CASE: 1 PEOPLE V.

OLARBE TOPIC: SELF DEFENSE

PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: PRAYER:
• PEOPLE • RODOLFO • Reversal of trial court decisions
• ROMEO OLRABE y • ACQUITTAL
ARCA BALIHANGO
(VICTIM) (ACCUSED)
FACTS:
• On May 2006, Olarbe and his common-law wife were sleeping in their house in
Luisiana, Laguna, when at midnight, they were awakened by the seemingly drunk Arca,
carrying a rifle and a bolo, shouting insults and threatening to kill them from outside their
home.
• Arca, armed with the rifle (described as an airgun converted into a caliber .22) and the
bolo, we to the house of Olarbe towards midnight. The latter and his household re
already slumbering, but were roused from bed because Arca fired his gun and was
loudly shouting, Mga putang ina ninyo, pagpapatayin ko kayo. Thereafter, Arca forcibly
entered Olarbe's house. Olarbe managed to the gun of Arca, and they struggled for
control of it. Upon wresting the gun from Arca, Olarbe fired at him, causing him to totter.
But Arca next took out the bolo from his waist and charged at Olarbe's common-law
spouse. This forced Olarbe to fight for possession of the bolo, and upon seizing the bolo,
he hacked Arca with it.

• However, Arca still managed to get his bolo from his waist and attack them, until the fight
had moved to the outer portion of the house, where accused and deceased fought again
for the possession of the bolo, which Olarbe managed to acquire, and hack Arca, and
after the killing incident, surrendered himself to the authorities.

• Olarbe was charged and convicted of the murder of Romeo Arca on the year of 2014 by
the Regional Trial Court, and this conviction was also reaffirmed by the Court of Appeals
in 2016, and again invokes self defense and defense of stranger in his case.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: CA RULING:

• charged with and convicted of murder by the • Court of Appeals (CA)
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, in affirmed the conviction
Santa Cruz, Laguna
ISSUE(S):
• Whether or not Olarbe may be acquitted on grounds of self-defense.

RULING:

• Yes, the court rules that Olarbe may be acquitted on grounds of self-defense, and
reverses the statements of the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals, pursuant to
Article 11, paragraph 3 of the Penal Code, where “Any person acting in defense of the
person or rights of the stranger, provided that the first and second requisites mentioned
in the first circumstance of this article are present and that the person defending may not
be induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.”
• The indispensable requisite for either of these justifying circumstances is that the victim
must have mounted an unlawful aggression against the accused or the stranger.
 Without such unlawful aggression, the accused is not entitled to the justifying
circumstance.
• The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether
the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the
person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat

• The first and second requisites from the first paragraph of justifying circumstances are
“Unlawful Aggression”, and “Reasonable necessity of the means provided to
prevent or repel it.” The Court held that Olarbe had established the justifying
circumstances invoked, as Arca’s act was a culmination of consistent aggression
towards Olarbe and his common-law wife, and Olarbe’s actions were of someone driven
to protect himself and his spouse, and repel the unlawful aggression towards them, as
the danger to their lives was imminent.

• The Court’s rationale also holds in his pleas of self-defense and defense of stranger, that
they should not demand that he conduct himself in a rational manner as the threat to
their lives were fatally close, and he had to respond quickly to them. Thus, pursuant to
Article 11, paragpraph 3, Olarbe was acquitted on grounds of self-defense and
defense of stranger.
DOCTRINES:
The indispensable requisite for either of these justifying circumstances is that the victim must
have mounted an unlawful aggression against the accused or the stranger. Without such
unlawful aggression, the accused is not entitled to the justifying circumstance

The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the
aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person
defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds:

1. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a
weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause
the injury.
2. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of
happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely
imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another
with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent
unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as
pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an
angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.

Reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the unlawful aggression does not
mean absolute necessity. It must be assumed that one who is assaulted cannot have sufficient
tranquility of mind to think, calculate and make comparisons that can easily be made in the
calmness of reason. The law requires rational necessity, not indispensable need.

In determining the reasonable necessity of the means employed, the courts may also look .at
and consider the number of wounds inflicted. A large number of wounds inflicted on the
victim can indicate a determined effort on the part of the accused to kill the victim and may belie
the reasonableness of the means adopted to prevent or repel an unlawful act of an aggressor.
DECISION:
 • WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on
March 22, 2016 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07112; ACQUITS accused RODOLFO
OLARBE y BALIHANGO on the grounds of SELF-DEFENSE and DEFENSE OF A
STRANGER; DECLARES him NOT CIVILLY LIABLE to the heirs of the late Romeo
Arca; and DIRECTS his IMMEDIATE RELEASE FROM CONFINEMENT unless he is
otherwise legally confined for another cause.

CASE: 2 GANAL JR V. PEOPLE TOPIC:

PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: PRAYER:
• PRUDENCIO • PEOPLE • ACQUITTAL
GANAL JR. • JULWIN
ALVAREZ (DEAD
VICTIM)
• ANGELO
FOLLANTE
FACTS:
• About 7 o'clock in the evening of May 20, 2013, GANAL AND HIS COMPANY were
drinking in GANAL’S HOUSE in Santor, Baggao, Cagayan.
• By 9:30 o'clock in the evening, petitioner's neighbor Angelo Follante arrived uninvited
and insisted to join the drinking session. GANAL refused because Angelo was already
very drunk. Angelo then challenged petitioner to a fight, but the latter advised him to just
go home.
• Later, stones were hurled at the roofs of the adjacent houses of petitioner and his father,
Ganal, Sr. Ganal, Sr. went out to check and saw Angelo together with his uncle JULWIN
ALVAREZ. The two were in the middle of the road near the front gate. Ganal, Sr.
approached and asked them to go home because his wife was suffering from
hypertension and should not be disturbed. Julwin replied that he did not care if Ganal,
Sr.'s wife died, he would kill all of them, including petitioner. Ganal, Sr. tried to pacify the
two,
• Julwin, who had a knife tucked in his waistband and holding two (2) stones, advanced
towards him. Petitioner thus rushed inside his house, got his gun, and fired a warning
shot into the air. Ganal, Sr. this time had regained consciousness and hid near the gate.
Angelo ran away but Julwin continued advancing towards him.
• When Julwin was about two (2) to three (3) meters away from him, petitioner thought
that the victim was intent on killing him. Petitioner fired at Julwin, who in turn, pointed a
finger at him, threatening to kill everyone inside the house. Afraid that Julwin would
make good on his threat, petitioner fired all the rounds in his gun. Julwin fell within a
meter from petitioner's door.

• Petitioner borrowed the cellphone of his mother Erlinda Ganal and called the Baggao
Police Station. He asked assistance from PO3 Marcelino and committed to surrender
himself.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: CA RULING:
• CHARGE: accused Ganal was charged with • Affirmed the RTC DECISION
homicide for the death of Julwin Alvarez
(Julwin)
• the RTC found petitioner guilty of homicide.
It did not give credence to petitioner's claim of
 self-defense on the ground that the force he
employed was not commensurate to Julwin's
supposed unlawful aggression.
• According to RTC, the nature and number of
wounds (5 bullet wounds and 2 lacerations)
revealed petitioner's intent to kill.
ISSUE(S):
• Whether or not GANAL may be acquitted on grounds of self-defense.

RULING:

• YES, SC ACQUITS GANAL ON THE BASIS OF SELF-DEFENSE

GANAL's primary invocation is self-defense and his claim of defense of relative should be
deemed subsumed therein.

To successfully claim self-defense, an accused must satisfactorily prove these elements: (1)
unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself or herself.

The first element, unlawful aggression, is present here. Actual or material unlawful aggression
contemplates the offensive act of using physical force or weapon which positively determines
the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Here, Julwin committed a series of offensive acts
that patently revealed his intent to harm petitioner.

As for the second element, reasonable necessity of the means employed, we disagree with
the trial court and the Court of Appeals, and hold that the same is likewise present.

Here, though petitioner inflicted five (5) bullet wounds and two (2) lacerations on Julwin, the
number of wounds alone should not automatically lead to the conclusion that there was a
determined effort on petitioner's part to kill the victim. Petitioner was overcome by the instinct of
self-preservation on seeing that Julwin brashly entered into his property and even knocked his
father unconscious for getting in the way. Julwin was determined to inflict injury on petitioner -
he brought two (2) large stones and knife for the purpose.

The third element of self-defense, lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself or herself, is also present here. In fact, both the prosecution and defense
were one in saying that it was Julwin who went to petitioner's house and instigated the incident.
DOCTRINES:
Test of reasonableness of the means employed;

In judging pleas of self-defense and defense of stranger, the courts should not demand that the
accused conduct himself with the poise of a person not under imminent threat of fatal harm. The
test is whether his subjective belief as to the imminence and seriousness of the danger
was reasonable or not, and the reasonableness of his belief must be viewed from his
standpoint at the time he acted.

• The right of a person to take life in self-defense arises from his belief in the necessity
for doing so; and his belief and the reasonableness thereof are to be judged in the
 light of the circumstances as they then appeared to him, not in the light of
circumstances as they would appear to others or based on the belief that others may or
might entertain as to the nature and imminence of the danger and the necessity to kill.
DECISION:
• PETITION IS GRANTED
• Petitioner PRUDENCIO GANAL, JR. is ACQUITTED of HOMICIDE on ground of the
justifying circumstance of self-defense.

CASE 3: SENOJA V. PEOPLE TOPIC: SELF-DEFENSE; UNLAWFUL

AGRESSION
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: PRAYER:
• EXEQUIEL • LEON LUMASAC • ACQUITTAL AND REVERSAL
SENOJA OF TRIAL COURT DECISIONS
(KILLER)
• FIDEL SENOJA
• JOSE CALICA
• MIGUEL
LUMASAC
• CRISANTO
REGUYAL
(HUT OWNER)
FACTS:
• While Accused Senoja together with his friends are having a drinking spree inside a hut,
LEON Lumasac suddenly arrived holding a bolo and looking for his brother. Senoja and
Jose tried to pacify him but when they approached Lumasac, he tried to hack Senoja.
Senoja then was able to embrace Lumasac which gave an opportunity for Jose to get
the bolo from Lumasac.
• Afterwards, they were able to pacify Lumasac, and so Lumasac left but he returned and
angrily demanded for his bolo. Jose gave his own bolo. Lumasac then threatened
Senoja “May mangyayari sayo, kung hindi ngayon, bukas,” afterwards, He left.

• About 10 meters away from the hut, Senoja followed Lumasac. When Lumasac turned
around and saw Senoja, he told the latter “Kung hindi lang kita inaanak.” Then, Lumasac
hacked Senoja, hitting the latter on the left side of his head and thigh. Thinking that
Lumasac will attack him again, Senoja stabbed Lumasac frontally several times as well
as on the left buttock. Then, Exequiel Senoja ran towards the barangay road and threw
away the “kolonial” knife he used in stabbing Leon. The latter died on the spot.

• Senoja was charged with Homicide. Despite his claim for Self-defense, he was convicted
of Homicide. On Appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction but with modification.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: CA RULING:
• CHARGE: HOMICIDE AFFIRMED RTC’S DECISION
• RTC CONVICTION: HOMICIDE
ISSUE(S):
• Whether or not SENOJA acted in SELF-DEFENSE
 RULING:

• NO; SC found SENOJA GUILTY for HOMICIDE

In this case, there were two events concerned:

1) The arrival of Leon who was armed with a bolo and
2) When Leon demanded for his bolo because he wanted to go home already after the
commotion inside the house, and then eventually left with a threat.

Quoting the appellate court, the SC said that the victim had already left the hut. At that point in
time, the victim was simply walking toward his home; he had stopped being an aggressor. It
was Senoja who wanted a confrontation this time. It was Senoja who was now the unlawful
aggressor in this second phase of their confrontation.

The affirmative defense of self-defense may be complete or incomplete.

1. It is complete when all the three essential requisites are present;
2. it is incomplete if only unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and any of the two
essential requisites were present.

Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is a condition sine qua non to self-defense,
complete or incomplete. The right of self-defense proceeds from necessity and limited by it. The
right begins where necessity does and ends where it ends.

Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger

thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. Hence, when an inceptual/unlawful
aggression ceases to exist, the one making a defense has no right to kill or injure the former
aggressor. After the danger has passed, one is not justified in following up his adversary to take
his life. When the danger is over, the right of self-defense ceases

There is however, a perceptible difference between necessity and self-defense.

Self-defense excuses the repulse of a wrong; necessity justifies the invasion of a right.
Hence, it is essential to self-defense that it should be a defense against a present unlawful
attack. Self-defense is an act to save life; hence, it is right and not a crime.

• It is a settled rule that to constitute aggression, the person attacked must be

confronted by a real threat on his life and limb; and the peril sought to be avoided
is imminent and actual, not merely imaginary.

• Hence, when an inceptual / unlawful aggression ceases to exist, the one making a
defense has no right to kill or injure the former aggressor. After the danger has
passed, one is not justified in following up his adversary to take his life.
DOCTRINES:
Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger
thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. Hence, when an inceptual/unlawful
aggression ceases to exist, the one making a defense has no right to kill or injure the former
aggressor. After the danger has passed, one is not justified in following up his adversary to take
his life. When the danger is over, the right of self-defense ceases
DECISION:
 • the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
RTC’S HOMICIDE CONVICTION STANDS.

CASE 4: PEOPLE V. JAURIGUE TOPIC:

PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: PRAYER:
• PEOPLE • AVELINA •
• AMADO JAURIGUE
CAPINA • NICOLAS JAURIGUE
(DECEASED)
FACTS:
• Victim Amado CAPINA was courting Avelina JAURIGUE. On one occasion, while
Avelina’s cousin washed the Avelina’s hankerchief, Amado stole it. Amado proposed her
love to Avelina. Avelina refused. Amado grabbed her, kissed her, and touched her chest.
To this, Avelina slapped him, threw fist blows, and kicked him. Avelina told her mother
the next day. Her mother gave her a fan knife for protection.

• Not long after, Amado intruded in Avelina’s house while she was asleep. He kissed her
hand which woke her up. She screamed for help; he hid under the bed. Her parents
arrive in the room. He apologized.

• Days after, Avelina and her family attended services in the Seventh Day Adventists
chapel. Avelina’s father got there first, Avelina followed and sat on one of the benches.
Amado saw Avelina, sat beside her and put his hand in her right thigh. Avelina tried
to get her knife with right hand. Amado held her right hand to stop her. Avelina quickly
grabbed the knife with her left hand and stabbed Amado in the neck, inflicting upon
him a wound about 4 1/2 inches deep, which was necessarily mortal.

• Amado staggered. Avelina’s father saw Amado bleeding. Her father asked why she did
it, she said she could not endure it anymore.

• CFI found Avelina guilty of homicide with the aggravating circumstance of having
committed the act in a place of worship, inter alia. Avelina appealed.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: CA RULING:
CHARGE: MURDER
CFI OF TAYABAS CONVICTION: HOMICIDE
ISSUE(S):
• WHETHER JAURIGUE IS EXEMPTED FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR TRYING TO
DEFEND HER HONOR

RULING:

• NO; SHE IS NOT EXEMPTED BECAUSE THE MEANS SHE EMPLOYED IN DEFENSE
OF HER HONOR WAS EVIDENTLY EXCESSIVE.

In the language of Viada, aside from the right to life on which rests the legitimate defense of our
own person, we have the right to property acquired by us, and the right to honor which is not
the least prized of our patrimony
The attempt to rape a woman constitutes an unlawful aggression sufficient to put her in a
state of legitimate defense, inasmuch as a woman's honor cannot but be esteemed as a right as
precious, if not more, than her very existence; and it is evident that a woman who, thus
imperiled, wounds, nay kills the offender, should be afforded exemption from criminal
liability, since such killing cannot be considered a crime from the moment it became the only
means left for her to protect her honor from so great an outrage

As long as there is actual danger of being raped, a woman is justified in killing her aggressor, in
the defense of her honor.

According to the facts established by the evidence and found by the learned trial court in this
case, when the deceased sat by the side of defendant and appellant on the same bench, near
the door of the barrio chapel and placed his hand on the upper portion of her right thigh, without
her consent, and under the circumstances, there was and there could be no possibility of her
being raped.

And when she gave Amado Capina a thrust at the base of the left side of his neck, inflicting
upon him a mortal wound 4 1/2 inches deep, causing his death a few moments later, the means
employed by her in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive; and under the facts
and circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally declared completely exempt from
criminal liability.

In the instant case, if defendant and appellant had killed Amado Capina, when the latter climbed
up her house late at night on September 15, 1942, and surreptitiously entered her bedroom,
undoubtedly for the purpose of raping her, as indicated by his previous acts and conduct,
instead of merely shouting for help, she could have been perfectly justified in killing him.

But the fact that defendant and appellant immediately and voluntarily and unconditionally
surrendered to the barrio lieutenant in said chapel, admitting having stabbed the deceased,
immediately after the incident, and agreed to go to her house shortly thereafter and to remain
there subject to the order of the said barrio lieutenant, an agent of the authorities; and the
further fact that she had acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed
against her a few moments before, and upon such provocation as to produce passion and
obfuscation, or temporary loss of reason and self-control, should be considered as mitigating
circumstances in her favor
DOCTRINES:

DECISION:
• In stabbing to death the deceased Amado Capina, in the manner and form and under
the circumstances, the defendant and appellant committed the crime of homicide,
with no aggravating circumstance whatsoever, but with at least three mitigating
circumstances of a qualified character to be considered in her favor; and, in
accordance with the provisions of article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, she is entitled to
a reduction by one or two degrees in the penalty to be imposed upon her.

CASE 5: TOLEDO V. PEOPLE TOPIC: SELF-DEFENSE

 PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: PRAYER:
• NOE • PEOPLE • REVERSAL OF RTC AND CA
TOLEDO Y • RICKY F. GUARTE RULINGS
TAMBONG (DECEASED)
• SD
FACTS:
GUARTE’S VIEW
• On September 16, 1995, petitioner Noe Toledo (Noe) was on his way home at Tuburan,
Odiongan, Romblon when he saw his nephew, Ricky Guarte (Ricky) having a drinking
spree with his friends five meters away from his house. Noe ordered them to not make
loud noises, and they obliged. He then proceeded to his house and went to sleep. On
the other side, Ricky together with his friends went to sleep at the Guarte’s house.
• They had not laid down long when they heard stones being hurled at the roof of the
house three times. Ricky rose from the bed and peeped through a window and saw
Noe stoning their house. Ricky asked Noe why he was stoning their house but Noe
did not answer and instead, he met Ricky at the doorstep of his house and without any
warning, stabbed Ricky in the abdomen with a bolo.
• Ricky was taken to the Romblon Provincial Hospital thereafter where he was
immediately operated on by Dr. Fetalvero, but Ricky later on died while being operated
on because of massive blood loss.

TOLEDO’S VIEW
• On the Evidence of the Petitioner, Noe alleged that when Ricky went out the house that
night, he proceeded to Noe’s house inebriated and incensed, pulled out a balisong,
pushed the door and threatened to stab Noe. Trying too hard to block Ricky from
entering the house, Noe pushed their sala set against the door as he hurriedly ran
upstairs to get his bolo. He returned to the door and pushed it with all his might using his
left hand. He pointed his bolo, which was in his right hand, towards Ricky.
• The bolo accidentally hit Ricky in the stomach, and TOLEDO lost his balance and fell
to the floor. Noe, thereafter, surrendered to the barangay captain the next day.

• The RTC rendered judgment finding Noe guilty as charged, and not giving credence
and probative weight to the testimony of Noe that his bolo accidentally hit Ricky on the
stomach.
• Noe thereafter appealed to CA raising the issue whether or not he can be held criminally
liable for the accidental death of Ricky. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision with
modifications, ruling that Noe failed to prove that he acted on self-defense.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: CA RULING:
RTC OF ROMBLON: GUILTY OF HOMICIDE AFFIRMED THE RTC RULING

ISSUE(S):
• Whether or not the petitioner acted on self-defense, and can he invoke Article 12,
par. 12 of the RPC? (NO)

RULING:
 • The SC HELD TOLEDO GUILTY FOR HOMICIDE AND DID NOT AVAIL HIS CLAIM OF
SELF DEFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 11 AND ACCIDENT UNDER ARTICLE 12.

The herein accused Noe asserts two provisions in the Revised Penal Code that would
theoretically exempt him from criminal liability, which are –
1. Article 12, paragraph 4 of the RPC which reads: “Any person who, while performing a
lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of
causing it; and
2. Article 11, paragraph 1 of the RPC which reads: “Article 11. Justifying circumstances –
The following do not incur criminal liability:
Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur: First. Unlawful aggression; Second. Reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself.

Noe invoking the above-mentioned provisions of the RPC at the same is extremely deviating to
the law itself because the said defenses are directly opposites. There is no such defense as
“accidental self-defense” in the realm of criminal law.

Self-defense, under Article 11, paragraph 1, and accident, under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the
RPC, are affirmative defenses which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and
convincing evidence. Noe failed to prove that the victim was killed by accident, without fault
or intention on his part to cause it. The Supreme Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that Noe
failed to prove self-defense, whether complete or incomplete.

Furthermore, the SC belied TOLEDO’s view of the events.

First. If the testimony of the petitioner is to be believed, the force of the struggle between him
and the victim would have caused the door to fall on TOLEDO. However, TOLEDO failed to
adduce real evidence that the door of his house was destroyed and that he sustained any
physical injuries,20 considering that he was only five inches away from the door.

Second. If the door fell to the sala of the house of the petitioner, the RICKY GUARTE must have
fallen on top of the door. It is incredible that the bolo of the petitioner could have hit the stomach
of the victim. The claim of the petitioner that he managed to step aside and avoid being crushed
by the door belies his claim that the bolo accidentally hit the victim on the stomach.

No Unlawful aggression under article 11

The evidence on record revealed that there is no unlawful aggression on the part of Ricky.

While it was established that Ricky was stabbed at the doorstep of appellant’s house which
would give a semblance of verity to appellant’s version of the incident, such view, however, is
belied by the fact that Ricky arrived at appellant’s house unarmed and had only one purpose
in mind, that is, to ask appellant why he threw stones at his house. With no weapon to
attack appellant or defend himself.

Appellant was not justified in stabbing Ricky. There was no imminent threat to appellant’s
life necessitating his assault on Ricky. Pursuant to Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code,
Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense.
For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, unexpected
attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. In the
absence of such element, appellant’s claim of self-defense must fail. Furthermore, with the
failure of the petitioner to prove self-defense, the inescapable conclusion is that he is guilty of
homicide as found by the trial court and the CA. He cannot even invoke Article 12,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code

DOCTRINES:
It is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the same time because the
said defenses are intrinsically antithetical. There is no such defense as accidental self-
defense in the realm of criminal law.
DECISION:
• IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

CASE 6: PEOPLE V. RICOHERMOSO TOPIC: justifying circumstance for

avoidance of a greater evil or injury
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: PRAYER:
• PEOPLE • PIO •
• GEMINIANO DE RICOHERMOSO
LEON • SEVERO
(deceased) PADERNAL (father-
• MARIANITO DE in-law)
LEON • JUAN PADERNAL
(brother in law)
FACTS:
January 30, 1965 – at 9:00 AM, Geminiano de Leon with his common-law wife Fabiana
Rosales, son Marianito de Leon, and one Rizal Rosales encountered Pio Ricohermoso in Barrio
Tagbacan Silañangan.

• Geminiano asked Ricohermoso about his share of the palay harvest since the latter
cultivated such as kaingin.
• Ricohermoso said that Germinano could go to his house for some palay, anytime.

Upon return to the Barrio, Germiniano stopped at Ricohermoso’s place at about 2:00 PM with
Marianito who had a .22 caliber rifle slung on his shoulder. Ricohermoso told the former that he
would not give palay, whatever happens.

• Ricohermoso unsheathed his bolo from the left while Severo Padernal (his father-in-law)
got an axe and approached Ricohermoso from the right.
• Geminiano pleaded but was still stabbed by Ricohermoso on the neck. When he fell
facedown, he was hacked on the back with an axe by Severo Padernal.
• At the same time, Juan Padernal (brother-in-law of Ricohermoso and son of Severo)
suddenly embraced Marianito from behind. They grappled and rolled downhill to a
camote patch. Marianito passed out.

When he regained consciousness, he saw Geminiano mortally wounded and carried him for a
short distance. Germiniano died at 2:00 the same day.

Appellants’ version: That afternoon, when Ricohermoso refused to give any palay since the
land was allegedly public, Geminiano approached Ricohermoso. When Geminiano unsheathed
his bolo, Ricohermoso met him, drew his bolo, and struck Geminiano. As Geminiano turned
right to flee, Ricohermoso struck him again. Meanwhile, Mariano tried to shoot but Juan
disabled him and wrested the gun.

• Juan invokes the justifying circumstance of avoidance of a greater evil or injury (par. 4,
Art. 11, RPC) in explaining his act of preventing Marianito from shooting.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: CA RULING:
• Circuit Criminal Court at Lucena City: convicting
them of MURDER
• Trial court's ruled that JUAN PADERNAL
conspired with Ricohermoso to kill Geminiano
de Leon.
ISSUE(S):
• Whether JUAN PADERNAL conspired with Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal to kill
Geminiano de Leon (YES)
• W/N Juan can invoke the justifying circumstance for avoidance of a greater evil or injury
to exempt himself from the said charge of murder (NO)

RULING:
NO. Juan’s reliance on the justifying circumstance is erroneous

Appellant Juan Padernal invokes the justifying circumstance of avoidance of a greater evil or
injury (par. 4, Art. 11, Revised Penal Code) in explaining his act of preventing Marianito de Leon
from shooting Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal.

His reliance on that justifying circumstance is erroneous. The act of Juan Padernal in preventing
Marianito de Leon from shooting Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal, who were the
aggressors, was designed to insure the killing of Geminiano de Leon without any risk to his
assailants.

Juan Padernal was not avoiding any evil when he sought to disable Marianito. Padernal's
malicious intention was to forestall any interference in the felonious assault made by his father
and brother-in-law on Geminiano. That situation is unarguably not the case envisaged in
paragraph 4 of article 11.

CONSPIRACY
Juan Padernal contends that he was not a co-principal because he did not take any direct part
in the killing of Geminiano, that he did not force or induce Ricohermoso to stab Geminiano and
that he allegedly did not cooperate in its commission. That contention is not well-taken.

Considering the trio's behavior and appellant Juan Padernal's close relationship to Ricohermoso
and Severo Padernal, the ineluctable conclusion is that he acted in conspiracy with them. He
coordinated and timed his seizure of Marianito with the assault of Ricohermoso and Severo
Padernal on Geminiano. It is doubtful if the assailants could have consummated the killing of
Geminiano, without their suffering any injury, if Marianito had not been rendered helpless by
appellant Juan Padernal.

DOCTRINES:

DECISION:
• The judgment of the lower court as to appellant Juan Padernal is affirmed with costs
against him.

CASE 7: PEOPLE V. NORMA HERNANDEZ TOPIC: AVOIDANCE OF A GREATER

EVIL
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: PRAYER:
• PEOPLE • MARIA NORMA •
• VIVENCIO HERNANDEZ
LASCANO

FACTS:
• After Vivencio Lascano (19 years old) spent months of courting Maria Norma
Hernandez, the latter finally accepted and asked Lascano to bring his parents over to
Hernandez’s house to talk about their marriage. On the same date, she asked him to
bring his parents over her home so that they could talk about their marriage.

• When Vivencio, his parents and his twelve aunts went to her house, they brought 30
chickens and 3 goats and they agreed to buy a wedding dress, 2 vestidas, shoes, P20
for the sponsors and to repair the uncle’s roof. The wedding dress was left in the
doorstep because there was no one in the Hernandez residence when Vivencio
delivered the dress.

• On March 18 they allegedly constructed a temporary shed where the wedding feast was
to be held wherein they put up a temporary stove. They slaughtered goats, pigs and
chickens and they served around 90 guests.

• On the morning of March 19, they served around 70 guests because Vivencio’s parents
invited the appellant’s friends and relatives. While said party or celebration was going
on, Hernandez could be found nowhere. Vivencio and his parents still waited for her
until twelve midnight of March 19 but appellant never showed up thus causing them
great shame and humiliation.

• Norma Hernandez averred that Lascano indeed courted her but that she wasn’t really
in love with him. But her parents tried to persuade her to accept the proposal so she
only accepted it out of obedience to her parents and the uncle’s insistence.

• Before Vivencio’s parents came to their home, she already counselled them not to bring
the chickens and that they should not regret whatever may happen later if they insisted.
 • Appellant said she felt tortured because she wasn’t honestly in love with Vivencio and so
she decided to leave home as a last recourse to prevent the marriage. She went to
Mindoro where she stayed until her cousin fetched her as she was ordered arrested for
slander by deed. Hernandez averred that she never got the wedding dress that Vivencio
promised.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: CA RULING:
• CFI BATANGAS: SERIOUS SLANDER BY REVERSED THE CFI DECISION
DEED
ISSUE(S):
• Whether or not the appellant should be acquitted pursuant to Article 11(4) of the
Revised Penal Code

RULING:
Yes, The Court reversed the RTC judgment and acquitted the appellant.

A party to an agreement to marry who backs out cannot be held liable for the crime of
slander by deed for then, that would be an inherent way of compelling said party to enter a
marriage without his or her consent, and this would contravene the principle of law that what
could not be done directly could not be done indirectly.

Also, SC held that NORMA has the right to avoid to himself or herself the evil of going
through a loveless marriage pursuant to Article 11, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Malice, one of the essential requisites of slander hasn’t been proven. There is no malice
in the act of the appellant changing her mind. She was merely exercising her right not to
give her consent the marriage after mature consideration.
• Furthermore, there were no strained relations existing between the complainant &
appellant before the incident. There always existed good relations between them for
they were neighbors so it cannot be sustained that appellant was motivated by spite or
ill-will in deliberately frustrating the marriage.
• Appellant has the privilege to reconsider her previous commitment to marry and it would
be utterly inconsistent to convict her for slander by deed simply because she desisted in
continuing with the marriage. If she would be liable, then that would be tantamount to
compelling her to go into a marriage without her free consent
DOCTRINES:

DECISION:
• The Court reversed the RTC judgment and acquitted the appellant

CASE 8: PEOPLE V. DELIMA TOPIC: acts in the fulfillment of a duty

or in the lawful exercise of a right or
office
 PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: PRAYER:
• PEOPLE • FELIPE DE LIMA • REVERSAL OF JUDGEMENT
• LORENZO (POLICEMAN)
NAPILON
(DECEASED-
ESCAPEE)
FACTS:
Lorenzo Napilon had escaped from the jail where he was serving sentence.

Some days afterwards the policeman Felipe Delima, who was looking for him, found him in the
house of Jorge Alegria, armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance, and
demanded his surrender.

The fugitive answered with a stroke of his lance. The policeman dodged, it, and to impose his
authority fired his revolver, but the bullet did not hit him. The criminal ran away, without parting
with his weapon. These peace officer went after him and fired again his revolver, this time hitting
and killing him.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: CA RULING:
• DE LIMA was tried and convicted for
homicide and sentenced to reclusion
temporal and the accessory penalties.
• He appeals from that judgment which must
be reversed.
ISSUE(S):
• W/N DE LIMA CAN BE ACQUITTED BASED ON HISA ACT OF FULFILLMENT OF A
DUTY

RULING:
That killing was done in the performance of a duty.

The deceased was under the obligation to surrender, and had no right, after evading service of
his sentence, to commit assault and disobedience with a weapon in the hand, which compelled
the policeman to resort to such an extreme means, which, although it proved to be fatal, was
justified by the circumstances
DOCTRINES:
Article 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminal liability:

5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.

DECISION:
• Article 8, No. 11, of the Penal Code being considered, Felipe Delima committed no
crime, and he is hereby acquitted with the costs de oficio. So ordered.

CASE 9: PEOPLE V. LAGATA TOPIC:

PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: PRAYER:
• PEOPLE • IGNACIO LAGATA •
• TIPACE (PROVINCIAL
(DECEASED) GUARD)

FACTS:
• The accused, Ignacio Lagata, a provincial guard of Catbalogan, Samar, was in charge
of 6 prisoners (Jesus, Tipace, Eusebio, Mariano, Labong & Abria) assigned to work in
the capitol plaza of Samar.

• Lagata ordered the prisoners to go to the nursery to pick up gabi. Not long afterwards,
they were called to assemble. Epifanio Labong was missing so Lagata ordered the 5
remaining prisoners to go look for him.

• Eusebio Abria said that while they were gathering gabi, he heard 3 shots. He was
wounded by the 2nd one. They were already assembled by the 1st shot and that he did
not see Tipace being shot. He said he ran away because he was afraid that he might be
shot again and that his companions were also probably scared and that is why they ran.

• Another prisoner, Mariano Ibañez stated that Epifanio Labong did not answer their call
so Ignacio Lagata ordered to go look for him in the mountain. He said that Abria went to
the camote plantation and found footprints and called on Lagata to inform him about the
footprints. When Abria told Lagata of the flattened grass and that he was unable to look
for Labong, Ignacio Lagata fired at him, and he was hit on his left arm.

• Abria told Lagata he was wounded and in turn, Lagata told them to assemble. Once they
were assembled, Lagata cocked his gun and shot Ceferino Tipace. Mariano said that
when he saw Tipace was shot, he ran away because he also could have been shot.

• Pedro Mayuga, chief of Samar Provincial Hospital & Gilberto Rosales, Sanitary Division
president, verified the gunshot wound and that the death of Tipace resulted therein.

• Ignacio Lagata, however, said that he fired his gun because the prisoners were running
far from him when he already ordered them to stop. He said that he would be the one in
jail if a prisoner escaped under his custody. Furthermore, he would be discharged from
duty like the others. He was hopeless already. Moreover, the picking up of gabi was not
part of the prisoner’s work.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: CA RULING:
• LAGATA was charged with murder, serious
physical injuries and evasion through
negligence
• TRIAL COURT FOUND HIM GUILTY
ISSUE(S):
• W/N Lagata should be sentenced for homicide and serious physical injuries. (YES, But
entitled to mitigating circumstance)

RULING:
As regards the shooting of Abria and Tipace the SC are convinced that the facts were as
narrated by the witnesses for the prosecution. Abria was shot when by the witnesses for the
prosecution. Abria was shot when he was only three meter away from appellant and the latter
has not even shown that Abria attempted to escape.
Tipace was also shot when he was about four or five meter away from appellant. The latter's
allegation that Tipace was running — conveying the idea that said prisoner was in the act of
escaping — appears to be inconsistent with his own testimony to the effect that Tipace was
running sidewise with his face looking towards appellant and with the undisputed fact that
Tipace was hit near one axilla, the bullet coming out from the opposite shoulder. If
Tipace's purpose was to escape the natural thing for him to do would have to give his back to
appellant.

It is clear that Lagata had absolutely no reason to fire at Tipace. Lagata could have fired at
him in self-defense or if absolutely necessary to avoid his escape. The record does not show
that Tipace was bent on committing any act of aggression "he was running towards and then
around me". (Emphasis ours) How could anyone in his senses imagine that Tipace intended to
escape by running towards and around the very guard he was supposed to escape from?

There is no question that the escape of Labong scared LAGATA according to him because of
the experience of other guard who were dismissed from office or even prosecuted because of
prisoners who had escaped under their custody and that it was his “duty” to fire against the
prisoner if he wanted to be “exempt” from any responsibility.

Even if appellant sincerely believe, although erroneously that in firing the shots be acted in the
performance of his official duty the circumstances of the case show that there was no necessity
for him to fire directly against the prisoners so as seriously wound one of them and kill
instantaneously another.

While custodians of prisoners should take care to avoid the latter's escape, only absolute
necessity would authorize them to fire against them. There is a burden of proof as to such
necessity. The summary liquidation of Prisoner under flimsy pretexts of attempts of escape,
which has been and is being practiced in dictatorial system of government has always been and
is shocking to the universal conscience of humanity.

As recommended by the prosecuted appellants is entitled to the benefit of the mitigating

circumstance of incomplete justifying circumstance in paragraph5 of Article 11 of the
Revised Penal Code. Consequently, appellant should be sentenced for homicide to an
indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor to twelve years and one day of
reclusion temporal and in the case of serious physical injuries to an indeterminate penalty of
four months and one day of arresto mayor to two years, four months and one day of prision
correccional.
DOCTRINES:
• While custodians of prisoners should take care to avoid the latter's escape, only absolute
necessity would authorize them to fire against them. There is a burden of proof as to
such necessity.
• Appellants is entitled to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete justifying
circumstance in paragraph5 of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code.
DECISION:
 • Consequently, appellant should be sentenced for homicide to an indeterminate penalty
of six years and one day of prision mayor to twelve years and one day of reclusion
temporal and in the case of serious physical injuries to an indeterminate penalty of
four months and one day of arresto mayor to two years, four months and one day of
prision correccional.

CASE 10: MAMANGUN V. PEOPLE TOPIC: MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCE ONLY
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: PRAYER:
• RUFINO • PEOPLE •
MAMANGUN • GENER
• Together with: CONTRERAS
PO2 DIAZ (victim deceased)
AND CRUZ
FACTS:
• At about 8 PM, in Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan, a certain Liberty Contreras
was heard shouting “Magnanakaw… Magnanakaw.” Several residents responded and
chased the suspect who entered Abacan’s house and proceeded to the rooftop.

• Policemen (Andres Legaspi, Eugenio Aminas, Rufino Mamangun, San diego San
Gabriel, Carlito Cruz & Hobert Diaz) were dispatched who went to the rooftop of house
where the suspect was allegedly hiding.
• 3 policemen including Mamangun each armed with a drawn handgun, searched
the rooftop. They saw a man whom they thought was the robbery suspect and that
instance, Mamangun, who was walking ahead of the group, fired his handgun once,
hitting the man. The man turned out to be Gener Contreras who was not the robbery
suspect. Contreras died from the gunshot wound.

• According to Crisanto Ayson, lone eyewitness for prosecution, Mamangun pointed his
.45 cal. Pistol at the CONTRERAS who instantly exclaimed, “Hindi ako, hindi ako!” to
which Mamangun replied, “Anong hindi ako?” Before Ayson could say anything,
Mamangun already shot Contreras.

• Mamangun however said that the person raised a stainless steel pipe towards his
head but he was able to evade the attack. This prompted him to shoot the person on the
left arm. It was only at that point that the man told them, “Hindi ako, hindi ako.”

• Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner with homicide attended by an incomplete justifying

circumstance of the petitioner having acted in the performance of his duty as a
policeman, and also the generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
• Petitioner appealed, insisting that the shooting was justified because he was
repelling Contreras’ unlawful attack on his person, as Contreras was about to strike
him with a steel pipe.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: CA RULING:
• SANDIGANBAYAN: Homicide attended by
an incomplete justifying circumstance of
having acted in the performance of his duty
 as a policeman + generic mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
ISSUE(S):
• W/N the death of the victim was the necessary consequence of the petitioner’s fulfillment
of his duty (NO)

RULING:
No. The Court denies the instant petition and affirms Sandiganbayan’s decision after finding the
petitioner’s testimony to be nothing, but a concocted story designed to evade criminal liability.
Per Sandiganbayan’s observations, the defense was self-serving for the accused and biased
with respect to his co-policemen-witnesses

The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under paragraph 5, Article II, of the Revised
Penal Code may be invoked only after the defense successfully proves that:
(1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty; and
(2) the injury inflicted or offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due
performance or lawful exercise of such duty.

Concededly, the first requisite is present in this case. Petitioner, a police officer, was
responding to a robbery-holdup incident. His presence at the situs of the crime was in
accordance with the performance of his duty. However, proof that the shooting and ultimate
death of Contreras was a necessary consequence of the due performance of his duty as a
policeman is essential to exempt him from criminal liability.

However, as to the second requisite, the SC sees it that the MAMANGUN’s posturing that he
shot Contreras because the latter tried to strike him with a steel pipe was a mere afterthought
to exempt him from criminal liability.

• There can be no quibbling that there was no rational necessity for the killing of
Contreras. Petitioner could have first fired a warning shot before pulling the trigger
against Contreras who was one of the residents chasing the suspected robber.

Self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, cannot be appreciated as a valid justifying

circumstance in this case. For, from the above admitted, uncontroverted or established facts,
the most important element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim to justify a claim of
self-defense was absent. Lacking this essential and primary element of unlawful aggression,
petitioner’s plea of self-defense, complete or incomplete, must have to fail.

• To be sure, acts in the fulfillment of a duty, without more, do not completely justify the
petitioner’s firing the fatal gunshot at the victim.
• True, petitioner, as one of the policemen responding to a reported robbery then in
progress, was performing his duty as a police officer as well as when he was trying to
effect the arrest of the suspected robber and in the process, fatally shoot said suspect,
albeit the wrong man. However, in the absence of the equally necessary justifying
circumstance that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of
the due performance of such duty, there can only be incomplete justification, a
privileged mitigating circumstance under Articles 13 and 69 of the Revised Penal
Code.
 DOCTRINES:

DECISION:
• The Court is not persuaded and denied the petition. The decision of Sandiganbayan is
affirmed.

CASE 11: PEOPLE V. DAGANI TOPIC: COMPLETE SELF-

DEFENSE
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: PRAYER:
• PEOPLE • ROLANDO DAGANI •
• ERNESTO • OTELLO SANTIANO
JAVIER
(DECEASED-
VICTIM)
FACTS:
This is a murder case filed against Otello Santiano and Rolando Dagani for the killing of
Ernesto Javier.

At about 4:45 in the afternoon of September 11, 1989, a group composed of Ernesto Javier
(Javier), Lincoln Miran (Miran), and two other individuals had been drinking at the canteen
located inside the compound of the Philippine National Railways (PNR) along C.M. Recto
Avenue, Tondo, Manila.

All of a sudden, DAGANI AND SANTIANO, who were security officers of the PNR and covered
by the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, entered the canteen and approached the group.
Appellant Dagani shoved Miran, causing the latter to fall from his chair. Dagani then held
Javier while Santiano shot Javier twice at his left side, killing the latter.

The RTC ruled that Otello Santiano and Rolando Dagani are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder defined and punished under Art. 248, RPC, with the presence ofthe
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

Appellants invoked the justifying circumstances of self-defense and lawful performance of

official duty as PNR security officers. They also argued that the prosecution failed to establish
treachery and conspiracy.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: CA RULING:
The RTC ruled that Otello Santiano and Rolando APPEALED DECISION IS
Dagani are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the MAINTAINED (affirmation)
crime of Murder
ISSUE(S):
• Whether or not there is a complete self-defense. (NO)
• W/N the petitioners are in the performance of a lawful duty (NO)
 RULING:
LACK OF REQUISITES FOR SELF-DEFENSE

(1) The defense was unable to prove that there was unlawful aggression on the part of
Javier. They were unable to present evidence that the victim actually fired his gun. No
spent shells from the .22 caliber pistol were found and no bullets were recovered from
the scene of the incident. Javier also tested negative for gunpowder residue.
Moreover, the trial court found appellant Dagani’s account of the incident to be
incredible and self-serving. In sum, the defense presented a bare claim of self-
defense without any proof of the existence of its requisites.

Even if it were established that Javier fired his gun as the appellants so insist, the imminence of
the danger to their lives had already ceased the moment Dagani held down the victim and
grappled for the gun with the latter. After the victim had been thrown off-balance, there was
no longer any unlawful aggression that would have necessitated the act of killing. When
an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-
defense has no right to kill or even to wound the former aggressor. When Javier had been
caught in the struggle for the possession of the gun with appellant Dagani, the grave peril
envisaged by appellant Santiano, which impelled him to fire at the victim, had then ceased to a
reasonable extent,and undoubtedly, Santiano went beyond the call of self-preservation
when he proceeded to inflict the excessive and fatal injuries on Javier, even when the
alleged unlawful aggression had already ceased.

(2) The second element of self-defense demands that the means employed to neutralize
the unlawful aggression are reasonable and necessary. It is settled that reasonable
necessity of the means employed does not imply material commensurability
between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational
equivalence. The circumstances in their entirety which surround the grappling of the
firearm by Dagani and Javier, such as the nature and number of gunshot wounds
sustained by the victim which amounted to two fatal wounds, that Dagani was able to
restrain the hands of Javier and push them away from his body, that Dagani was larger
than Javier and had finished Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) hand-to-hand
combat training, and Javier, as admitted by the appellants, was inebriated at the time of
the incident, do not justify appellant Santiano’s act of fatally shooting the victim
twice.

All things considered, the appellants’ plea of self-defense is not corroborated by competent
evidence. Like alibi, the affirmative defense of self-defense is inherently weak because, as
experience has demonstrated, it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove.

Were they in the lawful performance of their official duties?

Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty
or in the lawful exercise of a right or office does not incur any criminal liability. Two requisites
must concur before this defense can prosper:
1) the accused must have acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right or office; and
2) the injury caused or the offense committed should have been the necessary
consequence of such lawful exercise.

These requisites are absent in the instant case.

The defense failed to prove that the security officers were in fact on duty at the time they
were at the canteen. The trial court gave weight to the fact that the appellants were unable to
submit their daily time records to show that they were on duty at the time. Appellants
assertion that they were ordered to go on 24-hour duty was belied by PNR Security
Investigator Rolando Marinays testimony that PNR security officers work in two 12-hour
shifts, from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. and from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00a.m.

Moreover, since it was not established that Javier fired his gun, the injury inflicted upon him
cannot be regarded as a necessary consequence of appellants’ due performance of an official
duty.

As stated, considering that the imminent or actual danger to the life of the appellants had
been neutralized when Dagani grappled with Javier and restrained his hands; that Javier
had been thrown off-balance; that Dagani had been specially trained for these purposes; and
that Javier had been drinking immediately prior to the scuffle, this Court holds that the fatal
injuries that appellant Santiano inflicted on the victim cannot be deemed to be necessary
consequences of the performance of his duty as a PNR security officer.

• The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last resort,
and under circumstances indicating that the offender cannot otherwise be taken without
bloodshed. The law does not clothe police officers with authority to arbitrarily
judge the necessity to kill. It may be true that police officers sometimes find
themselves in a dilemma when pressured by a situation where an immediate and
decisive, but legal, action is needed.
• However, it must be stressed that the judgment and discretion of police officers in the
performance of their duties must be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but
within reasonable limits. In the absence of a clear and legal provision to the contrary,
they must act in conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion, and within the spirit
and purpose of the law.
• We cannot countenance trigger-happy law enforcement officers who indiscriminately
employ force and violence upon the persons they are apprehending. They must always
bear in mind that although they are dealing with criminal elements against whom society
must be protected, these criminals are also human beings with human rights.
DOCTRINES:

DECISION:
• Since treachery cannot be proved fully and convincingly, the ruling shall be favorable to
the accused and therefore, Santiago shall be charged of homicide.
• Santiago had aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of official position by
using his gun on Javier but had a mitigating circumstance by surrendering.
• Santiago had aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of official position by using
his gun on Javier but had a mitigating circumstance by surrendering.
• CA decision is modified Santiago is found guilty of homicide
• Dagani is ACQUITTED - since Dagani’s conviction can only be sustained if the crime
had been carried out through a conspiracy duly proven, in view of the failure of the
prosecution to discharge that burden, this Court is constrained to acquit him.
CASE 12: PEOPLE V. BERONILLA TOPIC: Obedience to an order
issued by a superior for some
lawful purpose
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: PRAYER:
• PEOPLE • MANUEL •
• ARSENIO BERONILLA
BORJAL
(DECEASED-
VICTIM)
FACTS:
Setting: After Japanese occupation
Borjal served as mayor during the Japanese occupation.

• MANUEL Beronilla, after being appointed as Military Mayor of La Paz, Abra, received
a copy of a memorandum issued by Lt. Col. Arnold authorizing all military mayors to
appoint a jury of 12 bolomen to try persons accused of treason, espionage or the
aiding of the enemy.

• He also received a list of all puppet officials of the province of Abra (Borjal included) with
a memorandum instructing all Military Mayors to investigate said persons and
gather against them complaints from people of the municipality.

• Beronilla, upon the return of Borjal who left La Paz because of an attempt on his life,
placed Borjal under custody. Pursuant to his instructions, complaints were gathered, a
12-man jury was appointed, prosecutors and a clerk of the jury were assigned. Trial
lasted for 19 days and the jury found Borjal guilty on all counts (espionage, aiding the
enemy, abuse of authority). Death penalty was imposed.

• Beronilla forwarded the records of the case to the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry for
review. The records were returned by Lt. Col. Arnold adding that the matter was best
handled by the La Paz Government and whatever disposition taken was approved. Upon
receipt of the letter, Beronilla then ordered the execution of Borjal.

• The execution was reported to Col. Arnold and Beronilla received compliments based
on the reply of his superior. Col. Arnold who replied, saying “…I can only compliment
you for your impartial but independent way of handling the whole case.”

• Two years thereafter, Beronilla, along with the executioner, digger and jury, were
indicted for the murder of Borjal. Soon after, President Manuel Roxas issued Executive
Proclamation 8, which granted amnesty to persons who committed acts in furtherance
of the resistance to the enemy against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.

• The rest of defendants applied and were granted amnesty, but Beronilla and others were
convicted on the grounds that the crime was made on purely personal motives
and that the crime was committed after the expiration of time period for amnesty
proclamation.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: CA RULING:
CFI ABRA: convicted them of murder for the
execution of Arsenio Borjal, the elected mayor of La,
Paz, Abra (at the outbreak of war), which was found to
be aiding the enemy.
ISSUE(S):
• W/N the defendant-appellants’ actions are covered by justifying circumstances for
obedience to lawful order of superior. (YES)

RULING:
Yes. The accused acted upon orders of their superior officers, which as military
subordinates, they could not question and obeyed in good faith without the being aware of its
illegality. The records are ample to sustain the claim of the defense that the arrest, prosecution
and trial of Borjal were done pursuant to express orders of the 15th Infantry HQ.

The state however contends that there was a radiogram from Col. Volckmann to Lt. Col.
Arnold, specifically noting the illegality of Borjal’s conviction and sentence, which the
prosecution claims that Beronilla was informed about this but still pursued with the execution.

The evidence is sufficient to sustain the claim of the defense that arrest, prosecution and trial of
Borjal was done in pursuant to express orders of superiors. Additionally, it could not be
established that Beronilla received the radiogram from Colonel Volckmann, overall area
commander, which called attention to the illegality of Borjal’s conviction and sentence. Had
Beronilla known the violation, he would not have dared to report it to Arnold. The conduct
of the accused also does not show malice on their part because of the conduct of the trial,
defense through counsel given to Borjal, suspension of trial based on doubts of illegality and
death sentence review sent to the superior officers.

The Court concludes that Lt. Col. Arnold failed to transmit the Volckmann message to Beronilla.
The charge of criminal conspiracy to do away with Borjal must be rejected because the accused
had no need to conspire against a man who was, to their knowledge, duly sentenced to death.
The accused acted as military subordinates only following superior orders, thus there is
no criminal intent.

Criminal intent then could not be established. The maxim here is actus non facit reum, nisi
mens rea (Crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of to
be innocent).

Additionally, the lower court should not have denied their claim to the benefits of the Guerilla
Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 inspite of contradictory dates of liberation of La Paz, Abra. Even if
the dates were contradictory, the court should have found for the Beronila, et al because if there
are “any reasonable doubt as to whether a given case falls within the (amnesty) proclamation
should be resolved in favor of the accused.”
DOCTRINES:

DECISION:
 • Judgement appealed from reversed and the appellants were acquitted.

CASE 13: TABUENA V. SANDIGANBAYAN TOPIC:

PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: PRAYER:
• LUIS • SANDIGANBAYAN •
TABUENA
• GERARDO G.
DABAO and
ADOLFO
PERALTA
FACTS:
Then President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the
president’s office and in cash what the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) owes
the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to the 7 January 1985
memorandum of then Minister Trade and Industry Roberto Ongpin.

Tabuena agreed. About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then
private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated 8 January 1986 reiterating in
black and white such verbal instruction.

In obedience to President Marcos’ verbal instruction and memorandum, Tabuena, with the help
of Gerardo G. Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by
means of three (3) withdrawals.

On 10 January 1986, the first withdrawal was made for P25 Million, following a letter of even
date signed by Tabuena and Dabao requesting the PNB extension office at the MIAA the
depository branch of MIAA funds, to issue a manager’s check for said amount payable to
Tabuena. The check was encashed, however, at the PNB Villamor Branch. Dabao and the
cashier of the PNB Villamor branch counted the money after which, Tabuena took delivery
thereof. The P25 Million in cash was delivered on the same day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez.

Mrs. Gimenez did not issue any receipt for the money received. Similar circumstances
surrounded the second withdrawal/encashment and delivery of another P25 Million, made on 16
January 1986. The third and last withdrawal was made on 31 January 1986 for P5 Million.

Peralta was Tabuena’s co-signatory to the letter- request for a manager’s check for this
amount. Peralta accompanied Tabuena to the PNB Villamor branch as Tabuena requested him
to do the counting of the P5 Million. After the counting, the money was loaded in the trunk of
Tabuena’s car. Peralta did not go with Tabuena to deliver the money to Mrs. Gimenez’ office. It
was only upon delivery of the P5 Million that Mrs. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the
amounts she received from Tabuena. The receipt was dated January 30,1986.

Tabuena and Peralta were charged for malversation of funds, while Dabao remained at
large. One of the justices of the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a
defense witness and of the accused themselves; the volume of the questions asked were more
the combined questions of the counsels. On 12 October 1990, they were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
Tabuena and Peralta filed separate petitions for review, appealing the Sandiganbayan decision
dated 12 October 19990 and the Resolution of 20 December 1991.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: CA RULING:
SANDIGANBAYAN DECISION: FOUND GUILTY FOR
MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS
ISSUE(S):
• CAN THE PETITIONERS BE ACQUITED ON THE BASIS OF OBEDIENCE TO A
SUPERIOR ORDER?
• WERE THEY GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS?

RULING:
Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta are acquitted of the crime of malversation.

Tabuena acted in strict compliance with the MARCOS Memorandum. The order emanated
from the Office of the President and bears the signature of the President himself, the highest
official of the land. It carries with it the presumption that it was regularly issued.
(Presumption of regularity)

And on its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment of an
obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains one to act
swiftly without question.

Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was what the MARCOS
Memorandum required him to do. He could not be faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply
with the presidential directive, and to argue otherwise is something easier said than done.
Marcos was undeniably Tabuena’s superior – the former being then the President of the
Republic who unquestionably exercised control over government agencies such as the MIAA
and PNCC.

In other words Marcos had a say in matters involving inter-government agency affairs and
transactions, such as for instance, directing payment of liability of one entity to another and the
manner in which it should be carried out. And as a recipient of such kind of a directive coming
from the highest official of the land no less, good faith should be read on Tabuena’s
compliance, without hesitation nor any question, with the MARCOS Memorandum.

Tabuena therefore is entitled to the justifying circumstance of “Any person who acts in
obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.” The subordinate-
superior relationship between Tabuena and Marcos is clear. And so too, is the lawfulness of
the order contained in the MARCOS Memorandum, as it has for its purpose partial payment
of the liability of one government agency (MIAA) to another (PNCC).

Tabuena had no reason not to believe that the 55M was indeed part of a due and demandable
debt, a portion of a bigger liability to PNCC (existence of such debts determined from
testimonies). So even if the order was illegal and Tabuena was not aware of the illegality,
he would not be liable because there would only be a mistake of fact committed in good
faith.
Even assuming that the real and sole purpose behind the MARCOS Memorandum was to
siphon-out public money for the personal benefit of those then in power, still, no criminal liability
can be imputed to Tabuena. There is no showing that Tabuena had anything to do
whatsoever with the execution of the MARCOS Memorandum. Nor is there proof that he
profited from the felonious scheme.

“Good faith in the payment of public funds relieves a public officer from the crime of
malversation.” Not every unauthorized payment of public funds is malversation. There is
malversation only if the public officer who has custody of public funds should appropriate the
same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence
shall permit any other person to take such public funds. Where the payment of public funds has
been made in good faith, and there is reasonable ground to believe that the public officer to
whom the fund had been paid was entitled thereto, he is deemed to have acted in good faith,
there is no criminal intent, and the payment, if it turns out that it is unauthorized, renders
him only civilly but not criminally liable. Maxim: actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea – a
crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent.

4While even Tabuena admitted that procedures were ignored and that the disbursement was
unusual, he is found to be excusedfrom such because the Marcos Memorandum enjoined his
IMMEDIATE COMPLIANCE. On the other hand, while this allows for the negation of criminal
intent, as Tabuena acted in good faith, he would still be civilly liable (but he’s not criminally liable
anymore, escaping the harsher penalties)

Records show that the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a defense witness
and of the accused themselves. The questions of the court were in the nature of cross
examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation. Tabuena and
Peralta may not have raised the issue as an error, there is nevertheless no impediment for the
court to consider such matter as additional basis for a reversal since the settled doctrine is that
an appeal throws the whole case open to review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court
to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from whether they are made
the subject of assignments of error or not.
DOCTRINES:

DECISION:
• WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, herein petitioners Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo
M. Peralta are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of malversation as defined and
penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The Sandiganbayan Decision of
October 12, 1990 and the Resolution dated December 20, 1991 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.

CASE 14: PEOPLE V. GENOSA TOPIC: Battered Woman Syndrome

as Self-Defense
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: PRAYER:
• PEOPLE • MARIVIC GENOSA •
• BEN GENOSA
(DECEASED)
 FACTS:
Appellant was married to the victim Ben Genosa. In their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben
lived happily but soon thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and their fights would become
violent. Ben, a habitual drinker, became cruel to Marivic; he would provoke her, slap her, pin her
down on the bed or beat her. These incidents happened several times and Marivic would often
run home to her parents. She had tried to leave her husband at least five times, but Ben would
always follow her and they would reconcile.

On the night of the killing, appellant, who was then eight months pregnant, and the victim
quarreled. The latter beat her, however, she was able to run to another room. Allegedly there
was no provocation on her part when she got home that night, and it was her husband who
began the provocation. Frightened that her husband would hurt her and wanting to make sure
she would deliver her baby safely, appellant admitted having killed the victim, who was then
sleeping at the time, with the use of a gun. She was convicted of the crime of parricide. Experts
opined that Marivic fits the profile of a battered woman syndrome and at the time she killed her
husband, her mental condition was that she was re-experiencing the trauma, together with the
imprint of all the abuses that she had experienced in the past.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT RULING: CA RULING:
The Regional Trial Court found her guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide
ISSUE(S):
• Whether or not appellant can validly invoke the Battered Woman Syndrome as
constituting self-defense (NO)

RULING:
Short Answer: The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence”
supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were
acute battering incidents but appellant failed to prove that in at least another battering episode
in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient
evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle.

The Court held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-defense arising
from the battered woman syndrome to wit:

(a) each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at
least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner;
(b) the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have
produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her
batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life; and
(c) at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable – not necessarily
immediate and actual – grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence
perpetrated by the former against the latter.
Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense.

Under the existing facts of the case, however, not all of these were duly established. Here,
there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal
attack upon him. In fact, she had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and
escape to their children’s bedroom. The attack had apparently ceased and the reality or even
imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. Ben was no longer in a position
that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

Without continuous aggression there can be no self-defense. And absence of aggression

does not warrant complete or incomplete self-defense. Unlawful aggression is the most
essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack or an
imminent danger thereof on the life or safety of a person.

In the present case, however, according to the testimony of the appellant there was a
sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of the husband and her fatal
attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape
to their children’s bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed.
The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no
longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

Also, appellant herein failed to prove that she is afflicted with the “battered woman syndrome”
(BWS).
• The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence” supposedly
characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were
acute battering incidents but appellant failed to prove that in at least another
battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did
appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle.

• In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself
establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still
be considered in the context of self-defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the rule that
the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one’s life; and the peril
sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus,
the Revised Penal Code provides that the following requisites of self-defense must
concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.

• Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual
physical assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery
usually have a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an
obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life “would amount to sentencing her
to ‘murder by installment.’ Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in
previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant’s use of deadly force must be shown.
Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger.
Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be
appreciated.

DOCTRINES:
• A battered woman is identified as a woman who is regularly subjected by a man to any
forceful physical or psychological abuse. In order to classify as a battered woman, the
couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice.
This cycle of violence begins with the
• (1) tension-building phase, where a mild battering occurs, then the
 • (2) acute battering incident marked by brutality, destructiveness, and, sometimes,
death, and finally,
• (3) tranquil or loving period in which the batterer asks for forgiveness.

The repeated battering led Marivic to cave in her helplessness and fail to discern any potential
solution to the problem but to harm or kill her batterer.
• The Court, however, failed to find sufficient evidence that would prove that Marivic
suffered from the syndrome. Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed her conviction for the
crime of parricide for killing her husband.
DECISION:
• Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed her conviction for the crime of parricide for killing
her husband