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Secure and Efficient Defense Strategy Against Energy Exhausting Attacks in WSN
Secure and Efficient Defense Strategy Against Energy Exhausting Attacks in WSN
Secure and Efficient Defense Strategy Against Energy Exhausting Attacks in WSN
Abstract- One of the most critical concerns in WSN design is to communicate with other nodes and send some control packets
security and energy-efficiency problem and the wireless sensor such as SYNC, RTS (Request to Send), CTS (Clear to Send) and
networks is resilience against malicious attacks. Since energy is ACK (Acknowledgement). Using a SYNC packet exchange, all
the most precious resource for these networks, Denial of sleep neighboring nodes can synchronize together. Radios in networks
attacks is recognized as one of the most serious threats. Such which use this protocol will be asleep at 90% of the time,
attacks exhaust power supply of sensor nodes and can reduce the thereby producing an almost tenfold improvement in node life. A
sensor lifetime from years to days. Authentication and denial of sleep attacker can manipulate Mac protocol and cause
encryption solutions have been proposed to protect the network nodes to expend additional energy. For example, an attacking
from denial of sleep attacks. Though, the resources constraint node in a SMAC-based network could repeatedly send request-
motivates the use of simpler solutions to the same security to-send messages (RTS) and force the node listed in the RTS
challenges. In this paper, we survey different types of denial of destination field to respond with a clear-to-send (CTS) message
sleep attacks and we propose a cross layer energy efficient and remain awake waiting for the follow-on message. To provide
security mechanism to protect the network from these attacks. a defense against this attack, most of existing researches propose
The cross layer interaction between network Mac and physical authentication and encryption solutions or implement a complex
layers is mainly exploited to identify the intruders nodes and and energy inefficient mechanisms. However, WSNs require
prevent sensor nodes from energy exhaust attacks. Simulation simpler solutions to the same security challenges due to limited
results indicate that our proposal is energy efficient and can processing capability, memory storage, and energy capacity. The
significantly reduce the effect of denial of sleep attacks. purpose of this article is to discuss different types of DS attack
and propose a defense strategy to protect the network from them.
Keywords: Wireless sensor networks, Cross layer security, Our basic idea is the use of the cross layer interaction concept to
denial of sleep attacks prevent sensor nodes from energy exhaust attacks. In our
proposal, the MAC layer uses the cross layer information (one
I. INTRODUCTION hop routing table) from network layer in order to identify
attackers. Then all received RTS packets are rejected if the
Securing wireless sensor networks (WSNs) adds more sender does not belong to the routing path of receiver node.
challenges to the research. This is because WSN properties make
it harder to be secured than other types of networks. In WSNs, II. RELATED WORKS
applying a high security level imposes more resource and
decreases the energy efficiency of network. Sensor networks are In [1] Joseph Polastre, Jason Hill, David Culler et al presents
vulnerable to several malicious attacks. Since sensor batteries are To achieve low power operation, B-MAC employs an adaptive
severely limited, Denial of sleep attacks (DS attack) is preamble sampling scheme to reduce duty cycle and minimize
recognized as one of the most serious threats. The DS attack is a idle listening. B-MAC supports on-the-fly reconfiguration and
specific type of denial-of-service (DoS) attack that targets a provides bidirectional interfaces for system services to optimize
battery powered device’s power supply in an effort to exhaust performance, whether it be for throughput, latency, or power
this constrained resource and reduce the network life time. conservation. We build an analytical model of a class of sensor
Indeed, this attack tries to break in the device’s power network applications. We use the model to show the effect of
management system to reduce the opportunities to transition into changing B-MAC’s parameters and predict the behavior of
lower power states. Since Mac layer is responsible for managing sensor network applications. By comparing B-MAC to
the radio transceiver, defensive strategies implemented at this conventional 802.11- inspired protocols, specifically S-MAC, we
layer are the most effective in protecting radio usage. S-MAC develop an experimental characterization of B-MAC over a wide
protocol represents the baseline energy-efficient sensor MAC range of network conditions. We show that B-MAC’s flexibility
protocol designed to extend WSN network lifetime. In this results in better packet delivery rates, throughput, latency, and
medium access control protocol, sensor node periodically goes to energy consumption than S-MAC.
the fixed listen/sleep cycle. A time frame in S-MAC is divided
into two parts: one for a listening session and the other for a In [2] Tijs van Dam, Koen Langendoen et al presents A
sleeping session. Only for a listen period, sensor nodes are able contention-based Medium Access Control protocol for wireless
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Integrated Intelligent Research (IIR) International Journal of Business Intelligents
Volume: 05 Issue: 01 June 2016 Page No.8-11
ISSN: 2278-2400
sensor networks. Applications for these networks have some research towards primarily reducing energy consumption of
characteristics (low message rate, insensitivity to latency)that MAC functionalities
can be exploited to reduce energy consumption by introducing
an active/sleep duty cycle. To handle load variations in time and III. SURVEY ON DENIAL OF SLEEP ATTACKS
location T-MAC introduces an adaptive duty cycle in a novel
way: by dynamically ending the active part of it. This reduces Based on the attack strategy, we can classify denial of sleep
the amount of energy wasted on idle listening, in which nodes attacks in six categories: sleep deprivation attack, barrage attack,
wait for potentially incoming messages, while still maintaining a synchronization attack, replay attack, broadcast attack and
reasonable throughput. We discuss the design of T-MAC, and collision attack.
provide a head-to head comparison with classic CSMA (no duty
cycle) and S-MAC (fixed duty cycle)thro ugh extensive Sleep Deprivation Attack
simulations. Under homogeneous load, T-MAC and S-MAC The Sleep deprivation attack is presented where target of the
achieve similar reductions in energy consumption (up to 98%) intruder is to maximize the power consumption of sensor nodes,
compared to CSMA. so that their lifetime is minimized. By using lawful interactions,
attacker node can keep the victim node out of its power
In [3] Wei Ye, John Heidemann, Deborah Estrin et al conserving sleep mode. Thus, this attack can be used to
presents Wireless sensor networks use battery-operated dramatically reduce the lifetime of the victim. Further, this attack
computing and sensing devices. A network of these devi43ces is difficult to detect given that it is carried out solely through the
will collaborate for a common application such as environmental use of seemingly innocent interactions.
monitoring. We expect sensor networks to be deployed in an ad
hoc fashion, with individual nodes remaining largely inactive for
long periods of time, but then becoming suddenly active when
something is detected. These characteristics of sensor networks
and applications motivate a MAC that is different from
traditional wireless MACs such as IEEE 802.11 in almost every
way: energy conservation and self-configuration are primary
goals, while per-node fairness and latency are less important. S-
MAC uses three novel techniques to reduce energy consumption
and support self-configuration.
Low Power Listening (Lpl) Based Wsn Mac Protocol The attacker node is malicious and it is hard to detect it.
In the Low Power Listening (LPL) based WSN MAC protocol, Therefore it has knowledge of the Mac protocol and obeys Mac-
such as B-MAC the receiver wakes up periodically to sense the layer rules of collision, fragmentation, and communication
preamble from the sender and then to receive and process the schedules. The attacker node can broadcast a long message to all
data. When the sender needs to send data, it sends a long nodes in its radio range. Since in SMAC broadcast message there
preamble to cover the sleep period to ensure the receiver waking is no RTS packets that precede data message, the receiver node
up and sensing. The LPL based MAC protocol is an can't authenticate previously the followed broadcast message.
asynchronous protocol, which decouples the sender and receiver Therefore, the authentication and encryption solution proposed
with time synchronization. This long preamble design of LPL in can't prevent this kind of attacks since targeted node must
based protocol consumes the major energy of both sender and receive broadcast message before it can be decrypted, which
receiver. affects its sleep period and then drains the energy reserve. The
Ri-Mac Protocol solution pro-posed in mitigates the broadcast message; however
RI-MAC protocol is one of the receiver-initiated schemes to it radically proposes a new Mac protocol. In our proposed
minimize the channel occupancy time of a pair of a sender and mechanism, targeted node receives only the first data fragment
receiver which allows the sender to send data to the receiver as and rejects remaining fragment (by entering in the sleep mode)
soon as it senses the beacon. However, current layer-2 protocol of the broadcast message. Since the first fragment of the
designs are insufficient to protect a WSN from Denial-of-Sleep broadcast message contains the identity of sender, the proposed
attack. The energy conservation is one of the major goals of security mechanism can detect the intruder node and rejects then
WSN design, whereas the security scheme always consumes the followed fragment of broadcast message. Therefore, the
more energy of system. There is no well decision rule to effect of broadcast attack is significantly reduced as targeted
compromise the requirements between energy conservation and node receives one fragment and does not prolong its wake up
security scheme state to receive remaining fragments.
Denial of service:
The Denial-of-Sleep is one of the power exhausting attacks of V. CONCLUSION
WSNs. This attack is a special type of Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attack, which tries to keep the sensor nodes awake to consume To secure network nodes from denial of sleep attacks, we
more energy of the constrained power supply. An anti-node can proposed a cross layer energy efficient security mechanism
send fake data packets to sensor node of unprotected WSNs to where the cross layer interaction is heavily exploited. Our
initiate unnecessary transmissions repeatedly. It causes the approach reuses mainly the already available data generated by
jamming of a node or set of nodes. The jamming of a network network, Mac and physical layers to provide security scheme for
can come in two forms: constant jamming, and intermittent network node. We don’t claim that the proposed solution can
jamming. Constant jamming involves the complete jamming of prevent all types of denial of sleep attacks; though our proposal
the entire network. No messages are able to be sent or received. mitigates most of them. Simulation results demonstrate the
If the jamming is only intermittent, then nodes are able to performance provided by our security mechanism in terms of
exchange messages periodically, but not consistently. energy saving and network lifetime.
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Integrated Intelligent Research (IIR) International Journal of Business Intelligents
Volume: 05 Issue: 01 June 2016 Page No.8-11
ISSN: 2278-2400
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