolution of the COA was validly made on June intervention of COA, which nullified such order. Was
29, 2009 through the notice sent to the Office of the the nullification proper?
Mayor of Cebu City,16 we consider July 15, 2009 – the
date he reported back to office – as the effective date ANSWER:
when he was actually notified of the resolution, and the
reckoning date of the period to appeal. If we were to rule Yes.The COA is endowed with latitude to determine,
otherwise, we would be denying Osmeña of his right to prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary,
appeal the Decision of the COA, despite the merits of his excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
case. expenditures of government funds. It has the power to
ascertain whether public funds were utilized for the

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SCHOOL OF LAW 77
 purpose for which they had been intended by law. The
Constitution has made the COA “the guardian of
public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all
accounts pertaining to government revenue and
expenditures and the uses of public funds and
property, including the exclusive authority to define
the scope of its audit and examination, establish the
techniques and methods for such review, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations.”14 Thus, the COA is generally accorded
complete discretion in the exercise of its constitutional
duty and responsibility to examine and audit
expenditures of public funds, particularly those which
are perceptibly beyond what is sanctioned by law.
Verily, the Court has sustained the decisions of
administrative authorities like the COA as a matter of
general policy, not only on the basis of the doctrine of
separation of powers but also upon the recognition
that such administrative authorities held the expertise
as to the laws they are entrusted to enforce.
The Court has accorded not only respect but also
finality to their findings especially when their decisions
are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that
would amount to grave abuse of discretion.
Only when the COA acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may this
Court entertain and grant a petition for certiorari
brought to assail its actions. However, we find no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COA in
issuing the assailed decision.
Hence, the petition is dismissed.
CAUSING VS. COMELEC
Petitioner X, who is a Municipal Civil Registrar, filed a
complaint before the COMELEC accusing Mayor Y of
violating the prohibition of personnel movement during
election period. Mayor Y answered that the purpose of
transferring the office of X was to closely supervise
the performance of her functions after complaints
regarding her negative behavior in dealing with her
co-employees and with the public transacting
business in her office had been received. Mayor Y
further argued that petitioner failed to file a Motion for
Reconsideration as pre-requisite in filing for certiorari,
hence, the complaint should be dismissed. Is Mayor Y
contention correct?
ANSWER:
Yes, Mayor Y contention is correct.
The well-established rule is that the motion for
reconsideration is an indispensable condition before
an aggrieved party can resort to the special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. The filing of the motion for reconsideration
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before the resort to certiorari will lie is intended to
afford to the public respondent the opportunity to
correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by
way of re-examination of the legal and factual aspects
of the case.
The rule is not absolute, however, considering that
jurisprudence has laid down exceptions to the
requirement for the filing of a petition for certiorari
without first filing a motion for reconsideration, namely:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the
court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon
by the lower court, or are the same as those raised
and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question, and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government, or of the
petitioner, or the subject matter of the petition is
perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where the petitioner was deprived of due process,
and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of
arrest is urgent, and the granting of such relief by the
trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a
nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or
public interest is involved.
In this case, none of the exceptions are present.
EJERCITO VS. COMELEC, 742 SCRA 210
X, a candidate for governor filed a disqualification
case before the Comelec against incumbent Gov. Y
on the ground of overspending and giving “Orange
Cards” to influence the voters in violation to the
election laws.
The Comelec Division subsequently disqualified Gov.
Y based on the alleged grounds which was then
affirmed by the Comelec En Banc. Gov. Y filed for
petition for certiorari at the SC arguing that the
Comelec En Banc committed grave abuse of
discretion when it rule to disqualify Gov. Y.
78
 Decide on Gov. Y petition.

ANSWER:

The petition should fail.

Gov. Y failed to prove that Comelec acted with grave

abuse of discretion. A special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, is
an independent action that is available only if there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.

It is a legal remedy that is limited to the resolution of

jurisdictional issues and is not meant to correct simple
errors of judgment.More importantly, it will only
prosper if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and is
actually proved to exist. Grave abuse of discretion
arises when a lower court or tribunal violates the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. It
means such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as would amount to lack of jurisdiction; it
contemplates a situation where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law.

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SCHOOL OF LAW 79

RULE 65: CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION &
MANDAMUS
ARAULLO v. AQUINO
S made a statement that they received incentives in the
form of money for voting for the impeachment of Chief
Justice R. D stated that it came from the funds of DAP,
which is a program to ramp up spending to accelerate
economic expansion. D clarified that it came from the
request of the Senators. X filed a petition of certiorari
questioning the validity of DAP.
Was the remedy of certiorari proper?
ANSWER:
Yes. Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling
or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy
of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof,
copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3,
Rule 46.
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. — When the
proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to desist from further
proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or
otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified
true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject
thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant
and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-
forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of
section 3, Rule 46.
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of
errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
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In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to
warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion
must be grave, which means either that the judicial or
quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board
evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the
duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as
when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical
manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
TRIPLEX ENTERPRISES v. PNB-REPUBLIC BANK
X filed an action for annulment of contract, mandamus
and damages against Y and respondent Z before the
RTC of Pasig City. Atty. R, the real estate broker whose
services were engaged by X for its negotiations with Z
obtained a legal opinion from the OGCC. During the pre-
trial conference, the legal opinion was marked as
evidence. Then, during trial, Atty. R was called to testify,
which was objected by the counsel of Z, for being
violative of attorney-client privilege. The trial court
sustained the objection. X moved for reconsideration of
the court’s refusal to admit its evidence, but it was denied
by the court. X then filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA but it was dismissed.
Was the CA correct in dismissing the petition of X?
ANSWER:
Yes. Section 1 of Rule 65 states that when any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling
or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
Jurisprudence dictates that the writ may be issued only
where it is convincingly proved that the lower court
committed grave abuse of discretion, or an act too patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a duty, or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in
contemplation of law, or that the trial court exercised its
power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility. The rationale of this rule is
that, when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error
committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed.
Otherwise, every mistake made by a court will deprive it
of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment will be a
void judgment.
80
In this case, X assails the order f the trial court
disallowing the admission in evidence of the testimony of
Roque on the opinion of the OGCC. By that fact alone, no
grave abuse of discretion could be imputed to the trial
court. Furthermore, the said order was not an error of
jurisdiction. Even assuming that it was erroneous, the
mistake was an error in judgment not correctable by the
writ of certiorari.
DAVID v. RIVERA
X filed a ejectment complaint against Y in the MCTC of
Pampanga, which ruled in favor of X. Without appealing
the MCTC decision, Y filed before the RTC of Angeles
City a Petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction
and/or TRO seeking the nullification of the MCTC, with
the defense that MCTC had no jurisdiction as the issue
before it was agrarian in nature. RTC issued a TRO, and
issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. X filed a motion
to dismiss, which was denied by the RTC for the motion
partakes of a demurrer to evidence which may be granted
only upon showing that the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief prayed for. X then filed a Petition for Certiorari in the
CA, which did not find any grave abuse discretion on the
part of the RTC in denying the motion to dismiss, since
motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order and hence
cannot be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule
65.
Was the CA correct in denying the Petition for Certiorari?
ANSWER:
Yes. Section 1 of Rule 65 states that when any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling
or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require. In a case decided by the Supreme
Court, certiorari does not lie to review an interlocutory
order denying a motion to dismiss, even if it is in the form
of a demurrer to evidence filed after the plaintiff had
presented his evidence and rested his case.
Being interlocutory, an order denying a demurrer to
evidence is not appealable. Neither can it be the subject
of a petition for certiorari. After such denial, the
petitioners should present their evidence and if the
decision of the trial judge would be adverse to them, they
could raise on appeal the same issues raised in the
demurrer. However, it is also settled that the rule admits
of an exception, i.e., when the denial of a demurrer is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
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ESQUIVEL v. OMBUDSMAN
X , Y, and Z were charged with less physical injuries and
grave threats committed against a certain police officer. X
files a writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under
Rule 65 contending that Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over their persons as they hold positions
excluded in RA No. 7975.
Is Rule 65 the proper remedy?
ANSWER:
No. Section 2 of Rule 65 states when the proceedings of
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to desist from further
proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or
otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
In a case decided by the Supreme Court, it states that a
writ of prohibition is directed to the court itself,
commanding it to cease from the exercise of a jurisdiction
to which it has no legal claim. Prohibition, being an
extraordinary remedy, cannot be resorted to when the
ordinary and usual remedies provided by law are
adequate and available. It is only granted when no other
remedy is available or sufficient to afford redress.
Prohibition will not be issued against an inferior court
unless the attention of the court whose proceedings are
sought to be stayed has been called to the alleged lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over
Criminal Cases is clearly founded on law. Petitioners
were not devoid of a remedy in the ordinary course of law
for they could have filed a motion to quash the
informations at the first instance but they did not. The
records show that petitioners only raised the issue before
the SC. Hence, the writ of prohibition must be denied.
MILITANTE v. CA
Petitioner X is the registered owner of three (3)
contiguous parcels of land with an aggregate area of
1,590 sq. meters in Balintawak, Caloocan City. Twenty-
four (24) squatter families live in these lots. President
Marcos issued PD No. 1315 expropriating forty (40)
hectares of land in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The
land expropriated was identified in the decree as a slum
area that required the upgrading of basic facilities and
services and the disposal of lots to their bona fide
81
occupants with the national Slum Improvement and
Resettlement (SIR) Program and the Metro Manila Zonal
Improvement Program (ZIP). The NHA, as the decree’s
designated administrator for the national government,
undertook the implementation of PD 1315 in seven (7)
phases called the Bagong Barrio Project (BBP). The
properties covered include X’s land, was not among
those acquired and paid for in 1978-1979. On May 14,
1980, Proclamation No. 1967 identified 244 sites in
Metropolitan Manila as areas for priority development and
urban land reform zones. In 1981, the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) declared
the lots of petitioner to be outside the reform area.
Respondent Y, NHA Project Manager in Bagong Barrio,
refused to implement the clearance to eject the squatters
on X’s land. Y claimed that X’s land had already been
declared expropriated by PD 1315.
X filed with CA a “Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus
with Declaration as Inexistent and Unconstitutional PD
1315” against the NHA and Y.
Can respondent Y be compelled to effect the directive /
memorandum of relocation / resettlement subjecting the
said twenty-four (24) squatter families from unlawfully
occupying petitioner X’s subject property through a writ of
prohibition and/or mandamus?
ANSWER:
No. Petitioner X is not entitled to the writ of prohibition.
Section 2 of Rule 65 provides:
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. — When the proceedings
of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether
exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or
in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
defendant to desist from further proceedings in the action
or matter specified therein.
Prohibition is a preventive remedy. It seeks for judgment
ordering the defendant to desist from continuing with the
commission of an act perceived to be illegal. In the case
at bar, X does not pray that Y should be ordered to desist
from relocating the squatters. What X challenges is Y’s
refusal to implement the demolition clearance issued by
her administrative superiors. The remedy for a refusal to
discharge a legal duty is mandamus, not prohibition.
The petitioner X is also not entitled to a writ of mandamus.
Section 3, Rule 65 provides:
Sec. 3. Petition for mandamus. — When any tribunal,
corporation, board, or person, unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or
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unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment
of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and
there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at
some other specified time, to do the act required to be
done to protect the rights of petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful acts of the defendant.
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that may be
availed of only when there is no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A petition
for mandamus is premature if there are administrative
remedies available to the petitioner. In the instant case, X
has not exhausted his administrative remedies. He may
seek another demolition order from the NHA General
Manager this time directly addressed to respondent Y or
the pertinent NHA representative. In fact, the Government
Corporate Counsel asserts that petitioner should have
brought Y’s inaction to the attention of her superiors.
There is therefore no extreme necessity to invoke judicial
action as the administrative set-up could have easily
corrected the alleged failure to act. The General Manager,
as Chief Executive Officer of the NHA, has the power of
supervision over the operations and internal affairs of
NHA.
ENRIQUEZ v. MACADAEG
A special civil action for the recovery of a piece of real
property, the complaint alleging that the said property had
been bought by plaintiff A at an execution sale but that,
notwithstanding the sale, the judgment debtor, as
supposed owner of said property, subsequently
mortgaged the same to Bank X and refused to surrender
possession to A, whereupon, the latter brought suit to
have himself declared owner of said property and placed
in possession thereof. Before filing their answer, the
defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint, on
the ground, among others, that as the action concerned
title to and possession of real estate situated in Negros
Oriental, venue was improperly lain in the CFI of Cebu.
The motion was denied and the defendants filed a
petition for mandamus to compel the respondent judge B
to dismiss the action. Judge B puts up the defense that
the act sought to be ordered involves the exercise of
judicial discretion and that petitioner has another
adequate remedy, which is by appeal.
Is the denial of the motion to dismiss proper?
ANSWER:
No. The motion to dismiss should have been granted. But,
while the respondent judge committed a manifest error in
denying the motion, mandamus is not the proper remedy
for correcting that error, for this is not a case where a
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tribunal "unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office" or "unlawfully excludes another from the use
and enjoyment of a right." (Section 3, Rule 67, Rules of
Court.)
It is rather a case where a judge is proceeding in defiance
of the Rules of Court by refusing to dismiss an action
which would not be maintained in his court. The remedy
in such case is prohibition (section 2, Rule 67), and that
remedy is available in the present case because the
order complained of, being merely of an interlocutory
nature, is not appealable.
While the petition is for mandamus, the same may well be
treated as one for prohibition by waiving strict adherence
to technicalities in the interest of a speedy administration
of justice pursuant to section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court.
A writ of prohibition should be issued, enjoining the
respondent judge or his successor from taking
cognizance of this case unless it be to dismiss the same
in accordance with the Rules.
MADRIGAL TRANSPORT v. LAPANDAY
HOLDINGS
X filed a case against Y who subsequently filed a motion
to dismiss alleging that X failed to state a cause of action.
Subsequently, the motion to dismiss was granted. This
prompted X to file for a motion for reconsideration which
was later on denied, which led to the filing of a petition for
certiorari to the Court of Appeals which was subsequently
dismissed not being the proper remedy as ratiocinated by
the Court of Appeals.
Was the Court of Appeals correct?
ANSWER:
Yes. Sec. 1 of Rule 65 states that A petition for certiorari
is proper when any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.
In the present case it is proper to differentiate certiorari
and appeal, as to purpose Certiorari is a remedy
designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction while
an appeal is for error of law or fact or a mistake of
judgment. As to manner of filing, an Appeal the CA
exercises its appellate jurisdiction and power of review
while a certiorari, the higher court uses its original
jurisdiction in accordance with the power of control and
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supervision. As to subject matter, only judgments or final
orders and those that the rules of court so declare as
appealable may be appealed, certiorari on the other hand,
the main issue is jurisdiction.
As to period of filing, appeals should be filed within 15
days from notice of judgment or final order while petition
for review it should be filed and served within fifteen days
from notice of denial of the decision or of the petitioner’s
timely filed motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Lastly, as to the need for motion for
reconsideration, in certiorari it is generally required, such
motion is not required before appealing a judgment.
Hence, in the aforesatated distinction in the present case,
since appeal is still available so petition for certiorari
cannot be used as a substitute of such remedy.
TOPACIO v. ONG
X by virtue of a Supreme Court decision was enjoined in
taking an appointment as a Sandiganbayan Justice
before he could clarify his citizenship. X filed a special
proceeding in the RTC, but Y filed a request in the OSG,
to file a quo warranto proceeding which was denied.
Hence, a petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed in
the Supreme Court.
Will you grant the said petition?
ANSWER:
No. Sec. 5 of Rule 66 states that “A person claiming to be
entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully
held or exercised by the other may bring an action
therefor in his own name.
While denominated as a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, the petition partakes of the nature of a quo
warranto proceeding with respect to X for it effectively
seeks to declare null and void his appointment in the
Sandiganbayan for being unconstitutional. That for a quo
warranto petition to be successful, the private person
suing must show a clear right to the contested office. In
fact, not even a mere preferential right to be appointed
thereto can lend a modicum of legal ground to proceed
with the action.
Hence, the petition must be denied.
MORABE v. BROWN
X was dismissed by Y, which was subsequently ruled by
the lower court as a case of illegal dismissal. X then filed
for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for him to be
reinstated as he was wrongfully terminated but the court
refused to grant such since it ratiocinated that an
injunction is preventive writ.
Is the court correct?
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ANSWER:
No. Sec. 3 of Rule 65 states that when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station,
or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent,
immediately or at some other specified by the court to do
the act required to be done to protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent.
The writ known as preliminary mandatory injunction is
also a mandamus, though merely provisional in character,
the action of the petitioner is not an action of injunction
but one of mandamus because it seeks the performance
of a legal duty, the reinstatement of X. X being unlawfully
deprived of such right or privilege to continue in his
service of the respondent, because of his unlawful
dismissal. It is within the competence of the courts to
compel the respondent to admit him back to his service.
Hence, the court was wrong.
HERRERA v. BARRETO
X filed a petition for mandamus against Y the Municipal
President who allegedly denied to act on his ministerial
duty to issue cockpit license, which was applied to by X.
The Court of First instance granted the said petition,
which was refuted by Y, as it has no jurisdiction to such
case.
Is Y’s contention correct?
ANSWER:
No. Par. 2 of Sec. 4 of Rule 65 states that “The petition
shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the
acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation,
board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined
by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of
Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts omissions of a
quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law,
or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable
only by the Court of Appeals.
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a
cause, the right in a case. Since it is the power to hear
and determine it does not depend upon either the
regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the
rightfulness of the decision made. Jurisdiction should be
distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, the
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authority to decide a case at all and not the decision
rendered therein is what makes up jurisdiction of the
person and the subject matter, the decision of all other
questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that
jurisdiction.
Hence, the contention is incorrect.
MICROSOFT CORP v. BEST DEAL COMPUTER
The case involves X CORPORATION fighting to protect
its intellectual property rights through filing a complaint for
Injunction and Damages with Ex Parte Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and the Provisional
Measure of Preservation of Evidence against A
Corporation alleging that defendants without authority or
license copied, reproduced, distributed, installed and/or
loaded software programs owned by X Corporation into
computer units sold by them to their customers with
prayer of issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain and enjoin defendants from illegally reproducing,
selling and distributing unlicensed software programs and
an application for the issuance of an ex parte order for
the seizure and impounding of relevant evidence that can
be or may be found at defendants' business premises.
But the trial court denied its application for an ex parte
order. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was filed
submitting that the court a quo gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it ruled that the law does not allow an ex parte
provisional remedy of seizure and impounding of
infringing evidence.
Is petition for certiorari the proper remedy of X
Corporation?
ANSWER:
No. Section 1 of Rule 65 provides:
“When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require. Xxx”
Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy designed for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment. The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the
correction of errors of jurisdiction including the
commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, and does not include correction of the
court’s evaluation of the evidence and factual findings
thereon.
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 CAMPOS v. WISLIZENUS
A was proclaimed as the municipal president of Sibonga,
Cebu. C filed a protest against A. Notice was served to A
through his brother B in the house. A prayed for the
dismissal of the petition since service was not properly
done, thus the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case. The court held that no service of the protest had
been made on A in the manner required by law and that,
therefore, the court acquired no jurisdiction of the
proceedings and accordingly dismissed the protest.
Is the trial court correct?
ANSWER:
Yes. In the case of Navarro v. Jimenez (23 Phil. Rep.,
557) the court held that as a rule, where the jurisdiction of
the court depends upon the determination of a question
of fact and that question has been determined by the
court after a hearing, that determination is conclusive and
cannot be attacked collaterally.
In the case before us evidence as to the fact of service
was introduced by the petitioner and the sufficiency of
that evidence was challenged by the respondent. The
petitioner did not take advantage of the opportunity given
him by the challenge to present other and further
evidence in relation to the service but stood squarely
upon the facts already presented and accepted a
decision of the court thereon. Under such circumstances
there was nothing left for the court to do except to decide
the question upon the facts as they were.
ABAD SANTOS v. PROVINCE OF TARLAC
Province A and the X’s entered into a compromise
agreement from which the Judge’s partial decision was
based. The provincial fiscal moved for a reconsideration
on the ground that the compromise was entered into
under a mistaken belief, and by virtue of EO No. 71,
wherein it removed the province’s authority to expropriate
the questioned property. The motion was granted by
respondent Judge. Hence this case, as the petitioners
argued that the former lost his authority to set aside his
decision because it has already been promulgated.
Did the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion when he set aside his partial decision based on
the compromise agreement entered into by the parties?
ANSWER:
No. Whether or not the grounds alleged by the provincial
fiscal in his motion for reconsideration seeking relief from
the effects of the compromise and from the judgment
rendered thereon are or are not sufficient, is not a
question of jurisdiction but one of judgment which we do
not decide here. No abuse of discretion is shown by the
petitioners, and by abuse of discretion we mean such
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capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
LEUNG BEN v. O’BRIEN
A filed an action before the CFI to recover the sum of
P15,000 alleged to have been lost by B to A in a series of
gambling, banking and percentage. In B’s verified
complaint, A asked for an attachment against the
property of B on the ground that the latter was about to
depart from the Philippine Islands with intent to defraud
his creditors. This attachment was issued, and acting
under that authority, the sheriff attached the sum of
P15,000 which had been deposited by the A with the
International Banking Corporation. B filed a motion to
quash the attachment, which was dismissed by the court.
Hence this application for a writ of certiorari, the purpose
of which was to quash an attachment issued from the
Court of First Instance of the City of Manila.
Supposing that the Court of First Instance has granted an
attachment for which there is no statutory authority, can
this court entertain the present petition and grant the
desired relief?
ANSWER:
Yes. Jurisprudence in the case of In Leung Ben v.
O'Brien clarified:
It may be observed in this connection that the word
"jurisdiction" as used in attachment cases, has reference
not only to the authority of the court to entertain the
principal action but also to its authority to issue the
attachment, as dependent upon the existence of the
statutory ground. (6 C. J., 89.)
This distinction between jurisdiction to issue the
attachment as an ancillary remedy incident to the
principal litigation is of importance; as a court's
jurisdiction over the main action may be complete, and
yet it may lack authority to grant an attachment as
ancillary to such action. This distinction between
jurisdiction over the ancillary has been recognized by this
court in connection with actions involving the appointment
of a receiver. Thus in Rocha & Co. v. Crossfield and
Figueras (6 Phil. Rep., 355), a receiver had been
appointed without legal justification.
It was held that the order making the appointment was
beyond the jurisdiction of the court; and though the court
admittedly had jurisdiction of the main cause, the order
was vacated by this court upon application a writ of
certiorari. (See Blanco v. Ambler, 3 Phil. Rep., 358,
Blanco v. Ambler and McMicking 3 Phil. Rep., 735,
Yangco v. Rohde, 1 Phil. Rep., 404.)
By parity of reasoning it must follow that when a court
issues a writ of attachment for which there is no statutory
authority, it is acting irregularly and in excess of its
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jurisdiction, in the sense necessary to justify the Supreme
Court in granting relief by the writ of certiorari.
NAPA v. WEISSENHAGEN
X and Y instituted an action for the recovery of land
against Z. The justice’s court (today’s MTC) rendered
judgment in favour of X and Y, so Z appealed the
decision to the CFI but X and Y filed a motion to dismiss
arguing that the appeal has not been perfected within the
time required by law. CFI dismissed the appeal.
Z filed a writ of certiorari contesting the dismissal, the
erroneous judgment of the justice’s court and that the CFI
had no jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal.
Will Z’s writ for certiorari prosper?
ANSWER:
No. A writ of certiorari will not issue unless it clearly
appears that the court to which it is to be directed acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in the performance of
the acts complained of. If a court has jurisdiction of the
person and of the subject matter, decisions on all
questions pertinent to the cause are decisions within its
jurisdiction and, however irregular or erroneous they may
be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari.
The writ of certiorari in so far as it was a method by which
mere errors of an inferior court could be corrected no
longer exists. Its place is now taken by the appeal.
SAN PEDRO v. HON. ASDALA
The heirs of spouses A filed an accion reinvindicatoria
and quieting of title against B in the MeTC. The heirs
alleged that they were prevented from entering and using
the property since B claimed it as his own, allegedly with
a spurious TCT. B filed a motion to dismiss citing that the
MeTC had no jurisdiction since the matter is incapable of
pecuniary estimation. The MeTC denied the motion to
dismiss, so B filed a petition for certiorari in the RTC but
the latter dismissed the petition. B filed another certiorari
to the CA citing the grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction of the MeTC and RTC.
The CA dismissed the petition. An MR was denied by the
CA likewise.
B filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court. Will it
prosper?
ANSWER:
No. The settled rule is that appeals from judgments or
final orders or resolutions of the CA should be by a
verified petition for review on certiorari, as provided for
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
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For the very same reason given above, the CA, therefore,
acted properly when it dismissed the petition for certiorari
outright, on the ground that petitioners should have
resorted to the remedy of appeal instead of certiorari.
Verily, the present Petition for Certiorari should not have
been given due course at all.
Moreover, since the period for petitioners to file a petition
for review on certiorari had lapsed by the time the instant
petition was filed, the assailed CA Resolutions have
attained finality.
CAMUTIN v. SPOUSES POTENTE
A, owners of parcels of land and residing abroad,
discovered that B’s house and warehouse were erected
on said land upon their return in the Philippines. B agreed
to pay a monthly rental instead, and should the land be
sold, respondents would have the right of first refusal. B
failed to pay the rentals and were not able to buy the said
lots, therefore A sold them to C who then fenced the
property. B filed for partition in the RTC citing that they
own half of the property by virtue of an agreement with
A’s deceased mother.
B’s refusal to vacate and A’s inability to deliver the
property free from lien and existing improvement, A then
filed an unlawful detainer against B in the MTC. The MTC
issued a writ of execution, and noted the ‘amicable
settlement’ in the Barangay (where in fact it was an
agreement to defer the barangay case pending the RTC
case). The MTC ordered that the unlawful detainer case
be suspended.
A contested the validity of the MTC decision, and filed a
petition for certiorari in the RTC. Later on, B stated that
the case has become moot and academic because the
MTC had already now dismissed the unlawful detainer
case. A opposed and said that B is misleading the court
in telling that the dismissal is final already.
Should the petition for certiorari be granted?
ANSWER:
No. The filing of a petition for certiorari challenging the
MTC's Orders dated 5 June 2007 and 16 August 2007
cannot be deemed a dilatory remedy resorted to by
petitioners. On the contrary, sustaining the MTC's orders
would unnecessarily and unfairly delay the unlawful
detainer case, a result contrary to the rules' objective of
speedy disposition of cases. Petitioners could also not
appeal from the orders of the MTC because these only
ordered the indefinite suspension and archiving of the
case. The case was not resolved on the merits so there is
actually no decision from which petitioners can appeal.
Thus, the RTC could have validly ruled on the petition for
certiorari instead of dismissing it on the ground that it is a
prohibited pleading.
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However, the MTC's revival of the unlawful detainer case
and its subsequent dismissal thereof on the grounds
aforestated have rendered the resolution of the present
petition for review superfluous and unnecessary. In their
petition for review, petitioners seek the nullification of the
RTC's orders and the subsequent recall of the MTC's
orders suspending the proceedings in the unlawful
detainer case and archiving it. The suspension of the
unlawful detainer case has apparently been lifted and the
case has been decided. There is thus no more need for
the Court to decide the present petition on the merits.
SIM v. NLRC
X filed a case for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter,
alleging that she was initially employed by Y Bank as
Italian Consultant until, she received a letter from Y bank
informing her that she was being dismissed due to loss of
trust and confidence based on alleged mismanagement
and misappropriation of funds. On appeal, NLRC affirmed
the Labor Arbiter's Decision and dismissed X's appeal for
lack of merit. Without filing a motion for reconsideration
with the NLRC, X went to the Court of Appeals via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
CA dismissed the petition due to X's non-filing of a motion
for reconsideration with the NLRC.
Is prior motion for reconsideration indispensable for the
filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court with the CA?
ANSWER:
Yes. But subject to certain exemptions which are not
present in this case.
Under Rule 65, the remedy of filing a special civil action
for certiorari is available only when there is no appeal; or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. A "plain" and "adequate remedy" is a
motion for reconsideration of the assailed order or
resolution, the filing of which is an indispensable
condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari.
This is to give the lower court the opportunity to correct
itself.
There are, of course, exceptions to the foregoing rule, to
wit:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court
a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by
the lower court, or are the same as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of
the question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the
subject matter of the action is perishable;
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(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and
there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest
is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court
is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity
for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public
interest is involved.
In this case, X failed to qualify her case as among the few
exceptions. In fact, the Court notes that the petition filed
before the CA failed to allege any reason why a motion
for reconsideration was dispensed with by X.
ALCANTARA v. ERMITA
The president, issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 453
entitled "Creating a Consultative Commission to Propose
the Revision of the 1987 Constitution on Consultation
with Various Sectors of Society”. Eventually, lawyers,
filed an instant petition for prohibition in their capacity as
Filipino citizens and taxpayers. They alleged that under
Article XVII of the Constitution, the president has no
authority to participate in the process to amend or revise
the Constitution. However, the instant petition has been
overtaken by subsequent events. The Consultative
Commission is now defunct. Hence, the case has
become moot and academic.
Will the petition for prohibition still prosper?
ANSWER:.
No. SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the
proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to desist from further
proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or
otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
In this case, it is evident that the writ of prohibition is one
which commands the person to whom it is directed not to
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do something which he is about to do. If the thing is
already done, it is obvious that the writ of prohibition
cannot undo it, for that would require an affirmative act,
and the only effect of a writ of prohibition is to suspend all
action, and to prevent any further proceeding in the
prohibited direction. In other words, prohibition is a
preventive remedy to restrain future action. Prohibition,
as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already a
fait accompli.
SPECIAL AUDIT TEAM – COA v. CA
Commission on Audit (COA) created the Special Audit
Team (SAT) pursuant to an Order. It is tasked to conduct
a special audit of specific GSIS transactions. The team
shall also have the authority to administer oaths, take
testimony, summon witnesses and compel the production
of documents by compulsory processes in all matters
relevant to this audit/investigation. GSIS filed a Petition
for Prohibition with the CA against SAT.
Is prohibition the correct remedy in this case? Decide.
ANSWER:
No. COA was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial functions when it issued the Order creating the
SAT.
Under Rule 65, petition for prohibition can only be aimed
at judicial, quasi-judicial, and ministerial functions.
Ministerial acts do not require discretion or the exercise of
judgment, but only the performance of a duty pursuant to
a given state of facts in the manner prescribed.
Yet, in this case, issuing the Order was not ministerial,
because it required the exercise of discretion in both the
choice of the personnel and the powers/functions to be
given them.
Since the issuance of the Order creating SAT was not
characterized by any of the functions provided, then it
follows that the GSIS chose the wrong remedy.
PEFIANCO v. MORAL
X, a former DECS Secretary filed an administrative
complaint against Y for dishonesty. She was dismissed.
Y filed a petition for mandamus to compel petitioner to
furnish her a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee
Report.
Is Y entitled to the writ prayed for?
ANSWER:
No. Y is not entitled to the writ of mandamus prayed for.
It is settled that mandamus under Rule 65, is employed to
compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial
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duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to
require anyone to fulfill a discretionary duty. It is essential
to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that petitioner
should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and
it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to
perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases.
While it may not be necessary that the duty be absolutely
expressed, it must nevertheless be clear. The writ will not
issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his
duty to do or which is his duty not to do, or give to the
applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The
writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is
simply a command to exercise a power already
possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.
In her petition for mandamus, respondent miserably failed
to demonstrate that she has a clear legal right to the
DECS Investigation Committee Report and that it is the
ministerial duty of petitioner DECS Secretary to furnish
her with a copy thereof. Consequently, she is not entitled
to the writ prayed for.
PIMENTEL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This is a petition for mandamus filed by A to compel B to
transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court to the Senate of the
Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with Section
21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Does the Executive Secretary and the Department of
Foreign Affairs have a ministerial duty to transmit to the
Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a
member of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations
even without the signature of the President?
ANSWER:
No. As provided under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, A petition for mandamus may be filed when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station. We have held that to be given due course, a
petition for mandamus must have been instituted by a
party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any tribunal,
corporation, board or person which unlawfully excludes
said party from the enjoyment of a legal right. The
petitioner in every case must therefore be an aggrieved
party in the sense that he possesses a clear legal right to
be enforced and a direct interest in the duty or act to be
performed.
Thus, it should be emphasized that under our
Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President,
subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the
Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding
its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is
within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a
treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its
ratification, refuse to ratify it. The Court, therefore, cannot
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issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners
as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive
branch of the government to transmit the signed text of
Rome Statute to the Senate.
HIPOS SR. v. JUDGE BAY
Two information for the crime of rape and one Information
for the crime of acts of lasciviousness were filed against
A, before Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, acting as a Family Court, presided by judge
B.
Private complainants AAA and BBB filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation asking judge B to order the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the proper
information had been filed against A and C. Judge Bay
granted the Motion and ordered a reinvestigation of the
cases.
The Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution on
the reinvestigation affirming the Informations filed against
A and their C. This was signed by Assistant City
Prosecutor Raniel Cruz.
Subsequently, Second (2nd) Assistant Prosecutor
Lamberto De Vera reversed the resolution, holding that
there was lack of probable cause. On the same day, the
City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Information
before Judge Bay.
Judge B denied the motion to withdraw the information.
Is the petition for mandamus proper?
ANSWER:
No. Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act
required to be done, when the respondent unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station; or when the respondent excludes another from
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the
latter is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Thus, in the case at bar, A’s resort to a Petition for
Mandamus to compel the trial judge to grant their Motion
to Withdraw Informations is improper. While mandamus is
available to compel action on matters involving judgment
and discretion when refused, it is never available to direct
the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way
or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in
the exercise of either. The trial court, when confronted
with a Motion to Withdraw an Information on the ground
of lack of probable cause, is not bound by the resolution
of the prosecuting arm of the government, but is required
to make an independent assessment of the merits of
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such motion, a requirement satisfied by the judge B in the
case at bar.
COMELEC v. JUDGE QUIJANO-PADILLA
Congress enacted RA 8189 or the “Voter’s Registration
Act of 1996”, this provided for the modernization and
computerization of the voter’s registration list, and
appropriation of funds therefor. Pursuant to the said RA,
COMELEC promulgated a Resolution approving the
Voter’s Registration and Identification Project (VRIS)
which envisions a computerized database system for the
May 2004 elections.
COMELEC issued invitations for bid and it was awarded
to PHOTOKINA Marketing Corporation, which received
the highest total weighted score and declared winning
bidder. (BID was 6.58 B Pesos). HOWEVER, RA 8760
provided that the budget appropriated by Congress for
the COMELEC’s modernization project was only 1B and
actual available funds under Certificate of Availability of
Funds (CAF) was 1.2B. PHOTOKINA requested the
execution of the contract, but to no avail. PHOTOKINA
filed a petition with the RTC and was granted, it directed
the Commissioners to resume negotiations to formalize
the execution of the contract for the VRIS project.
COMELEC filed a complaint against respondent judge.
Is a petition for mandamus the appropriate remedy to
enforce contractual obligations?
ANSWER:
No. No rule of law is better settled than that mandamus
does not lie to enforce the performance of contractual
obligations. The passage of time has not eroded the
wisdom of the foregoing rule. The Supreme Court
carefully read the pleadings filed in Special Civil Action
No. Q-01-45405 and are convinced that what
PHOTOKINA sought to enforce therein are its rights
under the accepted bid proposal. Its petition alleged that
notwithstanding the COMELECs issuance of a Notice of
Award and its (PHOTOKINAs) subsequent acceptance
thereof, the COMELEC still refused to formalize the
contract. As a relief, PHOTOKINA prayed that after trial,
petitioners be directed to review and finalize the formal
contract and to implement the VRIS Project. Petitioners,
on their part, specifically denied the existence of a
perfected contract and asserted that even if there was
one, the same is null and void for lack of proper
appropriation. Petitioners labelled the contract as illegal
and against public policy.
Mandamus is not the proper recourse to enforce the
COMELEC's alleged contractual obligations with
PHOTOKINA. It has other adequate remedy in law.
Moreover, worth stressing is the judicial caution that
mandamus applies as a remedy only where petitioner's
right is founded clearly in law and not when it is doubtful.
In varying language, the principle echoed and re-echoed
is that legal rights may be enforced by mandamus only if
89
those rights are well-defined, clear and certain. Here, the
alleged contract, relied upon by PHOTOKINA as source
of its rights which it seeks to be protected, is being
disputed, not only on the ground that it was not perfected
but also because it is illegal and against public policy.
There are cases in which the writ of mandamus has been
used to compel public officers to perform certain acts, but
it will be generally observed that in such cases, the
contracts have been completely performed by the
petitioner, and nothing remained to be done except for
the government to make compensation.
MMDA v. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA
BAY
A maintain that the MMDA’s duty to take measures and
maintain adequate solid waste and liquid disposal
systems necessarily involves policy evaluation and the
exercise of judgment on the part of the agency concerned.
They argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its mandate,
has to make decisions, including choosing where a
landfill should be located by undertaking feasibility
studies and cost estimates, all of which entail the
exercise of discretion.
B’s, on the other hand, counter that the statutory
command is clear and that A’s duty to comply with and
act according to the clear mandate of the law does not
require the exercise of discretion. According to A, B, the
MMDA in particular, are without discretion, for example,
to choose which bodies of water they are to clean up, or
which discharge or spill they are to contain. By the same
token, respondents maintain that petitioners are bereft of
discretion on whether or not to alleviate the problem of
solid and liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is the
MMDA’s ministerial duty to attend to such services.
May the Court compel by mandamus administrative
inaction or indifference?
ANSWER:
Yes. The Supreme Court agreed with B.
Under what other judicial discipline describes as
“continuing mandamus,” the Court may, under
extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end
in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to
naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In India,
the doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to
enforce directives of the court to clean up the length of
the Ganges River from industrial and municipal pollution.
Thus, in the case at bar, The cleanup and/or restoration
of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of
the long-term solution. The preservation of the water
quality of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as
important as the cleaning phase. It is imperative then that
the wastes and contaminants found in the rivers, inland
bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from reaching
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
the Manila Bay. Otherwise, any cleanup effort would just
be a futile, cosmetic exercise, for, in no time at all, the
Manila Bay water quality would again deteriorate below
the ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275,
and other relevant laws. It thus behooves the Court to put
the heads of the A-department-agencies and the bureaus
and offices under them on continuing notice about, and to
enjoin them to perform, their mandates and duties
towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the
quality of its water to the ideal level.
The heads of A’s-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH,
DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and
also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle
of “continuing mandamus,” shall, from finality of this
Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly
progressive report of the activities undertaken in
accordance with this Decision.
DOLOT v. PAJE
X along with others filed a petition for continuing
mandamus with damages praying for the following reliefs:
(1) the issuance of a writ commanding the respondents to
immediately stop the mining operations in the Municipality
of Matnog; (2) the issuance of a temporary environment
protection order or TEPO; (3) the creation of an inter-
agency group to undertake the rehabilitation of the mining
site; (4) award of damages; and (5) return of the iron ore,
among others.
Public respondent X summarily dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction. It further ruled, among others, that
there was no final court decree, order or decision yet that
the public officials allegedly failed to act on, which is a
condition for the issuance of the writ of continuing
mandamus.
Is a final court decree a condition for the issuance of a
writ of continuing mandamus?
ANSWER:
No. The RTC’s mistaken notion on the need for a final
judgment, decree or order is apparently based on the
definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under
Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit:
(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an
environmental case directing any agency or
instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to
perform an act or series of acts decreed by final judgment
which shall remain effective until judgment is fully
satisfied.
The final court decree, order or decision erroneously
alluded to by the RTC actually pertains to the judgment or
decree that a court would eventually render in an
environmental case for continuing mandamus and which
judgment or decree shall subsequently become final. A
writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command
90
of continuing compliance with a final judgment as it
"permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in
order to ensure the successful implementation of the
reliefs mandated under the court’s decision."
MANALO v. PAIC SAVINGS BANK
Z loaned from respondent Y P3M secured by a real
estate mortgage of two lots of Z. Due to delay to pay loan,
REM was foreclosed in favor of Y. Writ of possession was
granted to respondent Y. However, at an earlier time
before the foreclosure, respondent Z sold the lots to
respondent W, then leased the same lots to X who is the
petitioner. Later, W assigned all his rights over the lots to
X show in a deed of assignment and transfer of rights.
X filed an action for specific performance against Y and Z
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, to
allow him to redeem the subject lots and release title to
him. Complaint dismissed for lack of cause of action,
hence the petition for review on certiorari.
Was mandamus the correct remedy?
ANSWER:
No. Mandamus is not the proper recourse to enforce
petitioner’s alleged right of redemption. Mandamus
applies as a remedy only where petitioner’s right is
founded clearly in law and not when it is doubtful. Legal
rights may be enforced by mandamus only if those rights
are well-defined, clear and certain.
Here, when respondent Z failed to exercise her right of
redemption within the one (1) year redemption period,
respondent bank ipso facto became the absolute owner
of the lots.
Verily, when respondent Y became the owner of the lots,
respondent W could no longer legally transfer, cede and
convey the property to petitioner X. Moreover, mandamus
cannot be availed of as a remedy to enforce the
performance of contractual obligations.
UP BOARD OF REGENTS v. CA
Private respondent Y enrolled in the doctoral program in
Anthropology of the UP CSSP Diliman. She already
completed the units of course work required and finished
her dissertation and was ready for oral defense. However
it was found out that she committed plagiarism.
Petitioner X held meeting against her case and some of
the panels indicated disapproval. Y still graduated at the
time because the request to cancel her name on the list
of graduating students did not reach the Board of
Regents.
Eventually, Y was formally charged with plagiarism and
recommended that the doctorate granted to her be
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
withdrawn. X informed Y of the charges against her. X
sent her a letter indicating that they unanimously resolved
to withdraw her Doctorate Degree recommended by the
University Council. Y sought an audience with X, which
request was denied by President.
Hence, Y then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and
damages, alleging that petitioners had unlawfully
withdrawn her degree without justification and without
affording her procedural due process.
Was Y deprived of her right to substantive due process?
ANSWER:
No. Y was heard several times. In administrative
proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to explain one's side of a controversy or a
chance seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A party who has availed of the opportunity
to present his position cannot tenably claim to have been
denied due process.
In the case at bar, Y was informed in writing of the
charges against her and given opportunities to answer
them. She was asked to submit her written explanation
which she submiited. She, as well, met with the U.P.
chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla committee to
discuss her case. In addition, she sent several letters to
the U.P. authorities explaining her position.
LAGUNA METTS CORP. v. CAALAM
In a labor case filed by private respondents Y against X
for illegal dismissal, the labor arbiter decided in favour of
private respondents, however it was reversed by the
NLRC. Motion for reconsideration was denied. Counsel
for private respondents received the April 30, 2008
resolution of the NLRC on May 26, 2008. On July 25,
2008, said counsel filed a motion for extension of time to
file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. The motion alleged that, for reasons stated therein,
the petition could not be filed in the Court of Appeals
within the prescribed 60-day period. Thus, a 15-day
extension period was prayed for.
Court of Appeals granted the motion and gave private
respondents a non-extendible period of 15 days within
which to file their petition for certiorari .Petitioner X moved
for the reconsideration of the said resolution claiming that
extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari are no
longer allowed under
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. In its denial the appellate court
argued that while the amendment of the third paragraph
of Section 4, Rule 65 admittedly calls for stricter
application to discourage the filing of unwarranted
motions for extension of time, it did not strip the Court of
Appeals of the discretionary power to grant a motion for
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extension in exceptional cases to serve the ends of
justice.
Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in granting
the non-extendible period of 15 days within which to file a
petition for certiorari?
ANSWER:
No. Rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with
and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of
claiming substantial merit. As a corollary, rules
prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking
certain proceedings are considered absolutely
indispensable to prevent needless delays that would
violate the constitutional rights of the parties to a speedy
disposition of their case and to orderly and promptly
discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these
rules are regarded as mandatory.
LAPID v. LAUREA
Sps L had a child who was suspended from school. They
demanded a written retraction and a public apology from
the school officials but the latter refused. Spouses L
subsequently filed a complaint for damages against the
school and the directors. They then proceeded to file a
motion declare the school in default which was denied by
the Trial Court. The spouses L then filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals which was dismissed
for failure to indicate in the complaint the material dates.
Was the dismissal proper?
ANSWER:
Yes. The dismissal was correct.
Sec. 1 of Rule 65 provides that the petition shall be
accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment,
order, or resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto,
and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as
provided in the third paragraph of Sec. 3, rule 46. In
relation to this, Supreme Court Circular No. 39-98 which
amended Sec. 3 of Rule 46 provides that the petition
shall state the specific material dates showing that it was
filed within the period fixed herein.
In this case, the petition failed to indicate the material
date, particularly the date of filing the motion for
reconsideration. As explicitly stated in the Rule, thus,
failure to comply with any of the requirements shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
CONCEPCION JR. v. COMELEC
C, then Punong Barangay of Forbes Park, Makati City,
was one of the signatories, as chairman, of the petition
filed by NAMFREL for accreditation to conduct the
operation quick count with the COMELEC. On the same
day that the petition was filed, Comelec promulgated
Resolution No. 7798 which prohibits Barangay Officials
from being appointed as member of the Board of Election
Inspectors or as official watcher of each duly registered
major political party, and the prohibition extends to
barangay officials, employees, and tanods, who are
members of accredited citizen’s arms on the basis o f E.O.
No. 94 of 1987.
The Comelec ruled conditionally in granting NAMFREL’s
petition with the condition that C, as National Chairman of
NAMFREL, must first be removed both as a member and
overall chairman of the said organization. NAMFREL
manifested its acceptance of the conditional grant of its
petition for accreditation, and requested for re-
examination without further arguments of the Comelec
Resolution which affected C’s membership with
NAMFREL which was subsequently denied by the
COMELEC. As NAMFREL did not question the
Comelec’s ruling, C filed a petition for certiorari to
question the Comelec resolution which ordered the
removal of his membership with NAMFREL, but actually
raised issues with respect to Resolution No. 7798.
Q: Does C have the legal personality to file the petition for
certiorari?
ANSWER:
No, C does not have the legal personality to file the
petition for certiorari as he is not considered as a person
aggrieved.
Section 1, Rule 65 essentially provides that a person
aggrieved by any act of a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions rendered
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may
file a petition for certiorari. An aggrieved party under
Section 1, Rule 65 is one who was a party to the original
proceedings that gave rise to the original action for
certiorari under Rule 65. The "person aggrieved" referred
to under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail of the special
civil action of certiorari pertains to one who was a party in
the proceedings before the lower court.
Here, C was not a direct party in the case before the
Comelec. The direct party, NAMFREL, did not even
question the assailed resolution. It would have been
another matter if NAMFREL had filed the present petition
with the petitioner as intervenor because of his personal
interest in the COMELEC ruling.
Therefore, C does not have the legal personality to file
the petition for certiorari as he is not considered as a
person aggrieved.
92
 GOLANGCO v. FUNG
X filed a criminal case for libel against Y. X was only able
to present 2 witnesses despite warning from the Trial
Court of dire consequences if they continue to fail to
complete its evidence. They requested that a subpoena
be issued and served to Atty. O so that he may appear as
witness. The date of trial was reset to another date. On
the day of the hearing X failed to present Atty. O as its
witness and consequently the RTC issued an order
terminating the prosecutions’ presentation of evidence. X
assailed the order via petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals.
Will the petition prosper?
ANSWER:
No. Sec. 1, Rule 65 provides that A petition for certiorari
may be had when any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
In this case the trial court had not been wanting in giving
warnings. The Prosecution had retained the duty to
ensure that its witnesses would be present during the trial,
for its obligation to the administration of justice had been
to prove its case sans vexatious and oppressive delays.
Yet, the warnings of the trial court had gone unheeded.
Instead, the Prosecution would deflect the responsibility
for the delays to the failure of the trial court to issue the
subpoena to its proposed witness and to cause the
subpoena to be served. The trial judge did not act
capriciously, arbitrarily or whimsically in issuing the
assailed order. Thus, the Court of Appeals properly
dismissed the petition for certiorari.
ALCARAZ v. GONZALEZ
X and Y had a road rage incident where Y fired several
shots against X. Y was subsequently intercepted and
detained by the police. X then proceeded to file a criminal
complaint for attempted homicide against Y. During the
preliminary investigation the investigating prosecutor
found probable cause. Y filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied. He then filed an appeal
with the DOJ which the latter granted. X filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied by the Secretary. Thus, X
filed a petition for review under Rule 43 with the CA which
was granted. Y on certiorari questions the appellate
jurisdiction of the CA.
Is the petition meritorious?
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
ANSWER:
Yes. Sec. 1, Rule 65 provides that A petition for certiorari
may be had when any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
In this case, the resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor
is subject to appeal to the Justice Secretary who, under
the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of
control and supervision over said Investigating
Prosecutor; and who may affirm, nullify, reverse, or
modify the ruling of such prosecutor. Thus, while the CA
may review the resolution of the Justice Secretary, it may
do so only in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, solely on the ground that the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Therefore,
since what was filed was petition for review under Rule
43 not petition on Certiorari under Rule 65, the petition
may be granted.
DAGAN v. OMBUDSMAN
X filed several complaint-affidavits before the Office of the
Ombudsman against Y for violation of Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act; malversation; violation of Republic
Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards of Public Officials and Employees; falsification
of public document; dishonesty and grave misconduct.
The Office of the Ombudsman rendered a decision
absolving Y. X filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it
was denied for lack of merit.
X elevated the case to the CA via a petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65. The CA dismissed the petition for failure
of petitioner to avail of the correct mode of appeal.
Was the dismissal proper?
ANSWER:
No. Sec. 1, Rule 65 provides that A petition for certiorari
may be had when any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
93
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. In
addition to this, Sec. 7 Rule III of Administrative Order No.
07 series of 1990 provides
Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in
case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public
censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one
month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the
decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other
cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration
of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent,
unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for
certiorari shall have been filed by him as prescribed in
Section 27 of RA 6770.
In this case, a decision of the Office of the Ombudsman
the respondents were absolved of the charges against
them by the Office of the Ombudsman. Such decision is
final and unappealable. When such administrative or
quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of
such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court
will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings. Thus, the
decision of the Ombudsman may be reviewed, modified
or reversed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, on a finding that it had no jurisdiction over
the complaint, or of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
OPTIONAL READINGS FOR RULE 65
HEIRS OF JULIO SOBREMONTE v. COURT OF
APPEALS
The heirs of X and Y co-owned a lot which was placed
under the government’s Operation Land Transfer
(OLT) program pursuant to PD 27 on emancipation of
tenants and declaring ownership of land by tenants.
During X’s lifetime, she filed a protest before the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) alleging
that no tenancy relationship existed between her and
the identified farmer-beneficiaries of the property.
DAR Secretary affirmed MARO’s and DAR Regional
Director’s decision dismissing the complaint. X filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA which
was dismissed by the latter. X then filed a petition for
certiorari with the SC.
Should the action be granted?
ANSWER:
No, the action should not be granted.
A writ of certiorari maybe issued only for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
as its function is limited to keeping the inferior court
within the bounds of its jurisdiction."Grave abuse of
discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
In this case, no abuse of discretion, grave or simple in
nature was committed by the CA in dismissing the
petitioners’ certiorari petition for being the wrong
mode of appeal. The CA’s dismissal of the certiorari
petition is, in fact, well-supported by law and
jurisprudence. It was held that Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court shall govern the procedure for judicial review of
decisions, orders, or resolutions of the DAR Secretary,
and that an appeal taken to the Supreme Court or the
CA by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be
dismissed.
The CA did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its assailed resolutions. Hence,
the action should be dismissed.
VILLAREAL v. ALIGA
An Information was filed against X for the crime of
Qualified Theft thru Falsification of Commercial
Document. During her arraignment, X pleaded not
guilty. After the RTC resolved to deny Y's motion for
issuance of a hold departure order against X and the
latter's motion to suspend proceedings, trial on the
merits ensued. Both the prosecution and the defense
were able to present the testimonies of their
witnesses and their respective documentary exhibits.
The RTC succinctly opined that the evidence of the
prosecution is very clear that X must have been the
one who made the intercalation in the subject check,
and that even without her written admission, the
evidence presented constitutes proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
It appearing that the amount of P60,000.00 subject of
the offense was already returned by the accused, the
Court hereby absolves the accused of civil liability in
this case.
X appealed to the CA, which, on April 27, 2004,
reversed and set aside the judgment of the RTC on
the grounds that:
(1) Her admission or confession of guilt before the
NBI authorities, which already qualifies as a custodial
investigation, is inadmissible in evidence because she
was not informed of her rights to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably
of her own choice; and
(2) The totality of the circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution is insufficient to
overcome the presumption of innocence of the
accused.
Y's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA
on August 10, 2004; hence, this petition.
Is Rule 65 of the rules the proper remedy to assail a
judgment of acquittal?
94
 ANSWER:
Yes. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules and NOT a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.
The People may assail a judgment of acquittal only
via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules. If
the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely
calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court
a quo, the constitutional right of the accused against
double jeopardy would be violated.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is
alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other
jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition
may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case,
the aggrieved parties are the State and the private
offended party or complainant. The complainant has
an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may
file such special civil action questioning the decision
or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional
grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring
the action in the name of the People of the Philippines.
The action may be prosecuted in the name of said
complainant.
In the case at bar, the petition filed essentially assails
the criminal, not the civil, aspect of the CA Decision. It
must even be stressed that petitioner never
challenged before the CA, and in this Court, the RTC
judgment which absolved respondent Aliga from civil
liability in view of the return of the P60,000.00 subject
matter of the offense on October 30, 1996. Therefore,
the petition should have been filed only by the State
through the OSG. Petitioner lacks the personality or
legal standing to question the CA Decision because it
is only the OSG which can bring actions on behalf of
the State in criminal proceedings before the Supreme
Court and the CA.
INC SHIPMANAGEMENT, INC v. MORADAS
Mr. X was employed as a wiper for the vessel owned
by Y Company.
Mr. X met an accident while working in the vessel.
Certain chemicals splashed all over his body because
the vessel’s incinerator exploded and suffered deep
burns because of the explosion. The burns suffered
rendered him permanently incapable as a seaman. So,
Mr. X filed a labor complaint demanding payment of
his full disability benefits under the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) and Standard
Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) to Y Company. Y
Company refused to heed because the injuries
suffered were self-inflicted hence not compensable
under the POEA-SEC.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Y Company. The
NLRC sustained the findings of the Labor Arbiter. It
gave due credence to the evidence presented absent
any showing that Y Company was motivated by ill-will.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the NRLC holding grave abuse of
discretion.
Was there grave abuse of discretion?
ANSWER:
No, there was no grave abuse of discretion.
Based on jurisprudence, it is well-settled that an act of
a court or tribunal can only be considered to be
tainted with grave abuse of discretion when such act
is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
In this case, having established through substantial
evidence that Mr. X’s injury was self-inflicted and,
hence, not compensable pursuant to Section 20 (D) of
the 1996 POEA-SEC. No grave abuse of discretion
can be imputed against the NLRC in upholding LA’s
decision to dismiss his complaint for disability benefits.
Principle:
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act of a
court or tribunal was done in a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment asis equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.
A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC. v. MONDEJAR
X filed a complaint for collection of sum of money for
the unpaid water bills against Y under Rule of
Procedure for Small Claims Cases before the MTCC.
In his defense, Y contended that he religiously paid X
the agreed monthly flat rate for her water consumption.
MTCC ruled in favor of Y prompting X to file a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 with the RTC which was
dismissed by the latter finding that the said petition
was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable
nature of small claims cases. X then filed a petition
for certiorari with the SC.
Should the action be granted?
ANSWER:
Yes, the action should be granted.
The Court has consistently ruled that "the
extraordinary writ of certiorari is always available
where there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
95
 Considering the final nature of a small claims case
decision under the above-stated rule, the remedy of
appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party may,
thus, immediately move for its execution.
Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small
claims cases, similar to other proceedings where
appeal is not an available remedy does not preclude
the aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In this case, X correctly availed of the
remedy of certiorari to assail the propriety of the
MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case,
contrary to the RTC’s ruling. Owing to its nature, it is
therefore incumbent upon petitioner to establish that
jurisdictional errors tainted the MTCC Decision. The
RTC, in turn, could either grant or dismiss the petition
based on an evaluation of whether or not the MTCC
gravely abused its discretion by capriciously,
whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is
material to the controversy. Likewise, X filed the
petition before the proper forum.
In fine, the RTC erred in dismissing the said petition
on the ground that it was an improper remedy. Hence,
the action should be granted.
REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN
X, through the PCGG, commenced a complaint for
"reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages against Y. Pre-trial commenced and the
temporary markings of Exhibits "A" to "LLL" of X,
together with their sub-markings, were adopted.
However, over the objections of Y, the PCGG
produced and caused the pre-marking of additional
documents, Exhibits "MMM" to "AAAAAAA." Y filed a
"Motion under Rule 29 of the Rules of Court," claiming
that the additional documents were never produced at
the discovery proceedings and praying that X be
sanctioned for contempt. The Sandiganbayan denied,
but later granted the motion.
Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of
discretion in excluding the documents due to
petitioner’s own failure to produce them at the pre-trial?
ANSWER:
No, the Sandiganbayan properly exercised its
discretion over evidence formally offered by the
prosecution.
Nothing therein shows that the court gravely
exceeded its jurisdiction. For the reviewing court to
interfere with the exercise of discretion by the lower
court, the petitioner must show that the former's
action was attended by grave abuse of discretion,
defined as a capricious and whimsical exercise of
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judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the
exercise of power in an arbitrary manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, so patent or
so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty,
to a virtual refusal to perform the mandated duty, or to
act at all in contemplation of the law.
In this case, the Sandiganbayan’s exercise of this
power is neither whimsical nor oppressive. A writ of
certiorari is available only to review final judgments or
decrees, and will be refused where there has been no
final judgment or order and the proceeding for which
the writ is sought is still pending and undetermined in
the lower tribunal. Pursuant to this rule, it has been
held that certiorari will not lie to review or correct
discovery orders made prior to trial. After failing to
submit the documentary evidence during discovery,
when it was clearly ordered by both the
Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court to do so,
petitioner also repeatedly failed to prove the due
execution and authenticity of the documents. Having
failed in its belated attempts to assuage the
Sandiganbayan through the submission of secondary
evidence, petitioner may not use the present forum to
gain relief under the guise of Rule 65.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in excluding the documents due to
petitioner’s own failure to produce them at the pre-trial.
BANK OF COMMERCE v. RADIO PHILIPPINES
NETWORK INC.
BC Bank entered into a Purchase & Assumption
Agreement with TR Bank and acquired its specific
assets and liabilities, excludingliabilities arising from
judicial actions which were to be covered by the BSP
mandated escrow of 50 million pesos. To comply with
the mandate, TR Bank placed the specified amount to
MT Bank to answer for those claims and liabilities that
were excluded.
Shortly after approval, acting in TR Bank v. RP
Network case, the court ordered TR Bank to pay RP
Network actual damages plus 12% legal interest and
some amounts. RP Network, rather than pursuing a
levy on execution filed a supplemental motion for
executionbased on the assumption that TR Bank had
been merged to BC Bank.
Having learned such, BC Bank filed an opposition
thereto questioning the jurisdiction and denying the
merger of the TR Bank and BCBank. RTC issued and
order granting and issuing the writ of execution to
cover all the assets including those subject to the P &
AAgreement. This prompted BC Bank to file for
petition for certiorari in CA. CA, however, modified
only the lower court’s decision.
Did the CA gravely erred in holding that BC Bank had
no valid excuse in failing to file the required motion for
96
 reconsideration of theassailed RTC Order before
coming to the CA via petition for certiorari.
ANSWER:
Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that that BC
Bank had no valid excuse in failing to file the required
motion forreconsideration of the assailed RTC Order
before coming to the CA.
Section 1 of Rule 65 provides that a petition for
certiorari may only be filed when there is no plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy inthe course of law.
Since a motion for reconsideration is generally
regarded as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy,
the failure to firsttake recourse to is usually regarded
as fatal omission.
However, there are some recognize exceptions to the
rule: a) there was an urgentnecessity for the CS to
resolve the questions it raised and further delay would
prejudice its interest; b) under circumstances, a
motionfor reconsideration would have been useless; c)
petitioner would have been deprived of its right to due
process when the RTC issuedthe challenge order ex
parte, depriving an opportunity to object; and d) the
issues raised were purely questions of law.
In this case, BC Bank fell the recognized exceptions
to the need to file a motion for reconsideration before
filing a petitionfor certiorari.First, The filing of a motion
for reconsideration would be redundant since actually
the RTC’s Order granted theapplication for the
issuance of the alias writ of execution. Second, an
urgent necessity for the immediate resolution of the
case by theCA existed because any further delay
would have greatly prejudiced BC Bank. The Sheriff
had been resolute and relentless in trying toexecute
the judgment and dispose of the levied assets of BC
Bank.
Clearly, BC Bank has valid justifications for skipping
the technical requirement of a motion for
reconsideration.
SARA LEE PHILIPPINES, INC. v. EMILINDA D.
MACATLANG
A Notice of Permanent Closure filed by Aris with the
DOLE stating that it will permanently cease its
operations. The Union, whichrepresents the rank-and-
file employees of Aris, staged a strike for violation of
duty to bargain collectively, 7 union busting and
illegalclosure.A complaint for illegal dismissal was
filed, incorporating FAPI.TheLabor Arbiter rendered
judgment dismissing the 5,984complainants as illegal
and awarding them separation pay and other
monetary benefits amounting to P3.4 billion.The
Corporationsfiled a Notice of Appeal with Motion to
Reduce Appeal Bond and to Admit ReducedAmount
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withNLRC. They asked NLRC to reducethe appeal
bond claiming that it would be impossible for the
insurance to cover the appeal bond. NLRC granted
the reduction of thebond.
Macatlang, et al., filed a petition for certiorari before
CA claiming that it committed grave abuse of
discretion in giving duecourse to the appeal despite
the gross insufficiency of the cash bond.While the
case was pending, the NLRC set aside the Decision
ofthe labor arbiter and remanding the case for further
proceeding. As a result, the Corporations filed a
motion to dismissthe petition forcertiorari for being
moot and academic. Court of Appeals subsequently
reverse and set aside the decision of the NLRC and
deemed itreasonable to order the posting of an
additional appeal bond.
Did the subsequent NLRC ruling on the merits during
the pendencyof the petition questioning an
interlocutory order renders the petition moot and
academic?
ANSWER:
No. The requisites for perfection of appeal as
embodied in Article 223 of the Labor Code are: 1)
payment of appeal fees; 2) filing of thememorandum
of appeal; and 3)payment of the required cash or
surety bond. These requisites must be satisfied within
10 days fromreceipt of the decision or order appealed
from.NLRC Rules and Procedure allow the filing of a
motion to reduce bond on two (2)conditions: (1) that
there is meritorious ground and (2) a bond in a
reasonable amount is posted. Compliance with the
two conditionsstops the running of the period to
perfect an appeal provided that they are complied
within the 10-day reglementary period.
In this case, when the NLRC granted the motion to
reduce the appeal bond and theCorporations posted
the required additional bond,the appeal was deemed
to have been perfected. The act of the NLRC in
deciding the case was based on petitioner’s appeal of
the laborarbiter's ruling, which it deemed to have
beenperfected and therefore, ripe for decision.
Prudence however dictates that the NLRCshould not
have decided the case on its merits during the
pendency of the instant petition. The very issue raised
in the petitionsdetermines whether or not the appeal
by the Corporations has been perfected. Until its
resolution, the NLRC should have held inabeyance
the resolution of the case to prevent the case from
being mooted. The NLRC decision was issued
prematurely.
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 MADARANG v. MORALES 725 SCRA 480
On September 24, 2010, D filed a petition for relief
from judgment rendered by the trial court on January
29, 2010, blaming oldlawyer who failed to file the
notice of appeal within the reglementary period. The
trial court denied the petition for it was filedbeyond 60
days from the finality of the trial court’s decision.
On July 13, 2011, D filed the petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied
outright the petition forfailure to file a motion for
reconsideration of the order denying the petition for
relief from judgment. D filed a motion
forreconsideration but was denied. Hence, the petition
before the court arguing they need not file a motion
for reconsideration of theorder denying their petition
for relief from judgment because the questions they
raised were purely questions of law.
Did the CA erred in dismissing outright petitioner’s
petition for certiorari for failure to file a motion
forreconsideration of the order denying the petition for
relief from judgment.
ANSWER:
No. Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that no appeal or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in theordinary course
of law is available to a party before a petition for
certiorari is filed.
In this case, a motion for reconsideration of the order
denying the petition for relief from judgment is the
plain, speedy, andadequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Petitioners failed to avail themselves of
this remedy. Thus, the Court of Appealscorrectly
dismissed petitioners’ petition for certiorari.
PRINCIPLE: A motion for reconsideration is required
before a petition for certiorari is filed “to grant the
court which rendered theassailed judgment or order
an opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error
attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal
andfactual circumstances of the case.
MENDEZ v. PEOPLE
BIR filed an information with CTA. BIR alleged that A
failed to file his income tax returns for year 2001-3003.
A countered that hisbusiness were registered only in
2003. BIR filed a motion to amend information. The
CTA ruled in favor of the BIR. A filed a motionfor
reconsideration but CTA denied. A filed petition for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 questioning
the denial of its motionfor reconsideration.
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Is certiorari the proper remedy in questioning the CTA
resolution?
ANSWER:
Yes, the certiorari is the correct remedy.Under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, certiorari is available when
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in theordinary course of law. A judgment or
order is considered final if it disposes of the action or
proceeding completely, or terminates aparticular
stage of the same action, in such case the remedy
available is appeal. If the order however merely
resolves incidentalmatters and leaves something
more to be done to resolve the merits of the case, the
order is interlocutory and the aggrieved party’sonly
remedy after failing to obtain a reconsideration of the
ruling is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
In this case, the CTA resolution allowed the
amendment of information by BIR. The resolution
merely resolves incidental matters.After failing in his
bid for the CTA to reconsider its admission of the
amended information, the only remedy left to A is to
file apetition for certiorari.
TRAJANO v. UNIWIDE SALES WAREHOUSE
CLUB
R filed a complaint to get the refund of the total value
of misdelivered, unsaleable, defective and/or
damaged goods, and to enjoin Aand P from
encashing the remaining post-dated checks in their
possession. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case
No 1, was raffled toRTC Branch 1, which was
presided by Judge M. The RTC issued a writ of
preliminary injunction prohibiting A and P from
encashingthe postdated checks. P moved to
reconsider the issuance of the writ for lack of factual
basis. The RTC issued an order sustaining
theissuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. A and
P separately moved for the voluntary inhibition of
Judge Mfor his alleged biastowards R. Judge M
recused himself from the case, but R moved to
reconsider his voluntary inhibition. Thereafter, the
case was reraffledto the RTC Branch 2, which was
presided by Judge E.
R contested the re-raffling of the case due to its
pending motion for reconsideration of Judge M’s
voluntary inhibition. Judge M deniedR’s motion for
reconsideration and the records of the case were
subsequently transferred to Branch 3. P filed a
petition for certiorariwith prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction before the CA. In his petition, Psought to
dissolve the writ enjoining him from encashing the
post-dated checks. The CA dissolved the writ of
preliminary injunctionwith respect to P for lack of
factual basis. The CA held that R failed to prove that it
98
 had a clear and unmistakable right to be protectedthat
warrants the issuance of the writ. This decision
eventually became final and entry of judgment was
made.
R assailed Judge M’s inhibition from the case in a
petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 123
before the CA. R argued thatJudge M’s perceived
bias in its favor was unfounded, and that the
preservation of the parties’ trust and confidence was
an insufficientground for Judge M’s inhibition.The
RTC held that the issue of whether Judge M should
hear Civil Case No. 1 presented ajurisdictional
question that prevented Branch 3 from resolving P’s
pending motions. Hence, P filed a petition for
certiorari assailingthe orders of the RTC before the
CA. In a decision, the CAruled that the events that
had transpired before Branch 1 of the RTCprovoked
the parties’ suspicions that Judge Mprejudged the
case, which warranted his inhibition.41 The CA also
denied R’s motion forreconsideration,42 prompting R
to elevate the case before the Supreme Court in R v.
A docketed as G.R. No. 193972, before theCourt’s
First Division
1. Whether the petition availed of the proper remedy
inappealing the CA resolution.
2. Whether the CA erred in not finding that the
RTCcommitted grave abuse of discretion in
suspending theproceedings in Civil Case No. 1.
Answers:
1. Yes, Trajano (P) properly availed of a Rule 45
petition inassailing the January 3, 2008 decision and
the October 28,2009 resolution of the Court of
Appeals
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rulesof Court invokes the Court's appellate
jurisdiction overquestions of law that has been
decided by the lower courts with finality. The CA
decision assailed by the present petitioninvolves its
final order regarding the alleged grave abuse
ofdiscretion involved in the RTC's interlocutory
orders.This CAdecision should not be confused with
the RTC's interlocutoryorders that had been disputed
before the CA, which wascorrectly contested by
Trajano(P) through a petitionfor certiorari.
In J.L. Bernardo Construction v. Court ofAppeals, we
stated that a petition for certiorari is anappropriate
remedy to assail an interlocutory order: (1) whenthe
tribunal issued such order without or in excess
ofjurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and (2)
when theassailed interlocutory order is patently
erroneous and theremedy of appeal would not afford
adequate and expeditiousrelief.
In the case at bar, Trajano(P) correctly filed a
petitionfor certiorari before the CA in order to strike
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down the RTC's interlocutory orders that he claims to
have been issued withgrave abuse of discretion. In
the same vein, Trajano's(P)present petition for review
on certiorari is also the properremedy, as it questions
the CA's final order regarding theRTC's interlocutory
orders.
Therefore, The petition is not procedurally infirm
because Trajano properly availed of a Rule 45 petition.
2.Yes, The RTC should continue with the proceedings
in Civil Case No. 1 during the pendency of G.R. No.
193972 The mere pendency of a special civil actionfor
certiorari commenced in relation to a case pending
beforea lower court does not automatically interrupt
the proceedingsin the lower court.
A petition for certiorari does not divest thelower courts
of jurisdiction validly acquired over the casepending
before them. A petition for certiorari, unlike anappeal,
is an original action; it is not a continuation of
theproceedings in the lower court. It is designed to
correct onlyerrors of jurisdiction, including grave
abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Under Section 7,Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
higher court should issueagainst the public
respondent a temporary restraining order ora writ of
preliminary injunction in order to interrupt the course
of the principal case The petitioner in a Rule 65
petitionhas the burden of proof to show that there is a
meritoriousground for the issuance of an injunctive
writ or order to suspend the proceedings before the
public respondent. Heshould show the existence of an
urgent necessity for the writor order, so that serious
damage may be prevented.Nonetheless, even if an
injunctive writ or order is issued, the lower court
retains jurisdiction over the principal case.
Indeed, we introduced in Eternal Gardens Memorial
Park v. Court of Appeals the principle of judicial
courtesy tojustify the suspension of the proceedings
before the lowercourt even without an injunctive writ
or order from thehigher court. In that case, we
pronounced that "[d]ue respectfor the Supreme Court
and practical and ethicalconsiderations should have
prompted the appellate courtto wait for the final
determination of the petition[for certiorari] before
taking cognizance of the case andtrying to render
moot exactly what was before this [C]ourt." We
subsequently reiterated the concept of judicial
courtesyin Joy Mart Consolidated Corp. v. Court of
Appeals. We,however, have qualified and limited the
application of judicialcourtesy in Go v. Abrogar and
Republic v. Sandiganbayan.
In these cases, we expressly delimited the application
of judicial courtesy to maintain the efficacy of Section
7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and held that the
principle of judicial courtesy applies only "if there is a
strong probability that the issues before the higher
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 court would be rendered moot and moribund as a
result of the continuation of the proceedings in the
lower court." Through these cases, we clarified that
the principle of judicial courtesy remains to be the
exception rather than the rule.
In the case at bar, the appellate court erroneously
applied the principle of judicial courtesy in the current
case. There is no strong probability that the issue of
the propriety of Judge M's voluntary inhibition in CA-
G.R. SP No. 123 would be rendered moot and
academic by the continuation of the proceedings in
the trial court.
Furthermore, whether Judge M properly inhibited
himself from the case does not pose any jurisdictional
problem in resolving the issues in Civil Case No. 1.
We agree with P that jurisdiction vests in the trial court,
not in the judges. We also point out in this respect that
the various branches of the RTC are coordinate and
co-equal courts whose totality constitutes only one
RTC. Each of the RTC's branches is not a court
separate and distinct from the other branches. When
a complaint is filed before one branch or judge,
jurisdiction does not attach to this branch or judge
alone, to the exclusion of the others. Trial may be had
or proceedings may continue by and before another
branch or judge. The different branches in the RTC do
not possess jurisdictions independent of and
incompatible with each other.
Therefore, The mere pendency of a special civil action
for certiorari commenced in relation to a case pending
before a lower court does not automatically interrupt
the proceedings in the lower court.
THENAMARIS PHILIPPINES INC. v. CA
X, the widow of Y who was employed by ABC
company as an oiler and eventually, as second
engineer, filed for a complaint for death benefits,
unpaid salaries, sickness allowance, refund of
medical expenses, damages and attorney’s fees
against ABV company with the Labor Arbiter. The
Labor Arbiter decided in favor of X. However, the
NLRC reversed the LA’s decision. X filed a Petition for
Certiorari before the CA, which declared that even
though it was filed 15 days late, in the interest of
substantial justice, it will entertain the petition and
directed X to cure the technical flaws in her petition.
ABC company filed for a motion for reconsideration
strongly opposing such extension.
Was the CA correct in allowing X to file a petition for
certiorari even though it was 15 days late from the 60-
day period requirement?
ANSWER:
No, the CA was not correct.
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SCHOOL OF LAW
Sec 4. of Rule 65 states that the petition shall be filed
not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether
such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day
period shall be counted from notice of the denial of
said motion.
In Labo v. Flores, the Supreme Court laid down some
of the exceptions which are, 1) most persuasive and
weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an
injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply
with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the
defaulting party by immediately paying within a
reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5)
the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of
any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous
and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10)
peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant
to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice
and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved;
and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge
guided by all the attendant circumstances.
In this case, counting 60 days from her counsel’s
receipt of the June 29, 2009 NLRC Resolution on July
8, 2009, private respondent had until September 7,
2009 to file her petition or a motion for extension, as
September 6, 2009, the last day for filing such
pleading, fell on a Sunday. However, the motion was
filed only on September 8, 2009.30 It is a fundamental
rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of time
must be filed before the expiration of the period
sought to be extended; otherwise, the same is of no
effect since there would no longer be any period to
extend, and the assailed judgment or order will have
become final and executory.
Hence, the motion for extension should be denied.
PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC. v.
PHILTRANCO WORKERS UNION-ASSOCIATION
OF GENUINE LABOR ORGANIZATION
XYZ Inc. retrenched 21 of its employees on the
ground that it was suffering business losses.
Consequently, the company union, herein private
respondent XYZ-Union, filed a Notice of Strike with
DOLE claiming that petitioner engaged in unfair labor
practices.
Unable to settle their differences before the NCMB,
the case was thereafter referred to the DOLE
Secretary, who issued a Decision in favor of the XYZ-
100
 Union. XYZ filed a Motion for Reconsideration while
XYZ-Union, on the other hand, submitted a “Partial
Appeal.” The Secretary of Labor declined to rule on
XYZ Motion for Reconsideration XYZ-Union“Partial
Appeal”, citing a DOLE regulation which provided that
voluntary arbitrators’ decisions, orders, resolutions or
awards shall not be the subject of motions for
reconsideration.
XYZ filed before the CA an original Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition, and sought injunctive relief.
The CA dismissed the said petition and held that, in
assailing the Decision of the DOLE voluntary
arbitrator, petitioner erred in filing a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules, when it
should have filed a petition for review under Rule 43
thereof, which properly covers decisions of voluntary
labor arbitrators.
Is a petition for certiorari under rule 65 instead of
under rule 43 of the rules of court the proper remedy
to assail the decision of the Secretary of Labor?
ANSWER:
Yes, Rule 65 is the proper remedy in assailing the
decision of the Secretary of Labor. It has long been
settled that the remedy of an aggrieved party in a
decision or resolution of the Secretary of Labor is to
timely file a motion for reconsideration as a
precondition for any further or subsequent remedy,
and then seasonably file a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure.
AYUNGO v. BEAMKO SHIPMANAGEMENT
CORPORATION
X was employed by A Coproration. However, while he
was working, he suddenly felt ill. When he went to the
doctor, he was diagnosed with hypertension. X filed
before the NLRC a complaint for the payment of
permanent total disability benefits, sickness allowance,
reimbursement of medical expenses, damages and
attorneys fees against A Corporation. X alleged that
his hypertension was aggravated by the conditions of
his employment and A assumed the risk of liability
arising from his weakened condition. The Labor
Arbiter decided in favor of X.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision. A
Corporation filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied by the NLRC, prompting them to file a petition
for certiorari to the CA.
The CA granted the petition. Was the CA correct in
granting the petition for certiorari?
ANSWER:
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SCHOOL OF LAW
Yes. To justify the grant of certiorari, the petitioner
must satisfy that the court or quasi- judicial body
gravely abused its discretion conferred unto them. In
labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be
ascribed to the NLRC when,inter alia, its findings and
the conclusions reached thereby are not supported by
substantial evidence.
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court
finds that the CA correctly granted respondents
certiorari petition since the NLRC gravely abused its
discretion when it held that A was entitled to disability
benefits notwithstanding the latters failure to establish
his claim through substantial evidence. Specifically, A
was not able to demonstrate, under the parameters of
the abovementioned evidentiary threshold, that his
Diabetes Mellitus was related to his work as Chief
Engineer during the course of his employment.
CRISOLOGO v. JEWM AGRO-INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION
X and Y were the plaintiffs in two collection cases
before the RTC Branch 15 of Davao City against A
and B. EEE Corporation was the succession -in-
interest of S, who was the plaintiff in another
collection case before the RTC, Branch 8, Davao City.
RTC branch 8 of Davao City rendered its decision
where it transferred the subject properties in favor of
S who transferred it to O and then to EEE corporation.
ON the otherhand, the case in RTC Branch 15 of
Davao City ruled in favor of X and Y. The branch
sheriff issued a notice of sale, which included the
subject properties now in the name of EEE
corporation. To protect its interest, EEE corporation
filed a separate action of issuance of a preliminary
injuction before RTC Branch 14, which was
questioned by X and Y. RTC branch 14 decided in
favor of EEE corporation. X and Y filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the order
of RTC branch 14, which was later on denied by the
CA for the writ of preliminary injunction subject of the
petition was already fait accompli, and thus the issue
became moot and academic.
Was the CA correct in holding that the issues raised
by X and Y had been mooted?
ANSWER:
No. The rule is that a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 is proper only if there is no appeal, or any plain
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. In this case, no adequate recourse, at that time,
was available to Spouses X and Y, except resorting to
Rule 65. Although Intervention under Rule 19 could
have been availed of, failing to use this remedy
should not prejudice Spouses X and Y. It is the duty of
RTC-Br. 14, following the rule on joinder of
indispensable parties, to simply recognize them, with
101
 or without any motion to intervene. Through a cursory
reading of the titles, the Court would have noticed the
adverse rights of Spouses X and Y over the
cancellation of any annotations in the subject TCTs.
Neither will appeal prove adequate as a remedy since
only the original parties to an action can appeal.25
Here, Spouses X and Y were never impleaded.
Hence, they could not have utilized appeal as they
never possessed the required legal standing in the
first place. And even if the Court assumes the
existence of the legal standing to appeal, it must be
remembered that the questioned orders were
interlocutory in character and, as such, Spouses X
and Y would have to wait, for the review by appeal,
until the rendition of the judgment on the merits, which
at that time may not be coming as speedy as
practicable. While waiting, Spouses X and Y would
have to endure the denial of their right, as
indispensable parties, to participate in a proceeding in
which their indispensability was obvious. Indeed,
appeal cannot constitute an adequate, speedy and
plain remedy.
TESORO v. METRO MANILA RETREADERS ET AL.
X worked as salesmen for XYZ by entering into a
Service Franchise Agreements with them. However,
XYZ terminated their respective SFA for they began to
default on their obligations. Aggrieved, X filed a
complaint for constructive dismissal against XYZ with
the NLRC. The LA dismissed the complaint because
there was no employer- employee relationship
between the two, which was affirmed by the NLRC. X
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA
stating grave abuse of discretion, which was
dismissed by the CA.
Was the CA correct in dismissing the petition?
ANSWER:
Yes. Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
The rule in labor cases is that the findings of fact of
quasi-judicial bodies, like the NLRC, are to be
accorded with respect, even finality, if supported by
substantial evidence. This is particularly true when
passed upon and upheld by the CA.
In this case, there was no finding that the CA abused
in discretion for the decision was supported with
substantial evidence presented in the LA.
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LANIER v. PEOPLE
X and Y were arrested for engaging in selling of illegal
drugs in Boracay Islands through a search warrant.
They then filed a motion to quash attaching to their
motion the affidavits of their witnesses. It was denied
by the trial court. They then filed a petition for review
before the DOJ assailing the March 8 2004 decision
of the provincial prosecutor which upheld the
Information and directed the return of the records to
the trial court for disposition. The Secretary of Justice
granted the petition. The OSG filed a petition for
certiorari seeking to annul the DOJ resolution, which
was granted by the CA.
Was the CA correct?
ANSWER:
Yes. In Verzano, Jr. v. Paro,11 we had the occasion
to rule that while generally it is the Secretary of
Justice who has the authority to review the decisions
of the prosecutors, the Court Appeals has the
authority to correct the acts of the prosecutorial
officers tainted with grave abuse of discretion
notwithstanding the filing of the informations before
the trial court. The authority of the Court of Appeals is
bolstered by the fact that the petition filed before it
was one under Rule 65, such that it has the
jurisdiction to determine whether or not the prosecutor
and/or the Secretary of Justice acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.12 The filing or withdrawal, as in this case,
of an Information before the RTC does not foreclose
the review on the basis of grave abuse of discretion
the resolution of a prosecutor, or the Secretary of
Justice on the issue of probable cause.
It is well-settled that courts of law are precluded from
disturbing the findings of public prosecutors and the
DOJ on the existence or non-existence of probable
cause for the purpose of filing criminal informations,
unless such findings are tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The rationale behind the general rule rests on the
principle of separation of powers, dictating that the
determination of probable cause for the purpose of
indicting a suspect is properly an executive function;
while the exception hinges on the limiting principle of
checks and balances, whereby the judiciary, through
a special civil action of certiorari, has been tasked by
the present Constitution to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Judicial review of the resolution of the Secretary of
Justice is limited to a determination of whether there
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 has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the
executive branch in the determination of probable
cause during a preliminary investigation. Courts are
not empowered to substitute their judgment for that of
the executive branch; it may, however, look into the
question of whether such exercise has been made in
grave abuse of discretion.
TORRES v. SATSATIN
X filed a complaint for a sum of money and damages
against Y and file an ex parte motion for the issuance
of a writ of attachment, alleging among other things
that Y is about to depart the Philippines, that Y has
real and personal properties in Metro Manila and in
nearby provinces, that the amount due to X is P19 M
above all other claims; that there is no other sufficient
security for the claim sought to.
On October 30, 2002 RTC issued an order granting
the application.
On November 15, 2002 the RTC deputized the sheriff,
together with police security assistance to serve the
writ of attachment. Thereafter the RTC issued a writ of
attachment dated November 15, 2002 directing the
sheriff to attach the estate, real or personal of Y.
On November 21, 2002 a copy of writ of attachment
was served upon the respondents. On the same date,
the sheriff levied the real and personal properties of Y.
On November 21, 2002, summons together with a
copy of the complaint was served upon Y.
Y argued that the subject writ was improper and
irregular having been issued and enforced without the
lower court acquiring jurisdiction over the person of Y.
Y maintained that the writ of attachment was
implemented without serving upon X the summons
together with the complaint.
Is Y correct on his contentions? Discuss
ANSWER:
Yes, Y is correct. The subject writ was improper and
irregular.
The grant of the provisional remedy of attachment
involves three stages: first, the court issues the order
granting the application; second, the writ of
attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the
writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial
two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant be first obtained.
However, once the implementation of the writ
commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction
over the defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the
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court has no power and authority to act in any manner
against the defendant. Any order issuing from the
Court will not bind the defendant.
Thus, it is indispensable not only for the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but also
upon consideration of fairness, to apprise the
defendant of the complaint against him and the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and the
grounds therefor that prior or contemporaneously to
the serving of the writ of attachment, service of
summons, together with a copy of the complaint, the
application for attachment, the applicants affidavit and
bond, and the order must be served upon him.
REPUBLIC v. LAZO
CA dismissed X’s petition outright for its failure to file
a prior motion for reconsideration. The CA explained
that "a special civil action for certiorari will not lie
unless the aggrieved party has no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
such as a timely filed motion for reconsideration so as
to allow the lower court to correct the alleged error."
X moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the
same in its Resolution.
Unsatisfied, X elevated the disputed CA resolutions
before the Court via a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.
X contends that the CA erred in dismissing its petition
for certiorari for filing it without a prior motion for
reconsideration which, according to it, constituted a
fatal infirmity.
Is X correct?
ANSWER:
NO. X is not correct.
The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is
a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for
certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the
court to correct any actual or perceived error
attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and
factual circumstances of the case. It is not, however,
an ironclad rule.
There are recognized exceptions such as (a) where
the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo
had no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in
the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as
those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c)
where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution
of the question and any further delay would prejudice
the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or
the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d)
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 where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner
was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief
from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where
the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack
of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex
parte, or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to
object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of
law or where public interest is involved.
In this case, a liberality in the application of the rules
of procedure may not be invoked if it will result in the
wanton disregard of the rules or cause needless delay
in the administration of justice. For it is equally settled
that, except for the most persuasive of reasons, strict
compliance is enjoined to facilitate the orderly
administration of justice.
Hence X is not correct.
PASCUAL v. DAQUIOAG, 720 SCRA 230
X seeks the review and reversal of the decision
promulgated on January 30, 2004, whereby the Court
of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment rendered on
November 7, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Laoag City dismissing the petition for certiorari filed
by petitioner in Special Civil Action Case No. 12150-
13 to assail the writ of execution and the execution
proceedings in a land dispute decided by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).
Did the CA err in sustaining the decision of the RTC to
dismiss the petition for certiorari?
ANSWER:
No. A special civil action for certiorari is the proper
action to bring when a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. The exercise of judicial function consists in the
power to determine what the law is and what the legal
rights of the parties are, and then to adjudicate upon
the rights of the parties. The term quasi-judicial
function applies to the action and discretion of public
administrative officers or bodies that are required to
investigate facts or to ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a
basis for their official action and to exercise discretion
of a judicial nature.
In this case, the issuance by Y of the assailed
memorandum implementing the writ of execution did
not derive from the performance of a judicial or quasi-
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judicial function. He was not thereby called upon to
adjudicate the rights of the contending parties or to
exercise any discretion of a judicial nature, but only
performing an administrative duty of enforcing and
implementing the writ.
Hence the CA did not err in sustaining the decision of
RTC.
PEOPLE v. ESPINOSA
X filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the April 10, 2002
Resolutionof the Sandiganbayan (SBN) in Criminal
Case Nos. 26422-26428. The anti-graft court
dismissed the criminal cases against Respondent Y
on the ground of double jeopardy as follows:
That being the case, the Court is constrained to
concur with the accused that jeopardy has set in and
that he is now at peril of punishment twice for the
same offense in violation of the protection afforded by
Sec. 21, Art. III of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, these cases are DISMISSED as
against accused Mario K. Espinosa alone.
Is Rule 65 the correct remedy?
ANSWER:
No. X should have filed a motion for reconsideration
before the SBN. The extraordinary remedy of
certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
Here, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy
expressly provided by law is a motion for
reconsideration to be filed within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation or notice of the final order or judgment.
The purpose of the motion is to afford public
respondent an opportunity to correct any actual or
fancied error attributed to it by way of a re-
examination of the legal and factual aspects of the
case.
Explaining further, the Court said:
x x x. Petitioner's inaction or negligence under the
circumstances is tantamount to a deprivation of the
right and opportunity of the respondent commission
to cleanse itself of an error unwittingly committed or to
vindicate itself of an act unfairly imputed. An
improvident resort to certiorari cannot be used as a
tool to circumvent the right of public respondent to
review and purge its decision of an oversight, if any. x
x x. (Italics supplied)
Second, the proper remedy is appeal under Rule 45,
not certiorari under Rule 65. Section 7 of Presidential
Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No.
8249, provides that decisions and final orders of the
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 Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme
Court by [a] petition for review on certiorari raising
pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, likewise provides that a judgment or final order
or resolution of the Sandiganbayan may be appealed
to the Supreme Court via a verified petition for review
on certiorari.
Clearly then, the remedy of appeal was available to
petitioner. For unexplained reasons, it chose not to
pursue this recourse. Neither has it cited grounds to
exempt the Petition from the stringent rule forbidding
a substitution of remedies. Verily, its cavalier
disregard of procedural requirements, especially its
erroneous choice of remedy, is indeed enough reason
to throw out this Petition summarily.
TENAZAS v. R. VILLEGAS TAXI TRANSPORT
X filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision dated
March 11, 2010 and Resolution dated June 28, 2010
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
111150, which affirmed with modification the
Decision dated June 23, 2009 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC Case
No. 07-002648-08.
Discuss Rule 45 & 65 in labor cases.
ANSWER:
Rule 45- SC:
"Well-settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of this
Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to
reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the
factual findings complained of are completely devoid
of support from the evidence on record, or the
assailed judgment is based on a gross
misapprehension of facts." The Court finds that none
of the mentioned circumstances is present in this case.
Rule 65- CA:
Judicial review of decisions of the NLRC via petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, as a general rule, is
confined only to issues of lack or excess of jurisdiction
and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.
The CA does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of
evidence upon which the LA and the NLRC based
their conclusions. The issue is limited to the
determination of whether or not the NLRC acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion in rendering the resolution, except
if the findings of the NLRC are not supported by
substantial evidence.
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MACAPAGAL v. PEOPLE
On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the
Sandiganbayan former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (GMA) for plunder, as defined by, and
penalized under Section 2 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.
Thereafter, accused GMA filed their petition for
bail which were denied by the Sandiganbayan on the
ground that the evidence of guilt against them was
strong.
After the Prosecution rested its case, accused GMA
then filed their demurrers to evidence asserting that
the Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder
against them. The same were denied by the
Sandiganbayan, holding that there was sufficient
evidence to show that to commit plunder. After the
respective motions for reconsideration filed by GMA
likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan, she filed
petitions for certiorari.
Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is
proper to assail the denial of the demurrers to
evidence.
ANSWER:
Yes if there’s grave abuse of discretion
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not
proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued by
the trial court because of the availability of another
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
expressly provides that “the order denying the motion
for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the
demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or
by certiorari before judgment.” It is not an insuperable
obstacle to this action, however, that the denial of the
demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an
interlocutory order that did not terminate the
proceedings, and the proper recourse of the
demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case
of their conviction they may then appeal the conviction,
and assign the denial as among the errors to be
reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in
which the writ of certiorari may issue should not be
limited, because to do so “x x x would be to destroy its
comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the
discretion of the court that authority does not want to
show that certiorari is more discretionary than either
prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of our
superintending control over other courts, we are to be
guided by all the circumstances of each particular
case ‘as the ends of justice may require.’ So it is that
the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a
substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.”
105
 The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure
to the contrary or for the sake of the convenience of
one side. This is because the Court has the bounden
constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of
discretion whenever and wherever it is committed.
Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory character and
effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the
petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of
the remedy of certiorari when the denial was tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
NAVAL v. COMMISSION ON ELECTION
A provincial board member cannot be elected and
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Before
the Court is a Petition for Certiorari filed by Naval to
assail the (a) COMELEC Second Division’s
Resolution granting the petition filed by Julia, seeking
to cancel the COC as Member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur of Naval, who is
allegedly violating the three-term limit imposed upon
elective local officials; and (b) COMELEC En Banc’s
Resolution denying Naval’s Motion for
Reconsideration to the Resolution issued by
COMELEC Second Division
Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is
proper in this case.
ANSWER:
No, there is no grave abuse of discretion.
Court has held that a petition for certiorariagainst
actions of the COMELEC is confined only to instances
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and
substantial denial of due process, because the
COMELEC is presumed to be most competent in
matters falling within its domain.
"In a special civil action for certiorari, the burden rests
on the petitioner to prove not merelyreversible error,
but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public
respondent issuing the impugned order, decision or
resolution. "Grave abuse of discretion arises when a
court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or
existing jurisprudence."
In the case at bar, the Court finds the COMELEC’s
disquisitions to be amply supported by the
Constitution,law and jurisprudence.
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PLDT v. OCAMPO
An Information for the crime of simple theft was filed
before the RTC of Makati City against A, B, C, and D
for unauthorized routing of international long distance
calls likened to a jumper, and thereby, depriving
petitioner XY Company substantial revenues. After
conducting an investigation on the alleged illegal
activities, two search warrants were issued by Manila
RTC and raids were conducted by the NBI agents.
Respondents filed in RTC Makati a Motion to
Suppress or Exclude or Return Inadmissible Evidence
Unlawfully Obtained,of Search Warrants were
invalidly conducted. On appeal, CA denied the
certiorari for RTC of Makati based on the Principle of
Non-Interference of a co-equal court. However, the
CA ordered the search warrant cases consolidated
with the criminal case. Then RTC denied it in open
court for no MR was filed and respondents present
evidence to substantiate their Motion.
Later respondent applied for issuance of subpoena
duces tecum, denied by RTC Makati for failureto file
within the prescribed 60 days and the date of receipt
was not indicated. CA reversed the decision and
ordered the RTC to grant the application, and to
continue with the hearing on Motion to Suppress and
Exclude Inadmissible Evidence Seized.
Petitioner filed for MR, but was denied. Hence, a
petition for review on certiorari was filed.
Is the CA correct in granting Petition for Certiorari
despite evident procedural lapses?
ANSWER:
No. Sec. 4 Rule 65 provides, When and where
petition filed. — The petition shall be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order
or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or
new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is
required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be
counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it
relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional
Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial
area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be
filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same
is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial
agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these
Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only
by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be
granted except for compelling reason and in no case
exceeding fifteen (15) days. (4a) (Bar Matter No. 803,
21 July 1998; A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC)
106

In this case, respondent file a petition for certiorari
from the denial of application for subpoena duces
tecum after the lapse of 60 days. They kept silent
about it and did not offer any plausible justification for
their non-compliance.
Jurisprudence consistently holds that the filing of a
motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to the
institution of a petition for certiorari. Respondent failed
to filed MR for the denial of their Motion to Suppress,
thus CA erred in giving due course to the petition.
Litigation is not a game of technicalities, this does not
mean that procedural rules may be ignored at will and
mere invocations of substantial justice and liberality
are not enough for the court to suspend procedural
rules.It must be followed to facilitate the orderly
administration of justice.
JAY CANDELARIA and ERIC BASIT v. RTC, CITY
OF SAN FERNANDO
Petitioners J and A were arrested and charged for the
violation of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known
as the IntellectualProperty Code of the Philippines.
After arraignment and they pleaded not guilty to the
charge, they filed Motion to Suppress/Exclude
Evidence based on inadmissibility of evidence. RTC
denied the motion on failure to move for the quashal
of the information before the arraignment, an accused
is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest.
Petitioner filed MR, but RTC denied.
Is the RTC of San Fernando committed grave abuse
in denying the motion to set the case for suppression
hearing?
ANSWER:
No. Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
Rule 65 is a special civil action a party seeking the
writ must be able to show that his or her resort to such
extraordinary remedy is justified by the absence of an
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. Petitioner in this case,
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failed to allege that there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
oflaw as to justify resort to certiorari.A petition for
certiorari which does not comply with the
requirements of the rules may be dismissed.
Certiorari is designed to correct errors of jurisdiction
and not errors in judgment. Clearly, in this case RTC
had jurisdiction over the case and the person of the
petitioners. Any perceived error in its interpretation of
the law and its assessment of evidence is
correctibleby appeal, not certiorari, it would only be
considered an error ofjudgment and not of jurisdiction.
The RTC’s denial of the Motion to Suppress was
based on its assessment that the evidence sought to
be suppressed/excluded isadmissible, was done in
the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.
Assuming that the RTC’s determination is erroneous,
the mistake is clearly not an error of jurisdiction but of
judgment which is not correctible by certiorari.
JOSE TAPALES VILLAROSA v. ROMULO DE
MESA FESTIN and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Petitioner A and Respondent B were two of the four
rival candidates for the mayoralty post in San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro during the May 13, 2013 National
and Local Elections. B was declared victor, with
difference of only 1,204 votes against A. petitioner
filed a Petition for Protest Ad Cautelam before the
RTC alleging irregularities attending the conduct of
the elections. And claimed that several ballots were
pre-marked or that the ovals appearing on the face of
the ballots.
RTC ruled in favor of A and later filed a Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal which was granted.
Meanwhile, B elevated the case to COMELEC via
petition for certiorari with prayer for injunction. A filed
a motion to dismiss.
COMELEC acting through its First Division, required A
to file an answer and granted the request for
injunction, enjoining the RTC’s decision execution
pending appeal. A moved to quash, which was denied
by COMELEC. Thus, Petition for Certiorari under Rule
64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Order of public respondent COMELEC.
Is the certiorari availed by petitioner was a correct
remedy?
ANSWER:
No. Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
107
 remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
Certiorari will not generally lie against an order,
ruling,or decision of a COMELEC division for being
premature, taking into account the availability of the
plain, speedy and adequate remedy of a motion for
reconsideration. The decision, order or resolution of a
division of the Comelec must be reviewed by the
Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration
before the final enbanc decision may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite
filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory.
Thus, failure to abide by this procedural requirement
constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.
Moreover, the COMELEC did not gravely abused its
discretion when the Special First Division issued the
question writ of preliminary injunction. The additional
term "special," in this case, merelyindicates that the
commissioners sitting therein may only be doing so in
a temporary capacity or via substitution. The
COMELEC First Division exercises jurisdiction over
the cases that were assigned to it before the
substitution was made. This jurisdiction was not lost
by the subsequent formation of the Special First
Division since this only entailed a change in the
Division’s composition of magistrates. Indeed, the
case was not reassigned or re-raffled anew. If
anything, it was only petitioner’s naivety that misled
him into interpreting the designation of the division as
a "special" one, meaning it is distinct from the first.
Corollarily, petitioner is also mistaken in claiming that
the jurisdiction was eventually "re-acquired" by the
First Division from the Special First Division by ruling
on the motion to quash since the First Division never
lost jurisdiction to begin with.
The exigencies justify the substitution of members
and the designation of special divisions to prevent
paralysis in the administration of justice. This is also
resorted to in order to ensure that the speedy
disposition of cases is not impeded and that docket
systems are unclogged. Obviously, these advantages
far outweigh petitioner's baseless cry of violation of
due process.
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ABOITIZ EQUITY VENTURES, INC. v. VICTOR S.
CHIONGBIAN, BENJAMIN D. GOTHONG, and
CARLOS A. GOTHONG LINES, INC. (CAGLI)
Aboitiz Shipping Corporation ("ASC") and CAGLI,
owned by the Chiongbian family, entered into an
agreement, whereby ASC and CAGLI would transfer
their shipping assets to William Lines, Inc (WLI) in
exchange for WLI’s shares of stock. WLI, in turn,
would run their merged shipping businesses and,
henceforth, be known as WG&A, Inc. ("WG&A").
Sometime in 2002, the Chiongbian and Gothong
families decided to leave the WG&A enterprise and
sell their interest in WG&A to the Aboitiz family, so a
Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) was entered into. .
Subsequently, WG&A was renamed Aboitiz Transport
Shipping Corporation ("ATSC").
CAGLI made demands to ATSC (the corporation) for
the return or payment of the excess inventories and
continued demanding and eventually addressed its
demand letters directly to AEV (the stockholder). AEV
rebuffed the demands alleging: a. CAGLI already
received the excess inventories; b. It was not a party
to CAGLI’s claim because it had a personality distinct
from WLI/WG&A/ATSC. c. CAGLI’s claim was barred
by prescription.
In a reply-letter, CAGLI claimed that it was unaware of
the return of the excess inventories and asked for
copies of the delivery receipts. In letters written for
AEV by its counsels, it was noted that the excess
inventories were delivered to GT Ferry Warehouse.
Attached were delivery receipts of the return. The
supposed unreturned inventories were only P119.89M
but P120.04M was returned so CAGLI was actually
the one liable to return the difference.
Not satisfied, CAGLI filed two applications for
arbitration before RTC-Cebu.
First complaint filed against the Chiongbian, ATSC,
ASC, and AEV for the return of the excess inventories.
RTC dismissed the petition and ordered the parties to
proceed to arbitration as provided in their contract.
AEV filed a motion for reconsideration. Subsequently,
the second complaint was filed by CAGLI but RTC
dismissed the same without prejudice to the first
complaint left the parties free to litigate the matter in a
subsequent action so there was no res judicata.
AEV filed a petition for review on certiorari (45) with
SC assailing denial of its motion to dismiss and
subsequent MR in the second complaint.
Is the petition for review on certiorari (45) is the proper
remedy?
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 ANSWER:
No. AEV is in error in seeking relief from this court via
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. As such, we are well in a position to
dismiss the present petition outright. Nevertheless, as
the actions of the Regional Trial Court are tainted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, this court treats the present Rule 45
petition as a Rule 65 petition and gives it due course.
An order denying the motion to dismiss in an
interlocutory order and no appeal maybe taken -
interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally
disposes of a case, as it leaves something to be done
by the court before the case is finally decided on the
merits. The proper recourse is for the movant to file
an answer. Unless, where the order denying the
motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
the movant may assail such order via a Rule 65 (i.e.,
certiorari, prohibition, and/or mandamus) petition.
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR. v. RICARDO S.
SILVERIO
Beatriz Silverio died without leaving a will, survived by
her legal heirs. A subsequent intestate proceeding
was filed for the settlement of her estate. The
appointment for an estate administrator was rendered
by the intestate court in a flip-flopping manner.
Silverio, Sr. was removed as an administrator, was
replaced by Silverio, Jr. as a new administrator.
Silverio, Jr. subsequently executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor CITRINE and another to
Monica Ocampo. An urgent application for the
Issuance of TRO preventing Silverio Jr, Monica
Ocampo and CITRINE from committing acts that
would affect the titles of the said estate properties.
On February 2011, SILVERIO SR. filed an Urgent
Omnibus Motion (a) To Declare as Null and Void the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated 16 September 2010; (b)
To cancel the Transfer Certificate of Title No.
0062011000050; and (c) To reinstate the Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 2236121 in the name of
Ricardo C. SilverioSr. and the Intestate Estate of the
late Beatriz S. Silverio. The intestate court rendered
the now assailed Orders granting the preliminary
injunction against Silverio, Jr., and declaring the Deed
of Absolute Sale, TCT and all derivative titles over the
Cambridge and Intsia properties as null and void.
The Court of Appeals rendered decision declaring the
Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificate of Title
and all derivative titles over the Cambridge and Intsia
Property valid. Silverio, Sr. contends that CA
committed a reversible error in upholding the validity
of the Intsia and Cambridge properties on the ground
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that the intestate court cannot annul the sales as it
has a limited jurisdiction only and which does not
include resolving issues of ownership.
Did the Intestate Court acted with grave abuse of
discretion in declaring the sales and derivative titles
over two properties subject of intestate proceedings
as null and void?
ANSWER:
Yes.The court ruled that the acts were tainted with
grave abuse of discretion as it was directed against
acts which were already fait accompli for the records
show that when the preliminary injunction was issued
new titles over the disputed properties were already
issued to CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC. and ZEE2
RESOURCES INC.
Citing the reasoning of the CA, the injunction order
which was made permanent by the Court of Appeals
(Seventh Division) was declared to be limited only to
the portion of the Omnibus Order that upheld the
grant of letters of administration by SILVERIO, JR.
and the removal of SILVERIO, SR. as administrator
and nothing else.
The parties to this case are evidently having a
personal conflict because of the flip-flopped decision
on the Letters of Administration, thus the proceedings
also suffered delays. However, this should not
prejudice Ocampo, Citrine and ZEE2, having relied in
good faith that the sale was authorized and with prior
approval of the intestate court which remained valid
and subsisting insofar as it allowed the aforesaid sale.
ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORPORATION v.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
Sherwood Holdings Corporation and Spouses Sandy
Ang and Arlene Ang filed a case for sum of money
against Absolute Management Corporation before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Private
respondent filed its answer and incorporated a third-
party complaint against petitioner Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Company.
The court set the case for pre-trial and
representatives (counsels) were ordered to submit
their authorizations to appear at the hearing. With
respect to the third party complaint, defendant
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company whose counsel
failed to present a Secretary’s Certificate and Special
Power of Attorney authorizing her to represent said
bank in today’s pre-trial, said third-party plaintiff
(Absolute Management Corp) is hereby allowed to
present evidence ex parte pursuant to the provisions
of Sec. 5, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. As a result, third-party defendant declared
to be in default. Third-party plaintiff were allowed to
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 present ex-parte evidence. A motion to lift the order of
default was filed and was denied.
A petition for certiorari was filed in CA. It reversed the
decision, on the reason that respondent’s counsel
failed to present Secretary’s Certificate and Special
Power of Attorney authorizing her to represent. MR
was as well denied.
Did the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in its
decision?
ANSWER:
Yes. The SC reinstated and upheld the decision of the
trial court. Respondent’s counsel had the authority to
represent respondent in her capacity as its
representative during the subject pre-trial, and not in
her capacity as its counsel. The SC agreed with the
trial court that respondent’s counsel did not have the
proper authority. The inability to provide the
Honorable Court the proper authority to represent
Third-Party Defendant at the pre-trial hearing is not an
excusable negligence.
In cases where a party may not himself be present at
the pre-trial, and another person substitutes for him,
or his lawyer undertakes to appear not only as an
attorney but in substitution of the client’s person, it is
imperative for that representative of the lawyer to
have “special authority” to make such substantive
agreements as only the client otherwise has capacity
to make. That “special authority” should ordinarily be
in writing or at the very least be “duly established by
evidence other than the self-serving assertion of
counsel (or the proclaimed representative) himself.”
Without that special authority, the lawyer or
representative cannot be deemed capacitated to
appear in place of the party; hence, it will be
considered that the latter has failed to put in an
appearance at all, and he [must] therefore “be non-
suited or considered as in default,” notwithstanding
his lawyer’s or delegate’s presence.
OLONGAPO CITY v. SUBIC WATER AND
SEWERAGE CO., INC
Pursuant to PD 198, X entered into a contract to pay
Y for the acquisition of a water system. Due to X's
failure to pay, Y filed a complaint for a sum of money
against X. X filed a counterclaim for unpaid bills by Y.
They entered into a compromise agreement to offset
their respective claims and counterclaims which was
approved by the trial court. 6 years thereafter, Y filed
a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution which
was granted. The trial court denied the MR of X. X
then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA imputing
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
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of jurisdiction to RTC. The CA granted the petition for
certiorari and reversed the trial court's ruling, the CA
declared that the issuance of the writ of execution is
null and void. The CA denied Y's motion for
reconsideration. Because Y failed to file before the SC
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, Y
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the
SC instead.
Is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 the proper
remedy?
ANSWER:
No. The instant petition should have been brought
under Rule 45 in a petition for review on certiorari.
Section 1 of this Rule mandates:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A
party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment
or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other
courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on
certiorari.
In this case, since what is questioned is the CA's
decision declaring null and void the writ of execution
issued by the trial court, it completely disposed of the
case. It was already a final order that resolved the
subject matter in its entirety, leaving nothing else to
be done. Therefore, it was the proper subject of a
Rule 45 petition.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is appropriate
only if there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
available to the aggrieved party. Settled is the rule
that where appeal is available to the aggrieved party,
the special civil action for certiorari will not be
entertained – remedies of appeal and certiorari are
mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive.
Hence, certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost
appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in
one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse.
It cannot be used to revive a lost appeal.
OSG SHIPMANAGEMENT MANILA, INC., v.
PELLAZAR
X, an oiler of a vessel, filed a complaint for permanent
total disability benefits and damages against Y, the
local manning agent of a Ship Management
partnership. There was a disagreement between the
amount of compensation between the company-
designated physicians and the physician of X's own
choice. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of X. Y filed
an appeal with the NLRC which modified the Labor
Arbiter's decision. MR was denied by the NLRC. X
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 filed a petition for certiorari Rule 65 with the CA. CA
reversed the NLRC ruling indicating that the NLRC
was intrinsically wrong.
Was the CA correct in reversing the NLRC ruling?
ANSWER:
No. It has been established by jurisprudence that
under Rule 65 before the CA, it may not go beyond
the determination of whether the NLRC's decision is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion because the
ruling is brought before it is already a final and
executory ruling of the NLRC, there being no appeal
provided for under the law. Accordingly, the Court
generally accords respect to the NLRC's factual
findings and its conclusions from these findings since
the absence of an appeal from the NLRC's ruling is a
statutory recognition of the labor tribunals' expertise
on the field of labor standards, labor relations and
allied legislation.
In this case, the CA went beyond its limited scope in
reviewing the NLRC decision. It should be limited to
the issue of whether the NLRC acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction - and not whether the NLRC ruling is
intrinsically correct or not.
VINUYA v. ROMULO
In 2004, X filed a petition for certiorari under Rules 65
before the SC after the denial for assistance by the
Department of Justice on 1988. The petition contains:
1. Since 1998, petitioners and other victims of the
"comfort women system," approached the Executive
Department through the Department of Justice in
order to request for assistance to file a claim against
the Japanese officials and military officers who
ordered the establishment of the "comfort women"
stations in the Philippines;
2. Officials of the Executive Department ignored their
request and refused to file a claim against the said
Japanese officials and military officers;
3. Undaunted, the Petitioners in turn approached the
Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Justice
and Office of the of the Solicitor General to file their
claim against the responsible Japanese officials and
military officers, but their efforts were similarly and
carelessly disregarded;
Was the petition for certiorari proper?
ANSWER:
No. X did not show that his resort was timely under
the rules. Section 4, Rules 65 of the Rules of Court
provides:
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Section 4. When and where position filed. – The
petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of judgment, order or resolution. In case a
motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed,
whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60)
day period shall be counted from notice of the denial
of said motion.
To establish the timeliness of the petition for certiorari,
the date of receipt of the assailed judgment, final
order or resolution or the denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial must be stated in the
petition; otherwise, the petition for certiorari must be
dismissed. The importance of the dates cannot be
understated, for such dates determine the timeliness
of the filing of the petition for certiorari.
There are three essential dates that must be stated in
a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65. First,
the date when notice of the judgment or final order or
resolution was received; second, when a motion for
new trial or reconsideration was filed; and third, when
notice of the denial thereof was received. Failure of
petitioner to comply with this requirement shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
In this case, The petition only mentions the year 1998
only as the time when petitioners approached the
Department ofJustice for assistance, but does not
specifically state when they received the denial of
their request for assistance by the Executive
Department of the Government. This alone warranted
the outright dismissal of the petition. Clearly, the
petition was filed in 2004 which is way beyond the 60-
day period. Furthermore, X did not show any
compelling reason for us to relax the rule.
FERNANDEZ v. CLAUDIO
X filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against his
employer Y. The LA held that there was just cause in
X's dismissal but the same was nonetheless effected
without procedural due process. X filed a notice of
appeal before the NLRC which was granted thereby
reversing the LA's ruling. Y file an MR but despite the
fact that the NLRC had yet to act on the motion, Y
filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA
granted Y's petition for certiorari holding that the
NLRC has gravely abused its discretion.
Was the CA correct in granting Y's petition for
certiorari?
ANSWER:
No. The CA gravely abused its discretion in giving due
course to Y's petition for certiorari under Rules 64
despite its finding that the latter still had a pending
motion for reconsideration. It is settled that the filing of
a motion for reconsideration from the order, resolution
or decision of the NLRC is an indispensable condition
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 before an aggrieved party can avail of a petition for
certiorari.
The recourse of Y should have been to move for the
immediate resolution of his MR before the NLRC
instead of filing a petition for certiorari before the CA.
JARDELEZA v. SERENO
X was nominated to replace the retiring Associate
Justice Y. X's integrity was questioned due to
numerous issues raised against him. He was made to
appear before the JBC but he answered that he would
defend himself provided that due process would be
observed. He requested the JBC to defer its meeting
considering that the Court En Banc would meet the
next day. X was then excused. Later on in the same
day, the JBC continued and proceeded to vote for the
nominees to be included in the list. X was excluded. X
filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
prayer for issuance of a TRO to compel JBC to
include him. JBC argues that it does not exercise
judicial or quasi-judicial functions, therefore a petition
for certiorari cannot be filed against them.
Does the SC's power of supervision over the JBC
include the remedies of certiorari and mandamus?
ANSWER:
Yes on the availability of certiorari. No on mandamus.
Under Art. VIII, section 1 of the 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.
It has been judicially settled that a petition for
certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of any
branch or instrument of the government on the ground
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by such branch or
instrumentality, even if the latter does not exercise
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
Mandamus is not available because Mandamus lies to
compel the performance of a ministerial duty but not
the performance of a discretionary duty. In this case,
JBC's duty to nominate is discretionary and it may not
be compelled to do something.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
JIMENEZ JR. v. PEOPLE
The RTC granted a motion to discharge X as state
witness in a criminal case. The RTC relied on the
recommendation of the prosecution finding that there
was compliance with the requisites under Section 17
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure;
that there was absolute necessity for X's testimony as
X alone was willing to testify among the accused-
conspirators to whose testimony can be substantially
corroborated with the material points; and that X is not
the most guilty basing on the specific acts of X in
relation to the crime. A petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 before the CA was filed by Y stating that the
RTC gravely abused its discretion in granting the
motion. Y contends that: the prosecution could use
X's testimony without discharging him as a state
witness; that X's testimony does not corroborate with
all the points; and that X is not the least guilty among
the accused.
1. What constitutes grave abuse of discretion?
2. Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion?
ANSWER:
1. Jurisprudence has defined "grave abuse of
discretion" as the capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
because of passion or hostility.
2. No. In this case, while the prosecution could use
X's testimony without discharging him as a state
witness, the control of the case belongs to the
prosecution and the court cannot dictate on the
prosecutor's choice in the discharge of a state witness,
save only when the legal requirements have not been
complied with. The prosecution’s right to prosecute
gives it "a wide range of discretion — the discretion of
whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of
which depends on a number of factors which are best
appreciated by prosecutors. As to the testimony's
corroboration, what the rule requires is merely
corroboration with the material points and not all the
points. Lastly, a state witness does not need to be
found to be the least guilty; he or she should not only
appear to be the most guilty. Therefore, the RTC did
not commit grave abuse of discretion as it acted
properly in accordance with the Rules.
OLSEN v. OLSEN
X, a defendant from judgment of the CFI of Manila,
appeals the sentence of payment for a sum of money
with a legal interest reckoned from the date of filing of
the complaint and dismissing the cross-complaint and
counterclaim set up by him. Can an order denying a
112
 motion for annulment of a preliminary attachment may
be reviewed through an appeal?
ANSWER:
NO. Preliminary attachment is an auxiliary remedy the
granting of which lies within the sound discretion of
the judge taking cognizance of the principal case
upon whose existence it depends. While it is true that
an order denying a motion for annulment of a
preliminary attachment is not subject to review
through an appeal independently from the principal
case, it not constituting a final order, yet when the writ
of preliminary attachment becomes final by virtue of a
final Judgment rendered in the principal case, said
writ is subject to review jointly with the judgment
rendered in the principal case through an ordinary
appeal.
DUNGOG v. Court of Appeals
Spouses X and Y entered a contract to sell with
Corporation A for some parcels of land.. B, son of the
spouses, alleged that Corp A stopped paying the
installments. Corp A responded that they already
made an excess payment. B threatened to cancel the
contract to sell. Corp A filed an action for specific
performance and writ for preliminary injunction which
was granted by the trial court subsequently. B
intervened in the case and prayed for the dismissal of
the writ of preliminary injunction. Will the dismissal
prosper?
ANSWER:
No. B does not have the legal standing to file the suit
since he is not a party-litigant to the action. Under
Section 3, Rule 58 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, a preliminary injunction is proper when the
plaintiff appears to be entitled to the relief demanded
in the complaint. The trial court found that Corp A
already paid an excess. The issuance of the Writ
would no doubt preserve the status quo between the
Spouses X and Y and Corp A that existed prior to the
filing of the case. We agree with the trial court that the
status quo should be maintained until the issue on the
parties’ respective rights and obligations under the
Contract is determined after the trial.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
MORAN JR. v. OFFICE BY THE PRESIDENT OF
THE PHILIPPINES
Petitioner X filed a complaint against Y for product
imperfections of a BMW car which the latter sold to
the former before the Consumer Arbitration Office
(CAO). CAO demanded respondent Y for refund and
pay a sum of money to X. Respondent appealed to
the DTI secretary who dismissed the case thus, case
was brought before the Office of the President (OP)
who granted the appeal subsequently.
Complainant filed a petition for certiorari before Court
of Appeals alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the OP. CA dismissed the petition on the ground it
was a wrong mode of appeal. Was the CA correct in
dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that
petitioner resorted to a wrong mode of appeal.
ANSWER:
NO. RA 7394 expressly provide for immediate judicial
relief from decisions of the DTI Secretary by filing a
petition for certiorari with the "proper court." Certiorari
is an extraordinary remedy available in extraordinary
cases where a tribunal, board or officer, among others,
completely acted without jurisdiction. Ineluctably, a
judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the
subject matter is void. While errors of judgment are
correctible by appeal, errors of jurisdiction are
reviewable by certiorari. Considering that the OP had
no jurisdiction to entertain private respondent's appeal,
certiorari lies to correct such jurisdictional error. The
CA thus erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari
on the ground of being an improper remedy. Pettition
for review on certiorari is granted.
REPUBLIC v. LAZO
Respondent spouses X and Y are owners of Monte
Vista, sold a portion of the land to the National
Irrigation Administration (NIA). After a hazard
assessment conducted, respondent asked for the
implementation of the assessment report and for just
compensation.
Respondent prayed also for preliminary injunction
which was granted by the trial court. The CA upheld
the lower court's ruling and opined that the
controversy falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts and not of the Sangguniang Bayan
concerned, because what petitioner seeks to nullify
are the Orders of the trial court allegedly rendered in
violation of R.A. No. 8975 and not the act or propriety
of the issuance of Resolution No. 34.
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 It agreed, however, with respondents that the petition
for certiorari suffers from fatal defect since it was filed
without seeking first the reconsideration of the trial
court. It was said that petitioner omitted to show
sufficient justification that there was no appeal or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
Was the CA correct?
ANSWER:
No. The general rule is that a motion for
reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a
petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to
grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any
error attributed to it by a re-examination of the legal
and factual circumstances of the case.
However, the rule is not absolute and jurisprudence
has laid down the following exceptions when the filing
of a petition for certiorari is proper notwithstanding the
failure to file a motion for reconsideration:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the
court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon
by the lower court, or are the same as those raised
and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the petition is
perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and
there is extreme urgency for relief;
(e) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of
arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the
trial court is improbable;
(f) where the proceedings in the lower court are a
nullity for lack of due process;
(g) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and,
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or
public interest is involved.
We cannot but agree with petitioner that this case falls
within instances (a), (b), (c), (d), and (i) above-
mentioned. As will be elucidated in the discussion
below, the assailed Orders of the trial court are patent
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nullity for having been issued in excess of its
jurisdiction. Also, the questions raised in the certiorari
proceedings are the same as those already raised
and passed upon in the lower court; hence, filing a
motion for reconsideration would be useless and
serve no practical purpose. There is likewise an
urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and
any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government.
680 HOME APPLIANCES v. HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS
The creditor of petitioner X filed a case for the
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings after the latter
defaulted in paying the loan secured by a real estate
mortgage over its commercial lot and building.
Y became the highest bidder after the foreclosure sale
and new TCT was issued after X failed to redeem the
property. Y petitioned for writ of possession which
was granted by RTC. Z filed for a motion to intervene
as he is the current occupant.
X filed for the cancellation of the writ of possession
which was denied, thus, he went to CA via a certiorari
petition. CA ruled that the petition to cancel was
prematurely filed since a judgment debtor may file a
petition for cancellation of the writ of possession
within 30 days only after the purchaser has obtained
possession of the property. X prays for the reversal of
the CA's decision through a certiorari petition.
Was the certiorari proper?
ANSWER:
NO. Procedurally, we observe that 680 Home availed
of the wrong remedy to question the CA decision
before this Court. A petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court is availed of only when there
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Unfortunately,
petitioner's resort to a certiorari petition could not be
justified by the unavailability or insufficiency of other
remedies. A motion for reconsideration is recognized
as an adequate remedy against a decision, resolution,
or order of a lower court, as it provides the court
opportunity to correct any error it might have
committed.
Also, the remedy provided under the Rules of Court
from a decision of the CA is an appeal by certiorari
under its Rule 45. Instead of instituting a certiorari
petition, petitioner should have filed an appeal under
Rule 45, especially considering that the issue raised
here is primarily legal in nature.
114

TZE SUN WONG v. WONG
Petitioner X is a Chinese citizen who immigrated to
the Philippines and established his business. He was
being complained by Y for misrepresentation as his
driver's license shows that he is a Filipino citizen.
Bureau of Immigration ordered for his deportation
which was upheld by the Acting Secretary of Justice
by then. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA which subsequently denied
the same.
Was the CA correct in its denial?
ANSWER:
NO. Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court clearly
states that decisions of any quasi-judicial agency in
the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions (except to
judgments or final orders issued under the Labor
Code of the Philippines) shall be appealed to the CA
under this rule. For a writ of certiorari to issue, a
petitioner must not only prove that the tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. He must
also show that he has no plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law against what he
perceives to be a legitimate grievance. A recourse
affording prompt relief from the injurious effects of the
judgment or acts of a lower court or tribunal is
considered "plain, speedy and adequate" remedy.
MACAPAGAL v. PEOPLE
The Court resolves the consolidated petitions
for certiorari separately filed by former President M
and Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO)
Budget and Accounts Manager Benigno B. Aguas.
On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the
Sandiganbayan former President M and PCSO
Budget and Accounts Manager Aguas (and some
other officials of PCSO and Commission on Audit
whose charges were later dismissed by the
Sandiganbayan after their respective demurrers to
evidence were granted, except for Uriarte and Valdes
who were at large) for conspiracy to commit plunder,
as defined by, and penalized under Section 2 (b) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No.
7659.
Thereafter, accused M and Aguas separately filed
their respective petitions for bail which were denied by
the Sandiganbayan on the ground that the evidence
of guilt against them was strong.
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After the Prosecution rested its case, accused M and
Aguas then separately filed their demurrers to
evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not
establish a case for plunder against them. The same
were denied by the Sandiganbayan, holding that there
was sufficient evidence to show that they had
conspired to commit plunder. After the respective
motions for reconsideration filed by GMA and Aguas
were likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan, they filed
their respective petitions for certiorari.
Was the special civil action for certiorari is proper to
assail the denial of the demurrers to evidence?
ANSWER:
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not
proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued by
the trial court because of the availability of another
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover,
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly
provides that “the order denying the motion for leave
of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer
itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or
by certiorari before judgment.” It is not an insuperable
obstacle to this action, however, that the denial of the
demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an
interlocutory order that did not terminate the
proceedings, and the proper recourse of the
demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case
of their conviction they may then appeal the conviction,
and assign the denial as among the errors to be
reviewed.
Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the
writ of certiorari may issue should not be limited,
because to do so “x x x would be to destroy its
comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the
discretion of the court that authority is not wanting to
show that certiorari is more discretionary than either
prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of our
superintending control over other courts, we are to be
guided by all the circumstances of each particular
case ‘as the ends of justice may require.’ So it is that
the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a
substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.”The
exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure
to the contrary or for the sake of the convenience of
one side. This is because the Court has the bounden
constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of
discretion whenever and wherever it is committed.
Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory character and
effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the
petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of
the remedy of certiorari when the denial was tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
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AYUNGO v. BEAMKO SHIPMANAGEMENT
CORPORATION
A entered into a twelve (12) month Contract of
Employment with respondent B whereby he was
engaged as Chief Engineer. While on duty, A
suddenly lost his sense of hearing and only heard a
constant ringing noise. He continued to work as the
vessel was about to reach the port of Yokohama,
Japan. There, he was confined and was eventually
repatriated to the Philippines for further medical
treatment. The company physician reported that A’s
hypertension and diabetes are both pre-existing and
not work-related.
Unconvinced, A consulted another physician, and he
was declared to be suffering from hypertension,
diabetes and coronary heart desease which render
him unfit for work, the status thereof being that of a
permanent total disability. In this regard, A filed before
the NLRC a complaint for the payment of permanent
total disability benefits, sickness allowance,
reimbursement of medical expenses, damages and
attorney’s fees against respondents B, Eagle Maritime,
and Salvatierra, Jr. He alleged that his hypertension
was aggravated by the conditions of his employment
and his employer assumed the risk of liability arising
from his weakened condition when it employed him
despite his declaration during his medical exam that
he has diabetes.
Did the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when
it granted the respondents petition for certiorari,
thereby setting aside the decision of NLRC holding
that A is entitled to disability benefits.
ANSWER:
No. Petition denied. Decision of CA affirmed.
To justify the grant of certiorari, the petitioner must
satisfy that the court or quasi
judicial body gravely abused its discretion conferred
unto them.
In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be
ascribed to the NLRC when,inter alia, its findings and
the conclusions reached thereby are not supported by
substantial evidence.
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court
finds that the CA correctly granted respondents
certiorari petition since the NLRC gravely abused its
discretion when it held that Ayungo was entitled to
disability benefits notwithstanding the latters failure to
establish his claim through substantial evidence.
Specifically, Ayungo was not able to demonstrate,
under the parameters of the abovementioned
evidentiary threshold, that his Diabetes Mellitus was
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related to his work as Chief Engineer during the
course of his employment.
TESDA v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
The TESDA audit team discovered that for the
calendar years 2004-2007, TESDA paid Extraordinary
and Miscellaneous Expenses (EME) twice each year
to its officials from two sources: (1) the General Fund
for locally-funded projects and (2) the Technical
Education and Skills Development Project (TESDP)
Fund for foreign-assisted projects. Payment of EME
was authorized under the General Provisions of the
2004-2007 General Appropriations Acts (GAAs)
subject to certain conditions.
The audit team disallowed the payment of EME
amounting to P5,498,706.60 for being in excess of the
amount allowed in the 2004-2007 GAAs. It was further
discovered that EME were disbursed to TESDA
officials whose positions were not of equivalent ranks
as authorized by the Department of Budget and
Management.
TESDA, through Director-General Augusto Boboy
Syjuco, Jr., appealed and argued that the 2004-2007
GAAs and the Government Accounting and Auditing
Manual allowed the grant of EME from both the
General Fund and the TESDP Fund provided the
legal ceiling was not exceeded for each fund. TESDA
argued further that the General Fund and the TESDP
Fund are distinct from each other, and TESDA
officials designated as project officers concurrently
with their regular functions were entitled to separate
EME from both funds. The COA denied the appeal for
lack of merit prompting TESDA, through its Director-
General to file a petition for review with COA. The
same was denied. The COA ruled that failure of
TESDA officials to conform to the 2004-2007 GAAs
negated their claim of good faith. Hence this petition
for certiorari with prayer for issuance of temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to
annul COA decision.
Did the court committed grave abuse of discretion?
ANSWER:
The petition is partly meritorious.
The Constitution vests COA, as guardian of public
funds, with enough latitude to determine, prevent and
disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of
government funds. The COA is generally accorded
complete discretion in the exercise of its constitutional
duty and the Court generally sustains its decisions in
recognition of its expertise in the laws it is entrusted to
enforce.Only when COA acts without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
116
 amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may the
Court grant a petition assailing COA’s actions. There
is grave abuse of discretion when there is an evasion
of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as
when the judgment rendered is not based on law and
evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism. We do
not find any grave abuse of discretion when COA
disallowed the disbursement of EME to TESDA
officials for being excessive and unauthorized by law,
specifically the 2004–2007 GAAs.
In this case, TESDA failed to point out the law
specifically authorizing it to grant additional
reimbursement for EME from the TESDP Fund,
contrary to the explicit requirement in the Constitution
and the law. In Yap v. Commission on Audit,22 we
upheld COA’s disallowance of medical expenses and
other benefits such as car maintenance, gasoline
allowance and driver’s subsidy due to petitioner’s
failure to point out the law specifically authorizing the
same. There is nothing in the 2004–2007 GAAs which
allows TESDA to grant its officials another set of EME
from another source of fund like the TESDP Fund.
COA aptly pointed out that not even TESDA’s
inclusion of EME from both the General Fund and the
TESDP Fund in the 2005 GAA justified its payment of
excessive EME from 2004 up to 2007.23 The 2005
GAA provided for a ceiling on EME that TESDA still
had to comply despite the grant of EME in the 2005
GAA for foreign–assisted projects.
Accordingly, the Director–General’s blatant violation
of the clear provisions of the Constitution, the 2004–
2007 GAAs and the COA circulars is equivalent to
gross negligence amounting to bad faith. He is
required to refund the EME he received from the
TESDP Fund for himself. As for the TESDA officials
who had no participation in the approval of the
excessive EME, they acted in good faith since they
had no hand in the approval of the unauthorized EME.
They also honestly believed that the additional EME
were reimbursement for their designation as project
officers by the Director–General. Being in good faith,
they need not refund the excess EME they received.
LANIER v. PEOPLE
The police operatives conducted a test-buy at
petitioners’ residence in Barangay Balabag, Boracay
Island. On the basis of the test-buy operation, they
were able to secure a search warrant from the RTC of
Aklan.
A Receipt for Property Seized was prepared by SPO1
Nathaniel A. Tan, but petitioners refused to sign the
same. Thereafter, petitioners were placed under
arrest. The assistant prosecutor of Kalibo filed an
Information charging the petitioners. The petitioners
filed a Motion to Quash the Information before the
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RTC of Kalibo but the RTC denied the motion and
remanded the case to the provincial prosecutor for
preliminary investigation. The prosecutor upheld the
Information and directed the return of the records to
the RTC for disposition. Petitioners filed a petition for
review before the DOJ. The Sec. of Justice favored
the petitioner on the belief that the evidences seized
were planted. The secretary, in a Resolution, directed
the prosecutor to withdraw the Information before the
RTC. RTC then granted the Motion to Withdraw
Information by the prosecutor.
OSG filed to the CA a petition for certiorari seeking to
annul the Resolution of the DOJ. The CA found
probable cause to sustain the petitioners’ indictment
and reinstated the Information against the petitioners.
CA nullified and set aside the DOJ Resolution and the
Order of the RTC.
Is the petition for review before the Court of Appeals
assailing the RTC Order is fatally defective because:
a) it was filed out of time; b) it substituted a lost
appeal; and, c) it was not preceded by a timely motion
for reconsideration.
ANSWER:
First, petitioners point out that the motion for
extension of time filed by respondent prior to the filing
of the petition for review before the Court of Appeals
is patently defective, because, while the motion for
extension did not implead the RTC Judge of Kalibo,
the latter was made a respondent in the petition for
review. Since the RTC Judge was not furnished a
copy of the motion for extension, said motion became
a mere scrap of paper which did not toll the running of
the period to file the petition for review. Hence, the
petition for review was filed out of time.
It is not necessary that the contents of a motion for
extension should be similar to a petition for certiorari.
When the OSG in his motion for extension failed to
implead the trial court judge, much less assail his
Order, said omission should not limit the pitch and
reach of the petition. Otherwise, the prayer for more
time would be pointless. It is sufficient that the motion
for extension state the material dates, as the Motion
of the OSG did, showing the timeliness of its filing.
The grant of the Motion for Extension occasioned the
timeliness of the review of both the DOJ Resolutions
and the RTC Order.
117
 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY v. OLAIREZ
A group of graduating students from St. Louis
University (SLU) College of Medicine filed their
complaint for mandatory injunction with damages and
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order
before the RTC against Dean Edacanay, challenging
the implementation of the revised version of COWE
as a prerequisite for graduation from SLU’s medicine
course.
The revised COWE was allegedly contrary to SLU’s
handbook and would arbitrarily delay their graduation.
RTC granted te writ and held that COWE was indeed
moot and academic on the ground that SLU had
already allowed the group to attend the graduation
rites, and the CHED had already issued a certification
that the group of students had completed all
requirements notwithstanding grant of autonomy. SLU
filed a petition for certiorari, but was denied by the CA,
and then moved for reconsideration, but was denied
again. Unsatisfied, SLU appealed the order of the
RTC finding it guilty of indirect contempt before the
CA, and its instant appeal wasa then granted. The
group of students moved for reconsideration, but was
denied. Thus, the group filed a petition for review on
certiorari.
Whether or not the SLU may file a petition for
certiorari without a prior motion for reconsideration?
ANSWER:
No. The general rule is that a motion for
reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the
filing of a petition for certiorari. Its purpose is to grant
an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or
perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination
of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. It is
not, however an ironclad rule. There are recognized
exceptions. Ynder the circumstances, SLU’s
explanation constitute o sufficient ground for the
application of the exception to the rule, and in the
same, petitioners may not arrogate to themselves the
determination of whether a motion for reconsideration
is necessary or not. For it is equally settled that
except for the most pursuasive of reasons, strict
compliance is enjoined to facilitate the orderly
administration of justice.
PASCUAL V. DAQUIOAG
X seeks the review and reversal of the decision
promulgated on January 30, 2004, whereby the Court
of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment rendered on
November 7, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Laoag City dismissing the petition for certiorari filed
by petitioner in Special Civil Action Case No. 12150-
13 to assail the writ of execution and the execution
proceedings in a land dispute decided by the
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Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).
Did the CA err in sustaining the decision of the RTC to
dismiss the petition for certiorari?
ANSWER:
No. A special civil action for certiorari is the proper
action to bring when a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. The exercise of judicial function consists in the
power to determine what the law is and what the legal
rights of the parties are, and then to adjudicate upon
the rights of the parties. The term quasi-judicial
function applies to the action and discretion of public
administrative officers or bodies that are required to
investigate facts or to ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a
basis for their official action and to exercise discretion
of a judicial nature.
In this case, the issuance by Y of the assailed
memorandum implementing the writ of execution did
not derive from the performance of a judicial or quasi-
judicial function. He was not thereby called upon to
adjudicate the rights of the contending parties or to
exercise any discretion of a judicial nature, but only
performing an administrative duty of enforcing and
implementing the writ.
TENAZAS v. R. VILLEGAS TAXI TRANSPORT
X filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision dated
March 11, 2010 and Resolution dated June 28, 2010
of the Court of Appeals ,which affirmed with
modification the Decision dated June 23, 2009 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Discuss Rule 45 & 65 in labor cases?
ANSWER:
Rule 45- SC:
"Well-settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of this
Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to
reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the
factual findings complained of are completely devoid
of support from the evidence on record, or the
assailed judgment is based on a gross
misapprehension of facts." The Court finds that none
of the mentioned circumstances is present in this case.
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 Rule 65- CA:
Judicial review of decisions of the NLRC via petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, as a general rule, is
confined only to issues of lack or excess of jurisdiction
and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.
The CA does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of
evidence upon which the LA and the NLRC based
their conclusions. The issue is limited to the
determination of whether or not the NLRC acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion in rendering the resolution, except
if the findings of the NLRC are not supported by
substantial evidence.
PEOPLE v. ESPINOSA
X filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the April 10, 2002
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (SBN) in Criminal
Case Nos. 26422-26428. The anti-graft court
dismissed the criminal cases against Respondent Y
on the ground of double jeopardy as follows:
That being the case, the Court is constrained to
concur with the accused that jeopardy has set in and
that he is now at peril of punishment twice for the
same offense in violation of the protection afforded by
Sec. 21, Art. III of the Constitution.
Is Rule 65 the correct remedy?
ANSWER:
No. X should have filed a motion for reconsideration
before the SBN. The extraordinary remedy of
certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
Here, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy
expressly provided by law is a motion for
reconsideration to be filed within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation or notice of the final order or judgment.
The purpose of the motion is to afford public
respondent an opportunity to correct any actual or
fancied error attributed to it by way of a re-
examination of the legal and factual aspects of the
case.
The proper remedy is appeal under Rule 45,
not certiorari under Rule 65. Section 7 of Presidential
Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No.
8249, provides that decisions and final orders of the
Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme
Court by [a] petition for review on certiorari raising
pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, likewise provides that a judgment or final order
or resolution of the Sandiganbayan may be appealed
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to the Supreme Court via a verified petition for review
on certiorari.
In the case at bar, the remedy of appeal was available
to petitioner. For unexplained reasons, it chose not to
pursue this recourse. Neither has it cited grounds to
exempt the Petition from the stringent rule forbidding
a substitution of remedies. Verily, its cavalier
disregard of procedural requirements, especially its
erroneous choice of remedy, is indeed enough reason
to throw out this Petition summarily.
REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN
The Republic, through the PCGG, commenced a
complaint for “reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages against X. Pre-trial
commenced and the temporary markings of Exhibits
“A” to “LLL” of the Republic, together with their sub-
markings, were adopted. However, over the
objections of the respondent X, the PCGG produced
and caused the pre-marking of additional documents,
Exhibits “MMM” to “AAAAAAA.” X filed a Motion under
Rule 29 of the Rules of Court,” claiming that the
additional documents were never produced at the
discovery proceedings and praying that petitioner be
sanctioned for contempt. Republic filed its formal offer
of evidence nd the Sandiganbayan initially excluded
the said documents but later partly relented and
admitted Exhibits “MMM” to “AAAAAA.”
Should Evidence not produced at the discovery
proceedings be admitted?
ANSWER:
No. It is the purpose and policy of the aw that parties,
before the trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial,
should discover or inform themselves of all the facts
relevant to the action, not only those known to them
individually, but also those known to adversaries as
set forth in Rules 24 to 29.
The general rule is that secondary evidence is still not
admissible until the non—production of the primary
evidence has been sufficiently accounted for. Nothing
on record shows, and petitioner itslef makes no claim,
that the Exhibits fall under any of the exceptions to the
Best Evidence Rule. After failing to submit the
documentary evidence during discovery, when it was
clearly ordered by both the Sandiganbayan and the
Supreme Court to do so, petitioner also repeatedly
failed to prove the due execution and authenticity of
the documents.
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 MENDEZ v. PEOPLE
BIR filed a complaint-affidavit with the DOJ against X.
The BIR alleged that the petitioner had been
operating as a single proprietor doing business and/or
exercising his profession for taxable years 2001 to
2003. BIR alleged that petitioner failed to file his
income tax returns for taxable years 2001 to 2003 and,
consequently evaded his obligation to pay the correct
amount of taxes due to the government.
X was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The
prosecution filed a Motion to Amend Information with
Leave of Court. The petitioner failed to file his
comment to the motion within the required period, the
CTA granted the prosecution’s motion. The CTA ruled
that the prosecution’s amendment is merely formal
one as it “merely states additional precision
something already contained in the original
information.” Petitioner filed petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65.
Is the remedy of Certiorai proper?
ANSWER:
YES. X correctly availed of the remedy of certiorai.
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, certiorai is
available when there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. After failing in his bid for the CTA to reconsider
its admission of the amended information, the only
remedy left to the petitioner is to file a petition for
certiorari.
A judgment or order is considered final if it disposes of
the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a
particular stage of the same action; in such case, the
remedy available to an aggrieved party is appeal. If
the order or resolution, however, merely resolves
incidental matters and leaves something more to be
done to resolve the merits of the case, as in the
present case, the order is interlocutory and the
aggrieved party's only remedy after failing to obtain a
reconsideration of the ruling is a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.
Nonetheless, while we rule that X availed of the
correct remedy, we resolve to dismiss the petition for
failure to establish that the CTA abused its discretion,
much less gravely abused its discretion.
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO et al v. BENIGNO
SIMEON C. AQUINO III
Sen. X delivered a privilege speech in the Senate of
the Philippines to reveal that some Senators,
including himself, had been allotted an additional ₱50
Million each as "incentive" for voting in favor of the
impeachment of Chief Justice C. Meanwhile,
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Secretary Y of the DBM issued a public statement that
Releases to Senators Part of Spending Acceleration
Program,1 explaining that the funds released to the
Senators had been part of the DAP (Disbursement
Acceleration Program), a program designed by the
DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate economic
expansion.
X brought to the Court’ attention the constitutionality
and validity of the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP) and National Budget Circular (NBC)
No. 541, (Adoption of Operational Efficiency
Measure – Withdrawal of Agencies’ Unobligated
Allotments as of June 30, 2012), alleging that NBC No.
541, which was issued to implement the DAP,
directed the withdrawal of unobligated allotments. X
filed an action under rule 65 certiorari and prohibition
to assail the validity of DAP.
The respondents argue that it is the application of the
DAP to actual situations that the petitioners can
question either in the trial courts or in the COA; that if
the petitioners are dissatisfied with the ruling either of
the trial courts or of the COA, they can appeal the
decision of the trial courts by petition for review on
certiorari, or assail the decision or final order of the
COA by special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64
of the Rules of Court.
Is certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to
assail the constitutionality and validity of the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), National
Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and all other
executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP?
ANSWER:
Yes, The petitions under Rule 65 are proper remedies.
All the petitions are filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, and include applications for the issuance of
writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction or temporary
restraining orders.
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. “When any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.”
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition.”When the proceedings
of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
120
 amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the
action or matter specified therein, or otherwise
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.”
The present Rules of Court uses two special civil
actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
These are the special civil actions for certiorari and
prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. A
similar remedy of certiorari exists under Rule 64, but
the remedy is expressly applicable only to the
judgments and final orders or resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on
Audit.
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of
certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in
scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or
prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal,
corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right,
undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any
branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if
the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. This application is expressly
authorized by the text of the second paragraph of
Section 1, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues
and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of
legislative and executive officials.
Hence, the petition for certiorari and mandamus are
proper remedies.
ANGEL G. NAVAL v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and NELSON B. JULIA
From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, X had been
elected and had served as a member of the
Sanggunian, 2nd District, Province of C. President B
approved Republic Act No. 9716, which reapportioned
the legislative districts in Province of C. Notably, 8 out
of 10 towns were taken from the old 2nd District to
form the present 3rd District. In the 2010 elections, X
once again won as among the members of the
Sanggunian, 3rd District. He served until 2013. In the
2013 elections, X ran anew and was re-elected as
Member of the Sanggunian, Third District. Y a
sanggunian member candidate from the third district
filed a petition to cancel the COC of X invoking 3-term
limit rule.
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COMELEC Second Division cancelled X’s COC. The
COMELEC en banc denied X’s Motion for
Reconsideration .
In support of the instant petition, X alleges that the 1st ,
2nd and 3rd Legislative Districts of Province of C are
not merely renamed but are composed of new sets of
municipalities and the voters from the Third
Legislative District are no longer the same ones as
those who had elected him to office in the 2004 and
2007 elections. In lieu of the denial of his petition by
the COMELEC he filed a Petition for Certiorari with an
Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court to assail the
resolutions of the COMELEC.
Did the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in denying the petition of X?
ANSWER:
No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.
When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
In one case, the Supreme Court ruled that a petition
for certiorari against actions of the COMELEC is
confined only to instances of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial
of due process, because the COMELEC is presumed
to be most competent in matters falling within its
domain. In a special civil action for certiorari, the
burden rests on the petitioner to prove not merely
reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of the public respondent issuing the impugned order,
decision or resolution."Grave abuse of discretion
arises when a court or tribunal violates the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence."
In the case at bar, the Court finds the COMELEC’s
disquisitions to be amply supported by the
Constitution, law and jurisprudence.
Hence, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
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 SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A
party desiring to appeal by certiorarifrom a judgment,
ABOITIZ EQUITY VENTURES, INC. v. VICTOR S. final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the
CHIONGBIAN, BENJAMIN D. GOTHONG, and Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever
CARLOS A. GOTHONG LINES, INC.(CAGLI) authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a
verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition
may include an application for a writ of preliminary
ABC Shipping Corporation principally owned by A
injunction or other provisional remedies and shall
family, BCD Lines, Inc. principally owned by the G
raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly
family, and HIJ Lines, Inc. principally owned by C
set forth. The petitioner may seek the same
family, entered into an agreement whereby ABC and
provisional remedies by verified motion filed inthe
BCD would transfer their shipping assets to HIJ in
same action or proceeding at any time during its
exchange for it’s shares of stocks. HIJ , in turn, would
pendency.
run their merged shipping businesses and, henceforth,
be known as H, A & B, Inc. The Agreement required
In the case at bar, Petition for review on certiorari
all disputes arising out of or in connection with the
under Rule 45 is a mode of appeal. The proper
Agreement to be settled by arbitration.
remedy is to file a petition for certiorari under rule 65
because an order denying a motion to dismiss is
Subject to the agreement, the Inventories to be
interlocutory in character.
acquired shall be determined not later than thirty (30)
days after the Closing Date and the payments shall be
Hence, it may not be the subject of an appeal. it is
made in equal quarterly instalments over a period of
elementary that anappeal may only be taken from a
two years with the first payment due inventories were
judgment or final order that completely disposes of the
transferred from BCD to HIJ as there was still a
case. An order denying a motion to dismiss is an
balance, BCD sent H, A & B (the renamed HIJ)
interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally
demand letters "for the return of or the payment for
disposes of a case, as it leaves something to be done
the excess inventories.
by the court before the case is finally decided on the
merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a
C and G families decided to leave the H, A & B
motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special
enterprise and sell their interest thereto to the AEV
civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to
family. As such, a share purchase agreement was
correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
entered into by petitioner AEV and the respective
judgment. Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss
shareholders groups of C and G’s family.
be the subject of an appeal unless and until a final
judgment or order is rendered.
AEV alleged that BCD resumed making demands
despite having already received excess inventories.
Therefore, the proper action is rule 65 not rule 45.
BCD filed the first of two applications for arbitration
against respondent C , HA&B , ABC, and AEV before
the Cebu RTC Branch 20. AEV filed a motion to
dismiss and asserted that AEV was not party to the JAY CANDELARIA and ERIC BASIT v. REGIONAL
agreement between ABC, BCD and HIJ. RTC TRIAL COURT
favoured AEV’s assertions.
During an alleged buy-bust operation A and B were
BCD filed a second application for arbitration in RTC
arrested at the corner of G avenue for delivering, with
Branch 10 during the pendency of the first case. AEV
the intention to sell, five cases of counterfeit Fundador
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of litis
Brandy. They were charged in violation of the
pendentia however RTC Branch 10 denied the motion
Intellectual Property Code. They pleaded guilty to the
to dismiss because first complaint was no longer
charged but they filed a motion to Exclude evidence
pending at the time of the filing of the second
based on its inadmissibility, alleging that were
complaint. Aggrieved AEV filed a petition for review
obtained in violation of their constitutional right against
on certiorari with an application for the issuance of a
unreasonable searches and seizures.
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
However the RTC denied their motion since it appears
from the said affidavit that the search and seizure was
Is the petition for certiorari under rule 45 a proper
incidental to a valid warrantless arrest of the accused
action?
who were caught in flagrante delicto, any evidence
obtained during such search and seizure is admissible
ANSWER:
in evidence. X and Y filed a Petition for Certiorari with
Application for Preliminary Injunction 1 filed under
No, the petition for certiorari under rule 45 is not a
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
proper action.

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SCHOOL OF LAW 122
 Is the petition bereft of merit?
ANSWER:
Yes, petition bereft of merit.
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.
When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
In the case at bar, It is to be stressed that in every
special civil action under Rule 65, a party seeking the
writ whether for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus,
must be able to show that his or her resort to such
extraordinary remedy is justified by the absence of an
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. "[H]e must allege in his
petition and establish facts to show that any other
existing remedy is not speedy or adequate.
Therefore, the instant Petition for Certiorari is
dismissible for failure to allege that there is no appeal,
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law as to justify resort to certiorari.
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR. v. RICARDO S.
SILVERIO, JR
X died without leaving a will and she was survived by
her legal heirs: her husband, sons and daughters.
Subsequently, an intestate proceeding for the
settlement of her estate was filed by Y Sr. the
husband of X. In the course of the proceedings, the
parties filed different petitions and appeal challenging
several orders of the intestate court that went all the
way up to the Supreme Court.
Y Jr. One of the sons of X assails the Order of the
intestate court to the estate of the late X. The
administrator first appointed by the Court was Y Jr.
but by virtue of a Joint Manifestation filed by the heirs
of X a motion to withdraw as administrator was
approved by the intestate court and in his stead, Y Sr.
was appointed as the new administrator.
The intestate court in its Omnibus Order ordered
among others, the sale of certain properties belonging
to the estate. Y Jr. executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
in favor of ABC HOLDINGS located in M city and later
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became the registered owner thereof. A Deed of
Absolute Sale was likewise executed in favor of M
located in C park in M city and TCT was further issued
then later M sold the property to DEF resources Inc.
Y Sr. filed an Urgent Application for the Issuance of
TRO/PI preventing Y Jr., M, ABC Holdings Inc. and
their successors-in-interest from committing any act
that would affect the titles to the three properties.
Y Sr. filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion to declare the
sale Null and void cancel the respective TCT and
reinstate it in the name of Y Sr. and the intestate of
the late X. The Intestate Court issued an Order
granting a TRO and declared that the sale is null and
void.
Y Jr., ABC holdings and M filed a petition for certiorari
alleging that the intestate court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in declaring the sale null and void.
Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion?
ANSWER:
Yes, RTC committed grave abuse of discretion.
In one case, The Supreme court held that the
preliminary injunction issued by the intestate court
was issued with grave abuse of discretion as it was
directed against acts which were already fait accompli.
In the case at bar, The records show that when the
preliminary injunctionwas issued new titles over the
disputed properties were already issued to ABC
holdings and DEF resources Inc. Respondent M, ABC
Holdings and EFG Resources should not be
prejudiced by the flip-flopping appointment of
Administrator by the intestate court, having relied in
good faith that the sale was authorized and with prior
approval of the intestate court under its Omnibus
Order which remained valid and subsisting insofar as
it allowed the aforesaid sale.
Therefore, the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in declaring the sale null and void.
KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP, INC. v.
JESSIE ROBREDO, G.R. No. 200903, July 22, 2014
Q: X Kalipunan were occupying parcels of land owned
by and located in the cities of San Juan, Navotas, and
Quezon. The Local Government Units of each cities
sent the X Kalipunan notices of eviction and
demolition pursuant to Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA
7279 to give way to the implementation and
construction of infrastructure projects in the areas
illegally occupied by them. The law authorizes
evictions and demotions without any court order. X
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 Kalipunan directly filed a petition for prohibition and
mandamus before the Court, seeking to compel the
Secretary of Interior and Local Government to first
secure an eviction and/or demolition order from court
prior. X Kalipunan further justified their direct recourse
by averring that they have no plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Was
the action of X Kalipunan correct?
A: The action of X Kalipunan was incorrect. A writ of
prohibition only lies against the tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person's exercise of judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions. The Court issue a writ
of prohibition to afford the aggrieved party a relief
against the respondent's usurpation or grave abuse of
jurisdiction or power. A petition for mandamus is
merely directed against the tribunal, corporation,
board, officer, or person who unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station or who
unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled. Thus, a writ of mandamus will only issue to
compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty. It will
not control a public officer's exercise of discretion as
where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise
his judgment in reference to any manner in which he
is required to act precisely because it is his judgment
that is to be exercised, not that of the court.
ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORPORATION v.
METROPOLITAN AND TRUST COMPANY
X Trust Company filed a case for sum of money
against Y Management Corporation. When the
counsels of the parties were asked by the trial court to
produce their respective authorizations to appear at
the said hearing, counsel for X Trust Company
manifested that her authority to appear for the
company was submitted by them at the first pre-trial
hearing. However, the counsel failed to show any
written authority even though she was given the
chance to go over the records. As a result, the trial
court, upon motion, declared X Holdings Corporation
in default. X Trust Company filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA alleging that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Order. The
CA reversed the trial court’s ruling. Was the filing of
petition for certiorari correct?
ANSWER:
Yes, a petition for certiorari may be filed if the trial
court declared the defendant in default with grave
abuse of discretion. However, an act of a court or
tribunal can only be considered to be tainted with
grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The court a quo did
not commit such grave abuse of discretion in the case
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
at bar. Consistently with the mandatory character of
the pre-trial, the Rules oblige not only the lawyers but
the parties as well to appear for this purpose before
the Court, and when a party "fails to appear at a pre-
trial conference (he) may be non-suited or considered
as indefault."
VILLAROSA v. FESTIN
V and F were two of the four rival candidates for a
mayoralty post. F was proclaimed as the victor. With
difference of only 1204 votes, V filed a petition
alleging irregularities attending the conduct of the
elections. A physical recount of the ballots were
counted and the RTC rendered a decision declaring
the proclamation of F as void. F elevated the case to
COMELEC via petition for certiorari with prayer for
injunctive relief. A motion to dismiss was filed by V.
Without yet ruling on the motion to dismiss,
COMELEC issued a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) to enjoin RTC from implementing its decisions.
Resolve.
ANSWER:
Certiorari will not generally lie against an order, ruling,
or decision of a COMELEC division for being
premature, taking into account the availability of the
plain, speedy and adequate remedy of a motion for
reconsideration. Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that there be
no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. A motion for
reconsideration is a plain and adequate remedy
provided by law. Failure to abide by this procedural
requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the
petition. In like manner, a decision, order or resolution
of a division of the Comelec must be reviewed by the
COMELEC en banc via a motion for reconsideration
before the final en banc decision may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite
filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory.
OSG SHIPMANAGEMENT MANILA, INC. v.
PELLAZAR
P, an oiler in the vessel M/T Delphina, was deployed
to M/T Delphina and while he was on duty, his right
hand was injured after it was struck by a solid iron
pipe. He was then certified by the physicians that he
was “permanently unfit for any sea duty”. P filed a
complaint for permanent total disability benefits and
damages against the X Shipmanagement Manila, Inc.
in the NLRC. The NLRC gave more weight to X
Shipmanagement Manila. P moved for
reconsideration but the NLRC denied the motion,
prompting him to seek relief from the CA through a
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 petition for certiorari. The CA granted the petition. The
petitioner seeks the reversal of CA’s decision.
In a Rule 45 petition for review of the CA decision,
which was rendered under a Rule 65 proceeding,
what the Court determines is the legal correctness of
the CA decision, i.e., whether the CA correctly
determined the presence or absence of grave abuse
of discretion in the NLRC decision brought before it -
not whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the
case was correct. In ruling for legal correctness, the
Court views the CA decision in the same context that
the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented
to it.
From the substantive point of view, the CA may not go
beyond the determination of whether the NLRC’s
decision is tainted with grave abuse of discretion
because the ruling that is brought before it is already
a final and executory ruling of the NLRC, there being
no appeal provided for under the law. Accordingly, the
Court generally accords respect to the NLRC’s factual
findings and its conclusions from these findings since
the absence of an appeal from the NLRC’s ruling is a
statutory recognition of the labor tribunals’ expertise
on the field of labor standards, labor relations and
allied legislation.
The substantive justification goes hand in hand with
the procedural justification. From the procedural point
of view, the CA has a limited scope in reviewing the
NLRC decision because of the intrinsic limitation of
the sole available remedy itself. A writ of certiorari is a
remedy that lies only to correct acts rendered without
jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion - and not mere errors of judgment.
For emphasis therefore, when a petition for certiorari
is filed, the judicial inquiry should be limited to the
issue of whether the NLRC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction20 - and not whether the NLRC ruling is
intrinsically correct or not.21cralawred
Given this framework, the Court finds that the CA
legally erred in its determination of the presence or
absence of grave abuse of discretion.
ARAULLO v. AQUINO III
Sen. JE delivered a privilege speech in the Senate
revealing that some Senators, including himself, had
been allotted an additional P50 Million each as
incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of CJ
Renato C. Corona. Sec. Abad of the DBM replied that
the funds released to the Senators had been part of
The Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) which
is a program to ramp up spending to accelerate
economic expansion. The revelation prompted X,
Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansa Makabayan, and
several other concerned citizens to file various
petitions of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
the SC questioning the validity and constitutionality of
the DAP. Y submits that there is no actual controversy
that is ripe for adjudication in the absence of adverse
claims between the parties; that the petitioners lacked
legal standing to sue because no allegations were
made to the effect that they had suffered any injury as
a result of the adoption of the DAP; that their being
taxpayers did not immediately confer upon the
petitioners the legal standing to sue considering that
the adoption and implementation of the DAP were not
in the exercise of the taxing or spending power of
Congress; and that even if the petitioners had
suffered injury, there were plain, speedy and
adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law
available to them, like assailing the regularity of the
DAP and related issuances before the Commission on
Audit (COA) or in the trial courts. Y further contend
that there is no authorized proceeding under the
Constitution and the Rules of Court for questioning
the validity of any law unless there is an actual case
or controversy the resolution of which requires the
determination of the constitutional question; that the
jurisdiction of the Court is largely appellate; that for a
court of law to pass upon the constitutionality of a law
or any act of the Government when there is no case
or controversy is for that court to set itself up as a
reviewer of the acts of Congress and of the President
in violation of the principle of separation of powers;
and that, in the absence of a pending case or
controversy involving the DAP. Y finally avers that the
special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus are not the proper remedies to assail the
constitutionality and validity of the DAP. Is Y correct?
ANSWER:
No, the petitions under Rule 65 are proper remedies.
The Constitution states that judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice not only "to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable" but also "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." It has thereby expanded the concept of
judicial power, which up to then was confined to its
traditional ambit of settling actual controversies
involving rights that were legally demandable and
enforceable.
The present Rules of Court uses two special civil
actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
These are the special civil actions for certiorari and
prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. A
similar remedy of certiorari exists under Rule 64, but
the remedy is expressly applicable only to the
judgments and final orders or resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on
Audit.
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 The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction
of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the
commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of
discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the
writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which
means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power
was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the
respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive
duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined
or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such
judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical
manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want
or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be
distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it is a
corrective remedy used for the re-examination of
some action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to
the cause or proceeding in the lower court and not to
the court itself, while prohibition is a preventative
remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is
directed to the court itself.
The Court expounded on the nature and function of
the writ of prohibition in Holy Spirit Homeowners
Association, Inc. v. Defensor:
A petition for prohibition is also not the
proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the
exercise of a quasi-legislative function.
Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed
against any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions,
ordering said entity or person to desist from
further proceedings when said proceedings
are without or in excess of said entity’s or
person’s jurisdiction, or are accompanied
with grave abuse of discretion, and there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Prohibition lies against judicial or
ministerial functions, but not against
legislative or quasi-legislative functions.
Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition
is to keep a lower court within the limits of its
jurisdiction in order to maintain the
administration of justice in orderly channels.
Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford
relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or
power by an inferior court, or when, in the
exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters
clearly within its cognizance the inferior court
transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by
the law, or where there is no adequate
remedy available in the ordinary course of
law by which such relief can be obtained.
Where the principal relief sought is to
invalidate an IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an
ordinary action for its nullification, an action
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
which properly falls under the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court. In any case,
petitioners’ allegation that "respondents are
performing or threatening to perform
functions without or in excess of their
jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined
by the trial court through a writ of injunction
or a temporary restraining order.
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of
certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in
scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or
prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal,
corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right,
undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any
branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if
the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. This application is expressly
authorized by the text of the second paragraph of
Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues
and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of
legislative and executive officials
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ATLANTA
INDUSTRIES, INC.
Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) and
International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) entered into a Loan Agreement
for a local development and investment project. Land
Bank entered into a subsidiary loan agreement with
City Government of Iligan to finance the project. Iligan
government conducted a public bidding and Atlanta
Industries, Inc. (Atlanta) participated and came up
with the second to the lowest bid. Atlanta was
disqualified by the committee. Atlanta filed a petition
for prohibition and mandamus to enjoin the rebidding
of the project against the City Government of Iligan,
the Bidding Committee, and Land Bank. The RTC
declared the subject bidding null and void on the
ground that it was done contrary to the rules and
procedures prescribed in the law. Was the petition for
prohibition proper?
ANSWER:
No, the petition was not proper. Land Bank asserts
that the Petition for Prohibition was improperly filed
before the Manila RTC considering that the acts
sought to be enjoined, i.e., the public bidding for the
supply of water pipes, are beyond the said court's
territorial jurisdiction. Atlanta, for its part, counter-
argues that the acts of Land Bank are as much to be
enjoined for causing the City Government of Iligan
126
 and its BAC to continuously violate the provisions of
RA 9184, its IRR, and the PBDs in the conduct of the
public bidding and that the filing of the prohibition
case in the City of Manila was in accordance with the
rules on venue given that Land Bank's main office is
in the City of Manila. The Court finds for Land Bank.
If the petition involves an act or an omission
of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise
provided by law or these rules, the petition
shall be filed with and be cognizable only by
the Court of Appeals.

A petition for prohibition is a special civil action that CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE
seeks for a judgment ordering the respondent to
desist from continuing with the commission of an act PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES' UNION (CAAP-EU)
perceived to be illegal. Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules FORMERLY AIR TRANSPORTATION EMPLOYEES'
of Court (Rules) reads:
UNION (ATEU), v. CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF
Sec. 2. Petition for Prohibition. - When the THE PHILIPPINES (CAAP
proceedings of any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions,
A filed an Original Petition for Prohibition directly
are without or in excess of its or his
before this Court. Said petition was subsequently
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amended on November 25, 2009. A asserts that such
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
grave abuse of discretion was shown by the
and there is no appeal or any other plain,
issuances of Authority Orders and Memoranda by B
speedy, and adequate remedy in the
which resulted in the classification and treatment of
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
the incumbent personnel of the Air Transportation
thereby may file a verified petition in the
Office (ATO), now of CAAP, into "hold-over" status,
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
thus violating the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
and praying that judgment be rendered
949712 otherwise known as the Civil Aviation
commanding the respondent to desist from
Authority Act of 2008 and the security of tenure of
further proceedings in the action or matter
government employees guaranteed by the 1987
specified therein, or otherwise granting such
Constitution and R.A. No. 6656.
incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.
Was there grave abuse of discretion when Section 60
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
of the IRR provided a "hold-over" status for ATO
employees, which was not expressly provided for
While the Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial
under R.A. No. 9497.
Court have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, if what
ANSWER:
is assailed relates to "acts or omissions of a lower
court or of a corporation, board, officer or person," the
No. Under Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition
petition must be filed "in the Regional Trial Court
will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as
manifested. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it
defined by the Court." Section 4 of the same Rules
must be grave.
provides that:
The term grave abuse of discretion is defined as a
Sec. 4. When and Where to file the petition. -
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so
The petition shall be filed not later than sixty
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
(60) days from notice of the judgment, order
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
or resolution. In case a motion for
enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed,
an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion
whether such motion is required or not, the
or hostility.
petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days counted from the notice of the denial of
In the case at bar, a careful perusal of Section 86 of
the motion.
R.A. No. 9497 reveals that the transfer of ATO
personnel, unless they opted to retire from the service,
If the petition relates to an act or an omission
to the CAAP implies the application of the hold-over
of a municipal trial court or of a corporation,
principle. There being no express, much less implied
a board, an officer or a person, it shall be
prohibition of the application of the hold-over principle
filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising
in R.A. No. 9497 per se, such proviso in the latter’s
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined
IRR does not amount to grave abuse of discretion.
by the Supreme Court. H may also be filed
with the Court of Appeals or with the
Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same
is .in aid of the court's appellate jurisdiction.

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 STAR SPECIAL WATCHMAN AND DETECTIVE
AGENCY, INC. v. PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, G.R.
No. 181792, April 21, 2014
A argues that the remedy of mandamus is proper to
compel B to comply with the November 18, 2003
decision of the RTC–Br. 223 which ordered B to pay A
the sums of money stated therein. Considering that
the said decision already became final, B had the
legal duty to comply with the same and pay A the
judgment debt stated therein as the compliance and
payment of a judgment debt are mere ministerial
duties on the part of B. On the other hand, B argues
that despite finality, the requirements provided for in
P.D. No. 1445 have to be complied with before any
government funds or property may be seized under
writs of execution and that only funds and property
owned by the government in its proprietary capacity
can be subjected to execution.
Should the petition for mandamus be granted?
ANSWER:
No. Under Rule 65, Section 3, there should be no
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law other than the remedy of mandamus
being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be
issued only in cases where the usual modes of
procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to
afford relief. In the case at bar, considering that the
COA still retained its primary jurisdiction to adjudicate
money claim, petitioners should have filed a petition
for certiorari with this Court pursuant to Section 50 of
P.D. No. 1445.
Hence, the COA’s refusal to act did not leave the
petitioners without any remedy at all. Thus, the
petition for mandamus should be denied.
KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP, INC. v.
JESSIE ROBREDO
A was occupying parcels of land owned by and
located in the cities of San Juan, Navotas and
Quezon (collectively, B). B sent A notices of eviction
and demolition pursuant to Section 28 (a) and (b) of
RA 7279 in order to give way to the implementation
and construction of infrastructure projects in the areas
illegally occupied by A. A directly filed a petition for
prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme Court,
seeking to compel B to first secure an eviction and/or
demolition order from the court prior to their
implementation of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279.
A seeks to prohibit B from implementing Section 28 (a)
and (b) of RA 7279 without a prior court order of
eviction and/or demolition. In relation to this,
paragraph 1, Section 28 of RA 7279 provides:
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Sec. 28. Eviction and Demolition. — Eviction or
demolition as a practice shall be discouraged. Eviction
or demolition, however, may be allowed under the
following situations:
(a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas
such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps,
riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public
places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and
playgrounds;
(b) When government infrastructure projects with
available funding are about to be implemented; or
(c) When there is a court order for eviction and
demolition.
Should the petition be granted?
ANSWER:
No. Under Section 3 of Rule 65, a petition for
mandamus is merely directed against the tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person who unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station or who unlawfully excludes another from the
use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled. In the cast at bar, a reading of
paragraph 1, Section 28 of RA 7279 clearly shows
that the acts complained of are beyond the scope of a
petition for prohibition and mandamus. The use of the
permissive word “may” implies that B have discretion
when their duty to execute evictions and/or
demolitions shall be performed.Consequently, the
time when B shall carry out evictions and/or
demolitions under Section 28 (a), (b), and (c) of RA
7279 is merely discretionary, and not ministerial,
judicial or quasi-judicial.
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA v. CHIEF JUSTICE
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
In its July 8, 2014 Resolution, the Court noted A’s
letter petition in view of the transmittal of the JBC list
of nominees to the Office of the President, "without
prejudice to any remedy available in law and the rules
that petitioner may still wish to pursue." Thus, A filed
the present petition for certiorari and mandamus
under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), seeking to
compel B to include him in the list of nominees for
Supreme Court Associate Justice, on the grounds that
B acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in excluding him, despite
having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify
for the position.
128
 For B, certiorari is only available against a tribunal, a
board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. The JBC, in its exercise of its mandate to
recommend appointees to the Judiciary, does not
exercise any of these functions.In the same vein, the
remedy of mandamus does not lie to compel a
discretionary act. For it to prosper, a petition for
mandamus must, among other things, show that the
petitioner has a clear legal right to the act demanded.
In A’s case, there is no legal right to be included in the
list of nominees for judicial vacancies. One’s inclusion
in the shortlist is strictly within the discretion of the
JBC.
Should the Court assume jurisdiction and give due
course to the subject petition for certiorari and
mandamus (with application for TRO)?
ANSWER:
The certiorari should be given due course but not the
mandamus.
Under Section 1 of Rule 65, a writ of certiorari is
directed against a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial function. However, pursuant to the expanded
judicial power of review, it has been judicially settled
that a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to
question the act of any branch or instrumentality of
the government on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
by any branch or instrumentality of the government,
even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions. In a case like this,
where constitutional bearings are too blatant to ignore,
the Court does not find passivity as an alternative.
The impasse must be overcome.
of certiorari can only be directed against a tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions and since the issuance of EO 10 was done
in the exercise of executive functions, and not of
judicial or quasi-judicial functions, certiorari will not lie.
Was the CA correct when it ruled that a mayor, an
officer from the executive department, exercises an
executive function whenever he issues an Executive
Order?
ANSWER:
No. Under Section 1 of Rule 65, the first requirement
for certiorari is satisfied if the officers act judicially in
making their decision, whatever may be their public
character. Furthermore, it is well-settled that it is the
nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the
office, board, or body which performs it, that
determines whether or not a particular act is a
discharge of judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Jurisprudence defines quasi-judicial function as a
term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of
public administrative officers or bodies required to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a
basis for their official action and to exercise discretion
of a judicial nature. In the case at bench, the assailed
EO 10 was issued upon B’s finding that Boracay West
Cove’s construction, expansion, and operation of its
hotel in Malay, Aklan is illegal. Such a finding of
illegality required B’s exercise of quasi-judicial
functions, against which the special writ
of certiorari may lie.

On the other hand, under Section 3 of Rule 65,

mandamus lies to compel the performance, when
refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the
performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will
not issue to control or review the exercise of
discretion of a public officer where the law imposes
upon said public officer the right and duty to exercise
his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is
required to act. There is no question that the JBC’s
duty to nominate is discretionary and it may not be
compelled to do something.

CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO v. MUNICIPALITY OF

MALAY, AKLAN

B, a mayor, issued and implemented Executive Order

No. 10, Series of 2011 (EO 10), ordering the
demolition of A’s hotel establishment. Alleging that the
order was issued and executed with grave abuse of
discretion, A filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer
for injunctive relief with the Court of Appeals. The CA
dismissed the petition, that the special writ

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 RULE 66: QUO WARRANTO
DE CASTRO v. CARLOS
X was appointed by President G as assistant general
manager for operations (AGMO) of the MMDA.
Subsequently, Y was appointed as OIC of the AGMO and
X’s name was removed from the MMDA payroll. The
latter demanded for reinstatement but Y was already
appointed by Pres. N as the new AGMO. It was found out
that the position for AGMO is career executive service
position in which X did not meet the requirement.
Thus, X filed a petition for the writ of quo warranto under
Rule 66 citing Section 2(3) of Article IX(B) of the
Constitution which guarantees security of tenure.
Was the filing of the writ proper
ANSWER:
No. Section 5, Rule 66 provides as to when an individual
may commence an action for quo warranto:
A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or
position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another may bring an action therefor in his own name.
In the case at bar, X does not have the eligibility for the
position of AGMO. Thus, his appointment was merely
temporary. Hence, he cannot file for the writ of quo
warranto since he is not entitled to the position of AGMO.
VILANDO v. HRET
A, as a taxpayer filed a petition for quo warranto on the
ground that B is not eligible for the office she was elected
and proclaimed since she is a Chinese citizen.
Was the petition for quo warranto proper?
ANSWER:.
No. Section 1, Rule 66 provides for the grounds as to
when it is said petition can be filed.
An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or
franchise may be commenced by a verified petition
brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully
holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by
the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture
of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the
Philippines without being legally incorporated or without
lawful authority so to act.
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In the case at bar, the ground for filing the petition for quo
warranto is against B’s citizenship which is not a ground
provided in Section 1. Moreover, a collateral attack of B’s
citizenship is also not allowed.
TOPACIO v. ONG
X implored the OSG to initiate post-haste a quo warranto
proceeding against Y in the latter’s capacity as an
incumbent Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan.
However, the OSG informed X that it “cannot favourably
act on his request for filing the quo warranto until the RTC
case shall have been terminated with finality.”
(SIDE NoTE: The case in the RTC was about the
citizenship of Ong which was still on going at the time X
requested the OSG to file a petition for quo warranto)
Did the OSG commit grave abuse of discretion in
deferring the filing of the petition for quo warranto?
ANSWER:
No. SEC. 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor
must commence action. ─ The Solicitor General or a
public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the
Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has
good reason to believe that any case specified in the
preceding section can be established by proof, must
commence such action.
SEC. 3. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor may
commence action with permission of court. ─ The
Solicitor General or a public prosecutor may, with the
permission of the court in which the action is to be
commenced, bring such an action at the request and
upon the relation of another person; but in such case the
officer bringing it may first require an indemnity for the
expenses and costs of the action in an amount approved
by and to be deposited in the court by the person at
whose request and upon whose relation the same is
brought.
Thus, in the exercise of sound discretion, the Solicitor
General may suspend or turn down the institution of an
action for quo warranto where there are just and valid
reasons.
In this case, the OSG saw the folly of re-litigating the
same issue of Ong’s citizenship in the quo warranto case
simultaneously with the RTC case, not to mention the
consequent risk of forum-shopping. Hence, it did not
commit grave abuse of discretion.
130
 MENDOZA v. ALLAS
X was the Director of the Customs Intelligence and
Investigation Service. He was temporarily designated as
Acting District Collector, while Y was temporarily
appointed to take X’s old position. Subsequently, X was
terminated, thus, he filed for petition for quo warranto
against Y which was granted. Y appealed, but it became
moot and academic since he was appointed to a higher
position. Hence, X filed for a motion for execution but was
denied since the position was vacated by Z. X alleged
that he should be reinstated since the appointment of Y
was null and void and the nullity extends to the
appointment of Z.
Was X’s contention tenable?
ANSWER:
No. Section 1, Rule 66 provides:
An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or
franchise may be commenced by a verified petition
brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully
holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by
the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture
of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the
Philippines without being legally incorporated or without
lawful authority so to act.
It is never directed to an officer as such, but always
against the person-- to determine whether he is
constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act
in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays
claim.
In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed
by petitioner solely against Y. Z was never part of the
case, hence, the decision cannot extend to him.
Therefore, X’s contention is untenable.
DAMASEN v. TUMAMAO
X a Vice Mayor from a town in Isabela died, opening a
vacancy in the Office of the VIce Mayor. Y the highest
ranking member of the Sanggunian Bayan was elevated
to such office thereby making another vacancy. Z a
member of the PDP Laban to which the same political
party that Y belongs was elevated to fill the vacancy in
the Sanggunian Bayan.However, Q also a member of
PDP Laban was also appointed as a member of the
Sanggunian Bayan.
During one of its sessions both Z and Q were present but
only Z was recognized and on the same Q filed a petition
for Quo Warranto on the same day seeking to be the right
ful member of the Sanggunian.RTC ruled in favor Q,
however it such was reversed on appeal before the CA.
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Q now contends Z was not properly appointed as
member of the Sanggunian and has no right to question
the case by way of an appeal, such that a separate
petition for Quo Warranto is the proper remedy.
Is the Contention of Q correct?
ANSWER:
No. Under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court under the
provision of Quo Warranto provides that,
Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. —
An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or
franchise may be commenced by a verified petition
brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully
holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise;
Q’s contention that Z should have filed a separate case of
quo warranto and not an appeal to the CA does not hold
water. The determination of who, between Damasen Q
and Z, is entitled to the contested position is the crux of
the controversy in the case at bar. Hence, a separate
action would only be tantamount to a multiplicity of suits,
which is abhorred by law.
CALLEJA v. PANDAY
R filed a case for Quo Warranto in the RTC of Camarines
against P alleging that he is a board member of St.
John’s Hospital but P also a board member of the said
hospital forcibly with the the aid of armed men usurped
the powers which is supposed to belong to R. RTC of
Camarines issued an order to RTC Naga to try the case
on the basis that the latter has jurisdiction but the RTC of
Naga refused, so the RTC of Camarines eventually tried
the case. P moves to dismiss the Quo Warranto Petition
on the following grounds
A) Section 1 (a) of the Rules of Court no longer contains
the phrase “or an office in a corpoation created by law”
hence intra-corporated diputes are no longer included as
an action against on such persons.
B) That RTC of Camarines had no jurisdiction to try the
case.
If you were the Associate Justice assigned as the
ponente of this case how would you rule on the 2
contentions?
ANSWER:
A) Yes, to the first contention
Under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court under the provision
of Quo Warranto provides that,
131
Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. —
An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or
franchise may be commenced by a verified petition
brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully
holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise;
Section 1(a) of Rule 66 of the present Rules no longer
contains the phrase "or an office in a corporation created
by authority of law" which was found in the old Rules.
Clearly, the present Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo
warranto against persons who usurp a public office,
position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office;
and associations which act as corporations without
being legally incorporated despite the passage of R.A. No.
8799. It is, therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure
Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No.
8799 (hereinafter the Interim Rules) which applies to the
petition for quo warranto filed by respondents before the
trial court since what is being questioned is the authority
of herein petitioners to assume the office and act as the
board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital,
Incorporated.
B) Yes, to the second contention
Under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court the provisions
governing Quo Warranto
Section 7. Venue. — An action under the preceding six
sections can be brought only in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondent
or any of the respondents resides, but when the Solicitor
General commences the action, it may be brought in a
Regional Trial Court in the City of Manila, in the Court of
Appeals, or in the Supreme Court. (8a).
In the case at bar, it obviously points out to an intra-
corporate dispute wherein only RTC courts assigned by
the Supreme Court pursuant to Administrative issuances
that RTC assigned as SEC Courts can have jurisdiction.
RTC of Camarines was not an RTC Court designated to
handle intra-corporate disputes.
MADRIGAL v. LECAROZ
In 1971, X, Y, Z, Governor, Vice-Governor, and Board
Member respectively in the province of Marinduque
passed a resolution abolishing the office of Q as
permanent construction capataz in the Office of the
Provincial Engineer. In 1972 Q filed a case before the
Civil Service Commission on the ground that his removal
from such office was illegal wherein the CSC ruled in his
favor. In 1975 Q requested the provincial goverment to
reinstate him in his former position but he was denied.
Thereafter, he went to the RTC and filed a petition for
Mandamus but was denied again on the ground that
under the provision in Quo Warranto the prescriptive
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period to file such petition is within 1 year after the cause
of the ouster. Q contends that no prescriptive period is
similarly found with respect to Mandamus.
Is Q Correct?
ANSWER:
No. Under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court Governing Quo
Warranto,
Section 11. Limitations. — Nothing contained in this Rule
shall be construed to authorize an action against a public
officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the
same be commenced within one (1) year after the cause
of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such
office or position, arose, nor to authorize an action for
damages in accordance with the provisions of the next
preceding section unless the same be commenced within
one (1) year after the entry of the judgment establishing
the petitioner's right to the office in question.
Further the Supreme Court ruled that, The unbending
jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is to the effect that a
petition for quo warranto and mandamus affecting titles to
public office must be filed within one (1) year from the
date the petitioner is ousted from his position.
PARDO DE TAVERA v. PHIL. TUBERCULOSIS
SOCIETY
In 1976, T filed a complaint for damages against PTS
alleging that she was the Executive Secretary of the
Society and that she was summarily removed from her
postion in 1973, the lawful cause of which she was not
informed. PTS argues that her removal was based on the
by-laws of the society and that the case should be
dismissed because the action had already prescbribed
alleging that the action is for Quo Warranto which should
be filed within 1 year after the cause of the ouster.
Is PTS correct that the action had already prescribed?
ANSWER:
No. Under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court governing the
provision of Quo Warranto,
Section 11. Limitations. — Nothing contained in this Rule
shall be construed to authorize an action against a public
officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the
same be commenced within one (1) year after the cause
of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such
office or position, arose, nor to authorize an action for
damages in accordance with the provisions of the next
preceding section unless the same be commenced within
one (1) year after the entry of the judgment establishing
the petitioner's right to the office in question.
It is not the relief demanded, is what determines the
nature of the action. While it is true that the complaint
132
questions petitioner's removal from the position of
Executive Secretary and seeks her reinstatement thereto,
the nature of the suit is not necessarily one of quo
warranto. The nature of the instant suit is one involving a
violation of the rights of the plaintiff under the By-Laws of
the Society, the Civil Code and the Constitution, which
allegedly renders the individuals responsible therefore,
accountable for damages.
Corollarily, the one-year period fixed in Section 16, Rule
66 of the Revised Rules of Court within which a petition
for quo warranto should be filed, counted from the date of
ouster, does not apply to the case at bar. The action must
be brought within four (4) years, a case involving a
plaintiff separated from his employment for alleged
unjustifiable causes, where this Court held that the action
is one for "injury to the rights of the plaintiff, and must be
brought within 4 years under Article 1146 of the New Civil
Code."
PPSTA v. APOSTOL
Private respondent X as a member of the Philippine
Public School Teachers Association filed with the RTC a
complaint with preliminary injunction for the annulment of
the 1972 annual elections of the PPSTA Board of
Directors.
After the parties in a series of pleadings filed voluminous
documents dealing with the background and activities of
the PPSTA, which the court considered as stipulations of
facts and rendered without further hearing and its trial
decision holding that the activities, including the election,
were null and void being contrary to the by-laws of the
corporation and the Corporation Law.
The PPSTA argued that X has no personality and
standing as a single individual member our of thousands
of members of the PPSTA to bring the action as she was
not even a chapter delegate who have raised no question
as to the proceedings.
Has the action filed by X complied with the requirements
on Quo Warranto?
ANSWER:
No. The requirements of quo warranto was not complied.
Rule 66 of the Rules of Court on Quo Warranto provides,
that in order that an individual may directly bring the
action, he or she must claim to entitled to the public office
or position allegedly unlawfully held or usurped.
Otherwise, the action must be brought by the Solicitor
General or fiscal with leave of the court upon the
complaint of the relator under section 4 of the Rule.
In the instant case, X manifestly lays no claim herself to
the office of PPSTA director nor has the present action
been filed with leave of court by the Solicitor General or
fiscal upon her relation as a party having an interest
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injuriously affected, as required by the cited Rule. Her
action must therefore fail on this score and the judgment
erroneously rendered by respondent court shall be set
aside.
LIBAN v. GORDON
X, an officer of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City
Red Cross Chapter, petitioned in Court to declare Y as
having forfeited his seat in the Senate.
Y’s incumbency as a member of the Senate of the
Philippines, was elected Chairman of the PNRC, in which
X alleged that by accepting the responsibility, Y deemed
ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Sec.
13, Article VI of the Constitution:
Sec. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office or employment
in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his
term w/o forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed
to any office which may have been created or the
emoluments thereof increased during the term for which
he was elected).
Y contested that the petitioners’ citation of a constitutional
provision had no basis, since PNRC is not a government-
owned or controlled corporation. Thus, prohibition under
Sec. 13, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution did not apply in
the case. Furthermore, service rendered in PNRC is a
volunteer service to which is neither an office nor
employment.
Does X have legal standing in filing the action?
ANSWER:
No. X does not have legal standing.
Sec. 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Courts provides that an
action for the usurpation of a public office against a public
officer who does or suffers an act which constitutes a
ground for forfeiture of his office.
In the present case, X has no standing to file the petition
which appears to an action for quo warranto since X does
not claim to be entitled to the Senate Office of Y.
Moreover, since it is a quo warranto case, it could only be
brought by the Government or an individual who claims
entitlement to the public office considering the C did not
seek the Senator’s seat, he is not proper party to bring
the action.
133
 SANTIAGO v. GUINGONA
During the election of officers in the Senate, Senator X
and Seantor Y were both nominated to the position of
Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator X was
declared the duly elected Senate President. Thereafter,
Senator Y manifested that, with the agreement of Sen. S,
allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was
assuming position of minority leader. He explained that
those who had voted for Senator X comprised the
“majority,” while only those who had voted for him, the
losing nominee, belonged to the “minority.”
Senator F manifested that the senators belonging to the
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering 7 and, thus, also a
minority had chosen Senator G as the minority leader.
Thereafter, the majority leader informed the body that he
was in receipt of a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator G
as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate
President formally recognized Senator G as the minority
leader of the Senate. Senators S and Y filed a petition for
quo warranto, alleging that Senator G had been usurping,
unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate
minority leader, a position that, according to them,
rightfully belonged to Senator Y.
Are Senators S and Y correct in saying that Senator G
had been usurping, unlawful holding and exercising the
position of Senate Minority Leader?
ANSWER:
No. Senators S and Y were incorrect.
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary
assumption and exercise of power by one without color of
title or who is not entitled by law thereto. A quo warranto
proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the
right or title to the contested public office and to oust the
holder from its enjoyment. The action may be brought by
the solicitor general or a public prosecutor or any person
claiming to be entitled to the public office or position
usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. The
action shall be brought against the person who allegedly
usurped, intruded into or is unlawfully holding of
exercising such office.
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful,
the person suing must show that he or she has a clear
right to the contested office or to use or exercise the
functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held
by the respondent. In this case, petitioners present no
sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the
office of the Senate minority leader.
As discussed earlier, the specific norms or standards that
may be used in determining who may lawfully occupy the
disputed position has not been laid down by the
Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the
power has been vested. Absent any clear-cut guideline,
in no way can it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted
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Respondent G's assumption and exercise of the powers
of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no
grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize
any of his specific acts as minority leader.
CAMID v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
X filed a petition arguing the existence of Municipality A.
The petition was based on a previous ruling annulling the
Executive Orders creating 33 Municipalities, including
Municipality A. X represents himself as resident of A.
Is A entitled to recognition as de facto municipal
corporation?
ANSWER:
No. A is not entitled to recognition as de facto municipal
corporation.
The following are the factors to be considered to validate
the creation of a municipal corporation: (1) the fact that
for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the
municipality had never been challenged; (2) the fact that
no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of
the executive order creating such municipality; and (3)
the fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth
class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit
court and considered part of a legislative district in the
Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of
Representatives.
Above all, it was held that whatever doubt there might be
as to the de jure character of the municipality must be
deemed to have been put to rest by the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R. A. No. 7160), 442(d) of
which provides that "municipal districts organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders
and which have their respective sets of elective officials
holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code
shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities."
YAP v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
A started working with the PNB. After several promotions,
she was appointed Senior Vice President. A filed several
applications for leave of absence (due to medical reasons)
which were duly approved. While she was on leave, EO
No. 80 (Revised Charter of the PNB) was approved. Said
executive order authorized therestructure/reorganization
and rehabilitation of PNB.
A was notified of her separation from the service. As a
general rule, reorganization is carried out in 'good faith' if
it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy
more efficient. In that event, no dismissal or separation
actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist.
Whether A should be reinstated to her former position?
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ANSWER:
No. The Rules of Court provides in Rule 66 Sec 6 that
Section 6. Parties and contents of petition against
usurpation. — When the action is against a person
for usurping a public office, position or franchise, the
petition shall set forth the name of the person who
claim to be entitled thereto, if any, with an averment of his
right to the same and that the respondent is
unlawfully in possession thereof. All persons who claim to
be entitled to the public office, position or franchise may
be made parties, and their respective rights to such
public office, position or franchise determined, in the
same action.
A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or
position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another may bring an action for quo warranto. The
petitioner therein must show a clear legal right to the
office allegedly held unlawfully by another.
DIVINAGRACIA v. CONSOLIDATED
BROADCASTING
A Company and Ba Companies are radio networks both
involved in the operation of radio broadcasting services in
the Philippines, they being the grantees of legislative
franchises. NTC allowed them to install, operate and
maintain various AM and FM broadcast stations.
C, alleging that he was a stockholder of respondent
companies, filed complaints with the NTC alleging that
despite the provisions of the law mandating the public
offering of at least 30% of the common stocks of
Respondents, both entities had failed to make such
offering. C prayed for the cancellation of all the
Provisional Authorities or CPCs of A and B.
Whether or not NTC has the power to cancel Provisional
Authorities and CPCs of entities which Congress has
issued franchises to operate.
ANSWER:
No. The Rules of Court provides in Rule 66 Sec 1 that
Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. —
An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or
franchise may be commenced by a verified petition
brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully
holds or exercises a public office,position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by
the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture
of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the
Philippines without being legally incorporated or without
lawful authority so to act.
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Even while the action is maintained in the name of the
Republic, the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor is
obliged to commence such action upon complaint, and
upon good reason to believe that any case specified
under Section 1 of Rule 66 can be established by proof.
FELICIANO v. VILLASIN
A was general manager of XYZ but when ABC took over
the management and policy-making functions of XYZ due
to default on the payment, administrative charges against
A for misconduct, dishonesty and conduct of unbecoming
were filed. The interim XYZ board of directors found him
guilty.
A filed with RTC petition for quo warranto arguing that
since the XYZ had no power to remove a general
manager appointed by a regular board of directos, it
should follow that an interim board of directors neither
had the power to discipline or remove him. A is under
legal obligation to comply by submitting his appointment
to the Commission for attestation/approval. This, he did
not do. He instead stubbornly maintained his personal
stand that water districts are private corporations, not
government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charter.
Whether filing of quo warranto was proper.
ANSWER:
No. The Rules of Court provides in Rule 65 Sec 1 that
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling
or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
Failure to comply with any of the aforesaid requirements
for filing an independent civil action for Certiorari is
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. This rule
accords sufficient discretion to the court hearing the
special civil action whether or not to dismiss the petition
outright for failure to comply with said requirement. A is a
mere usurper or intruder who has no right or title
whatsoever to the position/office of General Manager. His
further occupancy of the position after said date holds
him criminally liable for usurpation of authority.
135
 RULE 67: EXPROPRIATION
NPC v. CO
A was established by R.A. No. 6395 to undertake the
development of hydroelectric generation of power and the
production of electricity from nuclear, geothermal and
other sources, as well as the transmission of electric
power on a nationwide basis. Its charter grants to
petitioner, among others, the power to exercise the right
to eminent domain.
A filed a complaint with the RTC for the acquisition of an
easement of right-of-way over three (3) lots belonging to
B, in connection with the construction of its transmission
lines for its Lahar Affected Transmission Line Project. A
project for public use Republic v. Gingoyon (Gingoyon),
we observed that R.A. No. 8974 covers expropriation
proceedings intended for national government
infrastructure projects.
How shall issues on uncertain ownership and conflicting
claims, effects of appeal on the rights of the parties, and
such other incidents affecting the complaint be resolved?
Rules of Court Rule 67 Sec 14 states that:
Section 14. Power of guardian in such proceedings. —
The guardian or guardian ad litem of a minor or of a
person judicially declared to be incompetent may, with
the approval of the court first had, do and perform on
behalf of his ward any act, matter, or thing respecting the
expropriation for public use or purpose of property
belonging to such minor or person judicially declared to
be incompetent, which such minor or person judicially
declared to be incompetent could do in such
proceedings if he were of age or competent.
The right of a property owner to receive just
compensation prior to the actual taking of the property by
the State is a proprietary right which Congress can
legislate on. R.A. No. 8974 being applicable in this case,
the government agency involved must comply with the
guidelines set forth in Sec. 425 of R.A. No. 8974.
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK v. BCDA
X Development Authority filed expropriation actions in
RTC Branch 58 for acquisition of lands needed for the
construction of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway
Project. The defendants were the registered owners of
the expropriated lands which they acquired as
beneficiaries of the comprehensive agrarian reform
program. Y Veterans Bank filed motions to intervene in
which they alleged that the covered properties actually
belonged to them. RTC denied Y’s motion on the ground
that the intervention amounts to a third-party complaint
which is not allowed in expropriation cases. The CA
affirmed the ruling of the lower court.
Was the denial of the CA correct?
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ANSWER:
No. Section 9, Rule 67 provides:
If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or
there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court
may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation
for the property to be paid to the court for the benefit of
the person adjudged in the same proceeding to be
entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the
payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the
defendant or the court before the plaintiff can enter upon
the property or retain it for the public use or purpose if
entry has already been made.
Y’s point regarding the authority of the court in
expropriation cases to hear and adjudicate conflicting
claims over the ownership of the lands involved in such
cases is valid. However, such rule is inapplicable to Y’s
bank because (1) Y’s bank tried to intervene when there
is already a pending similar case in Branch 62. Branch 58
had no authority to pre-empt Branch 62 of its power to
hear and adjudicate claims that were already pending
before it. Moreover, the jurisdiction over the annulment of
the individual defendant’s titles lies with the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). Branch
58 would still have no power to adjudicate the issues
presented by Y’s intervention.
The remedy of Y is to secure an order from Branch 58 to
have the proceeds of the expropriation deposited with
that branch in the meantime, pending adjudication of the
issues of ownership of the expropriated lands by the
DARAB as section 9 empowers the court to order
payment to itself of the proceeds of the expropriation
whenever questions of ownership are yet to be settled.
REPUBLIC v. GINGOYON (2005)
NAIA 3, a project between the Government and the X
International Air Terminals was nullified. Planning to put
NAIA 3 facilities into immediate operation, the
Government, through expropriation filed a petition to be
entitled of a writ of possession contending that a mere
deposit of the assessed value of the property with an
authorized government depository is enough for the
entitlement to said writ, as provided in Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court. However, respondents averred that
before an entitlement of the writ of possession is issued,
direct payment of just compensation must be made to the
builders of the facilities, citing RA No. 8974 and a related
jurisprudence (2004 Resolution) promulgated by the
Supreme Court. They further claimed that the statute
amended Rule 67. Decide.
ANSWER:
No. Rule 67 will not apply. The most crucial difference
between Rule 67 and RA 8974 concerns the particular
essential step the Government has to undertake to be
entitled to a writ of possession.
136
Section 2, Rule 67 provides:
Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter
and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall
have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the
real property involved if he deposits with the authorized
government depositary an amount equivalent to the
assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to
be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court.
Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the
court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a
government bank of the Republic of the Philippines
payable on demand to the authorized government
depositary.
Rule 67 merely requires the Government to deposit with
an authorized government depositary the assessed value
of the property for expropriation for it to be entitled to a
writ of possession. On the other hand, RA 8974 requires
that the Government to make a direct payment to the
property owner before the writ may issue. Moreover, such
payment is based on the zonal valuation of the BIR in the
case of land, the value of the improvements or structures
under the replacement cost method, or if no such
valuation is available and in cases of utmost urgency, the
proffered value of the property to be seized. Rule 67
would allow the Government to take over the NAIA 3
facilities in a fashion that directly rebukes the 2004
Resolution. In this Resolution, the Court required that
there must first be payment of just compensation to X
International Air Terminals before the Government may
take over the property. If Section 2 of Rule 67 were to
apply, X International Air Terminals would be enjoined
from receiving a single centavo as just compensation
before the Government takes over the NAIA 3 facility by
virtue of a writ of possession. Adherence to the letter of
Section 2, Rule 67 would in turn violate the Court’s
requirement in the 2004 Resolution. It is the plain intent of
RA 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule
67 with the scheme of “immediate payment” in cases
involving national government infrastructures projects.
Section 14 of the IRR of RA 8974, however, recognizes
the continued applicability of Rule 67 on procedural
aspects when it provides “all matters regarding defenses
and objections to the complaint, issues on uncertain
ownership and conflicting claims, effects of appeal on the
rights of the parties, and such other incidents affecting
the complaint shall be resolved under the provisions on
expropriation of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
REPUBLIC v. GINGOYON (2006)
(Same facts above only that the Government filed a
motion for partial reconsideration in this case assailing
the words used.)
Q: The Government claimed that the 2004 Resolution in
Agan did not strictly require the payment of just
compensation before the Government can take over the
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airport facilities. Reliance is placed on the use by the
Court of the word "for," instead of "before."
A: The clear intent of the 2004 Resolution ruling is to
mandate payment of just compensation as a condition
precedent before the Government could acquire physical
possession over the airport facilities. The qualification
was made out of due consideration of the fact that
PIATCO had already constructed the facilities at its own
expense when its contracts with the Government were
nullified. Even assuming that "for" may be construed as
not necessarily meaning "prior to," it cannot be denied
that Rep. Act No. 8974 does require prior payment to the
owner before the Government may acquire possession
over the property to be expropriated. Even Rule 67
requires the disbursement of money by way of deposit as
a condition precedent prior to entitlement to a writ of
possession. As the instant case is one for expropriation,
our pronouncement is worthily consistent with the
principles and laws that govern expropriation cases.
ASIA’s EMERGING DRAGON v. DOTC
Q: AEDC claimed that, being the recognized and
unchallenged original proponent of the NAIA IPT III
Project, it has the exclusive, clear, and vested statutory
right to the award. AEDC banked their claim on the
Court’s declaration in Agan that the award of the NAIA
IPT III Project to PIATCO is null and void.
A: The bidding process as to the NAIA IPT III Project was
already over after the award thereof to PIATCO, even if
eventually, the said award was nullified and voided. The
nullification of the award to PIATCO did not revive the
proposal nor re-open the bidding. AEDC cannot insist that
this Court turn back the hands of time and award the
NAIA IPT III Project to it, as if the bid of PIATCO never
existed and the award of the project to PIATCO did not
take place. AEDC has no legal right to the NAIA IPT III
Project, corollarily, it has no legal right over the NAIA IPT
III facility. AEDC does not own the NAIA IPT III facility,
which this Court already recognized in Gingoyon as
owned by PIATCO; nor does AEDC own the land on
which NAIA IPT III stands, which is undisputedly owned
by the Republic through the Bases Conversion
Development Authority (BCDA).
AEDC did not fund any portion of the construction of
NAIA IPT III, which was entirely funded by PIATCO.
AEDC also does not have any kind of lien over NAIA IPT
III or any kind of legal entitlement to occupy the facility or
the land on which it stands. Therefore, nothing that the
Government has done or will do in relation to the project
could possibly prejudice or injure AEDC. AEDC then does
not possess any legal personality to interfere with or
restrain the activities of the Government as regards NAIA
IPT III. AEDC's offer to reimburse the Government the
amount it shall pay to PIATCO for the NAIA IPT III Project
facilities, as shall be determined in the ongoing
expropriation proceedings before the RTC of Pasay City,
cannot restore AEDC to its status and rights as the
137
project proponent. It must be stressed that the law
requires the project proponent to undertake the
construction of the project, including financing; financing,
thus, is but a component of the construction of the
structures and not the entirety thereof.
LANDBANK v. WYCOCO
Mr. X offered to sell his land to the government through
DAR in consonance with CARL, with an offer price of
14.9M and a land area of 85 hectares more or less. DAR,
valued the property at only 2.2M which was rejected by
Mr. X, to which DAR forwarded such case to DARAB for
determination of just compensation. Mr. X, meanwhile did
not file the necessary pleading before the DARAB, opting
rather to file a case directly with the RTC as a special
agrarian court. Does the RTC as a special agrarian court
have jurisdiction over determination of Just
Compensation?
Answer:
Yes. Anent the issue of jurisdiction, the laws in point is 57
of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988) which, in pertinent part, provide:||
Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. — The Special Agrarian
Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses
under this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate
cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30)
days from submission of the case for decision.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 24 it was held that
Special Agrarian Courts are given original and exclusive
jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) all
petitions for the determination of just compensation; and
(2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under R.A. No.
6657. Section 50 must be construed in harmony with
Section 57 by considering cases involving the
determination of just compensation and criminal cases for
violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the
plenitude of power conferred to the DAR. Indeed, there is
a reason for this distinction.
The DAR, as an administrative agency, cannot be
granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain and
over criminal cases. The valuation of property in eminent
domain is essentially a judicial function which is vested
with the Special Agrarian Courts and cannot be lodged
with administrative agencies.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the
landowner filed an action for determination of just
compensation without waiting for the completion of
DARAB's reevaluation of the land. This, notwithstanding,
the Court held that the trial court properly acquired
jurisdiction because of its exclusive and original
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jurisdiction over determination of just compensation,
thus —
. . . It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a
Special Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners." This "original and
exclusive" jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if
the DAR would vest in administrative officials original
jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an
appellate court for the review of administrative decisions.
Thus, although the new rules speak of directly appealing
the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special
Agrarian Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the original
and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in
the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the
adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the
RTCs into an appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to
Sec. 57 and therefore would be void. Thus, direct resort
to the SAC [Special Agrarian Court] by private
respondent is valid.
In the case at bar, therefore, the trial court properly
acquired jurisdiction over Wycoco's complaint for
determination of just compensation. It must be stressed
that although no summary administrative proceeding was
held before the DARAB, LBP was able to perform its legal
mandate of initially determining the value of Wycoco's
land pursuant to Executive Order No. 405, Series of 1990.
What is more, DAR and LBP's conformity to the pre-trial
order which limited the issue only to the determination of
just compensation estopped them from questioning the
jurisdiction of the special agrarian court. The pre-trial
order limited the issues to those not disposed of by
admission or agreements; and the entry thereof
controlled the subsequent course of action.
NPC v. ANGAS
NCP a government owned and controlled corporation
filed two cases for imminent domain before the RTC for
the use thereof in building a power plant and other related
structure thereof. Verily, the court ruled that the NCP paid
together with interest therewith. There was a dispute as
to which rate of interest should apply in Appropriation
proceedings?
Is it the Legal Interest or the Central Bank stated Interest?
ANSWER:
Applying the said rule on statutory construction to Central
Bank Circular No. 416, the general term "judgments" can
refer only to judgments in cases involving loans or
forbearance of any money, goods or credits.
As significantly laid down by this Court in the case of
Reformina v. Tomol, 139 SCRA 260:
"The judgments spoken of and referred to are judgments
in litigations involving loans or forbearance of any money,
138
goods or credits. Any other kind of monetary judgment
which has nothing to do with, nor involving loans or
forbearance of any money, goods or credits does not fall
within the coverage of the said law for it is not within the
ambit of the authority granted to the Central Bank. The
Monetary Board may not tread on forbidden grounds. It
cannot rewrite other laws. That function is vested solely
with the legislative authority. It is axiomatic in legal
hermeneutics that statutes should be construed as a
whole and not as a series of disconnected articles and
phrases. In the absence of a clear contrary intention,
words and phrases in statutes should not be interpreted
in isolation from one another. A word or phrase in a
statute is always used in association with other words or
phrases and its meaning may thus be modified or
restricted by the latter."
Obviously, therefore, Art. 2209 of the Civil Code, and not
Central Bank Circular No. 416, is the law applicable to the
case at bar. Said law reads:
"ARTICLE 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment
of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs a delay, the
indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the
contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed
upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest,
which is six percent per annum."
The Central Bank circular applies only to loan or
forbearance of money, goods or credits and to judgments
involving such loan or forbearance of money, goods or
credits. This is evident not only from said circular but also
from Presidential Decree No. 116, which amended Act
No. 2655, otherwise known as the Usury Law. On the
other hand, Art. 2209 of the Civil Code applies to
transactions requiring the payment of indemnities as
damages, in connection with any delay in the
performance of the obligation arising therefrom other than
those covering loan or forbearance of money, goods or
credits.
In the case at bar, the transaction involved is clearly not a
loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits but
expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public
purpose, the payment of which is without stipulation
regarding interest, and the interest adjudged by the trial
court is in the nature of indemnity for damages. The legal
interest required to be paid on the amount of just
compensation for the properties expropriated is
manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages for the
delay in the payment thereof. Therefore, since the kind of
interest involved in the joint judgment of the lower court
sought to be enforced in this case is interest by way of
damages, and not by way of earnings from loans, etc. Art.
2209 of the Civil Code shall apply.
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CITY OF MANILA v. SERRANO
An LGU passed an ordinance expropriating certain
parcels of land for urbanized housing. Mr. X opposed said
expropriation as the land in question is his only residential
lot, depriving him of such would render him homeless.
Further, that their lot is exempt from R.A. 7279. The RTC
ruled in favor of the LGU; however, CA reversed the
same for failure to comply with the formalities of R.A.
7279.
Is the expropriation proper even without having complied
with R.A. 7279?
ANSWER:
No. It is clear that respondents raised in issue the
propriety of the expropriation of their property in
connection with R.A. No. 7279. Although what was
discussed at length in their petition before the Court of
Appeals was whether or not the said property could be
considered a small property within the purview of the
exemption under the said law, the other provisions of the
said law concerning expropriation proceedings need also
be looked into to address the first issue raised by
respondents and to determine whether or not
expropriation of Lot 1-C was proper under the
circumstances. The Court of Appeals properly considered
relevant provisions of R.A. No. 7279 to determine the
issues raised by respondents. Whether or not it correctly
applied the doctrine laid down in Filstream in resolving
the issues raised by respondents, however, is a different
matter altogether, and this brings us to the next point.
MCWD v. J. KING AND SONS
MCWD a government owned and controlled corporation
in the business of Water Utility filed an expropriation
proceeding against Company X for the acquisition of a
five (5) square meter lot. This expropriation proceeding
has been duly approved by its BOD’s and the LWUA
(Local Water Utilities Administration). In the expropriation
proceeding. Company X lawyer failed to attend, verily
MCWD deposited the amount of the full value of the
property with the court. Verily, since payment has been
complied the Court issued
the Writ of Possession.
Is the issuance of the Writ of Possession valid?
ANSWER:
Yes. Rep. Act No. 8974 is plainly clear in imposing the
requirement of immediate prepayment, and no amount of
statutory deconstruction can evade such requisite. It
enshrines a new approach towards eminent domain that
reconciles the inherent unease attending expropriation
proceedings with a position of fundamental equity. While
expropriation proceedings have always demanded just
compensation in exchange for private property, the
previous deposit requirement impeded immediate
139
compensation to the private owner, especially in cases
wherein the determination of the final amount of
compensation would prove highly disputed. Under the
new modality prescribed by Rep. Act No. 8974, the
private owner sees immediate monetary recompense,
with the same degree of speed as the taking of his/her
property.
Petitioner was supposed to tender the provisional
payment directly to respondent during a hearing which it
had failed to attend. Petitioner, then, deposited the
provisional payment with the court. The trial court did not
commit an error in accepting the deposit and in issuing
the writ of possession. The deposit of the provisional
amount with the court is equivalent to payment.
Indeed, Section 4 of R.A. No. 8974 is emphatic to the
effect that "upon compliance with the guidelines . . . the
court shall immediately issue to the implementing agency
an order to take possession of the property and start the
implementation of the project".
Under this statutory provision, when the government, its
agencies or government-owned and controlled
corporations, make the required provisional payment, the
trial court has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of
possession. In Capitol Steel Corporation v. PHIVIDEC
Industrial Authority, we held that:
Upon compliance with the requirements, a petitioner in an
expropriation case . . . is entitled to a writ of possession
as a matter of right and it becomes the ministerial duty of
the trial court to forthwith issue the writ of possession. No
hearing is required and the court neither exercises its
discretion or judgment in determining the amount of the
provisional value of the properties to be expropriated as
the legislature has fixed the amount under Section 4 of
R.A. No. 8974.
It is mandatory on the trial court's part to issue the writ of
possession and on the sheriff's part to deliver possession
of respondent's property to petitioner pursuant to the writ.
REPUBLIC v. TAGLE
Y is the registered owner of two (2) parcels of land. X
and Y signed a Memorandum of Agreement which
provides, among others, that X 'undertakes to lease
within the period of twenty (20) years and/or sell a portion
of that property (which is no less than ten-hectares)' in
favor of Y which likewise agrees to lease' within a period
of twenty (20) years and/or buy said property site. After
the expiration of the lease contract on negotiations began
on the purchase of the property in question on a plain
offer of Y to sell the same.||| However, for reasons known
only to her, Y did not sign the Deed of Absolute Sale thus
reneging on her commitment to sell the lot in question.|||
May a writ of possession be granted on the ground that
the expropriating government agency is already
occupying the property sought to be expropriated.
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Answer:
No, a writ of possession should be granted.
Sec. 2, Rule 67 provides that the plaintiff shall have the
right tot ake or enter upon the possession of the real
property involved if he deposits with the authorized
government depository an amount equivalent to the
assessed value of the propoerty for the purpose of
taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders by
the court.
We note that in the present case, X has deposited not
just the 10 percent required under EO 1035, but the
whole amount of the just compensation that private
respondent is entitled to. Thus, no any legal impediment
for the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of X.
CITY OF CEBU v. SPOUSES DEDAMO
X filed a case for eminent domain, which fixed the
valuation of the land subject thereof . X questioned the
land valuation asserting that just compensation should be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint
and not at the time the property was actually taken.
When should the valuation of the land expropriated start?
ANSWER:
Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides that just
compensation shall be determined at the time of the filing
of the complaint for expropriation, such law cannot prevail
over R.A. 7160, which is a substantive law.
The Court explicitly stated therein that although the
general rule in determining just compensation in eminent
domain is the value of the property as of the date of the
filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an exception:
where the Court fixed the value of the property as of the
date it was taken, and not at the date of the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings.”
SPOUSES ORTEGA v. CITY OF CEBU
Spouses X and Y are the registered owners of a parcel of
land. The Sangguniang of the City enacted a City
ordinance to expropriate one-half portion of land owned
by the spouses. RTC issued and order fixing the value of
the land subject to expropriation. Z filed an Omnibus
Motion to Stay Execution, Modification of Judgment and
Withdrawal of the Case, contending that the price set by
the RTC as just compensation to be paid to [Spouses X
and Y is way beyond the reach of its intended
beneficiaries for its socialized housing program.||| Should
the Omnibus motion be granted?
140
ANSWER:
No, the order should not be granted.
As provided in Section 4, Rule 67, A final order sustaining
the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by
any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall
not prevent the court from determining the just
compensation to be paid. An order of expropriation
denotes the end of the first stage of expropriation. Its end
then paves the way for the second stage the
determination of just compensation, and, ultimately,
payment. An order of expropriation puts an end to any
ambiguity regarding the right of the petitioner to condemn
the respondents' properties. Because an order of
expropriation merely determines the authority to exercise
the power of eminent domain and the propriety of such
exercise, its issuance does not hinge on the payment of
just compensation. After all, there would be no point in
determining just compensation if, in the first place, the
plaintiff's right to expropriate the property was not first
clearly established.
Cebu City can no longer ask for modification of the
judgment, much less, withdraw its complaint, after it failed
to appeal even the first stage of the expropriation
proceedings.
BPI v. COURT OF APPEALS
NAPOCOR filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain,
seeking to expropriate a portion of petitioner BPI property
located for the purpose of constructing and maintaining
its Dasmariñas-Zapote 230 KV Transmission Line
Project.||| NAPOCOR deposited an amount equivalent to
the assessed value of the property.
How is just compensation determined?
ANSWER:
In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the
general rule is that the just compensation which the
owner of condemned property is entitled to is the market
value. Market value is "that sum of money which a person
desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing
but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be
given and received therefor."
BARDILLON v. BARANGAY MASILI
Two complaints for eminent domain were filed by X, a
barangay of Calamba Laguna to expropriate Y's parcel of
land. The first complaint was filed before the MTC which
was denied for lack of interest. The second complaint
was filed before the RTC which was approved there
being no application for res judicata since the MTC did
not have jurisdiction over the 1st action. X complied with
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the requirement of depositing the required amount. A writ
of possession was issued thereafter.
1. Does the MTC have jurisdiction over the expropriation
case which would then constitute res judicata.
2. Was the issuance of the writ of possession proper?
ANSWER:
1. No. It has been established by jurisprudence that an
expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum
of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the
government of its authority and right to take property for
public use. As such, it is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and should be filed with the RTC. Therefore,
the doctrine of res judicata should not be applied.
2. Yes. For local government units, expropriation is
governed by Section 19 of the Local Government Code.
Sec. 19 of the Local Government Code partly provides:
The local government unit may immediately take
possession of the property upon the filing of the
expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit
with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of
the fair market value of the property based on the current
tax declaration of the property to be expropriated:
Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the
expropriated property shall be determined by the proper
court, based on the fair market value at the time of the
taking of the property.
In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ of
Possession in favor of X after it had filed the Complaint
for expropriation and deposited the amount required was
proper, because it had complied with the requisites under
Sec. 19 of the LGC.
REPUBLIC v. CA
X filed with the RTC a complaint claiming just
compensation and damages against the Republic who
took X's property without initiating expropriation
proceedings.
The RTC, who appointed 3 commissioners without
objection by the parties, rendered a decision in favor of X
ordering the Republic to pay just compensation and
damages. The CA ordered to remand the case to the
RTC for the commissioners to reconvene or appoint new
commissioners to determine consequential damages for
X's loss of income from the remaining lot not taken by the
Republic. The Republic questions the CA's decision to
remand the case to determine the consequential
damages for the remaining lot. It contends that no
consequential damages may be awarded as the
remaining lot was not actually taken and that the award
would result to unjust enrichment on the part of X.
1. Was the RTC's appointment of 3 commissioners
proper?
141
2. Is the contention of the Republic correct?
ANSWER
1. Yes. Section 5 of Rule 67 partly states that "Upon the
rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall
appoint not more than three (3) competent and
disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and
report to the court the just compensation for the property
sought to be taken."
In the case at bar, while the Rule presupposes a prior
filing of expropriation proceedings, the appointment was
merely done mainly to aid the trial court in determining
just compensation which was not objected to by the
parties. Besides, the trial court is not bound by the
commissioners’ recommendations. The court has the
discretion on whether to adopt the commissioners’
valuation or to substitute its own estimate of the value as
gathered from the records.
2. No. It has been established that if as a result of the
expropriation made by petitioner, the remaining lot of the
owner suffers from an impairment or decrease in value,
consequential damages may be awarded to the owner.
Section 6 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Civil Procedure partly
provides:
The commissioners shall assess the consequential
damages to the property not taken and deduct from such
consequential damages the consequential benefits to be
derived by the owner from the public use or purpose of
the property taken, the operation of its franchise by the
corporation or the carrying on of the business of the
corporation or person taking the property. But in no case
shall the consequential benefits assessed exceed the
consequential damages assessed, or the owner be
deprived of the actual value of his property so taken.
The principle of unjust enrichment under Article 22
requires two conditions: (1) that a person is benefited
without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such
benefit is derived at another’s expense or damage. There
is no unjust enrichment when the person who will benefit
has a valid claim to such benefit.
Therefore, the Republic is wrong since actual taking of
the property is not necessary to grant consequential
damages. Furthermore, since X has a valid claim to the
benefit, no unjust enrichment shall result therefrom. The
CA was correct to remand the case to the RTC for the
commissioners to assess consequential damages.
EUSEBIO v. LUIS
The City of Pasig took X's property without expropriation
proceedings and used it as a municipal road. After 16
years without payment of just compensation, X filed a
complaint for reconveyance or payment of just
compensation, back rentals, and damages with the RTC.
The City of Pasig contends (1) that the action is barred by
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prescription, (2) that X can no longer recover the property,
(3) that the reasonable compensation should be based on
the value of the property from the time of taking, and (4)
that there should be no back rentals.
1. Can X recover the property?
2. In the event that said property can no longer be
returned, how should just compensation to X be
determined
ANSWER:
1. No. In the case of Forfom Development v. Philippine
National Railways, the Court held that recovery of
possession of the property by the landowner can no
longer be allowed on the grounds of estoppel and, more
importantly, of public policy which imposes upon the
public utility the obligation to continue its services to the
public. The non-filing of the case for expropriation will not
necessarily lead to the return of the property to the
landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of
compensation.
In this case, for a long period of time, X failed to question
the taking of the property which was for public use. X is
now estopped from recovering possession, but is entitled
to just compensation.
2. It has been established by jurisprudence that even if
there are no expropriation proceedings instituted to
determine just compensation, the trial court is still
mandated to act in accordance with the procedure
provided for in Section 5, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of
Court, requiring the appointment of not more than three
competent and disinterested commissioners to ascertain
and report to the court the just compensation for the
subject property. Such findings by commissioners may
only be disregarded or substituted with the trial court’s
own estimation of the property’s value only if the
commissioners have applied illegal principles to the
evidence submitted to them, where they have
disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where
the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or
excessive.
It is also settled jurisprudence that where property was
taken without the benefit of expropriation proceedings,
and its owner files an action for recovery of possession
thereof before the commencement of expropriation
proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of
taking that is controlling.
142
 LANDBANK v. SANTIAGO
Pursuant to PD 27 which took effect on 1972, DAR
acquired the property of X. In determining the just
compensation, DAR used the formula under PD 27 and
EO 228: Land Value = Average Gross Production x 2.5
Hectares x Government Support Price. Land Bank, as the
financial intermediary of the agrarian reform program, and
DAR's computation arrived at P135,482.12 using P35 as
the GSP per cavan of palay for the year 1972 under E.O.
228. X filed a petition before the Special Agrarian
Court(RTC) contending that the 1998 GSP per cavan,
P400, should be used in the computation and not P35
because the payment for preliminary compensation was
made only in 1998. The amount of P400 is based on RA
6657 which took effect on 1988.
Q:What formula should LBP and DAR use in computing
the just compensation? The formula under PD 27 (when
the property was taken) and EO 228 or RA 6657 (already
in effect when the payment for preliminary compensation
was made)?
ANSWER:
RA 6657. In the case of Land Bank v. Natividad, the
Court ruled "the seizure of the landholding did not take
place on the date of effectivity of P.D. No. 27 but would
take effect on the payment of just compensation." It
further ruled that under the factual circumstances of this
case, the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as
the just compensation to be paid private respondents has
yet to be settled. Considering the passage of RA 6657
before the completion of this process, the just
compensation should be determined and the process
concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the
applicable law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only
suppletory effect.
Therefore, since payment of just compensation is made
at the time RA 6657 came into effect, the formula under
RA 6657 should be used to determine the just
compensation X is entitled to.
LANDBANK v. ARANETA
At the heart of the controversy is a large tract of land with
an area of 1,645 hectares, more or less, which was
originally registered in the name of Alfonso Doronilla
(Doronilla) under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
7924 of the Rizal Registry. On June 21, 1974, then
President Marcos issued Proclamation 1283, carving out
a wide expanse from the Watershed Reservation in
Antipolo, Rizal and reserving the segregated area for
town site purposes, "subject to private rights, if any there
be.
In 1978, the OSG filed with the then CFI of Rizal an
expropriation complaint against the Doronilla property.
Meanwhile, on 1979, Doronilla issued a Certification;
copy furnished the Agrarian Reform Office, among other
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agencies, listing seventy-nine (79) "bona fide planters" he
allegedly permitted to occupy a portion of his land. On
1987 or nine (9) years after it commenced expropriation
proceedings, the OSG moved for and secured the
dismissal of the expropriation case. Earlier, or on March
15, 1983, J. Amado Araneta, now deceased, acquired
ownership of the subject Doronilla property by virtue of
court litigation. A little over a week later, he had OCT No.
7924 canceled and secured the issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-70860 in his name.
In the determination of the just compensation what law
shall governed: Presidential Decree No. 27, Executive
Order No. 228 or Republic Act No. 6657 or other law?
ANSWER:
RA 6657 for the 75 farmers and others are governed by
other law and not by RA 6657.
The farmer-beneficiaries, who were given the 75 CLTs
(Certificate of Land Transfer) prior to the issuance of
Proclamation 1283, as amended by Proclamation 1637,
are deemed full owners of the lots covered by 75 CLTs
vis-à-vis the real registered owner. The farmer-
beneficiaries have private rights over said lots as they
were deemed owners prior to the establishment of the LS
Town site reservation or at least are subrogated to the
rights of the registered lot owner. Those farmer-
beneficiaries who were issued CLTs or Eps
(Emancipation Patent) after June 21, 1974 when
Proclamation 1283, as amended, became effective do not
acquire rights over the lots they were claiming under PD
27 or RA 6657, because the lots have already been
reclassified as residential and are beyond the compulsory
coverage for agrarian reform under RA 6657. Perforce,
the said CLTs or EPs issued after June 21, 1974 have to
be annulled and invalidated for want of legal basis, since
the lots in question are no longer subject to agrarian
reform due to the reclassification of the erstwhile
Doronilla estate to non-agricultural purposes.
Hence the farmer-beneficiaries who were given the 75
CLTs governed by under RA 6657 while those other
farmers will not be governed by RA 6657 when the lots
have already been reclassified as residential and are
beyond the compulsory coverage for agrarian reform
under RA 6657.
LANDBANK v. PERALTA
Victorino T. Peralta (respondent) is the registered owner
of two parcels of agricultural land located at Sinangguyan,
Don Carlos, Bukidnon. Of the total area of more than 8
hectares, 2.73 hectares were placed under the Operation
Land Transfer (OLT) program and distributed to tenant-
beneficiaries pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27.
Respondent filed with the RTC, acting as Special
Agrarian Court (SAC), a petition for judicial determination
of just compensation for his landholding which he claimed
was valued by the Department of Agrarian Reform
143
Adjudication Board (DARAB) at the price of only
₱17,240.00. Respondent alleged that based on his own
investigation, the true valuation of lands sold within the
vicinity is ₱200,000/ha. while the valuation made by
petitioner as affirmed by the DARAB was fixed at only
₱6,315.02/ha., or 63 centavos per square meter which is
highly unconscionable. Judgment is rendered by SAC in
favor of the plaintiff, declaring the amount of 409,500.00.
CA affirmed with modification the judgment of the SAC by
deleting the award of attorney’s fees and litigation costs.
The CA found that petitioner has not shown that it
complied with the requirement of full payment of the cost
of respondent’s landholding. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA.

In the determination of the just compensation what

valuation formula to be applied: the formula under
Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228
or the formula under Republic Act No. 6657?

ANSWER:

RA 6657. If the issue of just compensation is not settled

prior to the passage of R.A. No. 6657, it should be
computed in accordance with the said law, although the
property was acquired under P.D. No. 27.

LBP’s contention that the property was taken on 21

October 1972, the date of effectivity of PD 27, thus just
compensation should be computed based on the GSP in
1972, is erroneous. The date of taking of the subject land
for purposes of computing just compensation should be
reckoned from the issuance dates of the emancipation
patents. An emancipation patent constitutes the
conclusive authority for the issuance of a Transfer
Certificate of Title in the name of the grantee. It is from
the issuance of an emancipation patent that the grantee
can acquire the vested right of ownership in the
landholding, subject to the payment of just compensation
to the landowner. The "taking of private lands under the
agrarian reform program partakes of the nature of an
expropriation proceeding." In computing the just
compensation for expropriation proceedings, the RTC
should take into consideration the "value of the land at
the time of the taking, not at the time of the rendition of
judgment." "The ‘time of taking’ is the time when the
landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his
property, such as when title is transferred to the
Republic."

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 RULE 68: FORECLOSURE REAL ESTATE
MORTGAGE
MONZON v. RELOVA
Spouses A (Relova) and B (Perez) filed a petition for
injunction since C (Monzon) issued promissory notes to
the respective spouses with lots as security (2A- Perez,
Lot 2B- Relova). C (Monzon) was indebted to Coastal
Lending which foreclosed the property due to the non-
payment of Monzon’s 3.4 million debt. D (Addio) was the
highest bidder in the sale. There was an excess of 1.6 M
from D (Addio’s) payment of 5M. The Spouses contend
that they should be given the residue as stated in Rule 68,
Sec 4. The residue money is with E (Atty. Luna) (clerk of
court).
Whether the spouses be given the residue as stated in
Rule 68, Sec.4
ANSWER:
No. Rule 68 governs judicial foreclosure and the issue at
bar is under Act 3135 Extrajudicial Foreclosure.
Rule 68 governs judicial foreclosure of mortgages.
Extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages which was what
transpired in the case at bar is governed by Act 3135.
Unlike Rule 68, Act 3135 does not grant to junior
encumbrancers the right to receive the balance of the
purchase price. The only right given to second
mortgagees in said issuances is the right to redeem
foreclosed property pursuant to Sec 6 of Act 3135 “any
person having lien on the property subsequent to
mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is
sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of
one year from and after date of the sale.
LOOYUKO v. CA
This are consolidated cases of various claims disputed on
a house and lot located in Mandaluyong City. In one of
the many cases, the original owner mortgage the house
to A (FGU Insurance), the original owner defaulter, thus it
was judicially foreclosed by FGU. The judicial foreclosure
proceedings became final and executory as there was no
appeal made.
RTC then issued a writ of execution, sheriff sold the
property in an auction sale with FGU as the highest
bidder and ordered the cancellation of the TCT of said
property for issuance of a new one under FGU. But
before the new TCT could be issued Spouses B (Gutang)
filed a motion for intervention. Likewise, C (Looyuko et. Al)
also filed a motion for intervention.
1. Was the motion for intervention filed by the Spouses
B(Gutang) and C(Looyuko et al.) proper?
2. Is Rule 68 section 1 mandatory?
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ANSWER:
1. No. In the present case, the motions for intervention
were filed after judgment had already been rendered,
indeed when the case was already final and executory.
Certainly, intervention can no longer be allowed in a case
already terminated by final judgment.
Intervention. – A person may, before or during a trial be
permitted by the court, in its discretion, to intervene in an
action, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or
in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof.
Intervention requires that a motion for intervention should
be made "before or during a trial." Because of varying
interpretations of the phrase, the present Rules have
clarified that the motion should be filed "any time before
rendition of judgment."
Intervention is merely collateral or accessory or ancillary
to the principal action, and not an independent
proceeding; it is an interlocutory proceeding dependent
on or subsidiary to the case between the original parties.
Where the main action ceases to exist, there is no
pending proceeding wherein the intervention may be
based.
However, based on this case, there is an exception that
was founded on jurisprudence according to the ever
changing Supreme Court.
a. Unawareness of the existing case; and
b. Intervenors are indispensable parties.
ANSWER:
No, sec 1 rule 68 of the rules of court requires all persons
having or claiming an interest in the premises subordinate
in right to that of the holder of the mortgage be made
defendants in the action for foreclosure. The requirement
for joinder of the person claiming an interest subordinate
to the mortgage sought to be foreclosed, however is not
mandatory in character but merely directory, in the sense
that failure to comply therewith will not invalidate the
foreclosure proceedings.
A subordinate lien holder is a proper, even a necessary,
but not an indispensable party to a foreclosure
proceeding. Appropriate relief could be granted by the
court to the mortgagee in the foreclosure proceeding,
without affecting the rights of the subordinate lien holders.
The effect of failure on the part of the mortgagee to make
subordinate lien holder a defendant is that the decree
entered in the foreclosure proceeding would not deprive
the subordinate lien holder of his right of redemption. A
decree of foreclosure in a suit to which the holder of a
second lien are not parties leaves the equity of
redemption in favor of such lien holders unforeclosed and
unaffected.
145
Hence the remedy is a separate foreclosure proceeding
to require them to redeem from the first mortgagee, or the
party acquiring title to the mortgaged property at the
foreclosure sale, within 90 days. (Rule 68 section 2 equity
of redemption)
Rule 68 Sec. 2. Judgment on foreclosure for payment or
sale.
If upon the trial in such action the court shall find the facts
set forth in the complaint to be true, it shall ascertain the
amount due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt or
obligation, including interest and other charges as
approved by the court, and costs, and shall render
judgment for the sum so found due and order that the
same be paid to the court or to the judgment obligee
within a period of not less than ninety (90) days nor more
than one hundred twenty (120) days from the entry of
judgment, and that in default of such payment the
property shall be sold at public auction to satisfy the
judgment.
HUERTA ALBA RESORT v. CA
B instituted a civil case as mortgagee-assignee of a loan
amounting to P8.5 million obtained by A from Intercon. In
a complaint for judicial foreclosure of mortgage B sought
the foreclosure of (4) parcels of land mortgaged by A to
Intercon Fund Resource, Inc. (“Intercon”), which was
granted by the CA. On September 6, 1994, B was
declared the highest bidder during the auction sale and
the Certificate of Sale issued in its favor was registered
on October 21, 1994. A filed a Motion to Compel B to
Accept Redemption on May 2, 1995 ,invoking for the very
first time its alleged right to redeem subject properties
under to Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 (General Banking
Act).
Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 provides that “in case of a
foreclosure of a mortgage in favor of a bank, banking or
credit institution, whether judicially or extrajudicially, the
mortgagor shall have the right, within one year after the
sale of the real estate as a result of the foreclosure of the
respective mortgage, to redeem the property.”
Does A have the right of redemption or equity of
redemption?
ANSWER
Only equity of redemption. Rule 68, Section 2. Judgment
on foreclosure for payment or sale. — If upon the trial in
such action the court shall find the facts set forth in the
complaint to be true, it shall ascertain the amount due to
the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt or obligation,
including interest and other charges as approved by the
court, and costs, and shall render judgment for the sum
so found due and order that the same be paid to the court
or to the judgment obligee within a period of not less than
ninety (90) days nor more than one hundred twenty (120)
days from the entry of judgment, and that in default of
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such payment the property shall be sold at public auction
to satisfy the judgment.
Where a mortgaged is foreclosed extrajudicially, Act 3135
grants to the mortgagor the right of redemption within 1
year from registration of the sheriff’s certificate of
foreclosure sale. Where the foreclosure is judicially
effected, however, no equivalent right of redemption
exists, except only where the mortgagee is the Philippine
National bank or a bank or banking institution.
In the case at bar, it was too late in the day for A to
invoke a right to redeem under Section 78 of R.A. No.
337. There then existed only what is known as the equity
of redemption, which is simply the right of A to extinguish
the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by
paying the secured debt within the 90-day period after the
judgment became final. A having failed to exercise its
equity of redemption within the prescribed period,
redemption can no longer be effected. Hence, only have
an equity of redemption.
SPOUSES SUICO v. PNB
Spouses A and B obtained a loan from PNB secured by a
real estate mortgage on real properties. Sps. A and B
failed to pay the obligation prompting PNB to
extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage over the subject
properties. X thereafter filed a complaint alleging that the
extrajudicial foreclosure conducted is null and void.
During the foreclosure sale, PNB was the lone bidder.
The amount of bid is P8,511,000.00. X alleged that the
outstanding obligation is only P1,991,770.38. Since the
amount of the bid grossly exceeded the amount of X’s
outstanding obligation as stated in the extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage, it was the legal duty of the
winning bidder, PNB, to deliver to the Sheriff the bid price
or what was left after deducting the amount of X’s
outstanding obligation. PNB failed to deliver the amount
of their bid to the Sheriff or, at the very least, the amount
of such bid in excess of X’s outstanding obligation. PNB
moved to dismiss citing the pendency of another action
between the same properties where PNB was seeking
payment of the balance of X’s obligation not covered by
the proceeds of the auction sale. RTC declared the
extrajudicial foreclosure null and void. CA reversed.
Is the PNB obliged to deliver the excess?
ANSWER:
Yes. Rule 68, Section 4. Disposition of proceeds of
sale. — The amount realized from the foreclosure sale of
the mortgaged property shall, after deducting the costs of
the sale, be paid to the person foreclosing the mortgagee,
and when there shall be any balance or residue, after
paying off the mortgage debt due, the same shall be paid
to junior encumbrancers in the order of their priority, to be
ascertained by the court, or if there be no such
encumbrancers or there be a balance or residue after
146
payment to them, then to the mortgagor or his duly
authorized agent, or to the person entitled to it.
After payment of the costs of suit and satisfaction of the
claim of the first mortgagee/senior mortgagee, the claim
of the second mortgagee/junior mortgagee may be
satisfied from the surplus proceeds. The application of
the proceeds from the sale of the mortgaged property to
the mortgagor’s obligation is an act of payment, not
payment by dacion; hence, it is the mortgagee’s duty to
return any surplus in the selling price to the mortgagor. It
has been held that if the mortgagee is retaining more of
the proceeds of the sale than he is entitled to, this fact
alone will not affect the validity of the sale but simply give
the mortgagor a cause of action to recover such surplus.
In the case at bar, it shows that X’s loan obligations to
PNB as of 30 October 1992 amounted to P6,409,814.92,
and considering that the amount of PNB’s bid is
P8,511,000.00, there is clearly an excess in the bid price
which PNB must return, together with the interest
computed. 6% interest – from the time of filing the
complaint and 12% interest – once the judgment
becomes final and executory.
SPOUSES ROSALES v. SPOUSES SUBA
The spouses X and Y were indebted to Z. Later, Z sued
the spouses for their failure to pay. During trial, it was
found out that there existed an equitable mortgage
between the spouses and Z. The court ordered the
spouses to pay Z and if they fail to do so, their property
shall be foreclosed.
The spouses failed to pay Z, thus, the court ordered the
sale at a public auction of their land in May 1998. The
highest bidder was the spouses A and B. In June 1998,
the trial court issued an order confirming the sale made to
the spouses A and B. The spouses X and Y then filed a
motion for reconsideration. The trial court ruled against
their motion as it ruled that there is no right of redemption
in judicial foreclosures. The CA affirmed the decision.
Can the debtor – mortgagor exercise the right of
redemption?
ANSWER:
No. There is no right of redemption in judicial foreclosure.
What can be exercised is equity of redemption.
Rule 68, Section 1. Complaint in action for foreclosure. —
In an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage or other
encumbrance upon real estate, the complaint shall set
forth the date and due execution of the mortgage; its
assignments, if any; the names and residences of the
mortgagor and the mortgagee; a description of the
mortgaged property; a statement of the date of the note
or other documentary evidence of the obligation secured
by the mortgage, the amount claimed to be unpaid
thereon; and the names and residences of all persons
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
having or claiming an interest in the property subordinate
in right to that of the holder of the mortgage, all of whom
shall be made defendants in the action.
Equitable mortgage is one which although lacking in
some formality, or form or words, or other requisites
demanded by a statute, nevertheless reveals intention of
the parties to change real property as security for a debt,
and contains nothing impossible or contrary to law.
As a general rule, there is no right of redemption in a
judicial foreclosure of mortgage. The only exemption is
when the mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank or a
bank or a banking institution. Since the mortgagee in this
case is not one of those mentioned, no right of
redemption exists in favor of spouses X and Y. They
merely have an equity of redemption, which is simply
their right, as mortgagor, to extinguish the mortgage and
retain ownership of the property by paying the secured
debt prior to the confirmation of the foreclosure sale.
However, instead of exercising this equity of redemption,
spouses X and Y chose to delay the proceedings by filing
several manifestations with the trial court. Thus, they only
have themselves to blame for the consequent loss of their
property.
SUICO RATTAN v. COURT OF APPEALS
Spouses XX mortgaged their properties with ABC bank
and was subsequently foreclosed. The former claim that
the foreclosed properties command a market price of P
50,000,000.00 at the time of the foreclosure sale.
However no evidence appears on record to prove this
allegation. According to the Spouses XX, the mortgaged
properties were sold during the auction for an amount
which is way below the their market price and thus such
places the spouses XX at a disadvantage.
Is the contention of spouses XX correct?
ANSWER:
No. The fact that the properties were sold at an amount
less than its actual market value should not militate
against the right to such recovery. On the contrary, a
mortgagor stands to gain with a reduced price because
he possess the right to redemption. When there is a right
to redeem, the inadequacy of the price should not be
material because the judgement debtor may reacquire his
property or sell his right to redeem and thus recover the
loss he claims to have suffered by reason of the price
obtained at the auction sale.
147
 OPTIONAL READINGS FOR RULE 68
LSK HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. v..
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK
ABC Holdings obtained a loan from P Bank secured
the same with a Real Estate Mortgage. Due to ABC’s
failure to pay it’s loan, the mortgaged property was
extrajudicially foreclosed with P Bank emerged as the
highest bidder during the auction sale and its
certificate of sale was registered.
ABC Holdings filed a complaint for annulment of extra
judicial foreclosure, mortgage contract, promissory
note and damages with prayer for issuance of
TRO/Writ of Preliminary injunction. On the other hand,
P Bank filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a
writ of possession with.
In the annulment case, the lower court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction and the ex-parte proceedings
for the issuance of a writ of possession was
suspended by the lower court in view of the injunction
issued. The lower court likewise declared as null and
void the consolidated title of P Bank which was
affirmed by the CA and later, by the SC.
May a petition for issuance of writ of possession be
dispensed with when the SC had already decreed the
propriety of the issuance of such writ?
ANSWER:
Yes. Under the principle of conclusiveness of
judgment, the right of P Bank to a writ of possession
is binding and conclusive on the parties. The doctrine
of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment
postulates that "when a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has
been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it
remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the
parties and those in privity with them."
All the elements of the doctrine are present in this
case. The final judgment was rendered by the Court
pursuant to its jurisdiction over the review of decisions
and rulings of the CA. It was a judgment on the merits
of P Banks's right to apply for and be issued a writ of
possession. Lastly, the parties are the same parties
involved in the present case. The proceeding in a
petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and
summary in nature. It is a judicial proceeding brought
for the benefit of one party only and without notice by
the court to any person adverse of interest. It is a
proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the
person against whom the relief is sought an
opportunity to be heard.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
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MARQUEZ v. ALINDOG
A extended a loan to G and as a security thereof, G
executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the
subject parcel of land. Since G defaulted in the
payment of his loan obligation, Asought the extra-
judicial foreclosure of the subject property. At the
public auction sale A emerged as the highest bidder.
Upon G’s failure to redeem the same property within
the prescribed period therefor, title was consolidated
in the name of Spouses M with an annotation of
adverse claim in the names of Spouses B. Said
adverse annotation was copied from an earlier
annotation made only after the subject property’s
mortgage to Spouses M.
Spouses B filed a civil case for annulment of real
estate mortgage and certificate of sale on the ground
that they purchased the subject property from G but
was unable to secure a certificate of title in their
names due to deception of a certain C. Eventually,
they found out that the property had already been
mortgaged to Sps. M. Meanwhile, A filed an ex-parte
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession
claiming that the same is ministerial on the court’s
part following the consolidation of her and her
husband’s title over the subject property. RTC granted
the same. Spouses B sought the issuance of a TRO
and/or a writ of preliminary injunction which the latter
granted.
Did the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it issued the injunctive writ which enjoined Sps.
M from taking possession of the subject property?
ANSWER:
Yes. Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
provides that the possession of the mortgaged
property may be awarded to a purchaser in an extra-
judicial foreclosure unless a third party is actually
holding the property by adverse title or right.
In this case, it is clear that the issuance of a writ of
possession in favor of Spouses Marquez, who had
already consolidated their title over the extrajudicially
foreclosed property, is merely ministerial in nature.
The general rule as herein stated – and not the
exception found under Section 33, Rule 39 of the
Rules – should apply since Spouses B hinged their
claim over the subject property on their purported
purchase of the same from its previous owner, i.e.,
Spouses Gutierrez (with G being the original
mortgagor). Accordingly, it cannot be seriously
doubted that Spouses B are only the
latter’ssuccessors-in-interest who do not have a right
superior to them.The court ruled that the RTC’s
finding anent the initial evidence adduced by Spouses
B constitutes improper basis to justify the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction in their favor since it
had no authority to exercise any discretion in this
respect.Besides, the act sought to be enjoined, i.e.,
148
 the implementation of the writ of possession, had
already been accomplished in the interim and thus,
rendered the matter moot. Case law instructs that
injunction would not lie where the acts sought to be
enjoined had already become fait accompli (meaning,
an accomplished or consummated act). Hence, since
the consummation of the act sought to be restrained
had rendered Spouses B’s injunction petition moot,
the issuance of the said injunctive writ was altogether
improper.
QUINTOS v. DARAB
GCFI is a domestic corporation organized for the
purpose of engaging in poultry and livestock
production, processing, and trading. Petitioner Q is
the majority stockholderof GCFI who managed its
properties until it was taken over by R.
Q filed a petition for exemption (exemption case)
before the Office of the DAR Secretary citing a
jurisprudence wherein it was declared as
unconstitutional the inclusion of lands devoted to
commercial raising of livestock, poultry, and swine
under the CARP.
The DAR Secretary denied Q’s petition. Meanwhile,
KAMIFCI filed an action for the peaceful possession
and enjoyment of the subject property (tenancy case)
against Q before the Office of the Provincial
Adjudicator (PARAD), asserting its rights under an
agricultural leasehold tenancy agreement it
purportedly entered into with L. The Office of the
President (OP) rendered a Decision in the exemption
case, that the act of the DAR in declaring the said
properties as covered by the CARP without affording
GCFI the opportunity to contest the supposed
conversion was arbitrary and confiscatory.
In the tenancy case, the PARAD, the DARAB and the
CA held the validity of the tenancy agreement entered
by APT with the 53 KAMIFCI members.
Did the CA correctly sustain the validity of the tenancy
agreement?
ANSWER:
In the present case, the PARAD, the DARAB and the
CA all held that a tenancy relationship exists between
GCFI and the 53 KAMIFCI members who were
allegedly installed as tenants by APT, the "legal
possessor" of the mango orchard at that time.
Records are, however, bereft of any showing that APT
was authorized by the property’s landowner, GCFI, to
install tenants thereon.
To be sure, APT only assumed the rights of the
original mortgagees in this case, which, however,
have yet to exercise their right to foreclose the
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
mortgaged properties due to the RTCs order enjoining
the same. It is settled that a mortgagee does not
become the owner of the mortgaged property until he
has foreclosed the mortgage and, thereafter,
purchased the property at the foreclosure sale.With
the foreclosure proceedings having been enjoined,
APT could not have been regarded as the
"landowner" of the subject property. Thus, since the
consent of the standing landowner, GCFI, had not
been secured by APT in this case, it had no authority
to enter into any tenancy agreement with the
KAMIFCI members.
Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 1199 assumes the existence of a
tenancy relation. As its epigraph suggests, it is a
"Limitation of Relation," and the purpose is merely to
limit the tenancy "to the person who furnishes the land,
either as owner, lessee, usufructuary, or legal
possessor, and to the person who actually works the
land himself with the aid of labor available from within
his immediate farm household." Once the tenancy
relation is established, the parties to that relation are
limited to the persons therein stated. Obviously,
inherent in the right of landholders to install a tenant is
their authority to do so; otherwise, without such
authority, x x x landholders cannot install a tenant on
the landholding. Neither Sec. 6 of (R.A. No. 3844 nor
Sec. 8 o(R.A. No. 1199 automatically authorizes the
persons named therein to employ a tenant on the
landholding.
Since the law establishes a special relationship in
tenancy with important consequences, it properly
pinpoints the persons to whom said relationship shall
apply.
SOMBILON v. GARAY
Sps. A were the owners of a property which was
mortgaged to B Bank as security for their loan. It was
foreclosed and sold at public auction where B Bank
emerged as the winning bidder. A Certificate of Sale
was issued in the bank’s name which was duly
registered in the RD. The one year redemption lapsed
but Sps. A failed to redeem the property. A Final Deed
was issued in favor of B Bank and TCT was named
under its name. On the same day, B Bank approved
the purchase offer of Atty. G since Sps. B failed to
make down payment. B Bank filed an ex-parte petition
for the issuance of Writ of Possession before the RTC.
The RTC issued an order granting the petition. Sps. A
then moved for the reconsideration of the issuance of
the writ arguing that Atty. G is barred from purchasing
the property pursuant to Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
The RTC then held in abeyance the Writ of
Possession.
Was the judge correct in holding in abeyance the
implementation of the Writ of Possession?
149
 ANSWER:
No. The issuance of a writ of possession is ministerial
upon the court. A debtor has one year from the date
the Certificate of Sale is registered with the RD within
which to redeem his property. During the one-year
redemption period, the purchaser may possess the
proeprty by filing a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession before the court, upon posting a bond. But
after the one-year period, the purchaser has a right to
consolidate the title and to possess the property,
without the need of a bond. And once title is
consolidated under the name of the purchaser, the
issuance of the writ of possession becomes
ministerial on the part of the court; thus, no discretion
is left to the court. Questions regarding the regularity
and validity of the mortgage or the foreclosure sale
may not be raised as a ground to oppose or hold in
abeyance the issuance of the writ of possession as
these must be raised in a separate action for the
annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure sale.
The pendency of such action is also not a ground to
stay the issuance of a writ of possession. In this case,
the redemption period had long lapsed when B Bank
applied for the issuance of the Writ of Possession. In
fact, the title over the subject property had already
been consolidated in PNB’s name. Thus, it was
ministerial upon the RTC to issue the Writ of
Possession in favor of PNB, the registered owner of
the subject property.
Though there are instances when the issuance of the
Writ of Possession may be deferred, we find none of
these recognized exceptions present in the instant
case. Spouses A claim that the sale between B Bank
and Atty. G was invalid as it was done in violation of
paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code. However,
the alleged invalidity of the sale is not a ground to
oppose or defer the issuance of the Writ of
Possession as this does not affect B Bank’s right to
possess the subject property. Thus, there was no
reason for the RTC to hold in abeyance the
implementation of the Writ of Possession. Clearly, he
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
assailed Order holding in abeyance the
implementation of the Writ of Possession because B
Bank, as the registered owner, is entitled to the
possession of the subject property as a matter of right.
CABLING v. LUMAPAS
A was the highest bidder in an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale. A filed an Application for the
Issuance of a Writ of Possession with the RTC.
The RTC issued an order granting the A's application,
and subsequently issued a Writ of Possession and
Notice to Vacate.
B, through counsel, filed a Motion for Leave of Court
for Intervention as Party Defendant (with Urgent
Motion to Hold in Abeyance Implementation of Writ of
Possession) and an Answer in Intervention, as a third
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
party in actual possession of the foreclosed property.
She claimed that the property had previously been
sold to her by C, the property's registered owner and
the judgment debtor/mortgagor in the extrajudicial.
The RTC issued an order holding in abeyance the
implementation of the petitioner's writ of possession
until after the resolution of the respondent's motion.
The RTC issued the 1st assailed order granting the
respondent's motion for reconsideration. In a decision,
the CA dismissed the petitioner's Rule 65 petition and
affirmed in toto the RTC's assailed orders.
While recognizing the respondent's actual possession
of the subject property, the petitioner contends that
such possession is not adverse to that of the
judgment debtor/mortgagor. Neither is possession in
the concept of an owner because in a conditional sale,
ownership is... retained by the seller until the
fulfillment of a positive suspensive condition, that is,
the full payment of the purchase price.
A argues that the present case is not an exception to
the ministerial issuance of a writ of possession. Is A’s
argument meritorious?
ANSWER:
Yes. The well-settled rule is that in the extrajudicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgages under Act No.
3135 (as amended), the issuance of a writ of
possession is ministerial upon the court after the
foreclosure sale and... during the redemption period
when the court may issue the order for a writ of
possession upon the mere filing of an ex parte motion
and the approval of the corresponding bond.
The writ of possession also issues as a matter of
course, without need of a bond or of a separate and
independent action, after the lapse of the period of
redemption, and after the consolidation of ownership
and the issuance of a new TCT in the purchaser's
name.
There is, however, an exception to the rule.
Under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
which is made applicable to extrajudicial foreclosures
of real estate mortgages, the possession of the
property shall be given to the purchaser or last
redemptioner unless a third party is actually holding
the property in a capacity adverse to the judgment
obligor. Thus, the court's obligation to issue an ex
parte writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial
when there is a... third party in possession of the
property claiming a right adverse to that of the
judgment debtor/mortgagor.
In the present case, the respondent cannot be said to
possess the subject property by adverse title or right
as her possession is merely premised on the alleged
150
 conditional sale of the property to her by the judgment a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and
debtor/mortgagor. may not be named a party defendant in a court action.

The execution of a contract of conditional sale does

not immediately transfer title to the property to be sold GOPIAO v. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST
from seller to buyer. In such contract, ownership or
title to the property is retained by the seller until the CO
fulfillment of a positive suspensive condition which is
normally the payment of the purchase price in the A writ of possession was ordered in in favor of Metro
manner agreed upon. In the present case, the Deed Bank when it purchased the subject properties at a
of Conditional Sale between the respondent (buyer) public auction and registered the same in its name.
and the subject property's registered owner (seller) Consequently, a Notice to Vacate was served
expressly reserved to the latter ownership over the Spouses.
property until full payment of the purchase price,
despite the delivery of the subject... property to the Upon learning of the notice to vacate Mr G filed an
respondent. In order for the respondent not to be Affidavit of Third Party. Claim on and a Very Urgent
ousted by the ex parte issuance of a writ... of Motion for Intervention and to Recall and/or Stop the
possession, her possession of the property must be Enforcement/Implementation of the Writ of
adverse in that she must prove a right independent of Possession.
and even superior to that of the judgment
debtor/mortgagor. Mr. G alleged to be in actual occupation of the subject
properties and claimed ownership thereof by virtue of
Under these circumstances, the general rule, and not a Deed of Sale Spouses Legaspi in his favor.RTC
the exception, applies. however denied his motions. Mr G. posits that the
RTC gravely abused its discretion when it failed to
recognize his right as a third party adverse possessor.
BEROT v. SIAPNAO He explains that while the issuance of a writ of
possession after a foreclosure sale is ministerial, it
ceases to be a ministerial duty of the court if there is a
M and Spouses B obtained a loan from S in the sum
third party holding the property adversely to the
of PhP250,000.00, payable within one year together
judgment debtor.
with interest thereon at the rate of 2% per annum from
that date until fully paid.
Is the contention of Mr. G Correct?
As security for the loan M and Spouses B mortgaged
ANSWER:
to S a portion, consisting of 147 square meters of that
parcel of land with an area of 718 square meters
NO, A writ of possession is a writ of execution
Pangasinan.
employed to enforce a judgment to recover the
possession of land. It commands the sheriff to enter
M died because of the mortgagors' default, appellee
the land and give its possession to the party entitled
filed an action against them for foreclosure of
under the judgment. Under Sections 6 and 7 of Act
mortgage and damages in the RTV of Dagupan.
3135,as amended by Act 4118, a writ of possession
Since M died is her estate a proper party to a
may be issued in favor of a purchase rin a foreclosure
foreclosure proceedings?
sale of a real estate mortgage either (1) within the
one-year redemption period, upon the ling of a bond;
ANSWER:
or (2) after the lapse of the redemption period, without
need of a bond.
No, A deceased person's estate has no legal
personality to be sued. Citing the Court's ruling in
It is a well-established rule that the issuance of a writ
Ventura v. Militante, it correctly ruled that a decedent
of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a
does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be
ministerial function of the court, which cannot be
made a defendant in a case: A deceased person does
enjoined or restrained, even by the filing of a civil case
not have such legal entity as is necessary to bring
for the declaration of nullity of the foreclosure and
action so much so that a motion to substitute cannot
consequent auction sale.
lie and should be denied by the court.
Once title to the property has been consolidated in the
An action begun by a decedent's estate cannot be
buyer's name upon failure of the mortgagor to redeem
said to have been begun by a legal person, since an
the property within the one-year redemption period,
estate is not a legal entity; such an action is a nullity
the writ of possession becomes a matter of right
and a motion to amend the party plaintiff will not,
belonging to the buyer. Its right to possession has
likewise, lie, there being nothing before the court to
then ripened into the right of a confirmed absolute
amend. Considering that capacity to be sued is a
owner and the issuance of the writ becomes a
correlative of the capacity to sue, to the same extent,

UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS

SCHOOL OF LAW 151
 ministerial function that does not admit of the exercise
of the court's discretion.
Moreover, a petition for a writ of possession is ex-
parte and summary in nature. As one brought for the
benefit of one party only and without notice by the
court to any person adverse of interest, it is a judicial
proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the
person against whom the relief is sought an
opportunity to be heard. Since the judge to whom the
application for writ of possession is filed need not look
into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its
foreclosure, it has been ruled that the ministerial duty
of the
trial court does not become discretionary upon the
filing of a complaint questioning the mortgage.
Corollary, any question regarding the validity of the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale and the resulting
cancellation of the writ may, likewise, be determined
in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in Section 8 of
Act No. 3135.
The foregoing rule, however, admits of a few
exceptions, one of which is when a third party in
possession of the property claims a right adverse to
that of the debtor mortgagor, as this Court has time
and again upheld in numerous cases, consistent with
Section 33of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. As such,
petitioner claims that since the following rulings
squarely apply to the instant case, the writ of
possession should not be enforced against him.
OKABE v. SATURNINO
The subject of the controversy is an eighty-one (81)
square meter property located in Barangay San Antonio,
Makati City, under the name of Spouses S. Spouses S
obtained a loan with the Philippine National Bank (PNB),
which was secured by the subject property. Because of
the couple's failure to settle their loan obligation with the
bank, PNB extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage the
Certificate of Sale was inscribed on the TCT. Considering
that the property was not redeemed by respondent during
the redemption period, consolidation of ownership was
inscribed and a new TCT was issued in favor of PNB.
Without taking possession of the subject property, PNB
sold the land to MR. O. TCT was later issued in Mr. O’s
name. Mr. Ofiled with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati.
City an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of Writ of
Possession over the subject property, to which Spouses
S submitted an Opposition with Motion to Dismiss. Is the
Issuance of writ of possession the proper remedy of
obtaining possession of the subject property?
ANSWER:
No, Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.
4118, states:
UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS
SCHOOL OF LAW
Section 7. In any sale made under the provisions of
this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First
Instance of the province or place where the property
or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession
thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond
in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for
a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in
case it be shown that the sale was made without
violating the mortgage or without complying with the
requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made
under oath and filed in the form of an ex parte motion
and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order
that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the
sheriff of the province in which the property is situated,
who shall execute said order immediately.
Under the provision cited above, the purchaser or the
mortgagee who is also the purchaser in the
foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of possession
during the redemption period upon an ex parte motion
and after furnishing a bond.
In GC Dalton Industries, Inc. v. Equitable PCI
Bank ,the Court held that the issuance of a writ of
possession to a purchaser in an extrajudicial
foreclosure is summary and ministerial in nature as
such proceeding is merely an incident in the transfer
of title. Also, in China Banking Corporation v.
Ordinario , we held that under Section 7 of Act No.
3135, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale is entitled to
possession of the property.In the recent case of
Spouses Nicasio Marquez and Anita Marquez v.
Spouses Carlito Alindog and Carmen Alindog ,
although the Court allowed the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale to demand possession of the land
during the redemption period, it still required the
posting of a bond under Section 7 of Act No. 3135.
Thus: It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure
sale becomes the absolute owner of the property
purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of
one year after the registration of the sale. As such, he
is entitled to the possession of the said property and
can demand it at any time following the consolidation
of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a
new transfer certificate of title. The buyer can in fact
demand possession of the land even during the
redemption period except that he has to post a bond
in accordance with Section 7of Act No. 3135, as
amended. No such bond is required after the
redemption period if the property is not redeemed.
Possession of the land then becomes an absolute
right of the purchaser as confirmed owner. Upon
proper application and proof of title, the issuance of
the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of
the court.
Here, petitioner does not fall under the circumstances
of the aforequoted case and the provisions of Section
7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, since she bought the
property long after the expiration of the redemption
period. Thus, it is PNB, if it was the purchaser in the
foreclosure sale, or the purchaser during the
152
 foreclosure sale, who can file the ex-parte petition for In this case, B and C’s contention that since they had
the issuance of writ of possession during the possession of the subject property, they are entitled to
redemption period, but it will only issue upon remain there, they confuse unlawful detainer with forcible
compliance with the provisions of Section 7 of Act No. entry. Prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not
3135. necessary in an unlawful detainer case. It is enough that
she has a better right of possession. Prior physical
possession of a property by a party is indispensable only
in forcible entry cases. In unlawful detainer cases, the
ARAMBULO v. GUNGAB defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of the
property, but his possession eventually becomes unlawful
upon termination or expiration of his right to possess.
A, registered owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT
Thus, petitioners' prior physical possession of the
No. 000, made a formal demand to B and C to vacate
property does not automatically entitle them to continue in
said property but the latter refused asserting that B is a
said possession and does not give them a better right to
co-owner and that their 'use and possession of these
the property. The evidence showed that A has a Torrens
portions of the subject property had been with the
Title over the land and as a registered owner, A is
knowledge, consent and tolerance of all the other co-
preferred to possess it.
owners’. Since no amicable settlement was reached in
the barangay, A filed an ejectment complaint against B
and C alleging (1) that she owns the subject property; (2)
that she tolerated petitioners' occupancy of certain
portions of the subject property without rent; and (3) that
despite her demands, they refused to vacate the subject
property. the MeTC dismissed the ejectment cases for
lack of cause of action, It ruled based on its findings (1)
that respondent's allegation of tolerance was
preposterous since she failed to prove her proper
acquisition of the subject property; and (2) that petitioners
were entitled to retain possession of the subject property
pursuant to Article 448 of the Civil Code.

Can A eject B and C?

ANSWER:

Yes. Pertinent to the instant case are the summary

remedies of forcible entry and unlawful detainer under
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. They are
distinguished from each other as follows:

In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of

land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully
withholds possession thereof after the expiration or
termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the
possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic
inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto.
In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful
but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of
the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful
possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant
is in actual possession and the plaintiff's cause of action
is the termination of the defendant's right to continue in
possession.
What determines the cause of action is the nature of
defendant's entry into the land. If the entry is illegal, then
the action which may be filed against the intruder within
one year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand,
the entry is legal but the possession thereafter became
illegal, the case is one of unlawful detainer which must be
filed within one year from the date of the last demand.

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 RULE 70: FORCIBLE ENTRY & UNLAWFUL
DETAINER
ARAMBULO v. GUNGAB
A, registered owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT
No. 000, made a formal demand to B and C to vacate
said property but the latter refused asserting that B is a
co-owner and that their 'use and possession of these
portions of the subject property had been with the
knowledge, consent and tolerance of all the other co-
owners’. Since no amicable settlement was reached in
the barangay, A filed an ejectment complaint against B
and C alleging (1) that she owns the subject property; (2)
that she tolerated petitioners' occupancy of certain
portions of the subject property without rent; and (3) that
despite her demands, they refused to vacate the subject
property. the MeTC dismissed the ejectment cases for
lack of cause of action, It ruled based on its findings (1)
that respondent's allegation of tolerance was
preposterous since she failed to prove her proper
acquisition of the subject property; and (2) that petitioners
were entitled to retain possession of the subject property
pursuant to Article 448 of the Civil Code.
Can A eject B and C?
ANSWER:
Yes. Pertinent to the instant case are the summary
remedies of forcible entry and unlawful detainer under
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. They are
distinguished from each other as follows:
In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of
land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully
withholds possession thereof after the expiration or
termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the
possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic
inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto.
In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful
but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of
the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful
possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant
is in actual possession and the plaintiff's cause of action
is the termination of the defendant's right to continue in
possession.
What determines the cause of action is the nature of
defendant's entry into the land. If the entry is illegal, then
the action which may be filed against the intruder within
one year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand,
the entry is legal but the possession thereafter became
illegal, the case is one of unlawful detainer which must be
filed within one year from the date of the last demand.
In this case, B and C’s contention that since they had
possession of the subject property, they are entitled to
remain there, they confuse unlawful detainer with forcible
entry. Prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not
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necessary in an unlawful detainer case. It is enough that
she has a better right of possession. Prior physical
possession of a property by a party is indispensable only
in forcible entry cases. In unlawful detainer cases, the
defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of the
property, but his possession eventually becomes unlawful
upon termination or expiration of his right to possess.
Thus, petitioners' prior physical possession of the
property does not automatically entitle them to continue in
said possession and does not give them a better right to
the property. The evidence showed that A has a Torrens
Title over the land and as a registered owner, A is
preferred to possess it.
SPOUSES BARNACHEA v. CA
That Spouses A and B are the registered owners in fee
simple of several residential lots identified as lots 16 and
17 covered by Certificate of Title Nos. 86821 and 86822
issued in the name of the spouses by the Register of
Deeds of Bulacan. A portion of the lots 16 and 17, a
portion of the house of the C was erected and built thus
usurping the said portion and this was made known to the
defendants when the plaintiffs caused the relocation of
the subject lots, however, considering that the latter were
not yet in need of that portion, they allowed the former to
stay on the portion by tolerance. Spouses A and B filed
their ejectment complaint against C before the MTC, the
subject matter being the lots titled in spouse B’s name
which lots are adjacent to the property that C owns and
occupy.
Is the ejectment case filed by spouses A and B for
unlawful detainer or forcible entry?
ANSWER:
The action is for unlawful detainer. The actions for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer are similar because
they are both summary actions where the issue is purely
physical possession. Other than these commonalities,
however, they possess dissimilarities that are clear,
distinct, and well established in law.
In forcible entry, (1) the plaintiff must prove that he was in
prior physical possession of the property until he was
deprived of possession by the defendant; (2) the
defendant secures possession of the disputed property
from the plaintiff by means of force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth; hence, his possession is unlawful from
the beginning; (3) the law does not require a previous
demand by the plaintiff for the defendant to vacate the
premises; and (4) the action can be brought only within
one-year from the date the defendant actually and
illegally entered the property. In marked contrast,
unlawful detainer is attended by the following features: (1)
prior possession of the property by the plaintiff is not
necessary; (2) possession of the property by the
defendant at the start is legal but the possession
becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right to
possession based on his or her contract or other
154
arrangement with the plaintiff; (3) the plaintiff is required
by law to make a demand as a jurisdictional requirement;
and (4) the one-year period to bring the complaint is
counted from the date of the plaintiff’s last demand on the
defendant.
In this case, the complaint shows that the spouses
allowed them to occupy the disputed property by
tolerance and the spouses eventually made a demand for
C to vacate the property but C refused. the complete
absence of any allegation of force, intimidation, strategy
or stealth in the complaint with respect to the petitioners’
possession of the respondents’ property. While
admittedly no express contract existed between the
parties regarding the petitioners’ possession, the absence
does not signify an illegality in the entry nor an entry by
force, intimidation, strategy or stealth that would
characterize the entry as forcible. It has been held that a
person who occupies land of another at the latter’s
tolerance or permission, without any contract between
them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he
will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action
for ejectment is the proper remedy. The status of the
defendant is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant
whose terms have expired but whose occupancy
continues by tolerance of the owner. Thus, the spouses’
action is one of unlawful detainer.
FERNANDO v. SPOUSES LIM
Spouses X and Y, registered owners of a property
covered by TCT 555, through counsel, informed Z that
they were the owners of said property, that they were not
renewing her lease and requested the latter to surrender
peacefully the possession of the leased premises to his
clients. Z refused which prompt X and Y to file an
ejectment suit. Z alleged that spouses X and Y had no
cause of action for ejectment because they did not serve
on her a valid demand to pay rent and vacate, or resort to
barangay conciliation and that she was never remiss in
her obligations under the monthly lease contract; and
under the Rent Control Law, expiration of contract is not a
valid ground for ejectment.
Is the filing of the unlawful detainer case proper?
ANSWER
Yes. Republic Act No. 9161,82 otherwise known as the
"Rental Reform Act of 2002," was the rent control law in
force at the time the complaint for unlawful detainer was
filed. Sec. 7(e) thereof allows for judicial ejectment of a
lessee on the ground of expiration of the period of the
lease contract.
In this case, Z’s right to possession of the disputed
property has expired and her continued possession
thereof unlawfully deprives respondents of the enjoyment
of the property; and that, therefore, she must now
peacefully surrender possession thereof to respondents.
Her remaining defense is that, under the rent control laws,
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respondents cannot eject her because she has been
religiously paying her rent.
The month-to-month lease contract of Z expired and was
not renewed by X and Y. Hence, the latter acted well
within their rights to file a complaint for unlawful detainer.
SPOUSES SAMONTE v. CENTURY SAVINGS
BANK
X’s property was foreclosed and its ownership
consolidated by Y as a result of an unpaid mortgage. X
then executed a contract of lease with Y over the said
property. When X failed to pay the rentals, Y filed a case
for ejectment against him. Consequently, X filed an action
to nullify the foreclosure proceedings for being void; he
also argued that the ejectment case must be suspended
because Y’s right to possess must depend on the
outcome of the said nullification case.
Is the argument of X correct?
ANSWER:
No. X is not correct.
Under Sec. 16, Rule 70, when the defendant raises the
defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue
of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved
only to determine the issue of possession. It has been
held that in cases under Rule 70, the issue is pure
physical or de facto possession and any pronouncements
made on questions of ownership are provisional in nature
and therefore cannot be clothed with finality.
In this case, no suspension must be allowed. Y’s right to
possess the property should not depend on the
foreclosure proceedings because any judgment by the
court in the ejectment proceedings are merely provisional.
Therefore, the argument of X is not correct.
SPOUSES REFUGIA v. CA
X bought a parcel of land and a title was issued in his
name. Its purchase price, however, was paid by his father
Z. X constructed a duplex and it was occupied by him and
his brother Y. One day, X, for some reason, asked Y to
vacate. Y refused, arguing that it was in fact Z who
bought the lot. X filed an action for ejectment against Y.
The court dismissed the ejectment case, holding that X
and Y are co-owners.
Is the court correct?
ANSWER
No. The court should not have ruled on the true
ownership of the property.
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Under Sec. 16, Rule 70, when the defendant raises the
defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue
of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved
only to determine the issue of possession.
In this case, the court erroneously held that X and Y are
co-owners. This is because the case is one of ejectment.
Any pronouncement by the court as to ownership in these
cases are merely provisional and are only for the purpose
of determining possession. The issue as to who among
the parties is the true and rightful owner must be decided
in a separate action, not in an ejectment case.
ENCARNACION v. AMIGO
Z entered and took possession of a portion of the
property of Y even after Y sold the property to X in 1995.
In 2001, X filed an action for ejectment against Z. The
court dismissed the case and held that the proper remedy
should have been accion publiciana.
Is the judgment of the court correct?
ANSWER:
Yes. Under Sec. 1, Rule 70, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or
other person against whom the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of
any contract, express or implied, of the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one year
after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial
Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or
persons claiming under them, together with damages and
costs.
It has been held that there are three kinds of actions for
the recovery of possession of real properties:
(1) Accion interdictal or an ejectment proceeding, either
for focible entry or unlawful detainer, which is a summary
action brough in the MTC;
(2) Accion publiciana or the plenary action for the
recovery of the real right of possession and brought either
in the MTC or RTC depending on the value of the real
property; or
(3) Accion reinvidicatoria which is an action for the
recovery of ownership brought in the proper RTC.
In this case, X was already the owner of the property in
1995, but it was only in 2001 that he filed a complaint for
ejectment. Six years had already lapsed, which brings the
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action beyond the ambit of accion interdictal and made it
one for accion publiciana.
SPOUSES MENDOZA v. CORONEL
X, one of the co-owners of the subject property, filed an
ejectment case against Y. The court dismissed the case,
ruling that the other co-owners of the property should
have been impleaded as indispensable parties.
Is the court correct?
ANSWER:
No. The court is incorrect in dismissing the case.
Under Sec. 1, Rule 70, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or
other person against whom the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of
any contract, express or implied, of the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1)
year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial
Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or
persons claiming under them, together with damages and
costs. It has been held that, pursuant to Art. 487, any one
of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment, the
suit being deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.
In this case, the other co-owners need not be impleaded.
X represents his other co-owners of the subject property
in this ejectment case and such is deemed to be for the
benefit of all the other co-owners.
PAJUYO v. CA
P and G, both squatters of a certain lot, executed a
Kasunduan or Agreement wherein P, as owner of the
house, allowed G to live the house for free provided the
latter would maintain its cleanliness and orderliness, and
G promised to vacate the same upon demand. P filed an
ejectment case against G when he did not vacate the
house upon P’s demand, and both the MTC and RTC
ruled in favor of P. G filed a petition for review arguing
that a suit by squatter against a fellow squatter does not
constitute a valid case for ejectment, and, therefore,
divests the court of jurisdiction to resolve the issue of
possession. The CA reversed the MTC and RTC rulings
declaring that P and G are squatters who illegally
occupied the contested lot which the government owned.
It further ruled that G has a better right over the property
in which the house was built under Proclamation No. 137
considering that G was the actual occupant or caretaker
of the lot during the time of issuance of the said
proclamation, and as squatters, they are in pari delicto or
in equal fault.
156

Is the principle of pari delicto applicable in ejectment
cases?
ANSWER:
No, the principle of pari delicto is not applicable in
ejectment cases.
The application of the pari delicto principle is not absolute,
as there are exceptions to its application. One of these
exceptions is where the application of the pari delicto rule
would violate well-established public policy. The
application of the principle of pari delicto to a case of
ejectment between squatters is fraught with danger. To
shut out relief to squatters on the ground of pari delicto
would openly invite mayhem and lawlessness. Petty
warfare over possession of properties is precisely what
ejectment cases or actions for recovery of possession
seek to prevent. Even the owner who has title over the
disputed property cannot take the law into his own hands
to regain possession of his property. The owner must go
to court. Courts must resolve the issue of possession
even if the parties to the ejectment suit are squatters.
The principle of pari delicto as applied by the Court of
Appeals would give squatters free rein to dispossess
fellow squatters or violently retake possession of
properties usurped from them. Courts should not leave
squatters to their own devices in cases involving recovery
of possession.
Thus, principle of pari delicto is not applicable in
ejectment cases.
SPOUSES BENITEZ v. CA
Spouses M bought a 285.70 square meter lot adjacent to
the lot owned by Spouses B. After a relocation survey
which was conducted within one year from purchase,
Spouses M discovered that some 46.50 square meters of
their property was occupied by Spouses B’s house.
Since Spouses B refused to vacate, despite verbal and
written demands, the portion of the lot occupied by their
house but owned by Spouses M, the latter filed with the
MeTC a civil case for ejectment against the former.
Spouses B argued that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over
the case because the real nature of the action is accion
publiciana or recovery of possession, not unlawful
detainer. Moreover, Spouses B argued that there is no
forcible entry because Spouses M did not have prior
possession of the contested property as they (Spouses B)
possessed it ahead of the respondents (Spouses M).
Is ejectment the proper remedy?
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ANSWER:
Yes, ejectment is the proper remedy.
Prior possession is not always a condition sine qua non in
ejectment. This is one of the distinctions between forcible
entry and unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, the plaintiff
is deprived of physical possession of his land or building
by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth;
thus, he must allege and prove prior possession. But in
unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds
possession after the expiration or termination of his right
thereto under any contract, express or implied. In such a
case, prior physical possession is not required.
Possession can also be acquired, not only by material
occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to
the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal
formalities established for acquiring such right.
Possession of land can be acquired upon the execution
of the deed of sale thereof by its vendor. Actual or
physical occupation is not always necessary.
In the case before us, considering that Spouses M are
unlawfully deprived of possession of the encroached land
and that the action for the recovery of possession thereof
was made within the one-year reglementary period,
ejectment is the proper remedy. The MeTC had
jurisdiction.
MALABANAN v. RURAL BANK OF CABUYAO
To secure the payment of a loan granted by C to M, M
executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of C over a
parcel of land with TCT No. 255916. When M failed to
settle his loan, he executed a dacion en pago over the
mortgaged property in favor of C in which a new TCT
No.T-493506 was subsequently issued. For refusal of M
to surrender the possession of the subject property
despite repeated demands, C filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer before the MTCC. The MTCC
dismissed the complaint, but the same was reversed by
the RTC and further affirmed by the CA. M filed a petition
for review on certiorari arguing that, the complaint should
be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia and forum
shopping as prior to the institution of ejectment case, M
had already filed an action for Annulment of the dacion en
pago and TCT No. T-493506 and reconveyance before
the RTC.
Will the judgment in the ejectment case amount to res
judicata in the annulment case, and vice versa?
ANSWER:
No, the judgment in the ejectment case will not amount to
res judicata in the annulment case, and vice versa.
It has been laid to rest by heaps of cases iterating the
principle that a judgment rendered in an ejectment case
shall not bar an action between the same parties
respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be
157
conclusive as to the facts therein found in a case
between the same parties upon a different cause of
action involving possession. In ejectment suits, the only
issue for resolution is the physical or material possession
of the property involved, independent of any claim of
ownership by any of the party litigants. However, the
issue of ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for
the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to
possession de facto. The provisional determination of
ownership in the ejectment case cannot be clothed with
finality. Ejectment case is simply designed to summarily
restore physical possession of a piece of land or building
to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof,
without prejudice to the settlement of the parties'
opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate
proceedings.
Here, what is being resolved in the ejectment case is the
physical or material possession of the property involved.
The ejectment case is without prejudice to the settlement
of the parties’ opposing claims of juridical possession. A
pending action involving ownership of the same property
does not bar the filing or consideration of an ejectment
suit, nor suspend the proceedings.
Thus, the judgment in the ejectment case will not amount
to res judicata in the annulment case, and vice versa.
OPTIONAL READINGS FOR RULE 70
ACBANG v. LUCZON
Y commenced an ejectment suit against X. The latter
did not file an answer thus prompting the MTC to
render judgment in favor of Y. X moved for an appeal
while Y moved for execution of the decision pending
the appeal, alleging that X did not file a supersedeas
bond to stay the execution. The motion for execution
was granted and a motion reconsideration filed by X
was later denied for failure to file supersedeas bond
as required by the rules to stay the execution of the
judgment.
Was the court correct in granting the motion for
execution?
ANSWER:
Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that If judgment is rendered
against the defendant, execution shall issue
immediately upon motion unless an appeal has been
perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a
sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the
Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the
plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing
down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and
unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he
deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent
due from time to time under the contract, if any, as
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determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial
Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit
with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of
the use and occupation of the premises for the
preceding month or period at the rate determined by
the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth
day of each succeeding month or period.
In the case at bar, although the X correctly states that
the Spouses Lopez should file a motion for execution
pending appeal before the court may issue an order
for the immediate execution of the judgment, Spouses
Y are equally correct in pointing out that they were
entitled to the immediate execution of the judgment in
view of X’s failure to comply with all of the three
abovementioned requisites for staying the immediate
execution. The filing of the notice of appeal alone
perfected the appeal but did not suffice to stay the
immediate execution without the filing of the sufficient
supersedeas bond and the deposit of the accruing
rentals.
ALCONERAv. PALLANAN
In an unlawful detainer case where X was a counsel
the MTCC ruled against his client. While an appeal
was pending, the RTC issued a writ of possession
upon the motion of Y. X filed a motion for
reconsideration assailing the writ of possession
issued. A disagreement between X and the sheriff
ensued, where X argued that the writ should not be
enforced pending the resolution of the motion for
reconsideration.
Is X’s argument tenable?
ANSWER:
No. X’s argument is untenable.
Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that If judgment is rendered
against the defendant, execution shall issue
immediately upon motion unless an appeal has been
perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a
sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the
Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the
plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing
down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and
unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he
deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent
due from time to time under the contract, if any, as
determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial
Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit
with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of
the use and occupation of the premises for the
preceding month or period at the rate determined by
the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth
day of each succeeding month or period.
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 In the case at bar, X did not comply with any of the
requirement stated in Rule 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure and the law provides that the rulings
are immediately executory and can only be stayed via
compliance of such rule. Thus, the failure of X to
comply with any of these conditions is a ground for
the execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in
this respect is ministerial.
TEODORO v. ESPINO
X, through a will, was bequeathed a piece of property
where an ancestral home stood before it was
demolished by X. Y, relatives of X, which lived in the
surrounding property, erected fences and signs which
effectively dispossessed X of the property. X then filed
a complaint for forcible entry. The MTC dismissed the
complaint but was reversed by the RTC. The CA
however reversed the RTC’s decision on the ground
that X failed to discharge the burden of proof that he
had prior actual physical possession of the subject
property before it was barricaded by Y to warrant the
institution of the forcible entry suit.
Was the dismissal proper?
ANSWER:
No. The dismissal was not proper.
Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that a
person deprived of the possession of any land or
building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building
is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of
any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one
(1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding
of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal
Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person
or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of
such possession, together with damages and costs.
In the case at bar, the act of Y in barricading the
property resulted to an unlawful dispossession of X on
the property. Also, exclusive ownership by X of the
whole property is not required for him to be entitled to
the possession since such ownership issue is inutile
in an ejectment suit except to throw light on the
question of possession. Therefore, the dismissal of
the Court of Appeals was improper.
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OCAMPO v. HEIRS OF BERNARDINO
X filed a complaint for forcible entry with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cardona, Rizal against
Y and Z in which the former sought to recover
possession of a portion of his property, covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. M-4559,
situated in Dalig, Cardona, Rizal, alleging that Y and Z
built a piggery thereon without his consent. Y denied
X’s allegation, claiming that the disputed parcel of
land is owned by his wife, Z, who inherited the same
from her father and further claimed that they have
been in possession of the said parcel of land since
1969. The MTC rendered a decision, which dismissed
the complaint for forcible entry filed by X and
subsequently denied the latter’s notice of appeal.
Consequently, the heirs of X, filed a complaint for
recovery of possession with the MTC, Y and Z who
claimed that the heirs of X’s’ complaint for recovery of
possession of the subject property is barred by res
judicata in the light of the finality of the decision in the
forcible entry case.
Does the finality of the decision in the forcible entry
case constitutes res judicata, which would warrant the
dismissal of the complaint for recovery of possession?
ANSWER:
No. Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
expressly provides that a "judgment rendered in an
action for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive
with respect to the possession only and shall in no
wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land."
For res judicata under the first concept, bar by prior
judgment, to apply, the following requisites must
concur, viz: (a) finality of the former judgment; (b) the
court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be,
between the first and second actions, identity of
parties, subject matter and causes of action The first
three requisites are present in this case. However, the
fourth requisite is not present. Although there is
identity of parties and subject matter as between the
forcible entry case and recovery of possession case,
there is no identity of causes of action. the forcible
entry case only involves the issue of possession over
the subject property while the recovery of possession
case puts in issue the ownership of the subject
property and the concomitant right to possess the
same as an attribute of ownership.
In this case, the heirs of X were able to prove that
they have a superior right over the subject property as
against the Y and Z. Thus, as owners of the subject
property, the heirs of X have the right to recover the
possession thereof from any person illegally
occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible.
159
 QUIJANO v. AMANTE
A and his siblings inherited from their Father B a
parcel of land. Prior to any partition among the heirs,
A sold a portion of his share, measuring 600 square
meters, to Z, with the affected portion being described
in the deed of absolute sale Eliseo executed. A and
his siblings executed a deed of extrajudicial partition
to divide their father's estate (consisting of the
aforementioned parcel of land) among themselves
and resulted in the portions earlier sold by A to Z
being adjudicated to C. Z was then asked by C to
vacate the property but the latter refused and thus the
former file a complaint for ejectment and damages in
the MTCC of Cebu City. C alleged that she was the
registered owner of the parcel of land and that Z was
only staying on the subject land by mere tolerance but
Z denied the allegation and contended that he was in
fact the owner and lawful possessor of the property,
having bought it from A.
Was the ejectment case filed against Z by C proper?
ANSWER:
No. Where the plaintiff does not prove her alleged
tolerance of the defendant's occupation, the
possession is deemed illegal from the beginning.
Hence, the action for unlawful detainer is an improper
remedy. But the action cannot be considered as one
for forcible entry without any allegation in the
complaint that the entry of the defendant was by
means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
In this case, In contrast, the Z consistently stood firm
on his assertion that his possession of the disputed
property was in the concept of an owner, not by the
mere tolerance of A, and actually presented the deeds
of sale transferring ownership of the property to him.
Considering that the allegation of the petitioner's
tolerance of the respondent's possession of the
disputed property was not established, the possession
could very well be deemed illegal from the beginning.
In that case. Thus, her action for unlawful detainer
has to fail.
ABADILLA, Jr. v. OBRERO
Spouses X initiated a case for forcible entry against Y.
The spouses claimed that they are the registered
owners of the land in question based on the TCT
registered under their name. They further claimed that
they were in possession thereof based on
improvements erected therein utilized for residential
and business purposes prior to the alleged act of Y
who forcibly fenced the perimeter of the land with
barbed wire. By way of defense, Y claimed that the
land was sold by the spouses to his late Father
evidence by a deed of absolute sale and being one of
the heirs, he is one of the owners.
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SCHOOL OF LAW
Should the ejectment case be granted?
ANSWER:
Yes. SECTION 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Who may institute proceedings, and when - ..”a
person deprived of the possession of any land or
building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building
is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of
any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person,..”
In this case, Spouses X have the right of possession
over the subject property on the strength of the title in
their names. As such, they were justified in
committing acts of possession over the said property,
to the exclusion of Y.
PENTA PACIFIC v. LEVY CONSTRUCTION
ABC Corporation owned the 25th floor of the Pacific
Star building in Makati and leased a portion thereof to
XYZ Corporation. After a few months, both parties
entered into a contract to sell for the entire 25th floor
which provided a cancellation or forfeiture provision
stipulating that failure on XYZ’s part to pay the full
downpayment, or deliver the post-dated checks or pay
the monthly amortization on the due date, shall entitle
ABC, at its option, to impose a penalty interest at the
rate of three percent (3%) per month on the
outstanding balance or to cancel this agreement
without need of any court action and to forfeit, in its
favor, any reservation deposits or payments already
made on the unit, without prior notice.
After several payments were made, XYZ stopped
paying the monthly amortization and continued to do
so despite demands from ABC. Due to XYZ’s failure
to pay, ABC cancelled the contract to sell and
forfeited the payments made and demanded the
former to vacate the premises. XYZ did not comply
which made ABC file an ejectment complaint before
the MeTC.
Was the complaint one for unlawful detainer?
ANSWER:
Yes. A suit for unlawful detainer is premised on
Section 1, Rule 70, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, of
which there are two kinds, namely: (1) that filed
against a tenant, and (2) that brought against a
vendee or vendor, or other person unlawfully
withholding possession of any land or building after
160
 the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or
implied. Furthermore, In unlawful detainer, the
complaint must allege the cause of action according
to the manner set forth in Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
remedy should either be accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria instituted before the proper forum.
Is the MTC correct?
ANSWER:

Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and
when. – Subject to the provisions of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the
rightto hold possession, by virtue of any contract,
express or implied, or the legal representatives or
assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person, may, at any time within one (1) year after
such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal
Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person
or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of
such possession, together with damages and costs.
No. A’s allegations shows that the required
jurisdictional averments so as to demonstrate a cause
of action for forcible entry, have all been complied
with. A alleged in his complaint that as the original
owner, a successor-in-interest of his late father, was
in prior physical possession of the subject land but
was dispossessed of a portion thereof by X who.
Through force and intimidation gained entry into the
same and thereafter erected a building thereon.
Clearly with these details., the means by which A’s
dispossession was effected cannot be said to have
been insufficiently alleged as decided by the MTC.

In this case, the complaint herein sufficiently alleged

all the foregoing requisites for unlawful detainer. The
cause of action of the ABC was to recover possession
of the subject property from the XYZ upon the latter’s
failure to comply with the former’s demand to vacate
the subject property after the latter’s right to remain
thereon terminated by virtue of the demand to vacate.
Indeed, the possession of the latter, although lawful at
its commencement, became unlawful upon its non-
compliance with the former’s demand to vacate.

JAVIER v. LOMUNTAD

A represented by his Mother and natural guardian B,

alleged that he is one of the sons of the late C who
was the owner of a parcel of land located in barangay
Dolores, Taytay Rizal and Upon C’s death, A and B
continued their possession over the same. On March
2007, despite A’s vigorous objections, X gained entry
into the subject land and started to build a two-story
building on a portion of the subject land. No amicable
settlement was reached in the barangay and thus, A
filed a forcible entry complaint against X.

In her answer, X to be the owner of a portion of the

land where the subject building was being constructed
as evidenced by a title in her name hence, she took
possession of said portion not as an illegal entrant but
as its owner. The MTC dismissed the complaint for
want of cause of action because A failed to aver the
required jurisdictional facts as it merely contained an
allegation that X’s entry into the disputed portion was
made by means of force and intimidation, without
specifically stating how, when and where such means
were employed. The MTC further intimated that A’s

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SCHOOL OF LAW 161
 RULE 71: CONTEMPT
MARANTAN v. DIOKNO
Police Officer X was charged with homicide for the death
of three individuals in a police operation. Y, mother of one
of the victims, and Z, lawyer of Y, were interviewed in a
news program because of Officer X’s involvement in
another police incident that caused the death of 13
people. Officer X argues that the recent incident placed
him in a bad light and were furthered by the statements of
Y and Z. He further argued that both have violated the
sub judice rule, making them liable for indirect contempt
for their contemptuous statements and improper conduct
tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice, and the statements
meant to influence the decision of the Court.
Were the arguments of Officer X valid?
ANSWER:
No. For a comment to be considered as contempt of court
"it must really appear" that such does impede, interfere
with and embarrass the administration of justice. What is,
thus, sought to be protected is the all-important duty of
the court to administer justice in the decision of a pending
case. The specific rationale for the sub judice rule is that
courts, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be
immune from every extraneous influence; that facts
should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and
that the determination of such facts should be
uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.
The "clear and present danger" rule means that the evil
consequence of the comment must be "extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely high" before an
utterance can be punished. There must exist a clear and
present danger that the utterance will harm the
administration of justice. Freedom of speech should not
be impaired through the exercise of the power of
contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the
utterances in question make a serious and imminent
threat to the administration of justice. It must constitute an
imminent, not merely a likely, threat.
CITY GOV’T OF BAGUIO v. MASWENG
M, acting as Regional Hearing Officer of the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) issued an
injunctive order against City B for the demolition of illegal
structures that had been constructed on a portion of a
watershed without the necessary building permits
required by law. The order was questioned on appeal and
was subsequently reversed and ordered City B to
continue with the demolition of said structures. Aggrieved,
another set of petitioners applied for a TRO and a writ of
preliminary injunction before the NCIP to enjoin the
enforcement of demolition orders. M, issued the same.
City B assailed such orders alleging willful disregard,
disobedience, defiance and resistance of the court’s
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former decision enjoining the said injunction case. Should
M be cited in contempt of court for issuing the subject
TRO and writs of preliminary injunction?
ANSWER:
Yes. Section 3, Rule 71 of the ROC provides, “After a
charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given
to the responder to comment thereon within such period
as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself
or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts
may be punished for indirect contempt: x x x (b)
Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order, or judgment of a court x x x.
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or
dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the
authority and administration of the law into disrespect or
to interfere with or prejudice party litigants or their
witnesses during litigation.
In this case, M was charged with indirect contempt for
issuing the subject orders enjoining the implementation of
demolition orders against illegal structures constructed on
a portion of the watershed in pursuance of a settled court
order. By acting in opposition to the Court’s authority and
disregarding its final determination of the legal issue
pending before him, M failed in his duty not to impede the
due administration of justice and consistently adhere to
the existing laws and principles as interpreted in the
decisions of the court.
CAPITOL HILLS GOLF v. SANCHEZ
M, filed a petition for the nullification of the annual
meeting of stockholders and the special meeting of
stockholders of C Corporation. He filed for a motion for
production and inspection of documents which the court
granted. However, C was not able to produce the
documents sought by M which prompted him to file a
motion to require the corporation to comply with its order.
The motion was granted and ordered the corporation to
strictly comply with the order; otherwise they will be cited
in contempt of court. C questioned the resolution anent
the threatened imposition of sanction for contempt which
was upheld on appeal. Was the court correct in giving
such order?
ANSWER:
No. The prescribed procedure must be followed. Sections
4 and 4, Rule 71 of the ROC provide the procedure to be
followed in case of indirect contempt. First, there must be
an order requiring the respondent to show cause why he
should not be cited for contempt. Second, the respondent
must be given the opportunity to comment on the charge
against him. Third, there must be a hearing and the court
must investigate the charge and consider respondent’s
answer. Finally, only if found guilty will respondent be
punished accordingly.
162
In this case, the proceedings for indirect contempt have
not been initiated. The resolution is not yet a “judgment or
final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt” as
contemplated under the Rules. The penalty mentioned
therein only serves as a reminder to caution C of the
consequence of possible non-observance of the long-
overdue order to produce the documents.
CAGAS v. COMELEC
COMELEC issued a resolution directing C to explain why
he should not be cited in contempt of court for the
defamatory letter he sent to court administrator M. He
stated that the letter was a personal communication to his
friend and not intended to be an official communication to
M and did not mean nor intend to be an affront or a sign
of disrespect to the court. May C be held guilty of indirect
contempt?
ANSWER:
Yes. Section 3 (c) and (d) of Rule 71 provides: x x x (c)
Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the
processes or proceedings of a court not constituting
direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule; (d) Any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice” x x x
The making of contemptuous statements directed against
the Court is an abuse of the right to free speech and
degrades the administration of justice. Hence, the
defamatory statements in the letter impaired public
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary and not just of
the ponente alone.
LIGON v. RTC
Y’s property was levied upon by virtue of a writ of
preliminary attachment in connection of action involving a
collection for sum of money filed by X. Z filed a similar
complaint in another court involving the same property.
Judge L rendered a decision in favor of Z and ordered the
Registry of Deeds to issue a new TCT free from any lien
and encumbrances after the property was sold to the
highest bidder. In effect, the earlier attachment was not
carried over to the new TCT named to the highest bidder.
Thereafter, the first court rendered a decision in favor or
X who found out of the deletion of the earlier attachment
by virtue of the second court’s order. Should the judge be
cited in contempt?
No. Section 3, Rule 71 provides: “After charge in writing
has been filed, and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within such period as
may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or
counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may
be punished for indirect contempt: x x x (b) Disobedience
of or resistance to a lawful writ, . . .; (c) Any abuse of or
any unlawful interference with the processes or
proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt
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under Section 1 of this Rule; (d) Any improper conduct
tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice;.
In this case, L failed to sufficiently show how the acts of
each of the respondents, or more specifically, Judge L,
constituted any of the acts punishable under the
foregoing section tending towards a wilful disregard or
disobedience of a public authority.
RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF
AMA LAND AGAINST CA JUSTICES BUESER,
VILLON & ROSARIO
AMALI is the owner and developer of the 37-storey
condominium project located along EDSA. Due to the
project's location, AMALI would have to use Fordham
Street as an access road and staging area for the
construction activities. In that regard, AMALI needed the
consent of the Wlack Wlack Residents Association, Inc.
(WWRAI). Accordingly, AMALI sent a notice to WWRAI,
which ignored the notice. Left with no option, AMALI set
up a field office along Fordham Street that it enclosed
with a temporary fence. WWRAI allegedly tried to
demolish the field office and set up a fence to deny
access to AMALI's construction workers, which prompted
AMALI to file a petition for the enforcement of an
easement of right of way in the (RTC) in Pasig City. The
petition, which included an application for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction (WPMI), the RTC granted AMALI's
prayer for the WPMI. HcSCED
WWRAI filed an urgent motion to set for hearing its
prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction
(WPI) contained in its answer. The denial of the prayer for
injunction by the RTC impelled WWRAI to bring a petition
for certiorari with an application for a TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction in the CA to enjoin the RTC from
proceeding.
After hearing, the CA issued a TRO, which prompted
AMALI to file an Urgent Motion to Lift and/or Dissolve
Temporary Restraining Order and later on a Compliance
and Motion for Reconsideration.
Subsequently, the CA issued a preliminary injunction and
required AMALI to file its Comment. AMALI consequently
filed a petition for review on certiorari in this Court. AMALI
then brought this administrative complaint, alleging that
respondent Justices had conspired with the counsels of
WWRAI, namely: Atty. Archibald F. de Mata and Atty.
Myra Jennifer D. Jaud-Fetizanan, in rendering an unjust
judgment. AMALI stated that the decision of the CA had
been rendered in bad faith and with conscious and
deliberate intent to favor WWRAI, and to cause grave
injustice to AMALI. In thereby knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment.
Whether or not amali could be held liable for indirect
contempt?
163

ANSWER:
Yes. The authorized representative of UMALI was
required to show cause in writing why they should not be
held in indirect contempt of court for bringing the
unfounded and baseless charges against respondent
Justices not only once but twice. To be clear, the ling of
unfounded and baseless administrative charges against
sitting judicial officers may constitute indirect contempt
under
Section 3 (d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge
and hearing. — After a charge in writing has been led,
and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment
thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court
and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of
any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:
xxx
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to
prevent the court from issuing process to bring the
respondent into court, or from holding him in custody
pending such proceedings.
Important Principles on Contempt: Anent indirect
contempt, the Court said in Lorenzo Shipping Corporation
v. Distribution Management Association of the Philippines:
Contempt of court has been defined as a willful
disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its
broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or
disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or
judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by
disorderly behavior or insolent language in its
presence or so near thereto as to disturb its
proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a
body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt
comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or
dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is
generic, embracing within its legal signification a
variety of different acts.’‘
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts,
and need not be speci cally granted by statute. It lies at
the core of the administration of a judicial system. Indeed,
there ought to be no question that courts have the power
by virtue of their very creation to impose silence, respect,
and decorum in their presence, submission to their lawful
mandates, and to preserve themselves and their officers
from the approach and insults of pollution. The power to
punish for contempt essentially exists for the preservation
of order in judicial proceedings and for the enforcement of
judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and,
consequently, for the due administration of justice. The
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reason behind the power to punish for contempt is that
respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their
institution; without such guarantee, the institution of the
courts would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN
PCGG issued sequestration order directed against all
properties, assets, records and documents of X Inc.
since it was allegedly ill-gotten wealth which were
manifestly out of proportion to their salaries. X refused to
the order.
Can the PCGG hold X Inc in contempt?
ANSWER:
Yes. From the provisions of law creating it, it is clear that
the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT (PCGG) has the following powers and
authority: 1) To conduct an investigation including the
preliminary investigation and prosecution of the ill-gotten
wealth cases of former President Marcos, relatives and
associates, and graft and corruption cases assigned by
the President to it; 2) Issue sequestration orders in
relation to property claimed to be ill-gotten; 3) Issue
"freeze orders" prohibiting persons in possession of
property alleged to be ill-gotten from transferring or
otherwise disposing of the same; 4) Issue provisional
takeover orders of the said property; 5) Administer oaths
and issue subpoenas in the conduct of investigation; and
6) Hold any person in direct or indirect contempt and
impose the appropriate penalties as provided by the rules.
In this case, PCGG can punish X inc for contempt for
refusing such order.
SILVERIO v. SILVERIO
In Oct. 31, 2006, RTC branch 57 of Makati City issued an
Omnibus order granting the Letters of Administration to Y
anent to the Estate of Z in lieu of X. A filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the CA questioning such Omnibus Order.
The CA later issued two Resolution, dated July 4, 2007
and February 29, 2008, which granted such application.
On June 13, 2008, Y wrote and sent two letters, one each
to X and B, demanding in the first letter that X cease and
desist from exercising the rights of a stockholder in PDC,
managing PDC’s affairs and business, and transacting
with third persons for and in behalf of PDC and to turn
over all of its books and records. The second letter
contains a demand from Y that B immediately vacate the
house at Urdaneta Village. X and B filed with the CA a
petition for Indirect contempt seeking that Y be declared
in indirect contempt and punished accordingly, for defying
the CA’s July 4, 2007 and Feb. 29, 2008 resolutions by
sending the two letters. The CA dismissed the petition.
Was the CA correct in dismissing the petition?
164
ANSWER:
Yes. Sec 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court states
that First, there must be an order requiring the
respondent to show cause why he should not be cited for
contempt. Second, the respondent must be given the
opportunity to comment on the charge against him. Third,
there must be a hearing and the court must investigate
the charge and consider respondent's answer. Finally,
only if found guilty will respondent be punished
accordingly.
The law requires that there be a charge in writing, duly
led in court, and an opportunity given to the person
charged to be heard by himself or counsel. What is most
essential is that the alleged contemner be granted an
opportunity to meet the charges against him and to be
heard in his defenses. This is due process, which must
be observed at all times. To be sure, since an indirect
contempt charge partakes the nature of a criminal charge,
conviction cannot be had merely on the basis of written
pleadings.
In the case at bar, the due process was not followed, for it
is the CA that should properly try the same, and there
should be hearing to resolve a charge for indirect
contempt, which was not present in this case.
Hence, the CA was correct.
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY v. OLAIREZ
X and Y filed their Complaint for Mandatory Injunction
with Damages and Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order before the RTC, against Dean Z. X and
Y alleged that as a condition for graduation, school
required their students to complete and pass the
Comprehensive Oral and Written Examination (COWE).
X alleged that the then newly designated Dean Z,
suddenly devised and revised the COWE by further
subjecting the graduating students to additional
requirements. Contending that the implementation of the
Revised COWE was contrary to School’s Student
Handbook and would arbitrarily delay their graduation,
they sought injunctive relief from the trial court.
Did the CA erred in ruling that the school and its officials
were denied of due process as they were not given the
opportunity to comment and be heard on the contempt
charges against them?
ANSWER:
Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge
and hearing. — After a charge in writing has been filed,
and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment
thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court
and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of
any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:
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(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance
of his official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a
person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from
any real property by the judgment or process of any court
of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces
another to enter into or upon such real property, or in any
manner disturbs the possession given to the person
adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the
processes or proceedings of a court not constituting
direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court,
and acting as such without authority;
(e) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or
property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order
or process of a court held by him.
In contempt, the intent goes to the gravamen of the
offense. A person should not be condemned for contempt
where he contends for what he believes to be right and in
good faith institutes proceedings for the purpose,
however erroneous may be his conclusion as to his rights.
To constitute contempt, the act must be done wilfully and
for an illegitimate or improper purpose.
PAGCOR v. THUNDERBIRD PILIPINAS HOTELS
(P. D.) No. 1067-A5 created PAGCOR with the task
to "centralize and integrate all games of chance not
heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted
by laws." PAGCOR is empowered "to enter into, make,
conclude, perform, and carry out contracts of every kind
and nature and for any lawful purpose which are
necessary, appropriate, proper or incidental to any
business or purpose of the PAGCOR, x x x, whether as
principal or as an agent, x x x with any person, firm,
association, or corporation."
ABC and its foreign principal, DEF entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement with PAGCOR whereby DEF
through ABC committed to invest millions in their gaming
and leisure operations. Believing that they are entitled to
a new franchise co-terminus with that of PAGCOR, on
June 3, 2011, ABC and DEF each filed separate
complaints against PAGCOR with the RTC.
Whether or not the Court would resolve to dismiss the
instant petitions on several procedural and substantive
grounds.
165
ANSWER:
Rule 58 Sec. 4-5 provides that:
Section 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order. — A preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order may be granted
only when:
(a) The application in the action or proceeding is verified,
and shows facts entitling the applicant to the relief
demanded; and
(b) Unless exempted by the court the applicant files with
the court where the action or proceeding is pending, a
bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an
amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the
applicant will pay to such party or person all damages
which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or
temporary restraining order if the court should finally
decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon
approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary
injunction shall be issued. (4a)
(c) When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction
or a temporary restraining order is included in a complaint
or any initiatory pleading, the case, if filed in a multiple-
sala court, shall be raffled only after notice to and in the
presence of the adverse party or the person to be
enjoined. In any event, such notice shall be preceded, or
contemporaneously accompanied, by service of
summons, together with a copy of the complaint or
initiatory pleading and the applicant's affidavit and bond,
upon the adverse party in the Philippines.
However, where the summons could not be served
personally or by substituted service despite diligent
efforts, or the adverse party is a resident of the
Philippines temporarily absent therefrom or is a
nonresident thereof, the requirement of prior or
contemporaneous service of summons shall not apply.
(d) The application for a temporary restraining order shall
thereafter be acted upon only after all parties are heard in
a summary hearing which shall be conducted within
twenty-four (24) hours after the sheriff's return of service
and/or the records are received by the branch selected by
raffle and to which the records shall be transmitted
immediately.
Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without
notice; exception. — No preliminary injunction shall be
granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or
person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts
shown by affidavits or by the verified application that
great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant
before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to
which the application for preliminary injunction was made,
may issue a temporary restraining order to be effective
only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the
party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein
provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the court
must order said party or person to show cause, at a
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specified time and place, why the injunction should not be
granted, determine within the same period whether or not
the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and
accordingly issue the corresponding order. (Bar Matter
No. 803, 17 February 1998)
However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding
sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the
applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury,
the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the
presiding judge of a single sala court may issue ex parte
a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-
two (72) hours from issuance but he shall immediately
comply with the provisions of the next preceding section
as to service of summons and the documents to be
served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid
seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case
is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine
whether the temporary restraining order shall be
extended until the application for preliminary injunction
can be heard. In no case shall the total period of
effectivity of the temporary restraining order exceed
twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two hours
provided herein.
In the event that the application for preliminary injunction
is denied or not resolved within the said period, the
temporary restraining order is deemed, automatically
vacated. The effectivity of a temporary restraining order is
not extendible without need of any judicial declaration to
that effect and no court shall have authority to extend or
renew the same on the same ground for which it was
issued.
However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a member
thereof, the temporary restraining order shall be effective
for sixty (60) days from service on the party or person
sought to be enjoined. A restraining, order issued by the
Supreme Court or a member thereof shall be effective
until further orders.
ANGELES v. COURT OF APPEALS
R filed a case for annulment of real estate mortgage
against P in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, which
was later decided in favour of R. After the judgment, R
filed a writ of execution which was denied since P was
successful in filing an appeal. The lower court then
ordered for the transfer of files to the Court of Appeals,
but upon motion for reconsideration the writ of execution
was granted before the files were successfully transferred.
The grant of the execution prompted P to file a case for
indirect contempt in the Court of Appeals.
Was the case properly filed?
ANSWER:
No, the case was improperly filed.
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Rule 71, Sec. 4 states that proceedings for indirect
contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court
against which the contempt was committed by any order
or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to
show cause why he should not be punished. In
connection with sec. 5 of Rule 71 which states that where
the charge for indirect contempt has been committed
against a Regional Trial Court or a Court of equivalent or
higher rank, or against an officer appointed by it, the
charge maybe filed with such court.
In the present case, assuming the act was contemptuous,
the order of having the papers forwarded to the CA which
was allegedly disobeyed was one given by the Regional
Trial Court. Since the said order was on given by the
Regional Trial Court then, the Petition for Contempt
should have been filed on the Regional Trial Court since
the contemptuous act was committed on the order of the
said court.
Hence, the case was improperly filed.
CAUSING v. COMELEC
X assumed office as the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. Mayor Y issued a memorandum
commanding for the detailing of X at the Office of the
Municipal Mayor.
X filed the complaint claiming that issuance made by
Mayor Y ordering her detail to the Office of the Municipal
Mayor, being made within the election period and without
prior authority from the COMELEC, was illegal and it
violated the Omnibus Election Code. Mayor Y countered
that the purpose of transferring the office of X was to
closely supervise the performance of her functions after
complaints regarding her negative behavior in dealing
with her co-employees and with the public transacting
business in her office. The Provincial Election Supervisor
recommended the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for
lack of probable cause. COMELEC En Banc affirmed the
findings and recommendation. Hence, X filed a petition
for certiorari. Mayor Y insists that the petition for certiorari
should be dismissed because of X’s failure to file a
motion for reconsideration in the COMELEC, and
because of her failure to attach copies of important
documents to the case.
Should the petition for certiorari be dismissed for failure to
file a motion for reconsideration?
ANSWER
Yes, the petition should be dismissed.
The general rule is that the motion for reconsideration is
an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can
resort to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. The filing of the motion for
reconsideration before the resort to certiorari will lie is
intended to afford to the public respondent the
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opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error
attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal and
factual aspects of the case. The rule is not absolute,
however, considering that jurisprudence has laid down
exceptions to the requirement for the filing of a petition for
certiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration,
namely:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court
a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by
the lower court, or are the same as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of
the question, and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government, or of the petitioner, or the
subject matter of the petition is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where the petitioner was deprived of due process, and
there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest
is urgent, and the granting of such relief by the trial court
is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity
for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public
interest is involved.
The instant case shows that none of the exceptions was
applicable therein. Hence, X should have filed the motion
for reconsideration, especially because there was nothing
in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that precluded the
filing of the motion for reconsideration in election offense
cases.
[Note: This is the closest topic in the case that tackles
contempt or provisional remedy. There was no mention of
contempt in the case.]
REPUBLIC v. LAZO
Respondents Spouses X and Y are the owners and
developers of a residential subdivision (Monte Vista
Homes). They voluntarily sold to the National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) a portion of Monte Vista for the
construction of an open irrigation canal that is part of a
pump irrigation project. Spouses X and Y engaged the
services of Engr. Z to conduct a geohazard study on the
possible effects of the project on Monte Vista. Engr. Z
later came up with a report finding that ground shaking
and channel bank erosion are the possible hazards that
could affect the NIA irrigation canal traversing Monte
Vista.
The Sangguniang Bayan approved a resolution which
adopted the recommendations contained in the GAR.
Among others, it resolved that the GAR
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recommendations should be observed and implemented
by the concerned implementing agency of the NIA BPIP.
Spouse X brought to NIA’s attention the resolution and
specifically asked for the implementation of the GAR
recommendations and the payment of just compensation
for the entire buffer zone. When respondents’ demands
were not acted upon, they decided to file a complaint for
just compensation with damages against NIA. The trial
court found that petitioner violated the law and granted
respondents’ prayer for preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction.
Without moving for a reconsideration, Republic directly
filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. was the action
of the Republic correct? Rule.
ANSWER:
Yes, the filing of the petition for certiorari by the Republic
was correct.
A petition for certiorari may be given due course
notwithstanding that no motion for reconsideration was
filed in the trial court. The rule is not absolute because
the acceptance of and the grant of due course to a
petition for certiorari is generally addressed to the sound
discretion of the court because the technical provisions of
the Rules may be relaxed or suspended if it will result in a
manifest failure or miscarriage of justice. The exceptions
are:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court
a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by
the lower court, or are the same as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of
the question, and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government, or of the petitioner, or the
subject matter of the petition is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where the petitioner was deprived of due process, and
there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest
is urgent, and the granting of such relief by the trial court
is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity
for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public
interest is involved.
The instant case falls within (a), (b), (c), (d), and (i). The
assailed decisions of the trial court are patent nullity for
having been issued in excess of its jurisdiction. Also, the
questions raised in the certiorari proceedings are the
same as those already raised and passed upon in the
lower court; hence, filing a motion for reconsideration
would be useless and serve no practical purpose. There
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is likewise an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government. Public interest is actually
involved as the targeted increase in agricultural
production is expected to uplift the farmer’s standard of
living. Lastly, the issue raised - that is whether the trial
court committed a grave abuse of discretion in granting
respondent’s prayer for preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction despite the mandate or RA 8975 –
is one purely of law.
Note: This is the closest topic in the case that tackles
contempt or provisional remedy. There was no mention of
contempt in the case.
RIVULET AGRO-INDUSTRIAL v. PARUNGAO
Rivulet was the registered owner of a Hacienda, and
agricultural land which was sold to Atty. Jose Arroyo in a
tax delinquency sale but remained in the name of Rivulet.
DAR commenced the administrative proceeding to
acquire subject property under RA 6657 (CARP) and sent
Notices of Coverage to Atty. Arroyo. Subsequently,
Rivulet voluntary offered for sale (VOS) to the
government the subject property and a notice of coverage
was sent to Rivulet. During the pendency of the admin
process the hacienda was reclassified from agricultural to
agro-industrial.
Undersecretary of DAR finds Atty. Arroyo to be the owner
of the land declaring Rivulet’s VOS to be ineffectual.
Coverage can proceed despite reclassification since the
Notice of coverage was served on Atty. Arroyo when it
was still classified as agricultural.
On Oct. 26 Rivulet’s TCT was cancelled and a new one
was issued in the name of the Republic. On Dec. 15 court
issued TRO enjoining RD from cancelling Rivulet’s TCT.
Undersecretary sought the advice of the OSG on the
possibility of installing farmer beneficiaries in the property
despite the TRO, citing that the acts sought to be
enjoined had already been performed prior to its issuance
and that DAR was not among those enjoined.
Is the act of installing farmer-beneficiaries an open
defiance and disobedience of the Courts Dec. 15 TRO.
ANSWER:
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the
court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and
dignity, and signifies not only a willful disregard of the
court's order, but such conduct which tends to bring the
authority of the court and the administration of law into
disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due
administration of justice.
To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly
contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court. Thus, a
person cannot be punished for contempt for disobedience
of an order of the Court, unless the act which is forbidden
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or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so
that there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as
to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required|||
While the Court issued a TRO, records reveal that the
acts sought to be enjoined had already been
accomplished prior to its issuance, rendering the same of
no practical purpose.||| Time and again, the Court has
stressed that the power to punish for contempt should be
exercised on the preservative, not on the vindictive
principle, and only when necessary in the interest of
justice. Under the foregoing circumstances, the Court
finds no contumacious disobedience on the part of
respondents, particularly with respect to the TRO.
DIGITAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS v. CANTOS
X has legislative franchise to operate a justice, or dignity of the court which tends to bring the
telecommunications business throughout the Philippines.
Upon seeking with the renewal of its business permit, the
Mayor informed the latter that permit will not be granted
unless they pay their property taxes. X failed to pay their
property taxes, a cease and desist order was issued by
the said Municipality. X filed a case with the CA for
uplifting the cease and desist order and its exemption
from Real Property Tax. CA ruled in its favor and lifted
the same. However, Y the Provincial Treasurer issued a
Warrant of Levy on the properties of X for nonpayment of
Real Property Tax. X filed a case for indirect contempt
against Y.
RTC dismissed the case. Y appealed the decision with
the CA. X contended that double jeopardy has attached
with the dismissal and no appeal can be had.
Is Double Jeopardy applicable in Contempt?
ANSWER:
Yes. Sec. 11, Rule 71, thusly: “The judgment or final
order of a court in a case of indirect contempt may be,
appealed to the proper court as in criminal cases. But
execution of the judgment or final order shall not be
suspended until a bond is filed by the person adjudged in
contempt, in an amount fixed by the court from which the
appeal is taken, conditioned that if the appeal be decided
against him he will abide by and perform the judgment or
final order.”
At the outset, the Court shall address the issue on double
jeopardy as discussed by petitioner in its Memorandum.
In his Comment, respondent reiterated the CA's ruling
that the RTC Decision amounts to an acquittal, hence, an
appeal does not lie. Arguing against it, petitioner
contends that the rule on double jeopardy will not bar it
from pursuing its appeal because this is not a criminal
case and respondent is not tried as an accused.
The Court is not persuaded. Indeed, contempt is not a
criminal offense. However, a charge for contempt of court
partakes of the nature of a criminal action. Rules that
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govern criminal prosecutions strictly apply to a
prosecution for contempt. In fact, Section 11 of Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court provides that the appeal in indirect
contempt proceedings may be taken as in criminal cases.
This Court has held that an alleged contemner[sic] should
be accorded the same rights as that of an accused.
Thus, the dismissal of the indirect contempt charge
against respondent amounts to an acquittal, which
effectively bars a second prosecution. Be that as it may,
respondent is not guilty of indirect contempt. "Contempt
of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by
acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It
signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the
court's order, but such conduct which tends to bring the
authority of the court and the administration of law into
disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due
administration of justice. It is a defiance of the authority,
authority and administration of the law into disrespect or
to interfere with or prejudice party-litigants or their
witnesses during litigation."
LIM-LUA v. LUA
X filed for nullity of marriage and support pendente lite
against Y. Husband opposed the support demanded by X,
contending that she is not entitled to spousal support.
RTC granted the prayer of X, such order attained finality
with Y failing to comply with the three (3) day requirement
which verily did not toll the period and was ordered to
comply therewith or be cited for contempt. Y filed for
certiorari with the CA and granted the reduced amount as
well as to pay his arrears minus whatever he has already
given. Y issued a check thereof in compliance, however,
X challenged the deductions alleging they should not
form part of such, and filed such with the RTC. RTC ruled
in favor of X. With Y still failing to comply, X filed for
contempt with the CA.
Is Y liable for contempt for failing to comply with the order
to support?
ANSWER:
No. Sec. 3, Rule 71, scilicet: “Indirect contempt to be
punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in
writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within such period as
may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or
counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may
be punished for indirect contempt:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order, judgment of a court, xxx”.
Contempt of Court is defined as a disobedience to the
court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and
dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or
disobedience of the court's order, but such conduct which
tends to bring the authority of the court and the
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administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner,
to impede the due administration of justice. To constitute
contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an
illegitimate or improper purpose. The good faith, or lack of
it, of the alleged contemnor should be considered.
Respondent admittedly ceased or suspended the giving
of monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial court,
which is immediately executory. However, we agree with
the CA that respondent's act was not contumacious
considering that he had not been remiss in actually
providing for the needs of his children. It is a matter of
record that respondent continued shouldering the full cost
of their education and even beyond their basic
necessities in keeping with the family's social status.
Moreover, respondent believed in good faith that the trial
and appellate courts, upon equitable grounds, would
allow him to offset the substantial amounts he had spent
or paid directly to his children.
FORTUN v. QUINSAYAS
Following the criminal cases for murder filed against
Ampatuan (Maguindanao Massacre case), Atty.
Quinsayas filed a disbarment complaint against Atty.
Fortun, Ampatuan's lawyer, for engaging in every
conceivable chicanery or artifice to unduly delay the
proceedings by using and abusing legal remedies
available. Atty. Quinsayas disseminated copies of the
disbarment complaint against Fortun to members of the
media, as a result, media groups and personalities
published confidential materials on their respective media
platforms. Fortun now files a petition for contempt against
Quinsayas who conspired with the media groups and
personalities for violating Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court on the confidential nature of disbarment
proceedings.
Are they guilty of contempt?
ANSWER
Only Atty. Quinsayas is guilty of contempt.
Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court is not a
restriction on the freedom of the press. If there is a
legitimate public interest, media is not prohibited from
making a fair, true, and accurate news report of a
disbarment complaint. As provided by Sec 18 Rule 139-B,
disbarment proceedings are confidential in nature until
their final resolution and the final decision of this Court. In
this case, however, the filing of a disbarment complaint
against Fortun is itself a matter of public concern
considering that it arose from the Maguindanao Massacre
case, a very high-profile case. The interest of the public is
not on Fortun himself but primarily on his involvement
and participation as defense counsel in the Maguindanao
Massacre case. Indeed, the allegations in the disbarment
complaint relate to Fortun's supposed actions involving
the Maguindanao Massacre case. Since the disbarment
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complaint is a matter of public interest, the media and
personalities had a right to publish such fact under
freedom of the press. The media groups and
personalities merely acted on a news lead they received
when they reported the filing of the disbarment complaint.
It would have been different if the disbarment case
against Fortun was about a private matter as the media
would then be bound to respect the confidentiality
provision of disbarment proceedings under Section 18,
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
Atty. Quinsayas is bound by Section 18, Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court both as a complainant in the
disbarment case against Fortun and as a lawyer. As a
lawyer and an officer of the Court, Atty. Quinsayas is
familiar with the confidential nature of disbarment
proceedings. However, instead of preserving its
confidentiality, Atty. Quinsayas disseminated copies of
the disbarment complaint to members of the media which
act constitutes contempt of court. Therefore, Atty.
Quinsayas is guilty of indirect contempt.
Take note: The SC made a distinction between criminal
and civil contempt. A criminal contempt is conduct that is
directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a
judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the
administration of justice which tends to bring the court
into disrepute or disrespect. On the other hand, civil
contempt consists in failing to do something ordered to be
done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the
opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense
against the party in whose behalf the violated order is
made. In this case, what is filed is criminal contempt.
It has further been stated that intent is a necessary
element in criminal contempt, and that no one can be
punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence
makes it clear that he intended to commit it. On the
contrary, there is authority indicating that since the
purpose of civil contempt proceedings is remedial, the
defendant’s intent in committing the contempt is
immaterial. Hence, good faith or the absence of intent to
violate the court’s order is not a defense in civil contempt.
BELEN v. COMILANG
Judge X rendered a decision finding State Prosecutor Y
liable for contempt of court and for payment of
P20,000.00 as penalty. The latter filed for a motion for
reconsideration but was subsequently denied and thus
State Prosecutor Y file with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction assailing Judge X's decision. The CA issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining Judge X
from executing and enforcing his assailed Order and
Decision for a period of 60 days, which was subsequently
extended with the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. Notwithstanding the TRO, Judge X held State
Prosecutor Comilang guilty of indirect contempt. State
Prosecutor Y filed before the CA a petition to cite Judge X
in contempt of court. The CA found Judge Belen guilty of
170
indirect contempt for his disobedience of or resistance to
lawful court orders as sanctioned in Section 3, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court. Judge X asserts that he was deprived
of his right to due process because the CA proceeded to
rule on the petition for contempt without considering his
Comment thereon.
Was the CA correct in finding Judge X guilty for indirect
contempt of court?
ANSWER:
No. Judge X’s conviction for indirect contempt was
procedurally defective because he was not afforded an
opportunity to rebut the contempt charges against him.
Under Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
the following procedural requisites must be satisfied
before the accused may be punished for indirect
contempt:
(1) there must be an order requiring the respondent to
show cause why he should not be cited for contempt;
(2) the respondent must be given the opportunity to
comment on the charge against him; and (3) there must
be a hearing and the court must investigate the charge
and consider respondent's answer.
Of these requisites, the law accords utmost importance to
the third as it embodies one's right to due process.
Hence, it is essential that the alleged contemnor be
granted an opportunity to meet the charges against him
and to be heard in his defenses. The power to punish for
contempt is not limitless; it must be used sparingly with
caution, restraint, judiciousness, deliberation, and a due
regard to the provisions of the law and the constitutional
rights of the individual.
In this case, the CA failed to dutifully afford Judge X his
right to be heard. Such failure consists of a serious
procedural defect that effectively nullifies the indirect
contempt proceedings.
LOZADA v. ZERRUDO
X, clerk of court, berated Y, a security guard of the hall of
justice, after the latter called out the former’s act of
cheating the attendance sheet. After Y filed a complaint,
the Office of the Court Administrator directed X to file a
comment on the matter. Extensions to file comment were
granted several times by the OCA but, even after the
lapse of 2 years, X still did not file his comment. Because
of this, the OCA ruled that X’s adamant refusal to file his
comment, even after 2 years, amounts to an admission of
charges.
Did X, through his motions for extension, disrespect the
court?
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ANSWER:
Yes. X’s acts of repeatedly filing requests for extension of
time to file his comment and still failing to file his
comment despite the lapse of two years constitute an
appalling disrespect of the authority of the Court and its
rules and regulations. This inexcusable failure on the part
of respondents, by itself, amounts to an act of impudence,
as to be contumacious.
RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF TOMAS
MERDEGIA AGAINST CA JUSTICE VELOSO
X filed an administrative complaint against Justice Y after
the latter refused to inhibit himself from a case he was
handling. The complaint and the motion for inhibition
were both based on the same main cause: the alleged
partiality of Justice Y during the oral arguments of X’s
case. Subsequently, the court dismissed the complaint of
X. Furthermore, the Court directed Atty. Z, X’s counsel to
show cause why he should not be cited for contempt.
According to Atty. Z, he should not be punished for
indirect contempt as he was merely performing his duty
as X’s counsel when he assisted him in preparing the
administrative complaint against Justice Y.
Thereafter, the court found Atty. Z’s explanation to be
insufficient. Hence he was found guilty of indirect
contempt.
Was the Court correct in citing Atty Z in indirect contempt?
ANSWER:
Yes. Section 3(d), Rule 71 provides one of the acts
punishable for indirect contempt:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after
charge and hearing.
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
In the case at bar, the totality of facts would show that
Atty. Z’s complaint is merely an attempt to malign the
administration of justice.
Totality of facts referred in this case:
What tipped the balance against Atty. Adaza, in this case,
is the totality of the facts of the case that, when read
together with the administrative complaint he prepared,
shows that his complaint is merely an attempt to malign
the administration of justice. We note Atty. Adaza’s
penchant for filing motions for inhibition throughout the
case: first, against Judge Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez
Estoesta of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, who
issued an order unfavorable to his client; and second,
against all the justices of the Court of Appeals division
hearing his appeal, for alleged bias during the oral
arguments on his case.
These indicators, taken together with the baseless
administrative complaint against Justice Veloso after he
171
penned an order adverseto Atty. Adaza’s client, disclose
that there was more to the administrative complaint than
the report of legitimate grievances against members of
the Judiciary.

UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE - RECOLETOS

SCHOOL OF LAW 172