Democratic Developments in the EU

According to Arigho, the EU is a sui generis legal system.1 It was never intended to be
principally concerned with either providing or safeguarding Members’ democracy. The main
priority of the EEC was ensuring peace and economic growth. 2 Over time as more Member
States joined and the EU grew to become a “hybrid union”3, there were growing concerns
regarding a democratic deficit. The EU is not completely democratic, 4 however there have
been four main developments which have significantly provided some degree of democratic
accountability.

Firstly, Sieberson explains that the EU does not possess the classic elements of a democratic
federation, since it began as an intergovernmental organisation. 5 Ergo, it is not surprising
that the EU suffers a democratic deficit. Conversely, through the establishment of the
Copenhagen Criteria in 1993 requiring democratic conditionality, accession states must
demonstrate they are democratic. This arguably serves as a powerful tool in promoting and
ensuring democracy across all Member States6. Furthermore, Moravcsik argues that EU
membership represents a democratic gain overall, strengthening the state at EU level. 7
However, Sieberson explains that without extensive institutional checks and balances, in
comparison to its Member States, the EU falls short. 8

Secondly, with regard to EU institutions themselves, the Lisbon Treaty constitutes a

recognition of and response to the conclusions in the Book of European Governance that
there were institutional democratic deficits at EU level. The principal development was
strengthening the legislative role of the European Parliament, the sole directly elected
institution in the Union. The Parliament has gone from being “appointed”, to directly
elected, which Bonde considers to be democratic progress.9 Previously, one of the signal
democratic lacunae at EU institutional level was the fact that Parliament had such a weak
legislative role, notwithstanding its position as the only directly elected Institution. The
range of laws over which the Parliament enjoyed a veto was originally very small. Equally,
the range of laws over which the Parliament enjoyed some legislative input was relatively
small and included no power of veto. The separation of powers at EU level is ultimately
flawed10, which contributes to the institutional democratic deficit. The Commission arguably
trespasses on the legislative role by drafting proposed Regulations, Directives and Decisions
(which are formally decided upon by Parliament and Council) and also drafting the
secondary/subordinate legislation required to give effect to Parliament/Council legislation.
Moreover, the nature of appointment of the Commission is utterly undemocratic, further
constituting a democratic deficit. In response to this, under the Lisbon Treaty, Parliament
1
Redmond Arigho, The Supremacy of European Union Law: An Inevitable Revolution or Federalism in Action?, Journal of
Postgraduate Research | Trinity College Dublin | 2014, p.g. 7
2
The role of European Union accession in democratisation processes - Democratic Progress Institute 2016 p.g. 9, 12-13
3
Stephen C. Sieberson, 'The Treaty of Lisbon and Its Impact on the European Union's Democratic Deficit' (2008) p.g. 465
4
Ibid
5
Ibid
6
Ibid
7
Andrew Moravcsik, "Why the European Community strengthens the state: Domestic politics in the European Union" in
Journalof Common Market Studies 40, no 4, 603-624.
8
Ibid
9
Ibid
10
Ibid, p.g. 448-453
has been given equal standing with the Council when passing laws, known as co-decision. 11
Co-decision was renamed the “ordinary legislative procedure” 12, which has become the
default method of passing the majority of laws. This constitutes the main source democratic
progress in the Treaty of Lisbon according to Bonde, as Parliament has a much greater
influence in the legislative process as the only directly elected EU institution. 13

Thirdly, in order to ensure a political safeguard of federalism in delegated and secondary

legislation, Parliament insisted on the procedure of Comitology. 14 When the Commission is
passing Secondary Legislation, it creates committees that are populated by representatives
from each Member State to assist in its implementing powers. 15 Although it was argued in
the Boston University International Law Journal that comitology undermines the spirit of co-
decision,16 Curtin explains that comitology committees have evolved into quasi-autonomous
entities with their own methods of discussion and decision-making17. Furthermore, they
have been described as being “intrinsically schizophrenic”18 in institutional terms as to
where they belong, due to the incredibly wide range of subject matter they deal with,
constituting a democratic gain.
 
Finally, the Lisbon treaty aimed to improve the democratic quality of the EU by increasing
the involvement of national parliaments when new Directives, Decisions or Regulations are
being considered by Council and Parliament. ‘Yellow card’ and ‘orange card’ provisions act
as early warning mechanisms which give Member States eight weeks to scrutinise proposals
in order to assess whether it abides by the subsidiarity principle.19 Additionally, this allows
national legislators to have their voice properly heard for the first time which is distinct from
that of their governments. Under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure, national parliaments
must be at the very least consulted on proposals. If Commission desires to proceed with a
proposal, it is obliged to justify its decision in a reasoned opinion and to refer to the
Parliament and Council for the final say on the matter, somewhat addressing the concerns
regarding accountability.20

To conclude, the EU is a complex, hybrid union 21. Therefore, issues regarding the quality of
its democracy are inevitable. However, it is unjust to say that it is completely undemocratic.
The Treaty of Lisbon responds to most of the concerns of the EU’s democratic deficit,
though it must be considered that the EU can never be completely democratic unless the
inter-institutional workings are revised22, which is unlikely.

11
Implementing Lisbon: narrowing the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’? - Janis A. Emmanouilidis and Corina Stratulat
12
Article 294 TFEU
13
Ibid
14
Modern Law Review, Robert Schütze, ‘'Delegated' Legislation in the (new) European Union: A Constitutional Analysis’,
p.g. 669
15
Article 291 TFEU
16
Paola Michelle Koo, 'The Struggle for Democratic Legitimacy within the European Union' (2001)
17
D. Curtin, 'Holding (Quasi-)autonomous EU Administrative Actors to Public Account', (2007) European Law Journal
18
Gijs Jan Brandsma, Deirdre Curtin & Albert Meijer, 'How Transparent are EU Comitology Committees in Practice' (2008)
19
Ibid p.g. 3
20
Ibid p.g. 4
21
Ibid
22
Ibid