Steven B.

Casais JD-IIC

Tañada vs. Tuvera

136 SCRA 27
G.R. No. L-63915; April 24, 1985

Facts:

The petitioners filed for a writ of mandamus in order to compel respondents to

publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations, and administrative
orders.

Petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general

applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication;
and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette.

The respondent claim is that the issuances intended only for the internal
administration of a government agency or of particular persons did not have to be
published; that publication, when necessary, must be in full and in the Official
Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding
because it was not supported by eight members of the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Art 2 of the NCC refers to the
effectivity of laws and not to the requirement of publication?

Ruling:

The court, after a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties,
both on the original petition and on the instant motion, they have come to the
conclusion, and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the
date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any
event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous
publication.
People vs. Jabinal (55 SCRA 607)
G.R. No. L-30061
February 27, 1974
 
Facts:  At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of
not guilty, after which trial was accordingly held.

The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the

revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license
or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he
had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial
Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC
Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the
authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.
 
On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial
Commander of Batangas as Confidential Agent with duties to furnish information
regarding smuggling activities wanted persons, loose firearms, subversives and
other similar subjects that might affect the peace and order condition in Batangas
province, and in connection with these duties he was temporarily authorized to
possess an ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal protection while
in the performance of official duties.

The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned
appointments as Secret Agent tind Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the
firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of
the Supreme Court’s decisions in People v. Macarandang and People v. Lucero.
 
Issue: Whether decisions of Supreme Court are considered evidence of what the
law means.

Ruling: Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless
evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the
New Civil Code, “judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system.
 
The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as
of the date that law was originally passed, since this Court’s construction merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed
intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a
restatement of the legal maxim “legis interpretado legis vim obtinet”—the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.
Custodio vs Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 483

Facts: Respondents owned a parcel of land wherein a two-door apartment was

erected. Said property was surrounded by other immovables owned by petitioners,
spouses Custodio and spouses Santos.

As an access to P. Burgos Street from the subject property, there are two possible
passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about
20 meters distant from Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is
passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses. The second
passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabasa’s residence
to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters.

In passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic
tank and with 5-6 meters in length, has to be traversed. Petitioners constructed an
adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence
was first constructed by defendants Santoses along their property which is also
along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and
even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed.
As a result, the tenants left the apartment because there was no longer a permanent
access to the public street.

Respondents then filed an action for the grant of an easement of right of way. The
trial court ordered the petitioner to give respondents a permanent access to the
public street and that in turn, the respondent will pay a sum of Php 8,000.00 to the
petitioner as an indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway. On appeal by
the respondent to the CA, the decision of the trial court was affirmed, such that a
right of way and an award of actual, moral and exemplary damages were given to
the respondents.

Issue: Whether or not the award of damages is proper?

Held: No.To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action
for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff.
Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of
action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused
by a breach or wrong. There is a material distinction between damages and injury.
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which
results from the injury, and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded
for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty.
These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. In order that a plaintiff may
maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such
injuries resulted from a breach of duty.
Bier vs Bier 547 SCRA 123

Facts: Petitioner Renne Enrique E. Bier and respondent Ma. Lourdes A. Bier gets
married after six months of courtship.

The couple started experiencing marital problems after three years of marriage.
According to petitioner, respondent started becoming aloof towards him and began
to spend more time with her friends than with him, refusing even to have sexual
relations with him for no apparent reason. She became an alcoholic and a chain-
smoker. She also started neglecting her husband's needs and the upkeep of their
home, and became an absentee wife. After being gone from their home for days on
end, she would return without bothering to account for her absence.

As a result, they frequently quarrelled. Finally, respondent suddenly left for the
United States. Petitioner has not heard from her since. Petitioner instituted a petition
for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to fulfil her essential marital obligations to petitioner.
RTC granted the petition but the CA reversed and set aside the decision of RTC.

Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented by petitioner was enough to establish
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations.

Ruling: The petition is without merit. Psychological incapacity must be characterized

by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. The incapacity must be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The court overlooked the need to show the gravity, root
cause and incurability of respondent's psychological incapacity at the inception of the
marriage. The evidence for petitioner consisted of his own testimony and that of his
brother, Roderico Bier. He also presented as evidence a psychological report written
by Dr. Nedy Tayag, a clinical psychologist. Petitioner reasoned out that the personal
examination of respondent was impossible as her whereabouts were unknown
despite diligent efforts on his part to find her. Consequently, Dr. Tayag's report was
really hearsay evidence since she had no personal knowledge of the alleged facts
she was testifying on. Her testimony should have thus been dismissed for being
unscientific and unreliable.
Antonio vs Reyes 484 SCRA 353

Facts: Antonio and Reyes first got married at Manila City Hall and subsequently in
church on December 8, 1990. A child was born in April 1991 but died 5 months
later.  Antonio could no longer take her constant lying, insecurities and jealousies
over him so he separated from her in August 1991. He attempted reconciliation but
since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991. It is
only after their marriage that he learned about her child with another man.

He then filed a petition in 1993 to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The trial court gave credence to Antonio's evidence and thus declared the marriage
null and void.

Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision.  It held that the totality of
evidence presented was insufficient to establish Reyes' psychological incapacity. It
declared that the requirements in the 1997 Molina case had not been satisfied.

Issue: Whether or not Antonio has established his cause of action for declaration of
nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and, generally, under the Molina
guidelines.

Ruling: Yes. The case sufficiently satisfies the Molina guidelines: First, that Antonio
had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his
wife; Second, that the root cause of Reyes' psychological incapacity has been
medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by experts, and was
clearly explained in the trial court's decision; Third, that she fabricated friends and
made up letters before she married him prove that her psychological incapacity was
have existed even before the celebration of marriage; Fourth, that the gravity of
Reyes' psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause
was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage without their consent; Fifth, that she
being an inveterate pathological liar makes her unable to commit the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses based on love, trust, and respect; Sixth, that the CA
clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage was
annulled by the Catholic Church. However, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier
of facts, and not of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by
this Court. Seventh, that Reyes' case is incurable considering that Antonio tried to
reconcile with her but her behavior remains unchanged.
Bank of America vs American Realty Corporation
GR 133876 December 29, 1999

Facts:

The petitioner granted loans to 3 foreign corporations. As security, the latter

mortgaged a property located in the Philippines owned by herein respondent ARC.
ARC is a third party mortgagor who pledged its own property in favor of the 3 debtor-
foreign corporations.

The debtors failed to pay. Thus, petitioner filed collection suits in foreign courts to
enforce the loan. Subsequently, it filed a petition in the Sheriff to extra-judicially
foreclose the said mortgage, which was granted.

On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig RTC, Branch 159,
an action for damages against the petitioner, for the latter’s act of foreclosing extra-
judicially the real estate mortgages despite the pendency of civil suits before foreign
courts for the collection of the principal loan.

Issue: If the filing in foreign courts by the defendant of collection suits against the
principal debtors constituted a waiver of the security of the mortgages.

Held: Yes. In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may
institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action or debt or a real action
to foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies,
but not both. By such election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for
each of the two remedies is complete in itself.

The act of filing of an ordinary action for collection operates as a waiver of the
mortgage-creditor’s remedy to foreclose the mortgage. By the mere filing of the
ordinary action for collection against the principal debtors, the petitioner in the
present case is deemed to have elected a remedy, as a result of which a waiver of
the other necessarily must arise.

In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed
alternative and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a
waiver of the other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of
the suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of
mortgage. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by the
mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice but with the
Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made.

In the case at bar, petitioner only has one cause of action which is non-payment of
the debt. Nevertheless, alternative remedies are available for its enjoyment and
exercise.
F.F. CRUZ v. HR CONSTRUCTION CORP., GR No. 187521, 2012-03-14

Facts: Sometime in 2004, FFCCI entered into a contract with the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for the construction of the Magsaysay Viaduct,
known as the Lower Agusan Development Project. On August 9, 2004, FFCCI, in
turn, entered into a Subcontract

Agreement with HR Construction Corporation (HRCC) for the supply of materials,

labor, equipment, tools and supervision for the construction of a portion of the said
project called the East Bank Levee and Cut-Off Channel in accordance with the...
specifications of the main contract.

HRCC submitted its third progress billing in the amount of P2,569,543.57 for its
completed works from September 26 to October 25, 2004.[8] FFCCI did not
immediately pay the amount stated in the third progress billing, claiming that it still...
had to evaluate the works accomplished by HRCC

On November 25, 2004, HRCC submitted to FFCCI its fourth progress billing in the
amount of P1,527,112.95 for the works it had completed from October 26 to
November 25, 2004.

Subsequently, FFCCI, after it had evaluated the completed works of HRCC from
September 26 to November 25, 2004, approved the payment of the gross amount of
P1,505,570.99 to HRCC. FFCCI deducted therefrom P150,557.10 for retention and
P27,374.02 for expanded withholding tax... leaving a net payment of P1,327,639.87,
which amount was paid to HRCC on March 11, 2005

Issues: Does the act of [FFCCI] in conducting a verification survey of [HRCC's]

verify and approve said billings?

Ruling: Generally, the arbitral award of CIAC is final... and may not be appealed
except on questions... of law. Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1008 vests upon the CIAC
original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected with,
contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in the Philippines. Under
Section 19 of E.O. No. 1008, the... arbitral award of CIAC "shall be final and
inappealable except on questions of law which shall be appealable to the Supreme
Court

In People of the Philippines v. Donato, this Court explained the doctrine of waiver in
this wise: Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege,
which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary
abandonment or surrender, by a capable... person, of a right known by him to exist,
with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived
of its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such
right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent... with claiming it."
RHODORA ILUMIN RACHO v. SEIICHI TANAKA, GR No. 199515, 2018-06-25

Facts: Racho and Seiichi Tanaka (Tanaka) were married on April 20, 2001 in Las
Piñas City, Metro Manila. They lived together for nine (9) years in Saitama
Prefecture, Japan and did not have any children.

Racho alleged that on December 16, 2009, Tanaka filed for divorce and the divorce
was granted. She secured a Divorce Certificate issued by Consul Kenichiro
Takayama (Consul Takayama) of the Japanese Consulate in the Philippines and had
it authenticated by an authentication officer of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

she was informed that by reason of certain administrative changes, she was required
to return to the Philippines to report the documents for registration and to file the
appropriate case for judicial recognition of divorce.

When she went to the Department of Foreign Affairs to renew her passport, she was
likewise told that she needed the proper court order. She was also informed by the
National Statistics Office that her divorce could only be annotated in the Certificate of
Marriage if there was a court order capacitating her to remarry.

Japanese Law English Version of the Civil Code of Japan... she filed a Petition for
Judicial Determination and Declaration of Capacity to Marry

She insists that she is now legally capacitated to marry since Article 728 of the Civil
Code of Japan states that a matrimonial relationship is terminated by divorce.

Issues: Whether or not the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is

sufficient to prove the fact that a divorce between petitioner Rhodora Ilumin Racho
and respondent Seiichi Tanaka was validly obtained by the latter according to his
national law.

Ruling: Under Article 26 of the Family Code, a divorce between a foreigner and a
Filipino may be recognized in the Philippines as long as it was validly obtained
according to the foreign spouse's national law, thus: Article 26. All marriages
solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
Carbonell vs MBTC 825 S 1 (2017)

FACTS: The petitioners alleged that they had experienced emotional shock, mental
anguish, public ridicule, humiliation, insults and embarrassment during their trip to
Bangkok, Thailand because of the respondent's release to them of five US$ 100 bills
that turned out to be counterfeit.

They withdrew US$ l, 000.00 in US$ 100 notes from their dollar account at the
respondent's Pateros branch. While in Bangkok, they had exchanged five US$ 100
bills into Baht, but only four of the US$ 100 bills had been accepted by the foreign
exchange dealer because the fifth one was "no good." Because of currency’s
rejection, they had asked a companion to exchange the same bill at Norkthon Bank
in Bangkok, thereat the dollar bill was declared “fake, and was confiscated by the
bank teller. On the next day, they had been confronted by the shop owner at the
hotel lobby because their four US$ 100 bills had turned out to be counterfeit after
they had bought jewelry.

Upon the petitioners’ return to the Philippines, they had confronted the manager of
the respondent's Pateros branch on the fake dollar bills, but the latter had insisted
that the dollar bills she had released to them were genuine.

Prior to the filing of the suit in the RTC, the petitioners had two meetings with the
respondent's representatives. In the course of the two meetings, the latter's
representatives reiterated their sympathy and regret over the troublesome
experience that the petitioners had encountered, and offered to reinstate US$500 in
their dollar account, and, in addition, to underwrite a round-trip all-expense-paid trip
to Hong Kong, but they were adamant and staged a walk-out.

The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. The petitioners appealed, but the CA
ultimately promulgated its assailed decision affirming the judgment of the RTC with
the modification of deleting the award of attorney's fees.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely erred in affirming the judgment of the RTC.

HELD: No. The court affirmed with the judgment of the RTC. Injury is the illegal
invasion of a legal right, damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the
injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the
loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are
often called dmimum absque injuria.
Metro Heights Subdivision Homeowners Association Inc. vs CMS Construction
and Development Corp GR No. 209359 October 17, 2018

Facts: On June 29, 1992, petitioner Metroheights Subdivision Homeowners

Association, Inc. filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a complaint
for damages with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against respondents

Petitioner alleged, among others, that it sought the assistance of respondent MWSS
to address the insufficient supply of water in its subdivision to which the latter
advised the improvement and upgrading of its private internal water distribution lines,
foremost of which was the transfer or change in the location of its tapping source and
the change in size of its water service line from the old line tapped at Sanville
Subdivision to a new tapping source on Visayas Avenue, Quezon City;

However, sometime in April 1992, respondent CMS Construction made diggings and
excavations, and started to lay water pipes along Fisheries Street and Morning Star
Drive in Sanville Subdivision, Quezon City, petitioner's neighboring subdivision; that
in the process, respondent CMS Construction, with the knowledge and consent of
respondent MWSS but without petitioner's knowledge and consent.

RTC rendered a Decision... in favor of the plaintiff

The RTC found, among others, that respondents did not have the authority to simply
cut, disconnect and transfer petitioner's water supply with impunity, without notice to
or without getting its consent; and that respondents acted in concert and in bad faith,
which made them jointly and severally liable for damages. Respondent MWSS filed
its notice of appeal while respondents CMS Construction and the Cruzes filed a
motion for new trial which the RTC granted. On May 18, 2006, the RTC issued a
Decision[7] which affirmed its earlier Decision

Issues: Whether the respondents should be held liable for damages for the cutting
off, disconnection and transfer of petitioner's existing separate water service
connection on Visayas Avenue without the latter's knowledge and consent which
also resulted in petitioner's subdivision being waterless.

Ruling: We reverse the CA. Article 19 of the New Civil Code deals with the principle
of abuse of rights, thus: Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith. Article 19 [of the New Civil Code] was intended to expand
the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of
moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide[,] specifically in
statutory law. If mere fault or negligence in one's acts can make him liable for
damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith
make him liable.
Pe vs Pe 5 S 200 (1962)

FACTS: Alfonso Pe, the defendant, was a married man, agent of La Perla Cigar and
Cigarette Factory in Gasan Marinduque who was treated like a son by Cecilio Pe,
one of the petitioners. Cecilio introduced Alfonso to his children and was given
access to visit their house. Alfonso got fond of Lolita, 24 year old single, daughter of
Cecilio. The defendant frequented the house of Lolita sometime in 1952 on the
pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Eventually they fell
in love with each other.

Plaintiff brought action before lower court of Manila and failed to prove Alfonso
deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita’s affection. The case on moral
damages was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is liable to Lolita’s family on the ground of moral,
good custom and public policy due to their illicit affair.

HELD: Alfonso committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals,

good customs and public policy contemplated in Article 20 of the civil code. The
defendant took advantage of the trust of Cecilio and even used the praying of rosary
as a reason to get close with Lolita. The wrong caused by Alfonso is immeasurable
considering the fact that he is a married man.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby

sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.
Wassmer vs Velez 12 S 648 (1964)

Facts: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love
decided to get married on September 4, 1954. Wassmer made the necessary
preparations for the wedding including making and sending wedding invitations,
buying of wedding dress and other apparels, and other wedding necessities.

On Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left this note for his bride-to-be advising her that he will not
be able to attend the wedding because his mom was opposed to said wedding.

And one day before the wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer advising her
that nothing has changed and that he will be returning soon. Therefore, Velez did not
appear and was not heard from again.

Wassmer sued Velez for damages and he failed to answer and was declared in
default. On April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff
P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages;
P2,500.00 as attorney’s fees; and the costs.

On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was
because of fortuitous events. He further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable
for breaching his promise to marry Wassmer because there is no law upon which
such an action may be grounded. He also contested the award of exemplary and
moral damages against him.

Issue: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this

case.

Held: This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach
of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go
through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is
about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary
to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 which provides in part “any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”

And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an
award for moral damages as properly awarded by the lower court in this case.
Further, the award of exemplary damages is also proper. Here, the circumstances of
this case show that Velez, in breaching his promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton,
reckless, and oppressive manner – this warrants the imposition of exemplary
damages against him.
Eliascupidez vs Eliascupidez GR No 2269007

Facts: Gerardo and Glenda were husband and wife whose marriage was plagued
with fights and numerous and unreasonable demands from Glenda. According to
Gerardo’s testimony, Glenda would often throw things at him when they argued. She
also asked their household help to buy abortifacient medicines and to accompany
her to a manghihilot and such acts led to her miscarriage. Gerardo also said that she
would demand that he not wear nice clothes to work, and to quit his job so that he
could not flirt with his co-workers. He also said that Glenda became a negligent
mother and carried an illicit affair while he was away in Milan for work. Gerardo also
claimed that Glenda bore 2 children from the said affair.

Gerardo then decided to file a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under
Article 36 of theFamily Code.

The RTC ruled in favor of Gerardo and held that the marriage of petitioner and
respondent is void ab initio on the ground of respondent's psychological incapacity.
The CA reversed the RTC and found that the data gathered by Dr. Tayag was was
not comprehensive enough to establish the conclusion that Glenda is psychologically
incapacitated. This is because the report was grounded on information supplied by
the witnesses, which the CA felt was not competent enough to establish factors in
Glenda’s early life that would show or lead to her incapacity.

Issue: W/N the totality of the evidence presented by the husband was able to prove
that the wife was suffering from psychological incapacity.

Ruling: No, In this case, this Court agrees with the OSG that the totality of the
evidence presented by the petitioner failed to prove psychological incapacity of the
respondent to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. The root cause of
respondent's alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts
or shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable…What is important is
the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological
condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to. In the present case, however, the totality of the
evidence presented by the petitioner fails to convince this Court that respondent
suffered from a psychological incapacity that is permanent or incurable, and that has
existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Although respondent wassaid
to have exhibited "dramatic, extroverted behaviour" who was "prone to insecurities
and aggressive outbursts of emotions," these characterizations fell short of proving
that she was psychologically incapacitated to assume her marital responsibilities.
Republic vs Deang GR No 236279

Facts: Cheryl and Emilio were married on August 28, 1993 at Sangley Point, Cavite.
They have one child named Bryan Joseph R. Deang, who was born on January 12,
1994.

As a backgrounder, the couple first met sometime in March 1992 and soon after
became romantically involved. Two (2) months after living together, Emilio quit his
job and engaged in gambling. In April 1993, at the age of 21, Cheryl became
pregnant. Emilio offered to have an abortion outside the country, which however, did
not push through. Confused and stressed with her situation, she turned to Emilio's
friend for comfort, whom she became intimate with at one time. When Emilio learned
about this, he became jealous and began physically abusing her. At one point, he
boxed her on the stomach during her second month of pregnancy forcing her to
resign from work.

Issue: Whether psychological capacity is a ground for marriage.

Ruling: The Court has consistently ruled that psychological incapacity, as a ground
to nullify the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, should refer
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

It should refer to no less than a mental not merely physical incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as provided under
Article 68[39] of the Family Code, among others,[40] include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help and support.
Villalon vs Villalon 475 SCRA 572

FACTS: This is a Civil case filed on July 12, 1996 by petitioner Jaime F. Villalon
asking for the annulment of his marriage to respondent Ma. Corazon N. Villalon,
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. As ground therefore, petitioner cited his
psychological incapacity which he claimed existed even prior to his marriage.
According to petitioner, the manifestations of his psychological incapacity were: (a)
his chronic refusal to maintain harmonious family relations and his lack of interest in
having a normal married life; (b) his immaturity and irresponsibility in refusing to
accept the essential obligations of marriage as husband to his wife; (c) his desire for
other women and a life unchained from any spousal obligation; and (d) his false
assumption of the fundamental obligations of companionship and consortium
towards respondent. Petitioner thus prayed that his marriage to respondent be
declared null and void ab initio. The RTC granted the petition; it was reversed and
set aside in the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his

marital obligations.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court has ruled that the totality of the evidence in this
case does not support a finding that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to
fulfill his marital obligations. On the contrary, what is evident is the fact that petitioner
was a good husband to respondent for a substantial period of time prior to their
separation, a loving father to their children and a good provider of the family.

Although he engaged in marital infidelity in at least two occasions, the same does
not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him
incapable of performing his spousal obligations. The same appears as the result of a
general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted
in petitioner’s personal history. In an earlier case, the court has cited in its ruling that
“there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of „psychological incapacity‟ to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.”

Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from
psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable
to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. The evidence on record fails to
convince us that petitioner’s marital indiscretions are symptomatic of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the evidence reveals
that petitioner was a good husband most of the time when he was living with
respondent, a loving father to his children as well as a good provider.
Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals

FACTS: Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the

parents of plaintiffs Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad as well as
of defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all
surnamed JOAQUIN. The married Joaquin children are joined in this action by their
respective spouses. Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds
of sale covering 6 parcels of land executed by defendant parents
Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of their co-defendant children and
the corresponding certificates of title issued in their names. In seeking the
declaration of nullity of the aforesaid deeds of sale and certificates of title, plaintiffs,
in their complaint, aver that the purported sale of the properties in litis was the result
of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory
heirs (plaintiffs herein) of their legitime.

ISSUE: Whether Petitioners have a legal interest over the properties subject of
the Deeds of Sale

RULING: Petitioners do not have any legal interest over the properties subject of
the Deeds of Sale. As the appellate court stated, petitioners’ right to their
parents’ properties is merely inchoate and vests only upon their parents’ death.
While still living, the parents of petitioners are free to dispose of their properties. In
their overzealousness to safeguard their future legitime, petitioners forget that
theoretically, the sale of the lots to their siblings does not affect the value of their
parents’ estate. While the sale of the lots reduced the
estate, cash of equivalent value replaced the lots taken from the estate.
Republic vs Mola Cruz July 23, 2018

FACTS: In this annulment case, the clinical psychologist made a psychological

report and testified thereon. Said clinical psychologist relied on the personal
interviews she had with the spouses, as well as the wife’s youngest sister, and found
out that the wife was afflicted by Histrionic Personality Disorder. 

Histrionic Personality Disorder is a pervasive pattern of behavior characterized by

excessive emotionality and attention seeking

The Clinical psychologist testified, that going out without respondent husband’s

knowledge or permission; coldly treating her husband, verbally and sexually and
other abuses.

ISSUE: Whether Liezl's psychological incapacity to comply with her marital

obligations was sufficiently established by the totality of evidence presented by
respondent.

RULING: The petition lacks merit. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained
psychological incapacity as follows: "Psychological incapacity" should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.”

The Court holds that both the CA and the RTC did not err in finding that the totality of
evidence presented by respondent in support of his petition, sufficiently established
the link between Liezl's actions showing her psychological incapacity to understand
and perform her marital obligations and her histrionic personality disorder. The Court
respects the RTC's appreciation of respondent's testimony during trial on what
transpired before and during the marriage, considering that "the totality of the
behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and
genuinely witnessed mainly by the other." In addition, Dr. Tudla was able to collect
and verify largely the same facts in the course of her psychological evaluation of
both spouses and her interview of Liezl's sister. Dr. Tudla's report gave a description
of histrionic personality disorder, and correlated the characteristics of this disorder
with Liezl's behavior from her formative years through he course of her marriage to
petitioner. Indubitably, Dr. Tudla's report and testimony enjoy such probative force
emanating from the assistance her opinion gave to the courts to show the facts upon
which her psychological conclusion was based.
Tani-De la Fuente vs De la Fuente Jr. 819 SCRA 638

FACTS: On June 21, 1984, Maria Teresa Tani and Rodolfo De la Fuente Jr. got
married in Mandaluyong City after being in a relationship for five (5) years. They had
two children. While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already noticed that
Rodolfo was an introvert and was prone to jealousy. His attitude worsened as they
went on with their marital life. His jealousy became so severe that he even poked a
gun to his 15 year old cousin and he treated Maria Teresa like a sex slave who made
the latter feel maltreated and molested.

On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. As support to her petitions, clinical psychologist, Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez was
presented as an expert witness. However, Rodolfo did not file any responsive
pleading. The trial court eventually deemed his non-appearance as a waiver of his
right to present evidence.

The Office of the Solicitor General filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. It
argued that the trial court erred a) in deciding the case without the required
certification from the Office of the Solicitor General, 58 and b) in giving credence to
Dr. Lopez's conclusion of Rodolfo's severe personality disorder. It held that Dr.
Lopez's finding was based on insufficient data and did not follow the standards set
forth in the Molina case. Still, Rodolfo did not file any responsive pleading. The Court
of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC.

In its resolution dated May 25, 2009, CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed
by Maria Teresa. On July 24, 2009, Maria Teresa filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari. This time Rodolfo filed a Comment 70 stating that he was not opposing
Maria Teresa's Petition since "[h]e firmly believes that there is in fact no more sense
in adjudging him and petitioner as married.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

HELD: Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find that there
was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant the nullity of petitioner's marriage
with respondent. Petitioner was able to discharge the burden of proof that
respondent suffered from psychological incapacity. The Court of Appeals is mistaken
when it chided the lower court for giving undue weight to the testimony of Dr. Lopez
since he had no chance to personally conduct a thorough study and analysis of
respondent's mental and psychological condition.
Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA 266 SCRA 324

Facts: Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao-Tsoi married on May 22, 1988 at the Manila
Cathedral Intramuros Manila. After the celebration thereof and wedding reception,
the newlyweds proceeded to the house of husband-defendant’s mother. Contrary to
her expectations, instead of consummating their marriage, husband-defendant just
went to bed, slept on one side, then turned his back and went to sleep. The
newlyweds failed to consummate their marriage even on the succeeding nights. The
couple slept together in the same room and on the same bed for almost ten (10)
months but there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. She claims
that she did not even see her husband’s private parts nor did he see hers.

 On January 20, 1989, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr.
Eufamio Macalalag, urologist at the Chinese General Hospital. The results of said
physical examination showed that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that
of her husband’s examination was kept confidential. Medications were only
prescribed for her husband but the same was also kept confidential. No treatment
was given to her, but for her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he
failed to do so.

 Frustrated, the wife filed a case in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in order
to annul their marriage. Husband-defendant does not want his marriage annulled
since he loves her wife very much, he has no defect on his part, and there is still
chance of reconciliation. However, husband-defendant claims that if their marriage
shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
The husband-defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until
their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But,
the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that every time he wants to have
sexual intercourse with his wife, \

The trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed such decision and denied the subsequent motion for
reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not the refusal of a couple to have sexual intercourse with each
other constitutes psychological incapacity.

Held:  Yes, the refusal of a couple to have sexual intercourse with each other
constitutes psychological incapacity. The Court provides that one of the essential
marital obligations under the Family Code is “To procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the
basic end of marriage.” Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy
the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In this case, the Court ruled that the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
ASTRID VAN DE BRUG V PNB, GR 207004, June 6, 2018

FACTS: The late spouses Romulus and Evelyn Aguilar used to be borrowing clients
of PNB, Victoria Branch. Their sugar crop loans, which were obtained sometime
between late 1970’s and 80s, were secured by a real estate mortgage over four
parcels of land. However, for failure to pay their obligations, the mortgage was
foreclosed and ownership of the four properties was consolidated under the name of
PNB. When RA 7202 was enacted, the late Romulus Aguilar wrote PNB asking for
the reconsideration of their account based on the Sugar Restitution Law. PNB
informed Evelyn that while the subject loan account was covered by RA 7202, they
still need to comply with other PNB requirements. The Aguilars mentioned a similar
case, Sps. Pfleider v PNB, where PNB entered into a compromise agreement with
Sps. Pfleider, notwithstanding consolidation of the foreclosed property under the
bank’s name. The Aguilars thus filed a case for implementation of RA 7202, with
prayer for payment of damages. The RTC ruled in favor of the Aguilars, finding PNB
guilty of malice and bad faith in not pursuing its duty in helping the Aguilars of the
benefits of RA 7202. Upon appeal, CA granted the appeal and reversed the RTC
decision.

ISSUE: w/n PNB has an obligation to accord the Aguilars the same treatment as it
accorded the spouses Pfleider regarding the crediting of the proceeds of their
respective agricultural lots against their respective sugar crop loans covered by RA
7202

HELD: NO. The sources of obligations under Article 1157 of the Civil Code are: (1)
law; (2) contracts; (3) quasi-contracts; (4) acts or omissions punished by law; and (5)
quasi-delicts. Immediately, sources (2), (3) and (4) are inapplicable in this case. The
Aguilars are not privies to the Compromise Agreement between PNB and the
spouses Pfleider because: (1) the former are not parties thereto; (2) the principle of
relativity of contract would be violated; and (3) PNB 's freedom to enter into contracts
would also be violated if PNB would be compelled to accommodate the Aguilars.
Regarding law, as PNB's source of obligation, the CA correctly ruled that the
Aguilars are not entitled to restitution under RA 7202.

The duly notarized Compromise Agreement between the spouses Pfleider and PNB
that the accounts of the former to the latter were crop loans ("sugar and sugar-
related loans") and, thus, covered by RA 7202, unlike the accounts of the Aguilars
which included non-RA 7202 accounts. Since the Aguilars were delinquent in their
accounts, including their non-RA 7202 accounts, and the mortgaged properties of
the Aguilars similarly secured the non-RA 7202 accounts, PNB had no option but to
foreclose the mortgage. Thus, RA 7202 cannot be invoked as the statutory basis to
compel PNB to treat the Aguilars similarly with the spouses Pfleider