Economic and Political Weekly Economic and Political Weekly

Empire's Setting Sun?
Patrick Blackett and Military and Scientific Development of India

Author(s): Robert S. Anderson
Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 36, No. 39 (Sep. 29 - Oct. 5, 2001), pp. 3703-
3705+3707-3720
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4411166
Accessed: 28-08-2017 11:59 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
Economic and Political Weekly is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to Economic and Political Weekly
This content downloaded from 125.22.105.51 on Mon, 28 Aug 2017 11:59:54 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Empire's Setting Sun?
Patrick Blackett and Military and Scientific
Development of India
It is difficult to give a measure of Patrick Blackett's wide-ranging influence in India. He had
no official status in defence matters except as an advisor to Nehru. Since his consultations
were not widely known, his public reputation, nor surprisingly, was largely in the field of
scientific research institution building. In this capacity he advocated a realistic appraisal of
the relations between the state and the military, and limitations on the military's growth and
influence. It is not as a mililtary consultant, however, but as an intervenor in scientific affaiirs
and advisor to the research system that Blackett was and is best known in India. He came to
understand its political-economy, specifically the political limits of the influence of the
scientific community and the way in which very scarce economic resources were (or were not)
mobilised within it. Blackett's objectives in India are enduring: to improve the working
conditions of people doing research; to cut away the bureaucratic brambles which grow
around the practice of research; to think carefully about the things which can be developed
locally instead of being imported, to balance the state's insatiable desire for technical prestige
with enhancing ordinary peoples' abilities to provide a better life for themselves.
ROBERT S ANDERSON
nvited to lunch at the Nehru home in Nehru as crucial to his influence in both
question the prime minister-to-be posed to
January 1947, Patrick Blackett was
Blackett, like other questions in India, had
spheres. Nehru identified with and trusted
seated beside the acting prime minis- a long history. Blackett because both had been to Cam-
ter. Jawaharlal Nehru knew of Blackett's bridge, held favourable attitudes to 'po-
In describing some of Blackett's activi-
litical' socialism, and were cautious about
experience in war and military affairs, andties in India and relationships with Indian
asked him how long it would take "to leaders and their problems, my purpose the is same kinds of people, including 'the
Indianise the military", meaning both itsto convey - mostly in his own words - the Americans'. In turn, Blackett acknow-
command-structure and its weapons pro-problems he perceived and the solutions ledges Nehru to be unusually receptive to
duction and supply. He was not yet thehe advocated. Through this we get an under- his ideas and approaches, more receptive
prime minister and India was not yet an standing of the changing context in whichthan his own British prime ministers of the
independent nation. Blackett's reply was period to 1964 (such as Attlee or Churchill).
he worked, and the evolution of his thought
a challenging one, obliging Nehru toand practice as a consultant and interve- What Blackett does not say is that Nehru
explore two different kinds of strategy and acted on his ideas, not just because of
nor. Twenty years after he first set foot in
Nehru's personal receptivity, but also
that country, Patrick Blackett was thinking
thus two different military set-ups. For the
because Blackett's ideas were acceptable
'realistic' strategy Blackett preferred, heabout his influence on military and scienti-
told Nehru that Indianisation could be fic developments in India. In a free-rang-to a handful of other influential people in
completed in 18 months: this would ing pre-interview with B R Nanda in 1967 he India, namely scientists Homi Bhabha and
pare India for conflict with other similar Sir Shanti Bhatnagar, and also to D S
selected his influence as military consult-
powers in the region. For the 'unrealistic'ant as probably more important than his Kothari and senior military officers like
strategy, in which India would prepare other
for roles as scientific intervenor.1 This
General J N Chaudhuri. Few of these people
conflict with major world powers, Blackett would have been untouched by Blackett's
is in marked contrast to Indian perceptions
predicted it would take many, many years multitude of interests and torrent of en-
of him, which focused mainly on his influ-
to 'Indianise'. Nehru.liked his approach,
ence of large scientific research organisa-
ergy, and would therefore have paid atten-
and wrote to him soon afterward to ask tions. There is truth in both views, as I will
tion to his presence. But more importantly,
Blackett to advise him on military and show. (By 'intervenor' I mean a role moreBlackett articulated ideas they had, sup-
scientific affairs. From this invitation much ported them in their efforts, and made
penetrating and involved than 'consultant.'
Scientific intervenor was role in which
followed. One wonders if his memory cast connections at the highest level to people
back to 1924, when his father Motilal Blackett intervened and accepted some res-outside India for them. And finally, his
Nehru was, with Mohammed Ali Jinnah, ponsibility in the development of specificinfluence coincided with and extended the
a member of the first committee to try to
institutions of the scientific community).work of his old Cambridge colleague
accelerate the process to 'Indianise' the But Blackett rightly points to his rela-
A V Hill, who had been deeply involved
military (the Skeen Committee). The tionship with prime minister Jawaharlalin India since 1943 and continued to play
Economic and Political Weekly September 29, 2001 3703
a role among Indian scientists similar to honorary degree from the University of as a stage on which to demonstrate another
Blackett's. To this nexus of trusting and Delhi, an event requiring months of plan-kind of economic and political develop-
increasingly familiar relationships should ning and Blackett's foreknowledge. Evi-ment, both from the rivalrous view of the
be added the force of a number of material dently he decided in the autumn of 1946 great powers, and from the view of the
factors and ideas, making what Blackett to go to India. It appears that while flyingIndian government that Blackett served,
said and did even more influential in elite in India to the meetings of the IndianIndia became a most prominent example.
Indian political and scientific circles. Science Congress in early January 1947,India also had a huge reserve of British
The most powerful person in scienceBlackett and Nehru found themselves on pounds at this time, and its currency was
in Indiajustbefore independence, SirShantithe same plane, and managed to talk.4 intimately linked with sterling.
Bhatnagar, also was in a position to inviteShortly afterward, Blackett went for lunch It is difficult to give a measure of
foreign experts to visit and work in India.and talk at Nehru's home in Delhi. Much Blackett's influence in India. Blackett's
At the 1946 Empire Scientific Conferenceof Blackett's engagement in India resulted papers in the Royal Society seem incom-
in London, P C Mahalanobis and Bhatnagarfrom those conversations with Nehru. plete, and we do not have a thorough
proposed a scheme called 'Short Visits of This British expert became sought after record of all of his activities in India. Most
Scientists from Abroad' and Mahalanobis precisely as the sun was setting on the of his communication with Nehru and
followed up with a final list (based on listsBritish Empire, as physics was taking a Bhabha is still unavailable. We cannot
drawn up by people like Meghnad Saha) strategic turn, and as military development easily calibrate his experience in India
which included Robert Oppenheimer, was becoming a national and commercial with his other activities and relationships
Norbert Wiener, and Niels Bohr as well complex in which university-based scien- in the rest of his large life. In the 1967
as familiar British names Patrick Blackett,tists gradually played a less central role, interview he remarked "I had no official
J B S Haldane, Sir Henry Dale, Sir Henry particularly in contrast to Blackett's expe- status in defence matters except as an
Tizzard and Joseph Needham. Nehrurience in Britain over the previous 10 advisor to Nehru." Since his defence, re-
agreed to sign the invitations to give these years (that is from about 1938 to 1948). ports were marked 'secret', and his con-
visits prominence.2 It is probable that In 1947-1950, when his reputation was sultations were not widely known, it is
Blackett met some Indian scientists in deepening in India, the full consequence understandable that his public reputation
London at the month-long Empire Scienti- of the end of second world war was evi- was largely in the field of scientific re-
fic Conference in 1946. Eventually most dent. The British presence in India had tosearch institution building. In tracing his
of the individuals on this list came to Indiaend, but ended so slowly that Britain's relationships with key Indian figures and
and got involved - some.more, some reputation less institutions, I often learned more about
in India worsened after the war.
- in the development of their own fields The Indian adjustment to the new world India than I did about Blackett. It is his
and research institutions. power, the US, was complicated by the appraisal of others, usually very decisive,
When Blackett received an invitation in sudden emergence in 1947 of Pakistan. that reveals most about him. It is clear India
1946, signed by Nehru, he accepted. TheThe British adjustment to the US was also had a great influence on Blackett.
Council of Scientific and Industrial Re- difficult and uncertain, and there was Blackett's father's brother was a mis-
search, of which Bhatnagar was the direc- tension before the formation of NATO andsionary in India, his mother was the daugh-
tor, paid for Blackett's first trip to India.CENTO in 1949. The US was a majorter of Sir Charles Maynard, an officer in
He was asked to address the Indian Science power in Asia too, with bases in Japan, the Indian Army around 1857, and his
Congress (of which Nehru was president), Taiwan, and the Philippines. British and mother's uncle a tea planter in Assam.
and also the Association of Scientific French colonies in Asia (like Vietnam)Perhaps because of these associations, or
Workers of India. Blackett had been a seemed vulnerable. When the first Soviet in spite of them, Blackett stated he had not
committed member of this Association in atomic bomb was exploded in 1949 (years wanted to go to India before it achieved
Britain since the 1930s, and the objectives before the old Allies predicted it), military independence. We shall see that he was
of the Indian Association were identical, bases in northern Pakistan acquired a new horrified by the'Colonel Blimp culture'
to increase the applications of scientific significance to Britain and America. When among some of the British in India. Though
rationalism in politics and planning, and the victory of the Communist forces in he was proud to be there during the great
to improve the working conditions of China was complete in 1949, large diverse change to independence in 1947, he was
scientists. His old Cambridge colleague, populations and a great arc of land from soon to discover both how old lines of
and head of the Association in Britain, the the Baltic to the Pacific lay to the north dependence were maintained and new lines
physicist J D Bernal, was influential in of India, all 'marching to a different drum- of interdependence were established. He
getting the Indian Association recognised, mer'. The Anglo-American approach to was thus an early harbinger in the mid-
but the impetus for its development came India would have been complicated enough 1960s of the whole discourse on the proper
from India.3 Nehru himself was favourable after 1947 without Pakistan, a Soviet atomic role of science and technology in newly
to the association. The British Association bomb, and a communist China. But with independent developing countries.
experienced a great political shift fromthese factors, it was very complicated
1947-1948 onward, with British Commu- indeed. A year later, in 1950, these very Professor and Prime Minister
nists like Benal leaving it, and thousandscomplications led to a war in Korea during
of lab technicians, etc, joining it as a kindwhich US military planners thought they He was a superb leader. But he did not
of trades union from the early 1950s would use an atomic bomb. India was a know how to get things done very well.
onward. In India it retained its originalsecondary consideration to the great pow-(Patrick Blackett, 1967)
intellectual, planning, and agitational ers as the cold war evolved, but occasion- Few prime ministers anywhere at that
character for at least the next 30 years.ally became a sharp and pressing consid- time had the appreciation of and respon-
During his 1947 visit Blackett received aneration, and was usually an irritant. And sibility for science and scientists that Nehru
3704 Economic and Political Weekly September 29, 2001
did. He was the direct minister with port- mality and charm; his physical presence through it. Bhabha was an extraordinary
folio - with powerful secretaries (like was extremely attractive; he was very en-
man with his finger on the strategic pulse.
deputy ministers elsewhere) - one for gaging, with a shy sort of smile. He wasAt the time of his death in 1966 Blackett
atomic energy, the other for industrial called him "my best personal friend".
sort of light-hearted. I liked this about him.
research and natural resources. Nehru was But he spent too much time, I think, on Blackett went to parties at Bhabha's house,
intimately involved in a third and fourth science anyway. Considering the amount had his portrait sketched by Bhabha, had
subject - defence and economic planning. he had to do, running a country of that size,Bhabha to stay at his own house (for
He was also minister for external affairs. the amount of time he did spend with usexample in 1946 in Manchester, before
He kept these five files close to him, andwas indeed surprising. On the whole, he Blackett first went to India). The other
met directly with the scientists responsibleliked me and others more as companions powerful secretary was Sir Shanti
for them. The indirect evidence is that than as consultants." Although we know theBhatnagar, a chemist trained at Lahore and
Nehru discussed many issues in his re- close relation of Nehru and Blackett, we dothe University of London, who was the
sponsibilities with Blackett, judging from not know its frustrations, or what valuehead of the Council of Scientific and
comments in letters written by Bhabha, Nehru privately placed on his advice. Industrial Research and who also reported
Bhatnagar, Mahalanobis, Saha, and oth-Blackett was candid about Nehru in 1967,directly to Nehru. With Sir Shanti, Blackett
ers. Scientists and officers soon learned saying "He was a superb leader. But healso formed an ongoing personal relation-
did not know how to get things done veryship, until Bhatnagar' s early death in 1955.
that one way to Nehru, and simultaneously
to Bhabha or Bhatnagar, was through well. He believed in science in a rather They had frequent meetings in London as
Blackett's ear. From 1948 onward, Blackett
naive way. We all did at the time. He waswell as in Delhi.
usually stayed in the prime minister's not more naive than other people. It was In addition, Blackett was friendly with
residence, often for weeks at a time. In enormously valuable that he should put Prasanta Mahalanobis, a physicist trained
at Cambridge who became a renowned
1948 his wife Costanza stayed with him. science first in making Indians scientifi-
He received his correspondence and cally minded. But science is only partstatistician,
of and built the influential
phone calls there. If Blackett got inspired the game and the real effect of scienceIndian Statistical Institute in Calcutta.
about your project or problem, his energy comes from producing wealth...Now India Mahalanobis too had quasi-ministerial
knew no bounds. Blackett, of all people, is finding out that the problem of turningstatus, saw Nehru regularly and shaped
believed in the possible. This must have science into wealth...is very much more Nehru's entire approach to economic plan-
appealed to Nehru. Moreover, Nehru's difficult than just doing science. It is ning, not which we know was one ofBlackett's
beliefs that the state should lead in the continuing passions. Mahalanobis (and,
his fault that he did not fully understand
economy, and that the government could this..." Blackett's deepest critique was
perhaps more ambiguously Nehru) were
do almost anything if it tried were largely about implementation and action. "Nehrucommitted to a centrally-planned state-
Blackett's own beliefs. This awesome role did an enormous amount to get non- driven economy. This definitely appealed
and responsibility forecast by Nehru was scientists to understand what was scienti- to Blackett, along with Mahalanobis's
something Blackett seems to have thought fic. But his regime did not do nearly as well commitment to, and reputation in statis-.
this large group of scientists could actuallyin implementation. What he lacked weretics. At not quite so senior a level, Blackett's
meet. These beliefs were to have long-term hard-headed industrial-minded ministers advice shaped the career of Daulat Singh
consequences in India. who could push on the agricultural pro- Kothari, another Cambridge-trained physi-
During the years when Nehru was for-gramme, the industrial programme."6 cist who became the scientific advisor to
mulating the movement of non-aligned the minister of defence in 1948 and headed
nations, he tried his ideas out on Blackett, Patrick Blackett and the Defence Science Organisation when it
who was very receptive to them and prob- Indian Scientists was established in June 1949. This
ably contributed to them through discus- organisation in Delhi was modelled on the
sion and debate. (We do not have docu- We were all scientifically naive. We thought
one Blackett had prescribed in 1946 for
mentary evidence for this yet.) Blackett science was the solution to everything.theI UK. Kothari eventually held the most
spoke most approvingly of this part of do not think I was very conscious ofimportant
it positions in the politics of edu-
India's foreign policy, and showed how explicitly earlier in this period. (Patrick
cation and universities in India, including
Blackett 1967) being chairman of the University Grants
India could not possibly win an arms race,
not even with nuclear weapons. He said Nehru did, of course, have two scien- Commission. Together these men con-
in 1967 "I think you [India] would havetists as hard-headed secretaries of his trolled larger budgets for construction and
employment than anyone else in the sci-
split up if you had to fall into the westernportfolios. They were not elected but had,
orbit in the first five years of indepen-as secretaries to the government, direct entific community.
dence. I think it was [Nehru's] great con-access to him, often more than any electedFrom the late 1940s, the scientists
tribution of showing that non-alignment *Blackett knew were travelling regularly;
minister. They had unelected 'deputy min-
is a thing that is feasible...I did not thinkister' status, but were as powerfulBhatnagar
as to Norway to negotiate a heavy
it was feasible at the time."5 water deal, Bhabha to Ottawa to negotiate
ministers, in my opinion, building systems
Blackett went on to say about Nehru thatand institutions, developing regulations, a reactor, Kothari to Moscow to purchase
"he had a bit too much intellectualism to troop transport aircraft, Mahalanobis to
and writing international agreements. One
solve the problem. He spent, from one Washington to look at the new large
was Homi Bhabha, the physicist whom
point of view; too much time talking...He computers. As they passed through Lon-
Blackett first met at Cambridge in the
liked intellectual company. (And he did1930s, in charge of the atomic energy
-don they all kept in touch with Blackett.
not get it except in Homi Bhabha and programme and the labs (including Blackett
his visited their institutes, gave lec-
people like that.) He had extreme infor-own in Bombay) which were funded tures there, examined their doctoral stu-
cloud chamber in the early 1930s in and economic development with interests
dents, helped select candidates for appoint-
ments, appraised new research programmesCambridge. Bhabha made a commitment in scientific and defence policy was un-
and then promoted them if he liked them.to cosmic ray studies in India from 1939 resolved throughout Blackett's period.
These same scientists were also friends onward. He asked Blackett to lend him the They were all competing for the same
with A V Hill, whose influence upon sci-big magnet Blackett built at Cambridge scarce resources. Nevertheless he seems to
ence and the-military in India beganand in Manchester for cosmic ray research in have become more conscious of this con-
1943, four years before Blackett's own Bangalore in 1941,but apparently it was flict as he got older, although as a con-
never
relationships with the country. The sent. When Bhabha built the Tata sultant he did not have to face it personally.
Blackett friendship in some senses wasInstitute
an of Fundamental Research in His advice ranged from the most con-
extension of the Hill friendship. It pro- Bombay, Blackett was in on every step.
crete, like arguing for specific new posi-
vided the basis for professional advocacy Every time Blackett came to India, often
tions and arranging for specific appoint-
and intervention within the scientific com-
at someone else's expense, Bhabha would
ments, to a general concern for the develop-
munity. Hill knew Bhatnagar very well, andcommand part of Blackett's schedule,ment
and of a weapon like the tank or an
advised Bhabha on the establishment of organisation
arrange meetings for him, including intro- like the Defence Science
ductions to the captains of industry Organisation.
his own institute. As personal friends of with Then there was his wider
Blackett, these men (Bhatnagar, Kothari)whom he was very well connected through
commitment to cultivating certain ways of
also asked him to watch out for their the Tata family and other Bombay Parsithinking, ways we would now call 'sys-
children and other relatives when they networks. Blackett could not have had temic', to do with how systems operate,
studied orworked in London, which he more
did. a powerful and effective set of inter-
and how they can be understood dynami-
mediaries in India, nor a more secure cally
The relationship of Bhabha and Blackett base in the field. This wider commitment
from which to criticise and challenge
was different from the others. They already was explained in terms of strengthening
knew each other well at Cambridge, whereEstablishment thinking. That some of Indian
his strategies for economic develop-
Bhabha (11 years younger than Blackett) friends constituted part of the Establish-
ment, industry, and defence. At the core
studied under Paul Dirac. At a weekend ment, and wanted similar changes within
of these strategies glowed Blackett's own
conference in Manchester in 1937 Bhabha it, only enhanced his influence. holy grail, the pursuit of science in its
established himself in Blackett's eyes as purest, most difficult, and most exciting
an independent-minded physicist. In the Blackett as Military Consultant form, what his friend Homi Bhabha and
company of Heisenberg, Bhabha (age 28) others now called fundamental research.
challenged Blackett (age 39) who insisted On the whole I think my views aboutHe later reflected that he had not been
the
that the quantum theory of radiation must Indian armed forces expressed in 1948
conscious of the over-simplification in his
fail at higher energies because there could have not proved too incorrect. (Patrick
approach to science and development, and
be no particles heavier than electrons in Blackett 1972) began to re-think what he (and evidently
the penetrating component of cosmic rays Patrick Blackett was proud of hishis in-closest allies in India) believed about
at sea level. Bhabha persisted patiently involvement in military affairs in India, science
and in the 1940s and 1950s. During
saying there is a penetrating componentappears tQ have gained considerablethis in-entire early period as military consult-
heavier than the electron. According to ansight from the experience. A window ant, Blackett was actively promoting his
observer, Blackett stubbornly resisted this opened for Blackett upon a new world ownof scientific projects in India. In 1948
idea at the conference, but a few monthspoor countries which were trying, like India,
he was already in transition away from the
later conceded that an energetic electronto build a scientific and technological subject for which he won the Nobel Prize
could produce a cascade shower, accord-community that applies its skills to socio-that year (cosmic rays) to the question of
ing to the Bhabha-Heitler theory, and theeconomic problems, as well as building theup reversal of the earth's magnetism. He
penetrating component of cosmic rays musta modem military infrastructure. Althoughlectured on 'the origins of cosmic rays' and
'reversely magnetised rocks', and proposed
consist of a new type of particle with massthis task for poor countries is not some-
intermediate between the electron and the thing to which he appears to have given projects on white dwarf stars. He super-
proton.7 Bhabha travelled extensively in much previous thought, he threw himself vised collection of lava and rocks in India
Europe, was not dependent on a lab, and into it in the 1950s. At the same time, I 1950s and 1960s for his project on
in the
could discuss his work with all the influ- think he soon realised with regret geomagnetism.
that He presented - for his
ential physicists of the day. His international much of the effort of poor countriesfriends was and for casual observers - a unique
scientific reputation was thus already welldrained away in the importation of costly combination of the theoretical and the
established before the war. When the war weapons systems. Thus he argued that practical. His 1948 combination of win-
actually broke out, he was on holiday in India should define very carefully what ning the Nobel Prize, launching a book
India, and so had to stay there. He wrotearmed conflicts it would face, and should about a critique of cold war logic, and
more openly to Blackett than he did tochoose its weapons for those conflicts with being put of the US government's 'non-
many others. For example, in 1941, Bhabhaequal care. He correctly realised thatgrata' the list won hearts and minds in India.
wrote to him from India, "the attitude of military forces would be used in conflicts His rare ability to combine the practical
the government is as diehard as ever. The inside India, particularly after the 1948 and theoretical as a scientist was also fully
mis-rule would astonish you."8 A reluctant experience in Hyderabad and Kashmir. realised in Blackett's work as military
experimenter in physics, Bhabha preferredAnd he saw the conflict in India between consultant. It was physiologist A V Hill
a more theoretical mathematical physics,defence and science, and the need to addresswho involved Blackett in military research
but he liked the practical gleam in Blackett's the imperative of the era, which was then,committees starting with radar in 1936,
eye, and was delighted when Blackett got as now, to reduce poverty. The conflict and Hill and Blackett communicated fre-
the Nobel Prize in 1948 for work with the between the interests rooted in industrial quently about new weapons and strategic
questions prior to Hill's departure for India at Cambridge, before leaving in 1933, gave the chaotic changes going on around them.
in 1943. Hill preceded Blackett as a mili- him access almost everywhere. Moreover, his friends in India correctly evaluated his
tary consultant in Delhi, when he spoke through this period he understood all the value to their objectives. In the period bet-
to the senior military staff in India in 1943 engineering required to apply fission to ween 1945 and independence, Britain was
about the value of science and scientists, both weapons and power generation. In preoccupied with many issues in India
gave a lecture on Operational Research, 1946 he received the US Medal of Honour but scientific development was not really
and reported on his appraisal of the situ- for his work on the Mark XIV bomb sight. among them. As the end drew near, Blackett
ation to the Viceroy. Hill himself had Yet about 1948 he suffered a quick drop briefed the Viceroy and British Com-
established a special group of physicists in reputation in official American circles, mander-in-Chief Field-Marshall Auchin-
and mathematicians in the first world war reflecting the rise of 'anti-Communism' leck in Delhi, and prime minister Attlee,
with a responsibility to develop the ability and Senator Joseph McCarthy. President Sir Stafford Cripps, and Lord Mountbatten
to defend London against Zepplin attacks. Truman issued the 'Loyalty Order'for (poised to be appointed to be the last
This group was called 'Hill's Brigands' federal employees in March 1947, and Viceroy) in London about his intensive
during that war. When Lord Mountbatten suspicion eventually reached physicist meetings in India with Nehru and mem-
needed scientific advisors in 1943 in Robert Oppenheimer. Between 1947 and bers of the Atomic Energy Committee and
Supreme Allied Command, Hill was1951 in-British PM Atlee chaired a Cabinet Board of Atomic Research (Bhabha.
strumental in getting physicist J D Bernal Committee on Subversion (Gen 183). ItBhatnagar, Meghnad Saha) in early 1947.
and physiologist Solly Zuckerman to work applied the concept of 'negative vetting'The subject of all these meetings was "the
for him, and Bernal spent the last weeks which established a list of people whoatomic energy set-up in India", and he was
of 1944 in Calcutta, the Arakan coast of might constitute a risk to security. Thealso soliciting their commitment to assist
Burma, and at the HQ in Kandy, Ceylon.discovery of the physicist-spies Fuchs andhis friend Homi Bhabha, whom Nehru had
Blackett, who moved effortlessly during Pontecorvo by UK and US intelligence already identified as his own champion of
the war between the naval and airforce agencies was underway. Blackett's isola-atomic energy and nuclear research.11
tion in Britain was partly because of his In 1945 and 1946 Blackett was on the
'camps' in the British military, already had
long experience of inter-service competi-
book criticising the development of nuclearsubcommittee on future weapons for the
tion when he served on defence commit- weapons for war, partly because of hisChiefs of Staff of the British armed forces.
tees. Despite being classified as a navalfriendship with British members of theHe chaired the Harwell atomic power
expert, he developed the 'Blackett bomb Communist Party (like Bernal), and partlycommittee from May 1946, and was mem-
because of his relationship with Sovietber of the powerful Advisory Committee
sight' (Mark XIV) that was standard equip-
ment on Allied bomber aircraft, and scientists like Kapitza (whom he hadon Atomic Energy between August 1945
specialised in bomber/bombing strategy nevertheless not done much personally to and April 1949, including after its renam-
and studies. He persuaded the Navy to save from Stalin before the war). Ameri-ing it to the 'Nuclear Physics Committee'
form a group of physicists, astronomers, can advice probably played a role in hisin January 1948, when Chadwick became
chemists, mathematicians, biologists and isolation: the bigger context for the treat-chair and Blackett was vice-chair. Blackett
physiologists (six were or to become FRS, ment of this distinguished scientist was thewas instrumental in having Tizard ap-
two of those to win the Nobel Prize) and British (Labour) government's effort topointed to this committee, asking Stafford
this group became known as 'Blackett's secure US loans to stave off their balance- Cripps to include Tizard to strengthen an
Circus'. By November 1943 he had access of-payments crisis, and a mutual militaryindependent point of view in the commit-
to Ultra secret code material.9 He knew security agreement (including nucleartee (remember that Tizard had supported
Paul Rosbaud, the German physicist who weapons) with the Americans. BlackettBlackett in the 1942 strategic bombing
supplied Churchill with a crucial assess- was a disposable symbol in this shift, as controversy with Lindeman and others).
ment of the lack of progress of Werner moves like this was expected to appeaseBoth Blackett and Tizard took the position
Heisenberg and his team on an atomic some of the numerous Anglo-phobes inthat the UK should not develop atom
bomb. He debriefed the captured German the US government. But observers of thebombs, should leave that project to the
nuclear physics team at Farm Hall, just British scene at the time remark on the Americans, and should obtain some pro-
outside Cambridge, in September 1945, severity of the turn against him in defencetective nuclear guarantee from them. This
being the person asked for by both and policy circles. Curiously however, inwas not the position approved by cabinet,
Heisenberg and Eric Welsh, the intelli- 1949 he travelled again to the US for and Blackett was identified again as a non-
gence controller of Paul Rosbaud, the extensive talks with scientists and strategicconformist. The British decision to de-
nuclear spy. "It was a measure of confi- analysts in the context of publication of velop nuclear weapons was taken in Janu-
dence between the three men that Blackett the American edition of his book on nuclearary 1947. Blackett had to leave the com-
was brought to Farm Hall". It is probable weapons. With so little evidence available,mittee and return each of its documents
that Rosbaud read the final draft of and so little open debate about nuclearin 1948. But Blackett was notjust a physicist
Blackett's 1948 book.10 He sat on the key weapons, Nehru would probably have readwho understood nuclear strategy, but he
and discussed Blackett's book with him
committees (or talked regularly with people was also a naval officer with practical
like Sir John Cockcroft, Sir Henry Tizard,
shortly after its publication in 1948, though experience in war. In this he had some-
and Sir Rudolph Peierls, and Sir James
we do not yet have evidence of their thing in common with the new Viceroy,
Chadwick who sat on committees) thatdiscussions about it. Lord Mountbatten, with whom he would
bridged the public and secret uses of
It is his uncommon range of abilities and gradually become friendly. They had both
nuclear fission. experience that made Blackett valuable tobeen at Cambridge in 1919, but Blackett's
And he knew everybody interested in India, particularly his skill in the compara- meeting with Mountbatten on return from
other future weapons. The contacts he made tive analysis of military systems. Despitehis first trip to India in 1947 was not a great
success; "I wish I had been able to see Blackett met with the chiefs of the armed quick. The first Indian officer, vice admi-
Mountbatten alone" he said, "he was forces every time he went to India, and ral theKatari, became the chief of naval staff
obviously much more sensible than [Gen- minister of defence and the minister's sci- only in April 1958. In the case of the Navy,
eral] Ismay but still disappointed me a bit.
entific advisor. He gave a talk to the chiefs Blackett was intimately aware of admiralty
He seemed very keen on finding all the of staff in the War Room each time, toured thinking and planning, and was known to
arguments on why India should remain in armaments and aircraft factories, appraised everyone as a naval expert (despite his
the Commonwealth.It may be that this will candidates for strategic analysis positions, immense knowledge of aircraft). So the
in the end happen, but to over-stress our interpreted strategic implications of the naval drama is, though smaller in scale,
desire for it to do so would seem to me a cold war into Indian context. He got into perhaps richer in nuance. Admiral Parry
mistake."12 Blackett had been convinced,the details of building tanks and devel- "was a very nice man", said Blackett in
in January and February, by people inoping rockets in India. He said, with great 1967, "but he tried to sell India, or make
Delhi who said Britain should leave India satisfaction in the 1967 interview, "I like her buy, four fleet aircraft carriers which
within three months, not six or nine. This to think that...I saved India a lot of money would have required 16 new destroyers to
relationship between Mountbatten, by discouraging her from buying too much protect the carriers". (These were light
Blackett, Nehru and India was to be impor-big and expensive western equipment." He carriers of about 16,000 tonnes, then in
tant; if Mountbatten had not generallydistinguished between the Indian and great surplus, and being sold cheaply to
respected Blackett's work, he could haveBritish military risks to which new weap- friendly navies to raise money. Blackett
undermined his effectiveness in India. From ons were to be the solution. For example, might also have known that it was the
the friendly letters they exchanged in 1971-in 1948 he advised the British forces to Royal Navy's policy not to sell a carrier
1972 it appears that Mountbatten main-follow a rapid programme to develop su- to India that year, because it felt that the
tained throughout a respect for Blackett'spersonic fighter planes, whereas for India Indian Navy was not ready to maintain
activities in India, and Blackett would have he took a more cautious approach, and did one. His advice, and the Royal Navy's
known a great deal about Mountbatten'snot support integrated production of position, jet coincided, but for different rea-
activities. sons. This kind of carrier was eventually
fighters under licence in India until seven
In 1967 Blackett reminisced, with char-years later when he proposed a lighter, approved for purchase by India in 1957,
acteristic confidence, about the experiencemore versatile, transonic fighter based and on this British ship, which had commenced
of coming to India to try to influence thean Anglo-Dutch model designed by people construction in 1943 (but was not com-
defence establishment, and why he waswhose reputation he knew very well. pleted during the war), was actually com-
selected: "Nehru spoke to all the scientists, Underlying Blackett's 1948 report is "themissioned at sea in 1961 and renamed INS
but I was the only scientist there withunderstanding that it is the intention to Vikrant).The Blackettreportchapteron the
professional military experience; five yearsmake India as nearly as possible a self- Indian Navy is the only subject on which
there was cabinet disagreement in India.
at sea in the first war, and four years amidstsupporting defence entity as may be at the
the application of scientific methods toearliest possible date" according toIn order to prove that India could not afford
modern warfare. So it was not very acci-Abraham, who notes the remarkable simi- the consequences of Admiral Parry's plan,
dental that Nehru chose me to advise larities to the objectives of A V Hill's work
Blackett had to strengthen his argument by
him."13 Five years later he said, with during
con- the war. "Yet this understanding obtaining, from friends in Whitehall, secret
was neither invented by Blackett nor did
tinuing satisfaction, "On the whole I think estimates of costs of ships currently under
that my views about the Indian armed it come from Hill. Blackett took the quo- construction by the Royal Navy in 1948.
forces expressed in 1948 have not provedtation on self-reliance verbatim from the The military situation in India was quite
too incorrect."14 Blackett's memory in on Defence Science (1946) written volatile: Blackett had also probably heard
Report
by O H Wandsborough-Jones, a British about the mutiny in the Indian Navy in the
1967 was consistent with his first report
in 1948. After the Indian conflict with defence scientist advising the colonial previous year.Vice Admiral Parry returned
China in 1962 and Pakistan in 1965, Indian government."16 One wondersfire a few days after seeing Blackett's
Blackett said that his effort from the whether the ideal of self-reliance was so report; "I personally think you are being
immediately attractive to Blackett, in partunrealistic in your fundamental assump-
beginning had been to prevent the unnec-
because he was sympathetic to the 1930s-
essary and costly introduction of weapons tions - particularly that India should only
style Fabian socialism which stressed self-
and strategies which would not have prac- prepare for a local war against an imagi-
tical value, and to focus attention on the
reliance, and also because the experience nary opponent of comparable overall
military risks which India did face. The
during most of the second world war re- strength to herself."17 Parry had planned
most pervasive problem he faced was, an expansion in which India would expe-
quired it of Britain, particularly prior to
Blackett said, that "Indian officials and
the entry of the US in the war. rience a world war with current weapons
advisors were thinking purely from But a more importantly for him, he forced of all types, building its navy to protect
Whitehall angle. There was an appallingchiefs of forces and defence ministers to India's sea links in all directions.
psychological dependence on every word define what kind of wars they expected to The British admiralty rejoined first with
that Whitehall speaks. I understand in fight,
the who the probable enemies were andinstructions that India should simply de-
what the risks were. Hegave shrewd ap-fend the coastline and harbours of India,
beginning, in 1948, there was very little
praisals of his first adversaries, the admiralinstructions that gradually enlarged to be
time and experience to think for yourself.
But a great many of your problems are with
due whom he disagreed over the navy'sthat India's navy should complement the
future, the Air Marshal, and the chief ofstrength and force structure of the total
to imitative adoption of Whitehall habits.
not of the army. These British officersCommonwealth navies in case of a global
Actually a lot of that thinking should staff
be exported anywhere. Some of it is notcommanded the Indian forces, and the war. These instructions came from no less
even good here."15 transition to Indians in command was not a figure than the First Sea Lord, who was,
by 1951, Lord Mountbatten. Because the less intellectual but wiser than the others.
later at a cocktail party in New Delhi I was
commander of the Indian Navy was, right He was born and brought up in India, and introduced to a man whom I recognised
through to 1956, a British-appointed and understood what it was about, he knew the as the leader of the (to me) memorable
British-paid Admiral, Mountbatten exer- terrain. He immediately spotted that the shooting party. He is a British diplomat.
cised great influence over the Indian Navy's arms salesmen were trying to sell us things This [incident on the dyke] was January
development, and obtained from its chief like these tanks without telling us they were 1947, at a time of acute civil disturbance
all the intelligence the British needed about too big to cross our bridges."22 It cannot and with the end of the British Raj only
its strengths and weaknesses. The story of have escaped Nehru's attention that it was a few months ahead. One would have
India's purchase of a second cruiser from very useful to have an expert like Blackett thought that all Britishers would have been
Britain provides a extraordinary tour with a network in Whitehall to appraise on their best behaviour. Was the shooting
through the public and private lives of the the plans of India's (British) defence chiefs party typical of the heydey of the British
players:, a second cruiser was negotiated with their own networks in Whitehall. Raj?"24 Presumably Blackett knew the
in 1949-1950, but put on hold due to the Blackett also discovered at first hand the answer to this rhetorical question, and this
Korean war. Parry wrote plaintively to post-war 'Colonel Blimp culture' in India, helped explain why he did not wish to go
Mountbatten in 1951: "if the question (of which enraged him, and reported to Sir to India before its independence.
the cruiser) has to be shelved very much Stafford Cripps that he had just met General In his 1948 report to the minister of
longer we shall have to make some rather H L Ismay in 1947 with Lord Mountbatten defence Blackett listed those weapons
drastic decisions."18 The shelving of the in London. Ismay (who was also born in which should not be on India's list for
cruiser continued, so during one of his India, and would become secretary of state development, as follows: atomic weapons,
London visits in 1951 when Nehru dined for the Commonwealth in 1951), "pro- chemical warfare, supersonic jets, high
with the Mountbattens, the cruiser was duced more 'Blimpisms"', said Blackett, performance jets, and guided missiles. All
"than I have heard from anyone for ages. of these were unsuitable, he said. At the
discussed. Mountbatten urged him to write
He did not seem to me to have a clue as
to PM Attlee to ask for the cruiser, which same time Blackett grasped from the
Nehru did.19 Gradually the admiralty came beginning what not all Indians or British
to the real situation in India. Hejust doesn't
to the view that the second cruiser should
know the facts."23 Blackett had experi- realised - that despite 200 years of a deeply
be sold to India, but the Indian government enced this culture at closer range, a few
intertwined military development, British
forces would not likely play any further
was coming to the view that they should not weeks before, when he joined a expedition
accept it. "During this period the roles of which had been planned for bird watching
role in conflicts involving India, and that
the major players got reversed".20 Three but which (in anticipation. of Blackett'sforeign troops with these weapons would
years later, the [British] Commander-in- being unable to join in) was changed for not likely be based in India. Blackett soon
Chief of the Indian Navy, Vice Admiral bird shooting. Blackett's love of birds wassaw Indian troops deployed inside India,
Pizey wrote to Mountbatten to describe the well known, and his first lecture at Cam-
in Hyderabad and Kashmir. Nehru wrote
decisive role that Edwina Mountbatten bridge was partly about bird-watching. aInremarkably long letter to Blackett to
played in convincing Nehru to override the
the end, Blackett (not sympathetic to thank him for his work, to praise the Indian
objections and delays of finance and
shooting birds) joined the expedition.military
"I success in Hyderabad, and to say
that the war risk over Kashmir had sub-
was invited by a British General, who was
defence ministry officials about the cruiser.
a friend of mine...We drove out some 20
Pizey stated "...it was mainly due to [her] sided: "I think definitely that there is hardly
'whisper' in the right direction thatmileswe from New Delhi", he said, " and thenany chance of war between India and
managed to speed up the government's looked for partridges by drawing a rope Pakistan. Of course the Kashmir issue
acceptance of the second cruiser...The remains and it is a difficult one."25
across the top of a small sugar field. The
speed at which things happened over a
villagers soon came along, all with their Blackett says he gradually elaborated a
certain weekend was really quite Gandhi caps, to protest against the partytheory of marginal war, preparing India for
remarkable."21Although Blackett's nameshooting in their fields, without even asking war with a country the size and force of
is unmentioned, this story is relevant be-permission - adding that the last shooting Pakistan, and not with Russia or western
cause it shows the tangled web of affectionparty had shot a peacock, which of course power. He did not mention China. "The
and loyalty within which Blackett worked,are sacred birds. This is what was trans- Pakistan war (of 1965) was an exact
example", he said in 1967, "countries of
the interdependence of British and Indianlated to us. The leader of the shooting party
similar makeup fought each other to a
buyers and sellers of major military equip-told the villagers that they were not harm-
ment, the interplay of commercial anding the crops and they had no intention to standstill, more or less." He tried con-
strategic calculations, the role of theshoot peacocks. The villagers looked surly stantly to redirect the Indian attraction to
Mountbattens, and the continuing direc-but did not protest any further. Later in the grandiose military projects. By 1949 he
tion coming from Britain. afternoon the shooting party was driving had gained the public glow of winning a
The airforce Chief Air Marshall Elmhirst,slowly along an irrigation dyke when Nobel a Prize, something he did not have
Blackett continued in his 1967 interview peacock was seen on the dyke about aon his first two visits in 1947 and early
about his first report in 1948, "tried to 1948. He had also been told, in 1948, he
hundred yards ahead of the cars. The leader
make India buy long range bombers", which of the shooting party stopped the car, was 'persona non grata' in the US, and was
would ruin India while being useless in jumped out and raised his gun. But beforelater detained by American officials when
local wars. Worse, he said, long range bom- he had fired an Indian woman walked up his Canadian plane refuelled briefly in
bers would have been dangerous to India, the bank of the dyke between the car and Florida in 1950. This may have added to
inducing massive and uncontrollable re- the peacock. The leader lowered his gun his stature in India where there was a
and said "what a bore, now we won't have
taliation. For the Chief of the Army B lackett camaraderie among and respect for those
had more respect. General Bucher "waspeacock at the Club tomorrow". Two years who spent time in the prisons of a well-
~~~~~~~~~~3710~~ ~Economic and Political Weekly September 29, 2
known 'big power'. It is a measure of the vations, Blackett asked Shanti Bhatnagarphysicist who had seen how Rutherford's
deepening of the cold war that Blackett in 1948 to provide him a list of all patentsexperimental laboratory was organised, and
was awarded the Medal of Honour by the held by Indians which might be applicablehow stars in it like Blackett functioned.
US in 1946 and quietly declared persona to defence production. In 1950 BhatnagarThis new Defence Science Organisation
non grata by the US in 1948. The change sent him all "the various projects whichin Delhi was modelled on the one Blackett
in the international climate was equally have been patented, exploited, or underhad just prescribed for the UK. Since it
dramatic: Churchill's 1947 'Iron Curtain' consideration for exploitation."26 In an-was first housed in the new National
speech in the US provided a figure of other era this information would have been Physical Laboratory (of the CSIR), and
considered top secret. He then began toborrowed scientists and equipment from
speech to conjure the new state of affairs.
The US sought to install and secureexamine a production facilities. His tours ofit, there was around 1950 a deep integra-
monopoly of knowledge surrounding armaments factories were an observational tion of personnel in defence research and
atomic energy and weapons. On the west- displeasure. He recalled a factory set up industrial research. The close relationship
ern front in 1948, the Berlin blockadenorth of Bombay by the Swiss arms between Bhabha, Bhatnagar, Kothari and
posed again the risk of a war in Europe manufacturer Oerlikon: "Absolutely four Blackett - and all of them with Nehru -
between the Allies and the Soviets. In 1949
million pounds went down the drain. India reinforced the structural advances of such
the Chinese communist revolution was did not want new prototype weapons like integration. Kothari now joined the group
Oerlikon did, Indians wanted to manufac- of science developers who had institutes
successful, and the USSR tested their first
atomic bomb in August. Because of these ture existing weapons. The factory had to build and positions to fill: within months
changes, and because India had become some refugee-Germans trying to invent of starting, Kothari received a letter from
a member of the UN, because CENTO was recoil-less guns, under the charge of a his revered teacher, Meghnad Saha, en-
being planned, because India's views on charming ICS man who had been to Oxford quiring about ajob in defence research for
the Korean War were receiving wide pub- and who did not know anything about one of Saha's sons.29 By 1951 Blackett
licity, India was now being taken a bit more machine tools in the first place." In 1967 was channelling all Indian requests for
seriously. A new and alternative model of he went on, "You ran your Bangalore employment (on defence matters) directly
development was evidently needed, by electronics factory down. It is running all to Kothari. In 1953, for example, Bhabha
India as well as others. Over the next five right now. But it took ages to get it going, heard of Blackett's visit to Delhi and
years Nehru articulated his policies of non- because the people in charge had no phoned Kothari from Bombay to ensure
alignment, trying to build enduring rela- knowledge of it. One of the defence adequate time was set aside from his
tionships with south-east Asia and China, minister's followers was a poet. He was defence work for a visit to TIFR in Bombay.
and trying to limit the extent to which India so embarrassed. He did not know one Kothari then informed Meghnad Saha and
became dependent on the Americans. machine tool from another." Don't mis- P C Mahalanobis in Calcutta of the Blackett
The atmosphere surrounding Blackett's understand me, Blackett said elsewhere,visit "I to TIFR, and they immediately wrote
work for Nehru in 1948-1950 was turbu- am deriding my civil servantsjust as much. to Blackett to have their institutes put on
lent. Indian scientists like Bhabha, They thought they could run anything, the itinerary. Curiously, Blackett does not
Bhatnagar, and Kothari were thrown being into at Oxford."27 seem to have developed a relationship with
work that had immediate strategic impli- As part of 'Indianisation', Blackett im- K S Krishnan, the physicist who was
cations. They worked in a more conflictual mediately advised Nehru to establishdirector a of the National Physical Labora-
world, particularly after partition andnew theresearch function within the ministry tory and also member of the Atomic Energy
military operations directed by the Indian of defence. Until this time most research Commission.
Army in 1948. No longer did foreigners had been carried out in Britain. There were Blackett decided to intervene in train-
direct these activities, but Indians. Less a few technical development establishing; having overseen the creation of a
than a year after independence, a young ments under the Indian Army with the Defence Science Organisation, in 1950 he
Hindu zealot assassinated Mahatma Gandhi purpose of providing inspection and qual- urged creation of functional groups, such
in his garden in Delhi, creating a martyrity control in ordnance factories. Although as the Weapons Assessment Team and the
and settling a leadership question; the the officer corps were well trained and Operational Research Group. By 1951 he
people around Nehru would now be fully ineducated, scientists and engineers were was clearing the way for Indian defence
charge (with Patel's death in 1950 it wouldnot involved. A few weeks after giving his scientists to spend a year at Cambridge and
be Nehru alone who guided the Congressfirst major report to Nehru on defence in in the UK Operational Research Group. He
Party). Gandhi's rootedness, like many of 1948, Blackett wrote to the minister of also acted as intermediary for the appoint-
his followers, became a progressively more defence, "I am delighted with your choice ment of the first director of the Indian
nostalgic force; Nehru's cosmopolitan, of Kothari to be scientific advisor to the Institute of Armament Studies, a Briton
patrician and elitist leadership was without defence ministry. I am in complete agree- who was previously at the RAF College.
serious challenge, even from the Hindument with his views on these matters."28At that time Blackett and Kothari dis-
extremists who privately approved of Daulat Singh Kothari, whom he helped tocussed a Naval Research Laboratory for
partition and Gandhi's death. The partition become the scientific advisor to the min- Bombay. Although Blackett wanted a focus
and Gandhi's assassination were a chilling ister of defence and who thus headed the on real problems, he also said from the
and dramatic closing and opening of pos- new Defence Science Organisation (laterbeginning (to the minister of defence) "It is
sibilities. These were the possibilities and the Defence Research and Developmentmost important to realise...that a research
constraints that Blackett had to address. Organisation), had first met Blackett in theand development establishment must of-
Concerned about the costs of licensed Cavendish Laboratories in Cambridge inten keep a considerable number of its per-
defence production, and about capturing the early 1930s. Trained by Saha at sonnel employed on work which promises
more benefits in India from Indian inno- Allahabad, Kothari was a theoretical astro-no immediate or tangible results."30
In the years following independence there that president Truman had made an ex-feeling is that they must now think in terms
were immediate pressures on Indian lead- of specific Indian problems rather than
plicit connection between a new 'Grain for
ers to face the new (and uncertain) position India'plan and the fact that India heldcopying the problems of other nations."36
of the country in a hardening cold war three-quarters of the world's monazite/ This was the very goal which Blackett was
environment. Blackett understood this thorium. As it was known in London which striving to achieve - he perceived a pre-
environment as well as anyone else, disposition to adopting the solutions de-
person understood the implications of this
connection, the editor of the Daily Tele-
although his interpretations of it were un- veloped elsewhere to problems which were
conventional. After the 1948 Berlin Block-graph phoned and wrote Blackett asking not theirs. Nevertheless, Blackett was
for an interview. Blackett's disingenuoussupportive of new initiatives like rockets,
ade was broken, attention turned in August
1949 to the Soviet atomic bomb tests andreply was "I have nothing to tell you which
which did not have to be British: "when
the success of the Chinese Communist would be of use to you nor do I have anyI was there at Christmas the Minister was
Party in taking full control of China. The
comment on the report".33 By now Blackett
particularly keen on a French rocket weapon
Americans, confused by events, realised had become quite familiar with India'swhich sounded very good".37
with chagrin that their efforts in China hadrocks and minerals because of his new Notwithstanding his proximity to the
been futile, and were chastened to admitinterest in geo-magnetism, so he would Indian High Commission in London, and
that even their most rigorous controls on
have known. There are differing views hisof meetings with Krishna Menon, Nehru's
information had not stopped the Soviets how forthcoming Blackett was about advisor on foreign and military policy,
from developing their own atomic bomb. there is an absence of correspondence
enquiries like this: some, including those
French and Dutch military forces had been between Blackett and Menon in the Blackett
who met him, say he was ready to explain
fighting unsuccessfully in Indonesia and situations or his work in an informal manner
papers. This suggests that they met fre-
Vietnam to preserve their colonial territo-to people who were not well known to him, quently enough (or read accounts in news-
ries, and the march of North Korean and papers) to know each other's views, but
others (basing their opinion on reading his
Chinese troops into Seoul in 1950 deci- that they did not develop a close relation-
papers) that he typically refused interviews
sively opened Allied eyes to the risk to and requests for informal help. ship. In one sense Menon might have seen
their interests in Asia. Particularly because By this time, although Bhabha was Blackett as competition for Nehru's atten-
of its policy of non-alignment India began regularly meeting his official counterparttioh, and a person not wholly committed
to be taken slightly more seriously by the and old Cambridge friend Sir John to the kind of socialism Menon wanted.
Americans. The Indian ambassador in Cockcroft, director of the Atomic EnergyAccording to Blackett, one personal
Washington had prepared the ground for
Commission, he could always get anothermilitary planning triumph occurred in 1955.
Nehru, and the US ambassador to India view from Blackett, whorn he met at least It was an application of the principle which
wrote a formal request to the president for twice a year, and usually more. Blackett his friend Homi Bhabha was following in
five years of economic assistance. Nehru helped Bhabha indirectly too. For example, atomic energy, namely to decide on the
did not like the conditions that the US to he met the scientific attache to the Indian appropriate technology, to import a pro-
put on these loans, and did not pursue the High Commission in London in 1951 who totype and get training in production, and
request vigorously during his 1949 visit (in Bhabha said was "studying the organisation set about to produce the technology in
part because he found his relation with of institutions where nuclear and atomic India. Blackett realised that since he was
president Truman and secretary of state research is in progress". Although the UKengaged not only in weapons evaluation,
Acheson so difficult). The Indian ambas- Atomic Energy Authority treated this but also in the merger of defence policy
sador and then Nehru himself discussed survey very cautiously, Blackett knew it with industrial policy and macro-economic
possible loans for wheat and steel with the
was being done for Bhabha and Bhatnagar,policy, these economic, social and military
Americans in 1949. President Truman's he gave his views on the proper organisation objectives would be in conflict. He under-
response was that India should apply for of an atomic R and D system, drawing onstood that planning had to take into ac-
these loans to the World Bank (IBRD). his intimate knowledge of the organi- count such conflict. Blackett was just
Following this US rejection, Nehru then sational set-up in Britain.34 learning about the socio-economic and
suggested to Krishna Menon (High Com- Committed to atomic energy, and tac-political complexities of India. After the
missioner in London) "why not align with tically (if not morally) opposed tQ atomic use of Indian forces inside India in
the US somewhat and build up our eco-bombs, Blackett never lost sight of the Hyderabad and Kashmir, Blackett had to
nomic and military strength?"31 Despite importance of conventional weapons. Tothink strategically about kinds of conflict
its inconsistency with the non-alignment Nehru in 1951 he wrote, gently promoting he had not seen before. It is important to
Kothari's influence, "I have heard from remember the strategic context of the time.
policy, the signal had been sent, and grain
from Canada and the US eventually began Kothari that he is carrying on energeticallyIn 1954 and 1955 friendship treaties had
arriving in 1950-51, after prolonged offi-the investigations we started on tank and been concluded and visits exchanged with
cial negotiation.32 anti-tank gun performance".35 At the same both China and the USSR. In 1955 the
As a confidant of Homi Bhabha, Shantitime however, Blackett was talking to Soviets "expressed a willingness to sell
Bhatnagar, and Nehru, Blackett understoodpeople in London about new weapons likeadvanced military aircraft" to enhance their
what the Indians were doing in atomic rockets, as he did with H A Sargeaunt,offer to build a steel mill in India.38 But
research from the beginning, and he thus deputy scientific advisor for the Armyone notes that the first MiG fighters ac-
sometimes avoided explaining this pub-Council in the war office,Whitehall. tually arrived in India only in 1963, after
licly. Since 1944 the security of India's "Kothari's group", reported Sargeaunt from India's conflict with China. And Nehru
thorium and beryl had been a quiet but Delhi, "is certainly making great strides, was at the height of his non-aligned strat-
steady theme in Anglo-American politics.and I think there is no doubt that when you egy, chairing the Bandung Conference on
In 1951 the story emerged in Washington next come you will be impressed. My non-alignment just before the Gnat fighter
deal was initiated between India and
ian', which might have been unattractive minister of defence, there was a complete
to pilots
Britain. The year 1954 was also when Indiawho wanted something fancy.) review of Indian Armed Forces. Blackett's
increased the size of its dollar reserves and India was stepping into a zone of high knowledge of the past was now useful
proposed cutting the rupee from sterling uncertainty, said Blackett: "one has also again, and in the context of a letter on the
in order to follow an independent exchange to recognise the fact that during these days progress of cosmic ray studies, Bhabha
rate policy. Fearing "a break in a uniform of terrific rate of development in fighter- wrote by hand in the margin, "I hope you
sterling front and damage to the interna- aircraft, it is very difficult to forecast what will agree to take on the job of reviewing
tional role of sterling" (and critical of the current types would actually (if ever) find our Defence Research organisation, if asked
increase in dollar reserves), the Bank of their use in war. Many types would never to do so later."45 In 1967 Blackett said that
England and Chancellor of the Exchequer see war. They would, however, have served his military consulting declined as time
pleaded with India not to present its pro- the purpose of leading to more effective went on, but I notice that was still an
posal to the Commonwealth summit successors, eventually leading to the nth Admiral of the Navy included in a dinner
meeting. There was, at the same time, successor which sees battle."42Here party given for him at the High Com-
speculation on the pound and thus a sharp Blackett the planner triumphed, arguing missioner's Residence in Delhi in 1965
that the Hindustan Aeronautics programme (plus the cabinet secretary, arguably the
fall in the value of Indian sterling reserves
which were still very healthy, at 542 m "should consist of items which are a re- most influential person around the prime
pounds. 39 These reserves were still held, minister), and he was asked to read a
quirement for the services (or better still
at the time, in the Bank of England. So for the services as well as civil aviation), confidential report on precision optical
for political and economic reasons Britain and which are within its technical reach manufacturing (with military applications)
should have been very pleased with Patrick and resources." Blackett later took pride in 1966. By this time, of course, he was
president of the Royal Society and thus
Blackett's influence as a military consult- in the report that led to the Gnat instead
ant in the Gnat contract. very busy. But he kept up his study of
of heavier and more sophisticated aircraft.
The triumph Blackett alluded to con- The Gnat performed very well in both wars Indian scientific and military institutions,
cerns jet fighters. The Indian Air Force with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971, but, heand continuously used his influence to
already had a Vampire fighter, constructed noted wryly, "it never became an impor- improve conditions for doing research. He
from airframes built in Bangalore, and tant aircraft in the Royal Air Force".43 The formed a long friendship with General J
imported British engines. Like others, Gnat did, however, become the main N jetChaudhuri whose command of Indian
Blackett proposed an aeronautical research training aircraft for the Royal Air Force forces at Hyderabad in 1948 Blackett had
and development establishment from the for many years. admired (there is a letter in Blackett's
beginning, "if India is to build an air Not all his advice was accepted, how- papers showing this, written much later).
industry."40 But in 1955 Blackett's pro- ever, following the success of the Gnat I recall being asked by General Chaudhuri
posal was radical and risky: to start build- deal. Kurt Tank, a leading designer of the
at McGill University in 1970 whether I had
talked with Patrick Blackett about science
ing a fighter much lighter than the Vampire Focke-Wulf team during the second world
and to build both the airframe and the war was brought to Bangalore. Blackett and scientists in India, and if not, that I
engine. The choice, argued Blackett, should recalled "another occasion when I think a should do so quickly: "he knows the facts",
be the Gnat, a transonic aircraft with a wrong decision was made. This was thesaid Chaudhuri.
ceiling of 50,000 feet and thrust of 4,800 lbs plan to bring to Bangalore Tank, who was Patrick Blackett's work for the military
compared to Vampire's 3,300 Ibs. It was famous in the last war for his brilliant in India up to 1964 reveals some things
easier and cheaper to manufacture than German fighter designs. The plan was that that were not widely known. Although
alternatives, thus giving (said Blackett) Tank should design a quite new supersonic Blackett's presence in India for military
two Gnats for every conventional fighter, fighter which would be designed, manu- work was always public (as a person he
and more quickly. The catch was that it factured and tested in India. I was strongly physically towered over the stature of most
had not been combat-tested: Blackett later against this as I thought it too big a stepof his hosts), it is the other work he did
said that although the Gnat was still not from a simple trainer designed and built with scientists that took on greater impor-
fully operational, its designer came to Delhi at Bangalore to a supersonic fighter. tance.My Although his seminal 1948 Report
"and made a very convincing argument views were not accepted. This project to wasthe minister of defence remains secret
which eventually convinced most present a very big one. A few such aircrafts were in India to this day, his military persona
including myself. In fact I became a very made but I did not hear of their use in either was not clandestine. However, it was a
strong advocate for going into mass pro- of the two Pakistan-India wars."44Here physicist who won the Nobel Prize that
duction before waiting for the full tests of Blackett's views are controversial; some Blackett circulated among scientists and
the Gnat had been carried out: this meant observers say the fighter that Kurt Tank intellectuals and who naturally acquired a
gambling on the outstanding ability of called the HF 24 developed played a sig- reputation for development of science. On
Petter as designer and Folland as chief nificant role in the 1971 war between India the basis of evidence available so far, I do
engineer."41 and Pakistan. Others point out that the not think that Blackett's work as scientific
The discussions about the jet fighter 1969 Report of the Committee on Aero- intervenor was a camouflage for Blackett
"often became vehement", said Blackett, nautics (chaired by C Subramaniam) as military advisor. Nor do we yet have
"I think that the majority of service pilots criticised the HF 24 and that the aircraft any evidence about Blackett's possible
were against the Gnat but there was strong never received full approval. role in providing intelligence and influ-
enough support from some of the technical After revelations of the unprepared andence for Britain. For example, in his recent
staff at the ministry to win the case even- ill-equipped state of military forces duringstudy of the use of British scientists by
tually." (The Scientific Advisor's Report the 1962 conflict with China, and the sub-British intelligence agencies in this period,
described the Gnat as 'severely utilitar- sequent resignation of Krishna Menon asPaul Maddrell found no trace of
Blackett.46An explanation, Maddrell sug- reliant industry, made-at home goods, a lot. Bhatnagar valued Blackett's influ-
gested, is that intelligence agencies were independent-minded politics. While ence with Nehru, and supplied Blackett
preoccupied with science and secrecy in Gandhi would not have imagined this idea with the list of patents he needed for a
Europe and the USSR, contributing to their applied to military development, Nehru study of defence production. Bhatnagar
indifference about what could be learned and his political allies/advisers learned that worked hard to find good appointments for
it would be a policy of necessity, simply
via India via Blackett. Moreover, they may his laboratories, and was always looking
have presumed that nothing of importancebecause there could be few alternatives. outside India for candidates. There is no
could be learned via India. Or that because clue in the papers whether Blackett ad-
At the same time Blackett's independent
he was not trusted by the governments inviews on nuclear weapons and 'the arms
vised for or against the appointment of
power, he was an unreliable source, too race' was a stimulant to discussions with non-Indians, but he certainly assisted
'pro-Soviet'. Again, in a review of evi-Nehru, Homi Bhabha and other scientists. Bhatnagar, Kothari and Bhabha to identify
dence related to the uses of air bases in He was a regular guest of the chiefs of candidates abroad. Therefore in 1951
India and Pakistan for UK strategic offen-staff, discussing both disarmament and Blackett interviewed a Canadian metallur-
sive bombing plans against the USSR, armaments. In this sense there was an gist working in London, who wanted to
Aldrich and Coleman found no trace of official acceptance of his presence and "get a job in India and settle there perma-
Blackett's name.47This last explanation advice.
is During this period India learned
nently". Bhatnagar said the new National
'counter-intuitive', in that Blackett washow
an to optimise the potential of great- Metallurgical Laboratory was already "in
acknowledged bombing expert at the very power rivalry, and to use this rivalrytheto charge of a brilliant young French-
obtain favourable terms for commercial
time when Britain was trying (in 1946-49) man", and he welcomed the arrival of this
to secure access to airbases (not just and
in military contracts and agreements. Canadian W K A Congreve from London,
Peshawar) from which to reach industrial with Blackett's favourable opinion based
targets deep in the Soviet Union. Despite Blackett and Scientific I R on a metallurgist colleague's expert
his personal antipathy to the idea of of- recommendation.48A V Hill played a simi-
fensive bombing of the USSR, it is nev- What has gone wrong, I think, in some lar role at this time, looking internationally
ertheless conceivable that such agenciesgovernment research stations is that the for good candidates for Bhatnagar, but Hill
could have found informal ways to learnprinciple of scientific freedom has some- already had a much longer and deeper
what Blackett knew, which would havetimes been misapplied to mission-ori- involvement in the development of the
been considerable. ented R and D, where it is largely inap-
CSIR, starting in 1943.49
plicable. (Patrick Blackett 1971).
Few foreigners, if any, have played a role At the same time as he investigated
patents, Blackett was inspired by a re-
in independent India such as the role Patrick It is not as a mililtary consultant, how-
Blackett played between 1947 and 1972. ever, but as an intervenor in scientificsearch project on solar power at the Na-
As a military consultant he initiated a debate tional Physical Laboratory in Delhi, and
affairs and advisor to the research system
about the effective role of scientific re- that Blackett was and is best known in went to considerable length to obtain French
search in military development, and pro- India. He came to understand its politicalreports for the Indians in 1951. It is curious
moted the conditions and careers of sci- economy, specifically the political limitsBhatnagar could not obtain these directly,
of the influence of the scientific commu-
entists attached to defence research, par- because an agreement (involving Bhata-
ticularly up to about 1964. This was anity and the way in which very scarce nagar) was signed this year between France
period of dramatic change in India, with economic resources were (or were not) and India on scientific cooperation, in-
an emphasis on comparatively low-cost mobilised within it. Blackett and Bhatnagar cluding rare earths and nuclear power.50
military development (particularly when (and Nehru) often discussed the develop-The NPL solar powered cooker project did
compared with later periods). The same ment of the vast government research not deliver on its promise, but Blackett's
period also marked the steady decline in organisation, the Council for Scientific papers do not reveal evidence of the extent
India's foreign exchange reserves, and and Industrial Research (CSIR) but afterof Bhatnagar's embarrassment or Nehru's
Blackett understood how this decline would the visit of the winter of 1955-56 Blackett displeasure with its failure. Blackett's
influence major strategic programs, deter- is curiously absent from India for seveninvolvement in the NPL was to become
mine the level of imports, influence rela- years (according to his own records). The much deeper in a few years. A series of
tions with rich countries, and establish the 1956 Gnat fighter deal seems to end theproblems arose within the CSIR with
volume of subsidies sought by the In- first phase of this involvement, which began respect to leadership of the National
dian government. An argument for 'self- in 1947. Until his sudden death in January Physical Laboratory after the death of
reliance' became more and more neces- 1955 Bhatnagar was in regular communi- K S Krishnan in 1961, and Blackett was
sary, although paradoxically was increas- cation with Blackett, and they sometimes appointed by the minister of scientific
ingly difficult to put into practice. He argued
toured CSIR laboratories together. Blackett's research and cultural affairs (Humayun
for (and against) new weapons, learned deeper involvement with the CSIR seemed Kabir) to conduct what the newspapers
how these developments or purchases were to occur after 1963-64, during which period called a 'Full Enquiry at NPL'. Moreover,
financed, and helped in some instances to his work as military consultant graduallyone of these news stories said that "The
make appointments and close deals. He decreased. He appears to have liked Director's post...was offered to Professor
reinforced an attitude of 'self-reliance' Bhatnagar and approved of the general Blackett last year, but he declined it."51
already in circulation in the 1940s, articu- direction of the CSIR's evolution as the There is no trace of this offer in the Blackett
lated by Indian scientists long before any state's applied research system, even if he Papers at the Royal Society, but the idea
real prospect of independence for India, saw research that was not being applied, may have been presented in person, and
and which traded on the momentum of or couldn't be. In the eight years that heis consistent with the esteem in which
Gandhi's and Congress' idea of a self- knew him (1947-55), he helped BhatnagarBlackett was held.
Publicity about his NPL Enquiry be enough flexibility so that when an in- the Chinese were far advanced in elec-
prompted his old friend from London, dividual project is taken up which requires tronic instruments. (This was not the first
biologist J B S Haldane, to invite Blackett that scientists from different disciplines be
time this warning to India had been sounded
to visit for a discussion about CSIR. Writing brought together, then it should be pos-by a British physicist: newspapers through-
from Orissa, and with seven years expe- out India carried the statement ofBlackett' s
sible to do this without difficulty. This
friend J D Bernal in December 1954 that
aspect has been sorely neglected hitherto."
rience living and working in India, Haldane
drew Blackett's attention to what he must There was an exception to their approval,"China has made more rapid progress in
learn before he formed an opinion about however, in that "the Committee was not science than India". Speaking in Madras,
the CSIR, and provided Blackett with the at all in favour of one possibility indicatedBernal said this in context of his support
following advice "I don't envy your job. by professor Blackett, that of completely for the 'Five Nehru-Chou Principles', and
Considerable efforts will be made at the amalgamating the proposed Centre for
his condemnation of the arms race. Nehru,
top to prevent you from finding out the
Advanced Physics with the Delhi Univer-who had, like Bernal, just returned from
truth, and when you do get through sity".
to The report suggested instead anChina, was keen to meet Bernal in Delhi
unofficial sources you will hear some Institute like the Saha institute in Calcutta to hear his views, according to Bernal's
outrageous lies from people who cannot that was autonomous from but very close papers.)
imagine an uncorrupt reason for doing to the university, with university partici- The 1962 military conflict with China
anything. I advise you to get hold of thepation in its Governing Body. The mem- caused a rapid and agonised re-appraisal
bers of this committee included M G K
contract offered to junior scientific work- of India's development and military re-
ers (such as myself) agreeing to go any- Menon of TIFR (author of the report), R quirements.
C Homi Bhabha was appointed
where at a month's notice."52 Blackett Majumdar of Delhi University, A K Saha chairman of an Electronics Committee in
worked fast at the NPL, and submittedand
a B D Nag Chaudhuri of Calcutta's Saha1963, charged to plan the mobilisation of
report in a month. He recommended Indian resources for increased research,
Institute of Nuclear Physics - the latter
reorganisation of the whole Laboratory,
three were students of Meghnad Sahadevelopment
- and production in electron-
plus J C Kapur, W M Vaidya and Lics.
moving some or most of those who worked C Zaheer accepted Blackett's warning
Verman.53 The Menon Committee pro-
largely in basic research to a new Centre about the Chinese and electronics, and
for Advanced Physics at the University posed
of changes that did not always satisfy
quickly outlined the steps two CSIR labs
Delhi, moving those in rain and cloud Blackett, and on his copy, beside the issue
were taking - one in electronic engineer-
of the Centre for Advanced Physics, ing
physics out to the meteorological depart- he in Palani and the other in scientific
ment, moving potential manufacturing noted "All this does not agree with my instruments at Chandigarh - but Zaheer
units in radio, glass, and ceramics out recommendations".
to Much may be learneddid not admit (in his 1964 letter) that the
join their industries, and defining the work underdevelopment of electronics was re-
from a study of this era and these individu-
of remaining divisions more clearly while als in the NPL. Blackett was well aware tarding India. The real issue was not sim-
enhancing communication among them. of the complicated historic relations plybe- electronic instruments for researchers,
Blackett found a culture of administrative tween universities and government labo- or electronic engineering for production
rigidity in the NPL where most people ratories; the debate was already loud about and military systems, but also consumer
fought to define and protect the boundaries how universities were being deprivedelectronics,
of and more fundamentally the
of their work. In effect, he said, the NPL good researchers and so could not dem- supply and delivery of electricity itself.
lacked purpose. He had earlier criticised onstrate how good research was alsoHomi a Bhabha had just negotiated con-
the fact that the CSIR pressured Sir K S form of training. On the other hand, there tracts in 1963 with Canada and the US for
Krishnan to leave basic research in a nuclear reactors that were intended to solve
was equally loud criticism that universities
university, offering double his professor's
were inhospitable to good researchers, and this problem once and for all. Or so many
salary, to ask him try to build a research
this criticism was based on an assumption people thought.
tradition applied to industrial problems.
that government laboratories actually were Blackett was, at this stage, newly ap-
Blackett had seen this same phenomenon the source of most good research in India. pointed advisor to the minister of science
at Britain's National Physical Laboratory
For a historical explanation of this con- in the new Labour government. His rela-
at Teddington. Both Blackett and AV Hill relationship, see the recent essay tionship
tested by with the CSIR certainly contin-
Raina and Jain.54
criticised this practice in India. D S Kothari ued, though soon Blackett became presi-
The saga of the NPL reached Blackett
also criticised Bhatnagar for taking scien- dent of the Royal Society, and was even
tists away from the universities, but again
his late in December 1964, when the busier. But he didn't lose interest. For
own Defence Science Organisation did the
director general of the CSIR Husain Zaheerexample, he received a copy of the con-
same thing, when it could. Bhatanagar wrote
and to him, "I am afraid matters have fidential report written by C G Wynne of
Kothari argued that there was no not other
improved very much during the past Imperial College for the director general
source of competent people. year. The Director, whom we appointed
of CSIR about optical designing.5 At the
The CSIR struck a committee to review same time, Wynne also wrote Blackett a
last October, had eventually to be removed
Blackett's report, tour the labs, and rec-from service. [It is unclear whether long
he personal account of his visits to
ommend how the Executive Council of National Aeronautics, the Glass and Ce-
meant P K Kichlu.] The main defect was
NPL should respond to it. In April 1963 ramics Institute, and commercial firms,
that he could not get on well with his
this committee reported to the Executive younger colleagues. Now we are on thelamenting the amount of money wasted in
Council that "The Committee finds itself lookout for appointing a director." It is assistance
the to India and the frustration of
in general agreement with the spirit of the
director who would have to implement the talent in research centres like the Glass and
Blackett report". Its own assessment for changes.55 Blackett had just been in India,
Ceramics Institute in Calcutta. Wynn re-
its implementation was that "there should and discussed with Zaheer his opinion thatported everyone in India recognised the
strategic necessity of a developing high minister Shastri early in 1966. Foreign order and control in 'his' laboratories, as
precision optical glass industry, everyone exchange reserves had fallen to their low- much as it is about avoiding unnecessary
thought India was proceeding too slowly est level since independence. The secretly importation or engineers doing research
toward that goal, but everyone blamed planned devaluation of the rupee in June which others had already done elsewhere.
someone else. This conformed with the 1966 from Rs 4.76 to Rs 7.50 to the US Right through this busy period, Blackett
views of a wide range of Indian and foreigndollar(Rs 13.33 to Rs 21 to the UK pound) kept up with correspondence and visits,
opinion on many matters of strategic caused massive curtailment of importation until his final visit in 1971 at age 73. The
of industrial and scientific supplies and
necessity, and this negative opinion reached last visit was a nine-week tour through the
the Scientific Advisory Committee to the equipment (among other essential items). heat-of India in March-May 1971. While
cabinet about 1966-67, thus initiating It a also brought even stronger pressures'forthere, in March, he observed the re-elec-
wide review of success and failure in the tion of his old friend Indira Gandhi as
self-reliance and import substitution.
scientific and industrial community. Blackett's Nehru Lecture eight months after
prime minister. Apart from Pakistan's bru-
the devaluation, with its call for more
In a way Wynne's 1966 report gave tal crackdown in Dhaka on leading politi-
Blackett his subject for the Nehru Memo- realistic thinking about innovation, played cal and intellectual figures, and the move-
rial Lecture a year later. This lecture wason the historical sensitivity among elites ment of refugees to India, the conflict with
attended by prime minister Indira Gandhi,that was caused by these other events. Pakistan over Bangladesh had not really
and reviewed in all newspapers. He calledBlackett also now admitted the impor- yet developed. Prior to Blackett'sjourney,
for thinking about 'the innovation chain'tance of market forces in innovation, Atma Ram's intention to resign as director
from research to production, albeit in something
a he seldom discussed in India. general of the CSIR had been signalled to
somewhat linear way of thinking about He was fresh from the experience as advisor Blackett, and the opportunity arose to
innovation. He wanted industry in India to the new ministry of science and tech- appoint someone younger. With a distinct
involved in the process of innovation fromnology in the UK, a ministry created by reduction of his military contacts, Blackett
its inception at the laboratory stage. HeP M Edward Heath in 1964, partly at toured all his familiar scientific sites like
criticised the 'sanctity' of basic research.Blackett's suggestion. He had a hand in TIFR and the National Physical Labora-
Blackett's Nehru Lecture was gleefullydrafting Heath's speech on 'the white heat tory, plus new ones like the Space Re-
received in some government and industryof technology', had a new appreciation search Centre and Bharat Heavy Electron-
quarters, because it shook things up a bit.of a resurgent British industry, and un- ics, and a dozen CSIR institutes. He met
Some researchers, whose lives depended derstood the mutual frustrations experi- the most powerful man in Indian science,
on the 'sanctity' of basic research, felt heenced in the relations between industry Vikram Sarabhai; also M G K Menon,
had attacked them, and some researchersand government laboratories. Y Nayudamma (who soon succeeded
felt betrayed because Blackett's lecture Blackett's influence extended right into Atma Ram at the CSIR) and Pitambar Pant
seemed to undermine them, even in the the laboratories at this time. For example, of the Planning Commission. He toured
laboratories founded by Homi Bhabha and to Atma Ram, he criticised "the otherwise the Trombay Atomic Research Centre (re-
so often visited by Blackett himself. This excellent man Varma, talking lightly about named after Bhabha) with astronomer
was a widespread reaction after the lecturestarting to design an electron microscope S Chandrasekhar from the University of
among scientists I knew in India, both inat NPL. It seems that all you and I have Chicago, someone he had known since the
Bombay and Calcutta. He probably never been saying has not been taken in at all."58 early 1930s. Although the CSIR paid the
His influence also reached Delhi Univer-
heard this reaction to his lecture, and would expenses of Blackett and his wife Costanza
not understand that researchers 'in the
sity, where Blackett had been involved in on this last journey, he was also invited
ranks' thought the support for basic are- to advise the Indian Statistical Institute
planning a transfer of a small [obsolete?]
accelerator from the Cavendish Laborato-
search was fragile. He was now commu- (by P C Mahalanobis) and the University
nicating at a level very far removed from
ries at Cambridge to Delhi; at first BlackettGrants Commission (by D S Kothari). His
researchers 'in the ranks'. It seems he now thought it would be a good machine forconversations with Indira Gandhi showed
thought that support for basic research was training purposes, but he examined theBlackett that though she retained her
sufficiently strong. A few days later he project carefully when he visited India,father's respect for science and scientists,
wrote to Atma Ram, DG of the CSIR, "...it only to realise "that the machine was askedshe had also preferred to press forward
has been quite clear in recent months that for not by physicists at all but by engineersin the debate which gradually linked
our ways of thinking are very similar...I who wanted some way of playing around 'science' more strongly to 'technology'.
do realise the difficulty you will have in with high voltages. I do not think theyIndira Gandhi was determined to see more
guiding Indian policy in a new direction."57 should be allowed to do this, as the tech-practical results from the state's massive
Up to this date Blackett had not so publicly niques have almost no relevance in anyinvestment in industries relying on science
attacked what he viewed as the irrelevance other branch of engineering. The fact that and technology. This was the request she
of much research in India, including basic they should want to do this shows, I think,evidently made to Blackett to help her, as
research. This was an extraordinary period the underlying drive towards prestigeis shown below. Whereas her father had
in India, because there was uncertainty subjects, which is quite a danger in Indiaaligned science with 'education' and 'cul-
around the 1967 election and the rupee had as well as here."59 Was this remark aboutture', Indira Gandhi joined in the move in
just been devalued. The brief thrill of the disdain for engineers? About preferencethe 1960s linked 'science' to 'technology'.
1965 war with Pakistan had been forgot- for training vs 'playing around'? AboutShe was also prepared to redesign insti-
ten, replaced with worry about a severe conquering the impulse for prestige? tutions to achieve this, and, like her father,
drought and famine in Bihar and eastern Although it is difficult to say, I think it istook a direct interest in key appointments.
Uttar Pradesh, confrontations with the about Blackett trying to help Atma Ram For example, during 1971, she agreed that
American president, and the death of prime fight entrepreneurial 'chaos' and bringthe administration of the atomic energy
and space programmes should be divided, forthis
(not just to government scientists) for irrelevant arguments. Now when con-
and she engaged in the selection of people ditions have been created in the country,
cooperation. He praised the Central Leather
to lead both of these agencies. Research Institute (directed by Nayud-
thanks to the thinking generated recently,
Various lab directors wrote to him in amma) for appointing four economists this is
tothe opportunity to give concrete
1971, while in India and afterward, to ask shape to the R and D related to economic
its staff, thus providing it with an under-
him to persuade Atma Ram to promote growth. Even in allocation of resources,
standing of its markets and clients superior
to other CSIR laboratories. He did not
their objectives, improve liaison with CSIR at the most 10-20 per cent may be ear-
headquarters in Delhi, and provide more marked for basic research, the rest should
exempt industry from criticism, saying "the
freedom for their scientists to innovate. backwardness of much of Indian industry be devoted to applied work bearing on
Basically they were lobbying him, about itself' was partly to blame. But Blackett economic growth."61 This was the voice
which Blackett wrote to Atma Ram later. pointed to a CSIR study of 10 years'of Blackett from the late 1930s, ("the
ex-
Not opposed to their pleas, Blackett perience with 10 million pounds expen- stakes are high, the time is short") drawing
nevertheless said the central problem diture on 23 industrial pilot plants, which on his war-time experience advising the
facing some CSIR laboratories is that theyconcluded that the plants "brought in little War Office and the cabinet - in which,
have "shown a tendency toward ratherfinancial return." Without acknowledging nevertheless, there were often 'to and
basic research without always having anyRam's impending retirement in his Report, fro arguments', few of which were really
very definite practical goal. Some of the Blackett complimented Atma Ram's 'irrelevant' even when he disagreed with
work seems to me to be more suitable for speeches and articles as 'particularly elo-them. Blackett' s role in the strategic bomb-
university departments than for govern-quent'. Back in London, however, he ing controversy of the second world war
ment research stations, which were un- politely discouraged an Indian initiative to is a perfect example, and he knew that
doubtedly set up with the general goal ofnominate Ram as a Fellow of the Royal scientists did not always win these
producing practical results of use to indus- Society. contests anyway.
try and agriculture. This tendency towards This last tour occurred in the middle of Blackett was not alone in his criticism
purity is by no means only to be found in a Review Commission of the CSIR con- of the scientific community. Writing from
India [he then mentioned the same ten-ducted by retired justice Sarkar, to which New York, Mahalanobis warned Blackett
dency in the UK]. I think there are twoBlackett himself made a presentation, that and he did not like what was going on in
main reasons for this drift to purity, One Blackett asked the High CommissionerIndia:in "Indian science is in a state of
is that it is often much easier to do good London in September 1971 for an early confusion... .The immediate future does not
basic research than good applied research copy of the Sarkar Commission's report. look too bright...because we still remain
of interest to industry. The second reasonThis is further evidence that at age 73a he structured hierarchical system."62
is the widespread misapplication (in mywas passionately interested in India and Blackett, however, remained an optimist
view) of the principle of the importance enjoyed his influence in its scientific about India, ready to try new things. As
of the 'freedom of science'...In the field community. He felt the scientific commu-an example, while president of the Royal
of basic curiosity-driven research, itnity is had reached a certain maturity, and Society, he promoted the idea of a new
fully established that able research work- should be able to tackle the practical School of Genetics on the campus of the
ers should be given the greatest possible problems that confronted India, namely, Indian Statistical Institute in Calcutta
freedom to plan and execute their own poverty and population. Blackett discussed
during 1969-70, before Mahalanobis died.
research...What has gone wrong, I think, this with prime minister Gandhi, whomThis he institute was where Blackett's friend
in some government research stationshad is now known for 24 years (since she was
J B S Haldane had first gone to work when
he left Britain to live in India in 1956. The
30 years old). Before leaving India in 1971,
that the principle of scientific freedom has
sometimes been applied to mission- he wrote to Atma Ram to propose a new genetics school was not built.
oriented R and D, where it is largely in- advisory group for the prime minister, to
advise her "about the areas in which efforts
applicable, instead of only to curiosity Patrick Blackett, Vikram
should be most concentrated - in a way,
R.and D where it does apply."60 In parti- Sarabhai and Homi Bhabha
a 'task laying down body'. In order that
cular, he said that some labs "do not always
seem to understand the importance Rof and D would have a relation to economic Quite far from the politics of the CSIR,
directing work towards a market require- growth, this body should have an econo-Blackett had formed a friendship with
ment and close collaboration with indus- mist on it, and to ensure implementationVikram Sarabhai, the Cambridge-trained
try, and so are surprised when their work of the assignments should include a high physicist who was appointed Bhabha's
is wasted. Then there are some individuals official...This work should not be ham- successor as secretary to the Department
in certain stations who don't seem to be of Atomic Energy in 1966. Sarabhai stud-
pered on the plea of freedom for scientists.
trying very hard to do anything useful butIt must be appreciated that scientists are ied at Cambridge as a teenager, and then
returned after the war to complete his
think it is more important to advance basicnot free to do whatever they wish, certainly
research." His recommendations again not in the field of applied science....In
doctorate in 1947. Because the war had
changed the composition of the Physics
pointed to strengthening the powers of theorder that this evaluation of present activi-
Governing Body of the CSIR over the ties and assignment of future tasks is done Department at Cambridge so-greatly, there
strategic direction of its labs (leaving theunhampered and expeditiously, no lobby-was none present to examine Sarabhai's
tactics "firmly in the hands of the direc-ing should be allowed and the issues should
thesis in cosmic ray physics. So Blackett
tors"). He said India should study how not be bogged down in those superficial was asked to be the examiner, and Sarabhai
Harwell Atomic Research Centre and (age 28) was sent to Manchester for the
discussions and to and for arguments which
can always be produced. The stakes are
industry cooperated, and how government examination. Evidently they got on well,
high, time is short, and there is no room
funds were available to industry scientists because Sarabhai became known in the
Blackett household as 'my father's stu- pears to have championed this objectivein the role of science and technology in
dent'. They soon met again in India in too. It was now that Nehru cabled Bhabha developing countries matched Bhabha's.
1948, and Blackett went to Ahmedabad in in Geneva giving him full freedom to nego-Blackett's intellectual grasp of strategy
1958 to dine at the Sarabhai house and see tiate the terms of collaboration with Canada easily matched Nehru's and Bhabha's,
the Physical Research Laboratory that on the Canada-India Reactor. He had al- because he probably knew things they did
Sarabhai was building. Perhaps Blackett ready negotiated the installation of a British
not, even in the late 1950s and early 1960s
recognised that Vikram Sarabhai, who wasresearch reactor in the previous year. when he is said to have been out of the
then 39, would be an important force in By the end of 1955 the US and USSR British policy loop. According to Nye,
science in India. He may have heard thathad exploded both fission and larger fu- Blackett realised in the early 1950s that
Sarabhai had been discussed for a possiblesion (thermonuclear) bombs, and the he UKhad underestimated the lethal effects of
role in the CSIR after Bhatnagar's suddenhad exploded fission bombs. Bhabha and radioactive fallout, and had not anticipated
death in 1955. After the dinner, SarabhaiBlackett had formed the opinion that these the rapid development of missiles able to
wrote to Blackett to discuss their mutual were unlikely ever to be used in war. deliver small hydrogen bombs. "However,
Blackett continued to argue during the
interest in the explanation of the anomaliesEvidently they also agreed in the view that
in the divergence of the actual terrestrialthe original Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs 1950s and 1960s that conventional and
magnetic fields from an ideal single dipolehad been unnecessary. Perhaps Bhabha nuclear disarmament should be negotiated
field. Geomagnetism was by then had grown to accept Blackett's 1946 view in parallel."68
Blackett's passion. Sarabhai was begin- that these bombs were not simply aimedI do not know what Blackett would have
ning to direct his gaze to India's role in at Japan but were also the first act in a cold
thought if he knew that his friend Homi
space. A further dinner in London was diplomatic war with Russia, to limit the Bhabha was the person who, had he lived,
proposed, with more conversation about USSR's expansion in Asia. (It should be would have been in charge of the project
how to finance scientific research because to test
remembered that even for people with their nuclear weapons in 1974. It is
Sarabhai was in the middle of establishing kind of connections (e g, both of theminteresting to note that Blackett tried to
an industry-funded textile research labo-knew Robert Oppenheimer well) the bring Bhabha into the Pugwash Confer-
ratory at the time.63 Blackett saw SarabhaiManhattan Project evidence was still ence
se- in 1961. Bhabha replied, rather dis-
when he was in India or in London, and cret, and thus their interpretation of that
ingenuously, that it would take him too
prepared a moving obituary for him at thesituation would have been based on an long to study the issues for that particular
international cosmic ray conference in understanding that some of the facts were
meeting, and instead recommended Vikram
Jaipur. Unfortunately there are no other concealed from them.) Therefore, when Sarabhai.
an By this time, Bhabha was, I
letters between the two men in the Royal authoritative American source revealed think, more caught in an official net than
Society archives. something, it was considered valuable.
he realised and felt constrained to speak
Along with their love for physics, even among fellow scientists about nuclear
Bhabha wrote to Blackett quoting at length
Blackett and Bhabha shared a love for and with approval the views of Admiral policy. India was taking a strong stand for
mountains. When these pleasures were William Leahy, the chief of staff who disarmament in the Test-Ban Treaty nego-
combined, the joy was great. They both served under both presidents Roosevelt tiations in 1961, and when Bhabha spoke,
visited the cosmic ray laboratory up inand theTruman, that the atomic bomb was not even informally, it reflected on national
Alps. Blackett wrote to Bhabha in 1951: policy. Nevertheless, Bhabha arranged and
tactically necessary. Although this is clearer
"We have nearly 60 photographs oftoVus than it was them, we should not miss attended a lecture by Blackett in Delhi in
tracks from the Pic du Midi and it looks the point - meaning that Bhabha was well early 1962 on 'Military Policy and Disar-
informed and did not believe some of the
as if there are at least three separate neutral mament', and he and Blackett did attend
masses, two being greater than protonic mythology surrounding the use of the bombthe Pugwash meetings in 1963. A year
mass! Herr Gott certainly has made the in the ending of the war.65 Moreover, atlater, after Nehru's death, the first Chinese
world very complicated."64 Long forgot-the time Bhabha was participating in aatomic bomb was exploded in October
ten was the disagreement over the mass year-long review of recently declassified 1964. Bhabha complained that there was
of the penetrating component of cosmic evidence on the use and effects of nuclear no protection for countries capable of
rays at sea level. In February 1955 Dag explosions, soon published by the govern-making atomic bombs but which had
Hammerskjold announced that Bhabhament of India, with a foreword by Nehru.66refrained from doing so. He said that a
would be the president of the first confer- Perkovich says that Bhabha told Blackett climate favourable to such countries must
ence on the peaceful uses of atomic energy in 1958 that he hoped to develop nuclearbe created immediately. Bhabha probably
in Geneva that year. W Bennett-Lewis ofweapons, and this is certainly consistentgot the new prime minister's agreement to
Atomic Energy Canada was on the plan- with what Bhabha told other people around a project that prepared India for an under-
ning committee for the conference, and the that time.67 ground nuclear explosion, in late 1964. A
discussion of Indo-Canadian cooperation, Because Bhabha had confided in him a few months later Bhabha announced that
which began in Colombo Plan circles, India
great deal, Blackett kept abreast of current could make a nuclear bomb in 18
blossomed between them there. Consider- months, saying "We are still 18 months
strategic thinking in Delhi, and in atomic
able pressure had been brought from Nehruenergy/nuclear weapons circles elsewhere. away from exploding either a bomb or a
device for peaceful purposes, and we are
through Krishna Menon (then in New York)I think this larger view was made possible,
to ensure that someone (Bhabha?) from a despite their differences, by a number of doing nothing to reduce that period".
'neutral' country would chair the confer-similarities - common background Eighteen in months was the figure Dr. Bhabha
ence. More decisively, the British govern-physics at Cambridge, and a sense of cited a year ago and he said the situation
ment also championed Bhabha's candi- belonging to an international community had not changed since then."69 These news
dacy for the chair. Bertrand Russell ap-of scientists. Blackett's passionate interest
reports refer to a statement Bhabha had
made ('eighteen months ago') in Octo- historians of Indian military and scientific Not long after Bhabha's death, when
ber 1964, after the Chinese bomb test. development to judge what Blackett Blackett received his Order of Merit in
What Blackett might not have under- achieved in India, and what consequences 1967, he received a letter from senior civil
stood or accepted at the time was that his work had. We know little of how servant A J Kidwai whose words capture
nuclear weapons were becoming seen in the perspective- in which Patrick Blackett
Blackett was appraised outside the charmed
India as a great symbol of national pres- circle in which he normally moved, and
was viewed by a certain generation as part
tige, a symbol made by scientists and new historical research is necessary of the
to lineage of people considered as
engineers around which political parties understand how this new type of defence
friends of India. "To no other people outside
and non-political groups would gradually consultant and scientific intervenor was this country", says Kidwai, "have you given
join togetherpeople of otherwise differing viewed by others. If Britain made use of the same sense of belonging. And no one
views. Of course there were other moti- Blackett as a source of intelligence afterafter Harold Laski has had the same impact
vations, such as the influence of the Chinese
1947, we do not yet know how. Did they on Indian minds as you."72 This statement
bomb and two wars with Pakistan, but this think more carefully about India and southis more important to consider now, when
symbolic one was more important. It is not Asia as a result of listening to Blackett?a younger generation of well-educated
clear what position Blackett took with On the evidence I think Blackett's influ- Indians do not know who Patrick Blackett
ence in British policy toward India was
respect to Bhabha' s preparations in 1964-65, (or Harold Laski of the London School of
limited. Did India get unseen benefits
but it is highly unlikely that they failed to Economics) actually were, or what their
discuss it. The question of nuclear weaponsthrough Blackett and his connections? Did relationships with India were. [S1
for national prestige had faced Blackett Blackett's interventions promote or inhibit
before, in Britain, and he argued againstIndian self-reliance? The evidence here Notes
shows that whatever Blackett achieved in
prestige there too. It is not clear that Bhabha
ever took such a position against nuclearIndia, he did so only through cooperation[I am grateful for permission from the Royal
Society in London to quote from the Blackett
weapons. Many people assert that he al-with a number of powerful people and
Papers in their archives, and I thank Sandra
ways favoured them, though the evidence through the prestige he brought from BritishCummings and Mary Sampson for their kind
here is ambiguous too. This is one of the(and international) science and politics.assistance. This is a substantially reworked version
subjects of my forthcoming book. His worldly reputation as a consultant, of a two articles about Blackett published in Notes
It is, finally, at Bhabha's unfortunateterm he himself used, says a great dealand Records of the Royal Society, (1999, Vol 53,
death in an aircrash in the Swiss Alps inabout the continuity and interconnectionnos 2, 3) and appears here with agreement of The
1966 - at which there was little opportu-of the Indian and British scientific, mili-Royal Society. This essay is drawn from my larger
work, Nucleus and Nation: Scientists, Inter-
nity for Blackett to mourn - that friendstary, and political elites at the time. Itnational Networks, and Power in India (forth-
of Bhabha were drawn closer together.also says much about Indian awareness ofcoming), and for reasons of space I cannot supply
Blackett spoke on the radio in LondonBritish political culture, and how to usethe necessary but larger context for this portrait
most feelingly about Bhabha, this mayits resources. This awareness extended of Blackett. The major published study of Blackett
have been re-broadcast in India, and was widely, including the London School is by
of Sir Bernard Lovell, P M S Blackett - a
biographical memorial. London, The Royal
certainly widely quoted in Indian papers,Economics, the Royal Society, Cambridge
Society, 1976, and I am grateful to Lovell for
because Bhabha was considered a national University, etc. conversations with hifi on this subject. Two
hero. Letters came to Blackett, thanking The evidence here suggests that there is
conferences on Sir Patrick Blackett in 1998, one
him for his speech, and recognising that sometimes an interesting, creative,byandthe Royal Society at Imperial College, London
useful role for outsiders as intermediaries.
Blackett himself lost a special friend; letters and the other by the Royal Navy at Magdalene
came from men and women who liked In another 50 years, if we would look back College, Cambridge have benefited me enor-
then on Blackett's role in this formative mously, and I gratefully acknowledge the insights
Bhabha greatly - like the new PM Indira
and information which I received there, including
Gandhi. Blackett was identified, in theseperiod, I think we shall find that his conversations with his son Nicholas Blackett and
letters, as 'a true friend of India', andobjectives
on in India are enduring: that is,daughter Giovanna Bloor. This research was
an emotional level. It is curious that the' to improve the working conditions of completed while I was Visiting Fellow at Corpus
biographical appraisal of Bhabha written people doing research, to distinguish care-Christi College, Cambridge. This is necessarily
for the Royal Society records is not by fully between the objectives of scientific work-in-progress: there may be other unseen
documents and letters that (if seen) may change
Blackett, but by Sir William Penney, the institutions, to cut away the bureaucratic
or contradict the picture drawn here. I am grateful
scientist behind the UK' s nuclear weapons brambles which grow up around the prac-to my colleagues at NISTADS in Delhi for a lively
programme, a man who went rarely to tice of research and spend money wisely, welcome as Visiting Fellow there in 1998. I am
India, but who had known Bhabha sinceto think carefully about the things whichmost grateful for stimulating discussions with
the 1930s.70 can be developed locally instead of beingRichard Aldrich, Itty Abraham, Chris Bayley,
Blackett knew he had been tough on imported, to balance the state's insatiable Andrew Brown, George Perkovich, Shiv Visva-
nathan, Lt Gen (retd) M L Chibber, Ben Zachariah,
India, and had openly shown his frustra- desire for technical prestige with enhanc-Ashok Parthasarthi and some observers in India
tion with its conditions. At the same time, ing ordinary peoples' abilities to provide
who asked not to be named. I alone am responsible
he had created a circle of affection through a better life for themselves. I do not know
for the interpretation I have made.]
his friendships there, and had found what role the role of the military will be
talented and effective people who were in India in 50 years, but Blackett advocated 1 P M S Blackett, interview (in London), with
doing the kind of things he believed in. a realistic appraisal of the relations bet- B R Nanda of The Nehru Library, Delhi,
July 27, 1967;
His wife Lady Costanza Blackett said that ween the state and the military, and limi-
2 P C Mahalanobis to S S Bhatnagar, August 28,
in the later years of his life he cared more tations on the military's growth and influ- 1946, NISTADS Archive, Delhi.
passionately about his work in India than ence. That surely would not change in a 3 On the history of the Association in Britain,
he did about most other things.71 It is for democratic country like India. but without mention of its Indian counterpart,
see Gary Wersky, The Invisible College: A Institute Archives, Calcutta. of the National Physical Laboratory remains
30 P M S Blackett, Report to the Minister ofthe excellent Shiv Visvanathan, Organising
Collective Biography of British Scientists and
Socialists of the 1930s. London, Free Defence, September 10, 1948, Royal Societyfor Science: the Making of an Industrial
Association Books, 1988 (2nd ed). Archives. Research Laboratory, Delhi, Oxford
4 Itty Abraham, personal communication;31 Cited Robert McMahon, Cold War on the University Press, 1984. It is curious that despite
February 9, 1999. Periphery: the United States, India, and so much frank public discussion about the
5 1967 Interview. Royal Society Archives, p 4. Pakistan. New York. Columbia University CSIR there is so little serious academic analysis
6 1967 Interview, Royal Society Archives, p 4-5. Press, 1994, p 49. of the socio-economic and intellectual history
7 Bernard Lovell, 'Bristol and Manchester- the 32 Ibid, p 69. of its major institutions.
years 1931-1939' in R Williamson (ed), The33 P M S Blackett to L Bertin, February 24, 1951,54 Druv Raina and Ashok Jain, 'Big Science and
Making of Physicists Bristol, Adam Hilger, Royal Society Archives. the University in India' in John Krige and
1987, pp-158-59. About Bhabha's relation- 34 High Commission for India to P M S Blackett, Dominique Pestre (eds), *Sience in the
ship with Heisenberg, see David Cassidy, August 18, 1951, Royal Society Archives. Twentieth Century. London, Harwood
Uncertainty: the Life and Science of Werner35 P M S Blackett to J Nehru, January 31, 1951, Academic Publishers, 1997.
Heisenberg, New York, W H Freeman, 1992. Royal Society Archives. 55 H Zaheer to P M S Blackett, December 9,
8 H J Bhabha to P M S Blackett 1941 [day/ 36 1964, Royal Society Archives.
H A Sargeaunt to PM S Blackett, May 9, 1951,
month missing] Royal Society Archives. Royal Society Archives. 56 C G Wynne, Report on Optical Designing, for
9 A number of references to Blackett's role 37 P M S Blackett to H A Sargeaunt, May 29, CSIR, June 1966, Royal Society Archives.
during the war, including his extraordinary 1951, Royal Society Archives. 57 P M S Blackett to Atma Ram, December 4,
network of influential contacts, can be found38 McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 1967 Royal Society Archives.
in Guy Hartcup, The Effect of Science on the pp 219-20. 58 P M S Blackett to Atma Ram, December 4,
Second World War, London, Macmillan, 2000. 39 G Balachandran, The Reserve Bank of India 1967, Royal Society Archives.
10 Arnold Kramish, personal communication, 1951-1957 Delhi, Oxford University Press, 59 P M S Blackett to A J Kidwai, November 29,
February 19 and April 20, 1999. 1998, p 617. 1967, Royal Society Archive.
11 P M S Blackett to S Cripps, February 17, 194740 P M S Blackett, 'Scientific Organisation for 60 P M S Blackett, Report to the Leverhulme
and March 11, 1947 Blackett Papers, Royal the Defence Services' September 8, 1948, Trust, May 12, 1971, Royal Society Archives.
Society). Cripps had a special interest in India,Royal Society Archives. 61 P M S Blackett, "personal notes - Atma Ram",
having taken twc British diplomatic missions41 "A note prepared by the Scientific Advisor on no date, probably April-May 1971, Royal
there, and was just about to become - in thethe visit of ProfessorP M S Blackett- December Society Archives.
middle ofthe 1947 crisis -the chiefgovernment27, 1954 to January 15, 1955", and Patrick 62 P C Mahalanobis to P M S Blackett, June 29,
supervisor of the British economy, including Blackett, aide memoir, (typed, no date - 1971, Royal Society Archives.
its vast nationalisation programme. For these probably 1972), Royal Society Archives 63 V Sarabhai to P M S Blackett, February 14,
42 "A Note prepared by the Scientific Advisor..."
reasons Cripps appears to have been an informal 1958, Royal Society Archive.
'Secretary of State for India'. See Chris Bryant, January 15, 1956, Royal Society Archives. 64 P M S Blackett to H J Bhabha, February 13,
Stafford Cripps, London, Hodder and Stough- 43 Patrick Blackett, aide memoire, typed, no date, 1951, Royal Society Archives.
ton, 1997. I am indebted also to Peter Clarke'sprobably 1972; Royal Society Archives. 65 H J Bhabha to P M S Blackett, April 21, 1955,
44 Ibid, 1972, 40.
lecture on Cripp's negotations in India at Simon Royal Society Archives For the entire dis-
FraserUniversity, Vancouver, September 1999.
45 H J Bhabha to P M S Blackett, August 3, 1963. cussion of the consequences of using the bomb,
46 Paul Maddrell, 'Britain's Exploitation of
12 P M S Blackett to S Cripps, March 11, 1947, see Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the
Royal Society Archives. Occupied Germany for scientific and technical Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an
13 1967 interview, p 4, Royal Society Archivesintelligence on the Soviet Union', unpublished American Myth London, Harper Collins, 1995.
14 P M S Blackett to B R Nanda, February 8,PhD dissertation. University of Cambridge66 Government of India, Nuclear Explosions and
1972, Royal Society Archives. 1999. See also Paul Maddrell, 'British- TheirEffects. Delhi. The Publications Division,
15 1967 interview, p 7, Royal Society Archives.American Scientific Intelligence Collaboration 1956.
16 Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic during the Occupation of Germany' in
67 George Perkovich. lndia's Nuclear Bomtb:
Bomb: Science, Secrecy, and the Postcolonial intelligence and National Security. Summer The Impact on Global Proliferation, Berkeley,
State, London, Zed Books, 1998, p 56. 2000, vol 15, #2. University of California Press, 1999, p 35.
17 Vice Admiral Parry to P M S Blackett, 47 Richard Aldrich and Michael Coleman, 'Britain Bhabha's efforts to build an Indian capacity
September 7, 1948; Royal Society Archive. and the Strategic Air Offensive Against the for the bomb is a subject of my forthcoming
18 Vice Admiral Parry to Lord Mountbatten,Soviet Union: The Question of South Asian book.
January 2,1951, cited in Jaswant Singh, Defen- Air Bases, 1945-1949', The Journal of the -68 Mary Jo Nye, 'A Physicist in the Corridors
ding India. London, Macmillan, 1999, p 122. Historical Association. October 1989, pp 400- of Power: P M S Blackett's Opposition to
19 J Nehru to C Attlee, January 28, 1951, quoted428. Atomic Weapons Following the War', present-
J Singh, ibid, p 123. 48 S S Bhatnagar to P M S Blackett, April 22, ed to Conference on Patrick Blackett, Imperial
20 Ibid, p 123. 1951, P M S Blackett to S S Bhatangar April 27, College London, April 1998.
21 Vice Admiral Pizey to Lord Moutbatten,1951, Royal Society Archive. 69 Anthony Lukas, 'India Rules Out Secret Atom
March 23, 1954, cited J Singh, p 124. 49 The relationship between Hill and Bhatnagar Test', New York Times, November 29, 1965.
22 1967 interview, p 7, Royal Society Archivesis one of the subjects of my forthcoming book See also Patrick Keatley, 'The Brown Bomb',
23 P M S Blackett to S Cripps, March 11, 1947,Nucleus and Nation. The Guardian (London), March 11, 1965.
Royal Society Archives. 50 On the history of the solar power research at president, Blackett would have chaired the
70 As
24 Personal Communication, Nicholas Blackett, the NPL, see Shiv Visvanathan, Organising meeting at which the assignment to write
October 5, 1998, including a copy of a letterfor Science, Delhi, Oxford University Press, Bhabha's obituary [which had to be written by
typed shortly after the event. 1985). a Fellow of the Royal Society] was made. But
25 J Nehru to P M S Blackett, September51 26,
The Statesman, (Calcutta) January 24, 1963. Blackett himself appears not to have written
1948, Royal Society Archives. 52 J B S Haldane to P M S Blackett, January 25, anything about Bhabha. Even in his 1967 inter-
26 S S Bhatnagar to P M S Blackett, December 29,1963, Royal Society Archives. On the relation- view with B R Nanda, a year after the crash,
1950, Royal Society Archives. ships between Blackett, Bernal, and Haldane, Blackett talked very little about Bhabha because
27 1967 interview, Royal Society Archives, p 8.see Gary Wersky, The Visible College, op cit. the interview was expressly about Nehru.
28 P M S Blackett to Baldev Singh, Minister 53of
M G K Menon et al. Report to the Executive 71 Personal communication, Sir Bernard Lovell,
Defence, Delhi September 30, 1948. Royal Council, National Physical Laboratory, April 9, April 24, 1998.
Society Archives. 1963 Royal Society Archives. The best assess- 72 A J Kidwai to P M S Blackett, November 21,
29 M N Saha to D S Kothari, July 21, 1948 Sahament of Blackett's report in the overall context 1967, Royal Society Archive.

Economic and Political Weekly Economic and Political Weekly

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

Economic and Political Weekly Economic and Political Weekly

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Economic and Political Weekly Economic and Political Weekly

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Empire's Setting Sun?

Patrick Blackett and Military and Scientific Development of India

Economic and Political Weekly September 29, 2001 3703

3704 Economic and Political Weekly September 29, 2001

Economic and Political Weekly September 29, 2001 3705

Economic and Political Weekly September 29, 2001 3707

3708 Economic and Political Weekly September 29, 2001

Economic and Political Weekly September 29, 2001 3709

~~~~~~~~~~3710~~ ~Economic and Political Weekly September 29, 2

Economic and Political Weekly September 29, 2001 3711

3712 Economic and Political Weekly September 29, 2001

Economic and Political Weekly September 29, 2001 3713

3714 Economic and Political Weekly September 29, 2001

Economic and Political Weekly September 29, 2001 3715

3716 Economic and Political Weekly September 29, 2001

Economic and Political Weekly September 29, 2001 3717

3718 Economic and Political Weekly September 29, 2001

Economic and Political Weekly September 29, 2001 3719

3720 Economic and Political Weekly September 29, 2001

You might also like

~~~~~~~~3710 ~Economic and Political Weekly September 29, 2